Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Catalog link: https://jainqq.org/explore/007608/1

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THE TATTVASANGRAHA OF SHĀNTARAKSITA
nminnmnnmlnnrܬܠܬ
WITH THE COMMENTARY OF
KAMALASHILA
1
TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH BY GANGANATHA JHA
VOLUME I
Innnmnnnnmnnmlnnr
Elm
GzGa Ga Galorado

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GAEKWAD'S ORIENTAL SERIES Published under the Authority of the Government of His Highness the Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda
GENERAL EDITOR : B. BHATTACHARYYA, M.A., Ph.D.,
RAJARATNA
No. LXXX
TATTVASANGRAHA ENGLISH TRANSLATION
Vol. I

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THE TATTVASANGRAHA OF SANTARAKSĪTA with the Commentary of
Kamalasila
Transluted into English by
GANGANATHA JHA
IN TWO VOLUMES
VOL.!
Bsal
Baroda Oriental Institute
1937

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UENTRAL AFGELUGUAL
LIBRARY NEW DELHI. 1. No.79.74...... Ate l l-/2.-36.............. Ivo BS ............
San The
Printed by P. Knight at the Baptist Mission Press, 41A, Lower Circular Road, Calcutta, and Published, on behalf of the Government of Baroda, by Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, Director,
Oriental Institute, Baroda,
Price Rs. 17

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PREFACE
Vol. I of the English Translation of Tattvasangraha is being set out. The talented editor of the Gaekwad Series has supplied all the information available rogarding the Authors of the Original and the Commentary,-in the extensive and lucid Introduction to the original Sanskrit Text.
The texts translated are difficult-linguistically as well as philosophically. In the latter aspect, my past work on Kumārila's Shlokavirtile and Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārtika has enabled me to follow the trend of the arguments; as these two writers for the principal targets for attack in the work; and the work is entirely polemical.-In the linguistic aspect of the work, I have not always felt quite sure, specially in regard to the technical terms in which Buddhistie literature abounds and my knowledge of these had all been derived from Brahmanical Sources. But as the work progressed, I felt surer of my ground, and I hope that in the final result, I have not gone far wrong in my interpretations. For the slips that there are bound to be there, I apologiso to Buddhist Scholars and hope that they will correct me wherever I may be found to have gone astray.
In that hope, I send forth this work of mine with thankfulness for having been given the strength of mind and body to do it.
My thanks are due to the Editors of the Sanskrit Text, whose introduction has been helpful in the understanding of the text.
GANGANATHA JHA
ALLAHABAD, July 23, 1937

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TATTVASANGRAHA.
Volume I. LIST OF CONTENTS.
Page
od
25 68
101
108
118 132 130 164
192
Introductory Chapter Chapter I-Doctrine of Primordial Matter as origin of the
World I--Doctrine of God 'as origin of the World .. TTI-Doctrine of Both-God and Primordial Matter
as origin of the World .. IV--Doctrine of Thing-by--Itself' as origin of the
World V-Doctrine of Word-Sound' as origin of the World VI-Doctrine of Puruşa VII-Doctrine of Ātman-according to Nyiya. Vaishesika
, (B) Doctrine of Ātman-according to Mināmsā ..-(C) Doctrine of Alman (Puruşa)-according to
Sarikh ..-(D) Doctrine of Atman-according to Digambara
Jaina ..E) Doctrine of Alman-According to the Advaitin --(F) Doetine of Atman-according to the Vütsi.
metriya .. VIII–Doctrine of the Permanence of Things IX- » Action and Reaction
X-Examinntion of Substance' XI
Quality' XII
Action XIII
Universal XIV
Ultimate Individulity XV—
* Inherence' XVI
Import of Words XVII
Sense perception XVIII
Inference Index to Vol. I
204 213
217 227 283 318 300 394
402
146 450) 486 614 679 729
The subsequent volumes will contain the following Chapters. Examination of other forms of Cognition Chapter XIX (A)-Verbal Cognition.
XIX (B)--Analogical Cognition.
XIX (0)-- Presumptive Cognition , XIX (D)--Negative Cognition.

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viji
CONTENTS.
Chapter
XX-Examination of Syadvrida'. XXI
Three Points of Time! XXII
. Materialism. XXIII
the 'External World'. XXIY
,, Revealed Word'. XXV
. Self-validity of Cognitions. XXVI
.. the "l'erson with Superhuman Powers of
Perception!

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INTRODUCTORY.
17
inanent ! Mere Being is said to be their sole function as well as Cause'.This points to the section on the Permanence of Things (Chapter 8, below).
Objection :-"If this is so, then the Intervolved Wheel of Causation cannot be regarded as the basis of any adjustments regarding Act, its Fruit and the Connection between them, and such other things; as ex hypothesi, the said Wheel is mobile (momentary)."
The answer is supplied by the second line of the first verse of the TextKarma, etc.', 'It is the basis of sneh notions as Actions, otc.'- What the Text means is that this shall be explnined later on. In this connection * Actions are good and bad, their fruits' are desirable and indesirable, and the
connection between them is that of the product and the produced (cause and effect); the notion of this is its adjustment, usage, arrangement.--The term 'ads' and the rest ') in the Text includes all such notions as those of Remembrance, Recognition, Uncertainty, Certainty, the Following up of a self-appointed Task, Eagerness for perceptible things, Cessation of such eagerness, the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Cogniser of these, the Means of Cognition, Bondage, Emancipation and so forth. The said Wheel' is the basis of all these such is the analysis of the compound.-To this affect there is the following declaration of the Blessed Lord—“Bhikogus the Action is there, the Fruit is there, but the Actor is not found,--apart from the 'indication' (Sanketa) of the Principles and Practices' (Dharmas), - who renounces these Sensorial Phases (Skandhas) and takes up others. So that it is due to the indication of the Principles and Practices that a certain thing comes about when another thing is there (as its cause)."
-This points to the Chapter on Actions, their Fruits and the Connec. tion between these (Chapter 9, below). This Intervolved Wheel of Cauation should be understood as appertaining to the Sensorial Phases (S'leandhas),
Phenomena' (Dhalus) and the 'Receptacles (Ayalanas); as it in these that are produced by the Intervolved Wheel of Causation.-(1)
[Text 2.] Question " There are many such things as Substance, Quality, Movement and tlie rest; wliy does not the Wheel of Causation apply to these ?"
The answer is given by lines 1 and 2 of Text 2, beginning with the term 'guna, etc.', 'It is devoid of all such concepts as Quality, etc. The term guna- samavāya' is a Copalative Compound the term "jäti', * universal', includes both kinds of Universal, the Higher (Wider) as well as the Lower (Narrower) ;-the term 'adi', and so on', includes the (1) Specific Individuality subsisting in ultimate substances (as postulated by the Vaishēsika), (2) also those characteristics which some people describe as distinct from the thinge possessing those characteristics,-.g. the character of Being as subsisting in all the Six Categories (of the Vaishëşika), the character of being apprehended by all such Means of Cognition as bring about the apprehension of existing things, and so forth. The compound between the term guna ... samavāya' and 'upādhi' is Karmadharaya, one between the qualification and the qualified [the upādhi' being the qualified, and the preceding term the qualification) ; -of these upådhis, concepts, in the

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TATTVASANGRAHA :
shape of Substance, etc.) the wheel is devoid ; i.e. it is free from all this. In regard to this, the Blessed Lord has declared as follows :-"O Brahmana! All is All; le. the five Skandhas' (Five Sensory Phases), the twelve * Ayalanas' (Twelve Sensory Receptacles-consisting of Mind, five Senseorgans and the external objects apprehended by these six), and the oighteen
Dhatus '[Elements or Ingredients, consisting of the aforesaid twelve, along with the six elements of Visual Sensation, Auditory Sensation, Olfactory Sensation, Gestatory Sensation, Tactile Sensation, Mental Sonsation)."--This points to the Section on the Examination of the Six Categories (Chapters 10 to 15).
Question-"In the absence of the said concepts, how does the Intervolved Wheel of Causation become the object of Verbal Expression and Conception? And when it does not become the object of these two, it cannot be spoken of; as a matter of fact Verbal Expression and Conception cannot operate apart from the concepts in question. How then is it that the Blessed Lord has propounded it?"
[Page 12.] The answer to this is contained in the second line of Text 2, beginning with the word "dropita', 'It is amenable, etc.'.—The compound
aropitci, etc.' is to be explained as follows— aropita äkāra' is the imposed or assumed form; and this 'assumed form is the character of the Wheel of Catzsation, as forming the object of Verbal Expression and Conception; i.e. that whicle forms the subject of the Wheel of Causation is that which is amonable ia Verbal Expression and Conception in an assumed (superimposed) form.The term "pratyaya' (Cognition) here should be understood in the sense of the particular form of Cognition which appears in the form of a verbal concept,As is indicated by the proximity of the term 'verbal expression '; specially as these two are invariably associated in regard to any single object. Thus the sense of the Text comes to this-Though the said concepts are not there (in tle Wheel), yet through the fact that things are always perceived as distinguished from each other, the Conception is understood to apportain to something external ; so that the amenability to Verbal Expression, in the form of invariable association, is present in the said Wheel). In reality. however, it is not amenable to Verbal Expression, because all sorts of Conceptual Content have disappeared from it. But, just as the denotation of words is adınitted in common parlance is something nice, though not justified by reason, in the same manner, with a view to introducing the True Teaching, the Blessed Teacher, closing his eyes, in the manner of the elephant, to the true character of things, sought to express the true idea, through a sort of illusion; and this simply because there is no other way of doing it.-Even though the form of the denotation of words is really superimposed upon it (as an illusion), yet, by reason of invariable association, it becomes indirectly related to the thing to be spoken of, and thus becomes the means of expressing it; and the thing, thus expressed, does become manifested, by virtue of the powers of the Teachers; hence there is no chance of being deceived (regarding the true nature of the thing spoken of). This is what has been thus declared by Tayin-By whichsoever name is a Phenomenon (or Entity or Manifestation) spoken of, -this Phenomenon does not really exist there ; such is the phenomenal character of all phenomena",-(2)

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INTRODUCTORY.
19
[Text 3.) Question " Is this (Wheel of Cansation) A mere verbal jugglery indulged in on account of the paucity of valid reasons in support, - just as has been done by other philosophers assuming (without sufficient proof) their Categories? Or is there any valid reason for accepting it?"
The answer that there is such valid reason is given in Text 3.-Spasta, etc.', 'It is definitely cognised, etc.'-The compound Spaşlalaksana' is Karmadharaya, meaning 'whose definition, character, is clear, i.e. welldefined'; the clearness' of the 'definition is due to the fnct that it is free from the three defects of being impossible (inapplicable), or too narrow or too wide; the definition of the Means of Right Cognition provided by other philosophers, on the other hand, is not clear'; the Text thereiore has characterised its own Means of Cognition as clear'. Endowed with this character of being clearly defined' are the two Means of Cognition',-Sense perception and Inference ;-by theso is the Wheel of Causation definitely cognised'; this will be explained under all the sections (as occasion presents itself). This also is approved by the Blessed Lord, who has declared thus-O Bhiksus, my word should be accepted after due investigation, not merely throngh regard for me, just as gold is accepted as real only after henting, cutting and rubbing on the touch-stone-As regards Sense-perceptions, its definition is that it should be free from 'mistake' and conceptual content' or 'determination', this is exactly as declared by the Blessed Lord-who has said that one who has the visual cognition cognises the Blue all right, but not as blue': the phrase "cognises the Blue' implies that the cognition does not apprehend an object other than its own, which indicates the fact of its being not mistaken (or wrong); and the other phrase 'not us blue denies the presence in the Cognition of any connection with the definite name 'blue'; which indicates the fact of its being non-conceptual or not-determinale (free from all association with words). As regards Inference, tlie definition of that also has been set forth by pointing out the nature of the Linga (Inferential Indicative,
Middle Term', Probans); which has beon thus set forth-The Linga, Probans, is that which is (a) never non-concomitant with the Probandum, and (b) which is definitely known, -only then does it become the means of in. ferential cognition; this Probans, O Bhiksus, is sometimes Constructive, in all cases it is Destructive'. Here the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum is clearly asserted. This same condition has been stated in the dictum that Tho Probans is the basis of Inference, when it is charac. terised by invariable concomitance'; in this statement the Probandum has not been mentioned, because it is clearly indicated by the mention of the
invariable concomitance of the Probans' (which can only be with the Probandum).-This Probans is divided into three kinds, distinguished according to such peculiarities as those of (1) nature, (2) effect and (3) nonapprehension; the Probans called 'nature has been indicated by the term
Constructive' in the phrase 'O Bhikşus, that which is Constructive; as for the Probans styled Effect' it has been illustrated in the following statement The presence of Fire is known through Smoke, the presence of Water is known through the line of White Cranes flying above; and the Race (Gotra) of the Wise Bodhisattva is known through certain signs'.-Lastly, the Probans styled as 'a particular form of non-apprehension' has also

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20
TATTVASANGRAHA :
been explained in course of the denial of mere Non-apprehension by itself being a Means of Cognition; this has been declared in the following words -O Bhiksus, a Living Being cannot validly cognise a Living Being, or find a means of knowing it; if a Living Being validly cognises a Living Being, he becomes destroyed; I alone would cognise a Living Being, or someone else if he were like me'. Herein we have the denial of the validity of mere Non apprehension in general in regard to things beyond the kun (of ordinary men); the sentence 'I alone, etc. clearly shows the validity of particular cases of Non-apprehension.-All this points to those sections of the Text that deal with Sense-perception (Chap. 17), Inference (Chap. 18) and other Jeans of Cognition (Chap. 20).
Question . This Intervolved Wheel of Causation,-is it concomitant with any such generic character as being an entity', as declared by the Syädvudins (Jainas)? Or is it entirely unmixed (pure) in its essence 1—'What if it is the one or the other P-If it is concomitant with anything, then there would be a cross-division between the definition of the Wheel and that of Sense-perception and the rest ;-there would also be the incongruity that the cause would cease to bring about the effect, as there would be no difference between the Cause and Effect; and in that case the Wheel would not be * definitely cognisel by means of the two Means of Cognition (as stated in Text 3). Nor again, is it right to posit any such entity as the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; because even if it is entirely unmixed in its essence-inasiuch us there would be no particular diversity among the auxiliary causes, there would be no possibility of its having any efficient activity (which is the characteristic of overy ensity); exactly as there is none in things admittedly nonproductive."
In answer to this objection, we have the second line of Text 3 * Aniyasipi, etc. It is not mixed up with the nature of anything else even in the slightest degree'. What is meant is as follows-It is the latter of the two alternatives that we accept; and yet there is no room for the objections that have been urged against it; this we shall explain later on. The compound
mishribhūtā paratmakah' (in the Text) is to be analysed as- wherein the nature of anything else is not mixed up'; that is, wherein there is not the slightest trace of the character of anything else, for instance, that of the Cause in the Effect and so forth. - In the slightest degree',-avon in the most subtle form--and not only in the form of many such extensive entities as "Being *Knowable and so forth,—this is what is implied by the particle 'api', *even! What is meant is that, if the form of a single entity were present in it, the entire world would enter into its essence. This the Author will explain later on. This is what has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord-How can the Sprout be eternal 1-Since the Sprout is one thing and the Seed an en tirely different thing. Verily the Sprout is not exactly the same thing as the Seed. So also is the Sprout unlike the Seed. Hence one thing (Seed) does not pass on into the essence of another thing'. This points to the Ohapter dealing with the Examination of Syädyrāda (Chap. 20).-(3)
Question—"The Skandha (Sensorial Phase) and the rest, are pure and unmixed in nature; even so, do they always remain unchanged in their

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INTRODUCTORY.
character -as has been declared by some persons who hold all things to be real entities, passing from one phase into another ? "
The answer that it is not so is provided by the word ' 4 sanilerānsim! ! admits of no translocation' (Text 4). What is meant is that, if there were translocation (passing from one phase into another), then, inasmuch as everything (every cause) would always exist in its entirety, there would be no Effect or Product, and hence no possibility of any Intervolved Wheel of Causation, The word 'Asankranti' in the Text) siguifies that relierein there is no translocation'-.e. passing from phase to phase,-* of the Skandha and other factors': [Page 14). This has been declared by the Blessed Lord in the following words- When the Eye is produced, it does not come out from anything else ;—when it is destroyed, it does not return to any thing else; what happens, 0 Bhiksus, is that the Eye, not having been in existence, comes into existence, and having been in existence, it censes to exist':- This points to the Chapter dealing with the Examination of the Three Points of Time (Chapter 21 of the Text).
Question—" Then does it exist only at the time that it is actually seen? As declared by the Charváka (Materialist) - Whence can there be any coming again for that which has been burnt and ceased to exist ?*
The answer is supplied by the Text in the word 'andyantam!, it is without beginning, without "end; the compound being analysed as that whose beginning and ond are not'. This also has been pointed out by the Blessed Lord Buiksu8, the cycle of Births has no end and no beginning, etc. etc.';- in this quotation the term avara stands for end, audagra for beginning; hence the negation of these two is what is spoken of as 'anarrāgra'. This has been so asserted with reference to people who have not taken to the Noble Path; for those who have taken to the Noble Path, the Cycle of Birth has actually ceased. It is in view of this that it has been declared that-'For the childish person who knows not the true Dharma. the path of Birth and Rebirth is a long one-This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Philosophy of the Lokayalas (Chapter 22 of the Text).
Question—"Is this Intervolved Wheel of Causation of the nature of an external object? Or has it a purely subjective existence ?"
Answer-It is like the reflected image and other things (Text). This shows that it has a purely subjective existence. The sense therefore is that this has a purely subjective existence, just like the Reflected Image, Whirling Fire Circle, the Fanciful City in the Sky and such other fanciful things. This has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord- The external thing, as fancied by childish people, does not exist, it is only the Mind which, tossed about by Impressions, bears the serablance of the object and thus becomes operative. Tluis points to the Chapter on the Eaamination of the External Worul (Chap. 23, Text).
Having thus shown that the Intervolved Wheel of Causation is entirely free from the webs of the fanciful assumption of things that have no existence, the Author sums up the whole idea in the words Sarvaprapanela, etc., It is absolutely free from the whole lot of fantasios'; that is, it is free from the whole

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TATTYASANGRAHA :
lot of fantastic notions, like the idea of Primordial Matter being the cause of things and so forth.
Question-" Has this doctrine been realised by othor teachers also, -like lieu, Shiva, Hiranyagarbha and the rest ?"
Answer-Not so; it has not been apprehended by others; as a matter of fuct, all other philosophical systems lay stress upon wrong notions of the Soul, and it is the Blessed Lord alone on whom this enlightenmont has dawned. This is what the Text means. This the Author will explain in the course of all the sections of his work.-(4)
Question—"Was this doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Cauration apprehended by the Blessed Lord by Himself and then promulgated ? Or did he promulgate it on the basis of the Veda which is regarded by others as revealed (not the work of any Person) ?-As declared by the followers of Jaimini
This as regards things that are beyond the reach of the Senses, there is no Person who has seen them directly; hence that man alone knows them rightly who knows them through the Eternal Word '."
The answer to this is-Not so; Sratantnshrudin ihsanga independently of any self-swfficient revelation (Text 5). The term Self-sufficient revelation stands for the Veda' whose anthority is said to be self-sufficient, that is the Elernal Word;- nisanja' is one who is not dependent upon, not depending upon it, i.e. seeing things directly by himself ;-the Lord Himself promulgated the Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation. As a matter of fact, there is no sentence or assertion that has not emanated from a Person; as has been declared by the Blessed Lord-Those Great Sages, the Ananda. paurānas (Denizens of the Blissful Regions ?) are the authors of the Vedas and the promulgators of the Maniras. What the Author means is that he is going to explain this later on.-This points to the Section dealing with the Examination of the Self-sufficient Authority of the Revelations (contained under Chapter 19 of the Text).
Question—"For the Blessed Lord who liad attained all his own ends, what was the need for promulgating this Doctrine of the Interuolue Wheel of Causation ?"
neuer-With a view to bringing about the Welfare of the World (Text 5). Welfare of the World' is what is good for the world; this 'Good' consists in the destruction of all Afflictions and Tllusion, brought about by the duo comprehension of the Right Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Causation; the desire to bring this about is what is meant by the view to bring about' ;-this is the cause that led to the promulgation of the said Doctrine.
Question-"How is it known that the Lord had the desire to bring about the welfare of the world ?"
Answer Supreme mercy having entered into His very 800.1 through long innumerable cycles' (Text 5). The compound is to be analysed thus:"He whose supreme meray-Mahādaya'-entered into His very essence, -(stmibhūta through long (analpaih) innumerable cycles (kalpūsar. khyayaih). This suprema mercy of the Blessed Lord is inierred from the

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INTRODUOTORY.
fact that He did not renounce the work of doing good to other people, even though He had attained all His own ends.-(5)
[Page 15.] Question-"What did this Person do—who had this supreme mercy entered into His very soul?"
Answer'Who propounded, etc. The terın who', though a common pronoun, stands here for the Blessed Lord Buddha; 24 no one else possesses the qualities described.-The Doctrine of the Intervolved Wheel of Ortusation this term 'pratityasamutpūda' stands for the doctrine that the "upada',
causation or origination of the Skandhas (Sensory Aggregates or Phases) and other things takes place-pralilya', i.e. on the basis of, Causal Ideations; that is to say, who declared the Sensory Aggregates and other things to have been produced on the strength of Cansal Ideations. Though the term 'Samutpārla' (Origination or Causation) seems to have a negative (or exclusive) con notation, yet what is really meant to be expressed by the term is the positive entity produced by the Ideation), bizt viewed as excluding other aspects of it. -Or, the term "Samupada' may be construed as Samutpadyatë', that which is produced, the Product,--the terin being formed with the Chai' tfix in tho active sense, according to Panini's Sacra Kriyalyuto bahulam (3.3.113) and this term 'Samutpäda' thus explained is compounded with the term 'pratitya', according to Panini's Satra Sup-supa (2.1.4)', or According tothe rule governing such compounds as Mayuraryamsaka ( 2.1.72)
-Or the terin' Samutpala' may be taken by itself, nnt compounded with any other term.-What is expressed by all this is the fact that the Blessed Lord has the fully equipped power of bringing about the welfare of others. So that what the phrase 'who propounded the said Doctrine of the Wheel of Causation means is that the Lord has acted towards the bringing about of the wel. fare of others. And what constitutes his action towards bringing about the welfare of others is this same teaching to others regarding the right path towards Heaven and Final Emancipation. This has been thus declared* The act has to be done by yourselves, the Blessed Ones are only expounders'.
The equipment of this capacity to bring about the welfare of others consists of the capacity for the direct vision of Dharma and Supreme Mercy, Even a merciful Person, if he is devoid of the knowledge of Truth, would be unable to teach the Truth; and, on the other hand, even though one may possess the true knowledge of things, if he happen to be devoid of mercy, he would either give no teaching at all, or, even when teaching, might give such teaching as is harmful. Hence in the Blessed Lord, are present both these -Knowledge and Meroy-as equipment of His capacity to bring about the welfare of others. That He is possessed of the capacity for direct vision of Dharma has been indicated by the term (in the Text) 'independently of any self-sufficient revelation'; and the presence of Supreme Mercy has been indicated by the term Supreme mercy haring entered into His very Soul'.
Question" As a matter of fact, this Right Doctrine of the Interwolved Wheel of Causation has been taught also by other Persons-such as Bodhisattus and Saints; what peculiar excellence then does this constitute in the Blessed Lord Himself ?"

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TATTVASANGRAKA :
Answer-He is the Greatest of Expounders. Though it is true that the said Saints and others also have expounded the Doctrine of Intervolved Wheel of Causation, yet the Supreme Lord is the Greatest among them. The other persons could havo no capacity to expound the said dootrine, except by reason of the fact that the essence of Dharma had been taught by the Supreme Lord-Or the Supreme Lord-and none others-can be the "Greatest', because He represents the highest stage in the ascending scale of the presence of Excellences and the absence of Defects; the others not being 50.-By thus pointing out the fact of the Blessed Lord being superior to the Saints and others, it is made clear that the Lord was equipped with a specially efficient intellect,--this efficiency consisting in the destruction of all Dispositions, Amictions and Ignorance regarding all cognisable things. If it were not for this, in what way would He be superior to other Saints ? It is with a view to this that the Author has added the epithet 'That Omniscient Person' (Text 6). This points to the Chapter dealing with the proof for the existence of the Omniscient Being (under Chapter 2 on God' and Chap. 24).
Question-"What is it that is going to be done after bowing to the Omniscient Person :
Answer-The Compendium of True Doctrines' is going to be composed. The True Doctrine' meant are all those that lave been mentioned as the accompaniments of the Doctrine of the Interuolued Wheel of Causation; as these alone are not wrong :--the bringing together of these doctrines, which lie scattered, within a small compass is what is spoken of as Sangraha Com. penditem'; and as this brief résumé is dealt with in a book, the book itself is spoken of as the Compendium ; just as the poem dealing with the Alduction of Sita is called the Sita-harana (Sita's Abduction). Or, the term 'Tattva. sangraha' may be explained as the book itself, in the sense that it deals, rightly and completely, with the True Doctrines', -I8 being composed - the Present Tense has been used in reference to the time taken by the act of composing, from beginning to its completion.—(6)
End of Introductory Section.

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CHAPTER I.
Dealing with the Examination of the Doctrine of Primordial
Matter.
(A)
The Statement of the Sankhya Doctrine of Prakrti' (Primordial Matter).
TEXT (7)
"IT IS OUT OF Prakrti (PRIMORDIAL MATTER) ITSELF ALONE, AS EQUIPPED WITH ALL POTENCIES, THAT THE VARIOUS PRODDOTS EVOLVE,
REALLY HAVING THEIR ESSENCE IN THAT SAME MATTER."-(7)
COMMENTARY In order to show that there is no functioning of Primordial Matter, the Anthor proceeds to set forth the Särikkya theory regarding it, in Text (7).
-That which is equipped-endowed with all such potencies-produetive of the host of products such as the Mahat (Cosmic Intelligence) and the rest, -such is Pradhūna, Primordial Matter, which consists of the Attributes of Harmony, Energy' and 'Inertia', in the state of equilibrium; and it is from out of this that the Cosmic Intelligence and other Evolutes evolve such is the view of the Followers of Kapila.-The emphasising of
Primordial Matter alone is for the purpose of excluding such agencies as those of Time, A Personality and the like :--the addition of the term Kavalal.
itself', is meant to exclude the God' postulated by the Theistic Sankhya (Yoqa).-Evolve,-are prodnced, directly or indirectly. The process of this Evolution is as follows :-Out of Pradhāna (Primordial Matter) first of all evolves Buddhi (Cosmic Intelligence) out of Cosmic Intelligence, evolves Ahankara (the I-principle):-ont of the I-principle evolve the five Tanmātraa (Rudimentary Substances), consisting of Sound, Touch, Taste, Colour, and Odour-and also the eleven Sense-organs the five Organs of Sensation. in the shape of the Organ of Hearing, of Touch, of Vision, of Taste and of Smell,-tho five Organs of Action, in the shape of Organs of Speech, Hands, Foet, Exeretory Organ and the Generative Organ ;and Mind is the eleveuth.--Out of the five Rudimentary Substances evolve the five Gross Substances, - Ākāska out of Sound-rudiment, Air ont of Touch-rudiment. Fire out of Colour-rudiment, Water out of Taste rudiment and Earth out of Odour-ruiment.
This is as declared by Ishvarakrena (in the Savikhyakurika, 22)— From Primordial Matter issues the Grout Principle (Cosmic Intelligence); thence the I-principle; thence the Group of Sixteen; from among this Group of

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I.
Sixteen, out of five. issue the five Gross Substances. Here the term
Mahān', 'Great Principle', stands for Buddhi, the Cosmic Intelligence ; this Cosmic Intelligence functions in the form of snch conception or determination of things as 'this is a jar', this a piece of cloth'.-The I-principle functions in the form of such notions as I am handsome', 'I am presentable':--The Mind functions in the form of Reflection; for instance, a boy happens to hear that food is to be had in another village, and this gives rise to his reflection in the form 'I shall go there, I wonder if there would be curds and inolasses or curds only'; that which functions thus as Reflection is the Mind. Such is to be understood the distinction among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Mind. The rost (of Ishvarakrina's Kārika) is easily intelligible.
These entities, Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, along with Primordial Matter and the Spirit make up the twenty-five Principles (or Realities, Real Entities) of these philosophers. To this end, it has been declared that
One who knows tlio twenty-five Principles,-be he addicted to any life-stage, being either a Hormit (wearing knotted loeks), or a Wandering Mendicant (with shaven head), or a Householder (wearing the top-knot).-becomes liber. ated; there is no doubt on this point'.
All these various Products evolving out of Primordial Mattor are not entirely distinct from their Cause.-as are the Products postulated by the Baruldhrs ;-they are in fact, of the saine essence; ie, they have their essence in that stue-Primordial Matter; mich is the analysis of the compound
tadrüpan' in the Text). The products are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, in the sense that they are all made up of the Three Attributes. For instance, in the ordinary world, it is found that the Product is of the same essence as the Cause; eg, the cloth woven out of black yarns is black, and that woven out of white yarns is white. And Prinordial Mattor is made up of the Three Attributes and all that is manifested, in the form of Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle, Rudimentary Substances, Sonse-organs and Gross Substance, is also found to be made up of the Three Attributes, hence it is that all this latter is of the same essence as Primordial Matter. Sinilarly, Primordial Matter is not distinguishable, that is to say, it cannot be distinguished that these are the Three Attributes, Harmony and the rest (constituting the Unmanifest Primordial Mattor), and these are the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest constituting the Manifest'; in fact, the notion always is that 'the Attributes are the Manifest, and the Manifest is the Attributes':-Further, both these, the Manifest and the Unmanifest
-aro Objective, because they have the character of objects of enjoyment (experience, for the Spirit).-Both again are common, -to all Spirits ; just as the Malla-dūsi (the Slave-girl who is the common property of several men).-It is also insentient, as it cannot feel pleasure or pain or delusion.
-It is productive; that is, Primordial Matter is productive of Cosmic Intelligence, Cosmic Intelligence produces the I-principle, the I-principle produces the Rudimentary Substances and the Eleven Sense-organs; and the Rudi. mentary Substances produce the Gross Substances.-Thus all these various Products evolve, all having the same essence as Primordial Matter, inasmuch as they also are constituted by the Three Attributes (are nondistinguishable, objective, common, insontient and productive). This has

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
27
been thus declared (by Ishvarakına, in Rrika 11)- The Manifest is with the Three Attributes, undistinguishable, objective, common, insentient and productive; so also is Primordial Matter; the Spirit is the reverse and yet also similar
The following question has been raised" If the Products are of the same essence as Primordial Matter, then how is it that in this Philosophy a distinction has been made between the fanifest (Prodnet) and the Un. manifest (Cause) | For instance, it has been declared by Ishvarakrena (in his Kārika 10) The Manifest is with cause, nof eternal, not-peroxısive, mobile, nulliform, dependent, soluble, composite, subordinate; the Unmanifest is the reverse of this'. The meaning of this is as follows:- It is the Manifest alone that has a cause; e.g. Cosmic Intelligence is with cause '-i.e. has its cause in Primordial Matter; the I-principle has its caure in Cosmic Intelli. gence; the Five Rudimentary Substances and the Eleven Sense-organs have their cruise in the I-principle; and the Cross Substances have their cause in the Rudimentary Substances. The Unmanifest, however, is not 30 (having no cause), because it is never produced, having no heginning.-- Primordial Matter and Spirit subsist everywhere, in heaven, in sky and on Earth, pervading all things not so the Manifest, which, in fact, is non-pernd. sive in character. --Then again, in the course of Birth and Rebirth, the Manifest, equipped, in the form of the Subtle Body, with the thirteen-fold body consisting of Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle, the Sense-organs, actively moves Along (from birth to birth); not so the Unmanifest ; becanse, being all-pervading, it cannot be mobile-Further, the Manifest is actually found to be multiform. through such diversity as is involved in the notions of the Cosinie Intelligence, I principle and the rest ;--not so the Unmanifest, which in one and the same form, is the cause productive of all the three Regions, Then the Manifest is dependent, that which is prodnced out of another thing is dependent upon this latter ;-not so the Unmanifest; as it is not a product. The Manifest again is soluble', in the sense that it goes into dissolution; for instance, at the time of the Universal Dissolution, the Cross Substances become dissolved into Rudimentary Substances, the Rudimentary Substances and Sense-organs into the I-principle, the Iprinciple into Cosmic Intelligence, and the Cosmic Intelligence into Primordial Matter; the Unmanifest however never goes into Dissolution; as it has no cause into which it could become merged.-Further, the Manifest is composite', being made up of such components as Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste and Odour; not so the Unmanifest, as Sound and the rest are not found to be present in the constitution of Primordial Mattor.
-Lastly, just as, while the father is alive, the son is not his own master, so also the Manifest is always subordinate', resting always on its Cause: not so the Unmanifest, because it is eternal and hence not subservient to any Cause".
The answer to this is supplied in the Text, by the word 'Bhavalah'; - bharatah' means that 'in reality' there is sarneness of essence, and yet there is nothing incongruous in the idea that there is distinction into Cruse and Effect', based upon the diversity of modifications.-Or, the term 'bharatan may mean by their nature',-the sense being that by their very nature,

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER L.
consisting of the Three Attributes, the things operato only in that form, which is the same as that of Primordial Matter. What is meant is that, the diversity found in the World in the shape of the Great Principle' (Cosmic Intelligence) and other products is due to the predominance or otherwise of one or the other of the Three Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia. Thus it becomes finally established that the Product always exists in the form of the Cause.—(7)
Question—"How is it known that the Effect (Product) exists even before it is produced ?"
Ansiber
TEXT (8).
"IF THE EFFECT WERE NON-EXISTENT, POTENTIALLY, IN THE FORM OF THE CAUSE, THEN IT COULD NOT BE PRODUCBD; BECAUSE IT WOULD HAVE NO FORM AT ALL, BEING LIKE THE
Sky-Lotus," -(8)
COMMENTARY. For proving the existence of the Effect (even prior to its production), the other Philosophers (Sankhyas) have put forward the following five reasons (as stated in Sankhyalarikā, 9)_*(1) Because what is non-existent cannot be produced,—(2) because there is always recourse to the Cause--(3) because all things are not possible.—(4) because the efficient can produce only that for which it is officient.--and (5) because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause,--therefore the Effect must be existent (even before it is produced)."
(1) In support of the first reason, the following explanation has been provided (by tho Text) in the words - If the Effect were non-ecistent, etc.That is to say, if the Effect did not already exist in the form of the Cause, even prior to its production, then it could not be produced, as it would be like the Sley-lorus (a non-entity). This reasoning is formulated as follows:What is non-existent cannot be produced, -as for instance, the Sky-lotus,
-prior to its production, the Effect is non-existent, according to the other party, hence the acceptance of the other party's view would lead to a contingency contrary to the universal proposition (set forth above as the Major Premiss);-as a matter of fact, no such contingenoy does arise ;-hence it becomes established that whatever effect is prochuced in the shape of such Effects as Oil and the like, by such causes As Sesamum and the like, did exist even before the said production."
Potentially-i.e. in the form of the latent potency; 29 regards Betual appearance (manifestation), even the followers of Kapila do not regard the Effect to have existed prior (to the actual production).
Because it would have no form at all, which means that, if the Effect had no existence, then it could not have any form at all.-(8)

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER
29
In support of the second reason set forth (as above, in Sankhyakūrili. 9, "Because there is always recourse to the Cause"), the following argument has been put forward (by the Sārkhya)
TEXT (9)
"HOW IS IT THAT PEOPLE HAVE RECOCRSE TO ONLY SPECIFIC CAUSES, IN THE SHAPE OF SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE PADDY-SEED AND THE LIKE, AND NOT ANY OTHER,-EVEN THOUGH THE NONEXISTENCE (OP THE DESIRED EFFECT OR PRODUCT)
IS EQUAL (EVERYWHERE)?"
COMMENTARY.
"If the Effect were non-existent, then people would not have had rucourse to only specific causes (productive of particular Products). For instance, when a man wants paddy-grains, he takes up paddy-seeds, not Kodravaseeds; when a man, thinking of feeding Brāhmanas the noxt day, wislies to have eurds ready for the purpose, he secures a supply of milk, not water. As regards the 'non-existence of the Paddy-grain or the Curd, this 'non-existence' (according to the Opponent) is there as much in the Paddy-seed as in the Kolraxx-Heed (and as ich in milk as in water); then how is it that though the non-existence of the Paddy-grain and other products is equal everywhere in the Paddy-seed as well as in other seeds), yet it is only the specific seeds that are secured; the persons wanting the paddy-grain could secure the Kodrars and other seeds also inasmich as the Paddy-grain would be as non-existent in these latter ns in the Paddy seedis.- If it be urged that those other seeds are not secured by people because the desired grain is not there in them, then, in that case, the person wanting paddygrain also should not secure the Paddy-seed, as the desirod grain is not there also (according to the Opponent).—exactly as in the Kodrava-seed. But this is what never happens. Hence it follows that the particular Effect (Paddy-grain) is actually present in the particnlar Canse (Paddy-seed)." -(9)
In support of the third reason (set forth in Sarikhyakārikā, 9, “because all things are nol possible'), the following explanation is provided :
TEXT (10).
"EVERYTHING LIKELY TO BE PRODUCED WOULD BE PRODUCED FROM EVERYTHING, BECAUSE THE NEGATION OF CO-ESSENTIALITY IS
EQUALLY PRESENT IN EVERYTHING."-(10)
COMMENTARY. "If it is your view that the Effect that is produced has been non-existent (before production), then, under that view, every product, in the shape

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30
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER 1.
of gold, silver and the rest, would be produced from all things, such as yrass, dust, clods and the rest ;-why ?-because the negation of co-essentiality is equally present in everything; that is, the negation or absence of the character of being co-essential with,-of the same essence as-the Grass and the rest is equally present in everything that is likely to be produced. - In the preceding text, the incongruity was indicated through the Cause, and in the present text, it is indicated through the Effect; such is the difference between the two.-And yet, as a matter of fact, everything is not produced from overything. Hence it follows that the natural law is that one effect is produced from one canse because it is only in that cause that that effect already exists (in a latent form)."-(10)
The following might be urged (against the Sandhya view): The potency of Causes is such as is restricted to specific Effects; hence, even though the Effect has beon non-existent, yet it is only some one effect, an actual Product, that is produced, -and not an absolute non-entity, like the Skylotus ; this is the reason why only a specific canse is socured (for the production of a partienlar effect), that one which is efficient for the purpose, nut anything at random ; ho that particular effects are produced froin purticular causes, and not every effect from every cause"
Having this objection in view, the Sankhyat, under the pretext of answer ing it, puts forward the following arguments in support of the fourth reason Het forth in the Sankhyukariku, 9 : Because the efficient can so that only for which it is efficient").
TEXT (11).
** BECAUSE THE POTENCIES OF THESE THIXGS ARE RESTRICTED IN THEIR SCOPE, THEREFORE IT IS NOT AS HAS BEEN URGED; HENCE IT DOES NOT ANSWER OUR ABGUMENT. BECAUSE POTENT CAUSES PRODUCE ONLY SUCH EFFECT AS IS
AMEN ABLE TO THEIR POTENCY."-(11)
COMMENTARY.
of these things,-i.e. of things that are held to be causes.--II is not as has been urger ;-.e. the objection urged does not affect the Sanichya position ; hence it is not a suitable answer to our argument made by the Bauddha and others.-Why ?-Because even potent Causes, when producing their effects, produce only such effects as are amenable to their action, and not what is not so amenable.-11)
(Says the Opponent to the Sankhya]"Who has said that causes produce effects which they are not efficient to produce,- that you are denying it here? All that is said is that they also produce such effects as have been non

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
31
existent, and that such previously non-existent effect is quite amenable to the potency of the cause".
To this the Sankhya makes the following reply:
TEXT (12).
"THAT TO WHICH NO PECULIARITY CAN BE ATTRIBUTED, WHICH 15 FORMLESS AND UNMODIFIABLE, HOW COULD SUCH A THING BE PRODUCED BY CAUSES,—WHEN ANY MODIFICATION WOULD INVOLVE THE LOSS OF ITS VERY
ESSENCE ? -(12)
COMBIENTARY,
The Sankhya reasons as follows:-" The acceptance of the viow that the Effect produced has been non-existent implies that causes produice an effect which is incapable of being produced by thom. For instance, that which is non-existent is formless-i.e. chiructerless ;-that which is formless is, like tlie Hare's Horn, sumotling to which no peculiarity can be attributer,
-ie. which cannot be regarded as having any characteristics ;--and that to which no peculiarity can be attributed must be modifiable, immutallo, like Akasha ;-how can such a thing, wlich las not acquired a specific form, be produced by any cause?-It raight be argued that from the fact of its being perceived in its existing state (after being produced) it follows thnt it does become modified'. -The answer to that is that my modification would involve the loss of its very essence. If modification is admitted, then its pery essence,-essential character, which is described is consisting of formlessness,
-trould become lost. As a matter of fact, unless tho non-existent thing las relinquished its essential character (of formlessness), it cannot become existent; and if it does relinquish the essential character, then it would not le true that the non-existent (formless) thing has become existent (with form): the form of the Existent is entirely different froin the form of the non-e.cistent,
-the two being inutual contradictorios. Hence what is non-eristent cannot be produced. If it be admitted that a Causo can produce such a thing—then it would be admitted that Causes actually produce only such things als are incapable of being produced ! Certainly what is incapable of being produced can never be produced ; as we find in the case of the Sky-lotus. From all this it follows that the Sankhya argument (the fourth in the karikā) is unanswerable."-(12)
In support of the fifth reason [stated in the Sankhyakurikā, -Because The effect is of the essence of the Cause) --we have the following

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39
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER I.
TEXT (13)
"THUS THE EFFECT BEING IMPOSSIBLE, WHAT WOULD THAT BE BY PRODUCING WHICH ANYTHING WOULD BE A CAUSE? AS A CONSEQUENCE, IT CANNOT BE POSSIBLE TO ADMIT THE CAUSAL CHARACTER OF EVEN SUCH THINGS AS THE SEED AND THE
LIKE."-(13)
COMMENTARY.
Thus, ie, in accordance with the reason explained in the preceding text; or on account of the four Reasons slated above (by the Särilehya), the Effect being absolutely impossible, under the theory that the Effect is non-existent (prior to its production);-what would that be by producing vich, the Seed and other things would be a CauseHence it would be possible to assert that the Seed and other such things cannot be Causes, because their effect is non-existent, like the Sky-Lotits. And yet such an assertion is impos. sible. Hence it becomes established that the contrary view is the right one, that the Effect exists even prior to its actual production.-(13)
The following argument might be urged (against the Sarkiya)—" It may bo token as established that the Effect is ecistent; but low is it proved that all the diverse Products emanate from Primordial Matter itself ? "
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (14) "ALL THAT IS Manifest IS CLEARLY KNOWN TO BE HOMOGENEOUS WITH PLEASURE AND THE REST, TROM THE FACT OF THE EFvEor BEING FOUND TO BE THE PRODUOT OF SATISFACTION,
IRRITATION AND DEJECTION, ETC."-(14)
COMMENTARY.
As proofs of the existence of Primordial Matter, the following five affirmative arguments have been set forth by the other philosophers (Sankhyas), detailed as below in Särikhyakārika, 15-16) (1) Because the various Products are finite,-(2) because they are homogeneous,-(3) because activity is due to efficiency (potency), (4) because there is distinction between Cause and Effect,-and (5) because there is merging of the entire world {of effects),-therefore the Unmanifest (Primordial Matter) exists'.-The meaning of this is as follows:
(1) Primordial Matter exists, because the various Products are finite. In this world it has been seen that a thing that has a producer is always finite; for instance, the Potter takes up earth-clods which are finite and produces the Jar, which again is finite containing a seer or two seers and a half (of water); the 'Manifest' consisting of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, is found to be finite, Cosmic Intelligence being only one, the I-principle being

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER
33
only one, the Rudimentary Substances being only five, the Sense-organs being only eleven, the Gross Substances being only five. Hence, through Inforence, we prove it that Primordial Matter does exist, and it produces the Manifest, which is finite. If Primorelial Matter were not there, then all this Manifest would not be finite (would be without any definite size).
(2) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must be thereBecause the various Products are found to be homogeneous. As a inatter of fact, whenever something is found to belong to a certain genus, it is bound to have emanated from a Cause consisting of that Cenus; for instance, when things like the Jar and the Baucer are found to belong to the Genus Clay', they are the products of the Cause consisting of Clay. The Manifest in question is found to be homogeneous with-permeated by—such Genuses (Generic entities) as Pleasure, Pain' and 'Delusion':-how 1-because of its being found to be the product of Composure. Distress and Dejection. Thus Composure, Buoyaney, Attachment, Delight and Affection are the products of the Sattex-Attribute (Harmony); as a matter of fact, Composure (Happiness) is actually spoken of as Sattva (Harmony); similarly Irritation, Emaciation, Piercing Pain, Numbness, Anxiety, Calamity, and Iinpetuosity are products of the Rajas-Auribute (Energy); and Pain is spoken of as 'Energy:
-Depression, Concealment, Despondency, Disgust and Lethargy are the products of the Tamas Attribute (Inertia); and Inertin is spoken as * Delusion! AU this-Composure, Irritation and Dejection is found to be the Product of Cosmie Intelligence and the rest (constituting the Mani. fest'); and from this it is inforred that these are only particular phases of
Pleasure, Pain' and Dehision' (as representing the three Attributes of Satta, Rajas and Tamas, respectively). And from the fact of their being products of Pleasure', etc. it follows that they are homogeneous with * Pleasure, etc.; and from this "homogeneity', it also follows that they have emanated from a Source (Cause) which is coustituted of these (Pleasure. etc.): this having been established, it also follows by implication that this Source or Cause tuntust be Primordial Jalter. Thus it is established that Pri. mordial Matter exists--by the fact that the diverse products are found to be homogeneo119.
(3) For the following reason also, Primordial latter must exist :Because activity is due to efficiency in the ordinary world, when a man takes up an activity, it is only when he has the efficiency (or capacity) for it; for instance, tha Wenver taking up the work of cloth-weaving. By this we infer that Primordial Matter has the officiency (or Capacity) by virtue of which it produces the Manifest';--this efficiency (or Capncity) cannot be there without a substratum ; hence we conclude that there is Primordial Matter wherein the said efficiency subsists.
(4) For the following reason also Primordial Matter must exist :Because there is distinction between Cause and Effect. In this world, it is found that there is distinction between Cause and Effect; e.g. the Clay is the Cause, the Jar is the Effect; and this Effect has a character entirely different from that of the Cause ; e.g. the Jar has the capacity to contain Honey. Water and Milk, while Clay las no such capacity. Similarly seeing the Effect, in the shape of the Manifest' in question, we infer that there is

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34
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I.
Primordial Matter out of which is produced the Product in the shape of Cosmic Intelligence and the rest.
(5) For the following reason also, Primordial Matter must exist :Because there is merging of the entire world; the term 'Vaishvarupya', 'Entire World', stands for the three Regions (Heaven, Earthi and Nether World); all these, at the time of Dissolution, merge into something; for instance, thie five Gross Substances merge into the Rudimentary Substances, the five Rudimentary Substances and tho Sense-organs merge into the I principle, —the I principle merges into Cosmic Intelligence ; thus the whole of the Three Worlds become merged ; *merging' means non differentiation, as for instance, in the state of Milk, the differentiation is not possible, that Milk is different from Curd: similarly at the time of Universal Dissolution, no such discrimination is possible as that this is Manifest (Product) and that is Unmanifest (Case)' From this we conclude that there is such an entity as Primordial Matter wherein Cosmic Intelligence and the rest (making up the Manifest) become merged, incapable of being distinguished.
Our Teacher (Shantarakeita), however, has mentioned in the Text) only one reason-thut of Homogeneity, which is meant to imply the others nlso.
In the Text, in the phrases Pleasure and the rest!, the term 'the rest includes Pain and Delusion--the term Manifest stands for all the entities, irom Cosmic Intelligence clown to the Cross Substances. The phrase "is clearly knoton means is distinctly perceived :-how 1-from the fact of the Effect, etc. etc.'; the term "et cetera' is connected with each member of the compound (Composure, etc., Irritation, etc. and Dejection, etc.). This is as we bave already explained above.--(14)
Having established the validity of the reason' On account of homogeneity', the Text sets forth (on behalf of the Sankhya) the full argument in support of their doctrine.
TEXT (15).
* THUS, THE WHOLE (MANIFEST) MUST BE TAKEN AS HAVING EMANATED FROM SOMETHING MADE UP OF THE SAID (PLEASURE, ETO), BECAUSE THE SAID GENERIC CHARACTER IS FOUND PRESENT IN IT-JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS; AND THIS SOMETHING IS Primordial Matter"-SO SAY THE FOLLOWERS OF
Kapila.-(15)
COMMENTARY. The whole must, etc.':-i.e. emanated from a Cause which is made up of Pleasure and the rest;-this sentence states the Conclusion to be proved. -The Probans (Reason) in support of the conclusion is stated in the words* Because the said generic character is found present in it; that is, it is all

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
35
permeated by the generic character of being made up of the Three Attributes ;
- just as in the case of the Jar and other things ;-.e. such diverse products as the Jar and the rest. And this Cause made up of the Three Attributes is Primordial Matter -80 say the followers of Kapila,-i.e. the Sankhyas offer the said explanation.-(15)

Page #31

(B)
Refutation of the Sankhya Doctrins.
COMMENTARY. With the words Tadatra ', the Anthor begins the Refutation of the Sankhya Philosophy).
TEXT (16)
IN ANSWER TO THIS, THE WISE ONES DECLARE THAT THE ARGUMENT THAT HAS BEEN URGED (BY THE Sanlehya AGAINST THE DOCTRINE THAT THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT PRIOR TO ITS PRODUCTION) IS EQUALLY APPLICABLE TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE Existence OF THE EFFECT. AND THE ANSWER THAT YOU WOULD HAVE TO THAT ARGUMENT WOULD EQUALLY APTLY
BE THE ANSWER OF THE WISE ONES ALSO.-(16)
COMMENTARY It has been asserted (by the Sandhya) that "The various products emanating from Primordial Matter and other Canses, are of the same essence as those Causes ".-In regard to this, we proceed to consider the following points :-If these diverse Effects are of the same essence na Primordial Matter, then how is it that they emanale from it as its effects? When one thing is non-different from (of the same essence as) another, it cannot be its cause or effect; because the Cause and its Effect must be totally different in character from one another. If it were not so, how could there be any clear concertion as to one thing being the 'Cause' and another the Effect? In that case, how could there be any such deduction as that made by you—(a) that Primordial Matter must always be the Cause, (b) that the group of sixteen, consisting of the five Gross Substances and eleven Sense-organs must always be the Effect, and (c) that among Cosmic Intelligence, I-principle and Rudimentary Substances, one is the Effect of what prececles, and the Cause of what follows it! This deduction has been thus formulated in the Sankhya. karika, 3)—"Primordial Matter is never a Product-the group of seven consisting of the Cosmic Intelligence and the rest are both Product and Productive the group of sixteen is always Product ;-the Spirit is neither Product nor Productive ".-In fact (under the Sārikhya Doctrine) everything would be equally liable to be the Cause or Effect of everything else. Or, the character of Cause und Effect being always relative, --and (under the Sarichya doctrine of all things being of the same essence) there being no entirely different thing to be conceived of as in relation to another,-all things would, like the Spirit, be neither Product nor Pro. ductive; otherwise the Spirit also might be spoken of as 'Product' and

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
37
Productive". It has been said that- When Rudrila asserted that what is Curd is Milk and what is Milk is Curd, he gave evidence of his being Vindhyavasin, an inhabitant of the wilds of the Vindhya Hills'.*
[Under Sänkhyakärikā, 10] it has been declared that the Manifest has the character of being caused and the rest, and the Unmanifest is the reverse of all this;-this also is mere childish prattle. As a matter of fact, when one thing is not different in nature from another thing, it cannot be contrary to this latter; because contrariness' consists in difference of nature; otherwise, there would be an end to all notions of difference'; and as a consequence, there would be no grounds for accepting any difference among the Attributes of Harmony, Energy and Inertia (which are insentient) on the one hand and the sentient Spirits on the other; and the whole universe would be uniform; this would involve the contingency of the whole being produced and also destroyed at one and the same time. That all these contingencies would follow would be due to the fact that the notion of all kinds of Nondifference' must share the same fate (of being accepted or rejected). From this it follows that the Unmanifest' also, like the Manifest', should possess the qualities of being with cause' and the rest (which have been attributed to the Manifest only), for the simple reason that the forta (essence) of the Unmanifest is not different from that of the Manifest':-or (conversely) the Manifest should, like the Unmanifest', possess the qualities of being 'without cause' and the rest, on the ground of its form being not different from the Unmanifest; both these universal affirmative propositions would have to be accepted; otherwise undesirable contingencies would arise. Then again, in ordinary worldly experience, the relation of Cause and Effect is always apprehended on the basis of well-ascertained positive and negative concomitance; while as regards the subject under discussion, Cosmic Intelligence and other things are not ordinarily known to be produced from such causes as Primordial Matter and the rest. Nor again is any eternal thing found to have the nature of a Cause, on the basis of which the fact of the diverse Products being produced out of Primordial Matter (which is eternal) could be admitted. And the reason for this lies in the fact that, if an eternal thing is capable of any effective action, any idea of its operations being gradual or non-gradual (simultaneous), would involve self-contradictions.
The following argument might be urged-The relation of Cause and Effect that we postulate is not based upon the idea that the Cause produces something that did not exist before at all; and it is only such causal relation that would be incompatible with the non-difference in essence (form):what we do assert is that Primordial Matter undergoes modification into the form of Cosmic Intelligence and other Products,-just as the Coiled Serpent uncoils itself and becomes modified into the Elongated Serpent,-and it is in this sense that it is called the Cause of Cosmic Intelligence and other
There appears to be a pun here upon the name Vindhyavisin': Vindhya is the name given to the Vindhya Hills, so the direct meaning of the term Vindhyavasita' would be the character of being a denizen of the wilds of the Vindhya Range: the indirect inuendo is to the Sankhya author who gave expression to the opinion referred to here: his name was lindhyarasin. See Foreword, page LXI.

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Products: and these, Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, being of the nature of modifications, are called its Effect' (or Product);--and there is nothing self-contraclictory (or incongruous) in such modification, even though there be non-difference (between the original and its modification)."
This cannot be right; As under such circumstances, there can be no modi. tication. Because if there were Modification, it could come about either on the abandoning of the original form, or on the non-abandonment of it. If it were to come without the abandoning of the original form, then there would be a commixture of the two forms (original and modified); and it would be possible to perceive youth at the time of old age. If, on the other hand, Modification were to come after the abandoning of the original form, then this would involve the loss of form of the original); 30 that it would mean that the previous form has been destroyed and a new and different form has come about ; 90 that it could not be proved that any one thing is the 'modi. fication of another. Then again, you explain noclification' to consist in a change in the original itself into something else ;- now would this change be in part or in whole ? It could not be in part, because there are no parts (in Primordial Matter); nor could it be in chole, because that would mean the prodnotion of an entirely new thing and the consequens destruction of the original. Hence it cannot be right that there is change of the same thing; as it meolree the potion of the coming into existence of an entirely different character and thing).
It might be argued that—"What is meant is that while the thing itself remains constant, one property of it disappears and another property appears, and this (variation of the Property) is what is called Modification; and it does not mean that the very essence of the thing itself becomes different. ".
This also cannot be right. Because when the Property appears and dis. appears, would that Property be something differont, or non-different, from the thing itself in which it appears and disappears)!--If it were something different, then the thing itself remaining exactly the same, how can it be said to be modified? When two such things ns Cloth and Horse, which are entirely different from the Jar and other things, are produced or destroyed, it is not regardlecl as a modification of the Jar and other things. If it were so regarded, it wonld lead to an absurdity. It might be argued that-"if this line of argument were adopted, then the Spirit also would be modi. fiable'; inasmuch as the properties related to the Spirit actually appear and disappear, which would mean modification of the Spirit itself, not of anything else " Not so, we reply. As no relationship can subsist either in an entity or a non-entity, there can be nothing that could have any relationship at all. For instance, if a Relationship existed, it could subsist either in an entity or in a non-entity ;-as a matter of fact however, it cannot subsist in an entity: because the full majesty of its entire nature being already known As independent, it would not be possible for it to be dependent upon Anything else in the shape of a Relationship). Nor could the Relationship subsist in a non-entity, because by its very nature, it is devoid of all characterisation and as such cannot be depenrlent upon anything : e.g. the Hare's Horn' and such non-entities cannot be rightly held to be dependent upon anything.–Further, you do not advocate that there is modification on

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39
the appearance and disappearance of entirely different properties ;-what then what you advocate is that, in the case of an entity, its own essential character remaining constant, there is variation in its conditions (states), and this is what is meant by Modification'. When, however, the Properties are distinct from the Entity having the properties, there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant, as the entity itself is the one * essence of the Properties; and that, ex hypothesis is entirely different from them so that there is no possibility of any essential character remaining constant. Nor again does any person aver become cognisant of any such Property coming within his range of cognizanco as is different from the appearing and disappearing Properties; Jience all wise mon regard such a property as non-existent.If, however, it be held that it is not a different entity at all, as both the properties, the appeariny as srell as the disappearing, would be non-different from the Entity to which they belong-tliey should, like the Entity itself, bo one only; and under the circumstances, on what basis vould uitler the Erity or the Property be modified? The two varying Properties being non-different from the Entity whiel remains constant,-there can be no appearance (production) or disappearance (destruction) of these,-just as there is none of the constant Entity. As regards the Entity also, inasmuch as it is non-different from the Properties, all that might be possible would be the production (appearance) of something new that did not exist beiore and the destruction (disappearance) of that which has been in exist. ence : so that in no case wonld there be Modification of any single thing, I-rom all this it follows that even the basis of Modification your theory of Cause and Effect' is not tenable.
All this defect in the Sikhya theory is too manifest to need nssertiou ; -rith this idea, the Author has omitted to set it forth, and with the idea that we shall answer later on the objection that the sandhya las urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent (before the cansal oper. ation)',-ho proceeds, at this stage, to criticise the theory of the Effect being excistent, by showing that it is open to the same objections (that have been urged against the theory of the Effect being non-existent). This is what is done in the text-In answer to this, etc.'
The term "sulhiyah', wise ones', stands for the Bauddhas; they declare that the fivefold argument that the Sarikhya has set forth in the words
Because what is non-existent cannot be producel, etc.' (Sarikhyakürikā, 9),- is equally applicable ngainst the theory of the Effect being existent. For instance, it can be asserted (with equal reason) that 'Because what is existent cannot be produced, because there is recourse to the Cause, because all things are not possible, because the efficient thing can produce only that for which it is efficient, and--because the Effect is of the same essence as the Cause,-therefore the Effect is not existent';--[the reading
A sadakaranal' of the Sankhyakārikā being altered into 'Va sadakara nåt') the negative "not' (in the beginning) being construed with the phrase the Effect is existent (at the end of the sentence). “Why should the Effect be regarded as not existent ?"-Because of all the very same reasons thnt have been set forth in the Sankhyakuriki-Because what is non-existent cannot be produceri, etc. etc.- and when an objection is equally applicable to

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 1.
both parties (to a discussion), then it should not be urged by one against the other ; such is the sense of the Text.
Objection-"In what way is there this equality between the two theories), -when the objection as urged by one party is that 'the Non-existent cannot be produced', while as urged by the other, it is that the Existent cannot be produced ?"
There is no force in tliis objection, as it arises from non-compreliension of the sense of what is asserted. All that is mennt by the assertion of equality in the Text is only with reference to the five statements in the Karika) regarding non-production', presence of connection between Effects and Specific Causes and so forth (and not with reference to the conclusion deduced from these statements by the two parties, which are certainly contradictory): bocause the reasons of the non-producibility and the rest are equally applicable as against the theory of the Effect being existent. The answer that you, upholders of the doctrine of the Effect being existent, would make against these arguments (as against your doctrine) would also be the answer of the wise Bauddhas who uphold the Doctrine of the Effect being nonexistent. (16)
Question-"In wluat way are the two equal'?" The answer is provided in the following
TEXT (17).
IF THE CURD AND OTHER EFFECTS ARE ALREADY WHOLLY EXISTENT IN
THE ESSENCE OF THEIR CAUSES) MILK AND THE REST -THEN, INASMUCH AS THEY WOULD BE EXACTLY LIKE THE CAUSE, ETC. IN THEIR ESSENCE, WHAT OF THEIRS WOULD BE
THERE THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE PRODUCED ?-(17)
COMMENTARY The argument here set forth is for the purpose of supporting the view that what is already existent cannot be produced' (an argument aimed against tho Sankhya). If the Effects (Producte) in the shape of Curd and the rest exist wholly--in their entirety-i.e. in their inature and properly differentiated character, regarding their specific tasto, potoncy and consequences,-in the essence of their Causes, Milk and the rest, -then. as they would be already existent, what of their form would be there that would have to be produced, -i.e. for the purpose whereof they would have to be produced by such causes as Milk and the rest ?The compound hēlcãdisadysłatmanām' is to be analysed as those whose essence is exactly like the Cause, etc.'; the 'Cause' bere stands for the Primordial Matter; the .edc.' stands for the Sentience : -and certainly the fully matured Effects being thus circumstanced, what is meant is the fully developed form of the Effects, which, thus, cannot be produced again. This indicates the two Reasonings that go to demolish any such permanent relation as that between Cause and Effect.-(17)

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DOOTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
41
The Author now formulates the argument in the clear and proper forin
TEXT (18).
(A) THE SAID EFFECT CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY THE CAUSE, BECAUSE IT ALREADY EXISTS, LIKE THE CAUSE AND THE SPIRIT.-(B) THUS ALSO WHAT IS POSTULATED CANNOT BE THE CAUSE,-BECAUSE THERE IS NOTHING THAT CAN BE BROL'GHT ABOUT BY
IT, JUST LIKE THE OTHER THING.-(18)
COMMENTARY.
Hētu!, Cause', stands for Primordial Matter, and also the common things, Milk and the like:--Tat karya , the said affect', stands for the ('usinie Intelligence, etc. (products, according to the Sankhya, of Primor. dial Matter), as also the common things, Curd and the like Saltātah', means 'because it already existe? ;-hu-ritti rat', 'like the Cause and the Spirit, -* Cause stands for Primordial Matter and also for the common things, Milk and the like ; mitt", Spirit, stands for the Sentient Faculty : and what is like these two is like the Canse and the Spirit -The argunent may be thus formulated-That which is existent in its entirety cunnot be produced by anything. ---as, for instance, Primordial Matter und Spirit ;and the Effect in its nature state is nlready existent (ex hypothesi),-according to the opinion of our opponent the curd and the Products are already existent; -hence (if these were held as lo be produced) it would involve the contingency of going against a universal law.-Nor can the reason (prulans) lere put forward he regur led as not true, inadmissible: because, if what cannot be producod in any form were regarded as producible, then all things would have to be regarded as producible, and this would lead to a regressus ad infinitun, which would nullify the Opponent's proposition: and it would two involve the further absurdity of the prodncibility of what has already beeu produced.
So far the Author has shown that what are regarded (by the Sarkhya) as Effects cannot really be Effects or Products': now he proceeds to show that what are regarded as Causes' cannot really be Causes' - Thue also what is postulated, etc. Postulated ',-i.e. the Entity posited. W at is meant is as follows:-Primordial Matter, and also the Seed, alilk and other common things, which have been postulated as the Cause of such intended effects as Cosmic Intelligence and the rest, as also Curd and other common products,-cannot be the cause of these latter,—that is, it is not capable of being treated as the producer :-why I-because there is nothing that can be brought about by such a cause; as a matter of fact, there is nothing that can be brought about by the said entity; and as the said entity has this character, it cannot be regarded as the Cause'. That this is so follows from what has been said in the first lulf of the Text), regarding the effects in question being not effects at all; it is for this reason that the Text has used the term alah, thus
Parūtmavzt', 'Just like the other things', i.c. like the thing with a different character, -i.e. like the entity which has not been posited as a Cause; the

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 1,
entity that has not been posited as the Cause is the Spiril.-as declared (in the Sanielyakarika, 3)— The Spirit is neither procluctive por product'.
This argument may be formulated as follows:- That for which there is nothing to be bronght about cannot be a Cause,-e.g. the Spirit the entity postulated (as Cause) is one for which there is nothing to be brought about ;-hence the entity concerned is not found to fulfil the conditions which are invariably concomitant (with the nature of the Cause).
Both these arguments put forward in the Text are only meant to expose the anomalies (involved in the Santchya doctrine); hence there is no neecl for putting forward only such corroborative examples as are accepted hy both parties.
There is a party among Sarichyas who hold the view that—"The Spirit also is also a doer (a Cause) in regard to his own experiences on the analogy of the Reflection (which, though not of the Reflecting Substance, is yet attribut. el to it; similarly though Experience does not subsist in the Spirit, yet it is attributed to him]"
As against this party, the explanation of the Text would be as follows: The term partce stands for the Para-una, the Liberated Spirit; as such a Spirit would be liberated, he could not be the doer (Cause) in regard to Experience. Hence (even so) there is nothing wrong with the corroborative instanco cited in the Text.-(18)
The Author, in the following text, indicates (on behalf of the Sankhya) the fallacy of Inadinissibility in the argument just put up by himself
TEXT (10)
IT MIGHT BE VRGED THAT THERE IS SOME PECULIAR FEATURE, SOME
THING IN THE SHAPE OF manifestation AND THE LIKE, -BY PRODUCING WHICH, CAUSES MIGHT CEASE TO BE
DEPAMED (AS FUTILE)" -(19)
COMMENTARY.
[The Sankhya may argue as follows: "If, in your first argument, you mean your premies to be in the fully qualified form because it already exists in its entirety, even along with such features as being manifest and the rest'-then the premiss is Untrue', 'Inadmissible'; because we do not regard the Effect as existing along with all such features as being manifested and the like: we regard it as existing only in the form of a potency (in the Cause).
-If, on the other hand, you mean your premiss to be in general form, with. out the said qualification, then it is 'Inconclusive'; because such peculiar features as manifestation and the like are actually produced (even under our theory).-Nor does our theory involve the absurdity of all things being Effects (produced).-For the same reason, the second reason put forward by you is also 'not true', 'Inadmissible, as there is something to be brought about, produced
Tluis is what is meant by the phrase "Something in the shape of Manifestation and the like; the expression and the like' is meant to include such

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
peculiar conditions as Growth, etc.— Which' (in the Text) stands for the * peculiar feature:- To be defamed', -blamed. What is meant is that our theory is not open to the fallacies that have been urged against our Reason as being 'Inadmissible', 'Untrue' and the like.—(19)
The Author answers the above arguments in the following
TEXT (20).
IF
THIS (PECULIAR FEATURE) EXISTED PREVIOUSLY, THEN THE OBJECTION IS NOT ANSWERED; IF, HOWEVER, IT DID NOT EXIST PREVIOUSLY, THEN, BEING NON-EXISTENT, HOW COULD IT
BE PRODUCED OUT OF THE CAUSES ?-(20)
COMENTARY.
There can be only two alternatives : (1) This peculiar feature' thnt has been spoken of, existed alrendy, in its pristine state of Primordial Alatter', prior to the condition of manifestation and the rest,-or (2) it did not su exist. If it did exist, then you have not succeeded in showing the invalidity (inadmissibility) of the two Reasons put forward by us, and this aliswering them. If, on the other hand, it did not exist previonsly;-then, even so, low could that peculiar feature secure its production from the snid Causes? As your argument is that what is non eristent cannot be produced, such production eun hye right ach is the sense of the Text.-(20)
The argument because what is already eristent cannot be produced as stated by the Author himself (against the Sankhya theory on p. 24. 1. 20, parodying Sankhyakürikā, 9) las been duly supported; now be proceeds to argue in support of the other four arguments, because there is recourse to the Cause' and the rest,-in the following
TEXT (21).
For THE SAME REASON, IF THERE IS NOTHING TO BE PRODUCED, THERM WOULD BE NO BECOURSE TO THE CAUSE', NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY PRODUCTION OUT OF EVEN A SPECIFIO CAUSE,NOR WOULD THERE BE ANY EFFICIENCY, XOR ANY
OPERATION' (OF THE CAUSE).-(21)
COMMENTARY.
Ax in accordance with the said reasoning, the Effect to be brought about would (according to the Säilyr) be already in existence [read Sadhyasya bhavil'), 'recourse to Cause would not be possible; as intelligent persons have recourse to a cause only for the purpose of something that could be brought about by that Cause. Nor would it be necessary that particular

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I.
Effects, like Ourd and the rest, must proceed only from particular causes; simply because there would be nothing to be produced out of any cause. This supports the (parodied) argument Because all things are nol possible What is meant is that when the Sankhya asserts that an Effect cannot be produced from all causes what he means is that a particular Effect can be produced only from a particular Cause'. This is not possible under the Sarilehya theory of the Effect being already existent; as, under this theory, there would be nothing to be produced.- Similarly as regards the argument that 'an efficient Cause can produce only that for which it is efficent', neither efficiency' nor the production of that for which it is efficient is possible under the Sanchya theory; for the very same reason that there is nothing to be procluced (under the theory). If anything were produced by another thing, then alone could one admit the officiency of the latter thing, which could then be accepted as the Cause of that which would be produced ;-not otherwise.-This is what is meant by the words—Nor tvorild there be efficiency', nor any operation of the Cause', 421)
The following Text proceeds to show that it is not right that things should be regarded as 'Cause', for the simple reason that what is regarded as to be produced already exists (according to the Sārkhya)
TEXT (22). INASMUCH AS EVERY EFFECT IS ALREADY THERE IN ITS ENTIRETY, THERE CAN BE NOTHING TO BE PRODUCED' (Ax Effect); CON. SEQUENTLY, THE VERY NAME 'CAUSE' CANNOT BE
LOGICAL.—(22)
COMMENTARY. This is said in support of the argument (the last one in the parodied Sankhyakārika) Because the effect is of the same essence as the Cause': - But it is not (i.e. the name 'Carrse' is not illogical). Hence the Effect cannot be regarded as existent this conclusion has to be construed with all the (five) arguments set forth above.-(22)
With the following tect the Author proceeds to criticise the theory of the Effect being existent, from another point of view
TEXT (23).
ALL MEANS (OF COGNITION), WHEN OPERATIVE, SERVE TO SET ASIDE WRONG COGNITION AND TO PRODUCE DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION; THIS WOULD NOT BE COMPATIBLE WITH
REASON (UNDER THE Sanchya THEORY), (23)
COMMENTARY. * Operative-active. Wrong Cognition includes also Doubtful Cognition, as it partakes of both the contraries (affirmation and denial), and hence

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
45
is as much an "imposition' (as Wrong Cognition).--As a matter of fact, every Means (of Cognition), when operating on its objective, does two things : it sets aside Misconception and Doubt relating to the object of Cognition, and produces a definitely Certain Cognition relating to it. This fact cannot be compatible with reason, under the Sankhya theory of the Existent Effect :-(23)
In the following text, the Author proceeds to explain why the said fact is not compatible with reason, under the Sarithya theory :
TEXT (24).
THE DOUBT AND THE MISCONCEPTION CANNOT BE SET ASIDE, AS THEY WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE. NOR IS THE PRODUCING OF DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION POSSIBLE, FOR THE VERY SAME REASOX. HENCE ALL THAT HAS BEEN
SAID IS PUTILE.—(24)
COMMENTARY [It is not compatible) because, as regards Misconception and Doubt, both of these, under your theory, would be of the nature of either Senlienca (Oonsciousness, Spirit) or Coemic Intelligence and Mind ; in either case any setting aside of these would be impossible, because Spirit, Cosmic Intelligence and Mind, all these being eternal (constant).-Misconception and Doubt also would be constant. Nor would the production of Definitely Certain Cognition be possible through any Beans: for the same reason, i.e. because it is always there (ex lvypothesi).- From all this it follows that all that you lovo said in support of your doctrine is entirely futile.-What this hints at is that the Sankhya-doctrine involves self-contradiction; for instance, when the Sarklys speaks of the means of producing a definitely Certain Cognition, it implies the producing of the Definito Cognition which has not been thore; and this is contrary to the assertion that the Effeet is existent'; so there is clear self-contradiction.-(24)
TEXT (25).
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, (IT BE HELD THAT) THE DEFINITE COGNITION THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED WOULD BE ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN
THERE,—THEN, THIS ONE INSTANCE OF THE EFFECT BEING NON-EXISTENT) WOULD INVALIDATE ALL THOSE REASONS (THAT HAVE BEEN SET FORTH
BY THE Sankhya).- (25)
COMMENTARY If, in order to avoid the futility of the reasons, it be admitted that the Definite Cognition that is produced from the Meang is one that did not exist before, then, in that case, the entire set of reasoning - Because

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46
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I
what is non-existent cannot be produiren, etc. etc. (Sankhyakārika, 9),-becomes invalidated ; because as there is nothing incongruous in the production of the Definite Cognition (which has not been existent), so there would be no incongruity in the production of any other non-existent thing ;sivailarly, just as there is production of the non-existent Definite Cognition, and the securing of the particular Means for the said production, and as there is no possibility of the said Definite Cuguition being produced from all sorts of Means (Wrong, Doubtful and the like).-and as even though non-existent, the Definite Cognition is brought about by only such means as are efficient for that purpose,--and just as these Means have the nature of the Cause', 80 exactly could it be also in every other case [and the Premies of the Sikhya would thus become annulled).-(25)
TEXT (26)
IF IT BE HELD THAT THE EFTECT, WHICH HAS BEEN Amanifesled
(LATENT, IN THE CAUSE), ACQUIRES manifestation THROUGX THE CAUSES”, -THEN (THE QUESTION IS) WHAT IS THIS manifestation
OF THE EFFECT - IT CANNOT CONSIST IN THE APPEARANCE (PRODUCTION OF A PECULIARITY IN ITS NATURE, BECAUSE OF NON-DIFFERENTIATION
AND NON-CONNECTION.-26)
COMMENTARY.
The Sarulehya may argue thus" Thonghi, even prior to the operation of its Means, the Definite Cognition is already in existence, yet the Means (Cause) is not futile ; becarise prior to the operation of the Cause, the Cogni. tion was unmanifested (lying latent in the Cause), and subsequently to the operation), it acquires manifestation through that cause ; hence what the Cause operates for is the manifestation of the latent Effect); and so there is no futility."
This however cannot be right; because there can be no such manifestation'. This manifestation consists either (a) in the appearance of some peculiarity in the nature of the Effect, or (b) in the apprehension of the peculiarity, or (c) in the disappearance of what has been obstructing the apprehension of the peculiarity.
It cannot consist in the appearance of some peculiarity in its nature : because would this peculiarity in its nature bo non distinct from the Etiect [Definite Cognition in the case in question), or distinct from it? If it were nondistinct, then, inasmuch as there would be non-differentiation from the Definite Cognition (Effect), it would be as constant as the form of the Definite Cognition itself; and hence there could be no production of it. If, on the other lund, the peculiarity' is something distinct from the Effect (Definite Cognition) itsell,-aven so, there could be no such connection (or relationship) as this is & peculiarity of that'. Because any such connection (between the Effect and its Peculiarity) could only be either one of container and contained

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or of 'Cause and Effect (Producer and Product). The former is not possible in the case in question ; because the two factors concerned not rendering any help to one another, the said relation of Container and Contained' is not possible ; even if there were any help rendered, if that Help were something distinct from the two factors, then the Connection itself conld not be there ; so that there would be an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, the Help were not so distinct, then the operation of the Cause would be futile; as the Definite Cognition (Effect) itself would have brought about the Pecaliarity, which, ex hypothesi, is not distinct from the said Help.--Then agnin, the 'Peculiarity being something incorporeal, it would not be possible for it to fall downwards, and as such, it would not need a 'container' (or receptacle, support), because a receptacle' can only serve the purpose of preventing this downward fall (due to gravity).-Nor is the relation of Cause and Effect possible (between the Effect and its Peculiarity'); because the Cause in the shape of the Definite Cognition being aluvys there, it would be possible for the peculiarity to be produced aluxys, which is absurd. Nor world it be right to hold that the production of the Peculiarity by the Definite Cognition would be dependent upon the actual operation of the Cause. Because there can be no dependence upon what renders no help ; and if there is help rendered, then the theory becomes open to the objection and infinite regress urged above.-Further, this Peculiarity that is held to be produced as something distinct,-is it existent or non-ecistent (prior to the operation of the Cause)! These two horns of the dilemma present them. selves here also. If the Peculiarity is something non-existent, then, as urged above, all the reasons (put forward by the Sarikh ya) become invalidated. If, on the other hand, it has been existent, then there is no use for the Cause. -If in regard to the Manifestation also, a further manifestation were postulated, there would be nothing to prevent the infinite regress as to what this further manifestation is and so forth.-Thus, even on the alternative of the two being distinct, there would be non-connection' -and as tliere would be no connection (relationship), any production of peculiarity! in the nitture of the Effect would not be possible.-(26)
TEXT (27)
THE MANIFESTATION OF THE EFFECT CANNOT CONSIST IN ITS Apprehension ; NOR IN the removal of what was obstructing its Apprehension; BECAUSE THE APPREHENSION IS A CONSTANT FACTOR, AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND
(APPREHENSION), -(27)
COMMENTARY.
It cannot be right to regard the manifestation' (of the Effect) as consisting in the appearance of the cognition of the Effect; because the Cognition of the Effect is a constant factor. For instance, this cognition of the Effeet must, under the theory of the upholder of the theory of the Effect being

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 1.
existent, be something eternal ; under the circumstance what of it would be there which would be produced ? Also because no second apprehension is possible, the Manifestation of the Effect cannot consist in the appearance of the Cagnition of that Effect. The particle also has the cumulative force ; and it has to be construed apart from its place in the text; it should be taken as after the word ' asambhaval',-i.e. at the end of the sentence). So that the sense comes to be as follows:-According to your view, Cognition (Conscious. ness) is one only,—your doctrine being that from Creation down to Dissolution, there is only one Consciousness; and it is this same Consciousness that constitutes Definite Cognition ; apart from this then, what other apprehension is there which would be styled 'manifestation', and which would be produced by Causes?
The following might be wrged here (by the Sänkchya)—"The Apprehensio of an object is not of the nature of Buddhi (Consciousness), it is of the nature of Manas', Mind'".
But that cannot be right; because all these terms-Buldhi' (Intelligence), Upalabhi' (Apprehension}, dhya vizsuya' (Determinate Cognition), • Manas' (Mind), Samvilli' (Knorledge) and so forth.—ære synonymous. Tluis is going to be explained later on.
Nor can. Manifestation of the Effect consist in the remoral of vohat has been obstructing ils apprehension': for the same two reasons. For instance,
that which has been obstrueting its apprehension' being something eternal (ex hypothesi), no removal of it is possible. It is not possible for this *removal' to be in the nature of 'disappearance'; because until the thing has renounced its previous form, it cannot disappear'.
Further, because there is no possibility of a second apprehension, there cilu be no obstacle to apprehension; as there can be no obstruction (coucoal. inent) of what is non-existent, because what is obstructed' is always something that is existent. From all this it follows that there can be no removal of the Obstruction (of Appreliension).
Or the torm nityatuit', 'because of its being constant' in the Test), may be taken to mean that, because the Cognition of the Effect is constant (eternal), there can be no obstruction of it, and because such obstruction is impossible, there can be no obstruction' of it.-Nor again can the removal of the obstruction' be Isought about by anything, because it is characterless (being a negative entity, it has no positive character),
Under the doctrine of the Existent Effect', the futility of the cansal operation is not the only incongruity; the impossibility of Bondage and Liberation is another incongruity; in fact, the most undesirable contingency of the cessation of all worldly notivity cannot be avoided. For instance, you hold the doctrine that Liberation follows on the appearnace of True Knowledge, in the shape of real discrimination between Matter and Spirit ; now as this True Knowledge is always constantly present, all embodied beings would be always "liberated'; hence there could be no 'Bondage'. Conversely, 'Bondage also has been held to be due to Wrong Notion (Mis. conception, Illusion); and as this Illusion also would be a constant factor, all beings would be always 'under bondage'; and under the circumstances, how could there be any Liberation'

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
49
Then again, whenever people have recourse to any activity, it is either for securing what is beneficial or for getting rid of what is harmful. Under the theory of the Existent Effect however, there can be nothing that cannot be secured, nor anything that cannot be got rid of; hence the whole world would be without desire for anything; so that ultimately there would be total cessation of all worldly activities.-(27)
Having thus refuted the doctrine of the Effect being existent (even prior to the operation of its Cause),' the Author proceeds to refute the objections likely to be urged against the doctrine that 'the Effect is nonexistent (prior to the operation of its Cause):
TEXT (28). JUST AS (UNDER THE Sänkhya THEORY),-EVEN THOUGH, ON THE GROUND OF ALL THINGS BEING CONSTITUTED BY THE Three Attributes, THERE IS NO DIFFERENTIATION AMONG THEM, AND YET EVERYTHING (Caus) DOES NOT PRODUCE EVERYTHING (EFFECT), - IN THE SAME MANNER, EVEN THOUGH THE EFFECT IS NON-EXISTENT (BEFORE THE CAUSAL OPERATION), EVERYTHING CANNOT PRODUCE
EVERYTHING.(28)
COMMENTARY. The very denial of the theory of the Existent Effect has, by implication, proved that the Effect is non-existent'; as existent' and non-existent are contradictory terms; and hence no third alternative is possible. Even so, the Author now proceeds to show the futility of the objections that the Opponent has urged (against the Buddhist theory of the non-existent Effect').
The objection has been urged (by the Sarikhya, under Text 8. above) that "if the Effect were non-existent, it could not be produced, because it wordd have no form at all".
Now this Reason is fallacious, beset with the fallacy of being Unknown (not admitted); because the theory is that it is the nature or character itself (of the Effect) that is produced by the Cause), and this nature or character of the thing is not known' (admitted) to be *formless' -It might be urged that "before its production, it is certainly characterless".-Not so, we reply; as it is not possible for it to be characterless '; it cannot be right to regard the character itself as characterless ; because when something is said to be
characterless' what is meant is that it has no character, and this certainly is not there, even before the production of the thing; in fact, (under the argument of the Opponent) that itself would come to be characterless by which the Effect is produced. If the Reason 'because it would have no form 'be held to have been put forward with reference to the forinless entity' in the shape of the negation of the thing ---then the reasoning would be futile (proving what is already proved or admitted); as the negation of the thing has not been regarded by any one as 'something produced'.-Further,

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50
TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER I.
the Reason is invalid also as being 'Inconclusive': as no reason has been put forward for sublating the contrary; inasmuch as the potency of the Cause is always restricted, it is only some non-existent thing that is produced, only that for the production of which the Cause is there; that thing, for pro. ducing which there is no Cause-such for instance as the 'Sky.lotus', -is never, produced. Honce the Reason put forward (by the Sandhya) is 'too wide, Inconclusive' Everything cannot be regarded as the Cause of every. thing ; nor is any such universal proposition accepted as that whatever is non-existent must be produced '; what is accepted is the proposition that whatever is produced was non-existent before its production'.
The following might be urged (by the Sarkhya)—"All Causes being equally productive of what has been non-existent, why is it that all Causes are not productive of all non-existent effects ?"
This criticism can be urged with equal force against you also : All Causes being equally productive of what has been existent, how is it that all Causes are not productive of all effects? According to your view, there is nothing that is non-existent, which, on account of its non-existence, could not be produced
"It is because the potency of Causes is restricted that, though things like the Hare's Horn are existent, they are not produced."
The same is equally true for the other theory also.
Then again, just as for you, even though all things are equally constituted by the Three Attributes, yet everything is not productive of everything, because the potency (of things) is restricted ;-the compound
Sarvakärala' may be explained as productive of everything' or as 'that which has everything for its producer';-in the same manner (under our view also), even though all things (Effects) are equally non-existent, yet everything will not be productive of everything.
In fact, what has been asserted in the Text-'As in your case, so in mine also '-has been said after having admitted the Opponent's contention, for the sake of argument; in reality, there is no 'equality between the two theories. Because (under our view) even though there is diversity among things, yet, some one effect is produced by some one Cause only; there being no incongruity in the idea that the efficiency of the Cause is always restricted by the diversity of character involved in the series of causes' (Wheel of Causation) bearing upon a certain Effect. If, on the other hand, there is
non-differentiation' (between Cause and Effect),—how could it be possible to conceive of such an incongruity as that involved in one and the same thing being both 'cause' and non-cause at the same time? Specially as distinction (differentiation) among things is always based upon contrary properties being attributed to them. This has been thus declared- For all differentiation there must be some ground or basis in the nature of the things concerned ; if there were non-differentiation, then, all being one and the same, its activity as well as inactivity would both be rendered impossible' -(28)
In the following Text, the Opponent raises an objection on the basis of the Restriction of Potencies (of Causes)

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A-N. 12171
51
DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
TEXT (29)
** INASMUCH AS THE PRESENCE OF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU, THE POTENCIES CANNOT BE RESTRICTED. ON THE VIEW OF THEIR BEING EXISTENT, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEIR RESTRICTION WOULD BE RIGHT AND PROPER AS PERTAIN
ING TO THE LIMITS."-(29)
COMMENTARY.
For you-i.e. for the Buddhist who holds the Effect to be non-existent it is not possible for the (causal) Potencies to be restricted.-Why?-Because the presence of limits, in the shape of Effects would be impossible ; (as the Effeots would be non-existent, there would be nothing with reference to which there could be restriction); -for the simple reason, that when the limit is non-existent, that nohich is limited cannot be there. This argument may be formulated as follows:- Things devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects cannot have their potencies restricted-e.g. such things as Hare's Horns, -and (according to you) things like the Paddy.seed are devoid of limits in the shape of existent Effects; hence they do not fall within range of the Major term [i.e. they cannot have their Potencies restricted)'.
-With a view to show the soundness of his own view, the Sankhya adds On the views of their being existent, etc.-i.e. if Effects are held to be existent ; - their i.e. of the Potencies.-(29)
In the following Text, the Author points out the invalidity of the reason (set forth by the Sankhya, in the preceding Text):
TEXT (30)
IT IS NOT SO ; IT MAY BE THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE OF LIMITS
THERE CAN BE NO SUCH SUBSEQUENT ASSERTION AS HELD BY US. BUT THERE IS NO HARM DONE TO TRE NATURE OF THE THING ITSELF WHICH IS ENTIRELY FREE FROM ALL
RESTRICTIVE ADJUNCTS.-(30)
COMMENTARY.
[It cannot be as urged by the Opponent]-because, on account of the abrence of Limits, it may be that there can be no such subsequent assertion as that the potency to produce Curd is present in the Milk'; that may be so; but there is that Entity which is entirely free from all restrictive adjuncts—which is not a mere imposition (or assumption), subsequent to which there appears another Entity, which has not been previously perceived : and there can be no denial of such an Entity (as of the former one).—(30)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I.
The Sanchya may urge the following—"Where, with regard to any. thing, there is absolute cessation of all verbal and conceptual content/thera the very nature of the thing must cease".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (31). THE NAME OF THINGS IS NOT THEIR 'ESSENCE' (NATURE, FORM); BECAUSE
ALL KINDS OF CONCEPTION AND VERBAL EXPRESSION
PROCEED THROUGK HABIT, WITH REFERENCE TO THE UNDIFFERENTIATED (IMMACULATE) Entry -(31)
COMMENTARY The Nature of a thing is what has the widest extension (range); it is only when that is excluded that it sets aside its less extensive concomi. tants,-be it Cause or Effect, -becanse there is invariable concomitance between the two (the more extensive Nature' and the less extensive Cause or Effect); nothing else sets aside this; for if it did, it would lead to absurdity. Such 'verbal expression as that 'Milk has the potency to produce Curd',
-does not constitute the Essence'-Nature-of things; if it were so, then alone could 'the verbal expression, on being excluded, exclude the relevant thing also.
Verbal Expression' is mentioned only by way of illustration; Concep. tion' (Fanciful Assumption) also as related to the Thing in question is meant to be included.
Essence' also is mentioned only by way of illustration; it includes the Cause' also; so that the Name of a thing is not its 'Cause'; because the thing can be produced without the Name.
The Author states the reason for the assertion just made-Because all kinds of Conception', etc. etc. Because, -inasmuch as-all 'Conceptions', which are connected with Names, -as also all'Verbal Expressions'-express. ive words, both of which are of all leinds-of various kinds,-proceed, become applicable,-through habit,-with reference to the undifferentialed (Immaculate) Entity-i.e. the Entity which has no component parts and which is of one constant uniform nature. That is to say, there is a single Entity, in the shape of Word-Sound' for instance, which, being constant, is conceived and spoken of' hy speakers existing at varying times. It is only when these Word-conceptions' become identified with, and have for their objective, the said constant Entity, that this latter becomes diversified; or (conversely), like the Essence of the Entity itself, the Conceptions themselves become unified in essence; in no case can it be right that any single thing should be diverse in its essence ; any such idea would lead to absurdity.--Hence what happens is that the potency of the Cause being restricted, it is only some non-existent thing that is produced, not all.
Thus the Reason (put forward by the Sankhya, under Text 8, above) because it would have no form at all' is Inconclusive.
For the same reasons, the other reasons also (propounded by the Sankhya in support of the 'Existence of the Effect' under Sänkhyakarikā, 9)-such

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
53
as because the particular Cause is secured', and the rest --become invalid. Because, what is said regarding the securing of the particular Cause would be true if the said Securing of the particular Cause' were found anywhere to have been due to the presence (therein) of the Effect; specially as it is quite possible for the said securing of the particular Cause to be due to the restricted character of the Potency of the Cause itself.
That everything cannot be produced from everything' is also due to the restricted character of the Causal Potency itself; as it is impossible ior everything to be, by its very nature, capable of proclucing all things.
As for the argument set forth (by the Sankhya) above, under Text 12**that to which no peculiarity can be attributed, which is formless and unmodifiable, how could such a thing be produced by Canses?",--that also has been urged without understanding the real sense of our theory. We do not say that a Non-entity is produced; if we had said that then alone could it be urged against us that any modification of it would involve loss of its very essence. We have however already explained that what is produced is a Thing itself (not a mero non-entity); all that we say is that the thing was non-existent before its production,-a conclusion deduced from the fact that (prior to production) it is not found to fulfil the conditions of Cogni sability and that which is already a full-fledged entity cannot be an Effect, something to be produced ; and that it is spoken of as 'produced by that Cause on whose mere proximity it springs into existence. Nothing is produced by the entering into it of any operations (of the Cause), because all things are, by their very nature, devoid of operative activity. Then again, there is nothing that can be called a "non-entity, which could be modified (as urged by the Sankhya); nor can non-existence constitute the Essence of anything; because non-existence' is a mere negation.-Then again, if it be asserted that "What is non-existent cannot be produced, because no peculiarities of the product could be attributed to it”,-then how could the Existent also be produced, since its essential features are already accomplished, and no further peculiarities conld be attributed to it -For these reasons, the reasoning that "Because what is efficient can produce only that which can be produced by it" is invalid.
Further, inasmuch as under the theory of the 'Non-existent Effect, it is possible for things to be Causes', the final (Sänkhja) argument also - Because the Effect is of the essence of the Cause"-is invalid, too wide and Inconclusive'.-Or, inasmuch as the fact of the Existerul thing being an
Effect has been already shown to be impossible,-and as all the facts that have been urged, in the shape of the arguments in Sankhyakarika, 9) * because the particular Cause is secured and so forth, -are explicable only under the theory of the Effect being non-existent,--all these four arguments are contradictory' (as urged in support of the Sankhya doctrine of the
Existent Effect'), because they actually prove what is contrary to the conclusion desired (by the Sankhya)-(31)
[Says the Sankhya) - "If it is your view that what is produced has been non-existent, then how is it that in the Satra (of the Buddhists), the pro. duction of both, the Existent as well as the Non-eristent, has been denied ?

