________________
XIII]
Nature of Ayur-veda Discussions
401
that arises through the contact of the self, the senses, the mind and the objects seems very much like an earlier model for Akşapada's definition of perception, which adds three more qualifications to make the meaning more complex and precise1. The idea that in the first instance perception is indeterminate (nir-vikalpa or a-vyapadesya) is a later development and can hardly be traced in Hindu philosophy earlier than the Nyāya-sūtra2. The similarity of the various categories of vāda, jalpa, vitandā, chala, jāti, nigrahasthāna, etc., as enumerated in Caraka, to those of the Nyāyasūtra has been duly pointed out in a preceding section. The only difference between the two sets of enumeration and their elaboration is that Caraka's treatment, being the earlier one, is less full and less complex than that of Akṣapāda.
The fact that physicians in counsel earnestly discussed together, in order to arrive at right conclusions regarding both the theoretical causes of diseases and their cures and their actual practical discernment in individual cases, is abundantly clear from even a very superficial study of the Caraka-samhita. The entire work seems to be a collection of discussions of learned physicians with Atri as their chairman. Where differences of opinion are great, they are all noted, and Atri's own opinion on them is given, and, where there was more or less unanimity, or where Atri himself lectured on specific problems, his own opinion alone is given. It is also related how a good and clever physician is to defeat his opponents in dispute, not only in a legitimate and scientific way, but also by sophistic wrangling and unfair logical tricks. It was a practical necessity for these physicians to earn their bread in the face of strong competition, and it is easy to see how the logical tricks of chala, jāti and nigraha-sthāna developed into a regular art of debate, not always for the discovery of truth, but also for gaining the victory over opponents. We hear of debates, discussions or logical disputes in literature much earlier than the
than one reason. Firstly, granting that the Mīmāmsā-sūtra is very old (which is doubtful), the fact that these two logical terms were borrowed from it does not show that it must be a very old work; for even a modern work may borrow its terminology from an older treatise. Secondly, the fact that these three terms were borrowed from early sources does not show that the theory of tri-vidha anumana in the Nyaya-sutra is either its own contribution or very old. Mr Dhruva's arguments as to the Mathara-vṛtti being subsequent to Vatsyāyana's commentary are also very weak and do not stand criticism.
1 indriyārtha-sannikarṣotparmam jñānam avyapadesyam avyabhicāri vyavasăyatmakām pratyakṣam. Nyāya-sūtra, I. 1. 4.
•
2 Caraka uses the word vikalpa in II. 1. 10. 4 in the sense of distinction (bheda) of superiority and inferiority (utkarṣa-prakarṣa-rūpa).
DII
26
