________________
XIX] Yāmuna's doctrine of Soul
147 asgunas, and on that groundinfer that there must be someother entity, self (which is not testified by any other proof), as the basis in which the aforesaid guņas may inhere. It is hardly justifiable to accept a new substance, soul (which cannot be obtained by any other proof), simply on the ground that there must be some basis in which gunas must inhere; it is the maxim of the opponents that gunas must exist in some substance and that there are knowledge, willing, etc., which they are pleased to call gunas; one cannot take further advantage in holding thereby that, since there is no other substance in which these so-called guņas (knowledge, willing, etc.) might inhere, the existence of some other substance as the self must be inferred.
The Sāmkhyists also make the same mistake, when they hold that all the movements of this non-intelligent prakrti must be for the sake of the puruşa, for whom the prakrti is working. The objection to such a view is this, that even though such entities for which the praksti is working may be inferred, yet that cannot prove that those entities are not themselves also combinations of many things and objects requiring further superintendents for themselves; or that the puruṣas should be the same pure intelligence as they are required to be. Moreover, that alone can be the end of a certain combination of events or things, which can be in some way benefited, moved or affected by those combinations. But the purusas, as the passive pure intelligence, cannot in any way be affected by the prakrti. How then can they be regarded as the end for which the prakrti works? The mere illusion, the mere semblance on the part of the puruşa of being affected or benefited cannot be regarded as a reality, so that by it the purposes of the movements of the prakrti might be realized. Moreover, these so-called affections, or illusions of affection, themselves belong to praksti and not to the puruṣas; for the puruṣas, as pure intelligences, are without the slightest touch of modifications of the gunas. All mental modifications are, according to the Sāmkhya, but modifications of the buddhi, which, being unintelligent, cannot be subject to illusion, error, or mistake. Moreover, no explanation can be found in the supposition that the reflection of the puruṣas falls upon the buddhi; for, as the puruşa is not a visible object, it cannot be reflected in the buddhi. If it is said that there is no real reflection, but the buddhi becomes like the pure intelligence, the puruşa, then that also is not possible; for, if the buddhi is to become as qualityless as the puruṣas, then all
10-2