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 1.
This is the declaration-'O high-minded one, all Things are un produced, as neither the Existent nor the Non-existent is ever produced."
The answer to this is provided by the following: -
TEXT (32).
IN REALITY, THE PRODUCTION (OF A THING) CONSISTS IN ITS becoming a thing ; THIS PRODUCTION CANNOT BE RELATED TO WHAT IS existent,
OR WITH WHAT IS non-existent ; IT IS RELATED ONLY TO A CONCEPTUAL IDEA WHICH IS PURELY NON
EXISTENT-(32)
COMMENTARY
The particle 'tu(in reality) serves to emphasise what is going to be said.-When we come to examine in what manner e particular thing may be distinguished from other things, we find that what is called the production (appearance, coming into existence, of a Thing) is only its own Essence, becoming itself, which exists merely for a moment, free from all connection with all elements of the Past and the Future. It is not a Universale with particular features, as assumed by the Vaibhäşika; such a Universal' is going to be refuted (under Chapter 13). Nor does it consist in inherence in Being' or 'inherence in its own Cause', as postulated by the Vaishēsika ; as both these also are going to be refuted under Chapter 13); and because, under the theory of the other party (the Vaishēsika), both these (Inherences) are constant, and what is already constant cannot be produced. To this effect there is the following declaration :- Being (Existence) consists in being in contact with the Cause; the Cause is a cause by virtue of producing tho Effect; the Being and the Contact both being constant, what is there that could be produced ?
This—the said Production cannot be related to thot is non-existent, by the relation of co-essentiality (being of the same essence); as * existent and non-existent' are mutually contradictory, what is nonexistent cannot come about. Nor can the production be related to what is existent already from before; because before Production, the existent cannot be there.
Question-" Then how is it that you (Buddhists) are upholders of the doctrine that the Effect is non-existent!"
Answer-Only to a conceptual idea, etc. ;-it is only to a conceptual idea, which is of the nature of either the Active Agent or the Instrument,(Cause)-it is led into relationship. As a matter of fact, there is nothing called non-existent which could enter into 'production: the idea therefore that the non-existent is prodaced' is purely conceptual.—(32)
Question_"What is the basis of this conception on which the said Idea is supposed to rest ?"
The answer is supplied by the following:

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DOOTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
TEXT (33).
THE BASIS OF THE SAID CONCEPTION) LIES IN THE FACT THAT THE FORM OF A THING PERCEIVED IN IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE TO ANOTHER THING DID NOT EXIST BEFORE. IF THE SAID THING
HAD EXISTED PREVIOUSLY, THEN THIS BASIS WOULD NOT BE THERE (FOR THE SAID
ASSUMPTION).-- (33)
COMMENTARY When the previously unrerceived form of a particular thing is perceived in immediate seqnence to another thing, the said form is one that did not erist before-i.e. prior to its own middlemost state'*--for the simple reason that it is not apprehended as ful6lling the conditions of being percoived. Hence this forms the basis for the conception that the thing that is produced is one that did not exist before.-" How so?"-If the said thing, etc.;-ie. prior to its middlemost state', if the form of the thing, this middlemost state, had existed, there could be no room for the said basis of the Conception that what was non-existent has become produced'. Because the term becomes produced' connotes that particular state of the thing which appears in its middlemost state'; and if this were present even previously (to that state), then this would set aside the notion that the form of the thing consists in that particular form of it which appears during the middlemost state' only. As (ex hypothesi), it would be as all-pervading as Akasha, and as such it could not have any
previous' or 'middlemost or subsequent states at all. Under the circumstances, it would be possible to assert that all things are produced at all times', as there would be no grounds for differentiation.-(33)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out further defects in the doctrine of the Existent Effect -
TEXT (34) IT HAS BEEN HELD THAT THE CURD AND OTHER Effects SUBSIST IN THE MILK AND OTHER Causes, IN THE FORM OF Latent Potency; NOW WHAT IS THIS POTENCY'? IF IT IS THE SAME AS THE Curd AND OTHER EFFECTS, THEN THIS ALSO WOULD BE PERCEIVED LIKE THE
MILK ITSELF. (34)
COMMENTARY It is asserted (by the Sarikhya) that the Effect subsists in the Cause; what do you really mean by this? Do yon mean that the Effect exists
Each object has three momentary States': (1) moment of non-existence, prior to coming into existence, (2) moment of existence, and (3) moment of nonexistence, cessation, destruction.

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TATIVASANGRAHA: OBAPTER I.
there in the actually manifested form? If so, then that cannot be ; for if it were so. then while the Milk is still in the form of Milk, the Curd would be perceived, just as it is after the production of the Curd.-Or, is it meant that it subsists there in the form of Lalent Potency !-Is this 'Potency? something different from the Cund and other Effects as manifested in the perceptible form? Or is it the same as these 1-If it is the same, then, as before, it should be perceptible (which it is not).-(34)
[The other alternative that it is something different is taken up in the following Text]:
TEXT (35).
IF IT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT (FROM THE EFFECT), THEN THE EXISTENCTA
OF ONE THING CANNOT BE SPOKEN OF AS THAT OF ANOTHER, EXCEPT FIGURATIVELY. FOR EXAMPLE) THE EXISTENCE
OF THE ATTRIBUTE OF) 'HARMONY' IS NOT SPOKEN OF AS THE EXISTENCE OF PAIN
AND DELUSION -(35)
COMMENTARY
If the other alternative is accepted-viz, that the 'Potency' is something different from the Effect', -then the view that 'the Efiect subsists in the form of the Cause' becomes abandoned ; because you admit the existence of an entity different from the Effect, in the shape of Potency, For instance, when something becomes manifested in a form endowed with particular qualities resulting from the development of the particular taste and potency, then it is called an 'Effect', like the Curl for instance: and this Curd-effect is spoken of as 'non-existent in the state oi Milk, because it is not capable of being perceived. As regards Potency, which (you say) is something different from this Effect, it cannot thus be an Effect'; for the simple reason that the existence of one thing (Polency) cannot mean the existence of another (Effect); for if it did, then it would be all confusion.
"But we have such expressions as Butter is longevity, where Buller is found to be spoken of as longevity, which is a totally different thing, and Damp Reed is foot-disenzse, where Damp Reed is spoken of as footatisease, a totally different thing."
In answer to this, the Text has added the phrase 'eccept figuratively': -i.e. there can be no such expressions except in figurative language. Longevity is spoken of as Butter only figuratively, through attributing the character of the Effect (Longevity) to its Cause (Butter); and such expressions are not possible in their literal sense. If, when you say that 'the Effect is existent in the Cause', you are using only figurative language, then there is no difference between our views : there is difference however if you intend the assertion to be taken in its literal sense. --This is what the Text shows by means of an example-The eristence of Harmony, etc. Even yon (Sankhya) do not hold that the form of Pain' (Rajas-Attribute) and Delusion" (Tamas-Attribute) is the same as that of Harmony' (Sattra-Attribute):

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
as each one of these has been held to have a distinct character of its own.—(35)
The Text now proceed to show the Inadmissibility of the Premiss pnt forward (by the Sankhya under Kārika 15) in the form " Because of homogeneity":
TEXT (36)
THE MANIFEST' IS NOT ADMITTED BY US IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER
AS HOMOGENEOUS WITA (MADE UP OF) PLEASURE AND THE REST; BECAUSE PLEASURE AND THE REST ARE INTERNAL', SUBJECTIVE'; AND THAT THESE ARE SO IS MANIFEST
FROM THEIR OWN CLEAR COGNITION.-(36)
COMMENTARY. That the Manifest ', in the shape of Sound and other things, is 'homo. geneous' with-of the same form as, Pleasure (Pain and Delusion), is not admitted by ns in any way ;-why 1-because Pleasure and the rest are in fernal',-j.e. subjective, of the nature of consciousness (feeling); and Sound and other things being insentient,-how could they be homogeneous with Pleasure, etc. ?-The argument may be formulated as follows:- Things that aro not of the nature of Consciousness cannot consist of Pleasura and the rest : -e.g. the Spirit postulated by the other party and Sound and other things are devoid of the nature of Consciousness; hence the more extensive character is found absent in them (which excludes the presence of the less extensive character, that of consisting of Pleasure, etc.).
The following argument might be urged :-"It is only after the invariable concomitance of the character of being of the nature of Conscions. ness with this character of consisting of Pleasure, etc. has been established that the absence of the former might exclude the character of causing Pleasure from Sound and the rest, as a matter of fact however, the said invariable concomitance itself has not been established, -inasmuch as we do admit the Spirit to be of the nature of Consciousness and yet not consisting of Pleasure, etc.)".
In answer to this, the Text adds-That these are so is manifest from their own cognition. That is, the fact of Pleasure, etc. being of the nature of Consciousness is well established, -how from the cognition of Pleasure, etc. themselves : i.e. the cognition of Pleasure, eto, is itself quite clear on this point. -As a matter of fact, it is too clear to need emphasis) that the Cogni. tion itself of Pleasure, etc.-in the form of the Feelings of Satisfaction and the rest, following upon the presence or absence of Sound and other things, is self-luminous by its very nature and does not depend upon anything else to illumina (inanifast) it ;-and whatever is independent of other things to manifest it, and is self-illumined in the form of Satisfaction, etc., is spoken of by such terms as Consciousness, Pleasure', 'Feeling', 'Cogni

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I.
tion',-all which are synonymous. If the experiencing of Pleasure, etc. were due to some other feeling,--then the feeling of Pleasure, ele, would be of the nature of something other than Satisfaction and the rest, because it itself would not be of the nature of that; as is the case with the Yogin, or the Person making inferences, cognising the Pleasure, etc. as felt by other persons. If this were not so, then these persons-Yogin, etc.-also would be themselves actually feeling the Pleasure, etc. as present in others, and (hence) being distressed and so forth (on account of those feelings). Or (conversely), as in the case of the Yogin, so in all cases, the feelings of being kindly or ukindly treated would be absent, as the circumstances would be the same in both cases.-If then, tle Feeling is admitted to be of the nature of Satis faction and the rest, it becomes established that Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of Consciousness. Because our Pleasure is nothing more than the feeling of Satisfaction, and Pain is nothing more than the feeling of Dissasisfaction. From all this it follows that the Reason put forward in the Text is not Inconclusive nor Inadmissible. Specially among people who (like the Sankhya) believe in the Reality of the External World, it is an admitted fact that Sound and other things (which are external, objective) are devoid of the nature of Consciousness. If it were not so, then they would have accepted the doctrine of the Idealist; and this would be what we most desire.--Nor can our Reason be regarded as 'Contradictory, as it is found present in every caso where the Probandum is known to be present.—(36)
The following argument might be urged (by the Sankhya) :-"As a matter of fact, though Consciousness (or Cognition) by itself is devoid of the Blue or any other colour, yet it appears to be of that colour, by reason of the proximity of the Blue Object ontside, and in the same manner, the Consciousness, which by itself is devoid of the form of Happiness and the rest, appears in these forms by reason of the imposition of the external Happiness, etc. upon it; so that, even though the Feoling is of the nature of Happiness, etc., these latter cannot be regarded as constituting Consciousness; and thus our principal Reason is not too wide' or Inconclusive."
The answer to this is provided by the following:
TEXT (37).
ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY OF HABIT AND NATURE, ALL POSSIBLE ATTACHMENT AND THE REST ARE CLEARLY FOUND TO BE RESTRICTED TO EACH SINGLE OBJECT, LIKE SOUND
AND THE REST.-(37)
COMMENTARY. Bhavanäjätibhēdatah' ;- Bhavana' stands for Habit: jati', 'nature', for one's own character on account of the diversity-peculiarity-of these two;-attachment and the rest :-'attachment' stands for Longing; the phrase "and the rest includes such feelings as Love and the like, due to

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
69
the Harmony-Attribute, Hate, Agitation, etc. due to the Energy Attribute, aud Dejection, Illusion, etc. due to the Inertia-Attribute; thus the effects of all the Three Attributes become included all these are found to be restricted, -i.e. of one form for instance, on account of their peculiar habits, the Lover and other persons have one or the other of the said feelings in regard to Wine, Woman and other things, according as they have been found to be conducive to good or evil ;-similarly on account of the peculiar nature, one or the other of the said feelings appear in some of the anirnals, like the Deer (who are attracted by Sound), the Elephant (who are attracted by Odour) and the like.-All these feelings of Love, Hate and the rest) are always restricted (to the Lover, or the Deer, etc.),—and do not appear in all persons or animals. This would not be right if Sound and other objects were of the nature of (consisted of) Pleasure and the rest.-(37)
Question-"Why?" The answer is given in the following:
TEXT (38)
BEING IN KEEPING WITH ONE AND THE SAME OBJECT, THE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD BE VARIEGATED IN CHARACTER.-IF IT BE URGED THAT
"IT IS NOT SO BECAUSE OF DESTINY AND SUCH OTHER FORCES",-THEN THE CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING WITH THE OBJECT
AT ALL.-(38)
COMMENTARY.
All the said Feelings being in keeping with one and the same object, the Consciousness of each person would be variegated in character, just like the cognition of such objects as the Blue and the like.
It might be urged that—"Even though every Object is tripartite in character (as made up of the Three Attributes), yet under the influence of such auxiliary unseen forces as those of Destiny and the like, in the form of Merit and Demerit, it is only some aspeet of it that figures in the consciousness of any one person-and not all its aspects to all persons. The term 'adi, such other forces, includes Habit, Nature, Desire to hold and the like.
If that were so, then the Consciousness would not be in keeping with the object; i.e. such Consciousness would not rest upon the object; as it would Ise devoid of the form of the Object itself.-(38)
The following text proceeds to show how the Consciousness would be * devoid of the form of the Object':

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER I.
TEXT (39)
THE FORM OF THE Object ITSELF IS THREE-FORMED, AND THE Cognitions (of men) ARE ONE-FORMED ;-HOW CAN THESE LATTER BE REALLY POSSIBLE WITH REFERENCE TO THE OBJECT.-BEING ENTIRELY
DIFFERENT FROM IT IN CHARACTER 1-(39)
COMMENTARY. The form of the Object consists of the Three Attributes of Sattro (Harmony), Rajas (Energy) and Tamas (Inertia).-The Cognitions of men are one-formed; the term 'tat stands for Men, Spirits; what is meant is that the Cognitions that men have are all found to be of one form, having their form determined solely by each one of the numerous circumstances of Attachment' and the like. How can these latter, i.e. the Cognitions-in reference to the Object-Sound and the rest, -really-truly be possible - "Why cannot these be possible"-Because they are different from it in character; i.e. quite different in character from the object on which they are based.-The argument is to be formulated in the following form :-When a Cognition does not apprehend the form of a particular object, it cannot have this object for its objective basis ;-.g. Visual Cognition cannot have Sound for its objective basis-the Cognitions in question are devoid of the form of the three-formed object :-hence the conclusion of the Opponent would be opposed to the wider Premiss, and there is reason for denying it also, in the shape of likely incongruities.
The following might be urged by the Sankhya) -"Even though what is actually apprehended by Perception is the Object, Sound and the rest, in its entire aspect, yet, on account of predisposition and other circumstances, the definite cognition that actually appears (According to the Buddhist) is only in reference to certain aspects of it,-such as its momentary character and not in reference to all its aspects in the same manner (according to us) the Cognition would appear in a single form under the unseen influence of Destiny and such other circumstances."
This cannot be right. According to us, such conceptions as those of momentary character and the like do not in reality have any Entity for their objective; because (according to us) the 'Entity' is beyond all conception. It is only indirectly that conceptions and Cognitions) are connected with the Entity, and thereby becoming the means of apprehending that Entity, they come to be recognised as the Pram-ina (Proof, Evidence, Means of Cognition) for that Entity. As for Love and the rest on the other hand, they are actually admitted by the other party to have objects as their real objective ; if that were not so, then the said Love, etc. would have no basis (or substratum), and it would (thus) be not true to say that the Cognition of the feelings of Pleasure, etc. follows from the Cognition of Sound and other objects which are of the nature of Pleasure, etc. Further, inasmuch as the feelings of Love, etc. are definitely determinate in their character, there is no uncertainty or indefiniteness attaching to their character, and as a result of this, the Cognition of the feeling of these would be always

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
in their entire form. In fact it is this cognition of the object of all definite Cognitions that constitutes their definiteness.(39)
It has been asserted above (by the Sankhya, under Text 14) that** From the apprehension of such effects as Satisfaction, Irritation and Dejection, it follows that Sound and other objects are made up of Pleasure (Pain and Delusion)".--The following text proceeds to show that the premiss herein set forth is Inconclusive : -
TEXT (40).
FOR THE FOLLOWERS OF YOGA, SATISFACTION', 'DISSATISFACTION AND DELUSION ARE PRODUCED IN THE SAME SPIRIT; AND YET THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT HOLD THE SPIRIT TO
BE OF THE ESSENCE OF THOSE.—(40)
COMMENTARY.
Those followers of Yoga who accept the teachings of Kapila, when medita. ting upon the Spirit as distinguished from Primordial Matter, derive Satisfaction and Happiness, after having practised meditation of the Spirit in the right manner; but those who do not succeed in the practice of Meditation, and hence do not perceive the Spirit quickly enough, become beset with Dissatisfaction; while those who are, by their very nature, of dull intelligence, become beset with Delusion and yet the other Party do not regard the Spirit to be of the essence of these-i.e. to consist of the Three Attributes. From this it follows that the premiss stated in the form Because of the apprehension of such Effects as Satisfaction, Dissatisfaction and Dejection '-is Inconclusive, "too wide'.
"As a matter of fact, however, Pleasure, etc. proceed from Volition (Determination, the function of Cosmic Intelligence), not from the Spirit."
The same might be said of Sound and the rest also ; and in that case, as all these objects (Sound, etc.) would be products of mere Volition, there could be no such things as External Pleasure, etc.; because 'Volition' is of the nature of Consciousness, purely subjective. For the same reason the proposi. tion that "Oognition or Experience is of the nature of Satisfaction (Dissatis. faction and Dejection), through the influence of such impositions as those of external Pleasure, etc."-also becomes rejected. Specially because, even without the imposition of such external things, Happiness, etc. are actually found to appear entirely on the substratum of the Spirit itself. How too could the imposition of something else bring about the well-known feeling of Pleasure, etc. which appears independently of the proximity of external things, from the mere contemplation of what is agreeable and disagreeable ?
It might be said that "the Mind also (wherein this Contemplation takes place) would be made up of the Three Attributes through the imposition of the same ".
But that cannot be; because by the assertion that “That which is independent of all other illumining agencies and is self-sufficient, etc." it has been established that it is of the nature of Consciousness.

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TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER 1.
From all this it follows that the reason put forward (by the Sikhya) -"Because of homogeneity"-is Inadmissible, improven':-(40)
Now the Author admits (for the sake of argument) that the Reuson (Homogeneity) is 'admissible', 'proved ', -and proceeds to show its invalidity, Inconclusiveness in the following:
TEXT (41),
EVEN THOUGH THE MANIFEST ' BE ACCEPTED AS CONSISTING OF THREE ATTRIBUTES": -PRIMORDIAL MATTER DOES NOT BECOME ESTABLISTED AS THE ONE ETERNAL CAUSE OF THAT (MANIPRST); BROAUSE THAT MANIFEST IS NOT IMBUED WITH
ANY SINGLE GENERIC CHARACTER.-(41)
COMMENTARY. Even if it be taken as proved that the Manifest' consists of the Three Attributes', yet that does not prove what the sankchya wishes-vis, that the Cause of that Manifest' is that which is called 'Primordial Matter'; that is to say, because the reason that has been put forward has not beon found to be concomitant with a Cause of that kind. For instance, what the Sankhya desires to prove is that the Cause of the Manifest' is one, consisting of the Three Attributes, eternal and all.pervading; as a matter of fact, with such a Cause, the invariable concomitance of the Reason has nowhere been perceived; nor is it necessary that the Cause must be of the same nature as the Effect is found to be ; because there is a clear difference between the Cause and its Effect. You hold that the Effect in the shape of the Manifest' is that which has such characteristics as having a Cause',
being non-eternal', 'non-pervasive' and so forth; and yet you do not hold the Cause of this Manifest) to have these characteristics. Hence your Reason (Premiss) is 'too wide', 'inconclusive'.
The Text next proceeds to show that the Reason put forward (by the Sankhya) is contradictory' also, inasmuch it entails the conception contrary to the nature of the particular Entity -As the one eternal Cause, etc. ;-that is to say, what is meant to be proved is the existonce of an Entity, which is one, sternal and made up of the Three Attributes, as the Cause of the Manifest'); and no such entity is established by the Reason put forward ; -in fact, what is established is something quite contrary to it."How so?"-Because that is not endowed, etc.-The particle hi' stands for because'; hence the meaning is that the Effect in the shape of the Manifest' is not recognised to be imbued with any such single generic character As consists of the Three Attributes and which forms the very essence of the
Manifest ',-"What is it then that is recognised ! "-The Manifest' is actually cognised as endowed with such qualities as multiplicity, noneternality and so forth. If the 'Manifest' were really imbued with any such generic character as that postulated by the other party, then the Cause also of that Manifest' would have to be recognised as possessed of that character. Inasmuch as, however, the Effect (in the shape of the Manifest ') is actually

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63
found to be imbued with such qualities as non-eternality', 'multiplicity and the like-its Cause also has to be inferred as possessed of these same qualities. Specially because in the case of a Cause that is eternal, the idea of its fruitful operations being both sequential and simultaneous would involve self-contradiction and because diversity in the Effect can be only due to diversity in the Cause; otherwise the diversity in the Effect would be without any Cause (baseless),-From all this it follows that any such single eternal Entity as Primordial Matter cannot be recognised.- If the name Primordial Matter is given to a Cause that is non-eternal and many, then there we have no quarrel with you.--(41)
Question-"How is it known that the Manifest is not imbued with any single generic character ?"
The answer is supplied in the following:
TEXT (42) ALL MANIFESTED THINGS' ARE FOUND TO BE LIKE IRON-BARS: AS HAVING THEIR FORMS ASSOCIATED WITH AN ORDER OF SEQUENCE
AND THEIR ESSENCE MIXED UP WITH FANCIES.-(42)
COMMENTARY. Just as bars made of Iron stand apart from each other.-50 these Manifested Entities', as they appear in their own forms, are found to be diverse and separate, due to diversities of place, time, potencies, appearances and so forth; and they do not enter into each other's essence (or constitution). This proves the multiplicity (of Manifested Entities).
In order to prove their non.eternality, it is added-Having their forme. etc. etc. ;-the compound is to be analysed as-' have their fornus associated with-embraced, affected by-an order of senuence'
Question—"If this is so, then how is it that Entities are conceived of as units,-in the form of Earth and the like, and also as lasting in such notions as this is that same thing'?"
Answer-Their essence mixed up with fancies; that is to say, the con. ception of unity in regard to things is a fancy', a wrong assumption. This is going to be established later on, under the sections dealing with the doctrine of the ' Perpetual Flux '.-(42)
It has thus been shown that the Reason Because of Homogeneity (ne propounded by the Sankhya in support of his doctrine of all things being the product of one Primordial Matler') is open to the three fallacies of being Unproven, Inadmissible', 'Contradictory' and 'Too Wide, Inconclusive'. -The Author now proceeds to show that the corroborative instance cited (by the Sankhya in Text 15, above) in the words Just as in the case of the Jar and other things' deos not fulfil the conditions of, and is not possessed of the properties of the Probans and the Probandum [and as such cannot serve as a corroborative instance']

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 1.
TEXT (43) SO ALSO THE VARIOUS PRODUCTS OF CLAY AND OTHER THINGS ARE NOT RROOONISED AS IMBUED WITH ANY SINGLE GENERIC CHARACTER, NOR AS THE EFFECTS OF ANY SINGLE CAUSE; AS ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE 'LUMP OF CLAY ARE
DIVERSE.-(43)
COMMENTARY. The phrase "and other things is meant to include the products of such things as Gold and the like. The term 'so also may be taken as cumulative,-adding one further defect in the Opponent's reasoning, -or an indicating similarity (to other defects already pointed oat).-The phrase * not imbued with any single Generic Character' serves to show that the Instance cited (Jar, etc.) is devoid of the property of what has been cited (by the Sarikhya) as the Probans of his reasoning.-The phrase "Nor as the effects of any single Cause', has to be construed with recognised '; and it serves to show that the property of the (Sankhya's) Probandum also is not present in the instance eited.
Objection—" As a matter of fact, single Causes-of all such things, -aro actually found in the form of the Lump of Clay or of Gold and other things; and every one of these is also found to be imbued with the Generic Character of 'Clay', 'Gold' and the like. In what way then is our Instance devoid of both the properties of the Probans and the Probandum ?"
Answer-As all such things as the 'Lump of Clay' are diverse there can be no such single composite entity as 'Lump of Clay' if there were, then (since Generic Oharacters are all-pervading ex hypothesi), if it covered one point in space, the entire space would become covered. Nor is any
Generic Character' found to appear in each individual thing, -every one of which is perceived as distinct by itself.—(43)
The Text again proceeds to show the inconclusiveness of the Sünkhya's Reason-"Because of Homogeneity"-by itself:
TEXT (44). IN THE CASE OF SPIRITS, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE ENDOWED WITE
SENTIENCE AND OTHER QUALITIES, THEY ARE NOT REGARDED (BY THE Sankhya) AS PRECEDED (PRODUCED BY A SINGLE ENTITY (AS THEIR CAUSE).- IT MIGHT BE SAID THAT "THE SAID QUALITIES ARE ATTRIBUTED TO THE SPIRITS) ONLY SECONDARILY (INDIRECTLY, FIGURATIVELY)";THEN WHY CANNOT THE SAME BE THE CASE IN REGARD TO THE MATTER UNDER
DISCUSSION ALSO -(44)
COMMENTARY For instance, the Spirits are regarded (by the Sankhya) to be endowed with endless such properties as being sentient', 'enjoyer' and the like;

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DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
65
and yet they are not regarded by you as having a single Cause endowed with the same properties.-It might be urged that--" The property of being endowed with Sensience and the like that has been attributed to Spirits, is not in the direct literal sense, but in the indirect, secondary, figurative sense ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, all Spirits are found to be excluded from insentience' and other such qualities, and hence they are placed under the genus 'Sentient', which stands for the negation or exclusion of Insentience, which is assumed to meet their case; though in reality there is no such genus": -If then, it is only indireet and figurative, then, in regard to the Manifest' also, -as in the case of Spirits-why is the presence of Pleasure, etc. not taken as 'assumed ' in the same way,-without their being preceded and produced by any single Cause endowed with the same qualities –Thus the Probans (Reason) is found to be Inconclusive,
The mention of Spirits is only by way of illustration. In the same manner, Pleasure, etc., being so many modifications of Primordial Matter, are endowed with such qualities as being attributes', 'insentient', 'non. enjoyer' and so forth, -and Primordial Matter and the Spirits are endowed with such qualities as 'Eternality and the like, and yet none of these are preceded and produced by any single such Cause. So the Probans is clearly Inconclusive.-(44)
Thus the Reason (put forward by the Sarikhya)" Because of homogeneity".-has been refuted. Now under the pretext of Re-affirming his conclusion, the Author proceeds briefly to point ont defects in the other reasons (put forward by the Sankhya) :
TEXT (45). THUS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A CAUSE IN THE SHAPE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER', ALL DIVERSITY RELATING TO EFFECTS AND CAUSES AND OTHER THINGS BECOMES EXPLICABLE, ON THE
BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF POTENCIES.(15)
COMMENTARY.
It has been asserted (in Sänkhyakūrika, 15) that "Primordial Matter exists as the Cause, (a) because of the finite character of specific objects, (b) because Activity is due to Potency, and (C) because there is differentiation between Cause' and 'Effect".--As a matter of faet, all these threo Reasons are inconclusive, as no reason is provided to preclude a conclusion contrary to the one set forth.
For instance, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the three facts set forth-that of objects having a finite character, etc.-are not inexplicable. For instance, if what is sought to be proved is only the existence of a Cause,-then the argument is superfluons,-proving what is already proved'; we also do not admit of any Effect being produced without a Cause; so that if the name 'Primordial Matter' were given in general to all Causes, then there would be nothing to quarrel about. On the

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66
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER 1.
other hand, if what is sought to be proved is that there is an intelligent Cause, which produces an effect of certain finite dimensions, and acte according to its potencies', -then the Reason adduced becomes invalidated by 'inconclusiveness'; as even in the absence of an intelligent actor, there is nothing incongruous in the production of a particular effect with welldefined dimensions determined by the potencies of its own Cause. Further, it is not right to regard Primordial Matter as intelligent, as it is, ex hypothesi, *insentient', and 'intelligence' is synonymous with 'sentience'.
Further, if by means of the Reason Because Activity is due to Potency, it is meant to prove the existence of a mere Cause possessed of potencies not different (from those just needed for the particular effect), then it is superfluous, proving what is already adınitted by both parties. If, on the other hand, the Cause meant to be proved is some one Eternal Cause possessed of distinct and diverse potencies, ---then the Reason becomes invalidated by inconclusiveness':-Further, as concomitance with any such Reason is not cognised anywhere, the Reason becomes invalidated as being "Unknown' and 'Inadmissible' also; because as a matter, nowhere has any activity of the Cause towards the producing of an Effect been found to have been due to extraneous and additional potencies; as all potencies subsist in the essence of the tlung itself.
Another reason put forward by the Sänkhya (in Karikā 15) is—" Because of the merging of the whole world" -This Reason is absolutely unknown, Inadmissible'. No such 'merging of things is known of, all things being liable to such absolute destruction as leave behind no traces at all. If there were such' merging, it would come about either on the disappearance of the previons condition of the thing concerned, or without such disappearance. If it comes on the disappearance of the previous condition, then it involves the absolute destruction (without leaving any traces) (which the Sankhya does not admit). If, on the other hand, it comes without the said disappearance, then there can be no merging' at all, because no'merging' is possible for any entity so long as it retains its own utrammelled essence. Otherwise there would be endless incongruities. Hence the stalement because of the merging of the whole world' involves a self-contradiction.
Thus, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the diversity relating to the Effect,-in the shape of its being 'finite and the rest,—and the differentiation also into Cause and Effect-become explic. able, on the basis of the diversity of potencies. And this means that the reasons set forth by the Sankhya are all'inconclusive '.
The phrase and other things' is meant to include the argument of the Sarikhya)" Because all activity is due to Potency".
Or, the particle 'api', 'even',-in the phrase even in the absence, etc. etc.',-may be meant to be restrictive; hence the meaning comes to be this :-It is only when there is no Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter that there can be diversity in the Effect due to the diverse potencies of the Cause; and also because it is only thus that the relation of Cause and Effect would be possible ;-hence the Reasons put forward (by the Sankhya) are
contradictory. For instance, if Primordial Matter were the Cause of the * Manifest, then the whole universe, as being (ex hypothesi) of the same

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67
essence as that Matter, would be a single substance having the same character and form as that Matter : so that there could be no such distinction among Products As Cosmic Intelligence', 'I-principle', 'Five Rudimentary Substances and so forth; and this would mean that the World is entirely devoid of modification'.- Similarly, it is only in the absence of any such Cause as Primordial Matter that the activity of the Potter and other Agente towards the making of the Jar and other things, in accordance with their potencies (powers), would be possible,—which would not be possible if there were such a single Cause as Primordial Matter. This is what has been already explained under Text 21, by the statement-Nor would there be any efficiency, nor any operation'.
The distinction into . Cause' and 'Effect also is possible only in the absence of any such single Cause as Primordial Matter'. It has been already pointed out above that no diversity in the world would be possible if there were any entity as Primordial Matter (as the one Cause) :-it has also been pointed out that if Primordial Matter were the Cause, then the whole world would be of the same essence as that Matter, which would lead to the absurdity that the entire world is a single substance (without any diversities); and under the circumstances, as there would be no diversity of forms' at the very outset, how could there be any merging' of it (as declared in the Sarikhya kārika, 15)-(45)
I
ends the Section on the Eramination of the Doctrine of
• Primordial Mauer'.

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CHAPTER II. Examination of the Doctrine of God'.
Statement of the Doctrine of God' (Theiem).
COMMENTARY.
The next Chapter, beginning with the Text (46), proceeds to prove that there can be no operation of any such Being as the Supreme Lord'. * God
TEXT (46)
OTHER PHILOSOPHERS DECLARE THE LORD' TO BE THE CAUSE OF ALL THINGS PRODUCED; ON THE GROUND THAT NO INSENTIENT
THING, BY ITSELE, CAN PRODUCE ITS EFFECTS.-(46)
COMMENTARY. Inasmnch as things that are not produced,-snch as the Atom, Akasha and so forth-are eternal, they have no Cause, hence the Text has added the qualification 'things produced':-The term "Lord' stands for God. -
Othera-i.e. the Naiyāyika and other (Theists). Some of these Theists hold that "the crentor of the whole world is a distinct Soul or Spirit with spucial qualities, the omniscient God";-others hold that "the creator is a Substance (Being) distinct from the Soul' or Spirit', because He is eternal, one and equipped with the knowledge of all things, and as such having qualities different from those of the Spirit or Soul
Question-" Where there are already such Causes of the world as Merit and Demerit, Atoms and so forth, why do these philosophers postulate another Cause in the shape of God?"
Ander-No insentient thing, etc.-Though Merit and the rest may be the Cause--yot all these, being devoici of sentience or intelligence, cannot, by themselves, without an Operator or Supervisor, produce their effects; hence there must be a Creator (wlio is intelligent), as nothing that is devoid of intelligence is ever found to be the Operator. This argument is formulated as follows:What is devoid of Intelligence cannot produce its Effect, without an Operator ;-.g. such things as Clay-Jump, Stick, Water, String and the rest (all which are required for the making of the Jar) cannot produce the Jar, withont the Potter - Merit and the rest (which are regarded as the Cause of the World) are all devoid of Intelligence; hence the idea that (these are enough to produce the World) would be contrary to the universal Proposition stated. Thus it becomes established that there is an Operator

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DOCTRINE OF GOD
69
and that is God.--Even so, Merit and the rest do not become useless in the producing of the World); because God is only the 'Efficient Cause' (Guide, Supervisor) (and Atoms and Merit, eto. would still be needed as the Con. stituent and Contributory Causes).
The following objection might be urged "Those Merit and Demerit that are held to subsist in the Soul or Spirit of Man) may be the required Operator; why should one assume a God?"
Answer-That cannot be right; the particular Spirit at that time of Creation) would be wholly unconscious-so long as his Body, Sense-organs and other aggregates of Causes and Effects are not produced, the Spirit remains unconscions, not perceiving even such Colour, etc. as are quite perceptible; under the circnmstances, how could it perceive Merit and Demerit, which are entirely imperceptible? To this end, there is the following declaration-'The ignorant Creature, not master of his own pleasure and pain, may go to Heaven or to the Nethermost Hole,-only as he is urged by God' [quoted in Nyāyavārtika 4. 1. 21, where the Tätparya speaks of it as * Smrti').-(46)
The Text proceeds to set forth two Reasons propounded by A viddha. karna (an ancient Naiyáyila) in proof of the existence of God :
TEXTS (47-48).
"(A) THAT WHICH IS CHARACTERISED BY A PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF ITS OWN COMPONENT PARTS IS SUBJECT TO A CAUSE THAT IS ENDOWED WITH INTELLIGENCE,- FOR INSTANCE, THE JAR AND OTHER OBJECTS. THE THING IN DISPUTE,-WHICH IS PERCEPTIBLE BY MEANS OF TWO SENSE-ORGANS AND ALSO IMPERCEPTIBLE, -MUST BE PRECEDED (AND PRODUCED) BY A CAUSE ENDOWED WITH INTELLIGENCE, -ATOMS SUPPLYING THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE' per Dis.
SIMILARITY"-(48)
COMMENTARY The argument has been thus formally stated :--"The thing under dispute, which is perceptible by means of two sense-organs or not porceptible at all, must be regarded as produced by an Intelligent Cause,--because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its coroponent parts like the Jar, and unlike the Atoms (the Jar being the Corroborative Instance per Similarity, and the Atoms being so per Dissimilarity!"-Now in this formulated argument
- What is perceptible by means of two Sense-organs' stands for the three kinds of Substance, Earth, Water and Fire-which are perceptible by means of the two organs of Vision and of Touch, because they fulfil such conditions of perceptibility as being large, being composed of several substances, being coloured and so forth;-the imperceptible' Are Air and the rest, simply because the conditions of perceptibility are being large being cornposed

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IL
of several substances, being coloured' and so forth-and all these conditions are absent in Air and other things, as has been declared in the following passage--"Perception follows from Largeness, Presence of several Substances and Presence of Colour; the Atom is imperceptible because it contains no other substances; Air is imperceptible because it is devoid of the presence of Colour ;-the term 'Sanskura' stands for subsistence, presence in composition ; -And the Diad (Two-Atom-Compound) and other things are imperceptible because of the absence of largeness."
Now, in this argument, if the Probandum to be proved were stated in the general (unqualified) form that Things perceptible by two sense-organs and those imperceptible are produced by intelligent causes', then it would be superfluous, proving what is already admitted by both parties, in regard to such things as the Jar and the like, over which there is no dispute at all. It would involve the fallacy of contradicting one's own doctrine', because the Naiyāyika does not admit sich imperceptible things as the Atom, Akasha, and the like to be produced by an Intelligent Cause', and also because these latter are eternal (hence not produced at all), the said assertion would involve that contradiction of a perceived (well-recognised) fact. It is for the purpose of avoiding all these difficulties that the qualifying term 'under dispute' has been added : the term 'Tipratipatti' standing for different opinions, and that which forms the subject of diverse opinions is said to be the matter under dispute.-With this qualification. what become the subject' of the argument are only the Body, Sense-organs, the various Regions and so forth; and what is asserted does not apply to the Atom and such other things.
Similarly, if the Probandon (to be proved) wero stated in the form that the things under disputo are produced by a Cause', then the argument would be futile-proving what is already accepted by both parties. In order to avoid this, the qualification has been added in the form produced by an intelligent Canse'. This argument, the stated, cannot be futile as addressed to the Särikhya, as there is no Intelligence Buddhi) for the Sankhya apart from Primordial Matter, and certainly a thing cannot be produced by itself.
* Arrangement of component parts ' ;-the-arrangement',-.e. conjunc. tion in the form of aggregation', -of the parts that go to make up the Things; by this the Tluings in question are characterised - differentiated; consequently they must be as asserted. Mere characterisation by conponents' would incinde the universals Cow and the like (which also are held to be consisted of components in the shape of the individual animals) and thus rencier the Reason too wide'; hence the qualification its own components'; what the universal Cow and the rest are differentiated by is the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Substance,-not by the arrangement of the parts that go to make up the Cow itself.
The 'Intelligent Cause' thus proved is God.
It is this proof that has been stated in these two Tects. The compound Svārambhaka, etc. is to be analysed as meaning that which has for ita Vishēşına-differentia—the peculiar, characteristic - arrangement, disposi. tion of its own component parts'. This indicates the invariable con.

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DOCTRINE OF GOD.
comitance of the Reason (Middle Term) (with the Probandum). The pre. sence of the Reason in the Subject is indicated by the words which is perceptible by means of two organs, etc. etc.'--The expression 'vivāda padam' stands for what forms the matter under dispute'.-(47-48)
The second argument propounded (by Aviddhakarna) is next explained :
TEXT (49). "(B) THE MATERIAL CAUSE OF THE BODY AND OTHER THINGS IS CON
TROLLED BY AN INTELLIGENT BEING, -BECAUSE THEY ARE ENDOWED WITH COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES, LIKE THE YARN AND SUCH THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN SEEN TO BRING ABOUT THEIR EFFECTS (ONLY WHEN CONTROLLED BY THE INTELLIGENT WEAVER)."-(49)
COMMENTARY. of the Body and other things,-the material Causc,-in the shape of Atoms and such things-can bring about their effects only when controlled by an Intelligent Cause ;-such is the construction of the Text.-The Reason (Probans) statel is because they are endowed with Colour, etc.':--The Yarn, etc. Are cited as the Corroborative Instance. This has been thus declared - The material causes of the Body, the World and other things produce their effects only when controlled by an Intelligent Being--this is what we assert, on the ground that they are endowed with Colour, etc., --like stich things is the yarn and the like (49)
Udilyotakara however has formulated the argument as follows:-"The Causes of the World in the shape of Primordial Matter', 'Atoms and
Destiny' (Unseen Force) - need a Controller with Superior Intelligence, in the producing of their Effects-because their activity is intermittent, -like the Yarn, the Shuttle and such other causes (of the Cloth)".*_This is the argument set forth in the following Text: -
TEXT (50). * IN THE PRODUCING OF THEIR EFFECTS, ALL SUCH CAUSES AS MERIT, DEMERIT AND ATOMS ARE CONTROLLED BY AN INTELLIGENT BEING,—BECAUSE THEY OPERATE INTERMITTENTLY, -LIKE THE SHUTTLE AND THE YARN,"-(50)
COMENTARY. The meaning of this is quite elear.-(50)
* These words are not found in Uddyotakaros Vyāyacurtika. This idea is there (un der Sätra 4. 1. 21, 463, lines 11 st sel.-BID. Ind. Edn.); but the exact words are not there. Apparently the Commentator has reproduced the sense of Uddyotakari's argument.

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER II.
Prashastamali argues as follows:-"All the usages of men, at the beginning of creation mist hoxe been preceded by (dependent upon) the teaching of other persons,-because later on, the usage of enlightened mer is found to be restricted to particular things.-as for instance, in the case of little boys who have not yet learnt the use of words, it is found that their usage of words as restricted to particular things is always preceded (and brought about) by the teaching of their mother or other persons;--the phrase "the usages of onlightened men are restricted to particular things' means that the usage of men after enlightenment is found to be so restricted ;-that person to whose teaching usages at the beginning of Creation are due is God, whose superior knowledge does not disappear even at the time of Universal Dissolution",
It is this view that is shown as fully established, -by the Author in the following Text:
TEXT (51).
" AT THE BEGINNING OF CREATION, USAGE AMONG MEN MUST HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE TEACHING OF OTHER PERSONS WHEN THEY BECOME SUBSEQUENTLY AWAKENED TO CONSCIOUSNESS, IT IS FOUND TO BE RESTRICTED TO PARTICULAR THINGS,-LIKE
THE USAGE OF LITTLE BOYS."—(51)
COMMENTARY
The term Sarga Creation, stands for generation; the beginning of this is its first moment. The rest is easily intelligible.(51)
There are other arguments also put forward by Uddyotakara ; thiesa are the following :- "The Manifested World, consisting of the Primary Elemental Substances and the rest, are productive of Pleasure and Pain, only when controlled by an intelligent Cause, -a) because it is, by itself, insentient, (6) because it is a Product, (c) because it is perishable, and (d) because it is endowed with Colour (or Form) and other qualities, like the Ase and other things".*
These are the arguments that are set forth in the following two Texts:
* This is clearly a brief paraphrase of the arguments stated by Yiddyotubara in his Nyāyavārtika, on Sutra 4. 1. 21, page 463, lines ul e seq., Biblio. Ind. Edn., where the words are very nearly the same.

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DOCTRINE OF GOD!
TEXTS (52-53). "THE MANIFESTED WORLD, CONSISTING OF THE PRIMARY ELEMENTAL
SUBSTANCES AND THE REST, BECOMES THE SOURCE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN TO ALL PEOPLE, ONLY WHEN CONTROLLED BY AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE, BECAUSE IT IS INSENTIENT, ITSELF A PRODTOT, EVANESCENT AND SO FORTH,-LIKE THE AXE AND OTHER THINGS; THUS EVERYTHING IS CLEARLY BELIEVED TO BE
His."-(52-53)
COMMENTARY. Controlled by an Intelligent Cause, -i.e. controliod by a Cause which is endowed with sentience.—Thus-i.e. for the said series of reasons — His', -i.e. of God, the Cause of the entire world.-(52-53)
Question-In what way is God's omniscience proved, hy virtue of which He should become an object of devotion for people seeking for Prosperity and the Highest Good ?
The answer to this is supplied by the following Text
TEXT (54). "THE FAOT OF HIS BEING THE CREATOR OF ALL THINGS HAVING BEEN
ESTABLISHED, HIS OMNISCIENCE IS PROVED WITHOUT EFFORT ; BECAUSE THE CREATOR MUST BE ONE WHO KNOWS THE FORM AND ALL OTHER DETAILS REGARDING WHAT
HE HAS CREATED."-(54)
COMMENTARY. This has been thus explained by Prashastamati and others :-"The omniscience of God is proved by the fact of His being the Cause (Creator) of the entire World; because the Creator must possess full knowledge of all such details regarding what he creates as its material and contributory causes, its use, its receiver and so forth. In the world, when a man makes anything, he knows its material cause, ote; e.g, it is well known that the Potter who makes the Jar and such things, knows its material cause, in the shape of Olay.lump-its contributory causes, in the shape of the Wheel, etc., -its purpose, in the shape of Fetching Water and the like, and its receiver, in the shape of the Householder (who uses it); similarly God, who creates all the worlds, knows their material causes, in the shape of the Atom, etc., their contributory causes, in the shape of Merit. Demerit, Space, Time and so forth, also the auiliaries to their operation, in the shape of the Universal the Particular and Inherence, their purpose, in the shape of the Experience (of Men), and receivers in the shape of Men. This shows that He is omniscient.-One who knows the forms and other details regarding what he has created : Form and other details'. - Form stands for character ; other

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74
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 11.
dewilsstands for the Material Cause and the rest; the Vēdaka' of these is one who knows. Such is the sense of the compound. The word daka' is to be grammatically explained either as included under the group of words beginning with yājaka', or as formed with the affix ana in the passire serise-with the refrescive ka added to it. The rest is easily intelligible.-(54)
There is yet another series of arguments set forth by these persons :(A) "That which is the substratum of the variegated and the mobile, and that which is not the substratum of these—which is the thing under dispute. is cognised through a means of cognition other than the five beginning with the second,-just as Colour, etc. are cognised as distinguished from the character of being an entity' and so forth.--the 'Hair of the Tortoise (a non-entity) being the corroborative instance per dissimilarity"
In the argument as thus worded, the term, vichiiroclaya' stands for the category of Quality, in the sense that its 'waya', appearance, is 'vichitra variegated; the term 'prasyand stands for the category of Mobility : the ispada', substratum, of these two is the category of Substance ;-that which is not the substratram of these two (Quality and Mobility) stands for the five categories of Quality, Action, Universal, Particular and inherence : - such a thing is cognised through a Means of Cognition other than the five beginning teith the second-ie. Other than Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Non-apprehension ; i.e. through Sense-perception. The rest is easily intelligible.
(B) The other argument propounded by them is in the following form :-" The Thing under dispute, which is (1) what is embraced by the Particulars of such Universals its 'Being and the like, and also (2) what is not so embraced, his perceptible to some one,-because they exist-like Colour and the rest"-In this statement, the term Being and the like stands for the six non-specific (general) entities,Being,
Evanescent, Material Product', 'Cause', Universal'. Particular '; --the particulars' of these go to specify Substance, Quality and Action ; -hence what is embraced' by these particulars are these three categories of Substance Quality and Action :- what is not so embraced consists of the Universal and the rest. The rest is easily intelligible.-[And the Person who has the perception of all these things is God.]
This series of arguments is set forth in the following Text:
TEXT (55). * THE THING UNDER DISPUTE MUST CLEARLY BE PERCEPTIBLE TO SOME ONE,--BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS being a thing, BEING existent
AND SO TORTE JUST LIKE THE DIVERSITIES OF PLEASURE, PAIN, ETC.-[AND THIS SOME ONE
Is God]."-(55)

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(B)
Refutation of the Doctrine of God' (Theism).
COMMENTARY,
The text now proceeds to supply the answer to the above arguraents
TEXT (56).
THE FIRST ARGUMENT (PHUPOUNDED BY THE Maiyāyik) IS OPEN TO THE
FALLACY OF BEING UNPROVEN, INADMISSIBLE'. BECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY SUCH ARRANGEMENT' AS 'CONJUNOTION' IS NOT PROVEN, NOR TIAT OF THE
*COMPOSITE '—(56)
COMIENTARY.
In the arguments set forth (under Text 47) in the form. What is insentient cannot produce its effect without a controller, -the Probans (because it is characterised by a peculiar Arrangement of component parts) is one which, without any valid objection, could be cited as proving the contrary oi the Probandur (for proving which it has been put forward): and thus its presence in the contrary of the Probandum being suspected, it becomes 'inconclusive' ;-this is what the Text means.
Then again, the Probans that has been put forward in the first argunent* Because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of its component parts':-is'unproven' and Inaciraissible also. How this is so is explained in the next sentence-Because, etc. ;-what is meant by the expression * arrangement of component parts is a particular kind of Conjunction ; and the character of being characterised by this Conjunction is Attributed to the substance called Composite'; now both these,-the said Oonjunction and also the Composite that it characterises, -are yet unproven'unknown (to at least one of party to the Discussion, the Bruldhist, who denies both); hence the Probans cited is doubly unproven Inadmissible':-(56)
Question-" In what way are the two unproven !" The Answer is supplied by the following Text :

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16
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IL.
TEXT (57).
BECAUSE BOTH THE FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN ASSUMED (AND PUT FORWARD) ARE SUCH AS ARE NOT ACTUALLY APPREHENDED; AND FOR THE SAME REASON THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE ALSO THAT HAS BEEN CITED HAS NO CONNECTION WITH THE
PROBANS CITED.—(57)
COMMENTARY.
In brief, the Author for the present states his reason only in the form of Non-apprehension, which annus the Naiyāyika's argument,-a detailed objection to these two arguments will be provided under the Chapters (10-15) dealing with the Six Categories.
Both the facts.i.e. that have been put forward as the Arrangement' and the Composite'.- [Both of these are not apprehended) because the
Arrangement' has been regarded as something visible, in such statements (by the Naiyāyika) as Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Higher Universal, the Lower Universal and Action are visible, as inhering in coloured substances. The Composite also has been regarded as visible, in the statement- There is perception of it because it is large, is made up of several component substances and is coloured'. -As a matter of fact however, apart from Colou, etc., no other.Conjunction or. Composite' -such as is accepted by the Naiyāyika.-ever appears in Consciousness. Thus, while fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility', if it is not perceived, it must be regarded as non-existent, like the Hare's Horns':-It will not be right to argue that" inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the Senses, (if there were no such thing as the Composite composed of the Atoms), the perception of Colour and other qualities would be impossible"; -because it is admitted that qualified Atoms are apprehensible by the Senses, and hence they are not beyond the reach of the Senses ', -Thus then, both Conjunction and Composite' being non-existent, the Jar that has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity is found to be devoid of that character which has been set up as the Probans; this is what is meant by the Text in the words 'Tas no connection with the Probans, etc.-(57)
It has thus been shown that the Probans is essentially unproven and Inadmissible, on the ground of the qualification and the qualified being "unknown': the following Text proceeds to show that it is unproven' also on the ground of the unproven (unknown) character of part of its substratum :

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DOCTRINE OF GOD.
TEXT (58).
VISUAL COGNITION AND TACTILE COGNITION ALWAYS APPEAR DIEFERENTLY; THEY CANNOT THEREFORE HAVE ONE AND THE SAME SUBSTRATUM, -JUST LIKE THE COGNITION OF ODOUR
AND OTHER THINGS.—(58)
COMMENTARY.
In the argument (put forward by the Naiyāyika, under verse 48, above) two kinds of things have been mentioned as the Subject what is perceptible by two Sense-organs and what is imperceptible':-Now 18 a matter of fact, there is no object that is known (accepted by all parties) to be perceptible by two Sense-organs'; for instance, both Visual Cognition and Tactile Cognition, are known to appear in different forms, respectively as manifesting the Blue and other Colours and as manifesting Hardness, Softness, etc. of the things touched; thus both these cognitions cannot have the same objective, because they appear as different like the Cognitions of Odour, Taste and other things. The argument may be formulated thus:Any two cognitions appearing in different forms cannot have the same objective, like the Cognitions of Odour and Taste,-the Visual and Tactile Cognitions do appear in different forms hence the attributing of both to a single object would be a direct contravention of the said universal proposition. -If, even when appearing in different forms, Cognitions were to have the sa me objective, then the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and such diverse things also might be regarded as having the same objective; this is the reason that Annuls the argument of the Naiyāyika.-(58)
Says the Naiyāyika " If the two Cognitions (Visual and Thetile) cannot have the same objective, then how is it that there is the recognition in the form that I am tonching in the dark the same jar that I had seen in the light '*Hence the proposition set forth (by the Buddhist is annnlled by Inference. The Inference has boen formulated by Uddyotakara in the following form The two Cognitions under dispute,-the Visual Cognition and the Tactile Cognition,-have the same object, --becanse it is recalled (recognised).-like the Cognition of the Blue Lotus.''
The answer to this is provided in the following Text :
Darshana
• This discussion is a clear reference to Myye. Sara 3. 1. 1- sparsundblyamoksīrthagrahanät'.
+ This is a reference to Nyāyt Vārzika, 3.1. 1, page 350, Bib. Ind.

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 11.
TEXTS (59-60).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THE JOINT COGNITION (INVOLVED IN RECOGNITION) IS THE FACT THAT RECOGNITION CONSISTS IN AN ASSUMPTION ARISING OUT OF THE POTENCIES OF THE TWO COGNITIONS CONCERNED.-Thus, SUCH THINGS AS WATER, FIRE AND THE LIKE ARE NOT 'PRRCEPTIBLE BY TWO SENSE-ORGANS'; AND HENCE THE PROBANS (OF THE Naiyāyika) IS FOUND TO HAVE ITS SUBSTRATUM UNPROVEN, INADMISSIBLE', AS IS INDICATED BY THE UN. PROVEN CHARACTER OF THE
OBJECT ITSELE.—(60)
COMMENTARY.
Tayoh-i.e. of the Visual and Tactile Cognitions as apprehending (respectively) Colour only and Touch only ;-Potency' is capacity out of that capacity arises the assumption, which constitutes—forms the essence of the Recognition (in question). This shows that Recognition is not perceptible ; firstly, because it is an essentially wrong cognition, apprehending as one what is really not one, and secondly, because its very essence lies in an assumption.-Nor is there any other Means of Cognition (available for bringing about a valid notion of Recognition): firstly, because it apprehends what has been already covered by previous Cognitions, and as such it apprehends what has been already apprehended (and as such, is not of the nature of a Direct Valid Cognition): and secondly, because it is essentially wrong. From all this it follows that the Reason put forward by the Naiyāyika)" Because there is Recognition "-is "inconclusive'. If the validity of Recognition had been established and admitted, then the Reason would not be open to the charge of being 'inconclusive'; because in cases where notions of such things as the Jar and the like have appeared, taking in, in accordance with the capacity of things, a common ides of its Colour and other details,-if the Colour and the Touch have been duly apprehended, each by itself, by the organs of Vision and of Touch, then, at some future time, if the impressions of the things perceived present themselves accompanied by signs indicative of those things, there appears the notion of "unity', 'samoness', which is essentially wrong, and is of the nature of
Remembrance' (not Direct Cognition). It is for this reason that in this joint notion, the Colour-Blue- also presents itself, though it is not

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DOCTRINE OF GOD.
79
right that the notion of Colour should appear in the notion of Touch ; as Colour is perceptible by the Organ of Vision (not of Touch). For these reasons, the only reasonable view is what the Teachers have stated in the following words: After one has perceived by the Visual and Tactile Organs, each in its own way, there appears, subsequently, a notion, joining the two perceptions and apprehending the two objects conjointly as one unit; and this notion is of the nature of Remembrance
Objection-" In case the conjoint entity (Colour and Touch combined) has been previously actually perceived, then it would be right to regard this as Remembrance; but, you (Buddhists) do not admit of any joint entity. - apart from the individual things, Colour and the rest, which could have been thus previously perceived ; and if Colour and the rest were only individually perceived, then the Remembrance could only be one of Colour only, or of Touch' only and so forth,—and not of the Jar'; and in regard to things that have not been previously cognised, there can be no Remembrance then how could any Remembrance arise in regard to the joint entity (as asserted by your Teachers)?"
This is not right, we reply. It is not assorted that the joint entity that is previously perceived is something distinct from Colour and the rest ;your objection would hold only if the assertion of our Teachers meant this; what is meant however is that those same Colour and the rest, when serving the fruitful purpose of holding water and the like, come to be collectively called the Jar'; and what happens is that after each of those Colour and the rest, has been perceived by means of each of their pertinent sense-organs.there appears, at some future time, the Remembrance of these under the appellation of Jar, which bears the impressions of the said perceptions.Or the Joint Entity' may be regarded as conceptual', and being of the nature of a conceptual entity', as apprehended by its own cognition ; under the circumstances, why cannot Remembrance of such & Joint Entity be possible ?
From all this it is clear that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika), - Because of the peculiar arrangements of its component parts ",-has its substratum 'unproven'-"Why so?"-The Answer is-By the 'unproven character of the object itself ; that is, the object as stated by the Naiyayika in the form 'perceptible by two sense-organs' is not proven, unknown; and thus the Reason having its substratum unproven', becomes itselt open to the fallacy of being unproven', 'unknown, Inadmissible':-(59-60)
Thus it has been shown that the Reason (put forward by the Naiyāyika) is 'unproven' in three ways-anproven' regarding its qualified (subject).
unproven regarding the qualification of that subject, and unproven' regarding its substratum ; the following Text proceeds to show a fourth kind of unproven-ness' as pointed out by the Teacher:

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80
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 11.
TEXTS (61-62)
IN THE CASE OF TEMPLES AND SUCH THINGS, THE PRESENCE OF A PEOULIAR ARRANGEMENT (OF COMPONENT PARTS) IS DISTINCTLY PERCEIVED,-FROM WHICH PERCEPTION POLLOWS THE COGNITION (INFERENTIAL) OF AN INTELLIGENT BUILDER,—EVEN WHEN NO SUCH BUILDER IS ACTUALLY SEEN; IF, IN THE CASE OF SUCH OBJECTS AS THE BODY, THE MOUNTAIN AND THE LIKE, A SIMILAR PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF PARTS WERE DISTINCT LY PERCEIVED, THEN IT WOULD BE CORRECT TO DEDUCE FROM THIS PERCEPTION AS THE REASON, THE CONCLUSION THAT IS DESIRED (BY THE Naiyāyika).
(61-62)
COMMENTARY.
That peculiar arrangement of parts which is known,-through afirma. tive and negative concomitance,-as procluced by the operations of an intelligent builder, in the case of such things as the Temple and the like ;-on the perception of such a peculiar arrangement of parts, the notion is deduced that the Temple has had an intelligent builder, even though no such Builder is actually seen at the time if a similar arrangement of parts were put forward in connection with such 'subjects' as the Body, the Mountain and so forth, then your desired conclusion might have been proved. Because when the affirmative and negative concomitance between a Cause and an Effect has been duly discussed, that Effect can never fail to be produced by that Cause ; for if it did, it would cease to be the Cause.-As a matter of fact however, no such peculiar arrangement of parts' is so well known as regards the Tree, the Mountain and such things; all that is known is only tho bare babbling that there is an arrangement. A certain character which, by its very nature, stands as something distinct, does not cease to be so clistinct by mere assertion; and if brought forward as a Reason or
Probans, such a character cannot be sufficient to prove the desired conchision; as the presence of such a character would not be incompatible even with the contrary of that conclusion. As for example, when the character of being a product of Clay' is brought forward as a Reason for proving that the Anthill has been built by the Potter'. Such is the meaning of the Text taken as a whole.
The meaning of the words of the Text is now explained From which perception follows the cognition of an intelligent builder,-i.e. from the perception of which peculiar arrangement' there would follow the inference of an intelligent cause. In the case of such objects as the Body, etc. etc.; Tanrı

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DOCTRINE OF GOD'.
81
is Body : Aga' is mountain, or Tree; the phrase "and the like includes such things as the Ocean and so forth. The conclusion that is desired, -
-i.e. the fact of being the work of an intelligent maker.- Sadhana' is proof.-(61-62)
Question-"In what way would it be correct" (to draw the desired conclusion)?
The Answer is provided by the following Text:
TEXTS (63–65).
WHEN A CERTAIN THING IS DEFINITELY RECOGNISED, THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, AS THE EFFECT OF A CERTAIN CAUSE, THEN, THE PERCEPTION OF THAT EFFECT MUST PROVE THAT DAUSESUCH IS THE STANDING LAW.-THE PECULIAR ARRANGEMENT OF PARTS' IN SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE BODY, THE MOUNTAIN AND THE LIKE HOWEVER IS NOT AN EFFECT OF THIS KIND THERE IS A MERE ASSERTION TO THAT EFFEOT.-SUCH A REASON, WHEN PUT FORWARD, RENDERS THE CONCLUSION OPEN TO DOURT AND DENTAL, AS IT DOES WHEN PUT FORWARD ror PROVING THAT THE ANTHILL IS THE WORK OF
THE POTTER':-(65)
COMMENTARY
The Effert.-.g. smoke ;-of a certain cause,-e.g. Fire - definitely recognised,-in regard to Fire, etc.; the perception of that effect-when the effect in the shape of Smoke is seen.
"If that is so, then the same may be the case with the matter under dispute also.”
The answer is-The peculiar arrangement however, etc.
** If the peculiar arrangement is proved by the general assertion, then, it can very well be put forward as the Reason."
Answer-Such a reason, etc.-Such-i.e. based on mere assertion.-Work of the Potter, etc. ;-the reason being the fact of its being a product of Clay
Thus then, the conclusion arrived at is that the peculiar arrangement in question is unproven', and as for mere arrangement, that is 'inconclusive':-(63-65)
In the following Text the Opponent urges that what the Buddhist has put forward is only a 'Futile Rejoinder':

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IT.
TEXT (66). * WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (BY YOU) IS ONLY A FUTILE REJOINDER', AS IT IS BASED UPON THE ASSUMPTION OF A
PARTICULAR CHARACTER; WHILE WHAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (BY US, THE Naiyyika) 18 ONLY THE GENERAL CHARACTER OF 'EFFECTS!"-(66)
COMMENTARY. "What you have urged is only a Futile Rejoinder, that particular form of it which is put forward 'per parity of the character of effect. For instance, wlien it is argued that Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced the man putting forward the Futile Rejoinder says- The character of being produced that you put forward as the Reason,- do you mean this character as: (1) subsisting in such things as the Jar (2) Or as subsisting in Sound? Or (3) as subsisting in both (Jar and Sound)? The first alternative is not possible, as the subsistence of this Reason in the subject (oi your syllogism, Sound) would be 'unproven; in fact the character of one thing (the Jar) cannot subsist in another thing (Sound). The second alternative also cannot be accepted, as there would be no Corroborative Instance fulfilling the conditions of the Reason. The third alternative also would be open to both these objections. This has been explained to be an example of that Futile Rejoinder which is named 'Per Parity of the character of the effect'; as stated in the following words 'When the Conclusion is shown to be not-proved on the basis of even the slightest deviation from the character of the Effect, it is Fuile Rejoinder
"In the case under consideration the inference of non-eternality is sought to be proved on the basis of the generic character of the Effect', not on ony particular aspect of it. Hence if a Rejoinder is put forward on the basis of the assumption of a particular character (or aspect),-when the Reason or Probans has been put forward by the other party on the basis of its general character,—this is a Futile Rejoinder, named 'per Parity of the character of Effect'. In short, this is based upon the assumption of a different character and hence is a Futile Rejoinder."-(66)
The above is answered by the following Text:
TEXT (67) [IN THE EXAMPLE OF FUTILE REJOINDER CITED) THE MERD THING (EFFECT IN GENERAL), AS EXCLUDED FROM ALL THAT IS not that Thing (NOT
EFFECT), DOES REALLY PROVE non-eternality, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING OF THE SAME ESSENCE AS TRAT. BUT AS REGARDS THE PROBANS UNDER DISCUSSION,
THERE IS NO REASON FOR IT AT ALL - (67)
COMMENTARY. The argument put forward above (against which the example of Futile Rejoinder has been cited) is quite right and proper ; because the mere fact

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DOCTRINE OF GOD.
of being an effect (Product) in General does prove non-eternality (Evanescence); because between these two there is that invariable concomitance which consists in being of the same essence.--In the case of the reasoning put forward (by the Naiyāyika) however, there is no such reason behind the Probans as put forward by the Naiyāyika-viz." Because it is characterised by & peculiar Arrangement of its component parts"; specially as arrangement of parts in general is a factor the contrary of which is not precluded by any incongruity; hence the requisite invariable concomitance' is not available. In fact any such concomitance in the form of being produced from it'on the cognition of which the consequent conclusion could become accepted even when one does not actually perceive the actual operation of the Cause, is absolutely unknown, inadmissible. This is what is meant by the Text.(67)
The following text proceeds to show that the Naiyāyika's reasoning would be open to the fallacy of 'Indiecision' (Inconclusiveness), even if he gave up the idea of 'concomitance' being of a particular kind (i.e. invariable) and intended it to be in the general form (of inere concomitance in yeneral).
TEXT (68)
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE SMOKE THAT HAS BEEN SEEN TO BE INVARIABLY
CONCOMITANT WITH FIRE IS white; AND YET THM TENTION OF MERE' WHITENESS' COULD NOT PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF FIRE; IF IT DID, THEN THAT EXISTENCE COULD BE
INFERRED EVEN FROM THE 'Snow'.-(68)
COMMENTARY. "How is it then that the Futile Rejoinder is cited ?" The answer is given in the following Text:
TEXT (69). WHEN THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMIŠS) IS STATED IN THE
general TORM, AND THE OBJECTION URGED AGAINST IT IS ON THE BASIS OF A particular ASPECT OF IT, THEN THIS IS
SAID TO BE A Futile Rejoinder-(69)
COMMENTARY.
In a case where the invariablo concomitance of the Probandum with the Probans is definitely known to be in a general way.-specially by means of the right cognition of its absence in the contrary of the Subject'-and yet the objection that is urged against it is on the basis of a particular aspect or character of the Probans),-then such an objection constitutes a Futile

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84
TATTVASANGRARA CHAPTER II.
Rejoinder'.-In the case of the reasoning (put forward by the Naiyāyika) however, the invariable concomitance cited is not known to be in the general form; the Peobans that has been objected to as being unproven is one that has been put forward as being concomitant with a particular arrangement of component parts'; hence this objection is not of the nature of a Futile Rejoinder'.-(69)
If a general character could bring about the cognition of a thing even without being invariably concomitent with it, then absurdity could result; this is what is shown in the following Text :
TEXT (70).
THE MERE CHARACTER OF BEING DENOTED BY THE TERM Go (AS A GENERAL CHARACTER) MIGHT PROVE THE PRESENCE OF HORNS IN THE QUARTERS AND OTHER THINGS WHICH ARE ALL denoted by the term 'Go'), IN THE REASONING WERE
NOT ADOPTED IN A DIFFERENT FORM.-(70)
COMMENTARY. As a matter of fact, Heaven, Quarters, Speech, Eyes, Rays, Thunderbolt, Earth and Water, all these things are "denoted by the term Go'; if, on the basis of this general character of being denoted by the term Go!, it were sought to be proved that a particular Cow of variegated colour has horns,-then on the basis of the same character, it would be possible to infer the presence of Horns in Heaven, etc. also.-(70)
The following might be urged (by the Naiyāyika): "As a matter of fact, there is invariable conoomitance between the character of 'having a peculiar arrangement of component parts and that of being produced by an intelligent Cause', just as there is between this latter and the character of being a Product (Effect)'."
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (71).
IF IT WERE PROVED BY SOME VALID MEANS OF COGNITION THAT THERE IN
AN INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE BETWEEN THE PROBANS AND THE PROBANDUM (OITED BY TILE Naiyāyila). THEN, THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE FULLY ESTABLISHED BY REASONING, AND NO ONE COULD HAVE ANYTHING
TO SAY AGAINST IT, (71)
COMMENTARY But, as a matter of fact, no such Invariable Concomitance is proved ; this is what the Author proceeds to show by the following Text :

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85
TEXT (72) BUT THE EXISTENCE OF A BEING WHO IS ETERNAL, ONE, AND THE SUBSTRATUM OF ETERNAL ALL-EMBRACING CONSCIOUSNESS,-CAN NEVER BE PROVED; AS THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) THAT MAY BE CITED WOULD BE DEVOID
OF THE PROBANDUM.-(72)
COMMENTARY. What you (Naiyāyika) desire to prove is, not only that the World has been created by an Intelligent Maker, but that it is preceded (produced) by the intelligent Entity known as God, who is the Cause of the whole World, being himself one, eternal and the substratum of an eternal all-embracing Consciousness. In fact, it is this entity that forms the subject of dispute. The existence of such a Being cannot be proved :-why 1-because the Invariable Concomitance (that might be put forward to prove Its existence) will be devoid of the Probandum (the character to be proved); for the simple reason that any positive corroborative Instance that might be cited in the form of the Jar and such things would be lacking in the element of similarity that is essential [the maker of the Jar not having all the character that is predicated of God), and this would make it impossible to prove the necessary Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum ; as in no particular Instance (of any Product) is there any invariable concomitance between the Probans and the character of the Probandum 9 postulated by the Naiya. yika).-(72)
With a view to showing the same, the following Text proceeds to add tho following: -
TEXT (73). FOR INSTANCE, ALL SUCH PRODUCTS AS HOUSES, STEPS, GATEWAYS, TOWERS AND THE LIKE ARE DEFINITELY KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY MAKERS WHO HAVE BEEN MANY, AND WITH
FLEETING IDEAS.-(73)
COMMENTARY. Further, the Probans is not only Unproven' and 'Inconclusive'; it is also contradictory'; this is what is shown by the Author in the fol lowing Text:
TEXT (74). FOR THE SAME REASON, THE PROBANS IS ALSO DETRIMENTAL TO WHAT IS DESIRED ; INASMUCH AS WEAT IT ESTABLISHES IS A Cause] THAT
IS MANY, AND THE SUBSTRATUM OF FLEETING IDEAS.-(74)
COMMENTARY. For the same reason,-i.e. because the Invariable Concomitance (Prerniss) is contrary to the Probandum (which is desired to be proved).-What the

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term 'also indicates is that the Probans is not only unproven' and 'inconclusive, as shown above (but it is also contradictory')-(74)
[Says the Naiyāyika)—"The Probans would be Contradictory' only if it were invariably concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum ; in the case in question however, there is (as you say) no invariable concomitance even with the mere character of having an intelligent Cause'; how then could there be any such concomitance with any particular form of that character (which alone could be contrary to the desired conclusion) ?"
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (75)
THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED BY YOU IS ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO THE PROBANDUM IN THE FORM OF
THE CHARACTER OF HAVING AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE'; AND WE ARE GOING TO ASSERT IT CLEARLY WITH REFERENCE TO A SECOND (DIFFERENT, CON
TRARY) PROBANDUM.—(75)
COMMENTARY. You, Theist, in asserting the existence of God, have set forth an Invariable Concomitance in reference to the Probandum in the shape of the character of having an Intelligent Cause'; if that were not so, and if this general proposition (premise) also were not admitted, then how could it have been possible to prove that all things have God for their Creator Thus then, we admit (for the sake of Argument) the premiss from your view-pointthat Things have an Intelligent Cause',-and then proceed to show clearly that your Probans is invariably concomitant with a particular Probandum which is ‘Second -contrary-to that particular Probandum which you desire to prove ;--this "Second Probandum being the character of being preceded (produced) by a person of evanescent and many Cognitions (Ideas)'.
(75)
Question-"How are you going to show this clearly 1" The answer is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (76) For us, ETERNAL THINGS CANNOT PRODUCE ANY EFFECTS, BECAUSE CONSECUTIVE' AND 'CONCURRENT ACTION ARE MUTUALLY CONTRADIOTORY; AND IF OBJECTS ARE CONSECUTIVE, THERE MUST BE THE SAME CONSECUTIVENESS IN THBIR
COGNITIONS AL90.-(76)
COMMENTARY. Any such eternal things as God and the like cannot produce any effecta; because in any productive activity of an Eternal Thing, there is incompatibility

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between Consecutiveness and Concurrence'; hence only non-eternal things can be productive causes; as it is these alone which go on unceasingly changing their sequential character-of being present now and past at the next moment. Thus it is proved that an Intelligent Maker must be evanescent and many.
As regards the assertion (of the Naiydyika) that "God is endowed with eternal and one Consciousness", - this is contrary to all reason; this is what is indicated by the words "If objects are consecutive, etc. [Objects being fleeting, evanescent, according to the Naiyüyika also, their cognitions also must be evanescent; hence there can be no eternal cognition or con. sciousness).—(76)
What has been just asserted in the second line of the preceding Text) is further supported by the following Text:
TEXT (77).
God's COGNITION MUST BE CONSEOUTIVE, BECAUSE IT IS RELATED TO CONSECUTIVE COGNISABLE THINGS -JUST LIKE THE COGNITION OF DEVADATTA AND OTHER PERSONS, RELATING TO
FLAME AND OTHER THINGS.-(77)
COMMENTARY. That Cognition of which the object is consecutive must itself be consecutive : just as we find in the case of the cognition of Dēvadatta and other mon pertaining to such things as Flame and the like and God's Cognition has for its object only such things as are consecutive. This is a Reason based upon the nature of things. And as this reasoning is put for ward only by way of exposing the incongruity involved in the Theist's position), [and not as a formal Inferential Argument),-it will not be right to urge against it the fact of the Probans being unproven (not admitted by both parties). Inasmuch as the Cognition of Dēvadatta and others relating to such things as Universal' and the rest (which are held to be eternal) would be devoid of the main characteristic of the Probans (evanescence of the Object),--the instance cited is that of things like the Flame (which all parties admit to be evanescent).
Question-"What is the actual proof (argument) which annuls (the Theist's reasonings) ?"
Answer-If God's Cognition manifesting itself is produced by an object which is consecutive, then it becomes proved that it must be consecutive;
-if it is not so produced, then, as there would be no proximate contact (with the Object and the Cognition), God could not cognise the Object at all. And the result of this would be either that Cognitions would have to be held as valid even in the absence of their object, or you would have to renounce your doctrine (regarding the omniscience of God). There would be a further absurdity that, in regard to such objects as have been destroyed, or have not yet been produced, the Cognition (of God) would be objectless. -This is the argument that annuls the Theist's reasonings.-(77)

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It has been asserted (by the Naiyāyika, under Text 48 above) that ** Atoms supply the corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity (in support of the reasoning that the World must have an Intelligent Cause, because it is characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts 'l".
The Author proceeds to show in the following Text that the said Instance per Dissimilarity is one from which the character of the Probandum is not excluded
TEXTS (78-79).
THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE REGARDED BY US AS MERE AGGRECATES OF ATOMS; AND THE POTTER AND OTHER MEN WHO MAKE THOSE THINGS ARE ONLY MAKERS OF THE ATOMS; HENCE THE CHARACTER THAT YOU MEAN TO PROVE (1.B. YOUR PROBANDUM) IS NOT EXCLUDED (ABSENT) FROM THE ATOM WHICH HAS BEEN CITED (BY YOD) AS A CORROBORA
TIVE INSTANCE per Dissimilarity.-178-79)
COMMENTARY.
The 'Composite is going to be denied by us in detail (under Chapter 10): and it has already in a way been denied; hence (there being no such composito whole as the Jar) the Potter must be regarded as the maker of Atoms only; and thus the character to be proved that of being made by an Intelligent Maker,-is one that is not excluded from the Atoms, which have been cited as an Instance per dissimilarity; and thus the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity that has been cited (by the Theist, in support of his reasoning) is found to be open to the defect that the character of the Probandum is not absent from it and hence it cannot serve as an instance per dissimilarity].-(78-79)
The following might be urged "If what we had desired to prove were the particular phase of any character, then the corroborative Instance per Similarity cited by us in the form of the Jar) might have been open to the defect of being devoid of the character sought to be proved (Probandum); as it is however, what we are seeking to prove is only the general character of being produced by an Intelligent Cause'; and when that General thesis has been proved, then, by implication, God becomes proved as the Cause (Maker) of the Tree and other things. Potter, etc. cannot be the maker of these things, as they are of the Jar and such other things; because the General character is further specified by a particular characteristic. For instance, in the case of such things as the Tree and the like, it is not possible that there should be any other Maker; and the implication of this recognised fact is that, even without the specifio mention of a particular character (of the Maker), it is God alone that comes to be recognised as the Maker of these things."
The answer to this is supplied in the following Text:

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TEXT (SO).
IF THE CHARACTER OF BEING PRODUCED BY AN INTELLIGENT CAUSE IS MEANT TO BE PROVED ONLY IN A GENERAL FORM, THEN WE HAVE NO DISPUTE WITH YOU AS ALL DIVERSITY IS
DUE TO ACTIONS.-(80)
COMMENTARY.
If it is as you now explain, then your argument is open to the objection of being futile-seeking to prove what is already admitted by all parties.*How so? "-Because all diversity, i.e. the diverse character of the world that exists,- is due to Actions,-i.e. brought about by common and uncommon, good and bad, deeds. Hence men performing the good and bad actions, who are all intelligent beings, become the cause of all this. And in this form we also accept the general proposition that. Things are produced by Intelligent Causes') so your argument becomes futile'.-(80)
If (in order to avoid this) it be held that the proposition sought to be proved is in a particular (not the General) form”,-then the answer is as given in the following Text:
TEXT (81).
IF WHAT YOU SEEK TO PROVE IS THE FACT THAT THE WORLD IS CREATED BY A CAUSE WHO IS ONE AND WHOSE CONSCIOUSNESS IS ETERNAL,
-THEN THERE IS ABSENCE OF THE PROBANDUM (IN THE INSTANCE); AND IT IS INCONCLUSIVE' ALSO, SINCE SUCH THINGS AS THE HOUSE AND THE LIKE ARE
FOUND TO BE MADE BY SEVERAL MAKERS.-(81)
COMMENTARY.
Though this has been already explained under Text 73 above, yet it is asserted again with a view to clinching the argument. The compound
Nityaikabuddhipūrvatvam. may be taken to mean either produced by one who is eternal and has a single Consciousness', or produced by one whose Consciousness is eternal and one'.- Absence of the Probandum ;-i.e. in what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance per similarity also
inconclusiveness',-i.e, of the Probans-(this has to be supplied). -"How?" -The answer is-Since such things as the House, etc. etc.—(81)
It has been asserted (by the Theist, above, under Text 49) that "The material Cause of the Tree and other things is controlled by an Intelligent Being, etc. etc."
The answer to these arguments is given in the following Test :

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TEXT (82)
AGAINST TIH OTHER REASONINGS OF THE THEIST) ALSO, THIS SAME
CRITICISM MAY BE URGED mutatis mutandis ; SOME OTHER
CRITICISM ALSO IS NOW BEING BRIEFLY SET FORTH, -(82)
COMMENTARY.
As against the reason 'Because they have colour, etc., this same criticism may be urged: This same, -as follows:-(a) It is Unproven: (b) as there is no Invariable Concomitance, it is Inconclusive; (c) if there is Invariable Concomitance, it is contradictory: (d) the Instance is devoid of the Probandum; (e) if the Conclusion is meant to be general, it is futile, and so forth.-Tor instance, that presence of Colour, etc. which is controlled by an Intelligent Controller is not admitted as being present in the Tree, etc. ; -mere presence of Colour' by itself is not invariably concomitant (with the Probandum); hence the Probans is Inconclusive: if there is invariable concomitance, then, it becomes contradictory, as proving a conclusion contrary to the one desired ;the Corroborative Instance per similarity is devoid of the Probandum, as no concomitance is admitted with the character of being controlled by an eternal and one Intelligent Being' if the conclusion is meant to be in the general form, then the argument is futile; if it is meant to be specific, then it is inconclusive (Doubtful), the contrary being found to be the case with such things as the Jar and the like.-In this same manner, the criticism may be applied to the other reasonings also.-(82)
Another reason has been put forward (by the Theist, under Text 50)" because they operate intermittently (all such Oauses as Merit, Demerit and Atoms must be controlled by an Intelligent Being]".
Against this an additional objection is put forward in the following Text:
TEXT (83)
"INTERMITTENT ACTION OF ATOMS AND OTHER CAUSES IS not proven
(ADMITTED); AS THERE IS ' PERPETUAL FLUX', ALL THINGS ARE UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION EVERY MOMENT; IT IS ALSO INCONCLUSIVE' IN REFERENCE TO THAT SAME (GOD). AS HIS ACTIVITY ALSO IS CONSECUTIVE (HENCE
INTERMITTENT).-(83)
COMMENTARY
As a matter of fact, all things (according to us) disappear immediately on appearance, and they do not remain in existence even for a single moment; how then can the action of these be 'intermittent'! This Reason therefore is one that is unproven, inadmissible', for your opponent. It is also incon

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clusive', in reference to the same-God; as God also operates only intermittently over things which appear consecutively; and yet He is not controlled by an Intelligent Being; for if He were, then there would be no need to posit such In. telligent Controllers.-If the Reason be meant to be qualified by the qualifying phrase 'being insentient',-as has been actually done by Prashastamati,-even so the 'inconclusiveness' remains unavoidable; as the exclusion of the con. trary of the Probandum remains doubtful. That Reason alone can be regarded as logical which serves to exclude the Probans from the contrary of the Pro. baudum; that however which does not entirely set aside all doubt of the presence of the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum,-ever if put forward,-is as good as not there (i.e. ineffective). Further, even with the said qualification, the Reason remains open to the aforesaid defects of being unproven and the rest.-(83)
As regards the argument (put forward by the Theist under Text 51, above) that- At the beginning of Creation usage among men must bure been due to the teaching of other persons, eto, etc."-it is answered by the following Text:
TEXT (84) ACCORDING TO US, AT DISSOLUTION, PERSONS DO NOT CONTINUE TO
REMAIN WITH ALL CONSCIOUSNESS AND MEMORY COMPLETELY LOST; BECAUSE THEY ARE BORN IN ETFULGENT REGIONS, AND FROM THESE LATTER THEY ARE BORN AGAIN IN
THIS WORLD.-(84)
COMMENTARY
In Text (51) the Theist has used the qualifying phrase, when they become awakened to consciousness; but such a qualification is absurd. Because under our theory, it is not true that at Dissolution, there remain Persons with all consciousness and memory lost and with all organa enfeebled ; what happens is that they are born in Luminous Regions, in celestial bodies, endowed with superior forms of clear consciousness; those however who have still got to expiate their Karmic residue through the fruition of particularly sinful and other deeds become born in other material regions : so that even at the time of the future evolution of the world (following after Dissolution), those same persons fall down from the Luminous and other regions and become born in this world, without losing all consciousness and memory. Hence any such qualification as when they become subsequently awakened to consciousness' is absurd.
Further, the Reason put forward is also inconclusive, because its absence from the contrary of the Probandum is doubtful. And if all that is meant to be proved is the fact of being preceded by the teaching of other persons', -then the argument is 'Futile', as all parties are agreed that in the matter of usage, which is beginningless, dependence on mutual teaching is inevitable.--If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being

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preceded by the teaching of the particular person called God, then the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive', because as a matter of fact, it is actually possible in other ways also (withont such teaching). The Corroborative Instance also, in this case, would be devoid of the Probandum. This has already been urged before as a general defect (in the Theist's argument).-(84)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason put forward is also contradictory' and the Conclusion is contrary to the Theist's own doctrines
TEXT (85).
THEN AGAIN, THE TEACHERSHIP' OF A MOUTHLESS PERSON CAN ONLY BE A MATTER OF BLIND FAITH; God's MOUTHLESSNESS' IS PROVED BY HIS HAVING NO BODY, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE IN HIM
OF MERIT AND DEMERIT.-(85)
COMMENTARY.
If it were possible for usage to be proceded by (due to) Cod's teaching, then the Reason might not be Contradictory', as it is however, God having no mouth, it is not possible for Him to be a teacher; and the fact of His having no mouth is proved by His having no body,-i.e, because He is devoid of a body-Question-"But how do you know that He has no body?"Answer-On account of the absence in Him of Merit and Demerit; that is, in God there is no Merit and Demerit, which are the causes of Souls having bodies. This has been thus declared by Uddyota lara :-Proof is available for the presonce of Intelligence in God, but there is no proof for the presence of such qualities as Merit and the rest *_Thus the 'tenchership of God being impossible, usage cannot be attributed to His teaching: what is indicated is only the fact of its being due to the teaching of some persons other than God; and thus by discarding what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes - Contradictory'.
Even if God's leachership is admitted, the doctrine that He is * mouthless becomes abandoned ; and in this way the conclusion becomes contrary to the Theist's own doctrine.
As regards the argument- The manifest consisting of the Primary Elements and the rest being controlled by an Intelligent Controller, etc. etc. (put forward by Uddyolakara, in Nyayavintika, p. 463, and quoted in the Text 52), it can be shown that the Reasons cited there also, as before, are (a) 'inconclusive, as there is no proof against a contrary conclusion, () futile, if the reason is meant to be stated generally-and (c) if it is
* This is an exact quotation from the Nydyavartika, p. 468, 11. 12 el. seq., Bib. Ind. Ed., with this slight difference that for Saltve' in the present context, Nyâyavārtika has. Sambhace'.

