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XX Rāmānuja's theory of Illusion
179 over, it is quite easy to formulate other series of inferences to disprove the possibility of such ajñāna as is accepted by the Sankarites 1.
Rāmānuja's theory of Illusion-All knowledge is Real.
Rāmānuja says that all illusion may briefly be described as perception in which a thing appears to be different from what it is (anyasya anyathāvabhāsaḥ). It is unreasonable to imagine that the illusory content of perception must be due to no cause, or is something wholly unperceived or wholly unknown (atyantā-paridssțākāranaka-vastu-kalpanā-yogāt). If such a wholly chimerical thing is imagined to be the content of illusory perception, then it must be inexpressible or indescribable (anirvacanīya); but no illusory object appears as indescribable; it appears as real. If it appeared as an inexpressible entity, there would be neither illusion nor its correction. So it has to be admitted that in all illusions (e.g. in conchshell-silver illusion) one thing (e.g. the conch-shell) appears in another form (e.g. silver). In all theories of illusion, whatever may be the extent of their error, they have ultimately to admit that in all illusions one thing appears in the form of another. Speaking against the Sankarites, it may be asked, he urges, how is their inexpressible (anirvacanīya) silver produced? The illusory perception cannot be the cause; for the perception follows only the production of the indescribable silver and cannot precede it to be its cause. It cannot be due to the defects in our sense-organs; for such defects are subjective and therefore cannot affect the nature of objective reality or object. Moreover, if it is inexpressible and indescribable, why should it appear under certain circumstances in the specific form of a particular kind of appearance, silver? If it is urged that this is due to the fact of there being a similarity between silver and conchshell, it may again be asked whether this similarity is real or unreal. It cannot be real, since the content is illusory; it cannot be unreal since it has reference to real objects (e.g. the real silver in a shop). So such a theory of illusion is open to many criticisms.
Rāmānuja seems to have himself favoured the anyathā-khyāti theory of illusion, and says that there will be no explanations of contradiction of knowledge involved in illusory knowledge, or of consequent failure of behaviour as suggested by such knowledge,
1 Śruta-prakāśikā, pp. 178–180.
