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3. A CRITICAL STUDY OF SV, SVV AND SVT
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the sannikarsa, svarupalocana and jñāna are means of prama1; the activities of sense-organs are the instruments of right knowledge in sämkhya2; Prabhakara regards knowledge (anubhuti) as pramāna3; Buddhists' maintain that non-discrepant knowledge is pramāņa1; further, they contend that the 'sameness of form' (särupya) and 'capability' (yogyatā) are also accepted as means of pramā.
Thus it is seen that the means of cognition are jñāna, sense-organs and the conjunction of senses and objects (sannikarṣa). Out of these, Jainas endorse the view that knowledge is the only means of prama, since right knowledge (prama) is of the nature of consciousness; that is to say, no non-conscious instruments are admissible as means of prama; of course, sense-organs, their functions, and sannikarṣa bring about knowledge which serves as a valid means of right knowledge (prama). Sense-organs etc., cannot be pramāņa since the former are mediate means, while jñāna is an immediate means of prama. Just as darkness is removed by light, because of contradictory nature, so in order to remove ajñāna, jñāna is necessary; hence sannikarṣa etc. which are not of the nature of jñāna, cannot be the means of pramā; though, sometimes, knowledge is produced out of sannikarṣa etc., it is not produced invariably; hence they cannot be pramāņa; and knowledge is the guide for purposive actions, it cannot be other than knowledge.
This topic has been discussed in the present volume in details.
(iii) Jñana as Self-cognisance:
According to Mīmāṁsā, Jñāna is non-perceptive (paroksa) because buddhi itself is known by inference consequent upon the knowledge of objects apprehended by buddhi." But as the buddhi of ourselves is as imperceptive as the buddhi of others, so it is impossible to know the objects by our buddhi in as much as we do not know them by the help of the buddhi of others. Naiyāyika holds that jñāna is perceived not by itself but by the other knowledge. They argue that anything cannot act upon itself, just as a sharp edge cannot cut itself. But this view remains self-condemned by the example of a lamp which illumines itself and illuminates the objects
1 Prasastapādabhāṣya, p. 553.
3 Yogavārtika, p. 30; Samkhya-Pravacana-bhāṣya, I. 87.
3 Sabarabhasya, 1. 1. 5.
4 PV, II. 1.
5
TS, v. 1344.
•Pratipatturapekşam yat pramāņaṁ na tu pūrvakaṁ-SV, I. 3. "Sabarabhasya, I. 1. 5.
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