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meant to be particular, then the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum.-(85)
Having refuted in detail the arguments put forward for proving the existence of God, the following Text proceeds to urge the defects in the Invariable Concomitance (Premiss, on which the Theist bases his arguments), and thereby to establish his own view :
TEXT (86).
IN ALL THE ARGUMENTS, THE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) IS CONTRARY TO INFERENCE ; AND THERE CAN BE NO INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE OF THE PROBANS ON THE BASIS OF A
CONTRARY (FALSE) CHARACTER.-(86)
COMMENTARY.
In every one of the arguments put forward (by the Theist), the Invariable Ooncomitance that has been cited as between the Probans and the Probandum, is contrary to Inference,-as is going to be explained later on.
Question-"Why is not this contrariness to Inference urged against the conclusion (of the Theist)?"
Answer-It would be so urged if the conclusion formed part of the Proof (Reasoning). As a matter of fact however, the Conclusion does not, either directly or indirectly, form part of the proving of the Probandum; hence when what is going to be done is the urging of objections against the proof of the Probandum, if the party urged the defects in the Conclusion, he would become subject to the Clincher of 'Urging what is not defect'. It is for this reason that in connection with the statement of proofs, the defects of the Conclusion should not be urged. If in some cases, a defect in the Conclusion is actually urged, there also it should be taken as having been urged only for the purpose of demolishing the Invariable Concomitance.-Or such instances may be regarded as possible only in cases where the Conclusion alone has been asserted (without any reasoning in support of it).
Question-"Even at the time that the Invariable Concomitance is put forward, how can there be contrariness to Inference ?"
Answer-There can be no invariable concomitance, etc.--Contrary character -is that which is opposed to all Means of Valid Cognition, false ; as such a character would be impossible (non est), an invariable concoraitance with it would be impossible; certainly there can be no invariable concomitance with what does not exist.-(86)
Question-"What is that Inference by which the Invariable Concomitance is annulled ?"
The answer is provided by the following Text:

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TEXT (87).
GoD CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF BORN THINGS,—BECAUSE HE IS HOMSELF DEVOID OF BIRTH, ---LIKE THE SKY. LOTUS'. OTHERWISE, ALL THINGS WOULD COMED INTO EXISTENCE
SIMULTANEOUSLY.-(87)
COMMENTARY
That which is itself devoid of birth cannot be the cause of anything; -as the Sky-lotus-God is devoid of birth :-hence the proposition that He is the cause would be contrary to the Universal Premiss. This argument is meant only to indicate an absurdity in the doctrine of the Opponent; hence it is not open to the objection that the substratum of its Reason (Probans) is * unproven
Otherwise, all things would come into existence simultaneously ;-what is meant is that, if the Cause were one whose efficiency is never obstructed, then all things would come into existence simultaneously.-exactly like things which are admitted to be produced at one and the same time.
This argument is the proof that annuls the Invariable Concomitance of the Theist. Or this may be taken merely as stating the sense of what has been said before.
The absurdity involved in the Theist's position) is to be shown in this manner :- When the Cause is present, in its complete form, then the Effect must appear as a matter of course; just as it is found in the case of the Sprout which appears as soon as the final stage has been reached by the causal conditions conducive to it now under the doctrine of the Theist, as God, the cause of all things, would always be there and free from defects, all things, the whole world, should come into existence at once.
The following argument might be urged:-"God is not the only Cause (of all things); in fact what He does He does through the help of such auxiliary causes as Merit and the rest,—God Himself being only the Efficient (Oontrolling) Cause. So that so long as Merit and the rest are not there, the 'Cause of things cannot be said to be present there in its efficient form."
This is not right; if there is help that has got to be rendered to God by the Auxiliary Oauses,-then alone could He be regarded as dependent upon their aid; as a matter of fact however, God is eternal and as nothing can introduce into Him any efficiency that is not there already, there can be no help that He should receive from the Auxiliary Causes; why then, should He need such auxiliaries as are of no use to Him - Further, even these Auxiliary Causes,-all of them should have their birth subject to God and as such, they should be always near Him. Thus, how can our Reason be regarded as 'unproven Nor is our Reason inconclusive': for if that were so (doubtful), then there would be no 'Perfect (defectless) Cause' at all of things). If then, the Perfect Cause itself never came into existence, then there would be no birth (production) of anything, as the absence of Perfect Cause' would always be there.

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Uddyolakara has argued as follows:-" Though the cause of Things named 'God' is eternal and perfect and always present, yet the producing of things is not simultaneous, because God always acts intelligently and purposely; if God had produced things by His mere presence, without intelligence (or purpose), then the objection urged would have applied to our doctrine. As a matter of fact however, God acts intelligently; hence the objection is not applicable; specially as God operates towards Products solely by His own wish. Thus our Reason is not Inconclusive."
This is not right. The activity and inactivity of things are not depen. dent upon the wish of the Cause; only if it were so that the appearance of all Effects would not be possible, even in the constant presence of the untraminelled Cause in the shape of God, simply on account of His wish being absent. The fact of the matter is that the appearance and non appearance of things are dependent upon the presence and absence of due efficiency in the Cause. For instance, even though a man may have the wish, things do not appear, if he has not the efficiency or power to produce them; and when the Cause in the form of Seeds has the efficiency or faculty to produce the Sprout, the Sprout does appear, even though the Seed has no wish at all. I then the Cause called 'God' is always there fully endowed with the due untrammelled efficiency, -as He is at the time of the producing of a particular thing, then why should Things stand in need of His wish, which can serve no purpose at all? And the result of this should be that all things should appear simultaneously, at the same time as the appearance of any one thing. Thus alone could the untrammelled causal efficiency of God be shown, if things were produced simultaneously. Nor can God, who cannot be helped by other things, stand in need of anything, for which He would need His wish.
Further, in the absence of Intelligence, there can be no desire for anything else, -and the Intelligence of God you hold to be eternally uniform ; so that, even if God acted intelligently, why should not there be a simula taneous production of things? Because like God Himself, His Intelligence also is always there. If then, His Intelligence be regarded as evanescent, even so, it must co-exist with God, and its presence must be as constant as God Himself; so that the objection on that score remains in force.
Thus the addition of the qualification, in the form because of God's Intelligence', -turns out to be futile; and our Reason is not . Inconclusive, Nor is the Reason "Contradictory', because the Probans is present in all cases of the Probandum.
And yet the production of things is not found to be simultaneous; hence the conclusion must be contrary to that desired by the Theist.
The argument may be formulated as follows 'When a certain thing is not found to be produced at a certain time, it must be taken to be one whose Cause at that time is not untrammelled in its efficiency,-ag is found in the case of the Sprout not appearing while the Seed is still in the granary ;
These are not the exact words of the Nyüyavārtika; it is a paraphrase of what has been there said under Sütra 4. 1. 21, p. 466, 1, 8, and p. 467, 1. 10 st. seq., Bib. Ind. Ed.

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it is found that at the time of the appearance of one thing, the whole World is not produced,hence what has been stated by the Opponent) as a universal proposition is not found to be true.
This argument cannot be regarded as 'futile', because it has been shown that if God were the Cause of things, then it would be impossible to regard the Cause of things to be trammelled in any way.-(87)
argument canh lound to be trated by the Os, the whole Wor
The following Text sets forth another argument (against Theism) :
TEXTS (88-89).
THINGS THAT ARE BORN CONSECUTIVELY CANNOT HAVE GOD FOR THEIR CAUSE, JUST LIKE THE NOTIONS OF FOOLISH PERSONS ARISING
FROM THE SAID REASONINGS (OF THE THEST), -IE THOSE (NOTIONS) ALSO ARE PRODUCED BY GOD, THEN THE ADDUCING OF PROOTS (IN SUPPORT OF THEM) SHOULD BE USELESS, BECAUSE OF (Hrs) ETERNALITY; AND AS HE WOULD BE BEYOND REMEDY, THE SAID STATEMENT COULD RENDER NO
HELP.—(89)
COMMENTARY.
The notions i.e. the definite conclusions-derived from such reasonings as 'because characterised by a peculiar arrangement of component parts' and the rest,-relating to the object sought to be proved, - appearing in the minds of those foolish persons who are keen on proving God as the Cause of the World.
Objection-"As a matter of fact, the said reasons have all been shown to be invalid and beset with fallacies that have been pointed out; and hence no conclusive notions conld be derived from them, regarding what is desired to be proved; and under the circumstances, there could be no Corroborative Instance in support of the reasoning here set forth (by you)."
That is true; that is why the Text has used the term foolish persons': foolish people are not capable of discriminating the validity of Proofs, and hence they derive their notions from invalid premisses also.
"Even so, the Corroborative Instance would remain devoid of the Probandum; because the notions of foolish persons also are accepted by us as having God for their efficient Cause."
Answer-If these notions also, etc.-These notions,- i.e. the notions of foolish persons; if these also are held to be produced by God,-then the adducing of proofs should be useless; the putting forward of reasons would be entirely useless; i.e. because they would all be produced from God Himself.
"God would be the producer of the said notions, through the help of the statement of proofs, -and not by Himself alone; so that the said statement would not be useless."

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Answer-Because of His eternality ;-if the statement of proofs served to remove God's inefficient character and render it efficient--then it could be helpful to Him; but inasmuch as God is eternal and hence His character cannot be liable to removal or production, He could not be helped by anything; so that the statement of the proof cannot be of any use to Him.-(88-89)
Further, even in the absence of Causes with perceptible efficiency, you postulate the causal character of God, whose efficiency is never perceived; ---and this lands you in absurditios; because even after having assumed such a God, you might as well assume even such (absurd) things as the Dhēkasals and the like (?), as there would be no difference between such things and God. This is what is shown in the following Text :
TEXT (90)
WHEN YOU HAVE SEEN THAT A CERTAIN THING EXISTS ONLY WHEN CERTAIN OTHER THINGS EXIST, AND NEVER WHEN THESE DO NOT EXIST, THEN, IF YOU ASSUME A CAUSE FOR THE FORMER, OTHER THAN THESE LATTER, HOW CAN YOU AVOID
FALLING INTO AN infinite regress ?-(90)
COMMENTARY.
A yat' has to be added after 'bhavaddretam ', 'seen by you'. If you assume a Cause other than those ;-i.e, a Cause other than those whose efficiency has been perceived by the positive and negative concomitance spoken of). (90)
It has been argued (in Text 5€) that "the fact of His being the creator of all things having been established, His omniscience is proved without effort".-The answer to this is provided by the following Text:
TEXT (91).
BY THE REFUTATION OF God's CREATORSHIP, HIS OMNISCIENCE ALSO IS UNDERSTOOD TO BE SET ASIDE BY THE SAME ; AS IT IS ON THE STRENGTH OF CREATORSHIP THAT THE ARGUMENT FOR
OMNISCIENCE HAS BEEN BASED.-(91)
COMMENTARY You regard God to be omniscient only on the strength of His being the Oreator of all things; hence by the refutation of His Creatorship, His omniscience also becomes set aside without effort'-(91)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER II.
Admitting (for argument's sake) the validity of the Theist's arguments, the following Texts proceed to point out another objection
TEXTS (92-93).
YOUR REASONINGS MAY NOT BE BESET WITH THE DEFECTS URGED ABOVE ; AND YET THE CREATOR CANNOT BE one, BECAUSE THE FALSITY OF SUCH A PROPOSITION HAS BEEN SHOWN ABOVE ; AND WHEN THE ONENESS OF THE CREATOR IS NOT PROVED, WHEREIN
COULD OMNISCIENCE'SUBSIST 1-(92-93)
COMMENTARY.
The defecte urgeil above-ending with being contrary to Inference (Text 86).
Tho upshot of the whole is as follows: Though it may be true that the reasonings put forward succeed in establishing an Intelligent Creator of such things as the Body, Mountains and so forth, -yet it is by no means certain that the Creator of one particular thing is the same as that of another thing; becauso it is quite possible that each effect may have its own separate Cause (Creator); in fact, in the case of such things as the House and the like, it is found that they are made by many persons; hence it is not possible to establish that there is only one Creator for all things. And under the circumstances, how can 'omniscience be regarded as proved ?
Prashastamati has put forward the following argument for proving a single Orvator :- All beings, from Brahmā down to the Pishacha must have over them a single All-Superior Being, because among themselves thore are found to be of varying grades of superiority ;- in the ordinary world it is found that where there are several persons of varying grades of superiority, they are always under the sway of one Superior Being; e.g, the controllers of the House, the village, the city and the province are all under one Sovereign Emperor of the entire world; and all such beings as serpents, Raksasas, Yakşcts and such other beings are possessed of varying grades of superiority among themselves from these facts we are led to think that all these also are under one Controller in the shape of God".
If what is meant to be proved is that all these Beings are controlled by God, then the Reason put forward is 'Inconclusive'; as there is no valid reason for precluding the contrary conclusion; specially as no Invariable Concomitance is admitted. The Corroborative Instance also is found to be devoid of the Probandum-If from the mere fact of there being a Controller, it is meant to prove that the Control is actually there, then the argument is futile; As we also accept the fact that the Enlightened One (Buddha), who was the crest-jewel of the entire universe, did actually control the entire world, through His mercy; by virtue of which all good men of the present day also attain prosperity and Ultimate Good.

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DOCTRINE OF GOD.
99
The same writer (Prashastamali) has adduced the following further argument:"All the Seven Worlds must have been created by the intelli. gence of a single Being,-because they are all included under one 'Entity, - just like the several rooms of a House; we find that all the rooms of a House are built by the intelligence of a single architect; in the same way all the seven worlds are included under the one universe ; hence it is concluded that these must be the creation of the Intelligence of a single Creator; and the one Being by whoso intelligence all these have been created is the Blessed Lord, the one Architect of the whole universe".
The Probans of this reasoning is unproven (not admitted); there is no such thing as a single universe' or a single louso '; such names have been given to certain things only for the purpose of simplifying business. transactions.-For this same reason the Corroborative Instance that has been cited is devoid of the Probans. Further, as a matter of fact, the several rooms in a house are actually found to be built by several architects (and masons); hence the Probans is 'inconclusive (Doubtful) also.
Objections to other Theistic arguments also may be set forth in the aforesaid manner.-(92)
It has been argued (under Text 55) that "The theory under disputo must be perceptible to someone, etc. etc."
The answer to this is provided by the following Text :
TEXT (93).
IN FACT, THE REASON ADDUCED TOR PROVING THE OMNISCIENT PERSON
IS EFFECTIVE ONLY AGAINST THE FOLLOWERS OF JAIMINI.-(93)
COMMENTARY.
If what you seek to prove is only an Omniscient Being in general, then your proofs have no force against us ; as it proves what is already admitted by us. In fact, it is effective only against the followers of Jaimini who deny the Omniscient Being' entirely.
If however what you seek to prove is the "omniscient' God, then as there can be no Invariable Concomitance, the Reason is inconclusive, and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum. For all these reasons, your arguments are not effective against us. Such is the meaning of the Text.
The Theist, in his arguments, has made use of such qualifications for the Subject of his argument as appearing in various forms'. But there is no use for such an epithet; it is only a loud enunciation of your views for the purpose of deluding other people. For instance, if, in the absence of such epithets for the Subject, the Probans is free from the defects of being * uinproven' and the like, then that alone suffices for proving the desired con. clusion on the other hand, if the Reason is defective by reason of being

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER II.
unproven and the like, then, even on the introducing of the said epithet, the desired conclusion is not established. Hence in every way the qualification added is absolutely useless. Further, the Probans is one whose very substratum is unknown', 'unproven', as the other party knows of no such subject or entity as is possessed of the qualification in question. Hence the Subject should not be one that is known to your Philosophy only.-(93)
Here ends the Examination of the Doctrine of God.

Page #96

CHAPTER III. Dealing with the Doctrine of Both God and Primordial Matter—being the Cause of the world.
Statement of the Doctrine.
COMMENTARY.
The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no functioning of Both (God and Primordial Matter) -
TEXT (94).
THE DOCTRINES OF 'GOD' OR 'PRIMORDIAL MATTER' SEVERALLY BEING THE CAUSE (OF THE WORLD) HAVING BEEN REFUTED, -IT FOLLOWS THAT THESE TWO TOGETHER CANNOT BE THE
MAKER' OT THINGS PRODUCED.-(94)
COMMENTARY.
In this connection, some Sanickyus (the Theistio Sarikhyas, followers of the Yogasystem) have asserted as follows:
* It is not from Primordial Matter alone that the various products are produced (as held by the Sankhyas in general); that is not possible, as that Matter is insentient; no insentient entity has been found to proceed to any activity, in the absence of a Controller -the Spirit' (as postulated by the Sankhya) cannot be that Controller, because at the time of the beginning of the world) he is entirely unconscious (the consciousness of the Spirit being dependent upon contact with the products of Primordial Matter, after these latter have come into existence). For instance, what the Spirit cognises, and is conscious of, is only a thing that has been already determined' by Intelligence; so that prior to contact with Intelligence, he is absolutely unconscious,--and cognises nothing at all; and until he cognises things, he cannot make or produce anything; hence he cannot be the maker' (of the World). From this it follows that God is the maker, not by Himself alone, but through the help of Primordial Matter. For example, Devadatta alone by himself is not able to give birth to a son, nor is the Potter alone by himself able to make the Jar."
The doctrines of God or Primordial Matter severally being the Cause (of the World) having been refuted, it follows that the doctrine of these two jointly being the Cause-maker-of things born,-i.e. of products-also becomes refuted.-(94)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER III.
Objection—"If the separate makership of these two has been refuted above,--their joint makership remains unrefuted ; certainly, even though it is a fact that each of the Eye and other Sense-organs by itself alone has not the capacity to bring about the Visual and other perceptions, yet it does not necessarily follow that they cannot do so jointly."
The answer to this objection is provided in the following Text :
TEXTS (95-96).
AS FOR THEIR ASSOCIATION' ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THEIR ACTING
JOINTLY,—THIS COULD BE DUF EITHER (a) TO THE CREATION OF SOME PECULIARITY, OR (6) TO THEIR SERVING A COMMON PURPOSE. (a) THE FORMER OF THESE ASSUMPTIONS CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS BOTH ARE' UNMODIFIABLE'; (6) NOR IS THE LATTER ACCEPTABLE ; AS THAT WOULD LEAD TO TRE ABSURDITY OF ALL PRODUCTS COMING INTO EXISTENCE
SIMULTANEOUSLY.-(95-96)
COMMENTARY.
Association' implies joint action; this can be of two kinds-either (a) by the creation of some peculiarity in one another, or (6) by serving A common purpose. The assumption of the association of the former kind,- that consisting in the creating of some peculiarities-cannot be right;why ?-because both Cod and Primordial Matter are eternal and hence unmodifiable (unchangeable).--Nor is the assumption of the second kind of association right :-uch is the construction of the words of the Text ;-why 1–because that would lead to the absurdity of all prodncts coming into existence simultaneously. The potency of the Joint Cause-in the shape of God.Primordial Matter-being absolute and untrammelled, and they being constantly associated, its causal activity (towards the making of all things) would always be there.
In this connection, the arguments already urged before (in Commentary on Text 87)-in the words That Cause is present in its complete form, eto,'-may also be brought forward.—(95-96)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out, from the standpoint of the Opponent, the inadmissibility (unprover character) of the Reason put forward above (under 87), to the effect that when the Cause is present in its complete form, the Effect must appear as & matter of course, just as it is found in the case of the Sprout, etc. etc. :

Page #98

BOTH-GOD AND PRIMORDIAL MATTER,
103
TEXTS (97-100).
THE THEISTIC Sinthya MAY ARGUE AS FOLLOWS:"IT IS A WELLESTABLISHED FACT THAT PRIMORDIAL MATTER IS TRIPLE IN ITS ESSENCE ;
-WHEN THE SUPREME LORD COMES INTO CONTACT WITH THE MANIFESTED Rajas-aspect (ENERGY), HE BECOMES THE CAUSE OF CREATION WHEN AGAIN, HE HAS RECOURSE TO THE MANIFESTED Sattva-aspect (HARMONY), THEN HE BECOMES THE CAUSE OF THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE WORLD - WHEN HE COMES INTO CONTACT WITH THE MANIFESTLY OPERATIVE T'amasaspect (INERTIA), THEN HE BRINGS ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OF THE ENTIRE WORLD. THUS THE ATTRIBUTES OF HARMONY, ENERGY AND THE REST ARE HIS AUXILIARIES, AND THESE BECOME OPERATIVE ONLY CONSECUTIVELY; THAT IS WHY THERE IS NO absence of consecutiveness (1.E. SIMULTANEITY) OF PRODUCTS."
(97-100)
COMMENTARY.
"Even though these two Canses (Primordial Matter and God) are constantly present together, yet the various products will come into existence only consecutively, one after the other; because the three Attributes of Primordial Matter,-Sattva and the rest, are the auxiliaries of God; and as these Attributes function only consecutively, there is bound to be consecutive. ness in the Products also. For instance, when God becomes affected by the operative Rajas-attribute, He becomes the Creator of creatures, as the Rajas. attribute is conducive to production ;-when however, He has recourse to the operative Saltva-attribute, then He becomes the Cause of the continued existence of the worlds, because the Satta-attribute is conducive to subsistence; wlien He comes into contact with the operative Tumas-attribute, then He brings about the dissolution-destruction of the entire World; as the Tamas-attribule is conducive to mergence (dissolution). --This process has been thus described (by Bāņa-Bhatta in the opening verse of his Kadambari):- He who has recourse to Rajas at the birth of creatures, to Sallva during their existence, and to Tamas at their dissolution,—who is unborn, and controls the birth, existence and destruction, who consists of the Three Vedas, the very essence of the Three Attributes,-to Him obeisance !
* The particle * Kila' (in Toxt 99) is meant to indicate improbability (of any complete Dissolution)."-(97-100)
The answer to the above is provided in the following Text:

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104
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IIT.
TEXTS (101-102). THE ANSWER TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS:-AT THE TIME THAT THE TWO ARE
PERFORMING ONE ACT (OF CREATING OR MAINTAINING OR DISSOLVING),--IS TENIR CAPACITY TO PERFORM THE OTHER ACTS PRESENT? OR IS IT NOT PRESENT !-IF IT IS PRESENT, TEEN AT THE TIME OF creation, THE OTHER TWO ACTS ALSO SHOULD COME ABOUT:-THUS WHENEVER ANY ONE OF THE ACTS WOULD BE THERE, THE OTHER TWO WOULD
HAVE TO BE THERE I-(101.102)
COMMENTARY. The term 'layoh, the two', stands for Primordial Matter and God; al the time of performing one act:-i.e. from among the three acts of creating, maintaining and dissolving.- at the time that any one is being done, is their capacity to do the other two acts present in them or not?- These are the two alternatives. If the capacity is there, then, inasmuch as at the timo of creating, their Cause would be present in its untrammelled form, the other two acts-of maintaining and dissolving should also come about, just like the act of creating ; so that at the time that a thing would be maintained in excistence-its creation and dissolution also should be there! And at the time of dissolution, there should be its maintained existence and creation! This certainly cannot be right. Because when the three conditions are mutually nugatory (and incompatible) it is not possible that they should co-exist in the same object.-(101-102)
The following might be urged—“At the time that Primordial Matter and God are bringing about one offect in the shape of the Creation (Birth) of one thing, there is not present in them that particular form of theirs which would be productive of the other two effects (Maintenance and Dissolution); that is why there is no possibility of the absurdity that has been urged.”
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (103). As A MATTER OF FACT, THE Two (PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND GOD) ARE THE
CAUSE OF THE OTHER TWO AOTS ALSO, NOT IN ANY OTHER FORM THAN THE ONE THAT BRINGS ABOUT THE ONE AOT; THE FORM OF THE CAUSE REMAINS THE SAME; WHY THEN SHOULD THERE BE ANY CESSATION OF THE FUNC
TIONING OF ANY ACT AT ALL 1-(103)
COMMENTARY. The Pronoun Tat stands for the Cause, that is, Primordial Matter and God, -of the other,-i.e. of the two subsequent acts.--Not in any other form,

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BOTH-GOD AND PRIMORDIAL MATTER,
105
it is always in its own form that the Two operate as Cause.
-what then -(103)
The following might be urged :-" Though it does not serve as the Cause in any other form, yet at the time that it is producing one effect, the capacity necessary for the producing of other effects is not present in it for the time being; that is why the other two effects do not appear at that time."
The answer to this is provided in the following Text
TEXT (104)
IF THERE WERE DISAPPEARANCE OF ANY PARTICULAR POTENOY, THEN
THE CAUSE COULD NEVER BE PRODUCTIVE OF ITS PARTICULAR EFFECT-BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF THAT POTENCY AT SOME OTHER TIME; JUST LIKE THE 'SKY-LOTUS
AND SUCH OTHER THINGS.-(104)
COMMENTARY At some other time,- i.e. at the time of the producing of the particular effect meant by the Sankhya.-(104)
The following might be urged :-"Even though all the Potencies are present in Primordial Matter, yet a particular effect is produced only by that particular Potency which becomes manifestly operative and thereby becomes the Cause of that effect; thus it is that there is no simultaneity in the appearance of effects."
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (105)
IF THE manifested form of the Potency HAD THAT SAME (PRIMORDIAL MATTER AND GOD) FOR ITS CAUSE, THEN, THAT WOULD CONTINUE TO BE THERE AT ALL TIMES, BECAUSE OF THE PROXIMITY OF
THE CAUSE, WHICH IS ETERNAL.—(105)
COMMENTARY.
The 'manifested form of Satta and other Attributes that you speak of-cannot be said to be eternal; because these are found to appear at only certain timez; then, in regard to the coming into existence of this manifested form', there are only three alternatives : they could be either (a) produced by the same cause,- Primordial Matter and Godor (b) produced by some other Cause,-or (c) they would be self-sufficient.-(a) Under the first of these alternatives, the said 'manifested form' would always be there, because its

Page #101

106
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER III.
Cause, in the shape of Primordial Matter and God, is eternal and hence always present close at hand.-(105)
As regards to second alternative, the objection is stated in the following Text:
TEXT (106).
(b) AS REGARDS THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE, THAT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED
BY THE OTHER PARTY; AND TOR TELAT VERY REASON, IT COULD NOT BE THE EFFECT OF SOME OTHER Cause.-(c) NOR CAN IT BE SELF-SUFFICIENT; AS IT APPEARS ONLY AT
CERTAIN TIMES.-(106)
COMMENTARY.
Apart from Primordial Matter and God, no other Cause is admitted by the Sankhyas, from which the said manifested forma' could be produced,
Nor is the third alternative right; this is what is asserted by the words "nor can it be self-sufficient.-(106)
Says the Opponent"If the said manifested Potency be self-sufficient (self-produced)—why should that be incompatible with the fact of its appearing at only certain times?"
The answer is supplied by the following Text:
TEXT (107)
IF IT WERE SELE-PRODUCBD, THEN IT WOULD BE CAUSELESS; AS ANY OPERATION OF A THING UPON ITSELF IS A CONTRADICTION IN TERMS. IF THERE WERE DEPENDENCE (UPON SOMETIIINO ELSE) THEN THE EFFECTS WOULD BE SUCH AS WOULD
APPEAR AT ONLY CERTAIN TIMES.—(107)
COMMENTARY
If the production' (of the Manifested Potency) trere due to itself-its own nature,--then it would most certainly be causeless,
Question-"Why should an effect produced from itself be causeless, when its own nature (or essence) would be its Cause ?"
Ansier-Any operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms; any causal action of a thing upon itseli-its own essence-is incompatible.
The following might be urged "Let it be causeless ; oven so the Effect would not appear at only certain times."
Answer-If Were were dependence, etc, etc, Things that are dependent for their existence upon other things can appear only at certain times, as their existence and non-existence would be dependent upon the presence and

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BOTI-GOD AND PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
107
absence of those other things. Those that are not dependent for their existence upon other things, -as they do not need the aid of anything else-why should they appear at certain times only 1-(107)
Question-"How do you prove that there is self-contradiction' (in. congruity) in a thing operating upon itself!"
The answer is given in the following Text:
TEXT (108)
FOR INSTANCE, MERE NEGATION (ABSENCE) IS NOT REGARDED AS HAVING ANY ACTION UPON ITSELF-AS FOR THE WELL-ESTABLISHED POSITIVE ENTITY, IT IS WELL KNOWN AND RECOGNISED UNDER
THE CIRCUMSTANCES.-(108)
COMMENTARY.
When the nature' or 'essence of the Effect produces itself, is it itself an established entity or not? It cannot be an established entity; because under the circumstances, the said 'essence ie nothing apart from the established form ; so that the recognition is as established as the 'essence itself. Hence, as there would be nothing to be produced, whereupon could the Entits operate 2-(108)
Essence cannot be
The following Text proceeds to show that the sornething not-established:
TEXT (109).
TH ITS OWN ESSENCE IS STILL UNESTABLISHED, IT CANNOT BE OPER ATED UPON BY ANYTHING ;--BECAUSE IT IS BEREIT OF ALL POTENCY,
-LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS AND SUCH THINGS.-(109)
COMMENTARY.
Upon anything'—this is a general statement; the meaning is that it cannot operate either upon itself or upon any other thing. If it did operate, then it would itself be an established entity; as such operation is the only characteristic of an established entity.—109)
End of Chapler (3) dealing with the Doctrine of Primordial Matter
and God, both being the Joint Cause of the World.

Page #103

CHAPTER IV.
The Doctrine of the Thing by Itself.
COMMENTARY
The opening verses of the Text have spoken of other entities', which includes the doctrine of those philosophers who hold that the origination of the world is due to its own nature' (or constitution); this is the doctrine that is taken up now for refutation, even out of ita proper sequence, because there is little to be said regarding it,-by the following Text:
TEXT (110).
THE PROPOUNDERS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE THING BY ITSELF DESCRIBE THE ORIGINATION OF THINGS AS BEING INDEPENDENT OF ALL CAUSES. THEY DO NOT DECLARE EVEN THE
THING ITSELF TO BE ITS OWN Cause':-(110)
COMMENTARY
Though the Doctrine of the Thing by Itself' has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by the doctrine that the Things are produced by themselves (as detailed in Texts 106 et seq.), Those who assert that things are born out of themselves have been silenced by the words (in Text 107)- The operation of a thing upon itself is a contradiction in terms;now the upholders of the doctrine of the Thing by Itself' are going to be silenced.
These philosophers &ssert as follows:-“The origination of things does not proceed either from themselves or from any other thing; in fact, it is indepen. dent of all Causes, i.e. it does not depend on the action of any 'Cause' at all."
Question- What is the difference between these people and those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves!”
Anstoer-They do not, etc. They'-i.e. the upholders of the Thing by Itzelf' ;-the thing itself,i.e, its own form (prior to origination);* even - this implies that they do not accept the form of any other thing to be the Cause'; the difference thus is that while the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its 'Cause', these other people do not accept even that as the Cause':-(110)
These people put forward the following reason in support of their view :"When a thing which fulfils the conditions of perceptibility has its existence not perceived, it should be regarded by intelligent persons as non-existent, as the 'Hare's Horns' any Cause of things is something whose existence

Page #104

THE DOCTRINE OF THE
THING BY ITSELP!
109
is not perceived; hence it follows that there can be no cognition of the nature of the thing' (the Cause)".
In the following Text,-it is shown that the Reason put forward is not unproven' (hence inadmissible)
TEXT (111).
* WHO MAKES THE DIVERSITY IN THE LOTUS AND ITS FILAMENTS, ETC.?
BY WHOM TOO HAVE THE VARIEGATED WINGS OF THE
PEACOCK AND SUCH THINGS BEEN CREATED ?"-(111)
COMMENTARY. Rajiua' is Lotus ;--the filaments, etc.' of the Lotus. Such is the analysis of the compound; Et cetera' is meant to include the Stalk, the Petals, the Pericarp and other parts, also the sharpness of thorns and the like-Diversity':-such diversities as those of shape, colour, hardness and the like-'Who makes ? !-The sense is that no one makes it, since we do not find any such cause as God and the like.(111)
The following might be urged"Even if it be regarded as proved that external things are without cause, because no such cause is perceived, - How can it be taken as proved in regard to internal things"
The answer to this is provided by the following Text:
TEXT (112)
"JUST AS THE SHARPNESS AND OTHER PROPERTIES OF THE THORN AND OTHER THINGS MUST BE REGARDED AS without cause, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR APPEARING AT CERTAIN TIMES ONLY,-50 ALSO MUST PAIN AND OTHER (INTERNAL) THINGS BE REGARDED AS
without Cause."-(112)
COMMENTARY.
"Even though the fact of Pain and other internal things being without cause is not proved by Perception, yet it is clearly proved by Inference. For instance, what appears only at certain times is definitely known to be without cause,-e.g, the Sharpness of the Thorn and such things ;-Pain and such internal things appear only at certain times; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Nor is it right to hold that when a certain thing is present or absent when another thing is present or absent, then the latter should be regarded as the 'Cause of the former as this is not found to be always true; for instance, Visual perception is present when there is Touch (in the object perceived), and is absent when there is no Touch; and yet Touch is not the Cause' of Visual perception. Hence the said definition

Page #105

110
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IV.
the
of the cansal relation cannot be true. From all this it follows that origination of all things is independent of all causes."-(112)
The Author answers tle above argunents of the upholder of the Thing by Itself with the following Texts:
TEXTS (113-114).
As REGARDS THE LOTUS AND ITS FILAMENTS, ETC., IT IS DEFINITELY
ASCERTAINED THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION THAT THEY HAVE THEIR CAUSE IN THE SEED, CLAY, WATER AND THE REST UNDER CERTAIN PECULIAR CONDITIONS, WITH WHICH LATTER THEY ARD POSITIVELY AND NEGATIVELY CONCOMITANT; SUCH BEING THE CASE, WHAT OTHER CAUSE' CAN THERE BE OF THOSE, WHICH YOU ARE ASKING
ABOUT -(113-114)
COMMENTARY.
By this Text, the Author shows that the Renson adduced by the other party is unproven and finadmissible, and the conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts.
It has been asserted (under Text 111) that of such things as the Lotus, its Filaments and the like, no Cause is perceived " -This is not admitted '; as through Perception and Non-apprehension, such . Cause is definitely cognised to consist in the Seed, Clay, Water and such things, with which the said things are positively and negatively concomitant. To explain; when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter,
then this latter thing is said to be the cause of the former thing. Such a Cause of the Lotus and its Filaments, etc.' is found in the shape of the Seed, eto, -which under certain peculiar conditions, such as becoming swollen under moisture and so forth,-serves as their Cause', with which they are positively and negatively concomitant, i.e. the Lotus, etc. come into existenco only when the Seed, etc. are present, and they do not come into existence when these latter are absent;that these are the Cause' of the Lotus, etc. is definitely ascertained through Perception and Non-apprehension.Thus the Reason (Premiss) put forward by the other party is 'inadmissible', not true.
Then again, it has been urged that the definition of 'Causal Relation' is not true (fallible)". -This Reason also is 'unproven', not admissible; as, in the instance cited, as Touch also is a cause of Colour, it is admitted to be the cause of Visual Cognition also. To explain,-the term 'touch' (in this connection) stands for the material substance, and it is only by associating with those substances that Colour subsiste; hence in regard to Visunl

Page #106

THE DOCTRINE OF THE
THING BY ITSELF'.
Cognition, Touch does serve as a 'Cause'; the only difference is that while one (Colour) is a direct cause, the other (Touch) is only an indirect one.
Further, mere negation (Absence) is not regarded by us as determining the causal relation;" what then ?"-It is a particular kind of absence that is so regarded ; for instance, when it is found that, even though other efficient agents are present, yet in the absence of some one agent, the thing in question is not produced, then this latter agent is regarded as the Cause of that thing: and not when there is simple negation in the form that it is not produced while the other is absent. Otherwise (if such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) the Date growing in the country where one's mother may have been married would not be produced if the mother's marriage had not been there [as ex hypothesi, by mere negation the 'Mother's Marriage' would be the 'Cause of the growth of the Date].
The negative Premiss in the qualified form that we have shown is not * fallible' (untrue) in regard to Touch. For, if it could be shown that, even in the presence of Colour and other conditions (of visibility), there is no Visual Cognition on account of the absence of Touch alone,-then there might be 'fallibility in our premiss. Nothing like this however can be shown. Hence there can be no 'fallibility in the definition of the Causal Relation (as stated by us).-(113-114)
It is not only such things as the Seed of the rest that are definitely known as the 'Cause of things; even particular points of Place and Time are definitely known as such Causes' ;this is what the Author shows in the following Text:
TEXTS (115-116).
PARTICULAR POINTS OF PLACE AND TIME ALSO ARE RELATED (AS CAUSE) TO THINGS.-"How so?"-IF THE SAID POINTS WERE NOT THE CAUSE OF THINGS, THESE WOULD BE PRODUCED
EVERYWHERE AND AT ALL TIMES.-(115)
AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER THINGS ARE FOUND TO BE PRODUCED SPECIFICALLY AT A CERTAIN PLACE, AT A CERTAIN TIME AND IN CERTAIN RECEPTACLES, BEING DEPENDENT UPON THESE
AND INDEPENDENT OF ALL OTHERS. (116)
COMMENTARY.
If tho Lotus, etc. did not have them-i.e. the particular points of place and time,- for their Cause', then such phenomena as their production only in a particular Place, like Water and things like it, and not in other places like Stone,—and only at the particular point of time like the Summer, and not at other points of time like the Winter, -would not be possible ; in fact, the Lotus and other things would come into existence at all places and at all times, as they would be independent of the peculiarities of place

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER IV.
and time. It is olearly recognised therefore that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special places and at special times.-(115.116)
Question—"The things in question (by their insentience) cannot have any wish; how then can they have any need for (dependence upon) the causal conditions ?"
The Answer is given in the following Text:
TEXT (117).
WHAT IS MEANT BY THEIR BEING DEPENDENT' IS THAT THEY COMIC
INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT MANNER; SO THAT IT IS THE CHARACTER OF EFFECT THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'DEPENDENCE! THAT THINGS COME INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT MANNER IS A PERCEPTIBLE FACT; HENCE THE SAID CAUSES
BECOME DULY ESTABLISHED.-(117)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant by the Things being so dependent' is that they come into existence at particular places and times and not at others; it does not mean that they have any 'wish' or desire'.
Objection :- "If such is their dependence on the particular points of time and place,-even so, how does it follow that they are effects of these?"
Answer: It is the character of Effect that is spolcen of as dependence',The character of the Effect is not anything else except the dependence involved in the fact that they come into existence in that particular manner.
Question :-"How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?"
Answer: — It is a perceptible fact. (117)
TEXT (118).
THUS THE DOCTRINE OF THE THING BY ITSELT IS DISCARDED BY PERCEPTION; SPECIALLY AS THE EXACT NATURE OF THE CAUSE' OF THINGS IS DULY ASCERTAINED THROUGH PERCEPTION
AND NON-APPREHENSION.-(118)
COMMENTARY.
Tat-Therefore, thus-or the whole expression Tatevābhāvikavādah' may be taken as a compound, meaning 'The doctrine of the Thing by Ilself in regard to the Lotus and other things' is discarded by Perception; Perception alone is mentioned here, as the non-apprehension' also of a

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certain thing consists only in the apprehension of something else, and as such, is of the nature of Perception
It has been sought (under Text 112, above) to prove that pleasure and such internal things can have no Cause because they appear only occasionally " -This reasoning however is contradictory', inasmuch as it proves only the contrary of what is desired to prove ; because what has no cause and what is not dependent upon anything else cannot be occasional', 124penring only at certain tiines and places. What is meant is that the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the character desired to be provedl.-(118)
Thus it has been shown that the conclusion (of the other party) is contrary to facts of Perception and that their Reason is 'unproven, Inadmissible: now the Author takes for granted (for the sake of argument) the admissibility of the Renson, and then proceeds to show its Inconchesiveness-in the following Text:
TEXT (119).
IT MAY BE THAT THERE ARE NO PROOFS TOR TRE EXISTENCE OF THE 'CAUSE OF THINGS; BUT THE MERE absence of proof (MEANS OF COG. NISING) CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ANY
THING.–(119)
COMMENTARY. If inere. Non-apprehension' is put forward as the reason for the nouexistence of the Cause, thou it is Inconclusive; because were absence of prooli.e. mere absence of a valid means of knowing, -cannot serve as a reason for establishing the non-existence of the thing concerned.-(119)
Question :-" Why cannot it be a proof? " The answer is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (120).
INASMUCH AS PROOF (MEANS OF COGNITION) IS NOT PERVASIVE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE THING'; NOR IS IT ITS Cause', - (4) BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE, (D) BECAUSE THERE IS NON-CONCOMITANCE, AND (c) BECAUSE IT PROOBEDS FROM THAT, -[MERE ABSENCE OF PROOF CANNOT PROVE THE NON-EXISTENCE OF A THINO) -(120)
COMMENTARY. When one character is pervasive of (more extensive than) another, then alone cloes the absence of the former imply the absence of the latter; similarly the absence of the Cause implies the absence of the effect; and the

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reason for this lies in the fact that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence, and the effect is invariably concomitant with the Cause, being produced by this latter. In the case of Proof' and non-existence of a Thing' there can be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct ;-nor oan Proof be the cause of the Thing, as there is no concomitance betweon them; the Thing existing even when the Proof is not thero. For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitting the existence of Things which are far removed in space and time and character and hence are not within reach of any Proof (Means of Cognition) :-and when a thing can be there even during the absence of another thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the Cause of the former : for if it were, then it would lead to an absurdity. In fact, if the other party were to regard this as a Cause', he would renounce his own position.
Also because it proceeds from that,-Proof cannot be the cause of the Existence of Things. That is, the Proof arises out of the Thing itselfwhich forms its objective, and the cognisable Thing does not arise out of the Proof.-(120)
It might be argued that—"Even though not invariably concomitant, the Proof being absent) may yet preclude the existence of the Thing",The answer to this is provided by the following Text:
TEXT (121).
WHEN A THING IS NEITHER THE ONE NOR THE OTHER, ITS ABSENCE DOES NOT CONCLUSIVELY PRECLUDE THE OTHER THING; BECAUSE
THERE IS NO CONNECTION.-(121)
COMMENTARY Neither the one nor the other, i.e. neither the Carose, nor perursive: -the absence of what is not invariably concomitant cannot rightly be taken as necessarily precluding the other thing; for if it did, it would lead to an absurdity: the absence of the Horse might, in that case, imply the absence of the Cow also.----(121)
TEXT (122).
NON-PERCEPTION' BY ALL PERSONS IS DOUBTFUL; NON-PERCEPTION BY ANY ONE PERSON HIMSELF IS INCONCLUSIVE: AS IT IS FOUND THAT THE GRASS AND OTHER THINGS GROWING IN THE CAVES OF THE Findhya MOUNTAIN DO EXIST, EVEN
THOUGH THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED, -(122)
COMMENTARY Further, when non-apprehension is put forward as the Reason (for non-existence), is it put forward in the form of the absence of perception by

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all nen? Or of the absence of perception of any one person himself
-It cannot be the former ; because ordinary men with limited powers of perception can never be sure of any thing being not perceived by all men; hence it must be always doubtful. People of limited vision have no means of knowing that no man has the perception of an unseen cause for such things as the marks on the wings of the Peacock. As for any single man's own non-perception, that can never be conclusive :-why because even though such things as the grass, the coral, the pebbles and the like growing in mountain-caves are not perceived, yet they do exist; that is, there is nothing incongruous in regarding them as existent.Thus the reasons adduced being doubtful, the non-existence cannot be regarded as proved beyond roubt.-(122)
TEXTS (123-124).
IF NO REASON IS ADDUCED TO PROVE THE TAOT OF THINGS HAVING NO
CAUSE, THEN, INASMUCH NOTHING CAN BE PROVED WITHOUT REASON, YOUR THEORY IS NOT PROVED.-IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU DO ADDUCE A REASON PROVING TT, - THEN ALSO YOUR THEORY IS NOT PROVED, -AS Tu proving ITSELF WOULD BE PRODUCED BY THE PROOF ADDUCED (WHICH WOULD THEREFORE
BE THE Cause Of The proving].-(124)
COMMENTARY
Farther, you have to be asked the following question :-In support of your conclusion that "Things have no Cause",- do you adopt any Reason, or not? If you do not adopt it, then your view does not become proved ; as there can be no proving of anything without adequate proof (means of cognition).-If, on the other hand, you do adopt a Reason,-even then, your view cannot be proved; (such is the construction of the words of the Text].
Why so?"-Because the proving' itself would be produced by the Proof adduced. This is what has been thus declared by the revered Acharya Sari-'One who declares that there is no Cause would demolish his own conclusion if he adduced any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other hand, if he were slow to adduce reasons, what could be gained by mere assertion :'-(123-124)
The following might be urged: The Reason that I adduce is indicalive, not productive; why then should my conclusion not be proved?"
The answer to this is provided by the following text :

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IV.
TEXT (125).
AS REGARDS THE indicalive,-BE IT IN THE FORM OF THE PROBANS, OR
IN THE FORM OF WORDS EXPRESSIVE OF THAT (PROBANS). IT IS SAID TO BE INDICATIVE OF THE PROBANDUM (DESIRED CONCLUSION), ONLY WHEN IT BECOMES THE CAUSE OF THE proving (MAKING KNOWN) [OF THE SAID
CONCLUSION).-(125)
COMMENTARY.
The indicative Probans-i.e. the Probank fulfilling the three conditions, os conceived by the Ronsoner for his own benefit or in the form of words, when the same Probans is asserted for the benefit of some one else,-expressive of that-i.e of the Probans.-Cause of the proviny),-.e of the bringing about of the definite cognition of the object to be cognised.--If it were otherwise, and the Probans or Reason did not serve as the 'Cause of the said provingthen, how could it be regarded as an indicative! In fact, in this way, everything would be indicative of every thing else.—(125)
Question "If this is ho, then how do the Teachers make the distinction between the Indicative and the Productive ???
The answer given in the following text is that the Indicative' is so called because it makes the thing lenown, and what is called productive'is that which actually brings into existence the thing concerned :
TEXT (126).
TAUS IT IS REALLY THE PRODUCTIVE CAUSE WHICH IS SPOKEN OF AS
INDICATIVE': IT IS BECAUSE IT DOES NOT ACTUALLY PRODUCE (BRING INTO EXISTENCE) WHAT IS DESIRED TO BE ACCOM
PLISHED THAT IT IS NOT CALLED PRODUCTIVE-(126)
COMMENTARY It is called Indicative', -and not Productive because it does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished; while that which actually produces what is desired to be accomplished, such as tho Sprout and the like,- is called Productive'. Hence there is nothing wrong in the distinction that has been made.
This answers all the objections that may be urged against the declaration of Acharya Sūri. For instance, the following is an objection that may be raised "Even when asserting with Reason that there is no Cause, why should one demolish his own conclusion ? As what he asserts is an Indicative Reason, while what he denies is the Productive Cause". The answer to thir is as follows:-The Indicative Roason also is a Productive Cause, because it produces the cognition of the thing.-This urges against the other party the

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fact of his assertione being self-contradictory. In fact, there can be no Reason that could prove the absence of all Cuuso,-because such a proposi. tion would be clearly one that is contrary to, and set aside by, senseperception and the rest.-(126)
With the following Text, the Author sums up his position and thereby also shows that the conclusion of the other party is contrary to, and set aside by, Inference also
TEXT (127)
FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT OTHER THINGS ALSO HAVE THEIR
Causes',-AS THEIR PRODUCTION IS RESTRICTED, JUST LIKE YOUR COGNITION OF THE Probandum APPEARING WHEN
THE PROBANS IS THERE.—(127)
COMMENTARY
Things like the Lotus and its filaments-which are other' than the things spoken of by the other party in his reasoning.--As their production is restricted ;-i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there. The argument may be formulated as follows:-Those things whose production is restricted to occasions when certain other things are there must be regarded us with Cause--as for instance, your own cognition of tlie Probandum (desired to he proved) which appears only when the Probans (Reason) is there the same is the case with the Lotus and other things [hence these must be regarded as 'witli Cause']-this being a Renson based on the nature of things. (127)
End of Chapter (4) dealing with the Doctrine of the Thing by Itself'.

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CHAPTER V. The Doctrine of SOUND (Word-Sound') being the Origin
of the World
COMENTARY. The upholders of Word-Sound as Brahman' Assert their view in the following words :
Free from such distinctions as prior and posterior',- unborn,imperishable-such is the Brahman consisting of 'Word-Sound': and from this Brahman there evolve the whole lot of Things,-Such as Colour and the like this fact is clearly recognised. This has been thrus declared— Without beginning and end, Brahman, of the essence of SOUND,- in the form of Letter-Sounds, evolves in the form of Things; whence proceeds the entire world. process. The term 'adi', beginning, here stands for production ;
nidhana', 'end', stands for destruction, that which is free from these two is without beginning and end ': in the form of the Letter-Sounds': as it is the Letters and the rest which are the means (of the expressing of Word. Sound) this indicates the evolution in the form of the word ', the 'name'; -the evolution in the form of the thing denoted' is indicated by the phrase
in the forın of things the term process stands for the cliverse things ;-the term 'Brahman' mentions the name."
What has been asserted in the verse just quoted ie reiterated in the following Text:
TEXT (128).
"THE WHOLE LOT OF THINGS IS RECOGNISED AS EVOLVED OUT OF THAT Brahman WHICH IS OF THE ESSENCE OF Word-SOUND, THE HIGHEST, —
UNAFFECTED BY DESTRUCTION AND ORIGINATION.” -(128)
COMAIENTARY.
Destruction and Origination have been mentioned only by way of illustration; what should be understood to be meant is that it is entirely iree from all such distinctions as priority and posteriority of Place; this includes freedom from distinctions of priority' and posteriority of Time also.
of the essence of Word-Sound' ;-of the nature of Word-Sound; it is this fact of Word-Sound forming its essence that makes it spoken of as of the essence of Word-Sound'; what is meant is that Word-Sound is its inseparable form.
Highest,-in the form of the syllable 'om'; tliis syllable on is the essence of all words and names and also of all things, and it constitutes

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the l'eda. This Worel-Sound existing in the forn of Letters and Words con stitutes the Veda; which is the means of comprehending the syllable, oi which it stands as the replica.-This Highest Brahman is perceived only by such persons as have their minds thoroughly imbued with Merit conducive to the fulfilment of Prosperity and the Highest Good.
In support of this view, they set forth the following reason :-" When a set of things is always associated with the form of a certain thing, the former are modifications (evolutes) of that thing; e.g. the Jar, the Saucer and the Cup are evolutes of Clay, being always associated with the form of Clay: and are hence known to be of the essence of Clay-all Things are found to be associated with some form of Sound in the shape of Names; this reason being based upon the very nature of things; as it is a clearly perceptible fact that all things are associated with some form of sound in the shape of Name); for instance, when a cognition of tbe Name-Sound is produced in regard to things, the cognition of these things appears always associated with that Name-Sound. This is what has been thus declared in vakyapadiya) - There is no cognition in the World which is not associated with word-sounds; in fact, all cognition is always interfused with words'. -The knowledge of the nature of things also is always depondent upon the forn of their cognition (which is associated with words). From this it follows that all things are always associated with Name-Sounds; and this being established, it follows as a matter of course that they have their essence in these Sounds; as having their essence in Sound means nothing more than being always associated with Name.Sound.-(128)
The Author proceeds to refute the above doctrine (of Sound being the origin of the World) in the following Texts :
TEXTS (129-131).
THOSE PEOPLE WHO ASSERT THE ABOVE VIEW SHOULD BE ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS WHEN THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS EVOLVE OUT OF THE SAID SOUND] DOES-OR DOES NOT THE SOUND ABANDON ITS SOUND-FORM AND TAKE UP THE BLUE AND OTHER FORMS - Ir IT IS THE FIRST ALTERNATIVE THAT IT DOES ABANDON ITS OWN FORM) TRAT IS ACCEPTED, THEN TIE SOUND BECOMES DEPRIVED OF ITS IMPERISHABILITY,-INASMUCH AS ITS PREVIOUS TORM HAS BECOME DESTROYED.-IT THE SECOND ALTERNATIVE IS ACCEPTED, THEN, ON THE COGNITION OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS, EVEN THE DEAF SHOULD HAVE THE CLEAR PERCEPTION OF
THE SOUND-FORM-(129-131)
COMMENTARY.
Is the World regarded as ' of the Essence of Sound', Shabdamaya in the sense that sometimes it takes the form of the modification of Sound?

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER V.
Or in the sense that sometimes it is produced from Sound, -as in the case of the expression annamayah panal' (Life is of the essence of food '), the affix mayat denotes cause the meaning being that Food is the cause of Life)?
The first alternative cannot be right; as the said inodification itself is not possible. Because when Brahman who is of the essence of Sound' takes the form of the Blue and other things, does It--or does it not -abandon its own pristine Sound-form? If the former alternative he accepted that It does abandon its pristine Sorind-form,-then there would be an end to the view that it is without beginning and end', that is, imperishable, indestructible; as there would be a destruction of the pristine form.-If the second alternative be accepted that It does not abandon its pristine form, then, at the time that Blue is cognised by the deaf person, he should have the perception of Sound also; as the cognition of Sound would be non-different from the cognition of Blue. Tliis argument may be formulated as follows:-When one thing is non-different from another,if one is cognised, the other becomes also cognised, us when the Blue is cognised, the essence of that same Blue becomes also cognised :-Sound is non-different from Blue; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things.-If it were not so, inasmuch as the conditions for better or worse would differ in the two (Sound and Blue), they could not be recogniseci as of the essence of the other. This would be an argument against the con. clusion (of the other party).-(129-131)
This same argument is set forth in greater detail, in the following Text:
TEXT (132)
[IT WOULD BE AS ASSERTED ABOVE) BECAUSE ALL THINGS (AOCORDING
TO YOU) EXIST PRIMARILY IN THE FORM OF SOUND; AND IF THE SOUND-FORM IS NOT ABANDONED, THERE CAN BE NO
MODIFICATION (EVOLUTION).-(132)
COMMENTARY
Yena' here stands for yasmāt, because, - you hold that primarily the World is of the nature of Sound.
The second line explains why it would be as asserted.-(132)
Question-"What if the World remains primarily of the essence of Bound?
The Answer is provided by the following Text:

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TEXT (133).
THE IDENTITY (OF SOUND) WITH BLUE AND OTHER THINGS BEING not figurative (BUT REAL),-WHY SHOULD NOT THERE BE COGNITIOX Op Sounil AT THE TIME THAT THE Blue AND OTHER
THINGS ARE COGNISED -(133)
COMMENTARY.
Identity of Blue, etc.- i.e. with Sounul.
At the time that the Blue and other things are cogmised that is, under the circumstances when Blue, ete. are cognised ;-why should not there be cognition of Sound -that is to say, Sound also fulfilling all the conditions of perceptibility, it is only right that there should be perception of it, just as there is of Blue and other things, -(133)
TEXT (134).
IF THERE WERE NO COGNITION OF IT (SOUND), THEN THERE SHOULD BE NONE OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS ALSO; BECAUSE BOTH ARE OF THE SAME ESSENCE. IN CASE THEY HAD DIFFERENT PROPERTIES, THERE WOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFTERENCE
BETWEEN THEM.-(134)
COMMENTARY.
If you do not admit of the Cognition of Sound (at the time of the cognition of the Blue, etc.) then there would be the absurdity of there being no cognition of the Blue, etc. also, just as there is none of Sound :--because both are of the same essence ;-that is, Blue and the rest are of the same nature as Sound. Otherwise, if the Blue, etc. be held to have properties different from those of Sound, it would have to be admitted that the two are absolutely and entirely different. -(134)
The following Text explains why it would be so :
TEXT (135).
WHAT INDICATES DIFFERENCE AMONG A NUMBER OF THINGS IS THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES; OTHERWISE, NO DIFFERENCE COULD EVEN BE ASSUMED AMONG DIVERSE
INDIVIDUALS,-(135)
COMMENTARY It cannot be right for any one object to be perceived and not perceived at the same time and by the same person ; if it were, then, the object would cease to be one. Otherwise, if, even in the presence of incompatible properties,

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TATIVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER V.
there were one-ness, theu even that clifference which is assumed and accepted As subsisting among the Jar and other things would not be possible. The term
even is meant to imply that it is not in the form of Brahman only that there would be no diversity ; because the established view is that while Brahman rests within itself, there is no diversity in It; as diversity is appertenant to modification. For instance, when Brahman is held to be without beginning and end ', It is not in the form of such things as the Jar and the like, but in the form of the Supreine Self. The Jar and other things are actually seen to be undergoing origination and destruction and to be occupying limited place and time.
The absurdity has been urged above (in Text 131) against the other party-that the deaf would clearly perceive Sound (when he perceives the Blue and other tliings). This should be understood to be applicable to the other party only if the form of Brahman is regarded as fulfilling the conditions of perceptibility.-The absurdity is not applicable if Bralıman is held to be extremely subtile and beyond the reach of the Senses. But in that case the objection to be urged should be that (if Sound be not perceived, then) the Bine, etc. also would not be perceived, as these ure of the same nature as Sound, and in that case there could be no such generalisation as that ordinary men perceive only that inuch of things as is liable to origination and destruction'.
The following argument might be surged here :-“ Just as according to you (Bauddha) the momentariness, thongh not different from Blue, etc., is not cognised when these latter are cognised, -40, in the same manner, there would be no cognition of Sound"
This is not right; it is not true that momentariness is not cognised when Blue, etc. are cognised; what does happen is that even though momentariness is actually apprehended by the non-conceptual Cognition, yet it is said to be not definitely cogniserl, because of the imposition upon it of other qualities, through Illusion. So that, so fur as the man's general indefinite apprehension is concerned, it is duly apprehended ; but it is not apprehended in so far as its well-defined cognition is concerned ; and as referring to distinct forms of the cognition (definite and indefinite), both characters-of being apprehended and not-apprehended-are quite compatible. -In the case of your theory, however, such apprehension and non-apprehension of Sound (at the time of perceiving Blue, etc.) cannot be right; because you regard all cognitions as equully determinate and well-defined; so that Sound would be definitely apprehended in its complete form by a single cognition; and there would be no aspect of it which would remain not-apprehendeil. This has been thus asserted- How can that aspect of it which is not definitely apprehended by well-clefined cognitions-form the object of these latter ? "- If some cognition is admitted by you to be undefined and nonconceptual, then you should not make such an assertion as the following
There is no cognition in the world which is not associated with words": - In this case too, the reason adduced (by you) that "Things are associated with the form of Word-Sound "_would not be true, and as a result of this, there being no proof, any attempt to prove the fact of all things boing of the essence of Sound would be entirely baseless.

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Further, as regards the momentariness of things, it is actually established by means of proofs; and even though thus duly apprehended, it is spoken of as not definitely cogniserl. As regards the fact of Things being of the essence of Sound however,-by what proof is it established that it could be alınitted in the same manner as momentariness is admitted ?-(135)
The following Text proceeds to set iorth another method of criticising the Sexual theory
TEXT (136).
IT THE ONE SOUND-ESSENCE' BE HELD TO BE DIFFERENT WITH EACH
INDIVIDUAL THING, THEN ALL THINGS WOULD OCCUPY THE SAME POINT IN SPACE AND WOULD BE COGNISED IN ONE AND
THE SAME FORM.-(136)
COMMENTARY.
When (according to you) the Sound -essence' undergoes modification, does it lecome different with each object, or not?-If the view is that it dives not become different, then all things, Blue and the rest, should occupy the same point in space. That they should occupy the saine point in space is said only by way of illustration. Timo, modifications, functions and conditions also are meant to be included. The Cognition, Appearance (in Consciousness) - so would be in one and the same form ; As all things, Blue and the rest, would be non different froin the one essence of Sound.-(130)
TEXT (137). IF (ON THE OTHER HAND) IT DIFFERS WITH BACH INDIVIDUAL (THING),
THEN BRAHMAN BECOMES many,-AS HAVING A FORM WHICH IS DIVERSE AND OF THE NATURE OF SEVERAL THINGS, JUST
LIKE THE DIVERSITY OF INDIVIDUALS.-(137)
COMMENTARY, If the Sound-essence' is admitted to differ with each individual, thieu Brahman becomes many ;-as having a form which is diverse and of the natrere of several things; i.e. one whose nature-character is diverse and of the nature of several things:-And yet Brahman is held to be one. Thus your theory goes directly against your own tenet.-(137)
The Author states another objection (to the Sound-theory)-in the following Text:

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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER V.
TEXT (138).
IF THINGS CONSISTED OF ETERNAL SOUND, THEY ALSO WOULD BE
ETERNAL ; AND HENCE AS THINGS WOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH THE SOUND, NO MODIFICATION
WOULD BE COMPATIBLE.-(138)
COMMENTARY. If Things consisted of eternal Sounci, -ie, if they score of the same untum as eternal Sound,-i.e. if Sound constitutes the very essence of the World, -then Things Also should be held to be eternal; and hence us at all times the Things would be accomplished simultaneously with Som.d.-on account of their being so accomplished, it is not possible for them to be of the nature of modifications: Tal' stands for tasmal'. Hence.
Or the simultaneity' meant may be that of all such things as the Blue and the like. (138)
Question- Even if things are accomplished simultaneously, why should not they be modifications"
The Answer is supplied by the following Text:
TEXT (139).
THERE COULD BE MODIFICATION ONLY IF THERE WERE DISAPPEARANCE OT ONE FORM FOLLOWED BY THE APPEARANCE OF ANOTHER FORM,-AS IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE WITH CLAY AND OTHER THINGS IT COULD NOT BE POSSIBLE HOWEVER IF ALL APPEARED WITHOUT SEQUENCE
(SIMULTANEOUSLY).—139)
COMMENTARY. In a thing in regard to which there was no sequence, however, modi. fication would not be possible; the term 'tu', 'lowever, is to be construed with akrama '.- From this it follows that it cannot be right to regard Things as consisting of Sound', through modification: -(139)
The following Text proceeds to show that the other alternative cannot be maintainod :
TEXT (140) IF THE WORLD BE REGARDED AS 'CONSISTING OF SOUND IN THE FORM OF PRODUCT' (NOT ETERNAL), -EVEN SO, AS SOUND WOULD BE UNNODIFIABLE, THERE COULD BE NO SEQUENTIAL
APPEARANCE.-(140)
COMMENTARY. Even so, as Sound is eternal (ex hypothesi), and hence unmodifiable, it is not possible for the Products to appear sequentially: in fact, all things

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125
hould appear simultimeously, as being the effects of equally perfect cause of unobstructed potency. In fact, the appearance of effects is delayed only when there is the imperfection in the Causu; if the Cause is perfect, therefore, for what would the effect wait, and hence not appear simultaneously 24(140)
TEXT (141).
IF, FROM SOUND WHICH IS OF ONE FORM ALWAYS, DIVERSE TORMS ARE PRODUCED, THEN HOW IS IT THAT THE WORLD IS SPOKEN OF AS
EVOLVED IN THE FORM OF THE Object :-(141)
COMMENTARY.
Further, if it is achmitted that out of Sound, which is of one form only, Wirions diverse forres are produced,-thon it will not be true to say that
Brahma evolves into the form of the Object'; because it is not right that when a ditferent thing is proditeed, one thing should evolve out of another in that form, without actually entering into that forin itself. This the Proposition set up by the other Party cannot be maintained in any way 44 all.-(141)
Another reason prut forward (in support of the view that the World is procneed out of Sout) ix-" because all things are permeated with Soundforms"; the following Toxt proceeds to show that this Reason is unproven Inadmissible
TEXTS (142-143).
IN THE CASE OF SUCH DIVERSE THINGS AS THE JAR, THE PAIL AND THE LIKE, IT IS FOUND THAT ALL OF THEM ARE OF THE NATURE OF Clay, WHICH DIFFERENTIATES THEM FROM ALL THAT IS NOT-CLAY; AND ON THE BASIS OF THIS IT IS ASSUMED THAT IN ALL THESR THERE SUBSISTS THE ONE CLAY-NATURE':- NO SUCH NATURE HOWEVER IS PERCEIVED IN THE CASE OF SUCH THINGS AS THE Blue, THE Yellow AND SO FORTH ; HENCE THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY SUCH one nature AS IS PRECLUSIVE OF ALL THAT IS not-Sound WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BASELESS.
(142-143)
COMMENTARY
As a matter of fact, there can be no one comprehensive notion of all things; everything has its own specific character, and thereby differentiated from homogeneous as well as heterogeneous things; whenever they are

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regarded as permeated by a common character, it is only an assumption based upon the fact of that character serving to differentiate them from such other things as are heterogeneous; for instance, in the case of such things as the Jar, the Cup and the Pail, etc.-oven though these are really distinct from each other,--the common character of Clay' is assumed, on the basis of the exclusion of all that is not-Clay. Even this assumed 'uniformness, consisting of being permeated by the nature of Sound, is not possible in the case of the things in question, such as, the Blue, the Yellow and the like; because we do not perceive the Sound-character in the Blue, the Yellow and such things; and when you do not perceive such a uniform character in them, how can it be assumed that, being permeated by Sound-character is due to the preclusion of what is not of the nature of Sound? Thus the assumption is entirely baseless and hence the reason is unproven, Inadmissible' (142-143)
It has been urged (under Text 136) that "all things would occupy the same point in space and would be cognised in one and the same form" :
-the following Text raises an objection from the point of view of the other party :
TEXT (144).
IF IT BE HELD THAT-" BRAHMAN IN ITS ESSENCE REMAINS EVER UNDIFFERENTIATED ; IT IS ONLY UNDER DISTURBANCE DUE TO
IGNORANCE THAT PEOPLE REGARD IT AS DIVERSE ".-(144)
COMMENTARY.
The following view might be urged by the Opponent: "The one Principle of Brahman remains always undifferentiated, -essentially unmodified ; in reality, there is no modification of It; what happens is that people having their minds and eyes clouded by the darkness of Ignorance, regard It as diverse, in such forms as the Blue and the like. This has been thus declared :
Even though Akasha (Space) is pure, yet obsessed by darkness, people come to regard it as limited and made up of diversified parts; in the same manner, though Brahman is immortal and unmodifiable, yet It appears to be sullied by Nescience and hence diversely modified'.-Under the circum. stances, there would be no such absurdity as all things occupying the same point in Space; because in reality all things are non-entities, therefore there would be diversity in their cognitions also,-the diversity being due to the oscillations of Nescience":-(144)
The above argument is answered by the following Texts :

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TEXTS (145-146).
EVEN SO, WHAT IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IN THE FORM OF Blue AND THE REST BY PERSONS TRAMELLED BY NESCIENCE WHICH FORM SERVES AS THE BASIS OF REJECTING AND ACQUIRING CERTAIN THINGS,
APART FROM THAT FORM, WHAT IS THERE IN THE FORM OF BRAHMAN UNPERCEIVED, WHICH COULD BE COGNISED AS EXISTING', BY PERSONS WHOSE MIND HAS RISEN ABOVE (THB
SHACKLES OF NESCIENCE)-(145-146)
COMMENTARY
The existence of the cognisable thing can be established only by means of Proofs (Means of Cognition): there is however no proof for (means of cognising) the existence of Brahman as postulated. For instance, It cannot be proved by Perception, as Brahman does not appear in any form other than the Blue and the rest as the basis of such activity as rejecting and acquiring :-and when It does not appear at all in any pure form of Its own), low could It be cognised as existing, by persons whose minds have risen (above the shackles of Nescience and are centred on the path of Reason 1 (145-146)
TEXTS (147-148).
THE UNDIFFERENTIATED BRAHMAN CANNOT BE PROVED BY PERCEPTION,
BECAUSE IT NEVER APPEARS IN THAT FORM AND AS NOTHING CAN BE PRODUCED FROM WHAT IS ETERNAL, THERE CAN BE NO PROBANS IN THE FORM OF AN EFFECT (WHICH COULD LEAD TO THE INFERENCE OF Brahman); AND AS THE VERY EXISTENCE OF THE THING ITSELF (BRAHMAN) IS STILL UNPROVED, NO CHARACTER OF ITS OWN COULD SERVE AS THE PROBANS LEADING TO THE INFERENCE OF THE SAID Brahman); AND APART FROM THESE TWO, THERE CAN BE NO PROBANS WHICH COULD PROVE THE
EXISTENCE (or Brahman).—(147-148)
COMMENTARY
The following might be urged by the other party) :-"The said Brahman is proved by Its own cognition, since it is of the nature of

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Consciousness itself. For instance, Brahman Itself is Light, because It is of the essence of Sound, and because it is of the nature of Intelligence."
This however is contrary to our own experience ; for instance, even when one has his mind wandering elsewhere, when looking with his eyes upon Colour, one has such non-determinate perception of the Blue and such things as is free from verbal expression ; this is going to be explained in detail later on.
This also sets aside what has been asserted as to "there being no cogni. tion in the world which is not associated with words
From all this it follows that the undifferentiated Brahman of the essence of Sound cannot be proved by Perception.
Nor enn It be proved by Inierence. If there were an Inference (of Brahman) it could be bused on a Probans in the form of an Effect (of that Brahman), or in that of the nature of Brahman Itself.-As for mere Nonapprehension, it can have only negation for its object, and can have no influence upon an affirmation (such as that of the Existence of Brahman). Now, there can be no Probans in the form of an Effect, because no effect can proceed from what is eternal; because any fruitful action either consecutive or concurrent-would be repugnant to the very nature of the oterual Thing.–Nor can there be a Probans in the shape of the nature of Bralıman Itseli: because the Thing itself, in the form of Brahman, is still not established; and so long as the Thing itself has not been established, no nature or character of it can be established independently by Itself.
It might be urged that there may be some other Probans (apart from the two just mentioned).-In answer to this, it is added-Apart from these, etc.; -i.e. apart from Nature and Effect, there is nothing that can prove your Probandum; as no other Probans would be invariably concomitant with it ; and what is not invariably concomitant cannot serve as a Probans; for, if it did, it would lead to absurdities.
It has been asserted that Things are associated with Sound-forms ;stich association has not been proved, and is absolutely false ; and as such cannot prove the fact of Brahman being really of the essence of Sound.
Nor can such a Braluman be proved by Scripture; as the character of Scripture itself is uncertain.
"Non apprehension also is a sort of Indication (Probans); but that is included under what has been mentioned already as Nature : - Nop can this 'Non apprehension serve to prove Existence ; and it is Existence that is desired to be proved; this is what is meant by the phrase which could prove the existence of Brahman.-(147-148)
Further, you must understand that Brahman is not capable of bringing about even mere Coguition; and being so incapable, Its form turns out to be that of mere non-entity. A further elucidation of this is supplied in the following Text:

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TEXT (149-150).
ALL CONSCIOUSNESS MUST BE CONSECUTIVE, AS IT MUST TOLLOW THE ORDER
OF SEQUENCE OF THE OBJECTS COGNISED; IF IT WERE NOT so,
ITS EFFECT IN THE FORM OF COGNITION WOULD COME ABOUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.-HENCE EVEN IN THE EFFECT IN THE FORM OF COGNITION, THERE IS NOTHING, APART FROM THE REJECTING AND ACQUIRING, WHICH COULD BE WITHIN THE POWERS OF Brahman; SO THAT IT BECOMES REDUCED TO THE POSITION OF THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN'.-(149-150)
COMMENTARY. All this has beeu proved under the section dealing with God (in Text 89).
Tatah param', 'apart from that';-.e, other than the Blue and other things which form the basis of the acts of rejecting and acquiring. Or the term ialah ' may be taken as the re-assertion of the Conclusion; the meaning being that it is something apart from the Blue and other things which form the basis of the acts of Rejecting and Acquiring-Or the terma latah' may be taken as the re-assertion of the Conclusion, in the form therefore it is true, real'.
The position of the Son of the Barren Woman'; for regarding the • Son of the Barren Woman' as a non-entity, there is no reason apart from the fact of his being incapable of effective action.-(149. 150)
The following might be urged :-"The said essence of Supreme Braloman is perceived only by such Yogins (Mystics) as have their mind aided by Merit leading to Prosperity and Highest Good",
This also is not possible ;-this is what is shown by the following Text:
TEXT (151). FOR THE SAME REASON EVEN MYSTICS WITH THEIR ORAIN OF PURE
CONSCIOUSNESS' DO NOT KNOW THAT FORM OF Brahman; AS THE NECESSARY CONNECTION COULD BE POSSIBLE ONLY
AFTER AN AOTION OF THE COGNITION ITSELT.-(151)
COMMENTARY. If the Mystic had operated upon the cognition born of mystic communion, then it might be admitted that Mystics perceive that form of Brahman. As it is, however, in the manner shown above, no such operation is possible ; hence this view cannot be right,
The following might be urged :-"When Mystics perceive that form of Brahman, it is not through the appearance of cognition relating to it; as apart from that, neither the Mystic nor the mystic cognition has any existence; what happens is that during the mystic state, Mystics perceive It as their own self, in the form of Light effulgent".

