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186 Philosophy of the Rāmānuja School of Thought [CH. and here also it is the conch-shell that appears as silver. When the illusion is dispelled, we say that “this is not silver"; this cannot mean the mere presence of the conch-shell, but it must mean the denial of the imposition that was made previously. For, if negations could be treated as positive entities, then there would be no difference between positives and negatives (bādhyasya vidhirūpatve vidhi-niședha-vyatyāsam ca niședhe bādha iti tulyārthatrāt)". The akhyāti view speaks of non-apprehension of absence of association (e.g. of conch-shell-silver, asamsargāgraha) to be the cause of illusion. It may well be asked, What is this absence of association? It cannot be the mere thing itself; for, had it been so, we should expect that the thing itself (say the conch-shell) is not perceived and this alone constitutes error, which is impossible. Moreover, the silver is felt to be in front of us as the object we per ceive and not as something which we remember. We know that, when we perceive illusorily that “this is silver," there is the perception of a false association (bādhaka-samsarga-grahaņam); but the concept of non-apprehension of difference (bhedāgraha) never seems to be practically realized in experience. If we inquire into the nature of what constitutes falsity or contradiction (e.g. in conchshell-silver), we find that it is not the fact that a conch-shell when burnt becomes ash while silver, when burnt, may be made into a finger-ring that constitutes error, but the fact that what was believed to be capable of being rendered into a finger-ring by being put into fire cannot be so done (yadi tv-angulīyakādi-hetutayābhimatasya vyavahārasya bhasma-hetutrako hy atra višeşah). If this is what is really meant by falsehood, it is nothing but the apprehension of the cause of one kind of action as being another cause (anya-hetuvyavahāro 'nya-hetutayāvagataḥ). This will be anyathā-khyāti; for, if even here it is urged to be non-apprehension of difference, then
stretch our hands to pick it up, as if there were a real piece of silver before us. (See Prakarana-pancikā, Ch. iv, Naya-rithi.)
Sudarsana Sūri, commenting on the akhyāti view in his Sruta-prakāśikā in connection with his commentary on the pathārtha-khyāti view of Rāmānuja's seniors, says that the akhyāti view has the advantage of superior simplicity or the minimum assumption, viz. that in illusion only an indefinite object is seen, and the distinction between this and the image roused in memory by it is not apprehended. This has to be admitted in all theories of illusion, and in addition other assumptions have to be made.
i Nyāya-kulisa of Vädihamsāmbuvāha Rāmānujācārya, Govt. Oriental MS. No. 4910.
