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XI]
Rāmādvaya
samgraha and by others1. The upshot of the whole discussion is that on the occasion of a cognitive operation of the mind both the mind and the cognitive operation become enlivened and illuminated by the indwelling pure consciousness as subject-consciousness and awareness, and through contact with this cognitive operation the object also becomes revealed not as a mere content of awareness, but as an objective fact shining forth in the external world. Cognition of objects is thus not a mere quality of the self as knower, as the Nyāya holds, nor is there any immediate contact of the self with the object (the contact being only through the cognitive operation); the cognition is also not to be regarded as unperceived movement, modification or transformation of the self which may be inferred from the fact of the enlightenment of the object (jñātatā), as Kumārila held, nor is the illumination of the object to be regarded mere form of awareness without there being a corresponding as a objective entity (viṣayabhivyaktir nāma vijñāne tad-ākārollekhamatram na bahir-anga-rupasya vijñānābhivyāptiḥ), as is held by the Buddhist subjective idealists. The cognitive operation before its contact with the object is a mere undifferentiated awareness, having only an objective reference and devoid of all specifications of sense characters, which later on assumes the sense characteristics in accordance with the object with which it comes in contact. It must be noted, however, that the cognitive operation is not an abstract idea, but an active transformation of a real sattva stuff, the mind (antaḥkarana)2. Since in the continuous perception of the same object we have only a rapid succession of cognitive acts, each
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1 The theory is that there is an infinite number of the ajñāna-veils; as soon as there is the vṛtti-object contact, the veil is removed and the object is illuminated; the next moment there is again an ajñāna-veil covering the object, and again there is the vṛtti-object contact, and again illumination of the object, and thus there is very quick succession of veils and their removals, as the perception of the object continues in time. On account of the rapidity of this succession it is not possible to notice it (vṛtti-vijñānasya savayavatvāc ca hrāsa-daśāyām dipa-jvālāyā iva tamo 'ntaram mohāntaram avaritum viṣayam pravartate tato 'pi kramamāṇam kṣaṇāntare samagry-anusarena vijñānāntaram viṣay ivaraṇabhangenaiva sva-karyam karoti, tatha sarvany api atisaighryāt tu jñāna-bhedavad avaraṇāntaram na lakṣyate. Vedanta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 46). This view of the Vedanta-kaumudi is different from the view of the Vedanta-paribhāṣā, which holds that in the case of continuous perception of the same object there are not different successive awarenesses, but there is one unchanged continuous vṛtti and not different vṛttis removing different ajñānas (kiñ ca siddhante dhārāvähika-buddhi-sthale na jñānā-bhedaḥ kintu yavad ghaṭa-sphuranam tavad ghaṭākārāntaḥkaraṇa-vrttir ekaiva na tu nānā vṛtteḥ sva-virodhi-vrtty-utpattiparyantam sthayitvabhyupagamāt. Vedanta-paribhāṣā, pp. 26, 27, Bombay, 1911). 2 ataḥ savayava-sattvātmakam antaḥkaranam eva anudbhūta-rupa-sparsam adrsyam asprsyam ca viṣayākāreņa pariņamate. Vedānta-kaumudi, MS. copy, p. 42.
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