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The answer to this is as follows:-If it is so, then it has to be explained what the Brahman's form is prior to the mystic state. If It is always of the form of Light effulgent, then there can be no state which is not-mystic; as ex hypothesi, Brahman is ever of the nature of the effulgent light of Belf ; so that the Liberation of all beings would be accomplished without effort.
It is possible that the following might be urged:- Just as for you, Buddhists, during the state of Dream and the like, the Cognition, though one, appears in a variegated form,--so the Brahman also, even though one, appears diverse to persons whose chain of cognitions is not pure, through Ignorance."
That cannot be right; because as a matter of fact, apart from Brahman, there are none whose. Chain is not pure, to whom the said form could appear as stated.
"Brahman appears, by Itself, in that form."
In that case, no Liberation would be possible; because Brahman is Always of the nature of one single Cognition. As for us (Buddhists), Liberation is quite possible, as at that stage, there appears a distinct pure Cognition.
Turther, for you, apart from Brahman, there can be no Ignorance or Illusion under whose influence the Brahman would appear in the said form. And on account of Illusion being non-separate from it, it would be well-said that under the influence of that Illusion, Brahman appears as Itself in that form'!
It might be said that,"When it is said that 'It becomes cognised under the influence of Ignorance', what is meant is that It is of the nature of Ignorance (or Illusion).
If so, then the implication is all the clearer that there can be no Liberation: when the Eternal One Brahman has the nature of Ignorance, there can be no cessation of that Ignorance, which forms the essence of Brahman,by virtue of which cessation there could be Liberation.
If then, Ignorance is admitted to be something apart from Brahman, -oven so, it could not produce any effect upon Brahman, which is eternal and hence not susceptible to any addition to Its qualities. So that it cannot be right to assert that Ils appearance (in Cognition) is due to the influence of Ignorance; and thus there being no connection between Ignorance and Brahman, there can be no Birth and Rebirth.-Nor can it be right to assert that "It could be described as being neither real nor unreal"; because all things must fall within one or the other of these two; otherwise it would not be a Thing (Entity) at all. Nor will it be right to say that "it is because of its being a Non-entity that it is cognised in that form";as such an explanation would lead to absurdities.-If, oven in that state, it is called a State or Condition, in the sense that its nature is capable of fruitful action, we have nothing to say against that,
As for us (Buddhists), Ignorance (or Illusion) is only the Disposition of wrongful Attachment (or Yearning); and this Disposition is called & Faculty'; and this Faculty is only of the Essence of Cognition in the form of a Cause'. Hence what happens is that each preceding Cognition, --which is of the nature of Ignorance and serves as a Cause, -

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is followed by a succeeding Cognition, which is of the nature of its Effect and has within itself the traces of wrongful attachment; and under such circumstances, it is only right that there should appear a Cognition in the form under discussion, due to the influence of Ignorance. - This Ignorance is duly removed by Mystic Practices,-through the process of succeeding moments endowed with gradually increasing degrees of inefficiency (in the Ignorance), and there appears a series of pure Cognitions and consequent Liberation; so that the process of Bondage and Liberation' becomes duly established on a reasonable basis.
This is not possible under your theory; as Brahman, being Eternal and One, cannot have two states' (of Ignorance and Liberation), and because the said Brahman is one, the Liberation of one man would mean the Liberation of all men; and the non-liberation (Bondage) of one would mean the Bondage of all.
Nor is there any proof for the fact of Brahman being of the nature of *the Light of Self', during the non-mystic state. The Cognition that proves anything is of the nature of 'Light' and hence recognised as 'self-cognised '. The Sound-self however is never found to be cognised in all cognitions, as has been already mentioned before.—Thus then, if it is admitted that during the non-mystic' state, Brahman is not of the nature of the Light of Self', -even so, it will have to be explained how the Light of Self' which, thus, would not be previously existent, comes about subsequently during the mystic state', in the Brahman, without this latter having abandoned Its previous form and character.
From all this it follows that your doctrine of "Sound-Brahman' is ab. solutely wrong. We dosist from further expatiation on this point.-(151)
With the following Text, the Author applies the previously-detailed objections to this doctrine also:
TEXT (152) THIS DOCTRINE OF 'Brahman' ALSO IS SIMILAR TO THE DOCTRINE OF THE EVOLUTION FROM PRIMORDIAL MATTER'; AND THE OBJECTIONS URGED AGAINST THIS LATTER SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE APPLICABLE TO THE FORMER
ALSO.-(152)
COMMENTARY. The objection may be stated thus - The World cannot be the efieet of Sound, -because it exists,-like the cognition of the Cause ; hence what is meant to be the Cause cannot be the Cause--because it cannot be so proved, like the other Selt”,—and so on.-(152)
End of the Chapter on the Doctrine of Sound-Brahman'.

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CHAPTER VI.
Doctrine of the Purusa'-Spirit-Personality-as Cause'
of the World.
With the following Text, the Author introduces the doctrine of the Vedavadin' (Follower of the Veda) :
TEXTS (153-154),
OTHERS, HOWEVER, POSTULATE THE PURUŞA' (SPIRIT), SIMILAR IN CHARACTER TO God'-AS THE CAUSE OF THE WORLD, -THEIR MIND BEING SWAYED BY AN ILL-CONCEIVED DOCTRINE. THUS SPIRIT HAS HIS POWERS SUCH AS DO NOT CEASE EVEN IN REGARD TO THE DISSOLUTION OX ALL THINGS, HE IS THE CAUSE OF ALL BORN THINGS, JUST AS THE SPIDER IS OF THE
COBWEBS.-(151)
COMENTARY.
These people state their doctrine as follows:-"The Purusa, Spirit, alone is the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the whole world; his powers do not cease even in regard to Dissolution. This has been this declared
- As the Spider is the cause of the cobwebs, the Lunar Gem of water, and the Banyan Tree of its offshoots,so is the Spirit the Cause of all born things'; and again 'The Spirit alone is all this, the past, and also the future."
Similar in character to God;-.e. He has qualities equal to those of God; inasmuch as botls are the efficient cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of the universe : the only difference between these two (Spirit and God) is that those who regard God as the Cause of the World postulate other things also like the Soul and such things, as the constituent' and other kinds of Causo (God being only the efficient cause);-while those who regard Spirit' as the Cause of the world, posit the Spirit alone as the sole cause (efficient as well as constituent); but the character of being the efficient cause of creation, sustenance and dissolution is common to both doctrines. They have their mind swayed by an ill-conceived doctrine ; i.e. their mind is under the influence of a doctrine which is wrongly conceived.
The term Ornanäbha stands for the Spider.-(153-164)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against this doctrine :

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TEXT (155)
THE REFUTATION OF THIS ALSO IS TO BE SET FORTH, IN THE SAME MANNER AS THAT OF GOD': FOR WHAT PURPOSE DOES THIS SPIRIT' PERFORM SUCH AN ACT (AS THE creating, ETC.
OF THE WORLD) -(155)
COMMENTARY.
* Ishvaravat'-is to be construed as islvarotsya fea', 'as in the case of God'.
This refutation is to be stated thus :- The Spirit cannot be the Cause of born things, because He is Himself devoid of birth, like the sky-lotus: otherwise all things would come into existence simultaneously :-[This is exactly the same argument that has been put forward against 'God', under Text 87, above]
If the upholders of the Spirit put forward the same arguments that have been put forward by others in proof of God',-then the same fallacies -of being improven and the rest—that have been shown in the latter should be applied to the former also.
The Text mentions another line of objection also-For what purpose, etc.-The activity of all intelligent beings is found to be prompted by some purpose; hence it hny to be explained for what purpose the Spirit performs such an act as tlut of creating the world.-(155)
TEXTS (156-157).
IF HE DOES IT BECAUSE HE IS PROMPTED BY ANOTHER BEING, THEN HE CAN NOT BE SELF-SUFFICIENT (INDEPENDENT).-IF HE DOES IT THROUGH COMPASSION, THEN HE SHOULD MAKE THE WORLD ABSOLUTELY HAPPY, WHEN HE IS FOUND TO HAVE CREATED PEOPLE LESET WITH MISERY, POVERTY, SORROW AND OTHER TROUBLES,-WHERE CAN HIS COMPASSION BE PERCEIVED !-(156-157)
COMMENTARY
If the Spirit does all this, even though himself unwilling to do so, because he is prompted by another Being in the shape of God and the like.-then the self-sufficiency' that has been postulated for him disappears.-If it were through compassion that he did it, for the purpose of helping others, then he would not make it full of such dire miseries as those of Hell, etc.,-he world make it entirely happy.—(156-157)

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TEXT (158).
FURTHER, INASMUCH AS, PRIOR TO CREATION, THE OBJECTS OF COMPASSION WOULD NOT BE THERE, THERE COULD NOT BE EVEN THAT COMPASSION THROUGE THE PRESENCE OF WHICH
TEE ORDAINER IS ASSUMED.-(158)
COMMENTARY
Further, prior to creation, there is no entity towards whom he would be compassionato; and through the presence of this compassion, the Ordainer-Creator-is assumed.-(158)
TEXT (159).
NOR SHOULD HE EVER BRING ABOUT THE DISSOLUTION OT THOSE BEINGS WHO WOULD BE ALWAYS PROSPEROUS. IF IS SO DOING, HE BE REGARDED AS DEPENDENT UPON THE 'UNSEEN FORCE (OF DESTINY), THEN HIS "SELF-SUFFICIENCY
CEASES.-(159)
COMMENTARY.
If he created people through compassion, and they were always happy, - then why should he bring about their dissolution The sense is that it he has to bring about Dissolution, he should bring about the Dissolution of only such Beings as are miserable and imbecile.-It might be urged that"He makes people happy or unhappy in accordance with their Destiny, in the shape of Merit and Demerit".-That cannot be right; as in that case his self-sufficiency'—which has been postulated, would cense. One who is himself endowed with power does not depend upon anything else ; if one is wanting in power, then the creation of the world itself might be attributed to That on which he is dependent and in that case He would cerse to be the Cause'.-(159)
TEXT (160).
THEN AGAIN, WHY SHOULD HE MAKE HIMSELF DEPENDENT UPON THAT
DESTINY, WHICH IS CONDUCIVE TO SUFFERING AND PAIN? IN FACT, TULL OF MERCY AS HE IS, THE RIGHT COURSE FOR HIM
WOULD BE TO IGNORE THAT DESTINY (160)
COMMENTARY.
It may be granted that he is dependent upon the Unseen Force' (of Destiny). Even so, it is not right for the merciful Being to make himself dependent upon such Destiny-in the form of Merit and Demerit, -as leads

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to pain and suffering ; on the contrary, he should totally disregard such Destiny, if he is influenced in his activity) by Mercy and Compassion; merciful persons do not seek for such causes as bring about suffering ; becanse the sole motive behind their actions consists in the desire to remove the sufferings of others.-(160)
TEXT (161).
IT THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SPIRIT BE SAID TO BE FOR PURPOSES OF
* AMUSEMENT', THEN HE WOULD NOT BE HIS OWN MASTER REGARDING THAT AMUSEMENT, AS HE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE VARIOUS IMPLEMENTS OF THAT AMUSE
MENT, JUST LIKE A CHILD.-(161)
COMMENTARY
If it be lield that He creates the world, not through Compassion, --but for purposes of Amusement”,-that also cannot be right. As, in that case, in the matter of bringing about this Amusement, he would not be
self-sufficient', -being dependent upon such diverse implements of Amuse. ment as creation, sustenance and dissolution (of the world).- (161)
TEXTS (162.163).
IF HE HAD THE POWER TO CREATE THEM, HE WOULD HAVE CREATED, AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME, ALL THE IMPLEMENTS OONDUCIVE TO THE PLEASURE TO BE ACCOMPLISHED BY THE 'AMUSEMENT-IF HE DID NOT HAVE THAT POWER IN THE BEGINNING, THEN HE COULD NOT HAVE IT FOR CREATING THEM CONSECUTIVELY EITHER. BECAUSE FOR AN INDIVISIBLE THING, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO HAVE Power AND ALSO TO BE WITHOUT POWER.-(162-163)
COMMENTARY.
Further, those various implements of Amusement that are there, if he has the power to create them, then he should create them all at the same time; if he does not have that power in the beginning, then he could not create them subsequently, one by one either; as the 'powerless condition' would be there still; it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the power and not to have the power—to do a certain act-at one and the same time,-the two, power and absence of power, being mutually exclusive.
The arguments that have been urged before against the dootrine of God,e.g. why does He undertake such an operation as creation and so forth, -are applicable to this doctrine also.
This also disposes of the following arguments set forth by Prashasta. mati :-"God undertakes activity for the purpose of helping others. Just

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as a certain sage, who has had all his own purposes accomplished and hence for whom there is nothing to be done for either acquiring what is desirable or avoiding what is not desirable, imdertakes the work of tenching for the benefit of others, --similarly God also, having made known the majesty of His own power, proceeds to not for the purpose of helping living beings. -Or, just as, on account of the natural potency of Time, the Spring and other seasons come about by turns, upon which animate and inanimate products come abont by their own inherent nature,- similarly in the case of God also, the faculties of creating, maintaining and dissolving become inanifested by turns, and through these. He becomes the Cause of the creation, sustenance and dissolution of all living beings."
Tluis argument becomes set aside by what has been said above. For instance, the assertion that "Spirit acts for the purpose of helping others" is to be met by this reasoning :-If it were kindness towards others, then He should have created the world absolutely happy, etc. etc.
As regards the statement that it is due to the nature of his powers" ; -the objection against this is ns follows:- If he had his powers fully manifested, he would bring about creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world sinultaneously; if he has not his powers manifested, then the creation and the rest could not be brought about even consecutively; if then, the Being with manifested power were someone else, then how could there be a single Being in the shape of Spirit ?
The assertion regarding Time being the cause operating towards the consecutive appearance of Spring and other seasons is also open to the same objection. Time, in fact, is nothing more than Things of the world themselves as beset with such diversities as those of heat and cold; as we are going to explain later on.—162-163)
The Author now proceeds to examine Uddyolakara's view that the functioning of God is due to His own nature:
TEXTS (164-165).
IF IT BE HELD THAT THE YUNCTIONING AT THE BEGINNING OF CREATION IS DUE TO HIS NATURE, --JUST LIKE THE FUNCTIONING OF FIRE AND SUCH THINGS TOWARDS burning AND SUCH EFFECTS, WHICH IS DUE TO TARIR VERY NATURE" THEN, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ALL THINGS SHOULD COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY ; BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF THE CAUSE FULLY COMPETENT TO PRODUCE
THEM.-(164-165)
COMMENTARY
Uddyotakara argues as follows: "The action of God cannot be for purposes of amusement ; on the other hand, just as in the case of Eartli and other Rudimentary Elements, their very nature is such that they operate towards the bringing abont of their products, so also in the case of God". This is a

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clear reference to what is said in the Nyāyavārtika, pages 466-467 ; though the words are slightly different].
This is not right: as the appearance of all things being entirely dependent upon the action of that Being, when the Cause in its fully efficient and perfoct form would be present, all things would be produced simul taneously. It will not be right to introduce the qualification of "intelligence" (in the Canse),--as we have alrendy explained under the section on Gorl).-(164-165)
Question "If this is so, then how is it that the effects of Fire and other things do not come about simultaneously ?"
The answer is provided in the following Text :
TEXTS (166-167).
IN THE CASE OF SUCH THINGS AS FIRE AND THE LIKE, THEIR POWERS ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE EFFICIENCY OF THEIR OWN CAUSES, AND HENCE RESTRICTED IN THEIR OPERATIONS, AND CONSEQUENTLY NOT EFFECTIVE AT ALL TIMES. IF IT WERE NOT SO, ALL EFFECTS WOULD COME INTO EXISTENCE SIMULTANEOUSLY,—IY IN THEIR CASE ALSO THERE
WERE NO SUCH RESTRIOTION.-(166-167)
COMMENTARY.
Tēgām'-of Fire and such things. The particle api', also', implies that what is urged is applicable not to the case of God' only. If there exre no such restriction', -that is, the restriction due to the efficiency of their own causes.-(166-167)
The following might be urged :-"The Spider acts through its own nature, -why then does it not produce its effects, in the shape of cobwebs and the like, simultaneously ? "
The answer to this is given in the following Text:
TEXT (168).
IN THE CASE OF THE SPIDER ALSO, THE CAUSAL CAPACITY TO PRODUCE
THB COBWEBS IS NOT ADMITTED (BY US) TO BH DUE TO ITS VERY NATURE; WHAT PRODUCES THEM IS THE SALIVA EMITTED BY THE SPIDER'S EAGER DESIRD TO
DEVOUR INSECTS. (168)
COMMENTARY.
The Spider also does not act by its very nature; what happens is that it acts from its eager desire to devour insects, which appears only occasionally,

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through special cousas.-The Spider thus is not always of one and the same character; its efficiency also is only occasional and due to the force of its own causes. (168)
The following might be urged :-"The Spirit may not act through Compassion, or through Amusement; but somehow it acts unintentionally (automatically)".
The answer to this is given in the following Text :
TEXT (169). IF THE FUNCTIONING (OF THE SPIRIT) BE SOMEHOW' (UNINTENTIONAL)- THEN WHAT SORT OF 'INTELLIGENCE' IS HIS ?-SINCE EVEN THE FISHERMAN DOES NOT ACT WITHOUT THINKING
OVER THE EFFEOT OF HIS ACTION. (169)
COMMENTARY. How could such a Person be listened to by intelligent men,-being more ignorant and stupid than even such common people as the fisherman and the like.-' Buddhimatta' stands for intelligence. - Shanala' is the Jisherman.-(169)
This objection against the Spirit should be taken as rejecting all those creators -Shauri and the rest, who have been postulated by other people. This is what is shown in the following Text :
TEXT (170).
Shauri' (Visnu), THE SELF-BORN' (Brahma), AND OTHERS WHO HAVE BEEN ASSUMED TO BE THE CREATORS (OP THE WORLD)-ALL BECOME ACTUALLY BEJECTED BY THE ABOVE
REASONINGS.-(170)
COMMENTARY.
Shauri' is Vişnu; 'Self-born' is Brahma and others' is meant to include 'Intelligent Time, which also is postulated by some people.
[There is a lacuna in the Text here.]
End of the Chapter on Spirit' as the Creator.

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CHAPTER VII.
Doctrine of the Self' (Soul).
SECTION (A).
According to the Nyaya-Vaishēșika School.
TEXTS (171-176). OTHERS AGAIN POSTULATE THE 'SELF' (SOUL) AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF DESIRE AND THE REST, WHICH, BY ITSELF, IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS, BUT IS ETERNAL AND ALL-PERVASIVE ;-IT IS THE DOER OF GOOD AND BAD ACTS AND THE ENJOYER OF THE FRUIT OF THESE ; IT IS CONSCIOUS', NOT BY ITSELF, BUT THROTGH THE PRESENCE OF COXSCIOUSNESS-THE PRESENCE OF COGNITION, EFFORT, ETC. AS ALSO THE CHARACTER OF BEING THE DOER' IS ATTRIBUTED TO IT. Its BEING THE 'ENJOYER' (EXPERIENCER) CONSISTS IN THE SUBSISTENCE IX IT OF THE FEELINGS OF PLEASURE, PAIN AND THE LIKE CONTACT WITH PHYSICAL BODY AND WITH SPECIAL UNPRECEDENTED COGNITIONS AND FEELINGS IS CALLED IT'S BIRTH'; AND DISSOCIATION FROM THESE SAME AS TAKEN UP BEFORE IS CALLED ITS 'DEATH'; ITS REBIRTH CONSISTS IN BECOMING EQUIPPED WITH A BODY AND MIND, UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF MERIT AND DEMERIT. IT IS ASSUMED TO BE 'HURT BY TAL HURTING OF ITS BODY, EYES AND THE REST, SO THAT THOUGH IT IS ETERNAL, THE SAID PROCESS (OF BIRTH AND REBIRTH) HAS BEEN HELD
TO BE UNOBJECTIONABLE. -(171-176).
[There is a large lacuna here in Shantarakṣita's Tect tiself; as is clear
from the following portions of Kamalashila's Commentary, of which latter also, the earlier portions are wanting.]
COMMENTARY
[The existence of the Soul as the cogniser has been asserted in the following words:"All particular cognitions of such cognisables as Substance, Quality and Action, which are comprised under "Being, etc.,—and also of Generality, Specific Individuality and Inherence, which are not comprised under Being, etc.'--all which cognitions are perceptional or inferential or analogical or verbal or occult (astrological, etc.) or intuitional (e.g. 'my brother will come to-morrow') or doubtful or wrong or dreamy or dream-cognition-are apprehended by a cogniser distinct from my body, eto., -(a) because their origination is dependent upon their own causes,(b) because they are general' and particular':-(e) because they are of

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the nature of Consciousness, (d) because they are very quickly destructible,(e) because tluy leave impressions, -- because they are cognitions, just like the cognition of other persons ;-the Jar and other things serving as the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity."
The import of this comprehensive argument the Author sets forth (from the Nyāyi-standpoint) in the following Text :
TEXT (177).
"MY COGNITIONS ARE APPREHENDED BY A COONISER DISTINCT FROM MY BODY, ETC. BECAUSE THEY ARE COGNITIONS, -LIKE COONITIONS
OTHER THAN MINE.-(177)
COMMENTARY
in the phrase "body, ele.', the 'etc. includes the Intelleet, Sense organs and Feelings. Because they are cognitions, this also is only illustrative; the other reasons also are meant.--uch as having their origin dependent upon their own causes and the rest (mentioned in the aforesaid compre. hensive statement).-(177)
Sharikarasvāmin (an old Nyāya-writer) proves the existence of the Soul in another manner :-"Desire and the rest must subsist in something.because, while being entities, they are effects,-like Oolour, ote". This argument is set forth in the following Text:
TEXTS (178-179).
"ALL SUCH THINGS AS DESIRE AND THE REST MUST SUBSIST IN SOME
THING ; BECAUSE WHILE BEING ENTITIES, THEY ARE EFFECTS, LIKE COLOUR. THIS SOMETHING IS THE SPIRIT (SOUL). THE PRESENCE OF THE QUALIFYING PHRASE WHILE BEING ENTITIES' SAVES THE ARGUMENT FROM BEING * UNTRUE' (FALLIBLE), IN EBOARD TO DESTRUCTION: BECAUSE THOUGH DESTRUCTION IS AN EFFECT (HAS A CAUSE), YET IT IS NOT AN
* ENTITY""-(178-179)
COMMENTARY
The words the presence of the qualifying phrase, etc. serves to show the use of the phrase while being an entity':-(178-179)
Udd yotakara, on the other hand, seeks to prove the existence of the Soul in the following manner :-[The words here are almost an exact

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roproduction of the words of the Nyäyavārtika on 1. 1. 10, page 70, also on 3. 1. 1, page 340, Bib. Ind. Edn.) Dévadatta's cognitions of Colour, Taste, Smell and Touch must be due to one and to several causes, because they are recalled av mine',-just like the simultaneous cognitions of several men who have come to an understanding among themselves, relating to the glances of the dancing girl." -The meaning of this is as follows: “When several men have come to an understanding to the efiect that when the dancing girl casts her glances, we should throw clothes to her, there are several cognitions, by several cognisers, of the single object in the shape of the glances ', -and yet as the object cognised (the glances) is one only, each man recalls the cognition as I have seen', 'I have seen';- in the same manner, in the case in question also, the cognitions of several things would be recalled, on account of their cause (cogniser) being one only; and that one Cause is tlie Soul.-The recalling' of the cognitions also consists in their being grouped together in such expressions as 'It has been seen by me-heard by me' and so forth, as due to their belonging to a single Cogniser. In the case of the glances of the dancing girl' however, what is meant to be stressed is only the fact of the cognised object (not the Cogniser) being one. In all cases however the fact of the recalling remains, whereby several cognitions become associated with a single entity."
This argument of Uddyotakura's is set forth in the following Text:
TEXTS (180-181).
"ALL COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, ETO, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS HAVING ONE AND ALSO SEVERAL CAUSES,—BECAUSE THEY ARE BECALLED BY THE NOTION OF BEING COGNISED by me':JUST LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL MEN REGARDING THE GLANCES OF THE DANCING GIRL. IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO RECALLING, AS THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS
FOR IT."-(180-181)
COMMENTARY.
This is easily understood.-(180-181)
The following is another argument put forward by the same writer (Uddyotakara) :-[This argument is found set forth, in different words, in the Nyāyarārtika, under 3. 1. 19, page 368, Bib. Ind. Edition, see also page 340) — * The term 'Soul' must be expressive of something different from the aggregate of Body, Sense-organs, Mind, Intellect and Feelings, because it is a single term, while being distinct from the well-known synonyms of these lattor, -like such terms as Jar' and the like."
This argument is set forth in the following Text:

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TEXTS (182-183).
"THE TERM "atman '(SOUL) MUST BE EXPRESSIVE OF SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE AGGREGATE OF INTELLECT, SENSE-ORGANS AND THE REST,
BECAUSE IT IS HELD TO BE A SINGLE TERM, WHILE BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE WELL-KNOWN SYNONYMS OF THOSE TERMS; -WHATEVER IS DEFINITRLY KNOWN AS FULFILLING THESE CONDITIONS IS ALWAYS QUALIFIED BY THE SAID PROPERTY; AS IS FOUND IN THE
CASE OF THE TERM CLOTH '."-(182-183)
COMMENTARY
Being different from the welllenown synonyms i.e. such terms as "hi (which is a sonynymn of buldhi') and the rest, which are well-known synonyms of the term 'Buddhi'; the term "Soul' is distinct from all these syonyms.- Whatever is definitely known, etc.-i.e. which is different from well-known synonyms and is yet a single word -- is always qualified by the said properly, i.e. is alway, characterised by the quality of being expressive of something distinct from Intellect and the rest.-(182-183)
The same writer has also adduced a negative Reasoning in proof of the Soul—"This living body is not Soul-less, because if it were so, it would have to be regarded ns devoid of the functions of Breathing, etc., like the Jar and such things".
TEXT (184).
"TAS LIVING BODY WOULD BE DEVOID OF BREATHING AND OTHER FUNCTIONS,—BECAUSE IT WOULD BE SOUL-LESS, LIKE THE JAE.
HENCE IT CANNOT BE SOUL-LESS."-(184)
COMMENTARY
It cannot be Soul-le88,-i.e. the Living Body cannot be without a Soul.
Or the meaning of the Text may be that 'the Soul cannot be nonexistent ',-devoid of existence; that is, its existence is established.-(184)
As regards the question as to how the eternality and omnipresence of the Soul are to be proved,- Aviddhakarna has propounded the following argument :-"The cognitions that I have had since my birth must have had the same cogniser who had the first cognition immediately after my coming out of my mother's womb,-because they are my cognitions,-like my first cognition.-The same reasoning may be stated in regard to Pain and other experionces also.-This is the inferential reasoning that proves the eternality of the Soul."
This argument is set forth in the following Text :

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TEXT (185).
ALL SUBSEQUENT COGNITIONS ARE APPREHENDED BY THAT SAME COGNISER WHO APPREHENDED THE FIRST COGNITION IMMEDIATELY ON BIRTH, BECAUSE THEY ARE MY COGNITIONS, -LIKE THAT FIRST FORERUNNER OF
THOSE COGNITIONS."-(185)
COMMENTARY.
Like the first forerunner, etc.-.e. the first forerunner of all subsequent cognitions.-(185)
In proof of the omnipresence of the Soul, the same writer sets forth the following argument " The Earth, Water, Air and Mind which are things under dispute, are at a distance from my Soul, and yet they are in contact with that Soul,-a) because they have material form,- (b) because they have velocity--(e) because they have priority and posteriority,-(0) because they are associated with, and dissociated from, each other, just like my own body".
This argument is set forth in the following Text
TEXT (186).
* EARTH AND THE REST, EVEN THOUGH EXISTING AT A PLACE REMOTE FROM ME, ARE YET CONNECTED WITH MY SOUL-BECAUSU THEY HAVE A MATERIAL FORM, ETC., -JUST LIKE MY OWN
BODY."-(186)
COMMENTARY The next Text sums up the arguments of the protagonists of the Soul
TEXT (187).
"THUS THE EXISTENCE, ETERNALITY AND OMNIPRESENCE OF THE SOUL BEING DEFINITELY PROVED,-IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT
NOTHING IS SOUL-LESS."-(187)
COMMENTARY
The following Text proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the upholders of the Soul) :

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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER VII.
TEXT (188).
AS REGARDS THE FIRST ARGUMENT THAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD, IT IS
OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF 'PROVING WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED (FUTILE); AS THE APPREHENSIBILITY OF YOUR COGNITION BY THE OMNISCIENT PERSON AND OTHERS IS ALREADY
ADMITTED (BY US).-(188)
COMMENTARY. The first argument,-i.e. the one set forth in Text 177-"My cognitions are apprehended by a Cogniser, etc.". This is futile; inasmuch as we already admit the fact that your cognitions are approhended by a Cogniser other than your body, etc., -in the person of the Omaniscient Being, as also by the Shravakas and Pralyēkabuddhas and other thought-readers.-(188)
As regards the instance per similarity cited in the same argumentlike the cognitions of other persons ".-it is one that is devoid of the Probandum' (ie, the charneter meant to be proved is not present in it).This is shown in the following Text
TEXT (189). WHENEVER CONSCIOUSNESS APPEARS, IT APPEARS IN ITS OWN FORM, INDEPENDENTLY OF ANY OTHER 'ILLUMINATOR', SO ALSO THE COGNITION OF OTHER PERSONS' HENCE YOUR INSTANCE
IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM.-(189)
COMMENTARY. Inasuch as the cognition of other persons also appears in its own form, independently of any other illuminator',-this instance that you have cited is devoid of the Probandum,-i.e. devoid of the character that is sought to be proved. viz. that of being apprehended by a Cogniser distinct from the Body and the rest'.-(189)
It might be argued that it is not mere Cognition of another person that is meant to be the Corroborative Instance, but that particular cognition which appears in the form of the thing concerned".
The answer to this is supplied in the following Text:
TEXT (190) EVEN IF THE INSTANCE MEANT BE THAT COGNITION WHICH IS COGNISED AS TINGED BY THE FORM OF THE THING CONCERNED, -IT WOULD BE DOUBTFUL IN REGARD TO ANOTHER COGNITION.-(190)
COMMENTARY Even so, with reference to that cognition which does appear in its own form, without any cognition of another person', there would be doubts regarding the Probans cited, which, therefore, would remain inconclusive.

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It might be urged that the said Cognition also mnst be apprehended by a Cogniser different from itself,-(a) because it is prone to appearance and disappearance, (b) because it is cognisable -(c) because it is capable of being remembered as a means of cognition,-like the objects of cogni. tion)".
But here also: (1) as there would be nothing to preclude the contrary of the Probandum, the negative concomitance would remain doubtful; (2) as it would involve cognition after cognition, there would be an infinite regress ;-(3) there would be no object whose appearance had not become manifested; hence, for the establishing of one object', it would be necessary to carry on a series of Cognitions, which would take up the entire life of a man.
If for fear of the infinito regress', some one cognition were accepted as appearing by itself,--then that one case would render doubtful and inconclusive the whole set of Reasons cited, in the form being liable to appearance and disappearance and the rest. Further, in that case, why should there be any aversion to the acceptance of the self-cognisability' of other cognitions also.-on the basis of that said one cognition If (in order to avoid this difficulty) it be held that the said one cognition is one whose form is not cognised at all ;-even so, that cognition not being un-proven', the entire set of cognitions preceding it would be not proven', --having their appearance not manifested; and as a consequence of this, the object (of cognition) also would be not proven':-Further, as regards the opinion of the Idealista,-under which all Cognitions are self-manifested, on account of their being no Cogniser' of Cognisable things, and are not manifested by any other Cognition,-the defect in the Opponent's reasoning, of being devoid of the Probandum' would remain absolutely unslaken.
In the same manner it may be pointed out that the other reasons'having its birth dependent upon Causes' and the rest,-aro open to the objection of being Futile and so forth.
[In the opening lines of the Commentary on 171-176, above, it has been Esserted by the Naiyāyilu that “all particular cognitions of such cognisables as are the objects of Being, etc. etc.");-herein the qualification that has been added to the subject of the Reasoning, is, as before, absolutely ukeless; as in the matter oi proving the Probandum in question, they do not render any help at all, Because what is there that does not become included under the subject thus qualified 1-sinco all my perceptional and other cognitions are declared to be apprehended by a cogniser other than the Body, sense organs and the rest. Even if a distinction were made on the basis of some cognitions being perceptional' and some 'inferential' and so on. -any distinction in regard to the Subject itself would be useless, ss all cognitions would have become included under the term ' my cognitions'.-Nor even for the opposite party is any such qualified Subject known ; hence the Reasons put forward are devoid of a substratum.-- If it is the case that by setting up a useless qualification, another reason is put forward for the proving of the said substratum,—then the reasoner becomes subject to the Clincher' of Arthân. tara', 'Irrelevancy'-by reasou of setting up something entirely unconnected with the thing under consideration. -(190)
10

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
TEXTS (191.192). IF (BY THE ARGUMENT SET FORTE UNDER Text 178), IT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED THAT DESIRE AND THE REST MUST SUBSIST somewhere,
-AND TIAT THE CAUSE ONLY CAN BE SUCH A SUBSTRATUM, -YOU SEEK TO PROVE WHAT IS ALREADY ACCEPTED BY US. IF HOWEVER IT IS THE RECEPTACLE (OR CONTAINER) THAT IS MEANT BY YOU TO BE THE 'SUBSTRATOM (OF DESIRE, ETC.), -THEN ALSO THE ASSUMING OF A RECEPTACLE' FOR WHAT TS IMMOBILE IS
ABSOLUTELY USELESS.-(191-192)
COMMENTARY It has been argued (under Text 178, above) that “Desire, etc, must subsist somewhere"; if, by this, all that is meant to be proved is that only the Canse is the substratum of Desire, etc., then the effort is futile ; because we also do not regard Desire, etc. to be without cause; as is clear from our declaration that the mind and the mental phenomena are brought about by four etc.,
Parikalpyatê -asserted, meant.
If the substratum. you seek to prove is in the form of a container (Receptacle), then what is asserted being annulled by Inference, there can be no invariable concomitance between that and the Probans put for; ward.—This is what is shown by the words- If however it is the Receptarle, etc., i.e. the receptacle of the Desire, etc. It might be possible to postulate such # Roceptacle for things with material forms, which are capable of moving about,- for whom the "Receptacle' would save them from falling down; those things however which, like Pleasure and the rest, are immobile (and immaterial) can never fall down, and under the circumstances, what would any such thing as the 'Soul'do for them, whereby it would be their receptacle? (191-192)
Objection-" When the Jujube-fruit and other things are placed in such receptacles as the jar and the like-even though these latter do not do anything for the fruits, yet they serve as their receptacle (container); in the same manner the Soul would be the receptacle of Pleasure, etc."
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (193)
THE PIT AND OTHER THINGS CAN BE THE RECEPTACLE OF THE JUJUBE FRUIT AND OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE THEY SERVE TO OBSTRUCT THEIR MOVEMENT, OR BECAUSE THEY BRING ABOUT
SPECIFIC CHANGES.-(193)
COMMENTARY Because they serve to obstruct their movement '--this is in accordance with the view that things are not momentary ;-'because they bring about

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specific changes, this is in accordance with the view that things are momentary; as the changes' meant here are those that are brought about on the sume spot where the constituent cause existed.-Both these kinds of 'receptacle' are impossible in the case of Desire and the rest; hence there can be na receptacle' for these.(193)
Under the argument urged above (in Text 178) the phrase "white being entities' has been introduced as a qualification this qualification is absolutely useless; as there is nothing that it can serve to exclude. This is what is pointed out in the following Text:
TEXT (194)
IT IS NOT REASONABLE TO REGARD DESTRUCTION, WHICH IS formlesa, AS A PRODUCT'; HENCE THE QUALIFICATION MENTIONED IN THE REASONING OF THE OTHER PARTY IS
ENTIRELY USELESS.-(194)
COMMENTARY.
If Destruction could be of the nature of a Product, then the qualification being an entity' would serve the purpose of excluding that as a matter of fact however, as it is a non-entity, causes cannot do anything to it; how the could it have a Cause This reusoning may be formulated As follows :-That which is a non-entity cannot be the product of anything, 0.g. the 'Hare's Horns'.-Destruction is a non-entity ;-hence to speak of it as having 4 cause would be contrary to the said universal proposition.If it were a product, it would be an entity, like Pleasure, etc.-This would be an argument against the reasoning of the other party.
Further, what has been asserted also runs counter to your own doctrine. For instance, the name and the idea of 'Product' is due-(a) to its acquiring its character, or (b) to its subsistence (manifestation) in its Material Cause, or (c) to the subsistence therein of Being' (existence)-Destruction is not possessed of the character of Substance, etc., hence it cannot subsist in its Material Cause ; nor, for the same reason, can Being (Existence) subsist in it (Destruction), for the simple reason that it has no form (wherein the Existence could subsist). If it were otherwise, then, like Substance, etc., it would also be contained in a receptacle, and be an 'Entity also ; and as such, it could not be excluded by the qualification in question; hence this qualification being entitios' is absolutely useless. — (194)
As against the argument put forward by the Opponent under Text 180 above, to the effect that 'the cognitions of Colour, etc. have one and several causes, etc. eto.',--the Author urges as follows:

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
TEXTS (195-196),
THE 'RECALLING' OT SUCH XOTIONS AS BY ME (SEEN, HEARD) | ETC. MUST BE DUE TO PERTURBATIONS OF IGNORANCE, AS SUCH NOTIONS OF THE ONE-NESS OT THE AGENT (PERCEIVER) ARE FOUND TO APPEAR ALSO IN CONNECTION WITH ALL MOMENTARY THINGS. FROM THIS FALSE ASSUMPTION, IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO DEDUCE ANY CONCLUSION REGARDING THE TRUE STATE OF THINGS; SPECIALLY AS EVEN THINGS THAT ARE DIVERSE BY BEASON OF THE DIVERSITY OF THEIR POWERS BECOME THE BASIS OF AN EFFEOT CONCEIVED OF AS one.-(195-196)
COMMENTARY.
Seen by me and heard by me, etc. etc.,-the recalling', in the 'associating' of several such cognitions, has been put forward as the reason for their having a single Canse (in the shape of the Soul').-But this reason is inconclusive' s even in regard to momentary things, such * recalling' is possible through the false assumption of their being due to a single Cogniser. Hence it cannot be right to decluce any conclusion regarding the true nature of things from the fact of such recalling
Question-"In what way do your Moments (Momentary entities) come to be the cause of the said Recalling (of Cognitions)
Answer-By reason of the diversity of their powers, etc. i.e. by reason of the peculiarity of its powers,--the thing which is many diverse) becomes the *baaia'-cause of such single effects being recalled in one form; as is found in the case of such medicince of fever as Curluchi and the rest ; all which is going to be explained in detail later on.-(195-196)
Question - "How is it ascertained that the notion in question is wrong?" The answer is provided in the following Text
TEXT (197).
IF MANY THINGS-SUCH AS THE COONITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND THE REST, -WERE THE EFFECTS OF A SINGLE CONTINUOUS (PERMANENT) CAUSE, THEN ANY ORDER OF SEQUENCE AMONG SUCH EFFECTS
WOULD BE INCONGRUOOS; AS THEIR EYFICIENT
CAUSA WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE.--(197)
COMMENTARY.
If the cognitions of the Blue and the rest were the effect of a single such Cause as the Soul', which is eternal, continues for all time, past and future,

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-then any order of sequence among such cognitions would be incongruous; as the efficient Cause being present, all the effects should appear simul. taneously; specially as the eternal Cause cannot need the help of anything else ; for the simple reason that it cannot be helped by anything else.-(197)
Further, if what is meant to prove is merely the fact of the cognitions being 'preceded by a Cause', then the effort is futile :- this is what is shown in the following Text :
TEXT (198).
INASMUCH AS THE APPEARANCE OF Srx COGNITIONS OUT OF A SINGLE PREORDING COGNITION IS CLEARLY RECOGNISED SIMULTANEOUSLY,
-WHAT YOUR ARGUMENT PROVES IS ADMITTED BY US). (198)
COMMENTARY
I'on a single preceding Cognition,-out of a single Ougnition immediately preceding them, there is an appearance of Six Cognitions, through the Eye and other organs-Which appearance is clearly recognised. For instance, at the time that a man sees the complexion of the dancing girl, he also hears the Sound of the drum and other musical accompuniments, smells the odour of the Lotus and other fragrant things, lastes the Carplior and other things. feels also the wind emanating from the fans, and thinks oi taking up his clothes. It cannot be right to say that his vision appears to be such because it moves quickly, like the whirling fire-brand. For if it were so, then the appearances would be vague and dim. To explain ;it is on the basis of the
recalling of all these perceptions (through the several Sense-organs that you explain the feeling that the whole lot of the perceptions appears in a single Cognition; the Recalling too is done through Remembrance and Remeinbrance, appertaining, as it does, to the past, is always indistinct ;--while the single Cognition of Colour and the rest is found to be quite distinct.-Further, in the case of such expressions as saro-rasa, there is an appearance of the cognitions quickly apprehending the sa' and other letter-sounds ; so that in this case also there might be the notion of a single (lognition; and there would, therefore, be no idea of any order of sequence among them.-All this is going to be explained later on; in the present context the Text has merely indicated the lines of the refutation of the Opponent's doctrine).-(198)
If what you seek to prove is the fact of the Cognitions having a singlo Cause, by the fact of their having for their Canse a Single Eternal and Uniform Entity,-then your premiss is one that is annulled by Inference. - This is what is shown in the following Text :

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TEXT (199).
THAT THINGS APPEARING CONSECUTIVELY, ONE AFTER THE OTHER, CANNOT HAVE ONE AND THE SAME CAUSE, HAS JUST BEEN POINTED OUT, FOR THIS REASON, HERETN THE (OPPONENT'S) PREMISS
ASSERTINO TEE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS FOUND
TO BE CLEARLY ANNULLED BY INTERENCE, -(199)
COMMENTARY. Just been pointed out,'-in Text 197.
The 'annulment' is in the following manner :-Things whose causes efficient and untrammelled,--are present, must be produced simultaneously;
-e.g. Sprouts and such other effects, whose catsal paraphernalia is complete, appear at one and the same time ;-Devadatta's cognitions of Colour and such objects have their Causes-efficient and untrammolled, present ; this is a reason based upon the nature of things.-As a matter of fact however they never appear simultaneously; hence the conclusion is wrong.-(199)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Corroborative Instance Iso is devoid of the Probandum:
TEXT (200) AS FOR THE GLANCE OF THE DANCING GIRL, IT IS NOT REALLY A SINGLE ENTITY; IN FACT IT IS MADE UP OF SEVERAL MINUTE PARTICLES;
AND ITS ONE-NESS' IS ONLY ASSUMED.-(200)
COMMENTARY, Such things as the 'glance of the Dancing Girl' are not single entities : they are, in reality, an aggregate of several minute particles.
Question-"It that is so, then how do they come to be spoken of is one?"
Answer--Its one-ness is only assumed. -(200)
Question-"What is the basis of this assumption ?" The answer cornes in the following Text :
TEXT (201). IT IS BECAUSE IT IS USED FOR A SINGLE PURPOSE THAT IT IS SPOKEN OF AS 'ONE' IF SOMETHING LIKE THIS IS WHAT YOU DESIRE TO PROVE, THEN YOUR EFFORT IS TUTILE (PROVING
WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED).-(201)
COMMENTARY.
Becanse the glance of the Dancing Girl' is used for the purpose of bringing about the single effect in the form of Visual Cognition, therefore, even though diverse, it is spoken of as one!

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It might be urged by the Opponent-"It is just such a Probandum, of which the one-ness is assumed, that we mean; so that the Corroborative Instance cannot be said to be devoid of the Probandum '."
The answer to this is that if something like this is tohat you desire to prove, then it involves the fallacy of 'futility', 'proving what is already proved '; as (according to us) several Impressions appearing consecutively do form the objects of the apprehension of several things, which go to make up & single Cognition.—(201)
Under Text 182, it has been argued that "the term 'soul is expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of Intellect, Sense-organs and the rest." -This is answered in the following Text :
TEXTS (202-204).
IN THE CASE OF SYNONYMS, SUCH AS buddhi', chitta' AND THE REST - WE FIND THAT THOUGH EACH OF THEM IS A SINGLE TERM, YET IT DOES NOT EXPRESS A THING DIFFERENT (FROM THAT EXPRESSED BY OTHERS) HENCE YOUR REASON IS INCONCLUSIVE'. -"BUT A QUALIFICATION (IN THE FORM AS APART FROM RECOGNISED SYNONYMS) HAS BEEN ADDED."-OUR ANSWER TO THAT IS THAT THE QUALIFICATION IS NOT 'ADMITTED', AS THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE SOUL 'IS SYNONYMOUS WITH CONSCIOUSNESS'; AS IT IS CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF, AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS, THAT IS SPOKES OF AS THE SOUL' ALL THIS HAS BEEN SAID BY US ON THE BASIS OF ILLUSORY CONCEPTION'; IN REALITY, THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS DENOTED BY THE TERM IN QUESTION
(SOUL").-(202-204)
COMMENTARY.
The reason because it is a single term '-is 'inconclusive -Because in the case of such synonyms as (a) buddhi', chitta', jñana', -as (6) * indriya', 'akpa', -as (c) vēdana' and chitta',-as (d) kaya' and
sharira', --which are denotative of (a) Intellect, (b) Sense-organs, (c) Cognition, and (d) Body, according to our view, the character of denoting distinct things is not present, though each term is one; hence no preclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being possible, the Reason must be 'inconclusive!
Says the Opponent:-" It is because we suspected this that in our argument we added the qualification, apart from well-recognised synonyms', to our Reason; how then can it be Inconclusive ?"
The answer to this is as follows:-This qualification of the Reason is one that is not admitted '. -"How?"-Because the fact remains that the

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* Soul' is the synonym of Consciousness'. As it has been declared (by the other party) that-" It is Consciousness itself which, as the substratum of 1-consciousness, is spoken of as 'Soul '"; in this quotation upacharyate' stands for the phrase is spoken of in common parlance. It is for this reason that what Uddyotakara has said, regarding the figurative use not being right where the direct use is possible,-should be taken as being due to his ignorance of what is meant. This is what is made clear by the term 'giyate' (is spoken of). Hence the Reason has a qualification that is unproven inadmissible.
Whatever we have said regarding the inconclusiveness of the Reason so far is on the basis of Illusory Conception - admitting, for the sake of argument, the fact of there being something denoted (by the term 'Soul '); if what is sought to be proved is the fact of the term Soul' being really denotative of something distinct from Intelligence and the rest, then the Reason put forward is a highly improper one, the premiss (invariable concomitance) on which it is based being annulled hr Inference. This is what is shown by the Text in the words all this has been said, etc.' ;-that is, as a matter of fact, all verbal usage is based upon a conceptual imposition of its connection with tlungs ;--this is going to be explained later on. Thus then, in reality, there is nothing that is denoted by the term "Soul'; and under the circumstances, how could there be any invariable concomitance between the said Reason and the Probandam (the character sought to be proved) (202-204)
The following Text proceeds to show that even with the said qualifiertion, the Reason remains 'inconclusive'
TEXT (205).
THE REASON IS FOUND TO BE False ALSO; WHEN, FOR INSTANCE,
NAMES, SUCH AS Karaka' (ACTIVE AGENT), AND THE LIKE, ARH APPLIED TO THINGS LIKE THE SKY.
LOTUS'.(205)
COMMENTARY.
When a name, such as Karaka', is applied to such non-entities as the Sky-lotus in such expressions as 'the Skylotus is a non-entity, where the Sky-lotus' may be spoken of as the Nominative').-then, according to both parties, the term is one only and also distinct from terms denoting the Body, etc.; and yet the denotation of the term does not consist of a thing distinct from the Body, etc. Hence the Reason, as trged, is 'Inconclu. sive':-(205)
Question-"How can the declensional names we applied to nonentities, which are absolutely characterless ?"
The answer is supplied in the following Text

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TEXT (206). (THE USE OF] TERMS BEING BASED ENTIRELY ON CONVENTION-WHAT IS THERE TO WHICH THEY CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THE CASE OF TERMS LIKE SOUL' ALSO, THERE IS NOTHING IN THEIR VERY NATURE WHICH IS EXPRESSIVE OF
ANYTHING.-(206)
COMMENTARY Convention proceeds from the independent desire of men (to give a certain name to a certain thing); and Terms also are expressive of that alone; wherefore then could there be any restriction of their use?
If the meaning of the Opponent's Reason be that "because it is an unconventional single term", and by that means its Inclusiveness be sought to be avoided, then the answer is-In the case of terms like Soul', etc. that is, apart from Convention, terms, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; for, if it were so, then eveu unlearned persons (not conversant with Convention) could understand the meaning of words; there wonld also be no independent instruction as to the meaning of words; also because all Convention would, in that case, be seless. From all this it follows that such terms as Soul' and the like, by their nature, are not expressive of anything; so that the Reason put forward is unpruven', Inadmissible'
If (in order to avoid these difficulties) it be sought to add a further qualification-to the effect that it has for its objective a cognisable thing which is included under a category which cannot be specified', -as las beou itsserted by Bhāvipēka,-even so, inasmuch as such a qualification would be
unproven!, the Reason itself would be Inadmissible',-as also In. conclusive, on account of the absence of the necessary invariable concomitance.-(206)
It has been argued above (under Text 184) that "The living body would be devoid of Breathing, etc., if there were no Soul" -The answer to that is provided in the following Text :
TEXTS (207-208). THE CONTINGENCY THAT HAS BEEN URGED WOULD BE RIGHT IF THE CONNECTION BETWEEN THE FUNCTIONS OF BREATHING, ETC. AND THE
SOUL WERE WELL-ESTABLISHED ; OTHERWISE, IT WOULD BE ABSURD. FOR INSTANCE, THE ABSENCE OF THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN' CANNOT MAKE THE LIVING BODY DEVOID OF BREATHING, ETC. AND YOUR URGING OF THE CONTINGENCY IN QUESTION IS OF THE
SAME KIND.—(207-208)
COMMENTARY If between Breathing, etc. and the Soul, there were some connection, as that of beiny produced from it, or being of the same nature,-known as

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established, then there would be some reason for urging the contingency that the absence of the Soul would involve the absence of Breathing, etc. Otherwise, the urging of the absence of one thing on the absence of another thing not connected with it at all, would be absurd. Certainly the absence of the Son of the Barren Woman' does not entail the absence of Breathing etc. Hence, if someone were to put forward the contingency of absence of Breathing, etc. as due to the absence oi the Son of the Barren Woman',
-like that of the Jar,-this would be entirely inconclusive'; in the same way your argument putting forward the contingency of Breathing, etc. being absent on account of the absence of the Soul is purely inconclusive, for the simple reason that no connection is known to subsist between Breathing, etc. and the Soul).-(207-208)
Question-"How do you know that the connection is not known ! Answer:
TEXTS (209-210).
Tas BREATHING, ETC. CANNOT BE OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE SOUL, AS A DIFFERENON BETWEEN THEM HAS BEEN ADMITTED, NOR IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE TWO, AS IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEITY ; THUS THEN, ON THE ABSENCE OF THE SOUL,-WITH WELCE THEY HAVE NO CONNECTION, WHY SHOULD THE BREATHS-UPWARD, DOWNWARD AND THE BEST, DEPART FROM THE BODY 1-(209-210)
COMMENTARY
Between the two,-i.e. between the Soul and Breathing, etc., there cannot subsist the relation of being of the same nature ; because the Naiyayika himself admits the nature of the two to be different.-Nor can the relation between the two be one of being produced from itit; because (if the Soul were the Cause), then, inasinch this Cause would always be present in its perfect form, the Breathing, etc. would all be simultaneous. Apart from these two, there is no connection possible. Thus then, being devoid of any connection with the Soul, why should they disappear from the Body which is still endowed with Life 1-They can never so disappear. The sense is that for this reason, the Reason put forward by the other party is 'Inconclusive!
By this same argument all those indications of tho Soul which have been put forward by the other party.- in the shape of Desire, Hatred, Effort, Pleasure, Pain, Cognition and so forth-should be understood to be rejected on the sole ground of there being no connection between these and the Soul. This argument may be formulated as follows:When certain things are not related (by concomitance) with any particular thing, they cannot be regarded as indicators of this latter thing, -o.g, the line of cranes cannot be regarded as indicators of Sesamum and other things, and Breathing, etc. are not related with the Soul; hence the conditions of the general proposition are

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not fulfilled by these.-The Probans here put forward cannot be said to be
unproven'; as it has been already proved that neither of the two forms of relation in present in the case.-Nor can the Probans be said to be Inconclusive': for, if the Probans were so, then all things would be indicators of all things.-Nor can the Probans be said to be Contradictory '; as it is actually found to be present wherever the Probandum is present.
The other party has also asserted that "from the knowledge of the Instrument follows the knowledge of the Operator (of the Instrument)",This however is not-proved'. Because it has not been proved that the Eye and other organs are specific instruments' (of specific cognitions), in reality; as in the producing of cognitions the causal efficiency' of all the organs is equal; and because any such distinction as that between the * Instrument and the Operator' is purely arbitrary-If what is sought to be proved is only the fact of the Soul being the operator, then the argument is superfluous; because we have never denied the presence of the conceptual (assumed) Operator'. If the Reason be intended to prove the real Operator, then it is Inconclusive'; as the Eye and other organs have never been found to be invariably concomitant with any such real Operator:-(209-210)
It has been argued (in Tea:t 185) that "all subsequent cognitions are apprehended by that same Cogniser who apprehended the first Cognition immediately on birth, etc. etc.". - This is answered in the following:
TEXT (211). THUS THE EXISTENCE OF THE SOUL' NOT BEING TROVED BY ANY OF THE PROOFS (TUT FORWARD), THE INSTANCES THAT HAVE BEEN CITED OF DTERNALITY' AND 'OMNIPRESENCE BECOME
DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM':-(211)
COMMENTARY. The Opponent has cited the instances of the first cognition' and 'my body': all these instances are devoid of the Probandum',-as the existence of the Soul' has not been proved. --Consequently the Probans is clearly 'inconclusive':-(211)
With the following Text, the Author again introduces the view of Uddyotakara, Bhävivikta and others -
TEXT (212) OTHERS HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE "SOUL' IS PROVED BY PERCEPTION;
BECAUSE I-CONSCIOUSNESS' IS SELF-COGNISABLE, AND THE
SOUL FORMS TRE OBJECT OF THAT CONSCIOUSNESS, (212)
COMMENTARY. These people argue as follows: "Soul is proved by Perception itself; for instance, the notion of 'T', which is independent of any remembrance

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of the connection between an Inferential Indicative and that which has that Indieative, is of the nature of Perception', - like the cognition of Colour and other things. Of this notion of T', Colour, etc. do not for the object : as what appears in that notion is different from the cognition of Colour, etc. hence the object of that notion must be totally different [and that is the Soul)".-Uddyotakara has stated this view under 3. 1. 1 ; see Nyāyarartika. p. 345.]
This view is answered in the following texts :
TEXTS (213-214).
THIS IS NOT RIGHT, BECAUSE AS A MATTER OF FAOT, THE FORM OF THE
Soul' DOES NOT BECOME MANIFEST IN 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS'; THEREIN IS NOT PERCEIVED ANY MANIFESTATION OF ETERNALITY, OMNIPRESENCE AND SUCH PROPERTIES (POSTULATED OF THE SOUL); WHAT IS CLEARLY PROSENT THEREIN, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS THE FAIR COMPLEXION, ETC.; AND THE SOIL' IS NOT HELD TO BE OT THE NATURE OF THESE LATTER HENCE THE SOUL CANNOT BE AN OBJECT OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS :-(213-214)
COMMENTARY. The fact of 'I.consciousness'having the Soul' for its object cannot be regarded as proved ; as the form of the Soul' is not present in it. This argument may be formulated as follows:- When one thing is devoid of the form of another, it cannot have this latter for its object; o.g. Sound is not an object of visual perception ;-tlie notion of 'I' is devoid of the form of the Soul ; lience if it were regarded as its object, it would be contrary to the universal proposition stated above. That the Probans of this argument is not unproven is shown by the Text in the words There is nol perceivel any manifestation of Eternality and Omnipresence, etc. etc.':-that is to say, the Soul is held to be eternal, omni present, intelligent and so forth: not the slightest manifestation of these characters is perceived in I.consciousness': the manifestation that is perceived in 'I-consciousness' is all in connection with 'fair-complexion and other conditions of the body, -as is apparent in such expressions as I am fair, with weak powers of vision.-lean, beset with acuto pain' and so forth. From this it is deduced that I consciousness, which is thus found to appear as connected with the conditions of the Body, en visages the Body-Clearly present':--it is said to be clear, because it is never found to fail.
This argument serves to reject the following statement made by Uddyotakara and others :-"The character of Soul' is figuratively in directly) attributed to the Body which is only the locus of experience,-just as when speaking of a satisfactory servant, the King says-He is what I an"" -This assertion becomes rejected; because if such an attribution (notion) were figurative and indirect, then it would be liable to be false; because in the case of the Lion and the Boy, when the Boy is figuratively

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spoken of as the 'Lion, the notion of Lion' can never be true in reference to both the Boy and the Lion.-It might be urged that "the Body and the Soul are actually spoken of as distinct, in such expressions as My body, etc,'; and to that extent, the said figurative attribution does become false", - But it is not so: as it might be possible to regard the notion of Soul' with regard to the Soul also as false; as in this connection also, we find such expressions as My Soul', where there is a distinction made between the two. -If it be urged that in this case the distinction is assumed ",—then the same may be said in regard to the other case also.
Even if the expression I am fair is used in its direct sense, why should not the Soul be the object of this notion ?"
The answer is—The Soul is not held to be of the nature, etc.-i.e. of the nature of 'fair-complexioned', etc.; for the simple reason that it is not possible for the Soul to have any such qualities as Colour and the like.-- (213-214)
It has been explained that it is not right to regard the Soul' as forming the object of 'I consciousness, because this latter is devoid of the form of the Soul. The following Text proceeds to show that the same cannot be right also because in that case there would be no dispute (between us and the Naiyāyika) :
TEXT (215). IF THE SOUL WERE REALLY AMENABLE TO PERCEPTION, THEN WIRREFORE SHOULD THIS DISPUTE ARISE REGARDING ITS EXISTENCE
AND OTHER THINGS ?-(215)
COMMENTARY. Existence and other things '-i.e. regarding its Existence, Eternality, Omnipresence and so forth.—(215)
The following might be urged“Just as, for you, even though the Blue and other things are actually perceived, yet disputes arise in regard to their momentariness and other characters, which are held to be non-different from the nature of those things ;-in the same manner, there might be dispute regarding the Existence, etc. of the Soul Also".
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (216). THE 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS ALWAYS FUNCTIONS IN THE FORM OF A DETINITE COGNITION ; AND BETWEEN A Definite Cognition AND A MERE Indefinite Conception, THERE IS ALWAYS THE RELATION OF THE ANNULLER AND THE
ANNULLED' —(216)
COMMENTARY In the case of Blue and the rest, it is only right that even though they are apprehended by Perception, there should be clispute regarding their

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momentarineas and other properties; because the Perception of these things is always indeterminale (vague, undefined) in character, and as such not conducive to any definitely certain cognition; and hence there can be no definitely certain cognition of their momenlariness and such other properties.In your case however, it would not be right; because the notion of 'T' is welldefined and definite (according to you) and hence of the nature of a definitely certain cognition,-so that the notion of the Soul also would be definitely certain ;-and where a thing has been the object of a definitely certain cognition, there can be no room for any assumed conception to the contrary ; by virtue of which any dispute could arise; specially as when there are two contrary notions, one must annul the other. In fact, it is in the very nature of definitely certain cognitions regarding their objects, that they bring about well-ascertained notions of their objects; so that, if they do not bring about these well-ascertained notions, it follows that they do not apprehend the objects at all. (216)
Having thus demolished the Opponent's doctrine, the Author proceeds to set forth his own view :
TEXTS (217-218).
TAUS IT FOLLOWS THAT DESIRE AND ALL THE REST CANNOT SUBSIST IN THE SOUL';-BECAUSE THEY APPEAR SUCCESSIVELY,-LIKE THE 'SEED-SPROUT-CREETER'.-OR, ALL PSYCHICAL (SUBJECTIVE) CONCEPTS MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING THEIR FORMS OBSESSED BY ABSENCE OF SOUL',-BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS BEING THINGS BEING EXISTENT" AND SO FORTH.-JUST LIKE THE JAR AND
OTHER EXTERNAL OBJECTS.-(217-218)
COMMENTARY.
The argument is to be formulated as follows Things that are produced successively can not subsist in the Soul,-0.g. Seed-Spront-Creeper Pleasure and the rest are produced successively : hence they are found to be besot by a concomitance to what is denied (by the Opponent); because
successive origination' is invariably concomitant with 'subsistence in what is not-Soul', which is contrary to subsistence in the Soul' (which is what is desired by the other party). Aronson annulling the desired conclusion is also available in the fact that the appearance of effects must be simultaneous when the cause is present in its perfect form.
Or,-there is also a more direct reason :-Things that are ondowed with the chnracter of being things, being products, having origin, and so forth, all these are devoid of the Soul',-as is found in the case of such things as the Jar and the like ;-and all such subjective (psychical) concepts as the Mind, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain and the rest appearing in the Living Body, are endowed with the said character of being things and the rest;

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[hence they cannot have any connection with any such thing as the Soul).-(217-218)
Question--"In what way is this invariable concomitance (Premiss) established "
The answer is provided in the following Text :
TEXT (219).
IF THE THINGS IN QUESTION WERE CONNECTED WITH THE SOUL, THEN THE THINGS CAUSED BY THAT (SOUL) WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL; AND BEING ETERNAL, THEY WOULD YET BE POWERLESS FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION. CONSEQUENTLY IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE THE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE AND THE
REST.-(219)
COMMENTARY
If the things in question are connected with the Soul-if the Body and the rest wore controlled by the Soul,--then this Soul would be their 'Cause'; ay what is not a Cause cannot be a controller ; as otherwise there would be an absurdity. And the Body and other things cansed (produced) by that Sonl, having their Cause always present in its perfect form, would have to be regarded as eternal,- i.e. not successive.
The following might be urged: "If they are held to be eternal,even so they retain their character of being things and so forth.
The answer is given in the words and being eternal, etc. etc.' ;-i.e. being cternal, the Body and the rest would have to be regarded as powerless in bringing about any effective action. The word 'prasajyale' (singular) of the Grst line being transformed, in this construction, to the plural form [Prasajyata ' as applied to the second line being construed as 'Prasajyante').
-The sense is that in the case of an eternal thing, any effective action, either successive or simultaneous-is incompatible. And on the cessation of the power for effective action, they cease to be things' (entities); because
capacity for effective action is the characteristic of all Entities (Things), And when the character of being Entities has ceased, there is cessation of the other characteristics of Entities also,-such as having existence and the like; and thus the invariable concomitance becomes duly established.-(219)
Uddyotakara argues as follows:-"What is it that is meant by (the Living Body] being not connected with the Soul ?-a) If it incans that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul,—then, there can be no Corroborative Instanco (such as would be accepted by both parties); as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul.- (0) If again, what is meant is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the proposition being that the Soul is not the Body', then our answer is

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who is there that regards the Body as the Soul! Then again, the negative preposition nis', 'not' in the terın nirainakam' no-Soul ') signifies the negation of what is expressed by the following term atman (i.e. of something with Soul). So that it behoves you to explain what is that which is with Soul'; for in no case do we find the negative Prepositionnis' prefixed to a term denoting a non-entity; for instance, in the expression nimmaksikam', + without flies, the preposition is added to maksika' (denoting the Fly, a positive entity). (c) Again, if the statement the Body is not with Soul is meant to deny the Soul in the body, then the reasoning proves only what is already admitted by all; for who is there who holds that the Soul subsists in the Body 2-d) If then the statement means that 'the Body has no con nection with the Soul', then there can be no Corroborative Instance.-Lastly, all the aforesaid four cases would mean the denial of a distinctive character in regard to the Soul; and this would imply the tacit admission of the Existence of the Soul itself, in a general way; so that what was sought to be denied becomes admitted. If what is meant is that the term Soul, being a verbal entity, is transient, it must denote something that is transient, --then, in the first place, in view of the term eternal', the premiss of the above reasoning is found to be 'inconclusive', doubtful; and secondly, [the term soul' in your argument can stand either for the Body or for something other than the Body]; if it stands for the Body and such things, then the argument becomes superfluous; and if the term stands for some. thing other than the Body, etc. and your proposition declares it as denoting something transient, then the existence of something other than the Body, etc. becomes admitted ; and this goes against your doctrine."--[This is an exact quotation from Uddyotakara's Nyāyavdrtika on 3. 1. 1, Bib. Ind. Edn.. p. 346, line 18 to p. 347, line 10.)
The above is answered by the Author in the following Text :
TEXT (220).
TRAT NEGATION OF THE SOUL' WHICH OTHER PEOPLE SEEK TO PROVE IN REGARD TO THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS, THAT SAME WE ARE GOING TO PROVE IN REGARD TO THE
LIVING BODY - (220)
COMMENTARY.
The objection that has been urged above is equally applicable to your case also. For instance, it is admitted by you that the Jar and other external things are without Soul', either on the ground of their being not occupied by a Soul, or on the ground of their being the receptacle of the Soul's experiences. If it were not so, then you could not have mentioned these as the Oorroborative Instance in your argument which is stated in the form- This Living Body is not without Soul, because, if it were, then it wonid be devoid of Breathing and such other functions, -liko the Jar and other things'.-Now in reference to these Jar and other things, the

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question may be put-In what sense are these without SouDoes it mean that they serve no useful purpose for the Soul' and so on (as has been urged by Uddyotakara, in the passage quoted above). If so, then (a) you affirm the fact of all external things, like the Jar, being oqually without Soul.-on the ground of their being not occupied by the Soul, or on account of their being the receptacle of the Soul's experiences ;—and yon deny the absence of Soul in regard to the Living Body, in the assertion The Living Body is not without Soul'; and from this denial you deduce the conclusion that it is the Living Body alone that is rith Soul, and not the dend body, or the Jar knd other things. In the same manner, we also prove the fact that the Living Body is withou Soul, because it is a thing and so forth' (as explained above).
- Thus the various alternatives put forward Is it meant that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul' and so forth.--are entirely out of place; as 'absence of Soul' has been admitted by you also (in regard to certain things).
Further, it luas been alleged that there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the assertion that the Body serves no useful purpose for the Soul" -This is not right. Because it is possible to set up the following argument-When one thing does not add any peculiar property to another thing, it cannot be regarded as serving any useful purpose for this latter,c.g. the Vindhya of the Himalaya ;-the Body and the rest do not add any peculiarity to the character of the Soul, which remains eternally of one miform character:-hence the wider factor not being present (the less extensive factor cannot be admitted). -The Probans put forward in this argument cannot be said to be unproven', inadmissible, becanse the additional property not being anything distinct from the Boul itself, any adding to it would mean the * adding to the Soul itself; and this would imply the transience of the Soul. If, on the other hand, the additional property' be held to be distinct from the Soul itself, -as there would be no basis for any connection between that property and the Soul, there would be no such idea as that this property bolongs to the Soul'.-From all this it follows that for an Eternal Entity, there is nothing that can serve a useful purpose; as, in regard to such an Entity, it could not do anything at all.
It has been further alleged - Who is there who regards the Soul as the Body 1'-This again is not right; there are actually some people who describe the Body, etc. as being transubstantiation of the Soul' (Spirit) : e.g. the Followers of the Upanişads (Vedantins). So that the denial in ques. tion may well be regarded as urged against these people.
Then again, it has been argued that the preposition nie' (in the term 'nirätmakam') must pertain to the term that follows after it: hence it behoves the other party to say what is it that is with Soul (which is denied by the negative Preposition)?"--This also is entirely irrelevant. What is denied by the negative Proposition cannot be a real positive entity, in fact it is only a conceptual entity that may be denied ; a real positive entity can never be denied. Thus then, what is denoted by the negative compound ("nirātmaka, without Soul) is that particular entity which the other party has conceived through illusion; as it is only with reference to such an entity that the said denial is made, in order to proclaim that the other party entertains
11

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& wrong notion-If it were otherwise, when, when you proceed to put forward denials of the Buddhist's assumption of momentariness expressed in such words as 'The Lamp and the rest are momentary', - you would be open to the same objection ; because we never find any case where the negative is used without * term following it.
Then again, it has been assertedl - Who is there who holds that the Soul subsiste in the Body"-This also is not right; as there are some people who regard the Soul to be of the size of the half of the Thumb' or via Shyamála grain'; and under their view, the Soul, being a corporeal material substance, must be subsisting in the Body; and it is only right that the denial in question should be made against these people.
It has been alleged that "there is no Corroborative Instance in support of the denial of the Body being related to the Soul ”. - This is not true; as it is easy to prove, as shown above, that there can be no relationship between the Body and the Soul.-because one does not render any help to the other,-as between the Vindhya and the Himalaya mountains.
It has also been alleged that-"The denial of the particular implies the acceptance of the general". - This generalisation is not true; e.g. even though you deny the momentariness of the Lamp and other particular things, you do not accept the momentariness of anything in general.-It might be argued that "We do admit the applicability of the term 'momentary' to the Lamp and such things, on the basis of their not continuing to exist for a long time; so that in this way, momentariness in general may be regarded as admitted "-If it is so, the applicability of the term 'Soul' also to the Mind associated with 'I-consciousness' is admitted by us; and this may be regarded as the Soul in general being admitted.
The assertion of the two alternative views regarding the term Soul denoting something transient, etc. etc.-is not relevant ; for the simple reason that no such view has been held; nothing, in faet, has been held (by us) as to be really denoted by the term Soul'. Nor has any such object been admitted by us as is distinct from Colour, etc.. Nor again is the denotation of the term "Soul' admitted in regard to any eternal thing, which would falsify the said premiss.-Nor lastly can the use of the term Soul' in reference to the Body, etc. be regarded as figurative' (indirect);
because such use is never found to fail, as explained above. Hence there is no Superfluity' in our reasoning.-(220)
TEXT (221).
THUS THE SOUL' BEING SOMETHING NOT-PROVED, THE ENTIRE FABRIC (OF CONCEPTIONS) THAT HAS BEEN ADOPTED IN REGARD TO IT, BECOMES BASELESS LIKE THI SON OF THE BARREN
WOMAN',-(221)
COMMENTARY.
Thus, any such thing as the 'Soul' being found to be precluded by all means of Right Cognition, and hence not proved', 'not admissible

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the entire fabric (of Conceptions)', such as its being the doer, the experiencer and the like that has been set up by you, turns out to be like the Son of the Barren Woman', -entirely baseless. Hence no criticism is made of all this fabric; as it becomes demolished by the demolition of its very basis (in the shape of the Soul).-In what manner our view is not open to the criticism that it involves the destruction of what has been done and the appearance of what has not been done [i.e, the contingency of the Person not experiencing the effects of his own deeds, Karma, and experiencing those of the deeds not done by him)-is going to be explained under the Chapter dealing with the connection between Action and its Effects' (i.e. Chapter 9).
End of the Deaminalion of the Nyāya Doctrine of the Self'.

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CHAPTER VII.
SECTION (B)
Examination of the Minīmsaka's Conception of the Sell".
COMMENTARY
The Author next proceeds to refute the Mimamsaka's Conception of the Soul :
TEXT (222).
OTHERS AGAIN HAVE DECLARED THE SOUL' TO BE OF THE NATURE
or Chaitanya. SENTIENCE, EXCLUSIVE AND INCLUSIVE IN CHARACTER ; -Tas Chaitanya (SENTIENCE) BEING THE
SAME AS Buddhi (INTELLIGENCE).- (222)
COMMENTARY.
Exclusive in character :- the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc. (wherein tlio Soul is perceived) are mutually exolusive; inclusive' in character, such character as 'Intelligence', 'Substance, and Being' are inclusive' or * comprehensive (inasmuch as they serve the purpose of comprehending' or including, not excluding); these two, "exclusion and inclusion form the character', -characteristic feature-of the Soul.-What is meant is that the followers of Jaimini declare the Soul' to be of the nature of *Sentience (Consciousness), and to be exclusive in the form of the states of Pleasure, Pain, etc., and 'inclusive or comprehensive in the form of
Being' and the rest. This Chaitanya, 'Sentience', is not anything different from Buddhi, Intelligence',-as held by the Sankhyas (according to whom Buddhi is Cosmic Intellect, & product of Primordial Matter, while Chaitanya belongs to the Spirit];-it is in fact Buddhi, 'Intelligence, itself. This is what is shown in the text-Sentience being the same as Intelligence; that is, it is only a form of Intelligence; the sense is that apart from Intelligence, no other form of 'Sentience' is recognised.-(222)
Question—"How is it possible for one and the same Soul to have the two mutually contradictory characters of being exclusive' and * inclusive "
The answer to this from the Sankhya point of view is as follows:

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TEXTS (223-225).
"JUST AS, IN THE CASE OF THE SERPENT, THE 'COILED TORM DISAPPEARS, AND AFTER THAT, APPEARS THE STRAIGHTENED FORM, BUT THE CHARAOTER OF BEING SERPENT' CONTINUES THROUGH BOTH STATES IN THE SAME MANNER, IN THE CASE OF THE SOUL, THERE IS NO COMPLETE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE CHARACTER OF ETERNAL SENTIENCE'; NOR IS THERE CONTINUANCE OF ITS WHOLE CHARACTER; THERE IS DISAPPEARANCE OF SUCH OF ITS STATES AS ' PLEASURE, PAIN AND THE LIKE, -AND THESE APPEAR AGAIN ; BUT THROUGH ALL THESE SENTIENCE CONTINUES.”—(223-225)
COMMENTARY.
In the case of the Serpent,-snake,-though it remains one and the same, the coiled form disappears and the straightened form appears, and yet the character of the Serpent' continues in both forms in the same manner, in the case of the Soul,-though it is of the naturo of eternal Intelligence, and one only, yet, there never is disappearance of its whole character, nor is there a continuance of its whole character, -as postulated by the Naiyyika in regard to their Soul'; what happens is that its states of Pleasure, etc. go on disappearing and appearing again, but the form of *Intelligence continues to permeate throngh all these states; hence there is no incompatibility between the exclusive and inclusive character.-Such is the sense of the Text as a whole.
The meaning of the words is as follows:- The compound word 'nilyo. chailanyasvabhänsya' is to be explained as 'that which has eternal Intelligence for its form' ;-whole character', i.e. of the entire form; continuity there is not'; such is the construction ;- and these appear again! -.e. the states of . Pleasure and the like.-(223-225)
Question-Why is the theory of Abrolite Exclusion not accepted, -as it is by the Bauldhas, who postulate absolute (traceless) Destruction of things,-or even the theory of Absolute Inclusion (all-comprehensiveness). as it is by the Naiyāyika and others!
The answer is as follows:

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TEXT (226).
"IF THERE WERE ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION OF THE SOUL, THERE WOULD BE DESTRUCTION OF WHAT IS DONE AND THE BEFALLING OF WILAT IS NOT DONE'; AND IF THE SOUL ALWAYS REMAINED OF THE SAME FORM, THEN THERE COULD BE NO EXPERIENCING
OF PLEASURE, PAIN AND THE REST."-(226)
COMMENTARY.
If there were absolute destruction (of the Soul). then there would be destruction (ineffectiveness) of the act done; as the doer would not be there to come into contact with the effect of the act; and there would be 'be. falling of what is not done: as the Soul experiencing the effect of the act done would be experienced by a Soul who did not do the act.-Further, if the Soul remained of one and the same form, there could be no experieucing of Pleasure, Pain, etc. for it, just as there is none for Akasha ; specially as there would be no difference between the state of experiencing' and the state of not-experiencing'. This has been thus asserted by Kumarila- Thus both the absolute conditions being impossiblo, the Spirit (Soul) should be held to be of the nature of both Exclusion and Inclusion, just like the Serpent in the coiled and other forms. (Shlokavārtika, Atmavāda, 28)."-(226)
Objection-If the Spirit (Soul) is of the nature of both states, the state that does the act would not be the same that experiences its effects; so that this doctrine also would involve the anomaly of the des. truction of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'.
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (227).
"THE SOUL'S CHARACTERS OF DOER' AND EXPERIENCER ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE STATE ; HENCE, AS IT IS THE SOUL ITSELY THAT REMAINS THE SAME THROUGH THE VARIOUS STATES, IT IS THE Doer OF THE AOT THAT ALWAYS OBTAINS
(EXPERIENCES) THE FROIT OF THAT Aor."-(227)
COMMENTARY.
The character of being the Doer-and that of being the Experiencer—are not dependent upon the state of the Soul; they are dependent upon the Soul itself; as it is the Soul itself, -not its condition or stato-which does the Act and experiences its effects. Hence, for this reason, inasmuch as the Soul to whom the states belong remains the same and does not abandon its previous form, it is the Door himself who secures the fruit of that Act.
So that this doctrine is not open to the snid objection.-(227)

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Question-What is the Proof (Means of Cognition) that establishes the existence of the Soul ?
The answer is supplied by the following Text:
TEXT (228) " THE SPIRIT (OR SOUL.) AS DESCRIBED IS PROVED BY THE PRESENCE OF RECOGNITION; AND THE DOCTRINE OF 'No-SOUL' IS DISPROVED
BY THIS SAME (RECOGNITION)."-(228)
COMMENTARY.
By the presence of Recognition,-involved in such notions as 'I cognised it', 'I am cognising it' and so forth, where there is recognition of the same "doer' (cogniser)—is proved the existence of the Soul.-By this same-Recognition-also is disproved the doctrine of No Soul', as pro. pounded by the Buddhist and others; as has been thus declared This from this fact Recognition which is admitted by all men, follows the refutation of the doctrine of No-Soul'-(Shlokavārtika, Ātmavāda, 136).-(228)
Question-How do these two conclusions follow from the fact of Recognition ?
The answer is as follows:
TEXTS (229-237).
** THE NOTION OF 'I' INVOLVED IN THE CONCEPTION I KNOW 'ENVISAGES
THE Cogniser ; THIS Cogniser MAY BE EITHER THE 'SOUL' OR THE ABSOLUTELY EVANESCENT COGNITION (IDEA). IF IT IS THE
SOUL' THAT IS THB OBJECTIVE OF THAT NOTION, THEN ALL IS SQUARE ; ON THE OTHER HAND, IF THE MOMENTARY COGNITION (IDEA) IS HELD TO BE SO, THEN ALL BECOMES INEXPLICABLY CONFOUNDED. FOR INSTANCE, THE NOTION THAT APPEARS IN THE FORM IT WAS I WHO COGNISED THIS THING ON A PREVIOUS OOCASION, AND IT IS I WHO AM COGNISING IT NOW', .-OF THIS NOTION, WHAT COGNITIVE MOMENT IS ASSUMED TO BE THE OBJECTIVE? WOULD SUCH A MOMENT 'BE (a) past, OR (6) present, OR (C) IN THE FORM OF A CONTINUED SERIES? IF IT BE THE FIRST (a), THE MOMENT COULD WELL BE THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NOTION 'I COGNISED IT (IN THE PAST); BUT IT COULD NOT BE TIE OBJEOTIVE OF THE NOTION I AM COGNISING IT (NOW)', BECAUSE THE COGNISER IS NOT COGNISING THE THING AT THE MOMENT OF SPEAKING; IT IS ONLY WHEN THE OBJECT IS PRESENT AT THE TIME (OF COGNITION) THAT IT CAN BE SPOKEN OF AS I AM COGNISING IT', BUT (IN REGARD TO SUCH A PRESENT OBJECT) IT WOULD NOT BE TRUE TO SAY
I COGNISED IT, BECAUSE THE OBJECT DID NOT EXIST IN THE PAST, -FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT BOTH OF THESE (PAST AND PRESENT)

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CANNOT FORM TRE OBJECTIVE OF THE SAID NOTION. NOR DID BOTH
COGNITIVE MOMENTS COGNISE THE THING IN THE PAST; NOR DO THEY BOTH COGNISE IT IN THE PRESENT.-(c) NOR CAN THE SERIES BE REGARDED AS THE COGNISED OBJECT, AS BOTH ARE IMPOSSIBLE THE SERIES' COULD NOT COONISE IT IN THE PAST ; AND AS IT IS NOT AN ENTITY, IT CANNOT COGNISE IN THE PRESENT.–FOR ALL THESE REASONS, IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THAT WHEREIN I-CONSCIOUSNESS SUBSISTS, WHICH MUST BE SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE SAID COGNITION, IS THE SOUL' OF THE ETERNAL FORM."-(229-237)
COMMENTARY. That the conception 'I know envisages the Corniser,-is beyond all dispute; le the verb 'I know 'connotes the notion of the person who does the cognising. Now in regard to this Cogniser, there are two theorios possible : (1) that it is the 'Soul', or (2) the absolutely evanescent Cognition (Idea) as postulated by you (Buddhists).-If the theory that it is the Soul he accepted then all becomes Square, as it accomplishes what is desired. If, on the other hand, the other view is accepted-that it is the Idea, then all becomes extremely inexplicable. Because, the conception appears in the form I cognised this in the past and I am cognising it in the present', and Tierein thore is a clear conception, the notion of 'I' being the Cogniser in both cases of this conception of 'I'. if the Cognitive Moment' be assumed to be the object, would this moment' be (a) past, or (b) present, or (a) both present and past, or (4) in the form of a continued series! Thero are these iour possible alternatives.--Now as regards (a), the past moment' being assumed as the object of the notion of 'I', the idea that I cognised' might be all right, as the thing had been cognised in the past; but the idea that I am cognising it now could not be true, because the past Cog. nitive Moment' does not cognise the thing at the present time,-as er hypothesi it has already disappeared. (b) If the second alternative is accepted that the present Cognitive Moment is the object of the notion of l', then the iden that I am cognising would be all right, as it is really the Cogniser at the present moment; but the idea that 'I knew it in the past would not bo true; -why ?-because it did not exist at the previous time. The word idam in the Text) stands for the present Cognition. Thus then, inasmuch as the conception operates both ways, it becomes established that the present and the past, both, Cognitive Moinents cammot form the object of the notion of 'I'; as both these Cognitive Moments' did not cognise the thing in the past, nor do they cognise it in the present, as matter of fact, one Moment' cognised it in the past, and another Moment" is cognising it in the present.
For the same reason the Series' also cannot form the object of the notion of 'I'; as both-the past and the present acts of cognitionare impos. sible. Because this series did not cognise the thing in the past, nor does it cognise it in the present, because being only conceptual, it is not a thing, an entity; and what is not an entity cannot be the Cogniser, as being a Cogniser is a property that can belong only to an entity.

