________________
68
INTRODUCTION
emphasis is not so much on 'svasamvedana', since self-cognisance is a common charac teristic, not only of Pramana, but of knowledge, valid or invalid, as a whole. Hence, he used the terms 'svarthaviniscaya'1 and 'tattvärthnirnaya'2 indicating the result of Pramāņa sometime. He uses the term 'anadhigatārthadhigama's but without any emphasis.
Obviously, it is Akalanka who for the first time uses the term "avisamvadi", in definition of Pramāņa in Jaina Logic. Similarly he is the first to reject the Sannikarşa and nirvikalpaka darśana as the means of valid knowledge when he gives the term Jñana in the definition of Pramāṇa.
(2) The partial discrepancy: He did not stop at this stage only, he further argues that no knowledge is valid or invalid from the absolute standpoint; validity or invalidity is conditioned by the degree of nondiscrepancy. Though there may be partial discrepancy, on the strength of extensive non-discrepancy the knowledge can be valid.
(3) Refutation of the definitions of Pramana accepted by others : Akalanka refutes the Buddhist theory of non-discrepancy as the test of valid knowledge; because it is inconsistent with indeterminate knowledge (nirvikalpaka jñāna) which is accepted by the Buddhist as valid knowledge. Sannikarsa accepted by the Naiyayika as the source of knowledge is untenable because it is not knowledge by itself.
(4) The objects of Pramāņa is a reality which is of the nature of substance-cum-modifications and universal-cum-particular and knowledge
itself.
(5) Matijñāna: Akalanka widens the scope of Mati. Mati is confined to the knower himself, it is rather subjective; the four types-Avagraha (conation), Iha (conception), Avaya (judgement) and Dharaṇā (retention), have the characteristic of occurring successively, each antecedent member (of the order) is the cognitive organ and each succeeding member is the resultant. This completes the division of organ and resultant.
(6) Iha (speculation or conception) and Dharaṇā: iha or activation and dharaṇā or dispositions (Bhāvanā) are accepted by the Naiyayika as other than knowledge. Akalanka establishes them to be of the nature of knowledge because they are substantive cause and effect of knowledge."
1 SV. 1.3.
2 Pramanasangraha, p. 1.5.
3 Astasati, Astasahasri, p. 175.
4 SV. I. 3.
5 NV. I. 3.
Jain Education International
6 LTV. I. 6.
For Personal & Private Use Only
www.jainelibrary.org
