Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 1
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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Page 672
________________ EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PEROEPTION". 677 ness' -.e. conformity with the real state of things of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised. So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose ; as after that, there is no further activity." AnswerThere is no force in this objection. It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification free from error, in order to save the definition from the defect of being too wide' by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the 'Hairtuft', etc. being regarded as valid cognition.-As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition, this also is Inconclusive. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything; which would mean that they are unconscious beings; because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that this thing brings pleasure', 'that other brings pain, and are found to act accordingly, even before their present activity, and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother's breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth, even without remembering any points of similarity, etc.- it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition. In a case where there is no repetition, there alone,-not everywhere-is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects. This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like Smoke ; as here also, the effect, in the shape of Smoke, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference. Says the Opponent :-"The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place; it has to be explained how that first activity comes about ". Answer: That activity proceeds from the doubtful cognition. Question: "How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity!" Answer:-How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty ? "It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity." This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt. Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted; nor does it lead to desisting from activity ; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man. Otherwise,

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