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From all this it follows that, that thing wherein the notion of 'I' (I. consciousness) subsista,--and as shown above, it must be something distinct from the said Cognition,-is the Soul.—(229-237)
Question-How is it proved that the Soul is eternal ?" The answer is as follows:
TEXTS (238-239). " THE COGNISER' WHO FORMED THE OBJECT OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE PAST MUST BE REGARDED AS CONTINUING TO EXIST TO-DAY,BECAUSE HE IS TRE OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS :-LIKE THE COGNISER IN THE PRESENT.-OR, UE (THE PRESENT COGNISER) MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING BEEN THE COGNISER OF YESTERDAY,-BECAUSE HE IS THE COGNISER ; -OR BECAUSE OF THE SAME REASON (OF BEING THE OBJECT OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS'),-LIKE THE COGNISER OP YESTERDAY; AND ALL THESE FULFILL THE CONDI. TIONS OF THE PROBANDUM."
-(238-239)
COMMENTARY He who formed the object of 1-consciousness' in the past continues to exist to-day : just like the Cogniser in the present ;-and the Cognisor in the present is the object of I-consciousness':-this is the Reason based up the real state of things.
"Or, he'-i.e. the present Cogniser.- Because of the same reason -ie. because of being the object of 'I.consciousness
This argument has been formulated in reference to the Cogniser as the Subject. The Author next proceeds to set forth another argument on the basis of the present I notions is appertaining to the Probandum-All these,etc.* all these '-I-notions, of the past and of the present-fulfil the conditions of the Probundur,-i.e. come to appertain to the Probandum.-- (238.239)
The following Tect proceeds to show how this is so :
TEXT (240).
"ALL (I-NOTIONS) OF YESTERDAY AND OF TO-DAY MUST HAVE THE SAME OBJECT,- BECAUSE THEY ARE I-NOTIONS BELONGING TO THE COGNISER CONNECTED WITH ONE AND THE SAME
CHAIN -LIKE ANY SINGLE COGNITION."-(240)
COMMENTARY *AU I notions of yesterday and of to-day',-luis states the Subject in regard to which the Probandum is to be predicated must have the same object
-

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIL
this states the Probandum;--the meaning is that they should have one and the same object. -The Probabs is stated thus :-Being such I notions as belong to a Coqniser who is connected with one and the setme Chain, such as that of a single person like Dēradatta. The mere character of being 1-notion is present in the I-xolions of other persons also; hence if the Probans had been stated in that form, it would be Inconclusive'; hence in order to avoid that contingency, the Probans has been stated as qualified by the qualification of
pertaining to a Cognisor connected with one and the same Chain! Like any single Cognition ',--this is the Corroborative Instance; it means like any single intended Cognition among these same I-notions', -(240)
With the next Text, the Author proceeds with the Answer to the abovestated doctrine of the Miman saka :
TEXT (241).
IN THIS CONNECTION, THE FOLLOWING POINTS ARE TO BE CONSIDERED - Ir Intelligence IS HELD TO BE eternal and one, TEEN, COGNITION ALSO SHOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS OF THE SAME
CHARACTER.-(241)
COMMENTARY. If Intelligence is held to be eternal and one, then Cognition also-which has no form other than that of Intelligence, should have to be regarded as eternal and one. This however cannot be desirable for you; as it would be contrary to your doctrine. For instance, the author of your Bhasya (Shabara) has declared [under Súlra 1. 1. 5, page 9, line 17. Bib. Indica Edition) that 'Cognition, being momentary, cannot be present at the time of another Cognition! Jaimini also has asserted (under Sü. 1. 1. 5) that Perception is that Cogni. tion of nan which is produced on the contact of an existing thing'; and if Cognition were eternal, there could be no production' of it.
It would also involve self-contradition on the part of Kumarila himself: He has declared for instance that 'It does not remain for a single moment, nor does it even appear in the form of wrong cognition whereby it could operate later on towards the apprehending of its object, like the Sense-organs and the like ' Shlokavīrika, Pratyakşa-Sutra, 55).
Further, if Cognition were held to be only one, this would be contrary to the doctrine of Six Means and Forms of Cognition'.-It would also be contrary to Perception also, as Cognitions are clearly perceived to be liable to appearance and disappearance in the course of the thinking of things with constant imposition of variations.--(241)
Not perceiving all these incongruities and self-contradiction, Kumarila declares as follows:

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TEXT (242).
" COGNITIONS, AND THE SOUL ALSO, ARE HELD TO BE eternal and one, ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING OF THE NATURE OF INTELLIGENCE'; IF THERE IS DIVERSITY, IT IS DUE TO THE OBJECT." -(242) (This is a quotation from Shloisavārtika, Chapter
on Eternality of Somd, 401].
COMMENTARY.
Cognitions and the Soul also are regarded as eternal and one ;-whybecause they are of the nature of Intelligence ; that is, because, under our view Spirit is of the nature of Intelligence in the form of Cognitions.
Question-How then is it that such diversity in Cognitions) is recog. nised as Colour-Cognition', Taste-Cognition and so forth ?
Answer—" If there is diversity, it is due to the object; the term "it' has been used as admitting (for the sake of argument) the opinion of the other party; the sense being-'If-in case-diversity be assumed"-(242)
Objection (to Kumārila's position)-If Cognition is eternal and one, then, how is it that it appreliends Colour and other things consecutively? It should apprehend all at once, there being no distinction to which the successiveness would be due).
The answer to this (from Kumärila's point of view) is given in the following Text:
TEXT (243).
* THOUGH, BY ITS VERY NATURE, FIRE IS ALWAYS OF THE NATURE OF A burner, IT BURNS ONLY WHAT IS PRESENTED TO IT, AND THAT ALSO ONLY A THING THAT IS CAPABLE OF BEING BUBNT, -NOT ANY OTHER THING, NOR AT ANY OTHER
TIME."—(243)
COMMENTARY
Fire is eternally of the nature of a Burner, and yet it does not burn all things at all times. It burns only what is brought to it and then also, it burns only a thing that is capable of being burnt, -and not the Sky or any such thing. --(243)
In the following Text, he cites another example:

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
TEXTS (214-945).
** OR, THE CLEAN MIRROR, OR THE ROCK-CRYSTAL, REFLECTS THE IMAGE OF ONLY WHAT IS PLACED BEFORE IT IN THE SAME MANNER, SOULS, THOUGH POSSESSED OF ETERNAL SENTIENCE, APPREHEND COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS ONLY WHEN THEY ARE THEMSELVES IN THE BODY AND THE THINGS ARE PRESENTED TO THEM BY THE ORGANS. AND IT IS THIS SENTIENCE THAT WE CALL
INTELLIGENCE'."
(244-245)
COMMENTARY.
The epithet clean' has been added because the dirty mirror is not capable of reflecting images.—' Placed before it', -carried to it.-In the same manner; this introduces what has to be illustrated. Though, in reality, the Souls are all-pervading, yet, it is only when, under the influence of the Unseen Force (of destiny), they subsist in the Body, that they apprehend things that are presented to them by the Eye and other organs.--not while they are away from the Body.-Tliis eternal Sentience is what we call Buddhi' (Intelligence), and it is not different from it, like the Buddhi' (Cosmic Intellect) of the Sarikhyas.-244-245)
Question-If that is so, how is it that this Cognition is known as evanescent ?
In answer to this, the next Text proceeds to show the reason, already indicated before, why Cognition is regarded as evanescent, and thereby explains that evanescence:
TEXT (246)
“IT IS ON ACCOUNT OF THE EVANESCENT CHARACTER OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE PRESENTING ORGANS THAT THE COGNITION IS EVANESCENT; JUST AS, EVEN THOUGH FIRE IS ALWAYS A BURNER, IT BURNS ONLY WHEN THE COMBUSTIBLE
THING IS CLOSE TO IT."-(246)
COMMENTARY.
Presenting orjans', -the Eye and other organs which present to the Soul the Colour and other things the functioning -operation-of those organs is evanescent-fleeting :--and on this account, the resultant Cognition is recognised us evanescent; by itsell, it is not ovenescent, fleeting.--" If, by itself the Cognition is not evanescent, then the objection remains that

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it should apprehend all things": -The answer to this is that even though Fire is always a burner, etc. Similarly, the Cognition does not always apprehond all things; for the simple reason that all things are not always in close proximity (to the organs, etc.)-(246)
How do you know that Oognition is eternal ?
Question Answer:
TEXT (247)
"COGNITION IS ALWAYS RECOGNISED AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF
INTELLIGENCE'; AS REGARDS THE COGNITIONS OF THE JAR, THE ELEPHANT AND SO FORTH, THEIR DIVERSITY IS HELD BY PEOPLE TO BE DUE TO THE DIVER
SITY AMONG THOSE THINGS."-(247)
COMMENTARY
The term 'tatra' is a meaningless termo izsed as introducing the sentence * Being of the nature of Intelligence' ;-because it is always recognised as Cognition, it is eterna), like the Word-Sound.
"If that bo so, then how is it that in common parlance, we find such distinction among Cognitions accepted by observers as this is the Cogni. tion of the Jar', that is the Cognition of the Cloth and so forth?"
Answerda regards the Cognitions of the Jar, etc. etc. due to the diversity among those things',-.e. the diversity among the Jar, the Elephant and the rest.-(247)
The same idea is further clarified by the following Teat
TEXT (248)
"PEOPLE WHO FOLLOW UP THE DIVERSITY AMONG THE OBJECTS COGNISED
DO NOT SPEAK OF THE COGNITION as 'THAT SAME COGNITION'; NOR IS THERE NON-RECOGNITION OF IT ASCOGNITION , 50 LONG AS NOTICE IS NOT TAKEN OF THE DIVERSITY
AMONG THE OBJECTS.” -(248)
COMMENTARY
People who follow up, etc. ; i.e. the Cognisers.-What this Text shows, by means of affirmative and negative premisses, is that the diversity in Cog. nitions is due only to diversity among the objects cognised.-Nor is there non-recognition, etc. ; that is, there is recognition.—(245)
The following Text proceeds to answer the above arguments :

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
TEXT (249)
IT SUCH IS THE CASE, THEN, ON THE OCCASION WHEN THERE APPEAR COGNITIONS IMPOSING THE CONCEPTS OF ELEPHANT ' AND THE REST IN REFERINCE TO SPOTS WHERE THESE ANIMALS DO NOT EXIST, --TO WHAT IS THE DIVERSITY
IN SUCH COGNITIONS DUE ?
COMMENTARY.
If the diversity of the Cognition is due to the diversity in the objects cognised, -then, what is the basis for the diversity that appears in the case of those Cognitions which successively impose the concepts of the elephant
horse' and the rest upon a place where the elephants do not really exist ? The meaning is that in such cases there is no basis at all for the notion of such diversity, Because, there is no difference in the Cognitions per se; as all Cognition is beld to be one (by the Mimūnsaka). Nor can the diversity be due to the multiplicity of the objects imposed; as there is no object that does the imposing.-(240)
The following might be urged:-"The idea that a Cognition may be devoid of a real object is not true; as has been declared by Kumarila
It is not admitted that even in the case of Dreams and other such Cognitions, # real external object is entirely absent ; in every case there is an external background, only conceived of in connection with a wrong place and timo'. [Shlokavārtika, Nirālambanavāda, 107-108].""
This is the view presented in the following Text :
TEXT (250).
IF THE INDIVIDUAL OBJECTS EXISTING AT OTHER TIMES AND PLACES BE
HELD TO SUPPLY THE BASIS FOR SUCH IMPOSED COGNITIONS, ON THE GROUND THAT IN ALL COGNITIONS THE BASIS OF REALITY IS SUPPLIED BY OBJECTS EXISTING AT TIMES AND PLACES OTHER THAN THOSE OF THE APPEARANCH OF THE COGNITIONS TIEMSELVES,--[then the answer would be as stated in the
following Text).-(250)
COMMENTARY, * Basis, i.e. the cause of the notion of diversity among Cognitions. The compound deshakālānyathātmakam' is to be analysed as that of which the time and place are otherwise'; -or as that of which the differentiation is done by time and place',-(250)
The answer to this is given in the following Text:

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TEXT (251).
BUT AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITIONS IN QUESTION HAVI NO SUCH CONNECTION WITH THAT PARTICULAR PLACE; WHY THEN SHOULD
THEY APPEAR IN THAT TORM AT THAT PLACE ?-(251)
COMMENTARY
When at a certain place, a number of individual objects actually appear as 'imposed upon Cognitions in a certain order of sequence,-there is no connection between the Cognition and those individual objects existing at other times and places, in the same order of sequence. Under the circuirstances, how is it that they appear in the form that is imposed upon them arbitrarily ? Certainly it cannot be right for one thing to appear in the form of another thing; if it were, then this would lead to incongruities; and in this way all Cognitions would come to have all tlings for their objects; and there would be an end to all ordered usage regarding things.—(251)
TEXT (252).
THEN AGAIN, UNDER YOUR VIEW, THE EXTERNAL FORM IS NOT DECLARED TO BELONG TO THE COGNITION; NOR ARE THE ELEPHANT, POLE AND OTHER THINGS ACTUALLY EXISTENT AT THE PLACE
DESIRED.—(252)
COMMENTARY
Then again, under your-Mimānsala's-view, the form that appears (in Cognition) does not belong to the Oognition ; as you assert that the Cognition is formless." What if it is so ?"-At the place desired etc. ; i.e. at the place where the imposition is made the Cognitions should appear as connected with that same time and place wherewith the said objectsElephant and the rest-are connected ;-how is it then that they appear at a time and place which are not connected with themselves and which are yet different from those with which the objects are connected ?-From this it follows that these Oognitions have no real basis, and they are, in reality, unmixed in character and mobile ; that they are so is due to the fact of their appearing only occasionally ;--and it also becomes established that the Soul, which is of the nature of the said Cognition, must also be evanescent and many.
The following might be urged :-"Cognition is a property of the Soul; hence the diversity of the Cognition need not imply diversity of the Soul, the latter being only an object having that property."
This cannot be right; Pratyaya' (Cognition), 'Chaitanya' (Sentience), Buddhi' (Intelligence), Iñana' (Knowledge) are all synonymous terins: nor does a mere difference in names make any difference in the nature of things. Further, even with a difference in their names, all these are actually

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Recepted by you) as being of the nature of Sentience (Chaitanya); and as this Sentience is one and the same, there can be no distinction among the Cognitions that are of the same nature. If it were not so, then, on account of the attribution of contrary properties to them, the two (Sentience and Cognition) would become entirely different from one another,
This same argument in proof of Cognitions having no real basis serves Also to prove the imperceptibility of Cognitions. For instance, it has been proved that the form appearing in the Cognition cannot be the external Elephant, etc.; so that it becomes established that the Cognitions apprehending that form as their own are of themselves, because they are self-luminous in their character.-(252)
It has been argued (under Text 243 above) that Though Isy its very nature, the Fire is always of the nature of a burnor, etc, etc." -This argument is refuted in the following Text :
TEXT (253)
IT COGNITION REMAINS FOR EVER IN THE FORM OF THE APPREHENSION OF ALL THINGS,THEN HOW IS IT THAT THE COGNITION OF ALL
THINGS IS NOT PRESENT AT ALL TIMES!-(253)
COMMENTARY.
If Cognition, which is of the nature of Apprehension, exists for ever, then all things should be cognised at all times.—(253)
The following Text proceeds to show how this is so
TEXT (254).
That COGNITION ON WHICH Sound HAS BEEN IMPOSED MUST BE THE SAME THAT APPREHENDS TASTE, COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS. IT THIS IS NOT ADMITTED BY YOU, THEN YOU HAVE, BY YOUR OWN WORDS, ADMITTED THAT THERE IS
DIFFERENCE AMONG COGNITIONS.- (254)
COMMENTARY
Thal Cognition on which Sound has been imposed.-L.e. the Cognition of Sound, -is the same that apprehende Taste, Colour and other things, and it cannot be different; so that at the time of the apprehension of one thing, there should be apprehension of all things, -as the Cognition apprehending all these would be there always. This has been thus declared Many things being apprehended by a single Oognition, all these would be apprehended once for all, without any distinction : nor could it appear in any order of sequence, as no distinction is possible.

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If this is not admitted ; if you do not admit that the Cognition of Sound is the same that apprehends Taste and other things, then you would be admitting that there is diversity among Cognitions.-(254)
The following Text is going to show that the instance of Fire that has been cited (in Text 243) is itself 'unproven' (not admitted by all parties): -
TEXT (255).
EVEN FIRE IS NOT ALWAYS A BURNER OF ALL COMBUSTIBLE THINGS; OTHERWISE THE WHOLE (WORLD) WOULD BE INSTANTLY REDUCED
TO ASHES.—(255)
COMMENTARY. The Fire, in the form of the burner of all combustible things, is not always existent; if it were, then all combustible things would be reduced to ashes, -becanse they would always have their burner in contact with them,like that combustible thing which is in actual contact with the fire-flame.
Even', 'api', is meant to indicate that it is not only Cognition that cannot be of the nature of the apprehension of all things.-(255)
Objection- If that is so, then Fire is not always of the nature of the Burner (possessed of the power to burn); how then could it burn even the thing that is presented to it!"
The answer is provided in the following Text :
TEXT (256).
IN FACT, IT IS ONLY WHEN IT IS IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE COMBUSTIBLE THING THAT FIRE CAN BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS THE burner; THUS IT IS WHY THERE DOES NOT HAPPEN THE CON TINGENCY OF ALL THINGS BEING BURNT ALL
AT ONCE.—(256)
COMMENTARY.
Thus it is it is because of our acceptance of the view just expressedthat there is no simultaneous burning of all things i.e. there is no likelihood of any such absurd contingency.-(256)
It has been argued (under Text 244, above) that" Just as the clean Mirror or Rock-crystal, etc. etc."-It is shown in the following Text that what has been alleged there would not be possible if the Mirror, etc. were eternal and always of the same form:
12

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TEXTS (257-258).
ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE MIRROR, THE ROCK-CRYSTAL AND THE LIKE ARE THEMSELVES IN PERPETUAL FLUX; AND WHEN THEY BECOME CONNECTED WITH THE BLCE LOTUS AND SUOR OBJECTS, — THEY BECOME CAUSES OF BRINGING ABOUT THE ILLUSION REGARDING THEIR REFLECTIONS. IF THAT WERE NOT SO, EVERYONE OF THOSE THINGS WOULD BE ALWAYS ONE AND THE SAME,WHEN IN CONTACT WITH THE SAID OBJECTS, AS WELL AS WEEN not IX CONTACT WITH THEM; AND AS SUCH IT SHOULD BE SEEN EITHER AS ALWAYS WITH ITS REFLECTION OR ALWAYS WITHOUT ITS REFLECTION.
(257-258)
COMMENTARY.
The Rock-crystal, the Mirror and the like are things that are in a state of perpetual Aux,-undergoing destruction every mornent; and when they come into contact with the Blue Lotus and such things, they become masters in the producing of illusions (regarding the reflections of these things, which have no real existence, and whose Cognition, therefore, must be illusory, wrong).
Is that were not 80,- i.e. if it could reflect the image without being momentary,—then it would have to be admitted that the Mirror in contact with the object is the same as that not in contact with it; so that, even in the absence of the Blue and other reflected things, the reflection of these would be porceptible, as the reflector will not have abandoned its previous character (when in contact with the object);or, conversely, even when in contact with the object, it would be seen without the said reflections; as its form would not be different from its previous state (when not in contact with the object).
This argument serves to set aside the possibility of all reflections in general in any such reflecting substances as the Mirror and the like, under the view that things are not-momentary.- (257-258)
The Author now proceeds to refute the possibility of the perception of all Reflections, -under both theories that things are momentary and that things are not-momentary -

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TEXT (259).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE MIRROR-SURFACE CAN NEVER CONTAIN THE
REFLECTION (OF ANYTHING), —BECAUSE IT IS LASTING, BECAUSE IT IS INDIVISIBLE, AND BECAUSE SEVERAL THINGS WITH
MATERIAL SHAPE CANNOT SUBSIST TOGETHER.- (259)
COMMENTARY
Because it is lasting, i.e. not momentary, therefore the Mirror surface cannot contain the reflection.
Even if it is momentary, it cannot contain the reflection because it is indivisible; when the reflection is perceived it is perceived as if it were inside the mirror, just as the Water is perceived inside the well ; and yet the Mirrorsarface las no parisi... vacant space ;-because its component particles are closely packed. Hence the perception of the Reflection must be an illusion.
Or the term nirvibhāgatra, indivisibility', may stand for absence of difference between the previous and succeeding states; and the reason for this absence is because it is lasting'; so that the meaning comes to be because on account of its lasting character it is devoid of difference between its previous and succeeding states'; that is, because it has no previous or euc. ceeding states.
Further, because several things with material shape cannot subsist together, * the Mirror-surface cannot contain the reflection', this has to be construed here. Because what are perceived in the Mirror-surface are only reflections occupying the same space; material things with forms can never occupy the same points in space; as if they did, they would become one and the same.
This objection is applicable under both views—of things being momentary or non-momentary.-(259)
The Rock-crystal also does not become transformed into the reflected image of the object placed by it; this is what is shown in the following Text :
TEXT (260).
PERSONS STANDING ON THE TWO SIDES OF IT PERCEIVE ONLY THE PURELY WHITE ROCK-CRYSTAL; HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THIS ALSO DOES NOT
BEOOME TRANSFORMED INTO THE REFLECTION (260)
COMMENTARY.
For instance, the man standing in front of the Rock-crystal placed in contact with the Hibiscus Flower, perceives it as red; while persons who may be standing on two sides of it would perceive it as purely white,-not even as partly red and partly white.-Now if the Rock-crystal had become transformed into the reflection (of the Flower), then, just like the man standing

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in front, the persons standing on the two sides of it also would perceive it as red.
This objection is applicable under both views of things being momentary and not-momentary.-(260)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out the objection that would be applicable only under the view that things are not-momentary
TEXT (261).
TH OPPONENT'S THEORY WOULD ALSO ENTAIL THE INCONGRUITY OF THE ROCK-CRYSTAL BECOMING DIFFERENT WITH EACH OBJEOT PLACED BEFORE IT, IF THERE WERE A REAL TRANSFORMATION OF
IT INTO THB REFLECTION.—(261)
COMMENTARY.
If the Rock-crystal and such things were really transformed into the reflection of the object placed before them, then,-just as the reflections of the various things placed before the reflector appearing one after the other, are different in character, and hence there is no identity among them,in the same manner, in the Soul, and in the Rock-crystal and such things also, there would be differences due to the character of each thing presented to it (and reflected therein).-If the perception of the Reflection, however, be admitted to be an illusion, then there can be no objection to it,--this is what is meant by the epithet 'real':-(261)
TEXT (262)—(First line).
FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE SAID PERCEPTION OF THE REFLECTION IS AN ILLUSION,- APPBARING IN CONNEOTION WITH THINGS POS.
SESSED OF DIVERSE UNTHINKABLE POTENCIES.(262)
COMMENTARY.
Inasmuch as, under both theories, it is not possible for the Reflector to becomo transformed into the Reflection,-it becomes established that it is an Illusion.
Question - If that is so, then such Illusion appears only in connection with things like the Rook-crystal, and not with things like the Wall."
The answer is supplied by the words-In connection with things possessed of diverse unthin leable potencies. -Diverse, -of various kinds and unthinkable', -are the potencies of things; no objection can be raised against the particular potentialities of things, -as these potentialities are the effects of the series of causes that have brought about each thing. In fact, you also can have no dispute against this much; as you have yourself said
Who can take objection to the fact that it is Fire, not Akasha, that burns ?'.-(262)

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*If that is so, then in the case of Cognition also, the idea of its being transformed into the reflection of its object may be mere Illusion; so that there is no transformation into the reflected form."
The answer to this is provided in the following Text:
TEXT (262)—(Second line).
IN THE CASE OF COGNITION, THERE CANNOT BE EVEN ILLUSION; AS
THERE IS ABSENCE OF DIFFERENCE.—(262)
COMMENTARY.
It is not right that there should be Illusion in the case of Cognition. What is implied by the term 'even' is that it is not only transformation into Reflection that is not right ;-why-as there is absence of difference ; i.e. because there is no difference. In the case of the Rock Crystal and other things, it is right that there should be Illusion, as it is possible for the illusory cognition to be different from those things; in the case of Oognition, however, there cannot be another Cognition in the form of an Ilusion; as all Cognition is held by the Minänsaka) to be one. Nor can it be said that the Cognition itself appears in the form of an Illusion; as Cognition has been held to be eternal (which Illusion can never be).-(202)
It has been argued above (under Text 247). for the purpose of proving the one-ness and eternality of Cognition that'Cognition is aluxys recognised as being of the nature of Intelligence, etc. etc.
This is answered in the following Text:
TEXT (263).
THE CHARACTER Or being different from non-cognition is ONE TEAT IS
COMMON TO ALL COGNITIONS ; AND TIN SAID RECOGNTTION COULD PROOEED ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPOSITION OF THAT COMMON CHARACTER, -EVEN UNDER THE VIEW OF COGNITIONS
BEING MANY AND DIVERSE.-(263)
COMMENTARY. The Recognition that has been put forward is Inconclusive: because the said fact of Recognition can be explained, in regard to all Cognitions, as being due to the imposition of the character of being different from sout is not cognition;i.e. such things as the Jar and the like ;-and this would not be incompatible even with the viow of Cognitions being many and diverse. - The following has to be definitely understood: It is only when Cognitions are many, -and not when they are not many,—that the said Recognition can be explained as being brought about by the exclusion of all that is not homo. geneous to it'. For instance, in the case of such superimposed (assumed) Oognitions as have no real background, even when a diversity among the

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objects is not admitted, there is no Recognition; e.g. there is no such recog. nition as that this Cognition of the Horse and the Chariot is the same as what was the Dognition of the Elephant';-and it has been already proved that all these Cognitions are without any real background; hence we are not neserting that here again. Thas tho assertion that there is no nonrecognition of it as Cognition so long as notice is not taken of the diversity among the objects" (Tect 248, above)—should be regarded as unproven (untrue).-(263)
Then again, if the Soul is held by you to be enternally of one and the Bame form, then such diverse states as 'Happiness and the like are not possible. If you do admit these diverse states, then the Soul cannot be eternally of one and the same form. As one and the same thing cannot have such contradictory characters as diversity and non-diversity.
This Objection las been songht to be answered by Kumarila ; and what has been said by him is now introduced in the following Text,-for the purpose of refuting it (below, under Text 268 ef. seq.) -
TEXTS (264-265).
*TRE PERMANENT SOUL HAVING BEEN ABSOLUTELY ESTABLISHED AS DAVOID OF DIVERSITY DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF STATES, WHAT PEOPLE ASSUME TO BE THE STATES OF HAPPINESS AND UNHAPPINESS AND THE REST, EVEN WHEN UNDERGOING ALL THESE STATES, MY PERSON (SOUL) DOES NOT RENOUNCE HIS CHARACTER OF being sentient, being a substance, being an entity and so
forth." [Shokavārtika, page 695)—(265)
COMMENTARY. Undergoing '--passing through - Person-Soul. The term and &o forth' includes such generic characters as being lenouable, being rightly cognisable, being the active agent, and the like.—(265)
The following Text proceeds to show that there is no disappearance of the specific properties :
TEXT (266)
"EVEN ON THE APPEARANCE OF A NEW STATE, THE PRECEDING STATE
IS NOT ENTIRELY DESTROYED ; IT BECOMES MERGED INTO THE COMMON CHARACTER, IN ORDER TO HELP THE APPEARANCE
OF THE NEXT STATE." (Shlokavārtika, page 596]-(266)
COMMENTARY.
Preceding state -of happiness.
“If that is so, then why is not Unhappiness also not ielt during the state of Happiness!"

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The answer is-It becomes merged, etc. etc.-While the state of Happiness remains in its own form, the other state, of Unhappiness', does not appear; it remains merged in the common character, which permeates through all states, such as being sentient, being substance and so on; and thereby renders possible the appearance of the succeeding state of 'Unhappiness'; it is for this purpose that it becomes merged in the common character.-(266)
Objection-If that be so, then the mergence of the states into the common character also should be as unreasonable as in the other states; as that also involves an incongruity,
In regard to this objection, the explanation is as follows:
TEXT (267).
“TER STATES, IN THEIR OWN TORMS, ABD MUTUALLY INCOMPATIBLE ;
AS FOR THE COMMON CHARACTER, HOWEVER, IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH ANY STATE, AND IT IS ACTUALLY
RECOGNISED, IN ITS COMMON FORM, IN ALL
STATES." Shlokavārtika, page 696—(267)
COMMENTARY
The States of Happiness and the rest are incompatible among them. selves; hence it is not reasonable that they should become merged into each other ;-on the other hand, if any one State became merged into the common character, where would there be any incongruity, which would go against the acceptance of its mergence therein ? As a matter of fact, the said common character is actually seen to be compatibly permeating through all the States; as is clear from the fact that 'Sentience and the other common characters are found to be present in all the States.-(267)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments of the Mimamsaka
TEXT (268),
IF THE STATES ARE NOT ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE SOUL, THEN THHRE SHOULD BE DESTRUCTION AND ORIGINATION OF THE SOUL ALSO, FOLLOWING UPON THE DESTRUCTION
AND ORIGINATION OF THE STATES.-(268)
COMMENTARY,
If the States are not held to be entirely different from the Soul, then, on the destruction and origination of the States, there should be destruction and origination of the Soul also. The term 'entirely' is meant to show that, if there were even the slightest degree of non-difference, the said 'des

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truction and origination would be irrepressible. The argument is to be formulated as follows:-When one thing is non-different from another, its destruction and origination must follow on the destruction and origination of the latter, just like the specific forms of those same States of Happiness and the rest, and the Soul has been lield to be non-different in nature from the States of Happiness and the rest; hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.-(268)
The following Text shows that the Reason just put forward is not * Inconclusive
TEXT (269).
IF THERE BE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES, THEN THERE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTE DIFFERENCE; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF YOUR SOULS WHICH ARE ABSOLUTELY DIFFERENT FROM EACH OTHER, THROUGH THE DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER
BELONGING TO EACH OF THEM,—(269)
COMMENTARY.
If it bo lield that destruction and origination pertain to the States only, not to the Soul.-30 that the two (the States and the Soul) have two contradictory properties-of origination' and 'non-origination, then there must be difference between them : just as in the case of Souls, which are many,each has its own character restricted to himself, -and hence they are regarded as distinct from each other; that is, this much alone serves as the basis of difference.
The qualification distinctive character belonging to each' has been added for the purpose of avoiding the fallacy of the absence of the Probandum in the Probans, due to the fact that in the case of the Souls also, there is no difference in their own pristine forms. As a matter of fact, the form belong. ing to each of the individual Souls is entirely different from each other; if that were not so, as there would be no restriotion regarding the apprehensions and remembrances of different persons, there would be confusion in all matters.
The argument may be formulated as follows:-When one thing is not subject to the same vicissitudes as another, there cannot be non-difference between them;-.g. among Souls, each having its own distinctive form restricted to itself, they are not subject to the same vicissitudes,-the States of Happiness and the rest also are not all subject to the same vicissitudes;
-hence, inasmuch as the wider condition is not found in them (they oannot be non different).-(269)
It has been asserted that "on the appearance of another State, the preceding State is not entirely destroyed ";--the following Text supplies the answer to this:

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TEXT (270).
IF YOUR STATES BECOME MERGED INTO THE SOUL IN THEIR OWN FORM, THEN, ON THE APPEARANCE OF HAPPINESS, UNHAPPI
NESS ALSO SHOULD BE TELT. (270)
COMMENTARY. When the States become merged in the Common Soul, they could be so merged either in their own form or in some other form; if it is the former that is meant, then on the appearance of Happiness,-i.e. when there is feeling of the State of Happiness,—Unhappiness also should be felt; us this latter also is possessed of the common character of 'feeling -(270)
If they become merged in some other form, then there would be the following difficulty:
TEXT (271)
AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THERE IS TRANSFERENCE OF ONE FORM TO
SOMETHING, THERE CAN BE NO TRANSFERENCE OF ANOTHER FORM. SO THAT IF THE STATES BECAME TRANSFERRED (MERGED INTO THE SOUL) IN THEIR OWN FORM, THEN THE SOUL ALSO WOULD BE SOMETHING LIABLE
TO ORIGINATION.-(271)
OORIMENTARY Further, the transference (inergence) of Happiness and other States into the Soul could be possible only in their owu forms; and in that case, like Unhappiness and the other States, the Soul also, being non-different from them, would be something liable to originalion.-capable of being pro. duced.-(271)
It has been asserted (under Text 227) that "the Soul's characters of Doer and Experiencer are not dependent upon the State. The answer to this is provided in the following:
TEXT (272).
IT THE CHARACTERS OF Doer AND Experiencer ARE NOT DEPENDENT UPON THE STATE, THEN THE SAID CHARACTERS CANNOT BELONG TO THE SOUL-AS THEY CAN BELONG TO ONLY ONE WHO
HAS THAT STATE.-(272)
COMMENTARY.
If the character of Doer', etc. rested in the Souls themselves,-then these could never belong to the Soul, which never abandons its previous char

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acter. This argument may be formulated thius:-One who has not abandoned his previous States of non-doer and non-experiencer can never do or ecperience, e.g. the Akasha -and the Soul never abandons its State of nondoor and non-experiencer; hence we find (in the assertion concerned) conditions contrary to the more extensive character.-(272)
The revered Dinnaga having declared that if the fact of the Soul being Inodified on the appearance of Cognition meant the non-eternity of that Soul, then, there can be no Cogniser in the shape of the Sou not modified';in answer to this declaration, Kumarila has argued as follows:-“ We are not denying the fact of the Soul being expressed (spoken of) by the term
non-eternal'; but if the term meant mere modification, then that alone would not imply the destruction of the Soul."-(Shlokavirtika. Ātmavida, 22).
Against this the Author states the following objection, which also serves to sum up his own conclusion :
TEXT (273) FOR THESE REASONS, WE ARE NOT DENYING THE FACT OF THE SOUL BEING SPOKEN OF BY THE TERM - ETERNAL', BUT ON ACCOUNT OF ITS FORM BEING SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION, THERE
MUST BE DESTRUCTION OF IT. -(273)
COMMENTARY.
For these reasons, we are not denying the fact of the Soul being spoken of as 'eternal', on the ground that Sentience, which is in a State of perpetnai flux, continues undestroyed, along with its Cause, as long as the world lasts. But its form-nature-being subject to modification, as there is always the abandoning of the preceding and the appearance of the succeeding form,its liability to destruction is clearly indicated.-(273)
As regards the instance of the Serpent, etc. that has been cited above (under Text 223),—the following Text proceeds to show that all these things are not found to be eternal and of one and the same form :
TEXT (274).
THE SERPENT ALSO IS LIABLE TO BECOME OROOKED AND SO FORTH, BECAUSE IT IS SUBJECT TO PERPETUAL FLUX; IF IT HAD A PERMANENT FORM, THEN, LIKE THE SOUL, IT COULD
NEVER COME BY ANOTHER STATE,-(274)
COMMENTARY
Just as in the case of the Soul.-because of its being always of one lasting character, there is no possibility of another State,--so in the case of the

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Serpent also. If it were subject to destruction (modification) every moment, then alone could it have another State; as the appearance of another State is always in the form of the appearance of another character':-(274)
It has been argued (under Tect 229) that The conception of 1 in the notion I lonow apprehends the Cogniser" ;-the following Text proceeds to show that this is unproven' (not admitted by all parties) :
TEXT (275).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE' NOTION OF I' COMES ABOUT WITHOUT A REAL BASIS, THROUGH THE FORCE OF THE BEGINNINGLESS SEED OF THE VISION OF BEING, AND THAT ALSO ONLY
IN SOME PLACES.—(275)
COMMENTARY
The said I notion has no real background, by virtue of which the Cogniser' could form its object.
"It that is so, then what is the cause of its origin ?
The answer is that-Il proceeds from Une beginningless, elc. etc. Vision of Being' is the vision of the existing body :-the seed' of this vision is the Potency of Dispositions; and this seed' is beginningless ;-and it is through the force of this that 'l-consciousness' is brought about and that also only in some places,-i.e. only in the internal economy of the Sextuple Body.-(275)
Question.— "Why does not the * I-notion' come about everywhere ?" The Answer is supplied in the following: -
TEXT (276).
IT IS ONLY SOME (NOT ALL) IMPRESSIONS THAT SECURE THE REQUISITE POTENOY FOR BRINGING ABOUT THE SAID NOTION APPREHENDING THAT PARTICULAR FORM; HENCE IT DOES NOT APPEAR
EVERYWHERE.—(276)
COMMENTARY
The said notion, etc.,-i.e. the 'I-notion, apprehending the form of the Oogmiser, as existing through the preceding and succeeding points of time * Not suerywhere, -i.e. in other chains', like those of the Jar and other things.-(276)

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TEXT (277)
Ir TRIS WERE NOT SO, THE OBJECTION IN QUESTION COULD BE URGED WITH EQUAL FORCE AGAINST YOUR SOUL' ALSO; BUT ALL DIFFICULTIES ARE REMOVED BY THE FACT THAT THERE
IS DIVERSITY IN ITS POTENCIES.-(277)
COMMENTARY
Further, even when the I notion 'is held to have the Soul for its basis, the objection in question would apply with equal force Why does the said notion not appear in connection with another Soul also I-It might be answered that it is not so because of the restrictions imposed by the potency of things " then, for us also the same answer would be available,that the notion appears only in regard to some internal objects, and not in regard to all. So that all difficulties would be removed. -(277)
It might be urged that "There may be such restriction ; but how is the fact of its having no real basis proved ?"
The answer is supplied by the following: -
TEXTS (278-279).
IF THE SAID NOTION (OF I') HAD AN ETERNAL THING FOR ITS BASIS,
THEN ALL'I-NOTIONS' WOULD COME ABOUT ALL AT ONCE,
AS THEIR EFFICIENT CAUSE WOULD BE ALWAYS PRESENT. - IF IT HAD A NON-ETERNAL BASIS, THEN ALL THESE
NOTIONS WOULD BE EQUALLY CLEARLY MANIFEST. HENCE (IT FOLLOWS THAT) THE OTHER PARTIES NEEDLESSLY RAISE QUESTIONS REGARDING THE EXISTENCE OF THE BASIS OF THE SAID
I-XOTION -(278-279)
COMMENTARY.
The basis (background) of this 'I-notion could be either eternal or non-etorual ;-if it is eternal, then all I-notions' - I-consciousness-would come about (appear) simultaneously, as their cause would be present in its perfect condition; nor can the said basis be without cause; as such an idea would lead to abgurdities-norcan an efficient cause stand in need of auxiliary causes all this has been discussed more than once.-Nor can it be urged that " there is only one I-consciousness”, because its multiplicity is clearly proved by its appearing only occasionally. For instance, during the states of deep sleep, or of intoxication, or of swoon, there is no 'I-consciousness felt, and yet at other times, it is actually felt; and this non-apprehension of it at certain times shows that it appears only occasionally; and because it

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appears only occasionally, therefore it must be regarded as many also. Thus it is clear that all these I notions' would come about simultaneonsly, as their coming about is dependent upon the pressence of the said cause only.
If then the other view be accepted that the basis of the 'I-notion is non-eternal, then all I notions should be all as clearly manifest as the Visual and other Oognitions ; as they would be directly apprehending the specific individuality of the thing concerned.
For these reasons, we conclude that other people'-other philosophers, like Kumärila and others-noedlessly raise questions regarding the basis of the I notion in question,-in such words as (those under Text 232)"Oi that notion, what cognitive-moment is assumed to be the object ?" and so forth. -(278-279)
In this connection, it has been asserted by the Buddhist that the I. notion' is entirely baseless, and it appears only as an Illusion due to the beginningless Dispositions of the Vision of the Body of Being ". -As against this, Kumārila has raised an objection, which is set forth below -
TEXTS (280-281).
"WHAT THE DISPOSITION CAN DO IS TO BRING ABOUT THE RECOGNITION
OF THE COGNISER; IT CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF A THING AS WHAT IT IS NOT BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE OF ILLUSION (WRONG COGNITION). Thus THE 'I-XOTION CANNOT BE REGARDED AS AN ILLUSION; AS THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL IT (AND HENCE PROVE IT TO BE wrong)"; [Shlokavārtika, page 720]—IF THIS IS URGED [then the answer is as given in the following Text].—(280-281)
COMMENTARY.
What the Disposition can do is to bring about the Recognition of the Cogaiser, and not the Cognition of a thing-Cogniser-as what it is not,
-.e. as not-Cogniser; the construction is that Disposition cannot bring about this latter Oognition.—"why?"-because it cannot be the cause of Illusion; in fact it always brings about the Cognition of a thing exactly as it had been cognised on the previous occasion, and not a wrong Cognition.-Thus then, because this I-notion is produced from Dispositions, and because there is no valid reason for annulling it, it cannot be regarded as an Illusion.
The term chet', if this be urged ', should be construed away from its place, after the end of the sentence.-(280-281)
The following Text answers this argument:

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TATTVASASGRARA: CHAPTER VII.
TEXT (281).
WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT; AS THE REASONING ADDUCED ABOVE IS CLEARLY FOUND TO BE SUBVERSIVE OF THE SAID
IDEA.-(281)
COMMENTARY. * Adduced above '—under Text 278.—(281)
It has been argued that "Disposition cannot be the cause of Illusion"; this reason is Inconclusive this is shown in the following Text :
TEXT (282)
How Is IT THAT, ENTIRELY FROM DISPOSITIONS, SUCH DIVERSE ILLUSIONS COME ABOUT AS THOSE THAT DEVOTEES HAVE IN REGARD TO GOD AND OTHER BEINGS AS BEING THE CAUSE OF
THINGS AND SO FORTE ?
COMMENTARY.
If Disposition were not the cause of Illusion, then how could such Illusions appear, purely out of Dispositions, as 'God is the cause of all products, omniscient, the receptacle of eternal cognition and so forth In fact, Kumarila himself has denied a creator of the world, like God and other Beings.
In the phrase proceeding entirely from Disposition, the term ' entirely is for the purpose of excluding a real background.-(282)
TEXTS (283-284).
THUS THEN, THE BASELESSNESS OF 'I-CONSCIOUSNESS' HAVING BEEN
ESTABLISHED, THERE CAN BE NO Cogniser WHO COULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE SAID NOTION OF I'. HENCE AMONG ALL VALID FORMS OF COGNITION, THERE IS NOT ONE WHICH IS FOUND ABLE TO SUPPLY A FIT EXAMPLE ; AND THE REASONS ALSO THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED IN DUB COURSE ARE FOUND TO BE
UNPROVEN REGARDING THEIR
SUBSTRATUM.-(283-284)
COMMENTARY
Thus I-consciousness' being baseless, there can be no Cogniser who could be admitted to be the object of that consciousness. Hence the existence of the soul is not proved.

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The other party lias adduced (under Text 238, et seq.) such reasons as because he has been apprehended by past I notions and so fortit,-for proving the eternity of the Soul ; against this it is urged that there can be no Cogniser, etc.-ie. neither an eternal nora non-eternal Cogniser is there who conld serve as the corroborative instance; hence the corroborative instance (of the opponent's inference) is 'unproven' (non-existent). For instance, the first and second reasonings (set forth by the opponent) are open to the objection that the corroborative Instance is baset with the defect of living its subject unknown; as there is no such Cogniser known as is the object of the *I-notion of today and also of yesterday.-As regards the third reasoning, the Instance cited— like the single Cognition '-is devoid of the Probandum and the Probans ; because the one Cognition 'intended to be the 'I-notion of the cogniser connected with the same chain. -and also to appertain to a single object,-is not proven' (not admitted by all parties). Thus, on account of the two characters being unproven', the Instance itself has been declared to be unproven
Adduced in due course,-.e, those Reasons that have been adduced above;
in due course '-according to the nature of the defect found in euch.-'Unproven regarding their substratum '; --for instance, in the first and second arguments, the Reasons adduced are unproven regarding their substratum', as it is not admitted that there is any such object as the Cogniser apprehended by 1-notion';in the third argument, though the substratum is not "unproven', inasmuch as the "Cognitions' which form the subject are wellrecognised entities,- yet, what is not proven' in regard to them in the fact of their being qualified by a Cogniser connected with a single chain',
-because it is well known that Cognitions are baseless (devoid of any basis in reality). This is the reason why the Text has used the qualifying term, in due course :-(283-284)
End of section 7 (6) dealing with the Mimamsaka's Doctrine of the Soull.

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CHAPTER VII.
SECTION (C).
The Sankhya doctrine of the Soul' (Spirit).
COMMENTARY
The Text proceeds now to refute tile Soul' A9 postulated by the Sānideluja
TEXTS (285-286).
OTHERS HOLD Chaitanya SENTENCE' TO BE DISTINCT FROM THE FORM OF Buddhi, INTELLECT (COGNITION). THEY POSTULATE SENTIENCE AS THE SPIRIT'S' OWN TORM ; HE ONLY ENJOYS THE FRUITS PRESENTED TO HIM BY PRIMORDIAL MATTER; HE IS NOT THE 'DOER'; THE CHARAOTER OF DOER' IS TELD TO BELONG TO PRIMORDIAL MATTER
ALONE.—(285-286)
COMMENTARY.
Othere'-the Sānkhyas. They postulate the Spirit's own form as consist. ing of Chaitanya, sentience', -which is something different from Buddhi (of the Sankhyas, which is Cosmic Intellect); as their doctrine is that Buddhi is of the nature of Primordial Matter, while Chaitanya is the form of the Spirit alone.--This Spirit' is the enjoyer of the fruit of good and bad deeds, presented by Primordial Matter,-but he is not the doer of the deeds; as the character of the doer is held to belong to Primordial Matter alone, which contains within itself the evolution of the whole world. In support of this doctrine they adduce the following proof :- Whatever is of the nature of an aggregate is found to be for another's purpose, -e.g. Beds and such things; the eye and the rest are of the nature of aggregates; hence this is a reason based on the nature of things and this another is, by implication, the Spirit (or onl). This is what the other party means.-(285-286)
With the following Text proceeds the refutation of the said doctrine (of the Sankhyas)

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TEXT (287).
As RDGARDS THIS DOCTRINE, IT SENTIINCE'IS HELD TO BE ONE ONLY, THEN HOW IS IT THAT, IN THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER OBJECTS, WHAT IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED IS A FORM BESET WITH DIVERSITY ?--
(287).
COMMENTARY To explain-When the Sanya says that " Sentience is the Soul's own form ", what becomes postulated is that sentience is eternal and of one form,inasmuch as it is non-different from the Soul who is eternal and of one form. This however is contrary to facts of perception; inasmuch as in the Cognitions of Colour, Sound and other things, what is clearly-distinctly-perceived, througlı their own Cognition itself is a form beset with diversity, -i.e. a diverse character is perceived ;-and this could not be possible if Sentience were only one.-(287)
The following Text shows that the said doctrine is open to the charge of being contrary to doctrines of the Sankhya himself :
TEXT (288).
ITSENTIENCE'IS OF ONE TORM AND CONTINUES TO ESIST TOR ALL TIME, THEN, HOW IS IT POSSIBLE TOR. THE SENTIENT SOUL TO BE
THE ENJOYER OF THINGS OF MANY KINDS 1-(288)
COMMENTARY.
The Soul is of one form, and yet the enjoyer of many kinds of things, this involves self contradiction: specially as it cannot be distinguished from the state in which one is not the enjoyer.-(288)
It might be argued that "there is no self-contradiction, because of the presence of the desire to see and other characters".
The following Test supplies the answer to this :
TEXT (289).
THE DESIRE TO SEE AND THE LIKE, WHICH ARE DIVERSE, DO NOT COME INTO EXISTINCE AS FORMING THE BASIS OF THE SPIRIT'S EXPERIENCE; FOR, IF THEY DID SO, THEN THE SOUL
TTSELF WOULD BE SOMETHING produced.-(289)
COMMENTARY.
If, in regard to colour, etc. the desire to see desire to hear' and so forth-which are different from one another,-be assumed to be the basis of
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TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER VII.
the Spirit's experience, then no such can come into existence. If they did come into existence, then,-i.e, if they came into existence as distinct from each other,-the Spirit also would be something produced, just like the • desire to see, etc. as it is non-different from these.—(289)
This same point is made clearer in the following :
TEXT (290).
THE
DESIRE TO SEE' AND THE REST ART NOT ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM 'SENTIENCE'; AND IF THIS LATTER WERE LIABLE TO
APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE, THEN THE SAME
COULD NOT BE DENIED OF THE SOUL.-(290)
COMMENTARY.
If they were something entirely distinct, then there could be no such connection betweon them as that these are his '; as there is no benefit conferred which could be the basis of such connection.
The same',-.e, the attributing of appearance and disappearance'.
This orgument may be formulated as follows - When there is no basis for any restriction regarding the existence of a thing, that thing should not be so restricted by any intelligent person,-e.g. Alcāsha as having a material shape in the case of the Spirit there is no basis, in the shape of Desire to see and the rest for restricting the character of being the experiencer' to it; so that no reason is perceived for such restriction. This Reason cannot be said to be 'unproven'; as has been explained already.-(290)
For the following reason also the character of experiencer cannot belong to the Soul, on the ground that it cannot be the 'doer':
TEXT (291)
IT GOOD AND BAD DEEDS ARE NOT DONE BY THE SOUL, THEN WHEREPROM
DOES THIS DIVERSITY IN HIS EXPERIENCES PROCEED 1-(291)
COMMENTARY
As a matter of fact, no one enjoys the fruit of the act that he has not done ; for if he did, then this would involve the incongruity of the accruing of what has not been done', etc. etc.-(291)
The following Teat states a likely answer from the other party

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TEXT (292).
IF IT BE HELD THAT IT IS PRIMORDIAL MATTER THAT BESTOWS THE
FRUITS, IN ACOORDANCE WITH THE DESTRES OT THE SOUL ; AND THIS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TWO STANDS LIKE THAT BETWEEN THE LAME AND THE BLIND PERSONS",(then the answer is as given in the
following Text].-(292)
COMMENTARY. Though the Soul is not the door of deeds, yet it is Primordial Matter that presents to him things, in accordance with his desires, and then he enjoys these things. So that there is none of the incongruity that has been urged.
Question : -"Primordial Matter being insentient, how can it be the Doer of good and bad deeds, by virtue of which it brings about the fruits of deeds for the Soul according to his desires ?"
Answer: This relationship, etc.: just as the Blind man acts towards things, through his connoction with the man with eyes, -30 do the Cosmio Intellect and other divergent' things perform the functions of determining and the rest towards such effects as Merit, etc., through their contact with the Soul, which is sentient. This has been thus asserted—"The Soul serves the purpose of bringing about Perception (of Matter), and Prim. ordial Matter serves to bring about Liberation (of the Soul); the connection between these two this is like that between the Lame and the Blind ; and creation (evolution) proceeds from this connection " (Salchyakārika, 21).-(292)
The above argument is answered in the following
TEXT (293).
IF THAT IS SO, THEN HOW IS IT THAT EVEN WHEN THE DESIRE FOR THE DESIRED THING IS THERE, IT IS NOT FULFILLED? PRIMORDIAL MATTER CANNOT STAND IN NEED OF ANYTHING
EISE.-(293)
COMMENTARY.
If what is meant is that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul the desired fruit of even such acts as he has not done, then how is it that, at all times, on the desire appearing for anything, the desires of all men do not become fulflled ?
It might be argued that It does not becomo fulfilled because its cause. n the form of Merit, is not present".

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The answer to that is that Primordial Matter cannot stand in need of anything elst.-Merit is a product of Primordial Matter, and as such nondifferent from it; consequently it must be always present; and the desired fruit must therofore always appear. For instance, all things (for the Sūrichya) are ineluded under the two categories of 'Primordial Matter' and 'Soul', and these are always close to one another; so that the fruit should be always there.
Then again, if it is the desired fruit that Primordial Matter brings to the Soul, why then does it present to him what is undesirable ? For certainly no one desires what is undesiruble.-(293)
Further, if Primordial Matter presents the thing to the Soul,-even ko, it cannot be right to regard him as the enjoyer', as he is unmodifiable.This is what is pointed out in the following
TEXTS (294-295).
Ir, AT THE TIME OF HIS ENJOYING A THING, THERE IS NO MODIFICATION
IN THE SOUL, THEN HE CANNOT BE THE enjoyer; NOR CAN PRIMORDIAL MATTER BE OF ANY SERVICE TO HIM.-IF (ON THE OTHER HAND) THERE IS MODIFICATION IN HIM, THEN HIS WIERNALITY DISAPPEARS; AS 'MODIFICATION CONSISTS IN becoming changed into something else ; AND HOW COULD ANY SUCH CHANGE BE POSSIBLE IF THE SOUL REMAINED IN THE SAME CONDITION
ALWAYS ?-(294-295)
COMMENTARY
If the Soul is not made to undergo modification into Joy and Sorrow due to Pleasure and Pain and so forth, then he would be just like Alcāsha, and honce he cannot be the Enjoyer, and Primordial Matter also cannot be of any service to him,-[Buch is the construction of the Sentence]: because no service can be rendered to that which is unmodifiable.-It then, it be admitted that the Soul is modifiable,-then there is the undesirable contingency of his losing his eternality ; because what we mean by the 'Non-eternality of a thing is that it does not remain in the same form always; and as this would be there, if the Soul were modifiable, how could he be eternal ? As what is meant by "eternality' is that the thing should retain the same form always.
(294–295)
The following text provides another explanation of the Soul being the enjoyer from the standpoint of the other party :

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TEXTS (296.297).
THE FOLLOWING MIGHT BE URGED-" FIRST OF ALL THE COSMIC INTELLECT BECOMES EVOLVED IN THE FORM OF THE OBJECT; AND WHEN THIS OBJECT HAS BEEN DETERMINED UPON' (DEVINED) BY COSMIC INTELLECT, THE SPIRIT ATTAINS IT. THUS HIS CHARACTER OF BEING THE 'ENJOYER' IS THROUGH THE APPEARANCE OF THE REFLECTION; AND THE SPIRIT NEVER BENOUNCES HIS OWN
NATURE."—(296-297)
COMMENTARY
"The Spirit is not hold to the enjoyer in the sense that he becomes modified; what is meant is that he becomes so by way of the appearance therein of the object determined by Cosmic Intolleet. That is to say, the object, first of all, enters as a reflected image in the mirror of Cosmio Intellect,--this reflected image of the object then becomes transferred into Spirit, which is the second reflecting mirror; and this is what constitutes the Spirit being the enjoyer' (of the object); and not his undergoing modification. By the mere transference of the reflected image, the Spirit does not renounce his own nature, because, like the Mirror he remains just as he was.—Thus, in the argument that was urged above (by the Buddhist against the Sarikhya) to the effect that
what is non-differentiuted from the non-enjoyer cannot be the enjoyer etc. etc.' (under Text, 288)-the Renson is found to be 'inconclusive'-(206-297)
The answer to this is supplied in the following
TEXT (298).
OUR ANSWER TO THIS IS AS FOLLOWS IF THE REFLECTION APPEARS IN
THE SAME FORM (AS THR REFLECTING SUBSTANCE), THEN THU SAME LIABILITY TO APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE REMAINS.-IE, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS DIFFERENT,
THEN THE SPIRIT CANNOT BE THE enjoyer.-(298)
COMMENTARY
You hold that the reflection of the object in Cosmic Intellect becomes transferred to the Spirit, who is like a second mirror;now if this reflection in Spirit is non-different from the Spirit itself, then the Spirit rernains liable to
appearance and disappearance' as urged above; for the simple reason that he is non-different from identified with the Reflection, which is liable to appearance and disappearance.-If, on the other hand, the viow held is that the Reflection is something different from the Spirit, then he cannot be the
enjoyer'; as his condition would not be different in any way from what it was when he was not the enjoyer':-Nor can it be right to regard the Spirit's

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
character of being the 'Enjoyor' as being due to his contact with the roflection of the object; as there can be no contact' between two such entities as do not benefit each other in any way--(298)
TEXT (299).
IY PROORDIAL MATTER OPERATES TOWARDS BRINGING ABOUT THE DIVERSIFIED CREATION, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SPIRIT's) DESIRE TO SWE' AND THE REST -THEN HOW CAN IT
BE insentient 1-(299)
COMMENTARY
Then again, if Primordial Matter knew of the Spirit's desire to see! etc.- then it might be resonablo to rogard its activity to be for the sake of the Spirit, and to bo in accordance with his desire to seoote. -as a matter of fact, however, the said Matter is itself insentient-even when in contact with the Sentient Spirit ;- it cannot then be right to regard ita activity as brought abont as by the contact of the Lame and the Blind. Because even thongh tho Blind man does not see the road, yet he knows of the Lamo man's dosire, because he is himself sentient. Primordial Matter however cannot lenow the Spirit's desire to see' etc., because being insentient by its very nature, it is unconscious.-Nor is it possible for these two-Spirit and Primordial Matter to be related like the Lame and the Blind,-as there can be no mutual benefit in their case.—(299)
TEXT (300).
PRIMORDIAL MATTER KNOWS HOW TO PRODUCE THE SOUT AND OTHER THINGS, AND YET DOES NOT KNOW HOW TO EAT (ENJOY) THEN,
-WHAT CAN BE MORE INOONGRUOUS THAN THIS 1-(300)
COMMENTARY
If it be hold that Primordial Matter actually knows of the Spirit's desire to see' and the rest of it.-thien it must have to be regarded as being the
Enjoyor' also. How can one who knows how to produce a thing not know how to enjoy it? Hence what can be more incongruous than that Primordial Matter knows how to produce things, but does not know how to enjoy them ? The meaning is that nothing can be more incongruous. The Cook who prepares the soup and other things cannot be regarded as not knowing how to eat (enjoy) them. The particle siti' should be taken as understood aftervija ati':-(300)
In the following text the Author sets forth the answer likely to be given by the other party

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TEXTS (301-302).
IF IT BE ARGUED THAT" INASMUCH AS PRIMORDIAL MATTER IS EQUIPPED WITH COSMIC INTELLECT, ALL THIS CANNOT BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH ITS NATURE" THEN, ON THE GROUND OF TTS BEING EQUIPPED WITH INTELLECT, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE POSSESSED OF SENTIENCE ALSO,-LIKE THE SENTIENCE IN SPIRITS. BECAUSE 'INTELLECT', 'VOLITION,
CONSCIOUSNESS 'FEELING', 'KNOWING, ALL THIS IS EXPRESSIVE O Sentience.
(301-302)
COMMENTARY
All this 4.0, acting in accordance with the Spirit's desire to see' and the rest ; ils nalure-its character of Primordial Matter.- What is meant is this-"Even though Primordial Matter is not of the nature of Sentience, yet it is equipped with Cosmio Intellect which is of the nature of determination, and thus it can know of the Spirit's desire to know 'etc., and act accordingly; so that there is no incongruity at all",
The answer to this is that on the ground of its being equipped with Intellect, eto, ete. That is to say, if it is admitted that Primordial Matter is equipped with Intellect, then it should have to be regarded as endowed with Sentience also, like the Spirit ; as Buldhi' (Intellect) etc. are only so many synonyms of 'Sentience'. For instance, that which is of the nature of light and has ite form known by itself and shines independently of all else, is Sentience'; and this character is present in Buddhi (Intellect) also; why then shonld this lattor not be the same as Sentience ? specially as apart from Intellect, we do not perceive any other form of Sentience, by virtue of which this distinct nature could be attributed to Spirit.—(301-302)
In the following Text, the other party proceeds to show that Buddhi (Intellect) is something different from 'Sentience'
TEXT (303).
* COSMIO INTELLECT MUST BE INSENTIENT BY ITS NATURE,-LIKE SOUND ODOUR, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS, -ON ACCOUNT OF THE TWO REASONS OF being produced AND being perishable",IF THIS BE YOUR VIEW-[then the answer is as
stated in the following Text].-(303)
COMMENTARY
The opponent's argument is formulated thus:"Whatever is character. ised by the character of being produced, being perishable, and the like,-must

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
be insentient,-e.g. Taste etc. ;-Cosmic Intellect is so characterized; hence this must be a reason based upon the nature of things (for regarding it as insentienu). "-(303)
The following Text answers this argument
TEXT (304).
IF THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE MEANT TO BE SELF-SUFFICIENT, THEN
THEY ARE not admitted BY BOTH (PARTIES); IF THE REASONS ARE MEANT TO BE INDIRECT, THEN THERE IS NOTHING TO ANNUL
THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION.-(304)
COMMENTARY
The reason that has been put forward, -is it meant to prove the conclusion directly or indirectly (per Reductio ad absurdum) - If directly, then the Reason adduced is not admitted by either one or the other of the two parties; for instance, the producibility of things that the Buddhist adimits is in the form of the production of something that did not exist before. --similarly, the perishability of things that the Buddhist admits is of the nature of complete destruction-while such is not the producibility' or 'perishability that is admitted by you, the Sankhya ; as you regard them as being of the nature of appearance and "disappearance respectively; and the form in which you admit these is not the one that is admitted by the Buddhist ; hence the reason comes to be 'not admitted by either one or the other party. The mere admission of the verbal expression does not prove the admission of the Reason; the admission of a fact is proved by a fact, as it is only a fact that can be the cause. This has been thuis declared-'In the case of much fallacies as Falsity and the like: even though the verbal expression may be quite correct, the Reason may be regarded as fallacious, as it is only a fact that can prove a fuct.
If it be held that the Renson adduced is meant to prove the conclusion indirectly, even so, inasmuch as no reason has been adduced which would annul (and make impossible) a conclusion contrary to the one intended, the two reasons adduced must be regarded as 'inconclusive. What is there, for instance, to obstruct the notion that 'producibility and perishability' belong to Sentience?
As for the assumption of the Sankhya in the following Karika-"As the insentient milk flows out for the growth of the Calf, so does Primordial Matter act towards the liberation of the Spirit" (Sankhya-Karika, 57),-thig is not a sound assumption at all; because it is not independently by itself that the Milk flows for the Calf's growth; what happens is that the milk is produced by particular causes functioning occasionally; and when produced, the milk becomes the means of the calf's growth; and it is in this sense that it is said that even the insentient thing acts!. No such activity however is possible for Primordial Matter; because, inasmuch as Primordial

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Matter is eternal, and there can be no other cause except itself, -it cannot be right to regard its Potency as only occasionally active, on account of being dependent upon certain causes operating only occasionally. Nor can it be right to regard the said Potency of Primordial Matter to be inherent in it; for, if that were so, then as the Cause in its perfeot form would be always present, the entire purpose of all men, in the form prosperity' and 'highest good', would be brought about all at once.-(304)
It might be argued that-"There may be non-difference between Cosmic Intellect and Sentience, even so the fact of its being Spirit remains undenied" The answer to this is given in the following
TEXTS (305-306).
THERE IS NO HARM DONE TO US BY THE MERE APPLICATION OF THE
SPIRIT' To Sentience; WHAT WE ASSERT IS THAT ITS eternality IS DIFFICULT TO PROVE; BECAUSE THE EYI AND OTHER THINGS SERVE A FRUITFUL PURPOSE. IV Sentience WIERT RVERLASTING, THEN ALL SUCH THINGS AS TIR EYE AND THE REST WOULD BE USELESS ; E.G. THERE WOULD BE NO USE FOR THE FUEL I FIRE
WERD EVERLASTING.–(305-306)
COMMENTARY
What we deny is not merely the applying of the same 'Spirit'to Sentience ; what we do deny is the property of eternality that is imposed upon it. Why?'-Because such things as the Eye, the Light, the Mind and the like serve a fruitful purpose. Otherwise, if Sentience were everlasting-eternal-then the Eye and the rest would be entirely useless; as the only purpose served by these is the bringing about of Sentience (Cognition); and there can be no bring. ing about of what is eternal.-An example is cited. There would be etc.; -i.e, if fire were everlasting, then people would not fetch fuel for the lighting of fire.
Froin all this it follows that Sentience cannot be Eternal. (303-300)
Another argument put forward by the Sankhya (in Kūrika 17) is that "all composite things nre found to be for another's use" -The author pro. ceeds to examine who this another 'is

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
TEXTS (307-310).
THE VACT OF THE EYE ETO. BEING FOR ANOTHER'S USE' IS ASSERTED
(BY THE SānIchya), ON THE GROUND OP TENIR BEING COMPOSITE THINGS, LIKE THE BED, SEAT AND SUCH THINGS.-IT IT IS MEANT BY THIS TO PROVE TILAT THEY SERVE THE PURPOSE OF SOMETHING ELSE WHICH IS CAPABLE OF HAVING ADDITIONAL PROPERTIES PRODUCED IN IT, THEN WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVEN IS ALREADY ADMITTED ; INASMUCH AS THE SAID EYE ETO. ARE ADMITTED BY US TO BE HELPFUL TO COGNITION. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT IS MEANT TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE HELPFUL TO SOMETHING THAT IS unmodifiable, THEN THE REASONING IS OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE BEING DEVOM OF THE PROBANDUM; AS THE THINGS CITED AS THE INSTANCES ARE ALSO HELPFUL ONLY TO WHAT IS MOBILE (PERISHABLE).- LASTLY, IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROYED IS MERELY THE VAGUE GINERAL FACT OF THEIR BEING HELTFUL TO
ANOTHER'; --EVEN SO, THE REASON WOULD BE SUPERFLUOUS ; AS THEY ARE ALREADY ADMITTED TO BE HELPFUL TO THE MIND. (307-310)
COMMENTARY
The 'another that is meant,-(a) is it one capable of having additional properties produced in it 1-or (b) one incapable of having such additional properties produced, and hence unmodifiable 1-or (c) what is meant to be proved is the mere vague fact of being for another's purpose', which is pleasing enough so long as it is not examined — These are the three alternatives possible.
Under the first alternative (a), the reasoning proves what is already admitted ; as we also admit that the Eye etc. are helpful to Cognition; as is clear from the statement that That Cognition which originates from the Eye and the Colours is Visual Perception, and that Cognition which originates from the whole body and the touchable things is Bodily (Tactile) perception.'
Under the second alternative (b), the Reason is contradictory'; this is what is shown in the text 309. If the Eye, eto, aro meant to be proved as helpful to something that is unmodifiable (eternal), then as the Reason is found, in the instance cited, to be concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum, it becomes 'Contradictory'; because the Bed and other things (cited as instances) are actually found to be helpful to what is mobile, i.e., non-eternal : in as much as it is impossible to add to the properties of what is unmodifiable.
(c) Lastly if these alternatives are excluded, and what is meant to be proved is merely the vague general fact of being for another's purpose even so it would be proving what is already admitted; as the Eye and the rest are actually admitted (by us) to be helpful to the Mind. If the Mind

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also is included in the Probandum (along with the Eye etc.), as held by the Naiyāyiseas, even so, what you desire is not proved; as you do not hold the Spirit to be other than the Mind. Nor does the argument prove what is wanted by the Naiyayikas; because it is already admitted that the Eye and the rest are 'for another's purpose, in the sense that they are helpful to one another; specially as the notion of another is purely relative, like the notion of 'near and far?
Then again, the composite charncter that is assumed in the Mind is actually there, inasmuch as it takes in the help rendered by several causes; and to this extent your reason would be improven also (if the Mind also is included among the Eye aud the rest')-(307-310)
End of the Examination of the Sankhya Doctrine of Soul

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CHAPTER VII.
SECTION (D). The Doctrine of Soul' according to the Digambara Jainas.
COMMENTARY The Author now proceeds to refute the soul' postulated by the Dig. ambam (Jnina)
TEXT (311).
Thu Jainas, LIKE THE Mimamsakas, ASSHOT THAT THE PERSON (SOUL) IS CHARACTERISED BY SENTIENCE'; THAT, IN THE FORM OF 'SUBSTANCE, IT is inclusive, AND IN THE FORM OT
SUCCESSIVE T'Acroks', IT IS exclusive.-(311)
COMMENTARY
Jainas', i.e., the Digambaras.—They assert as follows:-" The Soul is characterised by Sentience only, and in the form of Sustance, it remains the same under all states, and as such is inclusive (comprehensive) in its nature; while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is
exclusive in its nature. This two-fold character of the Soul is cognised by direct Perception, and hence does not stand in need of being proved by other proofs. Thus that Sentience which is found to continue to exist through all the states, even though these states are diverse, in the forms of Pleasure and the rest, -is substance'; while tho successive factors consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived".
Such is the view of the other party (the Digambara Jainas).- (311)
The reputation of this viow proceeds with the following
TEXT (312) UNDER THIS VIEW ALSO, IF THE unmodified SUBSTANCE IS CONNECTED WITH THE Successive Factors, THEN THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE (OHANGE) IN IT, AND, IN THAT CASE, IT COULD NOT BE
LIABLE TO MODIFICATION.—(312)
COMMENTARY
There are two opinions possible:-(a) The Substance that exists in the form of Sentience may be connected with the successive factors in its um.

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modified form, i.e., without renouncing its previous character of Sentience, or (b) it is connected with the successive factors', in its modified form, i.e.. in a form in which the previous character has been abandoned. If this latter view be accepted, then there is disappearance of the eternality (of the Soul); as under this view, there would be no single entity existing throughout the series of successive factors. If the former view be accepted -that it is connected in its unmodified form, then there is no difference, i.e., change, as between the preceding and succeeding states ; so that the senti. ence would not be liable to modification, i.o., it has to be regarded as unmodifiable; as modification is of the nature of change, becoming something else. And yet it is held to be modifiable. The argument may be for. mulated as follows:--When a thing cannot be differentiated between its preceding and succeeding states, it cannot be regarded as modifiablo; e.g. the Alcasha; Sentience is not differentiated at all in any state; so that the wider character being absent (the narrower one must be denied).-(312)
In the following texts, it is urged from the standpoint of the Jaina that the reason just put forward is unproven', 'not acimitted
TEXTS (313-315),
* WHEN Sentience IS SPOKEN OF AS 'ONE, IT IS WITH REFERENCE TO
SPACE, TIME AND NATURE; WHEN IT IS SPOKEN OF AS DIPFERENT', IT IS WITH REFERENCE TO NUMBER, CHARACTERISTIO, NAME AND FUNCTION.-WHEN WE SPEAK OF THE 'JAR (SINGULAR) AND ITS COLOUR AND THE REST' (PLURAL), THERE IS DIEFERENCR OF NUMBER' AND 'NAME'; TEERE IS ALSO DIFFERENCE OT NATURE, INASMUCH AS 'INCLUSIVENESS' (COMPREHENSIVENESS) IS THE NATURE OF THE substance Jar, WALE 'EXCLUSIVENESS' (DISTRIBUTIVENESS) IS THE NATURE OF THE Successive Factors IN THE TORM or Colour and the rest; AND THERE IS DIFFERENCE ALSO OF
TUNCTION; INASMUCH AS THE PURPOSES SERVED BY THE TWO ARE DIFFERENT.SIMILARLY BETWEEN THE SUBSTANCE' AND THE
SUCCESSIVE FACTORS:-Tuus Substance IS NOT ABSOLUTELY undifferentiated, AS IT DOES BECOME DIFFERENTIATED IN THE VORM OF THE Successive Factors."-(313-315)
COMMENTARY
It the Substance were absolutely different from the successivc factors, then no differentiation in it would be possible ; because, on the ground of their non-difference regarding place, time and nature, the two are held to be one and the same; as a matter of fact, however, the two are different as regards number and other factors; for instance, the difference regarding

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
number is that while the substance is one, tlie successive factors are many; that is, the Substance is characterized by the number one, while the Successive Factors-Plensure and the rest-are charactorized by the number many'; the nature of the two also is different: inasmuch as the Substance is comprehensivo in nature, while the Successive Factors are distributive (exclusive). The term "sanjñá' stands for Name, and artha' for action, function. This has been this stated - Between the qualified and the qualification, there is non-difference, due to non-difference in their place, time and nature, but there is difference due to difference in their number, name, nature and function, as is found between the Jar and its Colour and other properties'; that is, between the Jar and its Colour, etc., there is nondifference regarding place, etc., while the Jar is different from Colour etc., regarding number, etc. ; e.g. the Jar is one while its properties, Colour and the rest, are way. There is difference in their name also: while the one is named 'Jar', the other is named 'Colour and the rest'. There is differ. ence regarding their nature also: while the Substance, in the shape of the Jar. etc., is comprehensive in its nature, the Successive Factors, Colour etc., are distribution. There is difference in their function also : the Jar serves the purpose of containing water, while Colour and the rest serve the purpose of lending colour to the cloth and so forth.
What las been said above (regarding tho Jar and Colour etc.) should be understood to hold respecting the substance Soul' which is of the nature of Sentience and the Successive Factors, Pleasure, Pain and the rest. In this case, the difference of function should be understood as follows: The fonction performed by Sentience is the apprehension of things', while that performed by Pleasure, Pain, etc. is happiness, unhappiness, and the like. This is what is shown by the Text, in the words 'Rupadayah, ... sarichyāsañjilāvibhēdita'; the latter term is to be construed with the term
dravyaparydyayoh' appearing later on (under text 315); the various terms in the second line of Text 314 are to be construed along with their respective correlates the construction being Karyabhēda' ' difference of purpose constitutes the difference of functions', and 'anuevotti, .. vyāuriti', 'Comprehensiveness and Distributiveness constitute the difference of nature'. One sentence ends with the word 'dravyaparyayayoh similarly between the substance and the successive factors' (in line 1 of teact 315); and another sentonco begins with the terms Doam nailanténa.'
Thus the Substance, etc.', this sums up the fallacy of being utproven in the Reason (put forward by the Buddhist as against the Jaina). What is meant is that, as shown above, the Substance is not absolutely undifferentiated: as a matter of fact, it becomes differentiated through the diversity in the forms of the Successive Factors, and thus Substance not being absolutely different from the Successive Factors, the reason put forward (by the Buddhist, in Text 312) because there is no difference is 'unproven', not true':-(313-316)
The answer to the above argument of the Jaina is provided in the following

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(D) DOCTRINE OF SOUL' AccORDING TO THE DIGAMBARA JAINAS. 207
TEXT (316).
ONE-N RSS' (SAMENESS, IDENTITY) CONSISTS IN non-difference of nature WERE THERE IF THIS ONE-NESS' (BETWEEN TWO THINGS), TEEN DIFFERENCE' (BETWEEN THEM) WOULD BE HARD TO PROVE IN ANY WAY; AS IN THE CASE OF THE FORMS OF
THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS THEMSELVES.-(316)
COMMENTARY. Even admitting that there is non difference between the Substance and the Successive Factors'-such being the case, the 'non difference should be absolute; how then could there be difference between them, which is the contradictory of non-difference '? It cannot be right to affirm and deny a thing,- affirmation and denial being mutually contradictory. For instance, when two things are spoken of as 'one', what is meant is that there is nondifference in their nature (character)', -this' non difference being inseparable from negation of difference; and when there is such non-difference of character' (between the substance and the successive factors'), how could there be, at the same time, difference', which is the negation of nondifference'! This argument may be formulated as follows :-In a case where there is non-difference between two things, there can be no room for difference, which is the contradictory of non-difference'; e.g. as is found in the case of the same successive factors and the substance', in regard to the specific individuality of each, where there is non-difference of character: and betweon substance and successive factors , non-difference is clearly present (hence there is perception of what is contrary to the Probandum, i.e. difference).-(316)
Thus in reality, there being non-difference between Substance and the Successive Factors', there cannot be any difference between them as regards their characteristics also ; this is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (317-318). THE ONE-NESS THUS BETWEEN SUBSTANCE AND THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' BEING NOT-FIGURATIVE (IE, REAL), THE 'SUBSTANCE ALSO SHOULD BE distributive (ExorUSIVE), LIKE THE FORMS OF THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS'; OR TEOSID SUCCESSIVE FACTORS' THEMSELVES SHOULD BE comprehensive IN THEIR CHARACTER, LIKE THE SUBSTANCE '; BECAUSE THE ONE-NESS OF THESE WITH SUBSTANODIS DULY ESTABLISHED.
-(317-318)
COMMENTARY. When a thing is non-different from another thing which is exclusive in its nature, the former also must be exclusive; as for example, the forms

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T'ATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
of the Successive Factors themselves and Substance is non-different from the Successive Factors, which are exclusive, so that there is a natural reason (for the Substance also being exclusive).-Or (the argument may be stated in another forin)-When a thing is non-different from another which is inclusive in character, the former also must be inclusive ; e.g. the form of the Substances and the Successive Factors in the form of Pleasure, ate. are nou-different from the Substance' which is inclusive; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding these as inclusive). If this were not so, then as the fate befalling them would be different, the two would have to be regarded as diferent.
There is also an argument which annuls the contrary of the conclusion, in the form that if things possessed of contradictory properties would bo rogarded as one, there would be an end to all business. "-(317-318)
TEXT (319)
FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS NO SUCK LASTING 'SUBSTANCE' AS THE SOUL 'AND THE LIKE ; BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENT
FROM THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS, -LIKE THE FORA OF THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS THEMSELVES.-(319)
COMMENTARY
The phrase and the like' is meant to include the Jar, Grains and other things.-(319)
The following text sots forth the upshot of the second, 'indirect, proof
TEXT (320).
NONE OF THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS 'ALSO CAN BE BESWT WITH' APPEARANCE AND DISAPPEARANCE',—BECAUSE THEY ARE NONDIFTRRENT FROM SUBSTANCE', -LIKE THE PERMANENT
FORM OF THE SUBSTANCE.'-(320)
COMMENTARY
The text has added the clause like the permanent form of the Sub. stance' in view of the argument that "Inasmuch as Substance also is held to be beset toith appearance and disappearance, there can be no absence of the Probandum in the Reason". The compound 'niyalātma' is to be taken as a Karmadhāraya, the meaning being the eternal form-nature in the shape of Substance and so forth':-(320)
The following Text clinches the argument:

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(v) DOCTRINE OF SOUL' ACCORDING TO THE DIGAMBARA JAINAS. 209
TEXT (321). FOR THIS REASON IT SHOULD BE ADMITTED, EITHER THAT THERE IS ABSOLUTE DESTRUCTION OF ALL, OR THAT ALL IS PERMANENT (ETERNAL); exclusiveness AND inclusiveness COULD NOT
EXIST IN ANY SINGLE THING.-(321)
COMMENTARY. Any such comprehensive entity as substance', cannot be accepted, not only because it is non-different in nature from the successive factors, but also for the following reason (shown in the next text), it is not perceived apart from the successive factors' even when the conditions of its percaption are present, and hence it should be treated as 'non-existent. This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (322) AS A MATTER OF TACT, THERE IS NO PERCEPTION OF SUBSTANOE', WHICH SHOULD BE PERCEPTIBLE, AS SOMETHING PERMEATING THROUGH
(AND COMPREHENSIVE OF) THE SUCCESSIVE FACTORS, -HENCE IT CANNOT BE REGARDED AS EXISTING,
-LIKE THE 'Sky.LOTUS '-(322)
COMMENTARY.
This shows that the statement that " The Soul, in the form of Substance, is permeating through the Successive Factors', is apprehended by percoption itself" is not true; because as a matter of fact, no such substance as 'Soul' is perceived to appear, in that comprehensive (all-embracing) form, in any such Cognition as is admitted (by all parties) to be 'Sense-perception '.-(322)
Question.-" If it is so,-i.e., if thoro is no such substance as 'Soul', apart from the Successive Factors', -how do the distinctions of Number etc. come about ?"
The Answer is provided in the following
TEXT (323).
IN FACT, THINGS ARE CAPABLE OF DIVERSE FRUITFUL ACTIONS; THEY ARE CAUSES ON THE NOTIONS OF SIMILARITY' AND THE REST;
-AND THEY ARE AMENABLE TO CONVENTIONAL VERBAL
EXPRESSIONS CONNOTING SUCH THINGS.-(323)
OOMMENTARY.
The fruitful actione',-of the successive factors', Colour etc.,-aro diverse-of various kinds--distinguished as similar and dissimilar ;-the
14

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
similar actions are the Holding of water and the like, and the dissimilar actions are the colouring of cloth, the bringing about of visual perception and the like ;-of these actions, the Successive Factors' are capable. Thus is the compound to be analysed. As regards the similar action', all the "Successive Factors are used simultaneously; hence in order to indicate their common causal efficiency,wovon though there is no common identical Substance permeating through them, and even though they are different from each other, yet—they are spoken of by means of the single term "Jar', As being one in number; and when it is intended to indicate the dissimilar specific actions of each of the Successive factors, they are spoken of by means of words expressive of the plural number ;-it is in this way that the diversity in number, as also diversity in action (purpose) is explained.
"How then is there diversity of characteristics ? "
They are causes of the notions, etc. cto.-The things, Jar e.g., become + causes of notions of similarity', when under all conditions, of baked, un. baked, etc., they are conceived of as Jar' and 'Jar' only,-being apprehended as objects of indeterminate cognitions ;-as even though they are destroyed every moment, they are produced at each succeeding moment as particular things, but of similar shape. But when they become produced in the different colours of dark, red, and the like, they become 'causes of notions of dissimilarity'. Thus even in the absence of any simple comprehensive entity permenting through them, the things become the causes (basis) of notions of similarity and dissimilarity, and thereby come to be regarded as comprehensive' and exclusive' in character; and thus the diversity of character becomes established.
The term 'adi' in the compound "tulyadi' is meant to include the aluya', 'notions of dissimilarity.
" To what then is the diversity in Name due ?"
They are amenable etc. Such things',-i.e. things like Colour, which Are capable of diverse fruitful actions and are causes of notions of similarity and dissimilarity such things form the object-connotation-of such conventional verbal expressions as 'Jar' and 'Oolour' etc.; and the said things are amenable to such verbal expressions (names).-(323)
Thus wbat is proved by Perception is the fact that things are without Soul', - this is what, by way of recapitulation, is pointed out in the following
TEXT (324).
IN FACT, IT IS ONLY THI 'SUOCESSIVE FACTORS' THAT ARE COGNISED A3 CHARACTERISED BY APPEARANCH AND DISAPPEARANCE'; HENOE PURE "SOULLESSNESS' BECOMES CLEARLY
ESTABLISHED
COMMENTARY.
Successive Factors'-i.e. Colour etc., is also Pain eto. as felt in their own nature ;-'only'-.e. without any one substance non-different from

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(D) DOCTRINE OF SOUL' ACCORDING TO THE DIGAMBARA JAINAS. 211
them because for an eternal entity, any fruitful action, either simultaneous or consecutivo, is incompatible. In fact, fruitful action in the case of things is possible only when they are liablo to appearance and disappearance Thus, through Inference also, it becomes established that those things which are capable of fruitful action are without Soul', this being indicated by their mere e cistence.-(324)
Against what the Buddhist has said under Text 322 above, the author an. ticipates the following objection from the opponent's (Jaina's) standpoint :
TEXT (325).
IT MIGHT BE URGED THAT "WHAT exists IS THE MIXED FORM OF THT
SUBSTANCE AND THE SUCCESSIVE FAUTORS';-BECAUSE IT IS HELD TO BE DUAL IN TORM, BUT IMPARTITE, LIKIO
Narasimha."-(325)
OOMMENTARY.
Mixed' -- joined together; that is why the form of the Substance', though existent, is not perceived The next sentence explains the reason for its being thus 'mixed' in character: Because it is held to be etc.,-.. because the Soul and other things, though dual in form, are held to be im. partite,-like Narasimha, and because the Soul is impartite, therefore it exists in the joint dual form, and hence is not perceived separately.-(325)
That this assertion (of the Jaina) involves self-contradiction is pointed out in the following
TEXT (326).
THE ASSERTION THAT A CERTAIN THING IS OF DUAL FORM' CAN BE BASED ON THE EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL THINGS, BECAUSE THE
TERAETORM CONNOTES nature.—(326)
COMMENTARY.
If the thing is impartite', then, to speak of it as of dual form is a contradiction in terms; because such an assertion can be based only upon the existence of several things; because when a thing is spoken of es dui. rupa', of dual form', what is meant is that it has two forms-two natures'; and one and the samo thing cannot have two natures'; as that would deprive it of its one-ness. What you have proved is only that there are two forms or characters, and not that there is a single entity with two forms , and that for the simple reason that the characters of being one and being many are mutually contradictory and preclusive.-(326)
As regards Narasimha, he is one only and is not regarded as of dual form', this is pointed out in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
TEXT (327),
Narasimha ALSO CANNOT BE ONE AND ALSO OF DUAL NATURE; AS HE IS PERCEIVED AS SUCH BECAUSE HE IS AN AGGREGATE OF
MANY ATOMS.—(327)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant by also is that it is not only the thing under dispute that cannot be oi dual form. Her i.e. Narasinha-08 such', through the diverse character of the parts of his body, and also through His oocupying larger space; otherwise He would not appear as He does. If even a small part-of the size of the fly's leg-of His body were concealed, He would be hidden to that extent.
This same argument also sets aside the fact of His being of the Colour of the Emerald.
All this we are going to explain in detail under the chapter on The Refutation of the Composite Whole'.
End of Chapter on the Jaina 'Doctrine of the Soul'.

