________________
668
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
TEXT (1343).
AS REGARDS THE MYSTIC'S COGNITION, WE ARE GOING TO DESCRIBE IT, ON THE BASIS OF SPOTLESS REASONS, AS ARISING OUT OF THE CONTEMPLATION OF THINGS AND BEING FREE FROM
CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND ERROR.-(1343)
COMMENTARY We are going to describe, under the chapter on The Omniscient Being.–(1343)
The Author next proceeds to set aside the diversity of opinion regarding the 'Frut' (ultimate effect) of 'Sense-perception as a means of Cognition :
TEXT (1344).
The cognition of the object IS HELD TO BE THE FRUIT OF THE MEANS OT COGNITION,—WHEN TRE MEANS OF COGNITION CONSISTS IN THE SAMENESS OF FORM' (BETWEEN THE COGNITION AND THE COGNISND); -OR Apprehension of itself IS THE FRUIT, AND THE MEANS, IN THIS CASE, CONSISTS IN CAPABI
LITY '-(1344)
COMMENTARY.
(a) When the external object is what is cognised, then the cognition of that object is the Fruit, and Sameness of form the Means, of the Cognition ; as even in the case of the self-cognition, the Cognition is of the same form as what is cognised. (b) When what is cognised is of the nature of Cognition, then the apprehension of itself' is the fruit, and capability the Means, of the Cognition. The said capability belongs to the Cognition only which carries with it the cognisability of its own function; by virtue of which capability, it is cognition alone and not the Jar and such things, that apprehends itself ;-hence it is by the instrumentality of this capability that Cognition is found to be self-manifested; hence Capability is said to be the 'Mears, the Instrument, of the Cognition of the Cognition itself. This has been thus declared–The Cognitions of Cognitions themselves, being neither the one nor the other, are capable of such self-apprehension; hence their capability is the Instrument (Means) and they themselves are the cognised, and their own apprehension is the fruit':-(1344)
In the following the Author sets forth the objection urged by Kumāriia
