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TATIVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
TEXT (1485).
“INFERENCE, CONSISTING OF A VERBAL STATEMENT, IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR THE SPEAKER; HE ONLY CONVEYS THE IDEA TO THE OTHER PARTY BY MEANS OF THE STATEMENT."
(1485)
COMMENTARY
He lie the Speaker. Tēna -by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statemont, The above view is controverted in the following
TEXT (1486). A CERTAIN MEANS OF KNOWLINGS IS HELD TO BE not A Means of Knowledge ONLY WHEN IT does not BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS NOT ALREADY KNOWN AS FOR INSTANCE, THE INFERENCE THAT YOU HAVE PUT TORWARD, WHICH CONVEYS NO IDEA TO
THE SPEAKER.-- (1486)
COMMENTARY.
When a statement is said to be 'not a means of Knowledge', it is not bu. cause, it conveys the idea to the Speaker,but because it does not convey any information that is not already known. As regards conveying the idea to the Speaker, it is of course there. In the case of your Inforence (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.-Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.
From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Coguition,—just like Sensu-perception.-(1486)
End of Chapter (18) un Inference.
End of Volume 1.
