Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Page 74

DOCTRINE OF GOD.
79
right that the notion of Colour should appear in the notion of Touch ; as Colour is perceptible by the Organ of Vision (not of Touch). For these reasons, the only reasonable view is what the Teachers have stated in the following words: After one has perceived by the Visual and Tactile Organs, each in its own way, there appears, subsequently, a notion, joining the two perceptions and apprehending the two objects conjointly as one unit; and this notion is of the nature of Remembrance
Objection-" In case the conjoint entity (Colour and Touch combined) has been previously actually perceived, then it would be right to regard this as Remembrance; but, you (Buddhists) do not admit of any joint entity. - apart from the individual things, Colour and the rest, which could have been thus previously perceived ; and if Colour and the rest were only individually perceived, then the Remembrance could only be one of Colour only, or of Touch' only and so forth,—and not of the Jar'; and in regard to things that have not been previously cognised, there can be no Remembrance then how could any Remembrance arise in regard to the joint entity (as asserted by your Teachers)?"
This is not right, we reply. It is not assorted that the joint entity that is previously perceived is something distinct from Colour and the rest ;your objection would hold only if the assertion of our Teachers meant this; what is meant however is that those same Colour and the rest, when serving the fruitful purpose of holding water and the like, come to be collectively called the Jar'; and what happens is that after each of those Colour and the rest, has been perceived by means of each of their pertinent sense-organs.there appears, at some future time, the Remembrance of these under the appellation of Jar, which bears the impressions of the said perceptions.Or the Joint Entity' may be regarded as conceptual', and being of the nature of a conceptual entity', as apprehended by its own cognition ; under the circumstances, why cannot Remembrance of such & Joint Entity be possible ?
From all this it is clear that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika), - Because of the peculiar arrangements of its component parts ",-has its substratum 'unproven'-"Why so?"-The Answer is-By the 'unproven character of the object itself ; that is, the object as stated by the Naiyayika in the form 'perceptible by two sense-organs' is not proven, unknown; and thus the Reason having its substratum unproven', becomes itselt open to the fallacy of being unproven', 'unknown, Inadmissible':-(59-60)
Thus it has been shown that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika) is 'unproven' in three ways-anproven' regarding its qualified (subject).
unproven regarding the qualification of that subject, and unproven' regarding its substratum ; the following Text proceeds to show a fourth kind of unproven-ness' as pointed out by the Teacher: