Kartikeyanupreksha

Author(s): Swami Kumar, A N Upadhye, Kailashchandra Shastri
Publisher: Paramshrut Prabhavak Mandal

Page 70

INTRODUCTION
51
deny the outside objective world, so patent to all, is a mockery of perverted understanding. What exists cannot be denied, and what does not exist cannot be grasped and described even as void. Names indicate objects which are facts of experience (247-52).
That is knowledge which knows rightly the self and other objectivity, endowed with manifold characteristics. The omniscience (kevalajñāna) enlightens the physical world (Loka) constituted of substances and modification and the pure space beyond (Alokākāśa). The omniscient is called omnipresent by his all-pervasive functioning of knowledge, but the knowledge does not leave the soul and go beyond. The process of knowing functions without the knower and the object of knowledge leaving their respective places. As distinguished from the Kevala (which is sakala-pratyakşa) Manabparyāya and Avadhi types of knowledge are Deśa-pratyakşa, i. e., of partial comprehension. Both Mati and Sruta types are indirect, the former of more clarity and immediateness. Matijñāna is possible through! five sense-organs and also mind : that through mind comprehends the topics covered by senses and sruta or scriptural knowledge. Of the five sense - knowledges, only one functions at a time, and the rest are latent. Every object has manifold aspects, and can be viwed only from a single aspect with the help of scriptural knowledge and of Nayas. Any assertion about it is from some point of view or the other. The knowledge brings out indirectly the manifold aspects of objectivity, divested of flaws like doubt etc. (253-62).
Naya is a variety of scriptural knowledge and originates from some characteristic or the other: it serves day-to-day worldly transactions with some aspect or object in view. The reality is a complexity, and when something is stated about it, it is with some aspect predominantly in view, and others being put in the back-ground for the moment. Naya is three-fold. That is a sunaya or a good point of view, which does not ignore or deny other points of view; but a bad point of view (durnaya ) leaves no margin for other views. All worldly transactions are well explained by good points of view (263–66)
Jiva is known from sense-functions and physical activities: that is anumāna or inference; it is also a Naya, a point of view of which there are many a variety. Collectively speaking Naya is one; spoken from the points of view of Dravya and Paryāya, it is two-fold; and going into more parti. culars, it has other varieties like Naigama etc. The Dravyārthika-naya, or the substantial point of view, states reasonably the general (sāmanya), without denying the particulars; while the Paryāya-naya states from various characteristics etc., the particulars keeping in view the generality (267-70).