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CHAPTER VII.
SECTION (E).
The Advaita' Doctrine of the Soul.
COMMENTARY
Others, upholding the Advaita (Monistic) system of Philosophy, who are followers of the Upanisads, postulate the Soul' to be Eternal, One and of the nature of Consciousness, which appears in the form of the illusory modi. fications of Earth etc.-This is the view set forth in the following Texts.
TEXT (328).
OTHERS ASSERT THAT "THE EARTH, FIRE, WATER ETC. ARE THE ILLUSORY MODIFICATIONS OF ETERNAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THIS IS WHAT CONSTITUTES THE SOUL."-(328)
following
COMMENTARY.
This is what constitutes the Soul-That is, the Soul is of the nature of one Eternal Consciousness of which Earth etc. are illusory modifications. Others-i.e. the followers of the Upanisads.-(328)
Question:What is the proof of this ?'-The answer is given in the
x
TEXT (329).
"THERE IS NOTHING IN THIS WORLD WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH THE
CHARACTER OF apprehensibility; AND ALL THIS IS HELD TO BE
THE ILLUSORY MODIFICATION OF CONSCIOUSNESS."-(329)
COMMENTARY.
Apart from Consciousness (Cognition), Earth etc. are not found to fulfil the conditions of apprehensibility'; whereby they could appear (be perceived) as composites;-and Atoms do not exist (for the Vedantin); hence, by implication, it is concluded that Earth etc. are merely so many reflections in Consciousness.
This-i.e. Earth and the rest.-(329)
The above view of the Vedantin is controverted in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VI.
TEXTS (330-331)
TAE ERROR IN THE VIEW OF THESE PHILOSOPHERS IS A SLIGET ONE,DUE ONLY TO THE ASSERTION OF ETHERNALITY (OT COGNITION); AS DIVERSITY IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED IN THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND AND OTHER THINGS.-IF ALL THESE COGNITIONS WERE ONH, THEN, COLOUR, SOUND, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS WOULD BE COGNISABLE ALL AT ONCE ; AS IN AN ETERNAL ENTITY THERE CAN
BE NO DIFFERENT STATES.-(330-331)
COMMENTARY.
The error is a slight one',-as thoy postulato only Cognition (Conscious. ness, as the only entity), which is quite reasonable.
"If that is so, then what is even the slight error' in their view ?" It is due lo llue assertion of eternality' * But why should not the acceptance of eternality' be reasonable ?"
Answer-Diversity is clearly perceived elc. etc.,— Eternality connotes remaining in the same state always, and non-eternality connotes not remaining in the same state always, and as a matter of fact, the Cognition that mani. fests (apprehends) Colour, Sound and other things is not found to be in one and the same state always actually it appears at one time as manifesting Colour and at another time, as manifesting Sound and other things, in a certain order of sequence. Under the circumstances, if all these things, Sound and the rest, were manifested by a single Eternal Cognition, then all of them would appear (be Cognised) simultaneously, like the bedspread of variegated colours; as the Cognition manifesting them would (ex hypothesi) be always there.
It may be held that "the Cognition of Sound and other things are different states of it appearing one after the other,--so that tho apprehension of Sound otc. could not be simultaneous".
The answer to this is 'In an Eternal Entity there can be no different states' -because the states are not different from the Entity to which they belong ; so that the Entity to which the states bolong would be liable to production and destruction',-appearance and disappearance in the same way as the States are liable; or, conversely, the states also would be eternal, like the Entity to which they belong.--If, on the other hand, the states are different from the entity to which they belong, then there can be no idea of the states belonging to this entity; as there is no benefit conferred by the one on the other; and this alternative (of the states being different from the Cognitions) would also be contrary to the doctrine that tho oternal Cogni. tion is the only one Entity.-(330-331)
Further, if the Eternal Cognition existed, it could be known either through Perception or through Inference; that it cannot be known through Perception is shown in the following

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(E) THE ADYAITA' DOCTRINE OF TER SOUL.
216
TEXT (332)
COGNITION OR CONSCIOUSNESS IS NEVER APPREHENDED AS ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS ; AND INASMUCH AS THESE LATTER UNDERGO VARIATIONS EVERY MOMENT, WHAT REMAINS THERE THAT COULD
BE LASTINO (PERMANENT, ETERNAL)-(332)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, apart from the Cognitions of Colour etc., which appear one after the other, we do not apprehend any lasting Consciousness, eternal and one,—whereby it could be held to be known through Perception. Then, inasmuch as it is well known that the Cognitions of Colour and other tluings are apprehended one after the other, and are destroyed every moment -it has to be explained what remains there that is non-different from those Cognitions ? Thus, inasmuch as there is no apprehension of any such Cognition, which would be apprehended if it were there, it cannot but be regarded as non-existent'. This is what the Text means.
Nor can it be held that the said Eternal Cognition is known through Inference. Becauso such an Inference would be based either upon the nature of the Cognition itself, or upon that of its effects. It cannot be the formor, as there is nothing which can prove that such is the nature of the said Eternal Cognition; on the contrary, there is Perception itself which precludes any such notion.
Thus the doctrine that the world is the illusory modification of the Eternal Consciousness' is not right.--(332)
Then again, under this doctrine, the notions of Bondage and Liberation' are not possible. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (333).
THERE CAN BE NO DISTINCTION IN COGNITION AS WRONG' AND 'RIGET -IT THE "SOUL CONSISTS OF A SINGLE (ETERNAL) COGNITION; HOW THIN CAN THERE BE ANY BONDAGE AND
LIBERATION' ?-(333)
COMMENTARY.
For one who holds the view that-Cognition is in perpetual flux, different evith different persons, undergoing variations in a series, the notion of
Bondage and Liberation is quite reasonable, as being due to the coming about of a series of cognitions, wrong and right; and through the practice of yoga, gradually purer and purer Cognitions coming about, the series of impure cognitions cease and the final Aim (of Liberation) is attained ; and thus the attempt at Liberation becomes fruitful.-For you, on the other hand,

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIT.
the Sonl' is of the nature of one Eternal Cognition ; how then can there be any 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' for such a Soul ? Because if the one Cogni. tion is eternally wrong, then, as there could be no other state for it, there could be no possibility of Liberation '; on the other hand, if the one Cognition were eternally right, then as it would be always pure, there could be no
Bondage':-As regards our doctrine, the Cognition is held to be defective (wrong) or pure (right), in accordance with the varying character of the Serios (in which it appears), and hence the notion of Bondage and Liberation' is entirely reasonable. This has been thus declared— Cognition is defective and free from defects, beset with impurities and free from impurities : if it were never impure, then all embodied beings would be always liberated, if it were never pure, then the attempt to secure Liberation would be fruitless'. -(333)
If it be held that 'Bondage and Liberation are only assumed, not real', - then it becomes necessary to explain the basis of this assumption. What this basis is under the doctrine of Cognitions being non.eternal' has been shown above. Thus the Effort in the form of the contemplation of Truth,
-that you put forth for the attaining of the Ultimate Aim' and for passing beyond the cycle of Birth and Death, can only lead to futilo fatiguie-This is slıown in the following
TEXTS (334-335). WHAT COULD THE MYSTIC SET ASIDE OR ACCOMPLISH BY THE PRACTICE
or Yoga? WHAT TOO IS THERE THAT COULD BE REJECTED ! As Wrong Cognition ALSO IS OF THE NATURE OF THE SAME (ETERNAL COGNITION),—THE Knowledge of Truth ALSO CANNOT BE SOMETHING TO BE BROUGHT ABOUT: AS, BEING OF THE NATURE OF COGNITION, IT IS ALWAYS THERE. SO THAT THE ENTIRE Practice of Yoga
ALSO IS ENTIRELY TRUITLESS.-(334-335)
COMMENTARY
If, by the contempletion of Truth, the Mystic could set aside, or bring about, anything, then his Effort would be fruitful. As it is however, he can never set aside Wrong Cognition, because it is of the nature of the same,- .e. of the nature of Eternal Cognition. For the same reason it cannot be rejected : because what is eternal cannot be destructible and hence its rejection is impossible. How can the Yogin accomplish-bring about the Knowledge of Truth? Being of the nature of Eternal Cognition, the knowledge of Truth would be always there. Thus the doctrine in question cannot be right (334-336)

Page #212

CHAPTER VII.
SECTION (F).
The Doctrine of Soul' according to Valsiputriyas.
COMMENTARY.
The Author proceeds to refute the doctrine of Pudgala' (Soul) set up by the Vulsipulriyas.
TEXT (336).
SOME PEOPLE WHO REGARD THEMSELVES AS 'Barddhas' DESCRIBE THE Soul BY THE NAME OF 'Pudgala', AND DECLARE IT TO BE NEITHER THE SAME AS, NOR DIFFERENT FROM THE
Skandhas, THOUGHT-PHASES).-- (336)
COMMENTARY.
Some people', -tho Vätsipuriyas.-Though these peoplo regard themselves as Saugalas', -sons of Sugata, Buddha-yet, under the pretended name of Pudgala', they postulate the 'Son!', which cannot be said to be either the same as', or different from', the thought-phases. The question arising as to how persons, who admit their being 'Sons' of the Blessed Buddha who has taught the doctirne of 'No-Soul', have wedded themselves to a false viow of 'Soul', -the Author answers it in a joking spirit, by the term who regard themselves as Bauddhas',
The character of the Soul' is held to be as follows:-(a) He who is the doer of the diverse good and bad deeds, (b) the enjoyer of the agreeable and disagreeable fruits of his deeds, and (c) who moves from the point of the abandonnent of the preceding Thought-phase to the point of the assuming of another Thought-phase, and is also the Experiencer,-is the Soul.-All this is held to be true (by the Vūtsiputriyas) of their Pudgala' also; the only difference is in regard to the name.-(336)
Question :-What is the reuson for regarding the Purgala as 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as, or as different from the Thought. phases)
The answer is given in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
TEXT (337).
The Puigala CANNOT BE SPOKEN OB AS 'DIFFERENT TROM TAK Thought
phases,-AS IN TRAT CASE THIS DOCTRINE WOULD BE THE SAME AS THOSE OF THE Tairthika Philosophers' ;-NOR CAN IT BH SPOKEN OF AS THE SAME' (NON-DIFFERENT); AS, IN
THAT CASE, IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS MORE THAN ONE (MANY) AND SO FORTH ;BENCE IT IS BEST TO REGARD IT AS 'INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OP' (AS EITHER TIE ONT OR THE
OTHER).—(337)
COMMENTARY
If the Pudwala wero hold to be different from the Thought-phases, then it would come to be the viow of tlie' Soul 'propounded by the Tairthika Philosophers,—wlich would mean the acceptance of the doctrine of the Eternal
Soul '; and it is not possible (as shown above) for the Eternal Soul to be the doer and the enjoyer, because it is always undifferentiated, like Akasha ; and the Blessed Lord also has denied the Eternal Soul; whose words- all entities are devoid of the Soul 'would this become contradicted.
"In that case, the Pudgala may be regarded as non-different from the Thought-phases”.
Nor can it be spoken of as 'non-different from the Thought-phases.If the Thought-phases, Colour and the rest, were tho Pudgala, then, as it would be non different from many Thought-phases, the Pudgala itself would have to be regarded as many,-like the various forms of the Thought-phases; and the Pudgala is held to be one ; as has been asserted in the sentence- The Pudgala is one, and is born in the world as one; and so also the Tathāgata'. -The phrase and so forth is meant to include 'non-enternality and such other characters. Under the circumstances, the Pudgala would be something linble to destruction, like the Thought-phases; which would mean that there is destruction of what has been done' [i.c. there would be no seruing of the fruit of one's deeds to the man, who would be disappearing every moment); and the Blessed Lord bas rejected the doctrine of the absolute destruction of things. From all this il follows that the Pudgala is 'incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as, or as different from, the Thouglitphases).-(337)
The following Text proceeds to show that like other things, the Pudgala also cannot be regarded as existing, because it is incapable of being spoken of this conclusion being deducible from your own words -

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(B) THE DOCTRINE OF SOUL' ACCORDING TO VÄTSIPUTRIYAS. 219
TEXT (338).
THESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE TOLD THAT (ACCORDING TO WHAT THEY HAVE
SAID), TEE Pudgala CANNOT BE RHCARDED A$ existing IN REALITY-BECAUSE IT IS INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OT EITHER AS THE SAME OR AS DIFFERENT (FROM THOUGHT-PHASES); JUST LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS
AND SUCH NON-ENTITIES.-(338)
COMMENTARY
The argument may be formulated as follows:- That which is incapable of being spoken of either as the same as, or as different from, a thing cannot be an entity,—us the sky-lotus ;--and the Prudgala is (ez hypothesi) incapable of being so spokon of -hence the wider character being absent (the narrower character must be absent); the corroborativo instance per dissimilarity is supplied by Feelings etc.-(338)
Question- How is the invariable concomitance (Premiss) urged hero arrived at 1
The answer is provided by the following
TEXT (339).
A THING CANNOT ESCAPE BEING EITHER 'SAME AS' OR 'DIFFERENT FROM', ANOTTIER THING: IN FACT, IT IS ONLY WIAT IS ENTIRELY TORMLESS THAT CAN BE REGARDED AS 'INCAPABLE OF
BEING SO SPOKEN OF:-(339)
COMMENTARY
A thing cannot escape from being either the same as, or different from another thing as there is no other third alternative possible. If that were not so, then Colour and the rest also would be incapable of being spoken of' (either as the same as or different from one another).- It is for this reason that it is only what, by its very nature, is formless that is regarded as 'incapable of being spoken of '; - not so any Entity.- (339)
* How is that "? The answer is given in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VII.
TEXTS (340-342).
IT IS ONLY AN ENTITY THAT CAN BE LIABLED TO THE ALTERNATIVES OF BRING DIFFERENT ' OR 'NON-DIFFERENT': HENCE IT IS ONLY IN REGARD To things that are formless (I.E. NON-ENTITIES) THAT IT CAN BE CORRECT NOT TO SPEAK OF THEM EITHER AS DIFFERENT' OR 'NON DIFFERENT (FROM ONE ANOTHER) NOT SO IN REGARD TO AN entity -BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF THE DENIAL 'this is NOT WILAT that is,-LIKE A DIFFERENT THING'-IT IS difference THAT IS CLEARLY SPOKEN OF ;-SIMILARLY WHEN THERE IS DENIAL this is NOT WHAT that IS NOT', WHAT IS CLEARLY SPOKEN OF IS non-difference (BETWEEN THE TWO); THUS IT IS THAT AN ENTITY CAN NEVER ESCAPE FROM BEING EITHER different or non-different
FROM ANOTHER ENTITY.-(340-342)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, an Entity alone can be the substratum of difference and non-difference; -never a non-entity; hence the non-mention of both difference and non-difference is possible only in regard to things that are fornless, i.e. have no character of their own ; such non-mention is not right in regard to an Entity such is the construction of the sentence; and the reason for this lies in the fact that no third alternative is possible.
"Why is no third alternative possible ?"
Answer: --Because in the case of the denial etc. etc.,—that is, when there is the denial, 'The Pudgala is not of the nature of Colour and other things, what is mentioned is the difference of the Pudgala from Colour and other things; because the denial of the fact of one thing being the same as another is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of a different character for the former, This argument may be formulated as follows:- When one thing is devoid of the character of another thing, it is different from it,-.. Colour is different from Feeling the entity named 'Pugala' is devoid of the character of Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regardod ns different from then) based upon the nature of things.-Similarly where there is denial
this is not what that is', -i.e. the denial of its not being of tho same character as the other thing, what is meant is its non-difference from that thing; because the donial of a real Entity being different from another thing is invariably concomitant with the affirmation of its being the same as that thing; if it were not 80,- ud no character is affirmed regarding that thing. -ihon all character being denied of it, it would become a non-entity, because a non-entity is characterised by the denial of all character in regard to it. This argument may be formulated as follows:-When one thing is denied the character of being something other than another thing, it must be the same as this lattor, just as Colour is denied the character of being something different from itself ;-the Pudgala (according to the opposite party) is denied the character of being something other than Colour and the rest; hence this is a reason (for its being regarded as non-different from the latter) based upon the nature of things.-Thus we conclude that an Entity cannot escape from the alternatives of being different or non different from another thing;

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() THE DOCTRINE OF 'SOUL' ACCORDING TO VÄTSIPUTRIYAS. 221
so that the Premiss of our main reason (against tho doctrine of the Vatsi. putriyus) is fully established.-(340-342)
It has thus been proved that, under the theory of its being 'incapable of being spoken of', the Pudgala can have an existence only in imagination The Author now proceeds to clinch the argument by showing that if the Pudgala is regarded as an entity, it cannot be right to regard it as 'incapable of being spoken of', otherwise the conclusion would be contrary to your own assez tion
TEXT (343). YOUR WORDS THAT "THE Pudgala is NOT DIFFERENT FROM TAD THOUGHT.
PHASES' ARE A CLEAR ASSERTION OF ITS non-difference; WHILE THE WORDS THE Thought-phase IS NOT THE Pudgala CLEARLY ASSERTS ITS difference.-(343)
COMMENTARY Further, when you assert that the Pudgala is incapable of being spokou of', you loudly proclaim quite clearly that the Pregalo is different from the Thoughi-phases. This is what is pointed out in the following
TEXT (344).
THE PRESENCE OF CONTRARY PROPERTIES IS SPOKEN OF AS CONSTITUTING 'DIFFERENCE 'ANONG ENTITIES ; IS THERE NO SUCH DIFFERENCE' BETWEEN THE Pudgala AND THE Thought-phases -(344)
COMMENTARY This argument may be formulated as follows Whero two things are possessed of properties that are mutually exclusive, they must be different from one another,-.g. between Colour and Feeling, the former being endowed with material shape and the latter being devoid of material shape ;Pudgala and Thought-phase are (according to you) possessed by such mutually exclusive properties as capable of being spoken of' and 'incapable of being spoken of'; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding the two as different).-(344)
The following Text proceedy to show that the reason here put forward is not 'unproven':
TEXT (345) FOR INSTANCE, THE Pudgala IS SAID TO BE ' incapable OF BEING SPOKEN OF AS DIFFERENT OR NON-DIFFERENT FROM FEELING AND THE REST, WHILE COLOUR, NAME AND OTHER THINGS ARE SAID TO BE ' capable OF BEING SPOKEN OF 'AS DIFFERENT FROM THEM.— (345)
COMMENTARY That is to say, the Pudgala is said to be incapable of being spoken of as different or non-different from Feeling, Name and the rest; while Colour,

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TATTYASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIT.
Name, and the rest are spoken of as quite capable of being spoken of as different from each other, so that our Reason is not unproven (345)
The following Text shows Another reason why the presence of contra. dictory properties in the two (Pudgata and Colour, etc.) must be admitted :
TEXT (346).
THE COLOUR-PHASE' AND THE REST ARE HELD TO BE CAPABLE OF
BEING SPOKEN OF AS 'NON-ETERNAL'; WHILE THE Pudgala is NOT SO ; SO THAT THERE IS A CLEAR DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
THE TWO.-(346)
COMMENTARY
The assertion that all impressions are non-eternal' shows that Colour and the rest are quite capable of being spoken of' as non-eternal'; while the Pucigala is not hold to be so capable of being spoken of' as non-eternal; on the ground that it is entirely incapable of being spokon of (as anything at all).
Nor is our Reason 'inconclusive': because all idea of difference' is based upon the said fact (of the presence of contradictory properties); if it were not so, then the whole Universe would be a single Entity; which would mean the possibility of all things being produced and destroyed simultaneously.-(346)
The Pudgala is a non-entity, not only on account of its being 'incapable of being epoken of as different or non-different from Colour eta', as explained above, but it is a non-entity for the following reason also, on account of its being incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal' this is what is explained in the following
TEXT (347)
Capacity for effective action IS THE DIFFERENTIA. OF THE Existence
(OF A THING); AND SUCH Capacity IS RESTRICTED TO MOMENTARY INTITIES ONLY; HENCE IT ANYTHING IS INCAPABLE OF BEING SPOKEN OF (As momentary)', IT
CANNOT BE AN existent ENTITY.-(347)
COMMENTARY
What characterises 'Existence, the nature of an 'Entity,' is Capacity for effective action as a matter of fact, & non-entity is characterised by the absence of all Capacity: which implies that Capacity for effective action

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(F) THE DOCTRINE OF SOUL' ACCORDING TO VĀTSIPUTRIYAS. 223
is the only characteristic of an Entity. This Capacity is restricted to momentary Entities only that is, it is invariably concomitant with momentarinees; specially as any effective action would be impossible for an Eternal Entity, whose activities could not be either successive or simultaneous. So that, if the Pudgala is "incapable of being spoken of as momentary',- then it cannot have the nature of an Entity; as the more extensive character of momentariness' is absent in it ;-just as the absence of the character of
Tree' means the absence of the character of the Shimshapa' (a particular tree). This is what has been thus declared :--That which is incapable of being spoken of as non-eternal cannot be the cause of anything."
The following might be urged :-"If the Pudgala were eternal, then Effective Activity would be incompatible as, being noither successivo nor simultaneous ;-but as a matter of fact, it is as 'incapable of being spoken of' as non-eternal as it is of being spoken of as eternal ; so that effective action cannot be incompatible with it."
This is not right; there can be no entity with a specific individuality which is devoid of both these characters (of eternality and non-eternality); asi' eternal and non-eternal' are mutually exclusive (and contradictory) terms; so that in any entity, the absence or presence of one of these must mean the presence or absence (respectively) of the other.
We are not objecting to the application of the term 'incapable of being spoken of', to the Pudgala ; because the applying of names to things depends entirely upon the wish of the speaker, and as such, cannot be objected to by anyone. What we are doing however is to examine the nature of the Entity', -is this natura always present in the thing called 'Pudgala', or not? If it is present, then the thing must be eternal, because "eternality consists in nothing else except that character which is always present and is never destroyed and it is only a thing having this character that is called 'Eternal'; as has been declared in the words- The learned call that thing Eternal which, in its own form, is never destroyed',If, on the other hand, the other view be held, that the said nature is not always present in the Pudgala.-- then the Pudgala must be non-eternal; as the only characteristic of the non-eternal thing is that it should not be lasting (permanent).--Thus then there being no other alternative apart from being momentary (non-eternal) or non-momentary' (eternal), and effective activity-either successive or simultaneous-being incompatible for the non-momentary (Eternal) Entity, the Existence of a thing must be invariably concomitant with momentariness'; so that if "momentariness is absent in the Pudgala, Existence also must be absent, --and it becomes established that it is non-existenl.-(347)
Says the Jaina :-"If it is so, and if the Pudgala does not exist at all, then how is it that the Blessed Lord (Budulha) when asked-as to whether the Living Entity is this and the Body is that, the Living Erzity being different from tho Body,--said this has not been explained' ?-Why did he not say straight away that there is no such thing as the Living Entity (Soul)?"
This is answered in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA; CHAPTER VII,
TEXT (348) GREAT MEN HAVE SUCCESSFULLY EXPLAINED ALL THOSE CASES WHERE THERE IS CONFLICT BETWEEN SCRIPTURE ' AND THE REAL STATE OF THINGS. IN FACT THE DIVERSE TEACHINGS OF THE MEROIFUL ONE ARE FOR THE PURPOSE OF REBUTTING
UNBELIEF ' (Nastikya).-(348)
COMMENTARY If there were such an object as the Pudgala', then alone could it have deserved an explanation as to whether it is different or non-different (like other things); as a matter of fact, however, the object itself has not been proved; how then could its character be explained ? An absolute non-entity, as the Hare's horn' can have no sharpness or other properties, which could be explained. Hence while propounding the notion that the Pudgala has only an ideal imaginary) existence, the Blessed Lord said it has not been explained
He did not declare straight away that it does not exist ', because the question had not been asked about the nature of the object itself (the question having been only about ita difference or non-difference from the Body]
Or it may be that, even though the thing had a merely ideal'existence, He wished to avoid the extreme view that it does not exist ';in consideraLion of the welfare of such disciples as were not yet fit for receving the extreme Doctrina of the Void (Nihilism). He did not say that the Soul or Pudgala does not exist. It has been this declared : Noting the difference between the Tusker and the Tusk, and the destruction of Actions, the Jinas propound the Dharma,-on the analogy of the Tigress' Oub (?). In this way have Vasubandhu and other teachers succeeded in disclosing the real import of the teachings in such works as the Koshaparamarthasaptati aud the rest ; hence it should be learnt from those works. In the present context the details are not written down for fear of becoming too prolix.
"If that is so "-says the opponent "how do you construe the assertion that there is existence which proves it'?"
The answer is for the purpose of rebutting unbelief etc. etc. There are divine teachings of the Merciful One which speak of sattua' and 'astitva (Existence), which are not incompatible (with the Buddhist doctrine) this has to be taken as understood. The mental series ' in which the 'iden of existence appears, it is with reference to the non-cessation (continuity) of hal series, that the Blessed Lord has said there is existence'. If he had not dono so, then there would be an idea that even those Impressions do not exist in the cause-effect-chain of whose moments there has been no break,- which would mean that things of the other world' do not exist, and this would demolish the whole idea of the other world, and the disciples would become inclined to unbelief. The form Nästikya' here is used in the old sense of the idea that there is no such thing as the Soul' or the other worla.')-(348)

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(F) THE DOCTRINE OF SOUL' ACCORDING TO VĀTSIPUTRIYAS. 225
The following argument has been urged by the opponent:-" It has been declared by the Blessed Lord as follows-'O Bhikelchus, I am describing to you the Burden, the Taking up of the Burden, the Throwing up of the Burden and the Bearer of the Burden; the term 'burden 'stands for the five constituent thought-phases, the 'taking up of the Burden for satisfaction (pleasure), the 'throwing up of the Burden for Liberation, and the Bearer of the Burden for the Pudgalas'.-Now, how do you explain this ? Certainly the 'Beurer of the Burden' cannot be the same as the 'Burden' itself."
The answer to this is supplied by the following
TEXT (349)
THE MENTION OF THE BEARER OF THE BURDEN' AND SO FORTI IS MADE WITH THE Aggregates, ETC. IN MIND ; AS REGARDS THE PARTICULAR DENIAL, THAT IS OF USE AGAINST THOSE WHO HOLD
THOSE VIEWS.-(349)
COMMENTARY.
The Thought-phases that appear at the same time, when meant to be spoken of collectively, come to be called aggregates'; when these appear at the same time, in the forın of Cause and Effect, they come to be called a * series or Ohain'; and when they are used as the basis of conception as a single concept, they come to be called by such names as members of the Series' and 'Components of tho aggregate ' -and it was with those nggregates in mind that the Teacher spoke of the Bearer of the Burden'; and there is thus no incongruity in this.
The term 'etc.' in the expression "aggregates, etc. includes the Series and the term and so forth in the phrase 'Bearer of the Burden and so forth stands for the Burden and the rest.
Thus then, those same Thought-phases which are spoken of as 'aggregate, series' and the like, are spoken of as 'the Pudgala, the Bearer of the Burden, as in common parlance it is this to which the name 'Padgala' is applied. It is for this reason that the Blessed Lord has described the Pudgala in the following words - What is Puigala, the Bearer of the Burden 1-having asked thus, He goes on— It is that which, O Long-lived one, bears such and such a name, belongs to such and such a caste, to such and such a clan, takes such and such food, feels such and such pleasures and pains, and lives so long'. Thus being of the nature of the ' aggregate of thought-phases, the Pudgala should be understood to be only ideally excistent, and not as an Eternal Substance, as postulated by others; it was with a view to show this that the Lord used the above words. It has to be accepted as true; otherwise, as the
Burden', etc. also have been spoken of as something different from the Thoughe-phases, (in the passage under reference), these also, like the Pudgala, would have to be regarded as not included among the Thought-phases. Thus it is clear that those preceding Thoughe-phases themselves which operate
15

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TATTVASANOPATIA: CHAPTER VII.
towards the bringing about of another succeeding Thought-phase have been spoken of as 'Burdon', -those that are going to appear as the result have been spoken of as the Bearer of the Burden. So that the passage quoted does not warrant tho conclusion desired by the Opponent.
Uddyotakara has argued as follows [This is a clear reference to Nyayazarlika 3-1. 1, page 341, but the passage found extends only up to the words
naivu tvamasi', in line 26, of the present text] "One who does not admit the Soulcannot make sense out of the words of the Buddha who has declared
- O Bhadanta, I am not Colour, I am not Feeling, Name, Impres. sion or Cognition, o Bhadanta ; similarly O Bhikou, you are not Colour, or Feeling, Name, Impression, or Cognition, you are not, 0 Bhadanta' -here Colour and the other Thought-phases have been denied to be the object of 'I.consciousness, this denial is particular, not Universal; while one who denies the Soul' should assert the denial in the Universal form
I am not-you are not! A particular denial always implies a corresponding particular affirmation ; o.g. when it is said I do not see with my left eye', it is clearly implied that 'I do see with my right Eye'; if the man did not see with the right Eye also, then the mention of the qualification
left' in the former assertion would be useless; the assertion should have been in the general form 'I do not see'. Similarly in the case in question when it is said Colour is not the Soul, Cognition is not the Soul', it becomes implied that the Soul is and it is something different from these (Colour, Cognition, and the rest). It may be 'incapable of being spoken of' or any, thing else, but in any case the Soul is there."
It is in answer to this that the Text adds' As regards the particular denial, etc..-That is to say, the mountain of the doctrine of the extant Soul propounded by evil-minded persons has risen up with twenty peaks,- such as Colour is Soul, Cognition is Soul, the Soul has Colour, the Soul has Cogni. tion, Colour subsists in the Soul, Cognition subsists in the Soul' and so forth. - It is as against the first five of these views that the denial has its use 08 against persons who hold those views. The term 'Taddrefin' means those who hold the view that Colour is Soul' and so forth. What is denied in the assertion (made by our Teacher) is exactly those points where the foolish-minded persons might have their doubts; and it is not intended to afirm anything. Otherwise, by saying what could not benefit His hearers, the Expounder would prove himself to be lacking in intelligence.-(349)
End of the section on the Pätsiputriyas' doctrine of Sou'.

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CHAPTER VIII
Examination of the Doctrine of the Permanence of Things.
COMMENTARY. The Author has spoken of his doctrine (in the opening lines of his Intro. duction) as "mobile","impermanent'. The following Texts proceed with the proof in support of this :
TEXT (350-351) OR, ALL THIS EFFORT (TO REFUTE THE VARIOUS DOCTRINES REGARDING THE ORIGIN OF THE WORLD) IS MADE NEEDLESSLY AS ALL SUCH DOOTRINES ARE REALLY SET ASIDE BY THE WELL-ESTABLISHED DOCTRINE OF THE PERPETUAL FLUX' OF THINGS.HENCE IT IS THIS PERPETUAL FLUX THAT IS GOING TO BE CLEARLY ESTABLISHED FOR THE REFUTATION OF ALL THAT HAS BEEN REFERRED TO ABOVE AND ALL SUCH THINGS AS THE UNIVERSAL' AND THE LIKE WHICH ARE GOING TO BE MENTIONED LATER ON, A REFUTATION THAT IS APPLIED EQUALLY TO ALL THOSE DOCTRINES.
(350-351)
COMMENTARY. As a matter of fact, by establishing the Perpetual Flag of things, all the various entities postulated by others, such as those of Primordial Matter * God and the like become discarded at a single stroke ; under the circumstances, all the effort that we have put forth in the above extensive portions of our work, towards the setting forth in detail of the several dootrines and refuting them, is practically useless; that is to say, all these are refuted by the much simpler method (of establishing the Perpetual Flux). That is to say, Primordial Matter' and the rest are not held by others to be undergoing destruction immediately on appearance, or to be liable to absolute destruction ; hence by the establishing of the doctrine of Perpetual Flux which includes all things, all those postulated entities become set aside ; holding this opinion as we do, we proceed to establish this 'Perpetual Flux' with special care,for the purpose of discarding (a) all those doctrines that have been discussed so far,-beginning with Primordial Matter' and ending with 'Pudgala',and (b) all those that are going to be discussed later on,-such as the Universal', 'Quality', 'Substance', etc., Words and their denotation, the Means

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TATTYASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
and the Objects of Right Cognition, the Thing of Variegated Character coloured with the various tints of the Emerald, etc., an Entity continuing during all these points of time, the four Elemental Substances postulated by the Charudka and the Materialists, and the Mass of Words (Veda) posited by the followers of Jaimini.
Clearly ',-because for the proof set forth, there is a Reason that satisfies all the three conditions of the valid Probans.
What is meant by this is that in reality, the whole purpose of our philo. sophy reaches its culminating point in this examination of the Permanent Character of things.-(350-351)
The Author proceeds to show how this Perpetual Fuais established -
TEXT (352) SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT THERE ARE TWO CLASSES OF THINGSCreated AND Uncreated ; OTHERS HAVE HELD THAT
THE TWO CLASSES OF THINGS ARE Momentary AND Non-momen
tary. (352)
COMMENTARY In this connection, the followers of Nyāya and others do not regard anything as momentary', and they hold that there are two classes of things in the shape of Created' and 'Uncreated '; among things some are created', -as the jar and the rest, while some are uncreated as the Atom, Aksha, etc.
Others however,-like Vätsiputriyas-hold that there is a further classification of things under the two heads of momentary' and 'non-momentary'; that is, according to these people, such things as Cognition, Sommd, Light-rays, are momentary, wbilo such things as Earth and Akasha are nonmomentary (352)
Such being the diversity among the various views, the Author first of all proceeds to set forth reasonings in support of the Perpetual Flux of those things that are held to be Created', which thus form the Subject' of the Reasoning set forth:
TEXT (353) AMONG THESE, ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE CREATED' ARH IN
PERPETUAL FLUX',-BECAUSE, AS REGARDS THEIR DESTRUCTION, ALL OF THEM ARE ENTIRELY
INDEPENDENT.(353)
COMMENTARY As regards their destruction, things are independent of other Causes.-- This briefly indicates the Reason which fulfills all the three conditions of the Valid Probang.--(353)
This reason is more clearly stated in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 229
TEXTS (354-355) WHEN A CHRTAIN THING DOES NOT NEED ANY OTHER CAUSE FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT OF A CERTAIN CONDITION, THAT CONDITION SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ATTACHING TO IT PERMANENTLY, BECAUSE, OUT OF ITS OWN CAUSES, THAT THING APPEARS IN THAT CONDITTON -- JUST AS THE CAUSAL CONDITIONS ARE INDEPENDENTLY, BY THEMSELVOS, CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THEIR EFFECT AND ALL THE THINGS THAT ARE PRODUCED ARE INDEPENDENT OF ALL ELSE IN THE MATTER OF THEIR DESTRUOTION.- (354-355)
COMMENTARY. The argument is to be iormulated as follows When certain things are independent in regard to a certain condition, they should be regarded as permanently attached to that condition as for example, the causal conditions that produce their effect immediately, are permanently restricted to those effects all things that are produced,—i.B. all created things are independent in regard to their destruction; hence this is a natural reason (for concluding that they are permanently attached to this destruction).- Any other Cause', -i.e. any cause other than that which has produced the thing itself. --The reason for this statement is added because out of its own causes, it appears in that form, i.e. because it is produced in a form so permanently attached to the said condition.-When certain things are not permanently attached to a certain condition, they are not independent in regard to that condition; as for instance, the unbaked jar in reference to the Baking. This forms the corroborative instance per dissimilarity.—(354-355)
Says the Opponent :-"The Reason put forward is Inconclusive: Even though things are independent regarding their destruction, yet it is quite possible that the destruction of a thing may come about at some other time and at some other place; so that it cannot prove the immediate destruction of the thing, which is what is desired by the upholder of the Perpetual Flux, the doctrine of all things being momentary'."
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (356) EVEN THOUGH INDEPENDENT, IF THE DESTRUCTION WERE TO COME AT ANOTHER PLACE AND TIME, THEN, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING DEPENDENT UPON THOSE,
THE THING COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS INDEPEN
DENT'-(356)
COMMENTARY. Esa-i.e. the Destruction.
On uccount of its being dependent upon those i.e. dependent upon the other time and place.

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
If a certain thing being independent in regard to a certain condition, were to be in this condition only at a certain time and place, then, as depen. dent upon that time and place, it would not be independent' at all. How then is there any 'inconclusiveness in our Reason? For instance, if a certain condition were to be present only at a certain time and place, and never apart from these,-then, how could it be regarded as 'independent? As such oxistence itself would constitute its dependence'; which term cannot stand for desire, for the simple reason that the thing is devoid of all 'inten. tion'.- (356)
"It then what is meant to be the reason is the fact of its being entirely independent, then such a Reason is not proven', 'not admitted '; for instance, some things aro dependent, for their destruction, upon such causes as the stroke of a Bludgeon-as in the case of things like the Jar. Even those things which, like Cognition, Words, and the like,-are known to be 'independent', -though they do not depend. for their destruction, on any such cause as the stroke of a Bludgeon, yet they do depend upon the peculiarities of time and place. Thus the Reason, as put forward by the Buddhist, is entirely unproven'."
The answer to tluis is provided in the following
TEXT (357) ALL produced things ARE ALWAYS AND EVERYWHERE INDEPENDENT IN REGARD TO THEIR DESTRUCTION; AS IN THIS MATTER, ALL CAUSES OF DESTEUO
TION ARE ENTIRELY INEFFICACIOUS.-(357)
COMMENTARY. Aluays and everywhere',-i.e. at all times and places, the produced things are independent of the cause of their destruction, because those that are not accepted as the cause of the destruction are inefficacious,-i.e. of no use; and there can be no dependence' upon what is of no use, it renders no help;-as if there were, then it would lead to an absurdity--(357)
The following Text shows why they are inefficacious :
TEXT (358) FOR INSTANCE, THE DESTRUCTIVE CAUSE CANNOT BH RIGHTLY REGARDED AS THE BRINGER ABOUT OF A
DESTRUCTION' WHION IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE THING ITSELF; AS THE POSITIVE THING IS PRODUCED FROM ITS OWN CAUSE.-(358)
COMMENTARY. When the destruction is brought abont--isit an entity or a non-entity - if it is an entity, then it must be brought about by the Cause of Destruction's

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 231
now, would the destruction, as an entity, be brought about as something not-different from the thing that was the cause of the destruction'1 or as something different from that thing? In regard to any existing entity, there can be only these two alternatives ; and only one of those two can be right; both cannot be right; nor can both be wrong; as tho denial of one cha. ractor of a thing must always imply the affirmation of the contrary of that character, and the affirmation of the former must imply the denial of the latter; and one and the same character cannot be both denied and affirmed, as has been explained above.
Of the two alternatives shown above, it cannot be right to hold that the Destruction, as an entity, is brought about as something not different from the cause of that destruction '; because that which is of the nature of a positive thing is always produced-born-from its own cause ; as that also, liko tho thing itself, is produced out of what is not-different from it; aud what has beon already brought about cannot have another Cause; as if it did have one, then there would be no end to the series of such causes.- (358)
The following might be urged :-" When the thing is born out of its cause, it is not in its completo form ; hence what it obtains from another cause is another character in the shape of 'Destruction."
This is answered in the following
TEXT (359)
WHEN A CERTAIN THING THAT OOMES OUT OF ITS CAUSE IS WITHOUT PARTS, THE 'DESTRUCTION THAT WOULD BE IMPOSED UPON IT BY OTHER CAUSES MUST BE OF
THE SAME NATURE.—(359)
COMMENTARY.
A single thing cannot have two natures, by virtue of which it could be produced in parts; on the contrary, the thing is without parts; and when a thing is produced from its Cause, it must be produced in its entire form; how then can another nature be imposed upon it, later on, by other Causes? In fact, what is not produced at the time that a thing is produced, cannot form the nature of that thing; because non difference', 'sameness, innplies complete identity of condition. Hence that which comes about at a later time, in the form of Destruction', must be a different nature' (character); and how can this, which is thus different, belong to the thing itself ? Hence there is nothing in this theory.-(359)
If the other alternative be accepted that the Destruction produced is something different from the thing', even so, the cause of the destruction of the thing would be useless. This is what is shown in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER Vm.
TEXTS (360-361)
IF THE DESTRUCTION THAT IS BROUGHT ABOUT IS SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE THING, THEN THERE IS NOTHING PRODUCED IN THE THING ITSELF BY THOSH OTHER CAUSES (OF THE SAID DESTRUCTION); SO THAT THE EFFECTS, LIKE THE APPREHENSION OF THE THING AND OTHER PHENOMENA, SHOULD CONTINUE AS BEFORE. AND AS THE THING CONTINUES TO REMAIN IN THE SAME CONDITION, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY CONCEALMENT' ETC. OF IT.
-(360-361)
COMMENTARY.
Tho bringing about of one thing cannot confer any benefit on another thing: if it did, then this wonld lead to an absurdity. Nor can it be right to assert that the bringing about of the Destriction related to a thing helps the thing itself, because no relation is known to subsist between them. For instance, inasmucli as the two ace, ex hypothesi, different, the relation between the two cannot be one of identity'; nor can the relation be that of being produced from it, as the destruction is produced only from the * Cause of destruction'; and there can be no other real relation between the two. Even if there were some relation between the two, as the thing is (ex hypothesi) an established positive entity, the apprehension and other effecte produced by it must also be positive entities (and Destruction is not positive) In the compound Upalambhakaryadi', the Upalambha',
Apprehension, itself is meant to be the 'Karya', offect *; and the term adi', and the other phenomena', is meant to include the containing of water (of the Jar), the breaking of the thighs, and so forth.
It might be argued that—" when the thing becomes concealed-or obstructed-by the destruction, which is soinething different from it, it ceases to produce such effects as its own apprehension and the like."
In answer to this it is added 'As the thing continues to remain in the same condition, etc. etc.-Nothing is possible as a concealer' or obstructor of a thing unless it removes its properties or does not produce them; if it were, it would lead to absurdities. Hence it follows that, on account of its previous nature being unabandoned, unconcealed, and unobstructed, there can be no concealment' or 'obstruction of the thing.-(360-361)
The following argument might be urged "It is not possible for the thing (whose destruction has been brought about) to bring about its apprehension and other phenomena ; because the destruction of the thing-being different from it, -has destroyed it.”
This is answered in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 233
TEXT (362) IT IS NOT TRUE TO ASSERT THAT THE THING IS DESTROYED BY ANOTHER THING NAMED "DESTRUCTION", BECAUSE THE ARGUMENTS BASED UPON THE ALTERNATIVES OF ITS BEING
DIFFERENT' OR 'NON-DIFFERENT'AND SO FORTH ARE APPLICABLE, BY IMPLICATION, TO SUCH AN ASSER
TION ALSO.—(362)
COMMENTARY. When the Destruction destroys the thing.—is the thing destroyed different or not-different (from the Destruction)? Or again, if it be asserted that it brings about that destruction of the thing which consists of its annihilation, like the Bludgeon and other things, the same alternatives may be put forward. And the objections urged above would all become applicablo; as is going to be explained later on. This is what is meant by the sentence *the arguments based, eta eto.'; i.e. even against the assertion that what is called destruction' brings about another destruction. Are applicable by implication', i.e. the alternatives of being difforent or non-different and so forth are applicable to this also.
Thus it is established that the Destruction of a thing cannot be an entity, [the first alternative put forward above, under Text 358).-(362)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Destruction of a thing cannot be of the nature of a non-entity
TEXTS (363-364)
IF IT BE HELD TEAT—5* THE DESTRUCTION (Nasha') BROUGHT ABOUT IS OF THE NATURE OF THE NEGATION OF ENTITY', OTHERWISE CALLED "DISRUPTION! (Pradhvamsa'), THERE CAN BE NO REASONABLE CAUSE FOR THAT ALSO.IF NEGATION WERE AN ETFECT, THEN IT WOULD BH AN Entity, LIKE THE SPROUT AND OTHER EFFECTS; BICAUSE WHILE THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF ITS BEING REGARDED AS SOMETHING not-produced', IT IS FOUND TO COME ABOUT THROUGH THE POTENCY OF A CAUSE.—(363-364)
COMMENTARY.
What is brought about, produced, is always an entity, not a non-entity, because of the latter, which is of the nature of the absence of positive cha. racter that could be predicated of it, there is no form that could be producer.

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TATIVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
Hence what is of the nature of the negation of entity, i.e. what consists of the denial of existence,-- cannot be brought about by anything,--simply because it is a non-entity,-like the 'Haro's Horns. Otherwise (if it were something produced) then it would be an effect, and as such an entity, like the sprout and other effects. This argument may be formulated as follows - Whab is an effect must be an entity, as the sprout and other things, -and Destruction is an effect (ex hypothesi), hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as an effect).
The author states the invariable concomitance (Premiss) of this reasoning-Because it is found to come about through the polency of a Cause. As a matter of fact, thot alone is said to be an effect' which acquires an accretion to its nature through the potency of a Cause; and it is only an entity that can acquire such accretion to its nature.
This point is not disputed even by the Naiyāyika and others: As these people also declare the character of the effect' to be either inherence in Being or inliorence in a Cause'; and Destruction cannot in here either in Being or in its Cause ; for, if il did, then, like Substanco and other things, it would have to be regarded as a substratum of existence' (i.e. an entity).(363-364)
Says the opponent"If that is so, lot the Destruction be an entity, what is the larm in that?"
Answer:
TEXT (365) THE VIEW THAT NEGATION IS BROUGHT BY AN AFFIRMATION HAS BEEN SOUGHT TO BE SUPPORTED BY HAVING RECOURSE TO PRECLUSION (AS THE FORM OF THE NEGATION SO BROUGHT ABOUT) BUT THE ARGUMENT BASED UPON THE ALTERNATIVES POSSIBLE REGARDING DIFFERENCE OR NON-DIFFERENCE, ALL BECOME APPLICABLE TO TRIS
VIEW.-(365)
COMMENTARY.
How is Negation brought about by Affirmation?' In answer to this question the other party has recourse to Preclusion', i.e. the assertion that it is Negation in the form of Preclusion that is so brought about ; that is to say, through the speaker's choice sometimes even an entity is spoken of 23 a different form (negation) of some other entity. With this explanation also the view is open to all those arguments that have been urged above as based upon the alternatives of difference' or 'non-difference' etc.-(365)
If, for fear of this criticism, it be held that-“what is brought about by the Causes of Destruction' is Negation,-not in the form of Proclusion', --but in the form of the absoluto negation."-But here also, the inefficacy of the cause of Destruction would be still clearer.
This is what is shown in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENOS OF THINGS. 235
TEXT (366)
IF IT BE HELD THAT "WHAT IS MEANT BY DESTRUCTION IS THE NEGATION OF EFFECTIVE AOTION, AND THIS DOES NOT BRING ABOUT A POSITIVE ENTITY",-EVEN SO, IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT WHAT BRINGS ABOUT THE DESTRUCTION CANNOT BE ITS CAUSE', BECAUSE IT 18 DEVOID OF THE
CHARACTER OF 'Cause',-(366)
COMMENTARY.
For instance, if Destruction means the negation absolute'-as in the expression brings about Destruction, i.e. Negation'-the negative terin would be related to the term denoting action, and the meaning would be that it does not bring about an entity (in the form of Action); and as this would be the denial or negation of Action, what it would imply is the fact of the Cause of Destruction not being a Cause'; for how can a thing devoid of action be a cause? So that nothing can be the Cause of Destruction.-(366)
In this connection, the Author proceeds to sot forth those arguments in proof of Destruction having a Cause which have been propounded by Aviddhalarna
TEXTS (367-368)
"THIS Destruction OF THE THING IS NOT PRESENT AT THE TIME THAT THE THING IS IN EXISTENCE ; NOR IS IT PRESENT BEFORE (THE THING HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE); NOR VERY LONG AFTER (THE THING HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE). IN PAOT, IT COMES IMMEDIATELY AFTER (THE THING HAS COME INTO EXISTENCE); THUS, IN ASMUCU AS IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE ONLY AT A PARTICULAR TIME, IT MUST HAVE A CAUSE. IF IT WERE INDEPENDENT (OF ALL CAUSES), THEN THIS OCCASIONAL CHARACTER WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AS SHOWN
BRFORE" -(367-368)
COMMENTARY.
That is to say, the Destruction of a thing cannot be present at the time that the thing is in existence, as if it did, then the momentarily existent

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
thing could never exist. Nor can it be present before the thing has been produced, as what has not been born cannot be destroyed; .g. the son of the Barren Woman' and such non-entities are not destroyed while unborn.
-Even when coming after the thing has come into existence, it cannot come very long after it; because all things (ex hypothesi) being destroyed at the third moment (of existence), there cannot be another destruction very long aiterwards, as is found in the case of Fire that has become reduced to ashes. The destruction of the thing, therefore, must come immediately after it has come into existence, i.e. at the second moment. Thus it is established that, as it has the time of its corning definitely fixed, the Destruction must have a Cause, just as the sprout has as it has the time, etc. etc.; i.e. because it appears only occasionally. The invariable concomitance of this reason is next shown- If it were independent etc. etc.'-if it were independent of all Cause, then its occasional character could not be possible ; as in that case its existence would be there at all times. Hence, from its occasional character, it is deduced that it must have a Cause.-(367-368)
Another reason for the same conclusion is set forth in the following
TEXT (369)
** As IT COMES IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THING, THE DESTRUOTION
MUST HAVE A CAUSE ; ALSO BECAUSE, NOT HAVING BEEN IN EXISTENCE, IT COMES INTO EXISTENCE, JUST LIKE
THE FOLLOWING MOMENT."-(369)
COMMENTARY.
Thus three reasons liave been stated : Destruction must have a Cause, (a) because it is occasional, (3) because it comes immediately after the thing, as admitted by the Bauddhas, and (c) because not having been in existence, it comes into existence, like the following Moment. The Hare's Horn' and such other non-entities serve as Corroborative Instances per dissimilarity. - (369)
The author next states the reasons adduced by Uddyotakara (in Nyayavärtika on 3.2.14, page 415, Bib. Indica, from where large portions of the Commentary on this Text are bodily quoted]

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 237
TEXTS (370-372)
< THEN AGAIN, IF DESTRUCTION HAD NO CAUSE, IT WOULD BE EITHER A NON-ENTITY, LIKE THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMEN AND OTHER NON ENTITIES, OR AN ETERNAL ENTITY, LIKE Akasha ; AS NO OTHER ALTERNATIVE IS POSSIBLE-IF DESTRUCTION WERE A NON-ENTITY, THEN ALL THINGS WOULD BE ETERNAL, AS THERE WOULD BE NO DESTRUCTION (OF ANYTHING); AND TAN IDEA OF THE Destructibility (FLEETING CHARACTER) OF ALL PROPERTIES WOULD BE BASELESS.IF DESTRUCTION WERE ETERNAL (EXISTING AT ALL TIMES), THEN IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR THE THING TO EXIST ALONG WITH ITS OWN DESTRUCTION; AS THERE COULD BE NO INCOMPATIBILITY IN THUS CASE ; AND THE ASSERTION OF THE DESTRUOTION OF WHAT HAS NOT BEEN PRODUCED WOULD NOT BE IN KEEPING
WITH REason."-(370-372)
COMMENTARY.
Uddyotakara has argued as follows:
**One who declares that there is no Cause for Destruction should be questioned as follows: Does this mean that there being no Cause for Dostruction, Destruction does not exist (come into existence) at all, like the *sky-lotus'? or that having no Cause, it is eternal (ever-lasting), like Äkäsha and other things 1 According to your view what is causeless is found to be of two kinds-eternal and non-existent, there is no other alternative to these two-existence and non-existence :-Now, if being without a Cause, Destruction is non-existent, then all things must be eternal; as there is no Destruction at all. And the idea that all properties become destroyed' becomes, in this case, baseless; because when there is no movement, the idea of anything moving is impossible. If, on the other hand, having no Cause, Destruction is eternal,- then it becomes possible for it to co-exist with the Thing (destroyed), as the Destruction would be always there. And this would be highly improper, as the Presence and Absence of a Thing are mutually negatory. If then the said co-existence is not admitted, then there can be no producing of any effect, as its contrary, the Destruction of the effect would be there always and when a thing is not produced at all, there can be no Destruction of it; for instance, such unproduced things as the 'Hare's Horns' are not known among people to be destroyed; hence any such assertion as that there is destruction of what has not been produced cannot be in keeping with Reason."—370-372)
The Author answers all these criticisms in the following Texts :

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238
TATIVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIII.
TEXTS (373-374)
WHAT SORT OF DESTRUCTION IS IT (THE CAUSELESSNESS OT) WHICH THE OTHER PEOPLE OBJECT TO ! (a) Is IT THE
MOMENTARY EXISTENCE OF THINGS, AS EXPLAINED BY us? OR THE CESSATION OF THE FORM OF THE ENTITY CALLED DISRUPTION (Dhvamsa, ANNIHILATION) ? -IPIT IS THE FORMER, THEN THERE IS NO QUARREL.
(373-374)
COMMENTARY
Destruction is of two sorts-positive and negative. For instance when, on account of the thing being mobile and having only a momentary existence, it becomes destroyed', this is called 'Destruction of the Positive kind); and there is the other kind of Destruction which consists in the thing losing its positive character and becoming what is called "disruption', 'annihilation'. If it is in reference to the former kind of Destruction' to whose 'causelessness objection has been taken by other people) on the ground of the roasons adduced above, then it is entirely futile (as what is objected to is denied by us also).-(873-374)
The futility of the arguments is further explained :
TEXT (375)
THAT THING WHICH, HAVING A MOMENTARY EXISTENCE, IS CALLED DESTRUCTION—This DESTRUCTION WE ALSO ADMIT AS having a cause; IT IS ONLY THE OTHER KIND OF DESTRUOTION WHICH WE REGARD As without cause, ox THE GROUND OF THERE BEING NOTHING ELSE (WHICH
COULD BE ITS CAUSE).-(375)
COMMENTARY. Question. "If that is so (and you admit what we have argued), then why have you held Destruction to be without cause'?"
The Answer is— It is only the other kind etc. etc.'; i.e. there being nothing else, - apart from the Cause that brought the thing into existence, coming later on, in the shape of the Bludgeon and such things that we regard the Destruction to be without cause.-(375)
The Subject (of the inference) in the form of Destruction being as explained, the two Reasons, because it is occasional' and because not having beon in existence, it comos into existence',-are duly admitted (by us also). As regards the character of coming immediately after the thing', if that is intended to be true only in a general way, then that too is

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 239
duly admitted by us), because its existence immediately after that thing which is the Cause is admitted by us.-If, however, what the other party means by the Destruction coming immediately after the thing is that it comes immediately after that thing which forms its own self (essence), then such a Reason is not admitted.--This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (376)
THE CHARACTER OF COMING IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THING DOES NOT SUBSIST IN THE DESTRUOTION AS DESCRIBED ; BECAUSE THIE DESTRUCTION IN THE FORM OF THE MOBILE (MOMENTARY) THING APPEARS ALONG WITH
THE THING ITSELF.—(376)
COMMENTARY.
In the Destruction as described', i.e. in the form not different from the nature of the mobile thing itself. There can be no 'parts of a thing which is devoid of parts, by virtue of which such Destruction could come immediately after such a thing because, like the nature of the Thing itself, its Destruction also comes about on the coming about of the thing itself; otherwise its forming the very nature of the thing would not be true; as already explained.-(376)
It has been argued above that There is no basis for the notion that all Properties are destructible' (under Text 371);this also becomes rejected by what has been just said. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (377)
THUS THEN, THE DESTRUCTION BEING THERE, THINGS CANNOT BE ETERNAL AND THE NOTION THAT THINGS ARE DESTRUC
TIBLE CANNOT BE BASHLESS.-(377)
COMMENTARY.
Simply because all things have tho character of existing for a moment, and those very things that are regarded as so destructible form the basis of the notion of destructibility of things, this notion therefore, cannot be baseless.—(377)
If then the 'Destruction' intended to be the Subject of the argumenta adduced by the other party is that in the form of Disruption (Annihilation),then all the three Reasons adduced are unproven', 'not admitted" (by us). This is what is shown in the following

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240
TATTVASANGRAHA - CHAPTER VIII.
TEXT (378)
AS REGARDS ANNIHILATION', AS IT CAN HAVE NO ESSENCE (CHARACTER), IT CANNOT COME INTO EXISTENCE IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE THING AND AS REGARDS THE PRESENCE OF THE
CHARACTER OP OOMING INTO EXISTENCE AFTER - HAVING NOT EXISTED BEFORE', THIS IS PRECISELY LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS AND
OTHER THINGS.—(378)
COMMENTARY.
Such characters as "coming into existence immediately after the thing, and the like can exist in things only, never in a non-entity, like the 'Hare's Horns'; and Annihilation' has no 'essence', no character ;-how then can it have any such character as 'coming immediately after the thing! and the like 7
As regards the presence of the character of coming into existence, having been not in existence before'; the particle cha' includes the character of being occasional.-(378)
“If that is so, if Annihilation has not the character of coming into e.cistence immediately after the thing, then what can be the meaning of the assertion that there is Annihilation of the thing'? When something does not belong to a thing, it can never be attributed to it."
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (379) WHEN IT IS SAID THAT THERE IS Annihilation OF THE THING", WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT THE THING IS NOT THERE'. AND IT IS NOT MEANT TO CONVEY THE AFFIRMATION
(PREDICATION) OF ANY THING.-(379)
COMMENTARY.
Even though the assertion there is Annihilation of the thing' appears to be affirmative of Annihilation, yet what is really meant is only the nega. tion of the Thing itself, and not the affirmation of any positive entity.-(379)
"In such expressions as 'It is Chaitra's Son', it is the existence of the son that is affirmed; so in the expression There is Annihilation of the thing', it must be the presence of the Annihilation that is affirmed."
This is answered in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 241
TEXT (380). THE MERE NAMING OF A PERSON AS DONKEY ' DOES NOT LEAD TO THE ATTRIBUTION OF THE WHOLE CHARAOTEB
OF THE ASS TO THAT PERSON.-(380)
COMMENTARY. The existence and non-ear istence of things are not dependent upon the use of mere words, as the using of words depends upon the whim of the speaker; if it were not so, then if, through a whim, the narne Donkey! were given to a man, the entire character of the Ass would have to be attributed to that man.
The term balaya' in the Text) is a synonym for rasabha' (Ass).(380)
The following Text Asserts that it must be understood that when annihilation' is spoken of in regard to a thing, it is only the negation of the nature of the thing itself, and there is no affirmation of anything
TEXT (381). IF THE CATEGORY NAMED ANNIHILATION' WERE AFFIRMED IN REFERENCE TO A THING, THERE BEING NOTHING ACTUALLY PRODUCED IN THE THING, HOW IS IT THAT THE THING CEASES
(TO EXIST)-(381)
COMMENTARY. If it were not as declared by us, and if the category of 'annihilation' were regarded as affirmed in reference to the thing,--then, as there is nothing actually produced in the thing concerned, -why should that thing cease to exist ?-(381)
As regards the argument put forward above (under Text 371)' If Destruction were non-existent, all things would be eternal', -it is answered in the following -
TEXT (382) THUS IT IS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF ANY DESTRUCTION OF THINGS' OF THE NATURE OF ANNIHILATION IS NOT ADMITTED ; BECAUSE THE DESTRUCTION OF A THING' CONSISTS IN THE Dissociation of a particular form, AND NOT IN THE
negation of its existence.-(382)
COMMENTARY. Thus:--because it is really of the nature of the dissociation of a parti. cular form of the Thing, -and it is not of the nature of the negation of the Thing due to the cessation of the existence of the nature of the Thing itself,
16

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIIT.
Why then should our doctrine involve the absurdity of all things being eternal ? If the Destruction of things', in the forn of the negation of their character, were non-existent, then alone the things would be eternal; as & matter of fact, however, the Destruction in the shape of the negation of character, though itself negative in character, is actually there;-how then could the things be eternal ?
As for the notion of all properties being destructible, -the basis for this has been already explained.-(382)
It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 372, above) that If the Destruction of the thing be eternal, then it would be co-existent with the Thing itself. This is answered in the following -
TEXTS (353-384).
WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT DESTRUCTION IS OF THE NATURE OF CESSATION, IT DOES NOT MEAN THE AFFIRMATION OF ITS POSITIVE CHARACTER IT ONLY DENIES THE CONTINUITY OF THE PARTICULAR FORM OF THE THING BEYOND ONE MOMENT. THUS NO LASTING FORM IS AFFIRMED IN REGARD TO THE ANNIHILATION, AND THERE IS NO ROOM FOR THE ALTERNATIVE THAT IT IS elernal.-(383-384)
COMMENTARY, When it is said that there is cessation, it does not mean the affirmation of the positive form of cessation' in regard to Annihilation', for the simple reason that it has uo positive form; it means only the denial of the continuity of the particular form of the Thing beyond one moment. Thus there is no room for the alternative that it is something absolutely eternal ; because, on account of its having no character at all, it is impossible for it to have & permanent form. Specially because the properties of eternality or noneternality are invariably concomitant with the nature of things.
It has been argued by Uddyotakara (under Text 371, above) to the effect that-"Under your view, what is without Cause may be either eternal or non-existent, ete."--But this assertion is based upon his ignorance of the doctrine of his opponent. As a matter of fact, for Bauddhas who are fully conversant with Logic, what is without cause must be non-existent; this has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord The Wise One seeking for the common property among similar things does not perceive any such property in the slightest form':--As for the Vaibhâsikas (a particular sect among Buddhists), who posit such existent things as Akasha and the rest, they are converts to your view, and they cannot be regarded as Followers of the Buddha ; hence the putting forward of their view cannot be relevant.
Thug all causes of Destruction being inefficacions, our Reason (put forward under Texts 353-366) cannot be said to be 'Unproven'.

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 213
For the following reason also the Causes of Destruction should be declared to be inefficacious :- When a Thing is produced from its Cause, is it produced sometimes as evanescent by its very nature,--and sometimes as not-evanescent (eternal)? If it is produced as evanescent, then it cannot be the cause of Destruction, because it is destroyed through its own nature. When a certain nature (or character) belongs to a Thing, this thing, when produced, is produced with that same nature ; and it does not depend upon any other cause (for producing that nature). For instance, the things that are bright or fluid or solid and the like-when producedere produced along with these properties, and they do not depend upon another cause for the bring. ing about of these properties. It might be argued that In the case of the seed and such things, it is found that though the seed has the nature of producing the sprout, yet by itself it cannot produce it, it needs the help of other causes in the shape of water and such things, and in the same way, though the Thing may have the evanescent nature, yet for its destruction it would require other Causes." This cannot be right; because what is regarded as the cause of a thing is what brings it about in its final complete form; nothing else is regarded as its 'Cause'. So when a thing has a certain nature, it must produce it by itself, and it does not need another Cause. If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it is because such productivity does not constitute its nature'; it may be called 'the cause of the Cause' (of the Sprout), not the direct Cause ; so that this does not vitiate our position.
If the alternative view be accepted that when the Thing is produced it is produced in the non-evanescent (permanent) form, then, for that also, any Cause of its destruction would be entirely inefficacious; because any change in the nature of such a thing would be impossible. Because if the nature of a thing were not destroyed immediately after its production, then, later on also, as the same character of permanent standing would be there, what is there that would be done by the cause of destruction', by virtue of which the thing could be destroyed 1-The following might be urged—“In the case of Copper and other things it is found that, though they are solid, yet, on the contact of fire, their condition becomes changed; similarly even though the thing may be naturally indestructible, the Cause of its destruction may change its condition, and by reason of this, it may become destroyed on its coming into contact with that Cause of Destruction " -This cannot be right; as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes changed; because 'Change' consists in the production of another nature or character; now this change that you speak of—is it something different from the Thing itself ? or is it the Thing itself ? It cannot be the Thing itself; as that has been already produced by its own Cause (and hence could not be produced again by the Cause of the change]. If it is something different from the Thing, then the Thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence; 50 that it has not changed. As regards the example of Copper and other things, that is not admissible. Because what happens in their case (according to us) is that the preceding solid-moment' of the Copper being inherently perishable (destructible) becomes destroyed by itself, then under the influence of such auxiliary causes as Fire and the like, there is produced, out of its own constituents and under other circumstances, a different character in the

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER vin.
shape of fluidity; again this character of fluidity, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of solidity. So that there is no change of one and the same thing.
Thus the Cause of Destruction is in every way infructuous; and our Reason is not unproven'.
Nor is our Reason' Contradietory', as what is put forward does actually happen according to our view.
Nor is the reason 'inconclusive', as it has been already established before.
The following might be urged—" The Alisha does not need a cause for becoming corporeal (with a shape), and yet it is not permanently liable to corporeality; in the same manner, though the Things may be products, yet there may be some thing which is not permanently liable to destruction."
This is not right. There is no Product which is not regarded as noneternal (avanescent); as all caused things are held to be evanescent; and these same Products are made the subject of the inferential argument; how then can the Reason be inconclusive? Those things which, though Products, are yet expected to be eternal, on account of their indestructibility, --these are really included under the category of 'uncreated things, and As such should be regarded as discarded by the discarding of that category itself. So that there is no defect in our Reason. Nor is it admitted that Akasha and such other things are independent in the matter of their corporeality: because as a matter of fact, when a Property does not belong to a thing. that thing is certainly dependent upon something else' in regard to that property; things are never regarded as dependent on something else' for the purpose of those properties that are already present in them ; in fact, they are so dependent, only in regard to Properties that are not there already. So the Corroborative Instance cited by the other party is one that cannot be admitted. (384)
The Author proceeds to say something regarding the category of uncreated things':
TEXTS (385-386). THE Akasha AND OTHER THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE 'UN. CREATED ARE REALLY NON-EXISTENT, IN THE FORM OF ENTITIES; AS THEY ARE DEVOID OP ALL POTENTIALITY; HENOB THERE CAN BE NO ROOM FOR ATTRIBUTING TO THEM ANY SUCH ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERS AS THAT OF 'MOMENTARINESS' OR NONMOMEXTARINESS '; WHEREBY THEY COULD BE REGARDED EVEN AS AN 'ENTITY'-BE IT EITHER
MOMENTARY OR OTHERWISE (385-386)
COMMENTARY. If things like Akasha were such as have their existence established, then alone could there arise any discussion as to their being momentary, etc.;

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HXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 245
because Properties have no existence by themselves ;- if they did, then they would cease to be Properties. Nor are Akasha, etc. uncreated things,-be. cause, being devoid of all potentiality, they are to be spoken of as 'non. existent like the son of the Barren Woman'. This argument may be formulated as follows:-A thing that is devoid of all potentiality must be non-existent-like the son of the Barren Woman':-, käsha, etc. are devoid of all potentiality; so that this is a natural reason (for regarding them as non-existent); or in reality, there is absence of the more extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive character). - Nor can the Reason ad duced be said to be 'inconclusive', as this alone is enough to justify the notion of non-existence'. Nor can the Reason be said to be 'unproven'; as we shall explain later on. Nor, lastly, can it be said to be contradictory'; as it is found to be present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.-(385-386)
Question " Why cannot the question of momentariness or nonmomentariness arise in regard to a non-entity ?"
The answer is provided in the following
TEXT (387).
THAT THING IS SAID TO BH'MOMENTARY' WHOSE FORM PERSISTS FOR A MOMENT; WHILE THAT THING IS SAID TO BE 'NonMOMENTARY' WHICH IS ENDOWED WITH A LASTING
(PERMANENT) TORM.-(387)
COMMENTARY The meaning of this is clear.-(387)
Uddyotakara has put forward the following argument :-"The term Kganika' (*momentary') contains the Possessive Affix ('than', by Panini 5-2-115): how does this affix come in ? If, in accordance with the Nirukla, ksana' stands for kepaya, Destruction, and the term 'kşanika' means that tohich has destruction, this cannot be right; because of the difference in time; that is, at the time that there is Destruction, the thing to which it belongs is not there (having ceased to exist); and the Possessive affix is never found to be used in connection with things that exist at different times. If (with a view to escaping from that difficulty) it be held that the positive entity itself, as qualified by its impending destruction, is what is spoken of as 'ksanika'. (momentary').-even so, it is not possible for the thing qualified by the destruction to be spoken of as possessing that Destruction ; and thus also the use of the Possessive affix would be injustifiable. If what is meant by things being * Tsanika' momentary, is that the time of their existence is only one moment; and that having posited the 'ksana', 'Moment', as the lowest conceivable measure of time, we call those things momentary' which continue to exist only during that point of time then

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this also cannot be right; because the Bauddha admits of Time only as a mere name (a hypothetical entity, without reality); and it is not right for what is a mere name to be regarded as the qualification of an entity." (ya. yavārtika on 3-2-14, page 418, lines 8-16, Bib. Indica Edition.)
This is answered in the following
TEXT (388).
THAT FORM OF THE THING WHICH DOES NOT PERSIST AFTER ITS PRODUCTION IS WHAT IS CALLED Ksana', 'MOMENT'; AND THAT WHICH HAS THIS FORM IS KELD TO BE
Kganika', 'MOMENTARY ':-(388)
COMMENTARY.
What is called "moment' is the character of the thing which is destroyed immediately after it has been produced ; and that which has this character is called momentary'. This has been thus declared
Moment is that which is destroyed immediately after the thing has come into existence, and that which has this is called momentary.'-(388)
"Even so, as the nature of a thing is not-different from the Thing itself, there can be no such idea as that this belongs to that's which idea is based upon the difference of the two factors concerned."
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (389).
EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN TWO THINGS, THERE IS NOTHING TO PREVENT THE NOTION OF THIS BELONGING TO THAT'; AS EVERY EXPRESSIVE
WORD IS APPLIED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
AN ARBITRARY WHIM.—(389)
COMMENTARY.
In such expressions as one's own nature, the body of the stone. image', and so forth--even though there is no actual difference between the two things spoken of, the Possessive ending implying difference is used on the basis of an assumed difference ; so would it be in the case in question also. Verbal expressions are used, not always in accordance with the real state of things, but in accordanco with the whim of the speaker.-(389)
Further, when a man utters a verbal sound, that sound denotes, in that form alone, only that much of a thing as to which it is applied, such

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denotation being due to convention ; and in reality there is no basio term' or an 'affix'; the term (verbal sound) 'kesanika' is applied by the learned to only such a thing as does not continue to exist after its coming into existence; and such a thing being meant to be denoted by the term 'momentary-it may be used along with an aflix or without an affix,—we have no regard for any such use, which is used on the basis of conventions that are purely arbitrary.--This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (390).
WHAT IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF (BY THE TERM Kpanika', 'MOMENTARY ') IS THE THING THAT DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST AFTER ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ; AND THAT TERM MAY BE USED EITHER WITH THE AFFIX OR WITHOUT THE AFFIX (TO WHICH Uddyota kara
HAS TAKEN OBJEOTION).
COMMENTARY.
Evam'-i.e, by the term csanika, momentary. With the arta-i.e., with the Possessive affix (Thor),(390)
Thus it has been shown that if Akasha and the rest are regarded as uncreated, they must be regarded as being non-existent; and it is now going to be shown that if they are regarded as existent, they must be momentary
TEXT (391).
Ir Akasha. TIME AND SUCH THINGS ARE existent, THEN, BEING SO, THEY CANNOT ESCAPE FROM BEING momentary, JUST LIKE THE CREATED
THINGS.-(391)
COMMENTARY.
Krtäh'-stands for krtakâh', created things'.
This indicates being', 'existence, as the Reason (for regarding things as momentary).-(391)
This Reason is stated more explicitly :

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TEXTS (392-394).
For INSTANOB, WHATEVER THINGS ARE EXISTENT ARE ALL IN A STATE OF PERPETUAL FLUX-JUST AS ALL CREATUD THINGS HAVE JUST BEEN SHOWN TO BE THESE THINGS, Akasha, TIME, GOD, AND THE REST ARE HELD BY YOU TO BE existent; THESE COULD NEVER HAVE AN EXISTENCE IF THEY WERE DEVOID OF momentariness ; -BECAUSE PERMANENT THINGS CANNOT HAVE ANY FRUTTFUL ACTIVITY, EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEREFORE THEY ARE HELD TO BE non-existent.
—(392-394)
COMMENTARY.
The reasoning may be thus formulated :-What is existent must be momentary,--like the things just shown to be momentary ;-Alāsha and other (uncreated) things are held by you to be existent; this is therefore a natural reason (for regarding them as momentary).
As have been shown to be i.e. as momentary.
This shows that the Corroborative Instance is not devoid of the Proban. dum, as its presence has been already established.
Reld by you';-this is meant to indicate that the reasoning here put forward is an indirect one, in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum. Otherwise the Reason cited would be one that is not admitted by one or the other of the two parties.
Question-"In what way is the invariable concomitance of the Reason (with the Probandum) established !"
Answer :- If they were devoid of momentariness, etc.; the existence' that is meant to be the Reason here is that which consists in "capacity for fruitiul action'; and this 'existence 'must be absent, it 'momentariness' is absent; because when things perform a fruitful act, they do it either successively and simultaneously, there is no other way of acting except successively and simultaneously; as these two are mutually exclusive, as is clearly perceived; for instance, the Jar is not perceived, at one and the same time, to perform the successive functions of containing wine, water and other liquids as apart from one another, and also the simultaneous functions of bringing about its own cognition and also containing water, at one and the same time - now those various acts that the Jar is seen to perform successively,-or the Potter is seen to make the Jar, the plates and other objects-all those it or he is not able to do or make simultaneously. When too the Jar is found to produce its own cognition and other things at ono and the same time, it is not, at that same time, found to produce those samo

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successively also. All this is clearly established by direct Perception. Thus Succession being excluded by simultaneity, and vice versa, the cognition that precludes both these functions (the siiccessive as well as the simultaneous) naturally precludes the object also to which those functions belong.-and it also indicates that there can be no third kind of functioning; thus then there is mutual exclusion- contradiction between these two-succession and simultaneity-of that particular kind in which the presence of one implies the absence of the other. Thus no third kind of activity being possible, all fruitful activity of things must be either successive or simulta. neous; and when such activity is precluded in Permanent things by the absence of the more extensive character, it precludes its characteristic in the shape of existence' also. In this way the necessary invariable concomitance becomes secured.
It cannot be argued, in answer to this that-"The succession and simultaneity of the things themselves have not yet been proved, inasmuch as Time is not postulated by us as a distinct entity."--It will not be right to argue thus, because we do not say that the succession and simultaneity' of things are due to a distinct category in the shape of Time; what we mean is that it is due to their coming into existence in those ways. For instance, when it so happens that when one comes into existence, the others also come into existence similarly, then they form the basis of the notion of non-succession' or 'simultaneity'; as is found in the case of several sprouts coming out from similar causal conditions ;-when, on the other hand, things appear in a different manner, they are spoken of as successive '; e.g., such things as the sprout, the stern, the leaves, and so forth.-Al these are clearly recognised by direct perception, and are spoken of as such by people. The functioning of Causes also towards the bringing about of such things is similarly spoken of as successive or simultaneous'. Thus the objection that has been urged cannot be rightly urged against us.
Says the opponent "In case the Thing were proved to be permanent, the preclusion of succession and simultaneity might not imply the preclusion of fruitful activity ; e.g when the existence of the Tree ' becomes precluded in regard to a certain place, it preclucies the particular tree * shimshapi'; otherwise, if the place itself were unknown where could the absence of the shimshapă be cognised As a matter of fact, the permanent thing itself does not exist (for you, the Buddhist), as this is what you wish to deny. If, however, you do admit that such a permanent thing does exist, then it cannot be right to deny it, since you admit its existence as the substratum (of the two kinds of activity). Thus your reason because it has existence becomes 'inconclusive ', as it is found to be present also in the contrary of your Probandum ("Momentary ')."
It is not so, we reply. When we urge the non-perception of the more extensive character as proving our negative conclusion, we do not urge it as an independent valid cognition ; we put it forward only in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum against the opponent ; the sense being if you accepe the permanence of the thing, then, you cannot admit its fruitful activity, as succession and simultaneity', which are of larger extension, and with which the said succession and simultaneity' are invariably concomitant,

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-cannot be present in it; because when the wider thing is not there, the narrower thing cannot be there; otherwise the two could not be related as being of 'larger' and narrower' extension. Hence on the preclusion of the capacity for fruitful activity, the presence of existence also cannot be accepted; as the said capacity constitutes the characteristic of existence.
By this method, the non-existence of things becomes established.
Nor is it necessary that the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity must always be a real entity; as all that is meant to be shown by such in. stance is that the absence of the Probandum means the absence of the Probans. And this is proved by the more assertion,—without admitting the real existence of any object--that when the wider thing is absent the narrower thing also must be absent,-after it has been recognised in a general way that between the two things there lies the relation that one has a wider extension than the other and as such there is invariable concomitance between them; e.g., the assertion when the Tree is absent, the Shimshapa cannot be there. This has been thus declared :- In the case of the Corro. borative Instance per dissimilarity, it is not necessary that the existence of the objective substratum should be admitted ; as what is intended follows from the mere assertion that on the absence of one, the other also cannot be there',-(393-394)
nilarity.
i tted ; as
other also
The following Text shows that the Permanent Thing cannot have any successive fruitful activity:
TEXT (395).
EFFECTS ARE DELAYED ON ACOOUNT OF THE NON-PROXIMITY OF THE CAUSE. IF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE WERE THERE,
TO WHAT WOULD THAT DELAY BE DUE !-(395)
COMMENTARY.
It is not by their own wish that the effects come into existence or not come into existence; in fact, their being and not being depend upon the presence or absence of the Cause. Under the circumstances, if the Thing in its permanent form were always there, as the cause of all things, then how is it that all effects are not produced at once, being dependent as they are upon the mere presence of the said Cause ? and why should they appear successively-one after the other ? - Kșēpa' is Delay.So that even the subsequent effect should come into existence beforehand. --because its Cause would be there in its untrammelled form.-- just like the effect that the Opponent has in view.-(395)
In the following Text, the Opponent offers an explanation:

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TEXT (396).
** EVEN OF THE ETERNAL THING, THERE ARE CERTAIN AUXILIARIES,-ON ACCOUNT OF WHOSE HELP, THE FORMER
BRINGS ABOUT THE LARGE NUMBER OF ITS
EFFECTS, IN SUCCESSION "-(396)
COMMENTARY.
* Even though the Permanent Entity is always there, yet its auxiliaries come up to it only in succession; hence on account of these latter, the Per. manent Entity will naturally produce its effects only in succession":-(396)
The following Treat answers this arguments
TEXTS (397-399).
THIS IS ALL VERY WELL ; BUT WHEN THOSE OTHER THINGS BECOME ITS
AUXILIARIES', IS IT BECAUSE THEY ARE THE CAUSE OF THE CAUSAL EFFICIENCY (OF THE PERMANENT THING) ? OR BECAUSE THEY ALSO SERVE THE SAME PURPOSE ?-IF THEY ARE THE CAUSE OF THE CAUSAL EFFICIENCY (OF THE PERMANENT THING),THEN THIS THING ITSELP WOULD BE PRODUCED BY THEM; AND YET THIS IS INCAPABLE OF BEING PRODUCED, AS IT IS ALWAYS THERE (BEING PERMANENT), OR, IF THE VERY FORM OF THE PERMANENT THING WERE HELD TO BE PRODUCED (BY THE AUXILIARIES), THEN ITS ETERNALITY (PERMANENCE) DISAPPEARS. IF THE
PECULIARITY' (PRODUCED IN THE PERMANENT THING) BE REGARDED AS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE THING ITSELF, THEN, HOW CAN THIS (THING) BE REGARDED
AS THE CAUSE'-(397-399)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any auxiliary. Because (a) would that be an auxiliary' by virtue of creating peculiar conditions in the thing as the Earth, Water and other things become auxiliaries of the seed through producing in it such conditions as swelling and the like? Or (6) would it by virtue of their serving the same purpose as the thing—as Colour etc. become auxiliaries to the Eye in producing the visual perception of Colour, by mere appearance !--The former view cannot be maintained ; because the peculiar condition that is produced in the Thing, by the auxiliary-would that condition be non-different or different from the form of the thing itself or would it be neither different nor non-different? Or would it be both different and non-different ?-as

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held by the Ajivakas. These are the four alternatives. The first of these alternatives is not tenable: as in this case, the condition, being non-different from the thing, wonld be, like it, always there, and what is always there cannot be produced, or if it be produced, the thing itself also might be produced in the same way; and that would deprive it of its permanence. -If the second alternative be accepted, in that case, the effect being produced by the condition in question, the Thing itself would cease to be the Cause.
The term asau' (in the fourth line of the Text) stands for the Permanent Thing.–(397-399)
The same argument is further clarified in the following
TEXT (400).
THE EFFECTS WOULD IN THAT CASE BE PRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE SAID CONDITION 19 THERE, AND THEY WOULD NOT BE PRODUCED WHEN THE CONDITION IS NOT THERE ;AND THUS IT WOULD BE THIS CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS THEIR
Cause.-(400)
COMMENTARY When it'-.e., the said condition—is there. Thus, i.e., from the positive and negative concomitance just pointed out.-(400)
The following Text states an answer from the standpoint of the Opponent (and then refutes it)
TEXT$ (401-402). IT MIGHT BE AROUND THAT—* ON ACCOUNT OF ITS (THE CONDITION'S) RELATION TO THE THING, THE CAUSAL CHARACTER DOES BELONG TO THAT THING) ALSO "-WHAT RELATION CAN BE HELD TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THESE TWO ?-IT CANNOT BE identity; AS THE TWO ARE RECOGNISED AS DISTINCT. NOR OAN THE RELATION BE HELD TO CONSIST IN THE FACT THAT IT IS PRODUOED FROM IT ; AS IN THAT CASE, THERE SHOULD BE SIMULTANEITY; AND THEN THE APPEARANCE OF THE EFFECTS
ALSO WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS.-(401-402)
COMMENTARY Ils' -.e., of the condition. That'--the permanent thing.
With the words what relation, etc.' the Author replies to the answer of the Opponent. The meaning is that no relation is possible between the two. There are only two kinds of relation possible : Identity and Being Produced out of it the relation between the thing and the condition cannot

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be that of Identity; as the two have been admitted to be different. Nor can the relation be that of being produced out of it; because, in fact, the effects are produced out of the auxiliaries themselves. If then, it be accepted that the conditions are produced out of the thing, then, as the appearance of the conditions would be contingent upon the thing itself, all the conditions would be produced simultaneously, and this would imply the simultaneous appearance of all the effects also; as the Cause (in the shape of the Permanent Thing) along with the conditions would be always present.-(401-402)
TEXT (403).
IF IT BE HELD THAT THERE IS NEED FOR A FURTHER AUXILIARY, THEN THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS. FROM THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ABSENCE
OF RELATION, THE EFFECT CANNOT BE PRODUCED EVEN ONCE. (403)
COMMENTARY.
If it be held that "for the producing of the said conditions' also there is need for other auxiliaries; so that the conditions appear successively and hence there can be no simultaneous appearance of the effects ",-this cannot be right; as in this way, there would be an Infinite Regress. For instance, for these auxiliaries also, there would have to be postulated further auxiliaries for the bringing about of other conditions; of that condition again, which would be different, there would be no relationship, and if it were to be produced out of the same, then all effects would be produced simultaneously; and if a further auxiliary were needed for that, the same difficulties would again present themselves. Thus there being this infinite regress, no relationship between the Thing and the Condition could be established; and when this cannot be established, then the effect would be produced not from the Permanent Thing, but from the Condition itself.-(403)
TEXTS (404-405).
IF THE RELATION BETWEEN THE TWO (THE PERMANENT THING AND THE CONDITIONS) WERE HELD TO BE THAT OF 'INHERENCE' (SUBSISTENCE), THEN ALSO THE FOLLOWING HAS GOT TO BE CONSIDERED:IS THE INHERENT' THING SO REGARDED BECAUSE IT IS HELPFUL? OR NOT SO? IF THE FORMER ALTERNATIVE IS ACCEPTED, THEN
IT COMES TO BE THE SAME AS THE RELATION OF BEING PRODUCED FROM IT, AND THIS HAS JUST BEEN REJECTED.-(404-405)
COMMENTARY.
It might be argued that "the relation between the condition and the Permanent Entity is not that of being produced from it, but that of inhering

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in it, the condition being inherent (subsisting) in the Permanent Thing”,This cannot be right; this is shown in the Text with the words - Then alao, etc. Or not 80 ;-the construction being—'it is held to be inherent without being helpful. Under the first alternative, the help rendered being non-different from the Thing helped, it would come to be the same relation which has been spoken of above all that of being produced from it; and this has been just rejected.-(404-405)
If the second alternativo is accepted, then there being no distinction, everything would be inherent in everything. This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (406)
IN CASH THE INHERENT' BE NOT SOMETHING HELPFUL TO THAT WHEREIN IT INHERES, THEN ALL Tangs WOULD BE EQUALLY INHERENT, AS THERE COULD BE NOTHING TO DIFFEREN
TIATE ONE FROM THE OTHER.-(406)
COMMENTARY.
Equally', -because, in the matter of joing not helpful, it could not be differentiated from the thing that is meant by the opponent (to be infierent). -(406)
The Author next takes up the views that both (the Permanent Thing and the Conditions) are both different and non-different :
TEXT (407).
EACH OF THE TWO ALTERNATIVES—THAT THE TWO ARE Different and non-different-HAVING THUS BEEN SEVERALLY REJECTED,
THE IDEA THAT THE CONDITION IS BOTH (DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT) ALSO BECOMES DISCARD
BD.-(407)
COMMENTARY.
The rejection of each of the two alternatives naturally implies the rejection of both alternatives; as the two alternatives together do not differ from the two alternatives treated severally-Further (between two contradictories), the acceptance or rejection of one must imply the rejection or acceptance, respectively, of the other; hence it cannot be right to regard the existing thing as being both different and non-different (from the Conditions); as the same thing cannot be both affirmed and denied at the same time; otherwise it would cease to be one.-(407)
The following Text shows that this has already been explained before, in course of the examination of the doctrine of the Pudgala' (section F, chapter VII) and the rest.

