Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 1
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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Page 671
________________ 676 TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII. put forward only for satisfying & whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is free from Conceptual Content and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it." This is not right. The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one's wish; by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out. For example, one points out 'rough. ness as a characteristic of the Earth. If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an 'impossible' one. As regards Sense-perception, there is nothing else to indicate its character, except 'freedom from Conceptual Content and freedom from errorFor instance, it must be free from error, because it is a valid means of Cognition, and it must be free from Conceptual Content, because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from association with words. -It is for this reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason. Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons. For instance, in connection with such cognitions as a) the Idea of the Jar, the action of Throwing up, the Universal, the Number and so forth, (b) the idea of Recogni. tion, and (c) the idea of the yellow conch-shell ', -some persons have been led to regard all these as 'Sense-perception', in accordance with the definition provided by other parties, and then they find that all these are either Conceptual or Erroneous, and then,-in accordance with the definition provided by us, they conclude that these cannot be Sense-perception'; thereupon they desist from (give up) the notion that Number and the rest are real entities and they also conclude that what is an entity is only that Specific Individuality of the Blue' for instance, which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.-How even the non-conceptual Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before. Says the Opponent :-" If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition-free from Conceptual Content', and 'free from error' need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition ; and no unknown thing: as the latter is as good as non-existent. And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding "freedom from error cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken ; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect; because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects; it has been shown above that truthful.

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