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Index
615
Sureśvara, Padmapāda and Mandana up to the fourteenth century in, 52, 53; continuity of conscious life in, 15; criticism of Buddhistic analysis of recognition in, 65; difference between pure intelligence and cognitional states in, 13; does not admit any relation between the character and the object, but both are manifested in one simple revelation, 13; eleventh century writers in, 49; everything else which is not a principle of revelation is māyā in, 16; existence of self cannot be proved by inference in, 68; existence of self is only proved through its immediacy and self-revelation in, 68, 69; general writers after the fourteenth century greatly under the influence of the Vivarana school in, 53; idea of jivan-mukti in, 251; in what sense cognizing is an act, in what sense it is a fact in, 15;“I” only a particular mode of mind in, 15; its account of the antahkarana, 75; its account of the koșas, 75, 76; its account of the possibility of recognition, 65, 66; its account of the universe, 76; its account of the t'āyus, 75; its central philosophical problem, 47; its chief emphasis is on the unity of the self, 72, 73; its conception of identity differentiated from the ordinary logical concept of identity, 14; its cosmology, 73-77; its difference with the Mahāyānists regarding nature of objects in the Vivarana school, 30; its theory of the subtle body, 311; its three opponents, Buddhist, Naiyāyika and Mimāmsaka, 71, 72; its twofold view, 13; logical explana- tion as regards the nature of identity in, 14; meaning of cognizing in, 15; meaning of prūna in, 260, 261; memory does not indicate awareness of awareness in, 67; mental states and revelation in, 15; nature of ajñāna and its powers in. 73, 74; nature of the antahkaraṇa in, 76, 77; nature of the obligatoriness of its study in, 46; no cognition canrfot be cognized again in, 14; notion of "I" as content in, 15; possible borrowing of its theory of perception from Samkhya by Padmapāda in, 89 n.; principle of revelation de- signated as self or ātman in, 16; principle of revelation is self-con-
tent, infinite and non-temporal in, 16; principle of revelation neither subjective nor objective in, 16; quarrel with the Prabhakaras on the subject of revelation in, 67; reasons adduced as to why cognition cannot be cognized in, 14; refutation of the arguments against the self-luminosity of the self in, 68, 69; revelation cannot be individuated, 16; revelation identical with self in, 15; self-identity proved through memory in, 67; seventeenth and eighteenth century writers more under the influence of Vācaspati, Sureśvara and Sarvajñātma than of the Vivarana in, 56, 57; Sriharşa, Citsukha and the mahuvidyā syllogism of Kulārka in, 51; status of the object in, 35; tenth century writers in and Buddhism in, 48, 49; the evolution of the microcosmos and macrocosmos from ajfāna, 74, 75; the self limited by māyā behaves as individuals and as God in, 72; the theory of trivrtkarana and panic-karana in, 74; Vidyāraṇya's analysis of the recognizer in, 66; Vidyāranya's contention that the self-identity cannot be explained by the assumption of two separate concepts in, 67, 68; writers from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century in, 57 n. 1; writers inspired by Jagannāthāśrama Nțsimha and Appaya in, 55; writers inspired by Kșsnānanda of the seventeenth century in, 56; writers of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
in, 55 Vedānta arguments, 118, 128 Vedānta dialectic, 125; history of its
rise and growth, 124, 125; mahāvidyā syllogisms of Kulārka as its
direct precursor in, 124, 125 Vedānta dialectics, 57 n., 163, 171;
forerunners of, 171 ff. Vedānta epistemology, 149, 154 Vedānta-hrdaya, 57 n. Vedānta idealism, 151 Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, 225, 226 Vedānta-kalpa-taru, 108, 119 n., 260 Vedānta-kalpu-tari-mañjari, 108 Vedānta-kalpa-taru-parimala, 108, 226 Vedānta-kaumudi, 52, 53, 197, 198,
204-206, 209, 210, 211 n. Vedānta-kaumudi-2"Jākhyāna, 205 Vedānta-kaustubha, 821. Vedāntu-naya-bhüşanı, 56, 82