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 255
TEXT (408).
IN COURSE OF THE EXAMINATION OF THE PUDGALA, ETC. IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT BOTH ALTERNATIVES CANNOT BE ACCEPTED. HENCE THE CONDITION CANNOT BE BOTA DIFFERENT ' AND NON-DIFFERENT'; NOR CAN IT BE NEITHER DIFFERENT
NOR 'NON-DIFFERENT' (408)
COMMENTARY. The other party now puts forward the view that the 'Auxiliaries of the Permanent Thing becomo so by reason of their serving the same purpose as the latter (the second alternative suggested under Text 397). To this effect, some people argue as follows: "The Permanent Thing does not require the Auxiliaries, and yet apart from the Auxiliaries, it cannot bring about its effect; the fact of the matter is that its very nature is such that it produces its effect only when all its auxiliaries are close to it-and never by itself, like the Final Cause. Hence even though the thing be always present, there is no possibility of all its effects being produced simultaneous.
This is the view set forth in the following
TEXTS (409-410).
" EVEN THOUGH THE PERMANENT THING MAY NOT ACTUALLY NEED THE AUXILIARY AGENCIES, YET, APART FROM THESE LATTER, IT CANNOT PRODUCE ITS EFFECT, LIKE THE FINAL CAUSE ; ITS OWN NATURE
IS SUCH THAT IT BECOMES AN EFFICIENT CAUSE ONLY WHEN IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO THE AUXILIARIES; HENCE IT IS THAT EVEN THOUGH THE PERMANENT THING IS ALWAYS PRESENT, ITS EFFECT DOES NOT COME ABOUT
ALWAYS."-(409-410)
COMMENTARY The 'na' (at the end of the second line) goes with carakah
Like the Final Cause '; - this is meant to be the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity; or it may be taken as the Corroborative Instance per similarity in support of the proposition stated in the last line it becomes an eficient cause, etc.'
The term "hëtuat' is to be analysed as "hetoh (with the genitive ending) * iva'.
*Even though the Permanent thing, etc. -i.e., even though the Permanent Thing is always there.-(409-410)
The above view is answered in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
TEXT (411).
THIS MAY BE SO ; DUT IF THE CHARACTER OF THE PERMANENT THING IN ITS COMPLETE FORM (ALONG WITH ITS AUXILLARIES) BE HELD TO BE THE SAME AS THAT OF IT IN ITS INCOMPLETE TORM (WITHOUT THE AUXILIARIES), THEN TUE AUXILIARIES ALSO SHOULD BE
PERMANENT (ETERNAL).-(411)
COMMENTARY.
The above theory may be all right; but what has to be examined here is this--The character that belongs to the Permanent Thing in its complete form as fully equipped with its auxiliaries,- is this character the same as that of the same thing in its incomplete form (without the Auxiliaries)? Or is it different from this latter -If it is the same, then the auxiliaries should be regarded as permanent.-(411)
The following Text shows how that is so
TEXTS (412-413).
BECAUSE THEY MUST EXIST WHILE THAT THING EXISTS WHOSE OHARAOTER IS CONNECTED WITH THEM.-IP, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE INCOMPLETH TORM BE HELD TO BE DIFFERENT (FROM THE COMPLETE TORM), THEN THE UNITY OF THE THING BECOMES LOST.-THUS THE SUCCESSIVE APPEARANCE OF EFFECTS IS NOT POSSIBLE, EVEN WHEN THE CAUSE IS DEPENDENT
(UPON AUXILIARIES).-(412-413)
COMMENTARY. The term tatsambaddha, etc.' is to be expounded as 'that whose character is connected with them, i.e. the Auxiliaries.
They must exíst-i.e. the Auxiliaries must exist.-Just as when a man tied to a chain is dragged, the chain also becomes dragged, -the auxiliaries must follow the Permanent thing with which they are connected. Thus alone does the Thing become saved from renouncing its previous character. If it does not renounce its character which is connected with the auxiliaries, then on account of the non-relinquishment of the character connected with the auxiliaries, the implication is that it does not relinquish the auxiliaries also; because the connection is always dependent upon the connected factor. Otherwise the character of the thing would not be the same as the previous one.

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If it be held that the incomplete form of the thing (i.o, without the auxiliaries) is different from that of the complete form (along with the auxiliaries), then the answer is as follows: If the form of the thing as without the auxiliaries be held to be difierent from its form as with the auxiliaries, then it loses its permanence; as the form is nothing different from the thing itself.
Tlms, even if the action of the cause be dependent upon auxiliaries, it is not possible for the Permanent Thing to have any successive fruitful activity.-(412-413)
The following Text shows that even simultaneous action is not possible -
TEXT (413).
As TOR simultaneity, THAT IS NOT FAVOURED (BY THE OTHER PARTY AT ALL); As TAR EFFECTS ARE ACTUALLY FOUND TO
APPEAR IN SUOCESSION.-(413)
COMMENTARY Even the other party do not favour the idea of the effects of the Permanent Thing being simultaneous. For instance, the following are described as the effects of Permanent Things : (a) Pleasure, Pain and the Rest-of the Soul; (6) Sound-of Ākāsła ; (c) the successive cognitions-of the Mind ; (d) the gross substances, from the Diad onwards-of the Atoms; (e) all products-of Time, Space, God and so forth. And in the case of all these effects it is clearly perceived that they appear in succession.-(413)
What is meant is that the theory of simultaneity is contrary to perceived facts, and also contrary to the opponent's own doctrines.
The author now proceeds to show that it is contrary to Inference also:
TEXT (414).
IT THE THING POSSESSED OF THE CAUSAL POTENCY DISAPPEARS, AFTER HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT ALL ITS EFFECTS SIMULTANEOUSLY, THEN ITS momentarine88 BECOMES
ESTABLISHED.-(414)
COMMENTARY
That is, does the nature of the thing consisting in its capacity for effective action disappear, after having brought about all the effects simultaneously
17

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Or does it continue to exist 2-These are the only two alternatives possible.If it is held that it disappears, then that establishes its momentary character: as at each moment fresh natures would be appearing, one after the other, each preceding nature becoming destroyed by itself.-(414)
TEXTS (415-416).
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE FORM OF THE EFFICIENT CAUSE CON"TINUES AFTER HAVING BROUGHT ABOUT THE EFFECTS), THEN IT SHOULD PRODUCE THE EFFEOT OVER AGAIN, BECAUSE, HOW COULD ANY EFFICIENCY BE ATTRIBUTED TO WHAT IS NOT EFFECTIVE IN BRINGING ABOUT DUH EFFECTS? THUS ALL THINGS WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT AND MOMENTARY,-LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS ',-ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR BEING DEVOID OF ALL efficiency; BECAUSE-IT IS efficiency (FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION) THAT CONSTITUTES THE CHARACTERISTIC OF
(EXISTING) * THINGS'.-(415-416)
COMMENTARY.
If the second alternative is accepted, then, as the form of the thing. in the shape of its causal efficiency, would continue.-it should produce its effect over again; because it will not have abandoned its previous form, just like its previous condition, and thus there would come about the same succession of effects. This shows that the doctrine of simultaneity is contrary to Inferential Reasoning.
It might be argued that,"It may be that the effective action of the Permanent Thing is neither successive or simultaneous; and yet its efficiency mny be there all the same."
In answer to this, it is said- How could any efficiency, etc. etc.'-When the efficiency of things is determined, it is only on the basis of their bringing about their effects, so that when a thing does not bring about any effect, how could it be efficient ? Otherwise, why could not officiency be attributed to the sky-lotus' and other such things also ?
Says the Opponent—"Even though the efficiency of the Thing has disap. peared, the existence of the Thing is still there (it still exists); and as it would be in existence, your Reason becomes Inconclusive."
Answer: Thus all things could be non-existent, etc. etc. The only characteristic of an sisting thing is that it should have the capacity for effective action; if this capacity has disappeared, how could existence, the characteristio feature of the entity, remain there?

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Thus it is established that Akūsha and other things which are held to be non-momentary (permanent) can only be regarded as non-existent',
- like the son of the Barren Woman',-because they are devoid of the capacity for effective action, functioning either successively or simultaneously. -(415-416)
TEXT (417).
IF, THEN, CAPACITY (FOR FRUITFUL ACTION) BE NOT ADMITTED TO BE THE CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF THE ENTITY, THEN, UNDER TEE OTROUMSTANCES, IT BEHOVES THE OTHER PARTY TO POINT OUT SOME OTHER CHARACTERISTIC FEATURE OF
ENTITIES": -(417)
COMMENTARY.
It might be argued that I capacity for effective action were the characteristio feature of entilies, then alone all this would be very well "-In that case it should be explained what their characteristic feature is. As a matter of fact, when it is said that the 'Hare's Horn and such thing are nonentities, this idea is based entirely upon the absence in them of the capacity for effective action. Then, inasmuch as entity" and non-entity' are mutually exclusive, it follows, by implication, that the characteristic feature of "entity', as distinguished from *non-entity', consists in its capacity for effective action.-(417)
The following Text anticipates the opponent's answer to the above :
TEXT (418).
IF THE CHARACTERISTIO FEATURE OF 'ENTITIES' BE HELD TO CONSIST IN being related to existence (Being),—THAT CANNOT BE RICHT; BECAUSE NO SUCH RELATION AS THAT OF
INHERENCE' AND THE LIKE IS KNOWN TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THEM. HOW TOO COULD THEY BE THE CHARACTERISTIO FEATURE OF ONE
ANOTHER !-(418)
COMMENTARY.
[Says the Opponent]" Capacity for effective action is not the character. istic feature of entities; it is being related to existence, i.e., the Inherence of existenca (Being)', that is their characteristic feature.”
The answer to this is—That cannot be right; i.e. that cannot be the right characteristic feature of entities;- because no such relation as that of Inher.

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ence and the like is known to subsist between them; the phase and the like'is meant to include 'existence. If any such relation as Inherence and the like were known to subsist between them, then Inherence' might be the character. istic feature of 'entities '; as a matter of fact however, it is exactly those relations whose existence the opponent has set out to prove; and also ho. cause there are valid proofs to the contrary. Or even the proofs already adduced before may be regarded as setting aside existence' (Being) as well as "Inherence'. The reason for this lies in the fact that 'Existence or "Being can have no relation with anything, as it cannot be helped by anything; and there can be no relation between things that are not helpful to one another; if there were such relation, it would lead to an absurdity. -Further, it behoves you to explain what is the characteristic feature of
Being (Existence), Inherence' and of the ultimate specific Individua. lities, which feature marks them out as 'entities. As a matter of fact
Existence' (or Being ') does not inhere (subsist) in either Inherence' or in the ultimate specific Individualities '; nor does it subsist in Being or 'Existence itself. In fact, the theory (of the opponent) is that what the prosence of existence (or Being) marks out as 'entities are only the three categories of Substance, Quality and Action.-Thus the characteristic foature proposed is found to be too narrow (not applicable to all the things in question).
Even granting that such entities as Existence and the rest do exist ;-the inherence of existence cannot be the characteristic feature of entities ; because it is an entirely different thing; when one thing is entirely different from another, it cannot constitute the form of the latter; and thereby serve as its characteristic feature. Thus, when a person is found whose mind is bewildered by his ignorance of the real character of
entities', if a definition of their characteristic feature is provided, what should be pointed out as the required feature is some character in the thing in question itself which serves to differentiate it from something else; so that through that character, the nature of the thing could be determined; e.g. the Earth is distinguished as characterised by roughness of surface. One thing cannot constitute the form of another thing: for if it did, then it would not be another thing at all; how then could it form its characteristic feature 1 Specially because the term characteristic feature in the present context stands for the nature or character of things.-(418)
Some people argue as follows: "That entity which in its ultimate form does not bring about any cognition even for the Omniscient Person,what would be the proof that would establish the non-existence of such an entity,-by virtue of which such a universal proposition could be asserted that whatever exists is momentary'? Nor would the non-cognition of such an entity vitiate the omniscient character of that Person, as His omniscience applies to only such things as are cognisable; it is only when a man doos not know what is knowable, that he is regarded us not onnisciant; while the said entity is not knowable ; because, even though its cognition could be produced, it would remain incapable of being cognised,"
Against these people, the author directs the following remarks :

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOUTRINE OF THE PERMANENCH OF THINGS. 261
TEXTS (419-421).
ALL OPERATIONS BEARING UPON THE CONSIDERATION OF THINGS ARE TO BE CARRIED ON BY ONE WHO HAS AN UNDISTURBED INTELLECT AND SEEKS TO ACCOMPLISH A USEFUL PURPOSE, -NOT BY ONE WHO IS DEMENTED. HENCH IT WOULD BE RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE EXISTENCE OF ONLY SUCH A THING AS WOULD BE OF USE TO SOME PEOPLE, AT SOME PLACE, AT SOME TIME AND IN SOME WAY. IT IS IN REFERENCE TO SUCH A THING THAT WE ARE PROVING THE momentariness ; AND IT IS ONLY WITH REFERENCE TO SUCH THINGS THAT THE UNIVERSAL PREMISS HAS
BEEN ASSERTED.-(419-421)
COMMENTARY
Whenever there is any consideration as to anything being existent or non-existent, it is done by one who seeks to accomplish some useful purpose, -and not because he is addicted to the habit of considering things; as otherwise he would be regarded as u demented person. Henco an intelligent person can seek to determine the existence of only such things as could be of use to persons sooking to accomplish a useful purpose, in some way, directly or indirectly, at some place, and at some time ; and not anything else ; as there would be no basis for such consideration, and no useful purpose would be served by it.
The term 'adi' is meant to include the consideration of such particular things as Fire, Wator and the like.
Thus what we are trying to prove is the momentary character of only those things which are capable of accomplishing some useful purpose of intelligent men, and which alone are known as "entity', 'thing', and which have the said character of being capable of accomplishing a zseful purpose. And as what we have cited as the Reason is the capacity for fruitful action', there is no fallibility in such a Reason, and it is only such a Reason which is found to be actually invariably concomitant, in the universal form, with the Probandum (Momentarinens). That Premiss is said to be 'universal which asserts the universal concomitance of the Reason, without any distinetion between what is actually known to contain the Probandum and what is not so lenown.-(419-421)
The following texts answer the question why the character of entity', *thing,' cannot be attributed to what is devoid of the capacity for effective actions

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIII.
TEXTS (422-424).
TRAT WHICH IS DEVOID OF ALL CAPACITY, AND IS LIKE THE SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN' NEVER BECOMES A CAUSE (BASIS) EVEN FOR THE MIND OF THE OMNISCIENT PERSON. AND AS IN SUCH A THING, INTELLIGENT MEN DO NOT PERCEIVE AN EFFECT OR CHARACTER AND SO FORTH, THEY DO NOT SEEK TO ESTABLISH ITS existence ; AS ANY SUCH ATTEMPT WOULD BE ABSOLUTELY BASELESS. THERE CAN BE NO USEFUL PURPOSE SERVED BY PROVING THE momentariness or SUCH A THING. SO THAT ANY OBJECTION TAKEN TO
THIS IS ALSO ABSOLUTELY PUTILE.-(422-424)
COMMENTARY. Even for the mind, etc. the term oven is meant to indicate that it is so, not only in regard to the momonte ' of the same series' as the said kind, but also in regard to such other purposes as the holding of water and the rest in the case of the Jar).
Do not perceive the effect or character and so forth ' ; -the term 'Karya', * effect', stands for the fruit, result, the term rūpa' for nature, character, -and so forth includes the particular time, place and condition ;-what is meant is that such a thing does not differ in any way from absolute non. entities like the Hare's Horns'.
Nor is there any useful purpose to be served for the person seeking to accomplish a purpose, by proving the momentariness of such a thing : because the perception or non-perception of such a character in it would not help in accomplishing any good, nor in avoiding an evil. This has been thus declared- For one seeking to accomplish a tuseful purpose, what would be the use in discussing a thing which is incapable of accomplishing a useful purpose ? What need has the young woman of discussing whether the man wanting in virility is handsome or ugly
For these reasons, when the disputant raises such questions as-"How is it known that it is momentary?"-it is entirely futile; because his opponent does not wish to prove the momentariness of such things. (422-424)
The opponent now proceeds to show that 'capacity for fruitful activity also cannot be the right differentia of entity', -as it would be too wide
TEXT (425). SUCH THINGS AS TER Sky-lotus ARE FOUND TO BE «capable of fruitful activity, IN SO FAR AS THEY SERVE AS THE CAUSE OF THEIR OWN COGNITION ; AND YET THESE ARE not existent.”—(425)
COMMENTARY. That is to say, things like the sky-lotus' are found to be capable of auch fruitful action as the bringing about of such cognitions as the sky.

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENOE OF THINGS. 263
lotus', 'the sky-lotus ' ;- and yet they do not really exist; hence the definition that Efficiency is the characteristic feature of the entity' (as put forward by the Buddhist under Text 416) is found to be too wide.-(425)
The following Text supplies the answer to this:
TEXT (426).
THE CHARACTER IN QUESTION AS ATTRIBUTED TO THE SKY-LOTUS' IS ENTIRELY BASELESS; ITS IDEA IS THERE ONLY AS THE RESULT
OF ONE'S EAGERNESS FOR WRANGLING.—(426)
COMMENTARY
As a matter of fact, the capacity for fruitful activity is not admitted in the 'sky-lotus' and such things. The idea of it is merely an outcome of the opponent's imagination and is utterly baseless.-(426)
Question: "What is the Proof that annuls the idea of the said notion actually arising out of the sky-lotus' and such things ?"
Answer:
TEXT (427).
IT THE SAID IDEA HAD A NON-ENTITY FOR ITS CAUSE, THEN IT WOULD BE PRODUCED CONSTANTLY; AS THE NON-ENTITY CANNOT NEED ANYTHING ELSE, BEING ALWAYS DEVOID OT
DISTINCTIONS.-(427)
COMMENTARY.
The compound abhavaläranatvē' is to be expounded as the character of having a non-entity,- like the sky-lotus-for its cause'. If the idea had such a non-entity for its cause then the idea of the sky-lotus and such things would be produced constantly; because its causo would be always present in its perfect form. Nor can it be said to be dependent upon the help of other things, as by its very nature it is incapable of being helped by anything else; hence its activity towards producing its effect could not

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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER VIII.
be held to be occasional on account of the occasional absence of such aids.-(427)
In the following Texts, the anthor sets forth the view of Bhadanla. Yogasena (a Buddhist writer):
TEXTS (428-434).
** EVEN IF THINGS ARE MOMENTARY,-HOW CAN THERE BE ANY effective action ? THE INITIAL AUXILLARIES COULD NOT BE PRODUCTIVE OF PROULIARITIES IN ONE ANOTHER; BECAUSE IF THEY HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE, THEY MUST BE THERE ALRYADY IN THEIR COMPLETE FORM; IF THEY HAVE NOT COME INTO EXISTENCE, AS THE ENTITIES WOULD NOT BE THERE, AS THIS ABSENOE WOULD BE WITHOUT DIFFERENTIATION, WHEREFORE COULD NOT THE EFFECT ITSELF BB PRODUCED THEREFROM (FOR THE BRINGING ABOUT OF WHICH THE AUXILIARIES ARE POSITED)? SPECIALLY AS THEY COULD NOT BE DIFFERENTIATED FROM ANYTHING ELSE, BEING EQUALLY OPEN TO QUESTION. Tous TOO THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS OF AUXILIARIES FOR YOU.-THEN AGAIN, AS THEY COULD NOT HAVE AN EFFECTIVE ACTION EITHER SUCCESSIVELY OR SIMULTANEOUSLY, IT IS USELESS TO REGARD THEM AS MOMENTARY'; SPECIALLY WHEN NO PEQULIARITY CAN BE BROUGHT ABOUT BY ANY AUXILIARIES, THE ENTIRE SERIES IS RIGRTLY HELD TO BE WHOLLY UNDIFFERENTIATED (UNIFORM). IF THAN THE DESTRUCTION WERE WITHOUT CAUSE, IT SHOULD COME ABOUT AT THE VERY BEGINNING AND IF THERE BE NO POSSIBILITY OF IT AT THE BEGINNINO, HOW COULD IT COME AT THE END ALSO ?-IF AGAIN, NO CAUSE IS ADMITTED EXCEPT THE CAUSE OF THE ENTITIES THEMSELVES,-THEN WHY SHOULD THERE BE ANY INOONGRUITY IN THEIR DESTRUCTION COMING ABOUT IN CERTAIN CASES ONLY (NOT
ALWAYS)?"-(428-434)
COMMENTARY.
Yogasēna has argued as follows -"Even if things were momentary, any activity of theirs, either successive or simultaneous, would be incompatible.-Because, by themselves, they could be either capable, or incapable, of such action. If they are capable, then they cannot need auxil iaries; as what is itself capable does not need anything else. If the things are themselves incapable, then any need for auxiliaries is all the more baseless. For instance, the things that fall within the scope of the first series cannot acquire any peculiarities from one another ; because things that are produced and not produced being existent and non-existent, cannot stand in the relation of Helper and the Helped. Hence at the initial stage, they being all undifferentiated, they could not produce any particular moment'; for, if

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such a moment' could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced ? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial - series', as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the series' themselves. If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinito rogress-Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated series' of Causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated Cause, then all things would be produced from all things.
"Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in effective action, coming either successively or simultaneously,-things do have effective activity, and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things aro momentary,
* Thus the Reason put forward (by the Buddhist) - because things exist (therefore they must be momentary)' is found to be Inconclusive.
"Nor can it be said that the production of the effect is due to the "Beries" in a particular condition, and not always':-becange in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by Auxiliaries, the series would remain always indifferentiated.-Nor can it be right to assent that the series itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause', as this would be contrary to a perceived fact. For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearanco (respectively) of the Auxi. liarios. If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to the thing inde. pendently of auxiliaries.
“Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated, such particular products as the Potsherd and the rest could not be prochuced out of the Jar.
" Then again, if the Destruction of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the serios of its homogeneous moments, were without Cause,--then, as independont of all else, it should come about at the very outset; and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before.--If then, for the destruction of things, no such Oause is admitted as another
series' distinct from the Cause of the things themselves,-thon why should Fire be the destroyer of Cold ? because what is ineffective cannot be i des. troyer, simply because it is incapable of doing anything and even 50 if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term 'non-apprehension and the destroying of life as being due to opposition (or destruction)." (428–434)
The above arguments are answered in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
TEXTS (435-436).
OUR ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS STAERE CAN BE NO MEITUAL HELP IN THE CASE OF THINGS APPEARING AT THE INITIAL STAGE'; THEY BECOME AUXILIARIES ONLY BY VIRTUE OF HAVING THE SAME EFFECTIVE ACTION. EVEN WHEN THERE IS NO HELP KENDERED TO ONE ANOTHER, THESE ARE NOT ENTIRELY undifferentiated; BECAUSE WHEN THEY ARE TAEMSELVES PRODUCED OUT OF THEIR OWN CONSTITUENT CAUSE, THEY BECOME PRODUCTIVE OF THEIR OWN SEVERAL
DISTINCT SERIES - (435-436)
COMMENTARY.
The effect is producer only from a cause that is efficient; and yet auxiliaries are not entirely useless. Because the Auxiliary is of two kinds(1) thnt which serves the same purpose, and (2) that which rouders mutual help ;- in the case of the effect appearing immediately, the auxiliary can be of the former kind only, not of the latter kind; because at one and the same moment one could not prociuice any peculiarity in the other, as it remains impartite (undifferentiated) ;-in the case of the remoter effect, however, the auxiliary is of that kind where there is mutual help ; as the qualified succoeding moment is produced mutually out of both, and the remoto effect is produced by mutual help in reference to its own 'series. Thus then, as regards those that appeared at the initial stage, there can be no differentiation from one another; and yet there can be nothing incongruoug in their rendering mutual help ; inasmuch as they serve the same purpose. But they are not undifferentiated in regard to the producing of the imme. diately following particular moment'; as the entire series of the succeeding effects is produced out of its own preceding 'causal ideas', and each member of this series is equally efficient in producing the said effects. These 'Causal Ideas are produced from their own Causal Ideas', these again from other
Causal Ideas of their own; and thus there is an endless series of causes. -Even if there is an Infinite Regress, that is nothing undesirable. Even though each member of the sories is efficient, yet the others are not useless; as they also have been produced as so efficient, through the potency of their own causes. Nor is it possible for them to have a separate existence, as there is no cause for it. Nor can it come later on, as all things are momentary,
They become productive of their own several distinct series that is, they are capable of producing the set appearing at the second moment.The term their own constituent cause should be understood to have been addel for the purpose of procluding the usefulness of an auxiliary that appears at the initial stage. And it is not possible for any effect to be pro. duced ontirely from its own constituent cause, as everything becomes possible with the help of attending circumstances. This has been thus declared

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Notluing can come out of any single thing, all is possible out of the attendant circumstances':-(435-436)
TEXT (437)
THENCEFORWARD THE PARTICULAR ENTITIES THAT COME INTO EXISTENCE ARE BROUGHT ABOUT BY THAT ; ON ACCOUNT OF THE FACT THAT THOSE THAT HELP TOWARDS THEM ARE OF
THAT NATURE.-(437)
COMMENTARY. Thenceforward' ;-i.e. since the moment following the second moment!
*Are broughd about by that? ;-that is, produced by the particular causes brought about by the auxiliaries.
"How so 7"
On account of, etc. etc. ' ;- i.e. because their nature is of that character, -.e. produced by particular causes brought about by particular auxiliaries.
Those that help towards them. ;-this should be construed with the preceding phrase "because their nature is of that form '; and the particle 'cha' has to be weerstood as before the phrase "Those that help towards them. The meaning thus is as follow -Towards the effect that comes into existence at the third moment, the particulars that have appeared during the second moment aro helpful, as its cause; and those that are so helpful have the character of having a nature which is capable of producing the effects producible by the particulars brought about by the auxiliaries; so that the particulars appearing at the third moment are all brought about by these.(437)
Question-"How does this restriction become applicable to these ?" Answer.
TEXT (438).
EVERY MOMENT, ENTITIES GO ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, WITH DET UNDEFINABLE POTENTIALITIES, AND NO OBJECTION CAN BE TAKEN
TO THEM, -JUST AS TO THE FIRE'S CAPACITY TO BURN.-(438)
COMMENTARY.
The naturs of things cannot be criticised (or objected to): because all diversity of the nature of things comes out of a series of ideas bringing the things into existence ; like the 'burning capacity of fire; as matter of fact, they come into existence every moment, as endowed with diverse potentialities, through the functioning of the series of ideas coming one after the other. Hence, even though, for some reason, they are cognised as being similar in form, through the presence of some similarity,-yet, in

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TATTVASAÑORAHA: CHAPTER VIIT.
reality, their nnture is entirely different. That is the reason why only one entity becomes the cause of only one other entity, and not everything of everything. Hence there is no force in the objection urged.
Bhavanti', go on coming into existence', -i.e. are produced.-(438)
It has been argued by the opponent (under Text 433, above) that "if the Destruction were without cause, it should come about at the very beginning " this is answered in the following
TEXTS (439-440).
IT IS DESTRUCTION IN THE SHAPE OF TEN BREAKING UP OF THE SERIES WHICH IS WITHOUT CAUSE ; AND THIS DOES NOT COME ABOUT EVEN AT THE END-WHAT IS DENIED IS ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE IN THAT TORM. AS FOR THE COMING INTO EXISTENCE OF SUCH DISSIMILAR THINGS (SERIES) AS THE Potsherd AND THE LIKE, THIS CERTAINLY HAS A CAUSE; BUT THIS ALSO IS NOT PRODUCED AT THE BEGINNING, BECAUSE AT THAT TIME ITS CAUSE IS
NOT THERE.-(439-440)
COMMENTARY.
Destruction' is of two kinds-(1) in the form of the 'Breaking up of the series, and (2) in the form of the coming into existence of a dissimilar series '-If then what has been urged refers to 'Destruction' in the form of the Breaking up of the series, then that cannot be right; as such
Destruction does not come about even at the end : for the simple reason that it has no form ; then what do you mean when you ask "How does it come about at the end Thus then, inasinuch as we do not admit of its coming into existence at any time, the argument based upon its presence or absence at the beginning or at the end is entirely irrelevant. All that is done by us is that its coming into existence in that form is denied :-*in that form',-i.e. by the appearance of another similar series. When it is said that there is destruction of the Jar', what is meant is that another similar series does not come into existence; and there is no affirmation of anything,
If the 'Destruction' meant by the opponent is that in the form of the coming into existence of a dissimilar series ',--then the fact of its being without cause is one that is not admitted (by anyone): because it is not admitted by any one that the stroke of the Bludgeon produces anything of the nature of a positive entity. That is the reason why it cannot come into existence even at the beginning : As at that time its cause, in the shape of the Bludgeon, is not there.-(439-4-10)
The following Text proceeds to explain the idea of 'antagonism' (relation of Destroyer and Destroyed) among things :

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 269
TEXTS (441-443).
THERE ARE TWO KINDS OF MOMENTARY THINGS '--SOME ARE CAUSES OF DECADENCE,-E.G. TIRE IS THE CAUSE OF THE DECADENCE (DIMINUTION) OF COLD ; AND OTHERS ARE NOT SO.-PEOPLE, NOT PERCEIVING THE TRUTH, THINK THAT THERE IS ANTAGONISM OF VARIOUS KINDS AMONG THINGS, EVEN WHEN THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS THERE. AS A MATTER OF FACT HOWEVER THERE IS NO REAL
ANTAGONISM AMONG THINGS, IN THE SHAPE OF THE RELATION OF THE DESTROYER AND DESTROYED. IT TS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE EXPRESSION NOTION OF ANTAGONISM HAS BEEN USED.
-(441-443)
COMMENTARY. There are certain things which become causes of the decadence of certain other things,-the decadence' consisting in the production of *moments of gradually decreasing degrees of intensity; for instance fire is the cause of such a decadence of Cold-while there are other things which are not 80,-i.e. not causes of the decadence of things; 0.g. Fire is not the cause of the decadence of smoke.--Among the former-i.e. among the causes of decadence, even though there is the relation of cause and effect, yot people, having their powers of vision bedimmed by ignorance, think that there is 'antagonism (between the said cause and the thing whose decadence has beon brought about), of various linds,-.g. Fire is antagonistic to Cold, Air is antagonistic to the Lamp, Light is antagonistic to Darleness and so forth.-In reality, however, there is no such antagonism among things as that betwoon the destroyer and the destroyed; because when an entity comes into existence, it does so in its complete form, and it is impossible to bring about any change in the nature of a thing : there oan bo no cause for any such change, whether it be different or nondifferent from the thing. As regards the non-entity, nothing can be done to it, simply because it is non-existent.So that in both ways, the 'antagonist' can do nothing. It is for this reason that the Teacher has declared that when your cause is there in its perfect form, and yet there is non-existence (of its effect) while something else is existent, it is spoken of as antagonism': it is only a notion of antagonism ; i.e. there is no real antagonismo.
The particle 'api' stands for cha', and should be construed after Eva':-(441-443)
In the following Texts, the author sets forth argumente against the doctrine of the Perpetual Flux, from the standpoint of the followers of Jaimini and others

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TATTVASANGRAKA: CHAPTER VIII.
TEXTS (414-445).
FE AS A MATTEE OF FACT, THERE IS ALWAYS THE Recognition OF A THING IN THE FORM THIS IS THAT SAME', WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN CONCERNED IS RIGHTLY FUNCTIONING; AND THIS RECOGNITION IS QUITE FIRM AND UNDENLABLE.-THIS THEREFORE IS AN IRREPRESSIELE FACT OF PERCEPTION, WHICH ANNULS ALL THE REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED FOR PROVING THE PERPETUAL FLUX OF
THINGS."-(444-445)
COMMENTARY.
"For instance, in regard to Mountains, the Body, the Diamond and such things, after the proper functioning of the sense-organ concerned, there appears the valid senso-perception called "Recognition',-in the form of * this is that same ,--which rejects the idea of things being momentary Even though it is true that such Recognition is found to appear also in regard to newly grown nails, hairs, grasses, and such things-yot the Recognition regarding the Diamond and such things cannot be invalid, -as it is never annulled. This is what is meant by the epithets firm and undeniable'. What is meant is that the mere fact that the Recognition in the case of Hairbrought about by the Eyes affected by darkness, is invalid cannot lead men with unclouded minds to regard as invalid the direct visual perception of the real Hair, brought about by undimmed Eyes.—The epithet firm' implies the fact of its not being of doubtful character, there being no such doubt Els to whether this is really the same or somothing else. The epithet 'undeniablo' implies the fact of its not being wrong," --(444-445)
The Author answers these arguments in the following
TEXTS (446-447). IX FACT, RECOGNITION CAN NEVER BE OF THE NATURE OF DIRECT SENSEPERCEPTION, BECAUSE THE FORM OF THE THING ITSELF IS INEXPRESSIBLE, AND THE Recognition IS EXPRESSED IN WORDS.-Recognition MUST BE WRONG, AND SENSE-PERCEPTION IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM IT. TRAT RECOGNITION IS WRONG 15 CLEAR FROM THE FACT THAT IT APPEARS IN THE FORM OF THE NOTION OF "nondifference' WHERE, IN REALITY, THERE
is difference.-(446-447)
COMMENTARY.
The very fact of the said Recognition being of the nature of Perception is not admitted. Because the real character of a Thing' is inexpressible in

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENOE OF THINGS. 271
words, because of the absence of contiguity: hence its real cognition can only ba in the form of a mental apprehension; specially because when the Thing las not been apprehended as related to any words, it cannot be possible to apprehend it along with a verbal oxpression. Hence a Real Perception, per taining as it does to the specific individuality of things, must be beyond all imposition, indeterminate. And as such Perception would be entirely valid, it cannot be wrong. This is the reason why wise men have declared the dofinition of Perception to be that "it is free from all determination, and not mistaken', which is perfoctly logical.-Recognition, on the other hand, is not 'free from determination', as it is always conceived in the verbal form this is that same'; nor is it unmistaken, because it apprehends, as non-differens, things that are really different.-(446.447)
Question Answer
"How is it so ? "
TEXT (448)
IF THE RECOGNITION DID APPREHEND THE FORM OF THE THING AS PREVIOUSLY COGNISED, TEEN IT WOULD HAVE APPEARED AT THAT SAME TIME, AS ITS OBJECT WOULD BE THE SAME,-LIKE THE
PREVIOUS COONITION-(448)
COMMENTARY.
If the Recognition had the same object that has been cognised before, thon it would have appeared at that same time, because as having the same object, its cause would be there in its perfect form ; like the previous cognition as its object wouid be the same'-.e. the object of the Recogni. tion would be that same object which has been cognised before.-(448)
The following Text puts forward reasonings in the indirect form of a reductio ad absurdum
TEXTS (449-450).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER IT IS NOT SO; TEEN THE RECOGNITION HAS NOT BEEN REGARDED AS APPREHENDING THE SAME OBJECT - BECAUSE IT IS PRODUCED AT ITS OWN TIME,-LIKE THE COGNITION or ANOTHER THING; AND INASMUCH AS IT APPREHENDS AS non-different WHAT IS REALLY different, IT MUST BE MISTAKEN, -LIKE TEE NOTION OF THE ILLUSORY
BALL.-(449-450)
COMMENTARY.
The arguments may be thus formulated : a) When & cognition doos not appear even when the thing is there in its periect form, that Cognition cannot have that thing for its object;-.g. even when Colour is thore in

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TATIVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIII.
its perfectly perceptibile form, the auditory perception is not there ;-even when the Diamond and other things were there in the perfectly perceptible form at the time of their previous perception, their Recognition does not appear at that time; hence the wider condition not being present (the less wide condition cannot be there).-(b) Thus if the Diamond and other things were permanent, the Recognition of those things should appear on the previous occasion, when its causes would be present in its perfect form ;-and yet as a matter of fact, it does not appear at that time; hence it becomes established that those things cannot be permanent. Thus then, it remains undisputed that since it apprehends as non-different what is different, the Recognition must be mistaken, like the cognition of the illusory Ball. Thus it has been shown that Recognition is not one that has its object not denied ;-[hence it is invalid]; because its object is actually annulled by the aforesaid reasoning which has proved it to be wrong.-(449-450)
272
For the following reason also, that it apprehends what is already apprehended, Recognition cannot be valid,-being just like Remembrance.This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (451).
IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD RECOGNITION AS VALID,-BECAUSE IT OPERATES TOWARDS AN OBJECT WHOSE PURPOSE HAS BEEN ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED,-LIKE REMEMBRANCE AND SUCH OTHER COGNI
TIONS AND HENCE IT IS DEVOID OF THE CHARACTER OF
THE VALID MEANS (OF COGNITION).-(451)
COMMENTARY.
That active agent alone is called the Means of Right Cognition which is the best implement and the most effective instrument in the bringing about of the action of valid Cognition. If then, Recognition has for its object something that has been already apprehended by a previous Cognition, then, inasmuch as it would be operating towards a Cognition that has been already brought about, it could not be the most effective instrument',-and under the circumstances, how could it have the character of the Means of Right Cognition? If it did, then Remembrance also would be a means of Right Cognition (which no one admits). And when it has not acquired the character of a valid means of Right Cognition', it cannot be effective in annulling any notion. If it did so, it would lead to an absurdity.
"Recognition may not be a separate Means of Right Cognition; and yet the mere fact of its having for its object something that existed at the previous time does annul the notion of the Perpetual Flux of things."
This is not right; because in reality, its object is not the same as the previous thing; in fact it is a figment of the imagination, and even though purely imaginary, it apprehends, through illusion, the previously perceived thing; and by reason of this illusory apprehension, it is said to have the previously perceived thing for its object. Under the circumstances, how can

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the doctrine of Perpetual Flux' be discarded on the strength of the said * Recognition which is illusory in its very source 1-(451)
The following Texts urge-from Kumärila's standpoint [vide Shloka vārtika -Perception, Shlo. 234]the argument that "Recognition does not appre. hend what has been already apprehended":
TEXTS (452-453).
"As A MATTER OF FACT, the existence of the thing at the present time (OF RECOGNITION) HAS NOT BEEN INCLUDED UNDER THE PREVIOUS
COGNITION ; THIS IS A PECULIAR FEATURE IN RECOGNITION, WHICH IS NOT PRESENT IN REMEMBRANCE. REMEMBRANCE IS IN THE FORM OF THAT AND APPERTAINS ONLY TO THAT WHICH HAS BEEN ALREADY OOONISED BEFORE : RECOGNITION HOWEVER IS IN THE FORM THIS IS THAT SAME, WHICH IS SOMETHING TOTALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE PRE
VIOUS COGNITION)."-(452-453)
COMMENTARY.
Kumarila has argued as follows:-" The previous Cognition has not apprehended the existence of the Thing at the present time (of Recognition): as it could not appear in the form this is the same as that'; hence there is a difference between Recognition and Remembrance." How?"-Remem. brance always appears in the form of 'That which takes in only that much of the Thing as has been cognised before ; while Rocognition takes in the idea of This also (being in the form This is the same as that), which is an additional feature of the thing concerned. To this extent, Recognition is something different from Remembrance. Thus Recognition acquires the character of a real "Means of Right Cognition', after having shaken off the Doubt and Mistake in regard to it.-(452-458)
Ho proceeds to show in what way it shakes off the Doubt and Mistake :
TEXT (454) "INASMUCH AS THERE IS NO DOUBT OR MISTAKE IN REGARD TO WHAT IS COGNISED (BY RECOGNITION), -RECOGNITION ACQUIRES THE CHARACTER OF THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION AFTER
HAVING SET ASIDE BOTH."-(454)
COMMENTARY Inasuch as Doubt and Mistake do not exist at all in regard to the thing recognised, having been dispelled, like cold in a place surrounded by a large mass of flaming fire.-(454)
18

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIIT.
The following argument has beon urged agninst Kumariln's position : In the case of an object cognised through Inference, such as the inference of the dark complexion of the child (from the fact of its heing born of a clark woman),-it is sometimes found that it is subsequently set aside by direct Parception (wlion the child is actually seen to be fair-complexioned);
in the same manner, in the case in question, even though the perinnnence of Things might be cognised throngh Recognition, yet it may be that at some later time, the successive (fluctuating) character of things may be proved through Inference based upon the fact of the effects of the tlung being successive; and the said permanence vouched for by Recognition may thus be set aside by this subsequent Inierence. Under the circumstances, how can the doctrine of Perpetual Flux' be held to be discarded (by Recognition)?
This is answered (from Kumärila's point of view) in the following
TEXT (455).
"A TEIXG, THOUCH COGNISED BY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION, COULD
BE ACCEPTED AS OTHERWISE, IF SO APPREHENDED BY SENSEPEROEPTION; WHEN HOWEVER A TATNG IS ALREADY TAKEN OP BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, THERE CAN BE NO APPEARANCE OF ANY OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION TO THE
CONTRARY)."-(455)
COMMENTARY. Other means of Cognition i.e. Inference and the rest; such as The child must be dark-complexioned because he is the son of so and so and so forth.
Could be accepted as otherwise, -through the instrumentality of Senseperception; otherwise, i.e. of a form other than that apprehended through Inference, etc.
* Already taken up, i.e. apprehended.
There can be no appearance, etc.' ;-Means of Cognition other than Senseperception, i.e. Inference and the rest-cannot set aside Sense-perception. (455)
Why ao ? Answer.
TEXT (450).
* WHEN A THING HAS BEEN DULY APPREHENDED THROUGH THE TIRMLY
ESTABLISHED HIGHEST MEANS OF COGNITION, HOW COULD ONE EVER HAVE A COGNITION TO THE CONTRARY, ON THE STRENGTH OF THE OTHER WEAKER MEANS OF COGNITION ? "-(456)
COMMENTARY. It is only right that what has been ascertained through Inference should be concluded to be otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception ; because

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this latter is the highest among the Means of Cognition ; but Inference and the rost can never alter the nature of a thing as cognised through Sense. perception ; as they are weaker.
Firmly established', -i.e. free from Doubt and Mistake.
"To the contrary',-i.c. otherwise than that coguised through Sense. perception.-(450)
With the following Tect, the Author answers the above arguments of Kumarila -
TEXT (457)
IF existence at the present time IS HELD BY YOU TO BE DISTINOT FROM THE PREVIOUS EXISTENCE, THEN DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THEM
BECOMES PROVED BY YOURSELF.-(457)
COMMENTARY.
It has been asserted that the object of Recognition is existence at the present time ;-is this present existence different from the existence apprehended by the previous Perception ? Or, is it the same! If it is different, then difference being proved by your own assertion, there is contradiction of your own doctrine ; shile for us, it is what is desired by us.-(457)
TEXT (458)
IF THE present existence is not different (FROM THE previous eristence), THEN HOW IS IT THAT IT IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE PREVIOUS COGNITION? IN FACT, IF IT WERE NOT INCLUDED THEREIN,
THEN IT WOULD COME TO THIS THAT THE TRING
ITSELF WAS NOT APPREHENDED AT ALL.-(458)
COMMENTARY.
If the present existence' is something different from the previous existence, then, how could it have been not-included in the previous Cogni. tion, on account of which you have asserted (under Teart 452) that it is not included in the previous Cognition'?
The following might be urged.--"The momentary character of Sound and other things, though not anything different from these things, is said to be nol-apprehended when the things are apprehended ; the same may be true in the case in question also."
This is not right. It is not true that while the object, Sound, is apprehended, its momentary character, though not different from it, is held to

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TATTVASANGRAHA; CHAPTER VIII.
be not appreliendeel; what is held is that, though the inomentary character is apprehended. yet its apprehension is not definitely certain, on account of the ground for certainty not being there : because mere apprehension does not bring about certain Cognition ; the certainty is dependent upon the needs of the apprehender and the soundness of the repetition of the apprehension.This explnnation is not available for you; because for you, even the previous perception is determinate (certain) in chnracter; and when the form of the thing has been definitely cognised with certainty, through that previous Perception, then its present existence also, which is non-different from the previous form, must also have been definitely ascertained with certainty by that same Perception; if this latter were not definitely certain, the form of the thing also, -as non-different from this present existence, would have to be regarded as not definitely ascertained.
Some people have held that-" The validity of the Rocognition is based upon the definite ascertainment of the Thing that has been in doubt." -This also becomes rejected by our above reasoning. Nor, in the present case, is there any ascertainment of a Thing in doubt -because in the case of Hairs, even though different hairs come ont one after the other, there is Recognition ; so that the doubt would remain (even after Recognition, which has been found to be fallible in the case of Hairs).-(458)
It has been argued (under Text 455) that " what has been cognised by other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception" -This is answered in the following
TEXT (459).
IF WHAT HAS BEEN COGNISED THROUGH INFERENCE AND THE OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION WERE ANNULLED BY SENSE PERCEPTION, THEN
INFERENCE AND THE REST COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, BECAUSE THEY ARE ANNULLED,-LIKE COGNITIONS THROUGH
DETECTIVE VISION.—(459)
COMMENTARY. If the subject matter of an Inference, such as because it is your child fit must be dark-complexioned]'.--could be annulled by Sense-perception,-then that Inference cannot be a Means of Right Cognition at all; because on account of its subject matter boing annulled, there can be no agreement with the real state of things, and hence it would be like the perception obtainod through defective vision-Hence the assertion that "What has been cognised through other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception is irrelevant, being entirely impossible.-(459)

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 277
It has been argued (under Text 456) that-"Sense-perception is the highest among the Means of Right Cognition " ;-that also is not true.-- This is shown in the following
TEXT (460)
TEE CHARACTER OF BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITE THE REAL STATE OF THINGS 'BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL FORMS OF VALID COGNITION, -WHY SHOULD THERE BE A PREJUDICE AT ALL-IN CASE THE BAD CHARACTER BE NOT PRESENT IN Inference AND THE REST, THEN THESE LATTER WOULD NOT BE VALID MEANS
OF Rigur COGNITION AT ALL.-(460)
COMMENTARY
The validity of the Means of Right Cognition consists only in their having the capacity to bring about the right notion of things; and if this is admitted as belonging to all the Means of Right Cognition,-then, why should Perception be regarded as the highest' among them ?-It might be said that "it is Perception alone that is in strict accordance with the real state of things", -then, this character of being in strict accordance with the real state of things being absent in Inference and the rest, these lattor would not be
Means of Right Cognition at all; because the very ides of being a Means of Right Cognition' is based upon accordance with the real state of things; and this (ex hypothesi) would be absent in Inference and the rest.-(460)
The following Te.ct introduces the arguments advanced by Bhavivikta (against the doctrine of Perpetual Flux)
TEXT (461).
" THE ALL-COMPREHENSIVE INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (PREMISS) THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IN ALL THE REASONINGS (PROPOUNDED BY THE BUDDHIST) BEOOMES ANNULLED BY THE FOLLOWING INFERENCE ; OR ELSE, THE PROPOSITION (ASSERTING THE DOCTRINE IN QUESTION) ITSELF BECOMES
REJECTED."-(461)
COMMENTARY
Question :-"What is that Inference ?" Answers

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TATIVASANGRAHA (HAPTER VII.
TEXTS (462-463).
** TAK SITBSEQUENT COGNITION OF THE SUN AND OTHER THINGS MUST APPERTAIN TO THE SAME SUN AND OTHER THINGS THAT EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE COGNITION THAT APPEARS IN CONNECTIOX WITH THE SUN AND MOON, ETC., BECAUSE WHILE IT IS NOT A COGNITION OF ANYTHING RELATED TO THE EARTH AND OTHER THINGS, IT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS (SUN, ETC.): - JUST LIKE THE PREVIOUS COGNITION OF
THE SUN AT THAT TIME." -(462-463)
COMMENTARY.
* The Cognitions-in dispute of the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and suc)objects mttat appertain to the Sun, the Moon, the Planets, the Stars and the rest as associated with the time at which appeared the cognition of these Sm and the rest in Dēvadatta and other persons, ---because while not apprehended as related to the Earth, they are spoken of by means of the terın ilia Cognition of the Sun, the Moon, the Planels, the Stars and the rest ',Tiko Dévadatta's Cognition of these things on the first occasion."
Must apperlain lo, etc. i.e. to luminous substances.
While not apprehender as related to the Earth';this qualification has been added in order to avoid the invalidity that might apply to it on the basis of the Cognition of the Sun, etc. as painted in pictures.
"Subsequent',-i.e. a Cognition other than Dēvadatta's ; i.e. appearing at a different time.-- (462-463)
The following is an argument put forward by Bhavivilta :-"The substrata of Universals like Colour', the substrata of those substrata, and the particular Cognitions of all these, in the form of Perception, Inference, Analogical Cognition, Verbal Cognition, Remembrance, Recognition, Mystic Vision, Donbt, Wrong Cognition, Representative Cognition, Dream, and Dream-end, -all these cannot be liable to destruction immediately on coraing into existence,-because they are spoken of by such verbal expressions as-knowable', rightly cognisable', 'expressible', 'either existing or non. existing ', 'not characterised by cognitions whose object is something different from Being and Non-being', 'not apprehensible by cognitions whose objects are non-apprehensible', 'not expressible by words which are inexpressive * expressible by such words as are the products of sounds produced by the conjunction and disjunotion of homogeneous and heterogeneous substances, -like Previous Negation and such things."
Substrata of Universals like Colour, etc. are the Colour, eto. therselves. The substrata of these substrata', -What are these 1-Such things as the Jar, (which are the substrata of Colour, etc.). - Mystic vision, perception by mysties.-The others have been explained before. Either excistence or non-existence i.e. Being or Non-being.--Inasmuch as there

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 279
is nothing that is neither Being nor Non-being', there can be no cognition of which that could be the objoct; and its non-characterisation' follows from its very non existence.—Similarly, the apprehension of an inappre. hensible object being impossible, inapprehensibility by such apprehension follows as a matter of course. Similarly inexpressibility by words which are inexpressible also follows from the fact that such words are meaningless.
Homogeneous things are substances, like the lips, teeth and so forth, all these having the common character of being products ; 'heterogeneous things are Akasha and the rest; the muluol conjunction and disjunction of these homogeneous and heterogeneous substances produce the first Sound, and this first Sound brings about, in due succession, its produet in the shape of the Sound that reaches the Ear; and it is by this Sound that things are expressed. The process of sound-production, according to these people, is as follows the initial sound arises from Conjunction and Disjunction: thence proceel other sound wavos, in the manner of the filaments of tho Kadumia fowor; that Sound which reaches the Akasha in the Ear, that alone is heard, not any other.”
This entire set of reasonings is set forth in the following: -
TEXTS (464-465).
" ALL THOSE THINGS THAT ARE THE SUBSTRATA OF COLOUR, ETC., AND THE SUBSTRATA OF THESE THINGS,--AS ALSO THE COGNITIONS THAT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THESE, -ALL THESE ARE NOT, LIKE THE SKY-LOTUS, LIABLE TO DESTRUCTION IMMEDIATELY ON COMING INTO EXISTENCE, BECAUSE THEY ARE
COGNISABLE AND EXPRESSIBLE."-(464-465)
COMMENTARY.
The two reasons cognisability' and 'expressibility' have been mentioned by way of illustration; the other reasons also are meant to be applicable.
* Kharabinda is the arabinda', Lotus, in 'Iha', the Sky,-i.e. the Sky-lotus':-(464-465)
Uddyotakana (in Nyāyavartila on 3. 2. 14, page 421, Bib. Ind. Edn.] has stated the argument (against Perpetual Flux) as follows:-" The Cognitions under dispute, appearing at diverse times, must appertain to the same thing,–because while being rightly co-extensive with the cognition of that thing, it is expressible by the same terms,-like the present cognition of a thing as appearing in various persons":-Here the term 'avyutthāyi' stands for what is not vyutthaya, wrong,-ie. what is right ;-the .co. extensiveness is that of the cognitions of the Jar and such things and the epithet 'right' is meant to qualify this co-extensiveness'; what is meant is that the said co-extensiveness is never sublatod or annulled. This qualification has been added in order to avoid the falsity that might attach to it on

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII.
the basis of the oxample of the Lamp-light and snel things. Hæpressible by the sume terms such as Chaitra's Cognition', Chaitra's Cognition and so forth.
This argument of Uddyolalara's is set forth in the following
TEXTS (466-467).
" OUR PROCLAMATION IS THAT THE COGNITIONS UNDER DISTUTE WRICH APPEAR IN SUCCESSION, -ALL APPERTAIN TO ONE AND THE SAME THING,—BECAUSE THE FACT OF THEIR BEING BASED UPON ONE THING IS NEVER ANNULLED, AND THEY ARE ALL SPOKEN OF BY THE SAME TERMS JUST LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL MEN APPEARING AT THE PRESENT SINGLE MOMENT," -
(466-467)
COMMENTARY
Proclamation our conclusion, declaration.
Co-extensiveness', the character of subsisting in the same things-this is not annulled. Such is the analysis of the compound.-(466-467)
The above argument is answered in the following
TEXT (468) IN THE FIRST REASONING, THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE IS DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM, AS IT IS ALL INCLUDED UNDER THE PROBANS; AND ALL OBJECTS OF COGNITION ARE NOT ALWAYS
SYNCHRONOUS WITH THEIR COGNITION.-(468)
COMMENTARY.
In the first reasoning', where the Reason (Probans) is stated in the form' because it is spoken of as the Cognition of that' (under Texts 462-463),
-As a matter of fact, the first Cognition of the Moon, etc. also does not appertain to the Moon, etc. as existing at the time of the Cognition ;--because what forms the object of the cognition is what is included under the Probans itself. Further, it is not possible for any causal relation to subsist between synchronous things. It has been thus Asserted :- What does not exist could have no previous potentiality, and it could have no use later on; all causes must exist before (these effects); hence the object cannot exist along with its own cognition' -(468)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason is 'inconclusive', even with the qualification though not apprehended as related to the Earth (under Text 463)

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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENCE OF THINGS. 281
TEXT (469).
WHEN TERMS LIKE SUN' AND THE REST, WHOSE USE DEPENDS UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, ARE APPLIED TO THE Lamp AND SUCH THINGS, -THE COGNITION OF THE SUN THAT APPEARS PROVES THE FALSITY OF THE REASON IN QUESTION.-(469)
COMMENTARY.
In the second set of arguments also (set forth in the Introduction to Texts 464-465),-for the simple reason that things like the Universal' do not exist at all, no one holds them to be 'momentary:-if the Opponent proceeds to prove the absence of such momentariness in those things (like the Universal', etc.), then his effort is entirely futile.-This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (470).
THINGS LIKE THE UNIVERSAL HAVE NO CHARACTER AT ALL (BEING NON-EXISTENT), HENCE THE MOMENTARINESS OF SUCH THINGS CANNOT BE POSTULATED BY ANYONE; SO THAT ANY REASONS ADDUCED FOR THE PROVING OF THE ABSENCE OF MOMEN
TARINESS IN THE SAID THINGS IS ENTIRELY
FUTILE (470)
3
*
COMMENTARY.
The term 'like', in the Expression Things like the Universal' is meant to include the substrata of the Universal, in the shape of Colour, Jar and the like, and also the Cognitions of these.-These also, even as qualified by the said qualification, do not exist at all; hence the reason that has been adduced for the purpose of proving the momentariness' of such things is entirely futile; that is to say, there can be no dispute on that point at all.
The Author has not gone into the minute details of the reasoning in question. If we go into the minute details, we come across a large number of defects. For instance, the reason that has been adduced in the form that it is either existent or non-existent, is found to be absent in the Probandum and also in the Corroborative Instance; as the term ' either-or' signifies option, and option is possible only when there are more things than one, and not when there is only one thing; and it is not possible for both existence and non-existence to be present in the object that forms the Probandum; because it being of the nature of 'entity', it is only existence that can belong to it. Nor are both possible in the Corroborative Instance; because, as it is a non-entity', it is non-existence alone that can belong to it. -The Reason also as stated has been loaded with a useless qualification: For instance, the expression because it is expressible by words', even by itself, is highly improper, as the term 'expressible itself implies the
+

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TATIVASAST: KAHAI CHAPTER VIIT.
qualification by words '-Similarly, the qualification put forward by the words homogeneous, etc.' is too childish. Similarly the other qualifications of ilio Reasoni diould be regarded usoless.
Further, all thio Reasons put forward are inconclusive ', -because no videne hus boon udduced in denial of a conclusion contrary to the desired Lonelul.- This is going to be explained later on.-(470)
As regards the argument set forth under Texts 466-467,--the answer is provided in the following
TEXT (471).
AS REGARDS THE CHARACTER OF BEING EXPRESSED BY THE SAME TERM -THIS IS PRESENT IN THE COGNITIONS OF THINGS LIKE THE LAMP ALSO. HENCE THIS REASON BECOMES
INCONCLUSIVE!:-(471)
COMMENTARY
In the case of the Cognitions of the Lamp, nu find that the same expression * Cognition of Lamp' is applied to the cognitions which have different things (in the shape of the flickering fames) for their object; hence the character of being expressed by the same term', which has boen adduced as the Reason for sameness, is found to be 'fallible' in the case of the Cognitions of the Lamp'.
Or the Text may be read with a taunting intonation, the sense being'the said character subsisting in the Cognitions of the Lamp is, on that very account, & very sound reason, and for you, indeed, it is infallible; but in reality, it is not so ':-(471)
In the following Tout the Author anticipates the view of the other party :
TEXT (472).
IF IT BE HELD THAT " IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITIONS OF THE LAMP, THE CO-EXTENSIVENESS 'IS SUBSEQUENTLY ANNULLED ", -THEN HOW IS IT THAT YOU DO NOT PERCEIVE THE CLEAR ANNULMENT OF THE SAME IN YOUR PROPOSED
CONCLUSION ALSO 4-(472)
COMMENTARY
"In fact, the qualifiention-' while being rightly co-extensive with the Cognition of that thing '--has been added (by Uddyotakara), solely for the purpose of excluding such cases as that of the Cognitions of the Lamp', as the one-ness of the object of these latter Cognitions is annulled; because the Lamp is at one moment with a high flame, and the next moment with a

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low flame, it is at one moment very bright and at the next moment, less bright. How then can our Reason be false ?"
Such is the sense of what the Opponent says.
In answer to this, the Author adds-How is it, etc.—That is, the qualification also is one that is not admitted. As a matter of fact, even in regard to the character of the Opponent's intended Probandum, there is annulment ; -why is that also not perceived ? For instance, in regard to Chaitra and other persons, the Cognition of them that is produced is in such diverse forms as infant', boy', 'youth' and so forth,-in regard to the mountain and such things, the notions are diverse in the shape of cold, 'hot', etc. So that, as in the case of the Lamp, so in the case of these things also, the diversity of the cognised thing is clearly perceived. If it were not so, then, if the same mountain that was cold subsequently bocame hob,then under both conditions both cold and heat would be perceptiblo there; because the said qualified conditions being related to the thing, the qualities would have to be regarded as present there ; for instance, when a man tied to a chain is palled, the chain also becomes pulled, This has been nearly all explained before.-Thus even with the said qualification, the Reason is wproven', 'not admitted'.-(472)
The annulment of the Opponent's argument by Inference also is next shown
TEXTS (473-474).
THE COGNITIONS UNDER DISPUTE CANNOT PERTAIN TO ONE AND THE SAME THING, BECAUSE THEY APPEAR IN SUCCESSIOX,-LIKE THE COGNITIONS PERTAINING TO LIGHTNING, LAMP AND SUCH THINGS.-IN ALL COGNITIONS PERTAINING TO ONE AND THE SAME THING, THE PRESENCE OF SUCCESSION IS INCOMPATIBLE. AND WHEN THE EFFECT IS THE SAME, EVEN THE DEPENDENCE OF OTHER THINGS WOULD BE INCONGRUOUS.
-(473-474)
COMMENTARY
The argument may be formulated thus :What appears in succession can never have its completo cause always in close proximity to it, as the cognitions of Lightning, Lamp and such things the Cognitions under dispute all appear in succession - hence there is found something which is contrary to that with which the desired character is invariably concomitant.-- This Reason cannot be said to be 'inconclusive'; because succession is not possible in the Cognition of any single object, the completo cause of which Cognition is present.-Nor can the cause be said to be dependent on other causes (which could account for the succession); because what is permanent cannot be helped by such aids; and no dependence can rightly be held to lie on what is not helpful; as this would lead to absurdities. If there were

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER VIII.
help actually rendered, then the thing would lose its permanence. This has heen explained hundreds of times.-(473-474)
284
The following Text shows that all our arguments are free from the defect of Inconclusiveness', as there is no proof in support of a conclusion contrary to ours
TEXT (475).
ALL THESE REASONS ARE FREE FROM DOUBT AND DENIAL-AS BEEN ADDUCED IN ANNULMENT OF THESE. (475)
NO PROOFS HAVE
COMMENTARY.
This is easily intelligible.-(475)
End of the Chapter on the Permanence of Things.

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CHAPTER IX.
Examination of the Relation between Actions and their Results: Action and Reaction.
COMMENTARY.
The Author now proceeds to examine the doctrine of Relation between Actions and their Results, the Law of Action and Reaction, mentioned in the Introductory verses; and starts off with an objection from the standpoint of that doctrine, against the Doctrine of Perpetual Flux
-
TEXT (476).
"IF ALL THINGS ARE OBSESSED BY non-permanence, IN THE FORM OF MOMENTARINESS', THEN HOW CAN THERE BE ANY RELATION
BETWEEN ACTION AND ITS RESULT (REACTION), OR
BETWEEN THE CAUSE AND ITS EFFECT AND SO FORTH?"-(476)
COMMENTARY.
4
f
The Text speaks of non-permanence in the form of momentariness', with a view to exclude that non-permanence' which does not consist in momentariness; the meaning being if things are held by you to be obsessed by that non-permanence which belongs to momentary things-then, how could there be any such relations as the one subsisting between Actions and their Results and so forth, which are recognised among men and in the scriptures ?-The expression and so forth is meant to include the means of cognising the cause and its effect, the Recognition following after Apprehension, the longing for one thing aroused by the seeing of another thing, the notion of Bondage and Liberation, Remembrance, Decision following after Doubt, seeking for something kept by oneself, the cessation of curiosity for things already seen and such other hosts of grounds for objection raised by the evil-minded.-What is meant is that if a doctrine is contrary to notions current among people and recognised by the scriptures, it can never secure acceptance; hence the Doctrine of Perpetual Flux' is open to the objection that it is annulled by universally accepted notions. For instance,

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it is well known among peoplo that the result of the good or bad action is experienced by that same man who did the act; when a good or bad act has been done by Deradata, the result of that act-agreeable or disagrecable,is not experienced by Yajnadatta. Nor is such an idea countenanced in the scriptures, where we read-When the action has been done by this person, who else will experience its results?-Such a notion is contrary to the doctrine of the Perpetual Flux of things; as under that doctrine there cannot be any one entity who would do the act and experience its result; so that the said doctrine is clearly open to the criticism that it involves the anomaly of the disappearance of the action done by the Person himself and the befalling upon him of the effect of what was not done by him'.-(476)
The following Text explains how the doctrine is open to this criticism:
286
TEXTS (477-479).
"IN THE CASE OF ACTIVE PEOPLE, THAT MOMENT' (MOMENTARY THING) WHICH IS BELIEVED TO BE THE doer oF THE ACT, DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST AT THE TIME OF THE APPEARANCE OF THE RESULT OF THAT ACT-AND THE ACT WAS NOT DONE BY THAT MOMENT' WHICH IS SPOKEN OF AS THE experiencer OF THE RESULT AT THE TIME OF ITS APPEARANCE; AS IT DID NOT EXIST AT THAT TIME,-THUS, INASMUCH AS NO SINGLE ENTITY IS ADMITTED AS BEING THE doer OF THE ACT AND THE experiencer OF ITS RESULTS, THE POSITION THUS CLEARLY
IS THAT THE ACT IS LOST FOR THE MAN RESULTS BEFALL ONE WHO DID NOT DO IT, ANOMALOUS." (477-479)
WHO DID IT AND ITS WHICH IS EXTREMELY
COMMENTARY.
'Does not continue to exist as it is destroyed immediately on its coming into existence.
Inasmuch as no single entity, clc.;-i.e. since the Act and its Result have not been taken up by one and the same entity. There is loss of the Act' for the door of the net, as he does not come by the result; and there is befalling of what he did not do' on the man who did not do the act.
Extremely anomalous-i.e. no such situation is found either among people or mentioned in the scriptures.-(477-479)
The anomaly of the loss of what is done and the befalling of what is not done has been pointed out, on the acceptance of the view that activity' is possible; the Opponent next proceeds to show-from Kumarila's standpoint, that activity itself is not possible (under the Doctrine of Perpetual Flux'):

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TEXTS (480-481). "AS A MATTER OF FACT, UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF No-Soot', THE doer OF AN ACT WOULD KNOW, BEFOREILAND, THAT, AS I AM GOING TO PERISH IMMEDIATELY, THERE WOULD BE NO RESULT FROM THIS ACT, OR IT WOULD COME TO SOME ONE OTHER THAN MYSELF AND KNOWING THIS, THE INTELLIGENT MAN WOULD NOT UNDERTAKE THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY ACT, GOOD OR BAD, FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING ITS RISULT; AS FOR THE RESULT, IT WOULD BE STILL FURTHER
REMOVED."—(480-481)
COMMENTARY,
Under the Doctrine of Porpetual Flux, it would be held that all things are devoid of Soul'; as all things being dependent upon their cause (in the Causal Chain '), nothing can be independent (self-sufficient). Under the circumstances, the intelligent agent must know,-be conscious of the fact, -"what?"-that after my destruction, the result could not acorte to me, as I would not be there at the time that the Result comes about : even if the Result comes about, it would come to a Moment other than myself'. Knowing this, the intolligent person would not undertake the act at all; how thon could there be any result which can follow only from an act preceded by the activity (of an active agent)? Such Result would bo 'still further removod', as absolutely impossible.-(480-481)
It has thus been proved that there can be no relation between Action and its Result; the Author next proceeds to show,-again from Kumārila's standpoint,--that the Relation of Cause and Effect is not possible under the doctrine of Perpetual Flux' :
TEXT (482).
" NEITHER THE FUTURE NOR THE PAST ENTITY CAN BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE EFFECT ; AS FOR THE PRESENT ONE, THAT ALSO
DOES NOT CONTINUE TO EXIST TILL THAT TIMH." -(482)
COMMENTARY.
Tint that time' ;i.e. during the time that it would come into existence and produce the effect, it does not continue to exist, being momentary(482)
The following Text adduces arguments in support of each of the assertions made in the preceding Text regarding the Future. etc. :

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER IX.
TEXTS (483-484).
"AN ENTITY THAT HAS ITSELF NOT SECURED ITS EXISTENCE CAN NEVER BE THE CAUSE OF SOMETHING ELSE; NOR CAN THE DESTROYED ENTITY (BE A CAUSE); NOR CAN THE PRESENCE (OF THE PRESENT ENTITY) BE CAPABLE OF PRODUCING THE EFFECT. FURTHER, IF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS MOMENT' BE HELD TO BE absolute, THEN THERE COULD BE NO PRODUCTION OF ANY SUBSEQUENT 'MOMENT',
288
AS ITS CAUSE WOULD NOT BE
THERE." (483-484)
COMMENTARY.
That thing is called 'future which has not yet secured its existence; -what has not secured its existence must be non-existent'; what is nonexistent must be devoid of all potentiality;-what is devoid of all potentiality cannot serve as the cause of anything else,-i.e. cannot serve as the cause of bringing about any other thing; because it is agreed on all sides that it is only a potential thing that can serve as a cause.
Similarly what has perished cannot serve as the cause of anything else, as it is devoid of all potentiality.
As for the Present thing, that has no continued existence, by virtue of which it could be capable of producing any effect.
Then again, if it is held that the preceding Moment' perishes absolutely, then there could be no producing of the subsequent 'Moment', as there would be no cause for such production.-(483-484)
The following argument might be urged (by the Buddhist):-Just as the rising and falling of the weighing scales come about simultaneously, so also would be the destruction of the Present Moment and the appearance of its effect; so that what is meant is that the subsequent Moment is brought about by the preceding Moment before the latter has been destroyed; and that the appearance of the later moment would not fail to have its cause.
The following Text supplies the answer to this argument :
TEXT (485).
EVEN IF THE DESTRUCTION AND PRODUCTION WERE SIMULTANEOUS, THERE WOULD NOT BE MUTUAL DEPENDENCE; SO THAT THERE COULD NOT BE THE RELATION OF *CAUSE AND
EFFECT, AS THERE WOULD BE NO HELP
RENDERED BY IT." (485)
COMMENTARY.
Even if the Destruction (of the first Moment) and the Production (of the second Moment) be assumed to be simultaneous, there would not be the

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relation of Cause and Effect' between the said Destruction and Production, or between the Moments undergoing the said Destruction and Production - because the two would be independent of one another. "How would they be independent of one another?"_Because there would be no help rendered by it; that is, the Destruction, being featureless, would have no action; and as for the entity that is regarded as the Cause, it is not present at the time that the Effect comes into existence; so that it could not have any action bearing upon the latter. -485)
The following might bo urged (by the Buddhist)-Even without any operation, the relation of Cause and effect' would be there on the basis of mere provimity.
The answer to this is supplied by the following
TEXT (486).
"THE Odour AND OTHER QUALITIES THAT APPEAR AFTER TAR DESTRUCTION OF THE Colour OF THE JAR ARE NOT HELD TO BE TIB EFFDOT OY TELIS LATTER; IN THE SAME WAY THE SUBSEQUENT Colours ALSO (COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS THE EFFEOT OY THE PREVIOUS
COLOUR)."-(486)
COMMENTARY.
If the idea is that when one thing comes into existence after another, it must be the effect of this latter, then just as, after the 'Colour-Moment subsisting in the Jar has ceased, the homogeneous Colour-moments that appear in it are regarded as the effects of the preceding Colour-moment, so also the Odour and other properties that are produced in the same Jar would have to be regarded as the Effects of that same preceding Oolour. moment. And, yet, even though this immediate sequence is there, the Odour-moment is not held to be the effect of the preceding Colour-moment ; because between material properties, there cannot be the same causal relation that there is between material substances themselves, because they appear in different chains (or series). This is the opinion that our opponent himself holds
In the same way the subsequent colours also that is to say, the homogeneous Colour-moments cannot be regarded as the effects of the previous Colour-moment, entirely on the ground of immediate sequence ; as otherwise there would be an absurdity.-(486)
Having thus shown that mere immediate sequence cannot be the basis of the causal relation, the Opponent sums up his own view by way of recapitulation :
19

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER EX.
TEXT (487). "Tuus THAT ALONE CAN BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF AN EITECT WHOSE ACTION IS FOUND TO BE THERE BEFORE THE PRODUCTION OF THAT EFFECT; AND NOT MERE IMMEDIATE
SEQUENOE."-(187)
COMMENTARY. Not mere immediale sequence', 'can be the basis of the notion of Cause-effect-this has to be regarded as understood.-(487)
What has been already explained above is now briefly summed up :
TEXTS (488-489). "THE UPSHOT BRIEFLY IS THIS IF THE EFFECT WERD PRODUCED FROM A CAUSE THAT HAS perished, THEN SUCH AN EFFECT WOULD BE WITHOUT CAUSE, AS WELAT HAS PERISHED CAN HAVE NO CHARACTER (OR POTENTIALITY).-IF THE EFFEOT BO VELD TO BD PRODUCED FROM A CAUSE TILAT Has not perished, -THEN, AS THE CAUSE IN THAT CASE WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST DURING SEVERAL MOMENTS, WHEREFORD COULD THE MOMENTARY CHARACTER OF THINGS NOT BECOME DISCARDED (ON THAT ACCOUNT) ?"
-(488-489)
COMMENTARY. Only two views are possible in this connection (1) The Effect is produced out of the Cause which is itself destroyed, and (2) that it is produced out of the Cause which is not destroyed; things cannot be other than either destroyed or not destroyed. The first view cannot be right; because what has been destroyed is non-existent, and if production from that were admitted, the effect would have to be regarded as without Cause ; which would mean that it is eternally excistent.-Nor can the second view be right as, in that case, things would continue to exist during several moments, which would deprive them of the character of momentariness.
Wherefore could it not be discarded ? '-i.e. it would certainly become discarded. For instance, it would mean that-a) the Thing comes into existence, then (6) it acts, then (c) it produces the Effect, then (d) it porishes; so that it is there during all these several moments; which rejects the idea of its being momentary 488-489)
Having thus shown the impossibility of the relation of Cause and Effect', the Opponent proceeds to show the impossibility of any Means of Cognising such relation:

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TEXTS (490-491). “IT THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS EXISTED ONLY FOR ONE MOMENT, THEN THEY COULD NOT BE PERCEIVED BY THE EY; AS THINGS THAT HAVE BEEN DESTROYED ARH NEVER COGNISED,-AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THINGS LONG PAST.THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT' CANNOT BE APPREHENDED BY MEANS OF PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION , BECAUSE THI NATURE OF THINGS IS NOT APPRE
HENDED AT ALL".-(490-491)
COMMENTARY. The Relation of Cause and Effect is sought to be proved through Perception (of Effect only when the Cause is present) and Non-apprehension (of the Effect when the Cause is absent). Under the circumstances, if Things were momentary, as they could not be in existence at the moment of their cognition, they could not be perceptible : as the relation of Cause and Effect is not possible between things existing at the same moment. Thus there is no possibility of Perception or Non-apprehension (in support of the momentariness of things); spocially because 'Non-apprehension also is only a form of 'Perception', being, as it is, of the nature of the apprehension of a Thing as not related to anything else ; and hence there being no use for it when there is no apprehension of any thing, Such being the case, how could the relation of Cause and Effect be provod through Perception and Non-apprehension 14(490-491)
Even though there be an apprehension of the Thing--as there can be no one entity who would comprehend the preceding and succeeding Moments,
-there can be no relation between these two.This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (492). “ WHAT PERMANENT DOER (AGENT) IS THERE WHO WOULD CORRELATE THE COGNITIONS APPEARING IN SUOCESSION? IT ANY SUCH WERE SEEN, TREN ALONE WHAT IS DESIRED COULD BE ADMITTED; AND IF ANY SUOH IS NOT SEEN, THEN THIS LATTER CANNOT
BE UNDERSTOOD."-(492)
COMMENTARY. The torm gati' stands for apprehension.- Kramavadgatim ', -the gati', apprehension, which is keramavati', successive.-'Who would correlate ' have a comprehensive notion of .--That is, no one.--If there were any one who would conceive of such a comprehensive notion as-The smoke has become cognised through the cognition of the Fire, and without the cognition of the latter the former is not cognised 'which appears in succession, -as apprehended by a single Perceiver, then it might be possible to establish the relation of Cause and Effect:-There can however be no such correlator,

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER IX.
under your view,- lience the relation of Cause and Effect cannot be estab. lished.-(402)
The following Text proceeds to show the impossibility of Recognition
TEXT (493). *[THINGS ARE IN PERPETUAL FLUX', THEN Recognition ALSO IS IMPOSSIBLE ; BECAUSE WHAT HAS BEEN SEEN BY ONE PERSON
CANNOT BE RECOGNISED BY OTHERS."-(493)
COMMENTARY.
Recognition consists of the notion that that same abjeot which was seen by me previously is seen by me now which includes within itself the two perceptions as pertaining to the same object and the same perceiver; and such 'Recognition cannot be possible if all things were in a
perpetual flux '; as under that view, neither one 'perceivernor one ' object' would be there (to be related to both porceptions); for instance, Vişnumitra does not recognise 'what has beon seen by Devadatla.
The mention of one person is only by way of illustration ; it is also to be undorstood that the object also which has been seen by one person cannot be recognised' by another person.-(493)
The Buddhist may argue that-As in the case of the hair and nails that have been cut and have grown again, though there is difference (between what has been cut and what has grown again), yet there is recognition on account of similarity, 80 would it be in all cases of Recognition. This is answered in the following
TEXTS (494-495).
* IN THE CASE OF THE HAIRS AND OTHER THINGS, WHERE THERD IS
DIFFERENCE, RECOGNITION MAY BE DUE TO SIMILARITY, BECAUSE THE PERCEIVER IS ONE AND THE SAME. WHEN HOWEVER TEURD IS DIFFERENCE OF BOTH, THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR RECOGNITION. IF THERE IS NO SINGLD ENTITY WHO COULD HAVE THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION, THEN HOW IS IT THAT, ON SEEING Colour, THERE APPEARS A LONGING FOR THE taste AND OTHER QUALITIES (OF THE THING
SEEN)?"—(491-495)
COMMENTARY.
If there were a single cogniser, then there could be Recognition based upon similarity, even when there is difference between the two things con

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cerned,-such Recognition being due to the common Cogniser. When however there is difference of both,-i.e. when the cognisers as well as the cognised things in the two cases are different, there would be no basis for the Recognition.-Then again, if there were no single cogniser correlating the two cognitions,-then how could there be such phenomenon as that when one sees the colour of the citron-fruit, he remembers the taste concomitant with that colour and evinces a desire for experiencing that tasto and undertakes activity towards securing it? Certainly no one could have a longing, etc. for what has been seen by another person.-494-495)
The following Text proceeds to show that 'Bondage' and 'Liberation' also would not be possible (under the doctrine of Perpetual Flux):
TEXT (496)
"WEAT is bound UP WITH CHAINS OF ATTACHMENT, ETC. IN THE PersonHOUSE OF THE WORLD IS ONE MOMENT', WHILE THE MOMENT'
THAT IS liberated IS ANOTHER, WHO HAS NOT BEEN IN
BONDAGH THIS IS INCOMPREHENSIBLE." -(496)
COMMENTARY.
One 'Moment' is bound up with Attachment while another is liberated, --this is incomprehensible; i.e. impossible.
Bhau' is world, Cycle of Birth and Rebirth, which is the prison - house', the place where persons are kept in bondage.—(496)
The following Teact proceeds to show that any attempt at Liberation would be useless, -as no Liberation can be possible :
TEXT (497).
"FOR THE BOUND (IMPRISONED) PERSON, LIBERATION CAN NEVER BE POSSIBLE ; BECAUSE (ex: hypothesi), HE IS ABSOLUTELY DESTROYED. HENCE ALL THE EFFORT PUT FORTH BY PERSONS
SEEKING FOR LIBERATION IS FUTILE."—(497)
COMMENTARY,
It might be argued that-there would be Liberation for one who has not been in bondage ;-where is the incongruity in that!
The answer to this is provided in the following

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294
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER IX.
TEXT (498).
"THE PERSON SECURING LIBERATION HAS ALWAYS BEEN FOUND TO BE ONE WHO HAS BEEN BOUND UP IN CHAINS, ETC.; ANY SUCH
ASSERTION THEREFORE AS THAT THE UNBOUND
PERSON BECOMES LIBERATED IS CONTRARY TO A WELL-PERCEIVED FACT."-(498)
COMMENTARY.
That the person who is liberated is the same that had been in bondage is a fact well recognised and seen in the world. The assertion therefore of the Liberation of the Person who has not been in Bondage is one that is annulled by popular notion and also by a perceptible fact.-(498)
The following Text points out that the said idea is annulled by Inference also
TEXT (499).
"BONDAGE AND LIBERATION' MUST BELONG TO THE SAME PERSON,BECAUSE THEY ARE OF THAT NATURE, LIKE BONDAGE AND
LIBERATION IN THE ORDINARY WORLD.-THUS EVERY
THING BECOMES THOROUGHLY WELL-ESTAB
LISHED."-(499)
COMMENTARY.
The argument may be thus formulated :-Bondage and Liberation must subsist in one and the same person,-like the Bondage and Liberation in the world, the Bondage' and 'Liberation' under dispute are Bondage and Liberation in the form of Attachment and Dissociation therefrom;this is a reason based upon the nature of things.
"Because they are of that nature;-i.e. because they are in the form of Bondage and Liberation, i.e. because they have the character of Bondage and Liberation.
4 Tau, these two-i.e. Bondage and Liberation.
Thus the single substratum in the shape of the Soul' being established, all the doctrines relating to the Relation between Actions and their Results and so forth become thoroughly established:-i.e. are beautifully proved: there being no room for the criticisms directed against them.-(499)

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TEXT (500).
"IN THIS SAME MANNER IT MAY BE SHOWN THAT, IF ALL THINGS ARE IN 'PERPETUAL FLUX', REMEMBRANCE AND SUCH OTHER PHENOMENA WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE, AS THERE WOULD BE NO SINGLE SUBSTRATUM (UNDER THAT
TIIBORY)."-(500)
COMMENTARY.
As any single Agent would be impossible, it should be understood that there would be no possibility of any such phenomena as the following: - Remembrance, well-ascertained cognition, seeking for a thing hidden by oneself and so forth. Because in all these, the substratum being different, there would be incongruities; e.g, wheti Chaitra is the original apprehender, doubter, lider and seeker.-Maitra could not be the rememberer, the ascer. tainer, seeker, and so forth.-(500)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answor the above criticisms (levelled against the Doctrine of Perpetual Flu) :
TEXT (501)
WE PROCEED TO ANSWER THE ABOVE CRITICISMS AS FOLLOWS THINGS BEING WITHOUT SOUL, IN REFERENCE TO THOSE ALSO, TIE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT BEING THERE, ALL THE SAID NOTIONS BECOME ESTABLISHED
WITHOUT ANY DIFFICULTY.—(501)
COMMENTARY.
Even when things are regarded as being without Soul', all such notions as those relating to the Relation between Acts and their Results' and so forth, are based upon the relation of Cause and Effect'; so that when the relation of Cause and Effect is there, all those notions become established and there is no incongruity at any point.-(501)
Says the Opponent-"This definite Law of Cause and Effect itself is not possible without a Soul'."
The answer is provided in the following

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TATTVASANGRAJA : CHAPTER IX.
TEXT (502).
JUST AS TIE TOTENCY OF THE SEED IS RESTRICTED TO THE SPROUT EVEN IN THR ABSENCE OF A PERMANENT 'Soul!, SO WOULD IT
ALSO BE IN THE CASE OF PSYCHICAL CONCEPTS.-(502)
COMMENTARY.
Just as the potency of the Seed and such things is restricted to the Sprout and such things,-even without a controller in the form of tho Soul's -So would it also be in the case of every psychical concept. Such things as the Seed and the rest are not controlled by the Soul', in the way that the Body, as the receptacle of experience, is held to be controlled. Otherwise, there would be no sense in the (Naiyāyiku's) argument that "the living body cannot be without soul, as, if it were, then there could be no breathing and other functions”; in the case of the Jar and such things, if the absence of
Breathing, etc.' were found to follow from the absence of the Soul', then alone could the negative concomitance involved in the argument be admissible if the Jar, etc. also were with Soul, then how could the Reason adduced have the requisite negative concomitance ?
Even in the absence of a permanent Soul', -i.e. even when there is no character which is common to them all.-(502)
Question-"How does the Causal relation become established ?"
Answer -
TEXT (503)
EITHER INDIRECTLY OR DIRECTLY, IT IS ONLY A CERTAIN THING, AND IN ONLY CURTAIN CASES—THAT HAS THE POTENTIALITY IN REGARD TO ANOTHER THING; THUS ALONE ARE SUCH RELATIONS AS THAT BETWEEN ACTIONS AND THEIR
RESULTS POSSIBLE.-(503)
COMMENTARY.
Just as, in regard to external things, the law of Action aud Reaction is restricted, so is it in regard to the group of Psychical Concepts also ; as the causal potency is everywhere restricted; it is only from certain good and bad acts that particular results, agreeable or disagreeable, follow, through a chain of moments; 6.g. from the apprehension of Colour follows its Remernbrance,—from cognition follows definite conclusion,- from the act of depositing follows the subsequent seeking for it,- from the longing for a thing follows the actual sight of it, thence the cessation of the eagerness for it. In no case do the Buddhists admit of all these Reactions of Remembrance and the rest as connected with any one single entity : for them, it is mere Conception, a mere Idea. This has been thus declared
The Action is there, the Result is there, but the Maker (Agent) is not

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perceived, one who abandons these thought-phases and takes up others; nothing apart from the Law of Things; this Law of Things being that where such and such a thing appears when such and such another thing is present the former is said to be produced from the production of the latter." Such relations as between Actions and their Reactions';-this is meant to include Remembrance and the rest;-the relation meant is that of 'Cause and Effect (Producer and Product').-(503)
Objection "If that is so, then how is it that among people and in the scriptures it is said in reference to the Soul-When the action has been done by him, who else will experience its Reaction ? ""
Answer:
TEXT (504).
4
THE NOTION OF THE DOER' AND THE REST IS IN REFERENCE TO THE UNITY OF THE CHAIN; AND THAT TOO IS HELD TO BE ONLY A FIGMENT OF THE IMAGINATION; IT IS NOT A PART OF THE REAL STATE OF THINGS.-(504)
COMMENTARY.
People have the light of their wisdom bedimmed by a mass of deep ignorance; hence they ignore all considerations regarding their being this or that, being existent or non-existent, and so forth,-and come to regard the chain of impressions in the shape of particular causes and effects as one', and thus come to make use of such expressions as The same I am doing this act', and proceed to make attempts to bring about their Liberation. It is in view of this (popular) egotisma that the Blessed Enlightened Ones, desirous of saving their disciples from the pitfalls of Nihilism, propound the theory of the Unity of the Chain' and thereby explain the notions of the Doer' and the like.
Says the Opponent-"The said Explanation is enough to establish the reality of the matter under dispute ".
Answer:-"It is not a part of the real state of things;-as a matter of fact, the real state of things cannot be determined on the basis of the notions entertained by childish persons enmeshed in illusion and averse to the investigation of truth; specially as the said notion is negatived by the evidences of Soullessness' and 'Perpetual Flux of Things.-(504)
The Author anticipates the Opponent's objection to the effect that "the absence of the continuous Soul in the case of Seed and such things not being admitted (by all parties), the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Buddhist, under Text 502) is one that is not admitted (and hence inadmissible as Corroborative Instance)"

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298
TATTVASANGRARA : ONLAPTER IX.
TEXTS (505-506).
IN THE ABSENCE OF CONTINUITY, THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT WOULD BE OF THE PARTICULAR KIND JUST POINTED OUT,-THIS ALONE IS POSSIBLE AMONG THINGS APPEARING UNDER DIFFERENT CHAINS' -IN THE CASE OF THE SEED SPROUT AND SUCH THINGS, THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS FOUND TO BE DEFINITELY CERTAIN, AND YET THERE IS NOT THE SLIGHTEST TRACE OF CON
TINUITY.-(505-506)
COMMENTARY.
anugama', continuity, i.e. of any
The term anvaya' stands for particular character.-(505-506)
The following might be urged by the Opponent :-" Continuity is cer. tainly present in the case of the Seed and such things; as has been declared by Uddyotakara :-What happens in the case of the Seed and Sprout is that the components of the Seed relinquish their previous formation and become arranged in a different formation, when they have taken this formation, the Earth-element in it becoming mingled with the water element, and heated by the l'ire-element, produces a substance in the shape of the Sap; and this Sap, along with the previous components assumes the form of the Sprout. Such being the case, how can it be true that there is not the slightest Irace of continuity ?"
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXTS (507-508).
IF THE ELEMENTS OF EARTH AND THE REST IN THE SEED-SPROUTCREEPER AND SO FORTE ARE NOT DIFFERENT,—THEN THERE CAN DE NO DIFFERENCE AMONG THEM; AS, IN THAT CASE, ALL OF THEM WOULD BE OF THE SAME NATURE. HENCE IT MUST BS ADMITTED THAT THERE IS NO CONTINUITY
IN THIS CASE.

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FOR THESIE REASONS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING THE EXISTENCE
OF ACTION AND RE-ACTION, THE SUPERIOR PHILOSOPHERS SHOULD PUT FORTH AN EFFORT TO PROVE THE RELATION or 'CAUSE AND EFFECT-AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF ESTABLISHING THE NON-EXISTENCE OF ACTION AND REACTION', THE OTHER PHILOSOPHERS SHOULD PUT FORTH AN EFFORT TO DISPROVE THE RELATION OF CAUSE
AND Ekrecr':-(507-508)
COMMENTARY.
The sense of this is as follows: If the Earth and other elements pre. sent in the later formation continue without surrendering their previous forms,—then there can be no surrendering of the previous formation and the assuming of the later formation ; because both the formations would be exactly of the same nature as before : so that there would be no difference among the Seed, the Sprout, and the Creeper, all being of the same nature.-In case you admit of difference among the Seed, etc., then, as there would always be the abandoning of the preceding form, it must be admitted that the Earth and other elements also abandon their own respective formations and assume other formations. Otherwise, there would be no difference at all ; as already explained. Thus there being an appear. ance of several forms, one after the other, where would there be any * continuity'?
Inasmuch as on the proving of the true character of the causal relation, all such notions as the relation between Action and ita Result become explicable,--and on the disproving of it, the said notions become dispelled, - for the purpose of determining the existence of Actions and their Results, etc.,-efforts should be put forth for the proving of the Causal Relation, by the superior philosophers,-i.e. by the Buddhists, who are 'Suporior philoso, phers' on account of their being followers of the best doctrines. And for the purpose of disproving the same notions, effort should be put forth by other philosophers,-i.e. the followers of other philosophical doctrines.
The term 'Küryakaranatāsiddhau " has boen construed twice over,the last term in one case being asiddhau'.
[The latter assertion would appear to be in the nature of a taunt).(507-508)
As for the two alternatives—destroyed or not destroyed'-set forth by the Opponent (under Texts 488-489),—the author proceeds to dispel them,—thereby establishing the Causal Relation as the very root of all laws:

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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER IX.
TEXTS (509-510).
OUR EXPLANATION IS AS FOLLOWS THE EFFECT COMES INTO EXISTENCE AT THE SECOND MOMENT ;-The Causa HAD COME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE FIRST MOMENT; AND DURING THAT MOMENT IT IS NOT DESTROYED, BUT BEING momentary, IT DOES NOT EXIST AT THE MOMENT AT WHICH THE EFFECT IS THERE; EVEN IF IT WERE THERE, IT WOULD BE USELESS, AS THE EFFECT WILL HAVE ALREADY COME INTO
EXISTENCE.-(509-510)
COMMENTARY
Our view is that the efect comes out of the Cause while this latter is still undestroyed; and there is no possibility of the two being simultaneous; because what happens is that the Effect comes into existence at the second moment, through its dependence upon the Cause which has come into existence at the first moment and has not yet bocome destroyed; so that when the Effect comes into existence it does so from the Cause while it is still undestroyed; as it has not been destroyed at the first moment. And yet the Cause does not continue to exist at the moment that the Effect is in existence, as, being momentary, it cannot so continue to exist. Even if it were to continue, it would not have the nature of the Cause; because when the Effect has already come about, it would be absolutely useless.-(509-510)
The following Text shows this same uselessness :
TEXT (511).
WHAT HAS ALREADY COME INTO EXISTENOT CANNOT BE PRODUCED BY IT OVER AGAIN ; BECAUSE WHAT IS MEANT BY A THING 'OOMING
INTO EXISTENCE' IS THAT THERE SHOULD COME ABOUT SOMETHING THAT DID NOT EXIST BEFORE. IF IT
WERE NOT SO, THEN THERE WOULD BE
NO RESTING AT ALL.(511)
COMMENTARY. Il e were not so, then there would be no resting' ;-i.. if it were not as stated, then there would be no resting,-i.e. there would be no limit; i.e. there would be an infinite regress. If what has come into existence were to be produced again, then there would be an equal possibility of its being produced over again ; and in this way there would be an infinite regress of productions, -there would be no cessation in the activity of the Cause, and the Causes themselves would be liable to be produced ; as there would be nothing to

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distinguish them and the result would be that there could be no such distinction as this is the Cause and that the Effect'.-(511)
In the following Text the author sums up his position and shows that there is no flaw in the view that the Effect is produced from the Cause while the latter is still in existence -
TEXTS (512-514).
THUS WE CONCLUDE THAT IT IS AT THE SECOND MOMENT THAT THE EFFECT
COMES INTO EXISTENCE OUT OF AN EFFICIENT CAUSE WHICH CAME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE TIRST MOMENT AND HAS NOT YET BEEN DESTROYED.IF IT HAD BEEN HELD THAT THE EFFECT COMES INTO EXISTENCE AT THE THIRD MOMENT, THEN IT WOULD COME OUT OF THE destroyed CAUSE AS THE CAUSE OF THE DEVELOPMENT WILL HAVE BEEN DESTROYED, LIKE THE EFFEOT ITSELI,-AS IS GOING TO BE EXPLAINED LATER ON-THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEITY ONLY IF THE EFFECT HAD COME AT THE FIRST MOMENT. BUT THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT, BHING JUST LIKE THE DOOTRING OF THE EFFEOTS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ALONG WITH THE CAUSE.-(512-514)
COMMENTARY, As regards the alternative of the Effect coming out of the destroyed Cause, that is improper, as it is not hold by us. As that alternative would mean that the Effect comes at the third and subsequent moments, -as has been hold by the Vaibhāşikas, in such assertions as the one presents the effect) when it is past'; if this view were held, then it would mean the admission of the view that the Effect comes from the destroyed Cause ;-but such is not the view held by us; because it is devoid of reason.
There might have been some chance of the anomaly of the Cause and Effect being simultaneous if the view were that the Effect comes at the first moment; as these same Vaibhāşilcas regard the Cause as born along with the Effect'. This is entirely unreasonable.-(512-614)
Why this is unreasonable is shown in the following
TEXT (515).
WHAT DID NOT EXIST COULD HAVE NO POTINOY; IF THD POTENCY WERE THERE, THE EFFECT WOULD SURELY BE PRODUCED ; HENCE SIMUI/TANEITY BETWBEN CAUSE AND EFTEOT
IS OLEARLY INCONGRUOUS.-(515)
COMMENTARY.
When the co-born Cause (i.e. the Cause that comes into existence along with its Effect) produces its Effect, it can do so either while it is itself unborn,

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or when it is itself born;-the former alternative cannot be right; as the Cause does not exist prior to the production of the Effect, and as such, is devoid of all potentiality. If it be said that "It produces the effect when it is born, and then, being endowed with potentialities, it produces the Effect", -the answer is-if the Potency were there, etc.'; i.e. if the Cause has its potency while it is in the state of having been born, then, like the character of the Cause, the Effect also would be already born; and under the circumstances, on what would the potency of the Cause operate ?-Thus the doctrine that Cause and Effect are simultaneous is clearly contrary to the authority of Inference.-(515)
302
Says the Opponent: "The relation of Cause and Effect is the same as the relation of Agent and Object'; and as such it would be highly incongruous if the two factors appeared at different times. For instance, between the Potter and the Jar, the relation of Agont and Object' is perceived only when the two are there at the same time ".
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXTS (516-517).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHEN THE CAUSE PRODUCES ITS EFFECT, IT DOES NOT DO SO BY HOLDING THE EFFECT IN THE MANNER OF THE PAIR OF TONGS, BY REASON OF WHICH THERE WOULD BE SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN THE TWO. NOR DOES THE EFFECT COME INTO EXISTENCE, BY FIRMLY EMBRACING ITS CAUSE, IN THE MANNER OF THE LOVER EMBRACING THE BELOVED, BY REASON
OF WHICH THE TWO COULD BE REGARDED AS COMING INTO
EXISTENCE AT ONE AND THE SAME TIME.
(516-517)
COMMENTARY.
If, in the producing of the Effect, the Cause operated in the manner of the Pair of Tongs,-or if the Effect, in the process of coming into existence were to do so by embracing its Cause in the manner in which a woman is embraced, then there might be simultaneity and co-existence of the two always. As a matter of fact, however, the whole of this universe is entirely devoid of activity, there is, in reality, no active agent' or 'objective' at all,-apart from 'Convention.-Such is the sense of the whole answer.
Prakṛti'-is cause.-(516-517)
Opponent "If that is so, and everything, the Cause as well as the Effect, is inactive, how is it that people are found to make use of such verbal

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expressions as the Fire produces Smoke', 'the smoke comes into existence on the basis of Fire,' and so forth ? "
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXTS (518-519). THOUGH THE THING IS REALLY INACTIVE, VET ON ACCOUNT OF THE RESTRICTION IMPOSED BY THE NATURE OF ITS CAUSE WHION CAME INTO EXISTENCE AT THE FIRST MOMENT, THERE APPEARS, IMMEDIATELY AFTERWARDS, SOMETHING COMING INTO CONTACT WITH THE SECOND MOMENT; IT IS UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT THE FORMER IS SAID TO PRODUCE THE LATTERSUCH ASSERTION BEING IN ACCORDANCE WITH A CONVENTION WHIOH IS PURELY ARBITRARY, BASED UPON THE WHIM OF THE SPRAKER.
—(518-519)
COMMENTARY. On account of the restriction imposed upon the potency of the Cause, arising from the Idea that gave rise to that Cause, a particular Effect is produced from the Cause which has appeared at the first moment,--this Effect being in contact withi-i.e. appearing at-the second moment; it is then that the said Cause' is said to produce the said Effect. The mention of producing is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to mean also that the Effect comes into existence on the basis of the Cause.
"Who are the people who speak of it as such ? "
Such assertion, etc. etc.'—that is, thus say those persons who act in accordance with conventions based entirely upon the speaker's wish, irrespectively of external realities.-(518-519)
Question "If & thing, on coming into existence, did not become operative, how could it become the Cause in the bringing about of a particular effect? " Answer :
TEXT (520). WHAT WOULD BE THE GOOD OT ANY ACTIVITY AT ANY TIME OTIER THAN THAT OF ITS OWN BIRTH Murn existence IS THE ONLY OPERATION, AS IT IS WHEN THIS IS THERE THAT THE EFFECT
APPEARS.—(520)
COMMENTARY. Inasmuch as the Effect is produced immediately after the Cause has come into existence, any operation of that Cause on this Effect, after the latter

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TATTVASANGBAHA : CHAPTER IX.
has come about, would be absolutely useless. Because, what is it that is called the operation of the Cause? It is that immediately after which the Effect socures its appearance; and as a matter of fact, the Effect appears iminudiatoly after the existence of the Cause; hence it is this existence itself wlich may be onlled the operation. What is the need of assuming any
operation' other than this 'birth' (coming into existence of the Causa ? -(520)
"If this is so, thon, how is it that people speak of the Effect has need of the Cause', the Cause operates on the Etreet'?" Anstoer
TEXT (521) IT IS THE NECESSARY CONDITION OF IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE THAT IS CALLED 'NEED'; AND IN THE APPEARANCE OF THR EFFECT, THE ONLY OPERATION OF THE CAUSE IN ALL CASES
IS ITS EXISTENCE ':-(521)
COMMENTARY. The need that the Dffec has of the Cause consists only in the fact of its coming into existence immodiately after the latter; and of the Cause also, the only operation' towards the bringing about of the Effect is that it is always in existence at the time of the appearance of the Effec.-(521)
Further, you have to admit that the causal character' of an operation' -or of a Thing with that operation, towards a particular Effect consiste entirely in the fact of the latter coming into existence only when the former is in existence ; in fact, for the determining of the causal relation between a Cause and its Effect thore is no ground except positive and negative concomitance. Such being the case, why is not the causal character attributed to the Thing itself (and not to its action or operation) - specially as it cannot be said that the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect with the Thing itself is not well known. Hence it is far better to regard the Thing itself as the Cause, with which the positive and negative concomitance of the Effect is well recognised.--This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (522). As A MATTER OF FACT, THE Operation ALSO IS ASSUMED TO BE THE CAUSE ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE FACT THAT THE EFFBOT APPNARS
WHEN THE OPERATION IS THERE; IT IS FAR BETTER, THEN, THAT THE THING ITSELF TO WHICH THAT OPERATION BELONGS SHOULD BE REGARDED
AS THE CAUSE.-(522)
COMMENTARY. • Assumed ',-.e. the operation', which has been assumed by you to be of the nature of neither the Cause nor the Effect, nor both.

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That to which the operation belongs ', - becomes the Cause, by reason of the fact of the Effect appearing only when it is there 'Such is the con. Struction of the sentence.
The Thing itself',-i.e. the Thing by itself, without any peculiar form of activity or operation, may be regarded as the Cause':-(522)
Question "What is the peculiarity in this latter view that it is said to be 'far better?
Answer:
TEXT (523) As A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS ON THE existence OF THE SEED ITSELF THAT THE SPROUT IS SEEN TO APPEAR ; ON THE OTHER HAND, NOTHING IS SEEN AS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ON THE EXISTENCE
OF AN OPERATION :-(523)
COMMENTARY.
On the existence',-1.e. on mere existence; i.e, on the existence of the Thing—the seed—itself, devoid of any other operation (or activity).This establishes the fact of the Effect being positively and negatively concomitant with the Thing itself, and not with the Operation.-(523)
Says tho Opponent "Even thongh the concomitance of the Effect with an Operation is not admitted, yet the Operation can have the causal character ?
Answer:
TEXT (524).
IF YOU ASSUME TEE 'CAUSAL CHARACTER OF THE OPERATION WHEN ITS POTEXOY (TOWARDS THE EFFECT) HAS NOT BEEN PERCEIVED,
THEN WHY DO YOU NOT ASSUME THE SAME OF SOMETHING ELSE ALSO ? OR, WHAT DISTINGUISHING FEATURE DO YOU FIND IN THE OPERATION WHICH IS NOT FOUND IN THAT OTHER
THING !-(524)
COMMENTARY.
Having ussurned the Operation to be the Cause, you will have to assume some other thing also as the Cause; because this letter would not be different from the Operation, as both would be equally such as having their potency not perceived ;-and so on there would be an infinite regress (of asswned Causes).-If no other Cause (than the Operation) is assumed, on the ground of there being no basis for it, then, the assumption of the Operation also may not be there ; as the baselessness' would be equal in both cases.
20

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TATTVASASGRAJA: CFAPTER IX.
Thon again, tlus Operation that is said to proclucu the Effect,- does it produce it Wurotgh the medium of another Operation Or by its mere scistenca ? It could not be the former, ts, in that case, the causal character should belong to that other Operution, not to the previous Operation, and for this later Operation alss, there would bo the need for another Operation, etc.-all which would be open to the same objection. And if that other Operation also would need a further Operation, then there would be an infinite regress.-(524)
If then, it ba hold that the Operation produces the Effect by its mere existence.-Then, like this Operation, the Thing itself might produce the Effect by its mera existence; and the Assuming of the Operation would be entirely futile. This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (525).
JUST AS THE OPERATION', WITHOUT ANY OTHER (OPERATION), IS HELD TO BE THE Cause or THE EFFECT,-IN THE SAME WAY, WHY
CANNOT OTHERS, LIKE IT, BH Causes 1-(525)
COMMENTARY
Just as the Operation, without further Operation, is regarded as the Cause of the Effect, in the shape of the Sprout,-in the same manner, why cannot other things also, without any partioular Oporations, be regarded as Causes 1-(526)
It might be argued that the Operation does not directly help the Effect, it helps only the Thing to which it belongs ".
The answer to this is provided in
TEXT (526),
[wluich is missing in the printed Text; the commentary upon it however is available, as iollows]:
The phrase "held to be the Cause' (of Text 525) is to be construed here also.-What is meant is that for you also, when the causal character would belong to the thing as equipped with the Operation, it would be so without the intervention of a further Operation ; so that there would be no Corroborative Instance available for you.-(526)
Then again, apart from its existence, there can be no other Operation of the Thing, for the simple reason that if it were there, it would be perceived, and yet its not perceived.--This is explained in the following

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TEXT (527).
THOUGH IT HAS BEEN REGARDED AS PERCEPTIBLE, YET WE DO NOT PERCEIVE IT ; HOW TIEN CAN WE ACCEPT THE CONNECTION OF THAT
AS THE BASIS OF THE CAUSAL CHARACTER) -(527)
COMMENTARY.
Operation' has been held by you to be something perceptible; as asserted by Kumārila (Shlokavärtila : Shabranityatá33) When the Operation of a Thing is perceived before the Effect, that thing is regardled as the Cause of that Effect, etc. etc.'-And further, that partionlar entity which is of the nature of the Operation'-is it something different from the thing to which it belongs? Or is it non different from it - In the case of all entities, no third alternative is possiblo; and no such alternatives are possible a Fit is both different and non-different, or that it is neither different nor non different!
If then, it is something different, then the Thing itself cannot be the Cause', as the causal character' belongs to the Operation which is something different from the Thing-It might be argued that " by virtue of its connection with the Operation, the Thing also would have the causal character ".-That however is not possible ; because there can be no connection betwoen things which do not help one another. It might be answered that "the Operation is helped by tle Thing".-That also is not right; as e matter of fact, the Thing has no other Operation by which it could help the previous Operation ; if it were otherwise, then there would be an infinite regress (of Operations), whereby the successive Operations themselves would accomplish each other, and there would be no connection between the Operation and the Thing.--If it be assumed that the Thing helps the Operation, without any further Operation, then, why should not the Thing by its mere existence, without any Operation, help the Effect (to come into existence),—for which purposo a different thing in the shape of the Operation is assimod? In fact, there is nothing to prevent its usefulness towards the Effect, by its mere existence. From all this it follows that it is not right to assume a distinct thing in the shape of the Operation'
If then the other alternative be accepted-that the Operation is non-different from the Thing" (to which it belongs),-then it becomes admitted that existence is the only Operation; because the term 'existence connotos only the nature of the thing concerned.
Thus the view that the Operation' (oi the Cause) is something different from its own coming into existence-cannot be accepted.-(527)
Further, in the case of Cognition, it is found that as soon as it appears in tho form of the apprehension of its object, -it operates by its mere esistence; and hence in the case of all Things, the causal character must belong to themselves, without any subsequent operation. This is what is explained in the following

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TATTYASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IX.
TEXT (528)
IN THE CASE OF COGNITION, ITS COMING INTO EXISTENCE ITSELF HAS
BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONSTITUTING ITS CHARACTER OF MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION', WHY THEN SHOULD NOT THE CAUSAL CHARACTER IN THE CASE OF ALL THINGS
BE HELD TO BE THE SAME ? -(528)
COMMENTARY
In the case of Cognition there is no other operation apart from its being born, coming into existence ; for instance under Mināmeü-sūtra 1. 1. 4, defining Sense-perception', while explaining the purpose served by the term janma birth, in the Sütra, Kuarila has declared as follows." What the torm birth of Cognition' connotes is the fact of the Cognition being a Means of Right Cognition as soon as it is born : in the case of other agencies, 2 certain Operation is found, which is something distinct from their birth; in order to preclude the same in the case of the Means of Right Cognition, it is nocessary to use the term birth'."-Shlokavirtika. Sutra 1. 1.4, 53-54).
* The causal characer, elc.':-.e. why cannot all things be regarded as produced by the birth , coming into existence', of the Cause 1-(528)
"In the case of Cognition, it is quite right that mere existence is the Operation, as the Cognition does not continue to exist at any later time, being momentary ; [but the same cannot be true in the case of other things, which are not momentary)."
This is answered in the following
TEXT (529).
JUST AS COGNITION IS MOMENTARY, SO ARH ALL THINGS THAT ARE BORN,
AS THEY HAVE BEEN PROVED TO BE. HENCE THE WHOLE
UNIVERSU MUST BE DEVOID OF OPERATION' -(529)
COMMENTARY.
Under the chapter on the Permanence of Things' it has been proved that all things are in perpetual flux
* So are, etc. -i.e. like Cognition.
Hence',-i.e. because of their moinentary character.
The argument may be formulated as follows:Things that are momentary can have no action (or operation), - like the Cognition,- Seed and other things have already been proved to be momentary this therefore is a reason based on the nature of things (for regarding them as devoid of action). As a matter of fact, things have no subsequent existence, and there could be no action without a substratum this supplies the argument annulling the possibility of action or operation in things.

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From all this it follows that the only basis for the relation of Cause and Effect consists in immediate sequence, and not in any action (or operation, on the part of the Cause).-(529)
It has been argued above by the Opponent (under Text 486) that, the Odour and other qualities that appear when the colour of the Jar has been destroyed, etc. etc.'; but this is not incompatible with the Buddhist's argument ;-this is what is shown in the following
TEXT (530).
AS REGARDS ODOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES (APPEARING IN THE JAR),
THE FACT OF THEIR BEING CAUSES OF EACH OTHER, AS FORMING FACTORS OF THE SAME CHAIN, IS ACTUALLY ADSITTED (BY US); AND THIS IDEA IS NOT ANNULLED BY THE ALLEGED ANOMALY OF THEIR BEING
SUCH CAUSES.-(530)
COMMENTARY. As regards Colour, Taste and other qualities, it is already admitted by ns that as forming part of the same chain' they are auxiliary causes of each other; as has been thus declared Without the action of Potonoy, there is no Cause of Taste; this is the only explanation of all past qualities that have oxisted at the same time, which is derived from the indications of their Efiecte ':-(530)
Says the Opponent :-" Just as Smoke appears in immediate sequence to Fire, so sometimes it may appear in immediate sequence to such things also as the Cow, the Horse and the life; then why cannot more immediate sequence be regarded as inconclusivo (in the proving of the Causal Relation)" Answer :
TEXT (531).
EVEN WHEN ONE THING APPEARS IN IMMEDIATE SEQUENCE TO ANOTHER, - IT IS ONLY IN SOME CASES (NOT ALWAYS) THAT THE LATTER IS THE CAUSE OF THE FORMER, WHERE THE SEQUENCE IS INVARIABLE; THIS IS WHAT IS ACCEPTED, IN VIEW OF SUCH BEING THE REAL STATE OF THINGS THE SAME IS THE CASE UNDER THE VIEW THAT THINGS ARE
PERMANENT.—(531)
COMMENTARY.
We do not say that mere immediate sequence is the basis of 'Causal Relation'); what we do assert is that one thing is to be regarded as the Cause

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TATTTASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IX.
of another when the latter is always found to appear in immediate sequence to the former, that is, one thing is regarded as the Cause of another when the latter is found to appear only in immediate sequence to the former. Smoko is not found always to appear in sequence to the Cow, tho Horse and so forth; because it actually appears even in the absence of these animals. - Then again, to you also, who lold Things to be permanent. the said criticism would be applicable--why the sinoko, appearing after the Cow, etc. is not regarded as the Effect of these 1-(631)
The Opponent urgos au objection (in the first hall, which is answered in the second half)
TEXT (532)
" IF A THING THAT IS ACTIVE TOWARDS THE PRODUCING OF AN EFFECT
IS NOT TO BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF THIS LATTER, WHAT TAEN!]"_THEN LET THAT BE ACCEPTED AS THE 'CAUSE OF A THING WHOSE PRESENCE IS ALWAYS ESSENTIAL FOR
THE APPEARANCE OF THIS LATTER.-(532)
COMMENTARY.
Then let, ele. This sentance supplies the Buddhist's answer to the othor's objection.-(532)
Thus it has been shown that even under the doctrine of things being momentary, the Relation of Cause and Effect is quite possible. The Author next proceeds to show the possibility of the Means of the Cognition of the said Relation:
TEXTS (533-535). As a MATTER OF FACT, THE existence and non-existence (or THINGS) ARE ALWAYS KNOWN THROUGH PERCEPTION AND NON-APPREHENSION (RESPECTIVELY),--IT THE VIEW HELD IS THAT THE THINGS ARE APPREHENDED BY COGNITIONS WITH FORMS.IT, ON THE OTHER HAND, YOU HOLD THAT THE THING IS APPREHENDED BY A COGNITION WHICH IS FORMLESS, THEN THE SAME IS FOUND TO BE THE CASE UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF THINGS BEING MOMENTARY. BECAUSE WHENEVER COGNITION IS PRO. DUCED BY ITS ANTECEDENT CAUSES, IT IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OF AN APPREHENSION HAVING THE SAME COLOUR, ETC. THAT HAPPEN TO APPEAR AT THE
TIME.-(533-535)
COMMENTARY.
Just as the approhension of the Permanent Thing would come about for you, 80 also would that of the Momentary also come about.

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For instance, when the apprehension of a Thing appears, it comes about either through a Cogoition with form, or through a formless Cognition. If it comes through the Cognition with a form, then the apprehension of the form of the Cognition would be the same as the apprehension of the Thing concerned and this would be equally possible under both viewsof things being permanent or momentary. If on the other hand, it is through fornless Cognition, that also makes no difference in the two views. Because, as a matter of fact, the Cognition is produced in such a form by antecedent Causes that what it apprehends is the same Colour, etc. that happen to be present at the same time, and no other Colour, etc. ; because it is produced in the form of the apprehension of these came.-Thus then, it being admitted that Cognition is of the nature of the apprehension of the Colour, etc. appearing at the same time, there is no difference in the character of the Thing itself As concerned under the two views of Permanence and Momentariness. You will have to admit the presence of the charactor of Cognition' in the apprehension of oach particular Colour, etc. appearing at the same time; by virtue of which, even though the character of appearing at the samo time is equally present in all, yet what distinguislies the Cognition is the Colour, etc., and not the Senge-organ concerned. And this explanation holds good under the doctrine of the Momentariness of things also. So it is of no significance at all.-(533-535)
The Opponent raises an objection against both (Cognition having a form, as also being formloss) :
TEXT (536).
"IT COGNITION HAS A FORM, THEN CONSCIOUSNESS WOULD BE OF VARIEGATED FORM. Ir, ON THE OTHER HAND, IT IS NOT MARKED BY ANY FORM, THERE CAN BE NO BASIS IN THE FORM OF
PROXIMITY (FOR SPECIFYING THE COGNITION)."-(536)
COMMENTARY
If the Cognition has a form, then in the Cognition of such things as the sheet of variegated Colour, this variegated Colour would be present in the Consciousness (Cognition) also ; while it is not possible for a single Cognition to have various Colours.
If on the other hand, the Cognition is formless, there could be no such differentiation as that this is the Cognition of the Blue Colour, not of the Yellow Colour'; as in all cases, the mere Cognition itself would be of the nature of Consciousness, and hence there being no distinction, there would be no basis for the snid differentiation in the Cognition).-(536)
The following Text supplies the answer to this cirticism -

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER IS.
TEXT (537).
YOU ALSO HAVE TO SUPPLY SOME EXPLANATION IN ANSWER TO THE AROVE; AND WHATEVER ANSWER YOU PUT FORWARD WOULD
ALSO BE OUR ANSWER TO IT.-(537)
COMMENTARY
The criticism that has been urged applios equally to both parties ; as you also will have to accept one or the other of the two views-of Cognition having forrn or being formless otherwise there would be no possibility of the Cognition apprehending an object.-Nor is there any other alternative besides these two ways in which the Cognition could apprehend the object. When a criticism is applicable to both parties, it should not be urged by one against the other. Thus then the answer that you may be able to make to tlya criticism shall be our answer also. For instance, under the view that Oognition has some form, the answer that you might make would be either that the forms are unreal, or that they are nothing different from the Cognition itself with which it is found to be invariably concomitant, even though the two appear to be different ;--and this sume answer shall be ours 190.Under the viow that Cognition is formless, the explanation that could be given would be that that character of the Cognition whereby it approhends only a particular tluing is due to previous Causes ;-and this same answer shall be available for 18 Bauddhas also, who hold Cognitions to be formless. Hence our answer to the Opponent's criticism is that it cannot be urgod against us.-(537)
Having thus established the existence of the Means of Right Cognition apprehending the Relation of Cause and Effect, the Author nowy proceeds to meet the objection that his theory involves the anomaly of the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'
TEXTS (538-539).
THERE WOULD BE WASTE OF WHAT IS DONE, ONLY IF THE CAUSE DID NOT PRODUCE AN EFFECT NO SUCH VIEW HOWEVER IS HELD BY US, WHEREBY THEEH COULD BE NO CAUSAL CHARACTER '-TRE * BETALLING OF WHAT IS NOT DONE' ALSO WOULD BE THERE IF AN EFFECT WERE PRODUCED WITHOUT A CAUSE ; THIS ALSO IS NOT HELD BY US; AS THE PRODUCTION OF THE EFPECT IS ALWAYS DEPENDENT UPON THE POTENCY OF A PARTICULAR
CAUSE.-(538-539)
COMMENTARY.
Ii it had been held by us that there is really a Doer and Experiencer, then the doctrine of the 'Perpetual Flux 'might have involved the anomaly of the

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waste of wliat is done and the befalling of what is not done'-as a matter of fact however, the view held by us is that the Universe is a mere Idea, and there is nothing that is done or experienced by anyone. How then could the said anomaly of the waste of what is done, etc.' be urged against us?
It is possible that the anomaly of (a) the Waste of what is done and (b) the befalling of what is not done' is urged against us on the ground that our view involves the production of Results from a Cause (a) which has lost that capacity to bring about desirable and undesirable results which is concurrent with a pre-existing Intelligence, and (b) which has acquired that capacity which is not concurrent with the preceding act.-But this cannot be right; because there is no incompatibility between the doctrine of No. Soul' and the presence of the capacity due to previous acts. For instance, just liko the Seeds soaked in red dye, the particular potentialities due to previous acts do actually continue in the chain'. and it is through these as subsequently developed that the desirable or undesirable result appears. Nor do we hold that the Result proceeds from a chain' not set up by previous acts; thus how could our view involve the anomaly of the befalling of what has not been done?
Uddyota kara has argued that the Mind being a fleeting entity, there is no possibility of its being affected (impressed) by Actions " -This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no affecting of the permanent thing which has not renounced its previous form ; as for the impermanent (fleeting) thing, its being "affected' consists in the very fact of the coming about of a new character. When the Scriptures speak of the Permanent Entity as affected, it is with reference to the permanence of the Chain'; that * Chain which is liable to be snapped cannot serve as the Cause', as it cannot bo present at the time of the birth of the Result at a long interval ; hence it would be clearly wrong to rogard such a Chain as the substratum of the 'impression leading to such a result. This is what is meant.-Thus what has been urged by Udd yotakara is based upon his ignorance of the doctrines of the other party and deserves to be ignored.—538-539)
Kumūrila has argued as follows:-* When we speak of the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done, we do not mean that the said anomaly is due to the act done by a certain Doer being destroyed, for the simple reason that under your view, there is no Doer; what we mean is that, inasmuch as you hold the destruction of the Act and the production of its Result to be absolute,- this is what involves the said anomaly of the waste of what is done and the befalling of what is not done'." (See Shlokavārtika, Atmavxida 12 et seq.]
In answer to this the Author proceeds to show that the said anomaly in this last form is what is actually admitted by the Buddhist and hence it is not right to put that forward to him as an undesirable contingency :

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TEXT (510).
WHAT IS URGED AGAINST US, BY SETTING FORTH THE ALTERNATIVE OF
TITINGS BEING DIFFERENT EVERY MOMENT, IS THE FACT OF EVERYTHING UNDERGOING DESTRUCTION AT EVERY MOBIENT AND SO FORTH. BUT BY URGING ALL THIS THE OTIIER PARTY HAVE NOT PUT FORWARD ANYTHING THAT
IS DISAGREEABLE TO U$.-(6-10)
COMMENTARY.
"The preceding Action-Moment being absolutely destroyed, there is *waste of what is done and then an absolutely new Result-Moment Being produced, there is 'Lefalling of what is not clone -if such is the unomaly that is urged against us, through the sotting forth of alternatives relating to the momentary change in things, then what is urged against us is whal is quite agrecable to us. In fact, we are going to show that there is no continuity of the slightest trace of any part of anything at all.-(540)
As regards the argument (put forward by the Opponent, under Texts 490-499) that "the intelligent man would not undertake any netivity",this is angwered in the following
TEXTS (541-542).
THE ASSUMPTIONS BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE AMONG MOMENTS DO NOT ARISE IN PERSONS THE POWERS OF WHOSE VISION HAVE BEEN DAMAGED,-BECAUSE OF THEIR IDEA OF THE UNITY OF THE CHAIN'. IN FACT, PERSONS WHO HAVE FULLY REALISED THE TRUTH UNDERSTAND THE LIMITATIONS OF THE CAUSES APPEARING IN A PERPETUAL FLUX', AND UNDERTAKE THE PERFORMANCE
OF GOOD DREDS ACCORDINGLY.-(541-542)
COMMENTARY.
Those persons whose powers of seeing things other than the ordinary ones have not deteriorated,--for them the assumptions made relating to the difference among Moments do not arise at all. Because they are fully satisfied by their conviction that by realising the Chain to be one they would be quite happy, and lience betake themselves to the performance of actions. -Those persons also who are devoted to the welfare of other people, having realised, through reasoning and scriptures, the momentariness and 'soul-less-ness of all things, and thus fully realised the Truth,—they also accept the 'Intervolved Chain of Causation'; they come to tinder. stand that when acts of charity and the like are done, being prompted by sympathy and good will, there come about Impressions tending to the weliare of oneself and also of others-these impressions appearing in a mutually

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intervolved 'Chain' or 'Series ' ;-and tbat no such impressions arise from the performance of such evil acts as Harming others and the like. Having thus realised the exact limitations of Canses and their Effects, they undertake the performance of good deeds. This has been thus declared Until the loss of love for one's own self comes about, the man continues to suffer pain and does not feel comfortable; there should therefore be efforts put forth for the removing of these false impositions.-even though there be no such entity as the Experiencer (of the fruits of actions)
How the Relation of Cause and Effect and the Means of Right Cognition thereof are establislied has already been explained above.-(541-512)
It has been argued above (under Text 493) that "if things are momentary, Recognition cannot be explained" -The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (643). THE PECULIAR CHARACTER OF CAUSE AND EFFECT IS RESTRICTED TO SOME MINDS ONLY; THAT IS HOW REMEMBRANCE, ETO.
COME ABOUT WITHOUT OBSTRUOTION. (543)
COMMENTARY. In the torm 'Karyakaryita', 'kâryi' is that which has an effect, i.e. a Cause; and thus the compound stands for the character of Cause and Effecl. In reality, there is no one who is the Rememberer or the Apprehender of things; for, if there were, then it would mean that the thing is remembered by the same entity that had apprehended it. What happens is that Remembranca and the rest come about only in that Chain (or Series) in which their seed has been laid by the successive production of more and more specialised
moments' by a specially vivid apprehension and not anywhere else ; as the scope of the relation of Cause and Effect is restricted. Such in brief is the sense of the Text.---This has been this declared :-Our theory cannot be vitiated by the possibility of Remembrance and Experience of Results coming to other persons ; becauso there can be no such remembrance at all : Who is the man whose mind has ever remembered what had been apprehended by another
As for Recognition and the rest, they are always brought about by previous Remembrance; henco there is no incongruity at all.—Nor has it anywhere been proved that Recognition and the rest are all based upon a single Cogniser, by virtue of which it has been asserted (under Text 494) that "if there were difference between the two, the Recognition would be baseless". Because merely on the basis of the relation of Cause and Effect, difference has to be admitted in all cases.-(543)
It has been argued (under Text 496) that "what is bound up with the chains of Attachment, etc. is one Moment, etc. etc.; and hence there can be no idea of Bondage and Liberation under tho theory of Perpetual FluxThe answer to this is provided in the following

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TEXT (544).
TGNORANCE AND THE REST, IN THE TORM OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT, ARR HELD TO CONSTITUTE BONDAGE, AND THE CESSATION OF THESE, AS CONSISTING IN THE PURITY OF THE MIND,
IS HELD TO CONSTITUTE ' LIBERATION'.-(544)
COMMENTARY
For us no Bondage and Liberation have been admitted as belonging to any one entity; as no one is held to be either bound' or ' liberated'; all that is admitted by us is that Impressions' in the form of Ignorance and the rest ending with decay and death are spoken of as 'Bondage on the ground of their being the cause of pain. This has been thus declared :
All this is merely an aggregate of the Thought-phase that causes painWhen the said Tgnorance and the roat conse, by virtue of True Knowledge, thoro comes about purity of the Mind; and it is this purity that is spoken of as 'Liberation': as tims doclared-'When the Mind is beset with the troubles of Attachment and the rest, it constitutes the Cycle of Birth and Death, and when the same is freed from then, it is called the End of Birth'.-(044)
It has been argued (under Text 499) that * Bondage and Liberation appear in the same substratum" -The next Text proceeds to show that in this argument the Corroborative Instance cited is 'devoid of the Probandum':
TEXT (545).
EVEN IS THE ORDINARY WORLD, THESE TWO BONDAGE AND LIBERATION'-ARE NOT ADMITTED AS APPEARING IN THE SAME SUB
STRATUM; AS EVERYTHING IS HELD TO BE momentary.-(545)
COMMENTARY.
When it has been proved that everything perishes immediately after it is born, then nowhore can Bondage and Liberation be accepted as appearing in the same substratum ; hence wbat has been cited by the Opponent as the Corroborative Instance is what is not admitted.-(545)
Having thus established his own doctrine, the Author proceeds to discard the doctrine of the Opponent :

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TEXT (546)
AS THE COMING IN OF ANT PEOULIARITY IS ENTIRELY IMPOSSIBLE, ALL NOTIONS OF THE DOER AND THE EXPERIENCER", BEING IN BONDAGE' AND SO FORTH,IN REGARD TO THE SOUL -MUST BE INCOMPATIBLE; OR ELSE THE SOUL
IS SOMETHING EVANESCENT.-(546)
COMMENTARY
If the Troubles in the shape of Attachunent and the rest had really brought about the Bondage of the Soul-or if Contemplation and the rest had really produced certain peculiarities in the Soul,—then the idea of the Soul's Bondage and Liberation might have been admitted ; as a matter of fact, however, as the Soul is eternal (ex hypothesi), no peculiarities can be produced in it; for the same reason no ideas of Bondage and Liberation', --which presuppose limitations of the relation of Cause and Effect,-are possible in regard to the Soul :- just as in regard to Alasha.
Or else', -ie, if peculiaritios were actually produced in the Soul, then as the 'Peculiarity would be of the nature of the Soul, the Soul itself also, being non-different from the Peculiarity, would, like the Peculiarity, be something evanescenl.-If the Peculiarity were something different from the Soul, then, the idea of its being produced in the Soul would be wrong,-- as no connection would be possible (between the Soul and the Peculiarity). This matter has been discussed timos without number.-(546)
End of Chapter IX.

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CHAPTER X.
The Examination of the First Category—* Substance'
COMMENTARY.
The Introductory verses have spoken of the Doctrine of 'Intervolved Chain of Causation is free from such limiting conditions as those of Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth'. In support of this the Author proceeds to examine the six categorios (of the Vaishëşikas); this examination is what is introduced in the following
TEXTS (547-5-48).
Tae HOLLOWERS OF Akşaplūda (CAUTAMA, Naiyāyikas) AND OF Kanāda
(Vaishēzikas) HAVE ASSERTED, SOLELY ON THE STRENGTH OF VERBAL AUTHORITY, THAT—"THE THEORY OF THE Ung. versal AND SUCH THINGS BEING FORMLESS, SET TORTA PREVIOUSLY-CANNOT BE RIGHT, BECAUSE THE SIX CATEGORIES OF SUBSTANCE' AND THE ROST DO REALLY EXIST".-HENOL THE REFUTATION OF THESE, SUBSTANCE AND THE REST, IS BRIEFLY SET FORTH HERE,
(547-548)
COMMENTARY.
"In one of the earlier chapters, that on the Permanence of Things' (Chapter VIIT), it has been asserted by the Buddhist) that 'the Universal and such concepts being formless, the momentary character is not attributed to them' (Teal 740). This cannot be right; because the six categories of Substance. Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence do really exist":-o say the followers of Akşapada and others. Naiyāyikrus have been called 'Aksapda' because they are the disciples, followers, of Akşapäda ; and similarly the followers of Kanada, the Vaishēpikas, have been called 'Kanāda'.
Solely on the strength of verbal authority' ;- i.e. they are dependent upon Verbal Authority only, totally devoid of reason.-(547-548)
With a view to refuting the category of Substance, the Author sets forth the subdivisions of Substance' (as postulated by its exponents) :

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TEXT (519).
SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN HELD TO BE OF NINE KINDS--DIVIDED UNDER THE DIFFERENT HEADS OF EARTH AND THE REST ; OF THESE, THE FOUR BEGINNING WITH THE EARTH' ARE OF TWO
KINDS—eternal AND non-eternal.-(549)
COMMENTARY.
The idea underlying this Betting forth of the subdivisions is that when the subject has been this stated, it is easier to find fault with it.
Nine Icinds',-as stated in tho Süera (Vaishëşika) Earth, Water, Fire, Air, Akasha, Time, Space, Soul and Mind'. From among these, Substance in the form of the first four-i.. Earth, Water, Fire and Airis of two kinds, being eternal and non-eternal.-(549)
Those two kinds are shown in the following
TEXT (550).
THRATOMS' THAT HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF EARTH AND THE REST ARE eternal ; WHILE THOSE MADD OP OF THE
ATOM AND THE REST ARE EVANESCENT.-(550)
COMMENTARY.
Earth, etc. in the form of the stom are eternal, -the Atoms being eternal. Those that are made up of the Atom and the rest are non-eternal, according to the Law that what has a Cause must be non-eternal.
"Atom and the rest ',-i.e. those among which Atoms are the first. Alāsha and the rest are eternal ;- such is the sense of the Text.-(550)
The Author proceeds to discard
Substance' of the said four kinds
TEXT (551).
AMONG THESE, THE NON-EXISTENCE OF THE ETERNAL (PERMANENT) ATOMS HAS ALREADY BEEN PROVED, BY ESTABLISHING THE FACT OF ALL THINGS BEING IN A STATE OF PERPETUAL
FLUX'.-(551)
COMMENTARY. Among these, what have been described as Earth and the rest in the form of Permanent Aloms,-the non-existence of these in the form of anything permanent has been proved by the establishing of the Perpetual Flux of things which pervades over all things, the Universal proposition having

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER X.
been established in the form- Whatever exists must be momentary,because what is not-momentary cannot have any fruitful action either successive or simultaneous; hence what is not-momentary cannot exist'.(551)
The following Te.ct states a countor-argument in annulment of the pornanence of Atoms :
TEXT (552).
IF ATOMS WERE PERMANENT, THEN ALL GROSS SUBSTANCES WOULD BE PRODUCED AT ONCE, AS THEY ARE EQUALLY INDEPENDENT OF
CONJUNCTION AND OTHER CONDITIONS.-(552)
COMMENTARY.
If Atoms, which are the cause of all gross tlings, like the Mountain and so forth, are held to be permanent, then their l'roducts, in the shape of all gross thing, should be produced simultaneously, as their canso would be always there in its perfect condition. This argument may be formulated thus :- All those things wise aluses are present in their porfect and unob. structed form must be produced nt once.- like many Seech, when their causes aro present in their perfect and unobstructed forns ;-all gross things are held to have permanent Atoms for their cause ;-30 this must be a natural reason (for regarding them as liable to be produced all at once). If things were not to be produced even in the presence of their causes in the complete form, then they might never be produced at all, there being nothing to distinguish one case from the other; this would be a counter-argument in annulment of the Nyaya doctrine.
The following argument might be put forward by the other party : "The Cause is held to be of three kinds—1) the Inherent (Constituent) Cause, (2) the Non-inherent Cause, and (3) the Eficient Cause when one thing interes (subsists) in another, it is its Inherent Cause; that which acts as the Cause without inhering in a thing is its Non-inherent Cause; e.g. tho conjunction of the component parts is such a Cause of the composite objeot ; -all the other kinds of Cause are included under the third kind, the Eficient Cause. Such aro the various kinds of Cause that go to produce a thing. All these nocessary causal conditions in the form of Conjunction and the rest cannot always be present; and the presence of the complete Cause cannot be admitted at all times. So that the Reason put forward in the above argument of the Buddhist cannot be admitted."
In answer to this, the Author has added 'They are equally independent of Conjunction and other conditions ;--if Conjunction and the other conditions produced a certain peculiarity in the Atoms, then these latter would be dependent upon those conditions ; as it is however, the Atoms, being permanent, cannot have any peculiarity produced in them by anything else ; under the circumstances, how could they be dependent upon Conjuno. tion and other conditions !

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As a matter of fact however all such gross things as the Body, the House and the like do not appear at one and the same time in fact, they are found to be produced one after the other. Hence the conclusion must be contrary to the ono propounded by the Naiyāyika. This argument may be formulated as follows :-The causes that prodnce things successively must be impermanent,-.g. the Seeds which produce the Sprouts successively - the Atoms also are productive of Effects in succession; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding Atoms as impermanent).-(582)
Aviddhakarna has put forward the following proof of the Permanence of Atoms.--" What is held to be the producer of Atoms cannot be endowed with the property of existence,--because it is not cognised by any Means of Right Cognition indicating existence ;-like the Hare's Horns! The
property of existence' means the property that should be present in the existing thing; and the denial of this in the said Cause is what is meant. It means simply that there is no Cause productive of the Atom."
This is the argument which is anticipated in the following
TEXT (553)
IF THE PRODUCER OF ATOMS IS NOT HELD TO BE ENDOWED WITH TIR PROPERTY OF existence, ON THE GROUND THAT IT DOES NOT FORM THE OBJECTIVE OF ANY MEANS OF COGNISING EXISTENT THINGS,—[then the answer is as
explained in the following Text].-(553)
COMMENTARY.
The construction of the sentence is If the Producer of Atoms is not held to be endowed with the property of existence.
The term vidyaminopalambha, etc.' means that it is not the objective of any such Means of Riglet Cognition as serves to apprehend the existent thing'. The rest is easily intelligible.
What is indicated by this is the argument that the assertion of the impermanence of Atoms is contrary to, and annulled by, Inference; because of the declaration that the existing thing which has no Cause must be permanent, which proves the permanence of Atoms on the ground of there being no canso productive of them.-(553)
The following Text explains that the Reason put forward here is not admissible :
21

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TATIVASANGRAH : CHAPTER X.
TEXT (554). THE REASON ADDUCED CANNOT BE RICHT; BECAUSE IT IS INADMISSTHLE ; AS THE CAUSR OF ATOMS IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED IN THE SHAPE OF TIE WEAVER AND THE LIKE ; INASMUCH AS THE CLOTH AND OTHER THINGS ARE ALL
CONSTITUTED OP ATOMS.-(554)
COMMENTARY The question being-"The Weaver, ote. are known to be the cause of such things as the Cloth and the like, then how can it be snid that they are found to be the cause of Atoms the answer is- They are constitute of Atoms; what is meant is that this is going to be shown later on.-(554)
Then again, in the case of things that are far removed in space, time and character, -oven though no Means of Right Cognition is found to be operative, yet their being existent is not regarded as incompatible; so that the Reason cited (Because it is not the objective of any Means of Right Cognition'] is not-conclusive (in proving the non-existence, of the Cause of Atoms),This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (555). IT MAY BE THAT THB existence OF A THING CANNOT BE KNOWN IN THE ABSENCE OF A MEANS OF THE RIGHT COGNITION OF THE EXISTING
THING. BUT THE MORE ABSENCE OF THE MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION CANNOT BEING ABOUT CERTAINTY REGARDING ITS BEING ACTUALLY non.
existent.-(555)
COMMENTARY. Cannot bring about certainty, etc.', -as is found in the case of such things as the Ghost (which is not seen, and yet one cannot be sure that it does not exist).-(555)
Having thus denied the Substance in tho form of Cause (Atoms), the Author next proceeds to deny it in the form of Products Things composed of Atoms)
TEXT (556). THE COMPOSITE SUBSTANCE MADE UP OF ATOMS,-AS DISTINCT FROM QUALITIES AND COMPONENTS-IS NEVER APPREHENDED , HENCE, THERE BEING NO EVIDENCE FOR IT, IT CANNOT BE
ADMITTED.-(556)
COMMENTARY. Qualities '-Oolour, eto. - Components' -Yarns, etc. that which is something different from these ;-such a Composite, distinct from Qualities

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323
and Components, is never apprehended. As a matter of fact, any such composite substance as the Cloth complete in itself, and entirely different from qualities like Whiteness, and from compononts, in the shape of the Yarns (composing it)-never appears in any visual or other kinds of Cognition.From this non-perception of the Substance as distinct from Qualities, it also follows that there is no basis for the idea that Substance and Quality are distinct categories and from the non-perception of the Composite as distinct from the Components, it follows that the idea of Component and Composite (Part and Whole) is groundless. This argumont may be formulated as follows: -When a perceptible thing is not perceived, it does not exist, just as the Jar, not being perceived at a certain place, is regarded as non-existent ; and no Qualified Substance', apart from the Qualities and Components, which is held to be perceptible,-is ever perceived as occupying the sanno place nor is any * Composite' ever perceived apart from the Componenta; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding such Composite Substance as non-existent).-The Reason adduced hero cannot be said to be not admitted '; because there is the distinct declaration of Kanāda to the effect that 'In a gross substance, there is perception due to its containing several substances and to qualities' (Vaishēsika-sutra), which clearly shows that the Quality and the Components are regarded as perceptible.-(556)
In the following Texts, the Author sets forth the arguments put forward by Uddyotakara, Bhävivikta and others,-to show that the Reason that
the Composite Substance is never perceived as distinct from its Qualities and Components', adduced in the above argument, is 'not admitted ', * unproven'
TEXTS (557-558).
" As A MATTER OF FACT, THE ROOK-CRYSTAL IS ACTUALLY PERCEIVED WHEN IN CONTACT WITH ANOTHER THING, EVEN THOUGH ITS QUALITY IS NOT PERCEIVED; SIMILARLY THE LINE OF CRANES AND SUCH THINGS ARE ALSO SEEN ;-WHEN THE MAN IS COVERED BY A LONG CLOAK, EVEN THOUGH HIS COMPLEXION, ETC. ARE NOT PERCEIVED, THERE IS PERCEPTION OF HIM AS A 'MAN' IN THE OASE OF THE RED CLOTH, THERE IS PERCEPTION
OF IT ASOLOTH'." (557-558)
COMMENTARY.
The said writers argue as follows:-"The Substance is really appre. hended as apart from its Qualities; in fact, even when its Colour and other Qualities are not perceived, the Substance itself is perceived. For instance, (a) when the Rock-crystal is placed near another thing, even though the colour of the white Rock-crystal itself is not perceived, the Crystal itself is perceived.-(6) Similarly things like the Line of Cranes flying in the sky at night when the light is dim, are actually perceived, even though their white

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
colour is not percei vod.--(e) Similarly wlien a man is covered by a long cloak roaching to his feet, oven though his dark complexion and other details are not sean, the perception that it is n'man 'is there all right.---(d) In the case of pieces of cloth coloured with saffron, ete., even though the natural colour of the cloth itself is suppressed, yet the Cognition of the Cloth' itself is tliere."-(557-558)
It has been explained above that the distinction between the Substance and its Quality is vouched for by Perception itself; in the following Teals, they proceed to show that it is proved by Inference Also:
TEXTS (559-560).
"(A) COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM THE LOTUS AND OTHER THINGS, BECAUSE THEY ARE DISTINGUISHED BY THESE (LATTER-JUST AS THE HORSE 13 DISTINGUISHED BY Chaitra (THE RIDER).-(B) OR, THE EARTH AND OTHER SUBSTANCES ARB ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM COLOUR, ODOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES BECAUSE THEY ARE DIFFERENTLY SPOKEN OF BY MEANS OF WORDS IN THE SINGULAR AND PLURAL NUMBERS (RESPECTIVELY), JUST AS THE MOON (SINGULAR) AND THE STARS' (PLURAL) ARE DIFFERENT."-(559-560)
COMMENTARY.
The Quality is different froin the Lotus, because they are spoken of as the Qualities of the Lotus', where the Qualities are distinguished by the Lotus : just as in the expression Chaitra's horse', the Horse is distinguished -i.e. differentiated-from other riders, by Chaitra, and is therefore different from him.
Each of the Substances, -Earth, Water, Fire and Air,--are different from (tho Qualities) Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch, -bocause they are Epoken of by means of words in the Singular and Plural numbers (respec. tively),just as the Moon and the Stars : just as 'Moon' being in the Singular number and the Stars in the Plural number form the basis of difference between them, so also Earth is in the Singular muunber, and the compound
Colour-Taste-Odour-Touch' is in the Plural number; similarly Water, * Air' and 'Fire' also.
The several Stars' meant are Prşya and the rest.-(559.560)
Having thus proved the difference between the Quality and the Substance possessing the Quality, the Opponents proceed to prove the difference between the Composite and its Components :

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TEXT (561).
"SIMILARLY, THE Yarns AND THB Cloth MUST BE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT, BECAUSE THEY HAVE DIFFERENT MAKERS AND DIFFERENT POTENCIES, - JUST AS THE PILLAR AND THE JAR ARE REGARDED AS DIFFERENT BECAUSR OF THE PRESENCE
OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES."-(561)
COMMENTARY
This argument is formulated as follows Things having different makers, different effects, different times, different sizes must be regarded as different, -just like the Pillar, the Jar and such things the things under discussion do have different makers, different effects, different times and different sizes.-This Reason cannot be said to be unproven' ('not admitted '), or "inconclusive'. In fact, the difference among things is always based upon the presence of contradictory properties, -as is found in the case of the Pillar, the Jar and so forth;—such contradictory properties are found in the Composite and the Component ; for instance, of the Yarn, the maker is the (spinning) woman, while of the Cloth, the maker is the Weaver: the Cloth—and not the Yarn, -has the capacity to remove cold; the Yarns are found there before the Cloth; hence it is prior in time, while the Cloth appears later, after the operation of the Weaver, the length and breadth of the Cloth are differont from those of each of the Yarns; thus the sizes of the two are different. Thus the Reasons adduced are not 'inconclusive'. Such is the sense of the argument.-(561)
Having thus established the difference between the Composite and the Components, the Opponent proceeds to prove the same on the strength of Perception also
TEXTS (562-563).
"IF THERE WERE NO GROSS SUBSTANCES, THON THE PERCEPTION OF THE TREE AND SUCH THINGS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE; BECAUSE THE ATOMS ARE BEYOND THE REACH OF THE SENSES; NOR WOULD THE TERM - ATOM (SMALL) BE POSSIBLE; BECAUSE IT IS THE EXTREMELY SUBTLE THING THAT IS SO SPOKEN OF IN RELATION TO A GROSS SUBSTANCE; HENCE IN THE ABSENCE OF THE GROSS SUBSTANCE, IN RELATION TO WHAT WOULD ITS
SUBTLETY' BE?"-(562-563)
COMMENTARY
If there were no Composite Substance, there would be the anomaly that there would be no Perception at all; as the Atoms themselves are beyond the reach of the Senses.-In the absence of the gross thing again, the

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name 'Atom' (Small) itself would not be possible.-Why 1- Because it is the extremely, eke. This is easy to understand.-(562-563)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above arguments (of the Realists) :
TEXT (564).
IN THE CASE OF THE Rock-crystal (CITED ABOVE), The Rook-ORYSTAL
IS PERCEIVED AS red IN COLOUR ; AND YET, IN REALITY, IT CANNOT BE RED;--AS THAT WOULD DEMOLISH YOUR
OWN THEORY.-(564)
COMMENTARY
It has been asserted that the Rock-crystal and such things are perceived even when their Qualities are not perceived"; but this cannot be admitted; because the said perception, being not in accordance with the reality, must Lo wrong, and henco baseless. For instance, whon the red Hibiscus flower is placed adjacent to the Rook-crystal, tho latter is perceived as Red, which it is not similarly when the Line of Cranes are perceived as Dart (in the dark) when they are really White. Neither of these two things-Rockcrystal and the Cranes-are really of the Colour as perceived ;-i.e. of the Red or the Dark colour.-" Why?"-Because that would demolish your own theory i.e. if they were really of the Colour that is perceived, then your theory, just mentioned, -that things are perceived even when their Colour is not perceived, would become demolished.-(564)
The Opponent might argue that "the Rock-crystal itself is perceived, apart from the Colour". This is answered in the following
TEXT (565)
APABT VROM THE COLOUR, NOTHING ELSE IS PERORIVED OF THE NATURE OF SOMETHING DIFFERENT; AND IT CANNOT BE RIGHT, EVEN
FOR YOU THAT THINGS SHOULD BE APPREHENDED BY THE COGNITION OF SOMETHING DIFFERUNT ; AS
TRAT WOULD LEAD TO AN ABSURDITY.-(565)
COMMENTARY
As a matter of fact, apart from the Red Colour, nothing else of the nature of something different,-i.c. in the shape of the Rock-crystal is perceived : as all that is actually perceived is the Red Colour.-If it be urged that " what is perceived as Red-coloured is the Rock-crystal itself which is not really red",-then our answer is that it cannot be right, etc. etc.';-ie. when a Cognition is regarded as appertaining to a particular thing, it is on the basis

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of the form cognised; it then, the object of the Cognition had a forin other than that of the Cognition.—then Sound and other things might be the object of the Cognition of Colour, there being no difference between the two casos.-(565)
Even granting that a Cognition may have for its object something which has a form different from tlut of the Cognition itself,—even so, what the other party desire cannot be uccomplished. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (566).
IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TOO IN THAT CASE, THAT IT IS THE White COLOUR (OF THE ROCK-ORYSTAL) ITSELT THAT IS ACTUALLY COGNISED ; BUT SUCH A COGNITION WOULD BE CLEARLY WRONG, LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE CONCI BEING
YELLOW.-(566)
COMMENTARY That is, (under the view of the other party) it might be possible that in the case cited, what actually exists apart from the White Substance (Rock. crystal) is the White Colour, which is cognised as 'red':-But even go, that does not prove the existence of the Substance with the Quality.--The cho' should be construed as after shukladayah'.
The Cognition wouid be wrong ',-i.e. not in strict accordance with the real state of things.-(566)
Another instance cited by the Opponent was that of the man covered by a cloak'.-That also cannot be regarded as 'Perception, because it is accompanied by a verbal expression ("this is a man'), and also because it is indistinct. It can at best be regarded only as an 'Inferential Cognition, as pertaining to the man' in the shape of the aggregate of Colour and other Qualities. So that this also does not serve to prove the existence of the Oom. posite Substance. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (567).
THE COGNITION THAT APPEARS IN THE CASE OF THE MAN OOVERED BY THE OLOAK IS INFERENTIAL, AND DOES NOT APPERTAIN TO THE Man AT ALL; BECAUSE WHAT IS REALLY COGNISED IN THIS CASE IS THE Cloak HAVING THE SHAPE DUE
TO THE MAN.-(567)
COMMENTARY.
The compound laddhetusanniveshasya' is to be expounded as the cloak which has the shape of which the Man, who is only an aggregate of

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TATTYASANGRAHA CHAPTER X.
Colour, etc.- is the Cause',-This shows that the inferential Cognition is brought about by the particular indicative mark colled the Effect':-(567)
Another example cited (by the Opponent) is the notion of the cloth in reference to the Red Cloth. The answer to this is as follows
TEXT (568). AS A MATTER OF FACT, SUCH THINGS AS THE RED DYE AND THE SAFFRON PRODUCB A NEW COLOUR IN THE CLOTH, ON THE DESTRUCTION OF THE PREVIOUS COLOUR ; BECAUSE THE CLOTH ITSELI
IS MOMENTARY (AND ITS PREVIOUS COLOUR HAS PERISHED ALONG WITH IT).-(568)
COMMENTARY.
What happens in the case cited is that the Cloth itself being momentary, its previons White Colour is destroyed, and a new Colour comes into existenco through other causal conditions; and when this new Colour is perceived, there appears, on the wake of that Perception, the reflective notion pertaining to the aggregate-as the Cloth, the Cloth with appropriate distinction ; and this notion of the Cloth) is purely illusory, without a real object. Thus the Cognition cited is not of the nature of Perception at all.
Nor is it Inference; as its object is one that has been already apprehended by a previous Perception, and also because it is not & Cognition brought about by means of an Inferential Indicative.
Thus in the case cited there is no Colour that has been suppressed. --(568)
The following might be urged :- "If the original White Colour does not lie hidden in the Cloth, thon how is it that when the Cloth is washed, the White Colour reappears ? "
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (569). WHAT KAPPENS IS THAT OUT OF ONE COLOUR (RED) ANOTHER WHITE COLOUR IS PRODUCED THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF WATER AND SUCH OTHER THINGS JUST LIKE THE BLACK
COLOUR OF METALS.—(569)
COMMENTARY.
Just as, in the case of Metals which have become bright white by the contact of Fire, the Dark Colour is again subsequently produced, -80 in the case in question also, another White Colour is produced in the Cloth. Hence there is no incongruity at all.-(569)

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SUBSTANCE.
329
The following might be urged :-"How do you know that a fresh White Colour is produced, and not that the previous White Colour itself, which could not be perceived by reason of being suppressed, becomes perceptible later on, by the removal of the suppression ?"
This is answered in the following
TEXT (570).
IF THE COLOUR HAD REMAINED IN THE SAME CONDITION, THEN THERE COULD BE NO SUPPRESSION OF IT, AS THE PREVIOUS UNSUP
PRESSED COLOUR WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST.-(570)
COMMENTARY.
This argument may be formulated as follows:-That which has not abandoned its unsuppressed charneter cannot be suppressed by anything else,-just as the same in its previous condition and under the suppressed condition also, the original Colour has not abandoned its unsuppressed character; hence this would be a proposition which is contrary to a larger proposition.
On the other hand, if it be held that, the Colour has abandoned its unsuppressed character, then it becomes established that the Colour subsequently produced is different from the original Colour.-(570)
It has been argued (under Tect 559) that " The Colour differs entirely from the Lotus, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (571).
THE DIVERSE WAYS OF VERBAL EXPRESSION WHEREIN THE GENITIVE AND DIFFERENT NUMBERS ARE USED PROOEED ENTIRELY FROM
THE SPEAKER'S WHIM; HENCE IT IS NOT RIGHT TO DETERMINE THE REAL STATE OF THINGS ON THE
BASIS OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS.-(571)
COMMENTARY
If it were admitted that the use of the Genitive and other forms of verbal expression proceed precisely on the basis of the real state of things, then the existence of such things could be admitted on the basis of those expressions; as a matter of fact, however, verbal expressions proceed entirely from the whim of the speakers, and they do not depend upon the real state of things, how then can they prove the real existence of anything?
The use of the 'Genitive referred to is in such expressions as Patasya rüpa', 'Colour of the Cloth' (which, according to the other party proves the difference of the Cloth from the Colour] and the use of diverse numbers

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
referred to is in such expressions as Patah, Cloth' in the Singular), and rūpādayah' 'Oolour and other qualities' (in the Plural). The phrase
diverse waye' is meant to include the use of the Locative, -as in the expression Patē rūpādayah', 'Colour, etc. in the Cloth '; -and such use of Nominnl Affixes as in the expression Patasya bhavaḥ palatvann, (where the Universal character of Oloth' is spoken of as different from the particular Cloth).-(571)
In the following Text, the Author further reiterates the inconclusive character of the Reason adduced by the other party :
TEXT (572).
FURTHER, THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT REGARD THE EXISTENCE OF THE SIX CATEGORIES AS ANYTHING DIFFERENT ; NOR IS ANY SINGLE
"Oroup' OF THEM ADMITTED.-(572)
COMMENTARY There are such expressions used *** samnām padārtānam astitvam', llo existence of the Six Categories', sanām varga)', 'the group of six ',where the Cenitive forms are used, even though there is no real difference between the two factors (the Categories and their existence, or the Categories and their group). You do not admit any such thing as existence', apart from the Six Categories' themselves.
This is only by way of illustration. In fact, in such words as dārah', • sikatäh' and the like, even though the Plural number is used, we do not perceive a multiplicity of the things (wife or sand).
As a matter of fact, the 'svatva ', self-hood', of a thing is not regarded as a distinct category.-(572)
In the following text, the Author anticipates the answer of the Opponent :
TEXT (573). IF IT BE SAID THAT_"The existence Of The Six CATEGORIES IS HELD
TO BE THE PROPERTY SUBSISTING IN WHAT IS AN OBJECT MADE KNOWN BY A Means of Right Cognition ", THEN, IN THAT CASE, THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DISTINCT TROM THE
SIX THAT YOU POSTULATE.-(573)
COMMENTARY.
"What is meant is that the existence of the Six Categories is a distinct property consisting in their being cognisable of such Means of Right Cognition as apprehend existing things ;-50 that there is no discrepancy in our Premiss" - this is the sense of the Opponent's answer.

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331
The answer to this is ' In that case, etc., etc.':- Distinct'-i.e. a distinct Category; i.e. it becomes a seventh Category: and this would militate against the doctrine of the Six Categorios':-(573)
Says the other party-"This is what we readily admit ; hence it does not vitiate our argument."
How is it then that you have declared the Categories to be six only ? The answer to this question is anticipated and answered in the following
TEXTS (574-575).
"THE SIX THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED ARE THINGS WITH PROPERTIES, AND THE PROPERTIES ARE CERTAINLY ADMITTED BY US TO BE DISTINCT FROM THEM."-IF THIS IS SAID (BY TER OTHER PARTY), THEN (WE ASK)—WHAT IS THE RELATION THAT IS HELD TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THE CATEGORIES AND THE PROPERTIES? THIS RELATION CANNOT BE THAT OF 'CONJUNCTION, AS THIS IS RESTRICTED TO SUBSTANCES ALONE (UNDER THE Nyāya-VIEW); NOR IS THE OTHER RELATION, THAT OF 'INHERENCE', POSSIBLE ; AND NO OTHER RELATION IS ACCEPTED BY THE OTHER
PARTY.-(574-575)
COMMENTARY
"The 'Six Categories' that have been postulated are only those that have Properties; while the Six Categories' in the shape of the Properties are held to be quite distinct; us is found in the following words of the Padārthapraveshaka-*This mention has been made of only the things with properties, without any mention of the Properties."
The answer to this explanation of the other party is provided by the words- Then what is the relation, etc., etc.' ;-Relation-of the Property in the shape of Existence, etc.-with those '-., the Categories ;-what is that relation by virtue of which Existence becomes the property of the Categories ? Without some sort of relation the character of 'Property and With Property' would not be possible ; otherwise it would lead to the absurdity of everything being the Property of everything. As a matter of fact, there is no relation between the Property of Existence and the Categories. Because there are only two kinds of Relation-Oonjunction and Inherence. The relation of Conjunction is not possible in the case in question, because being of the nature of Quality, Conjunction is restricted to Substances only (and Substance is only one of the Six Categories; all those latter, therefore, cannot have con. junction with the Property of Existence).-Nor can the relation be one of the nature of Inherence, because it is held to be one only, like 'Existence' itself; while if the relation of Inherence subsisted between Inherence and

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
the Categorios, then the former Inherence should have to be regarded as different from the latter (and this would involve self-contradiction). (574-575)
It might be argued that "the Property of Existence could belong to the Categories without any relation".-The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (576).
IF NO RELATION IS POSSIBLE, THEN HOW COULD THE PROPERTY BELONG TO THE CATEGORIES -IF IT WERB HELD TO BELONG TO THEM MERELY ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING PRODUCED BY THEM, THEN THERE WOULD BE OTHERS
ALSO LIKE IT.-(576)
COMMENTARY.
So that it would lead to an absurdity.
If it be held that the Proporty is said to be relatod to the Six Categories, on account of its being produced by them.-then, there are other things also,-such as Water and the like-which would be like it'-i.e. related to things like the Tank and such things, merely on that ground of being produced by them'; and under the circumstances, the postulating of Rolations in the shape of Conjunction and Inherence' would be futile.-(576)
TEXT (577).
FURTHER, AS THERE WOULD BE EXISTENCH' of the Existence ALSO, THE
INCOMPATIBLE (GENITIVE) ENDING WOULD BE INCOMPATIBLE WITH IT; AND IF THERE WERE EXISTENCE OF THAT EXISTENCE ALSO, AND SO TORTH, THERE
WOULD BE NO END TO IT.—(577)
COMMENTARY.
Further, even granting that the Property of Existence belongs to the Six Categories, your Reason remains defective (false, inconclusive). For instance, that Existence itself would have existence, as it is an Entity; how then conld there be the Genitive ending in the expression existence of Existence, which (as you say) is based on difference - If it be held that there is yet another existence of the Existence, then there is an Infinito Regress.(577)
Says the Opponent "When it is found necessary and desirable, Infinite Regress' cannot be a defect that can justify the rejection of the Premiss".
The answer to this is as follows:

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333
TEXT (578).
THUS IN ALL THESE EXISTENCES, THE CHARACTER OF BEING WITR PROPERTY WOULD BE DUE TO THE PRESENCE THEREIN OF ANOTHER PROPERTY; AND IN THE CASE OF Substance AND TIE REST ALSO, THE CHARACTER OF BEING WITE PROPERTY HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ON
THE SAME BASIS.-(578)
COMMENTARY.
In each one of these Existences (ad infinitum), the character of 'being with property would be due to the presence therein of the properties coming one after the other; and under the circumstances, the assertion that 'these Six Categories alone are with property' would not be correct; as there would be many other things also in the shape of the E.cistences), apart from tho Six Categories, which would be with property. Such is the sense of the argument.
It might be argued that," what are said to be six only are those things that are always with property only [while others are with property and also are themselves property)",
But there is nothing in this explanation. As, under this explanation, Quality, Action, Universal, Individuality and Inherence could not be mentioned therein, as these are not always with property only, they are of the nature of property also, as all these subsist in the Substance.
On the same basia'; .e. because of the presence of other properties.
The Opponent says :-"The existence of the Six Categories consists in their Cognisability by the Means of Cognising existing things; and this Cognisability is in the form of the Cognition which has the Six Categories for its object; as it is only when this Cognition is present that they are regarded as existent'. This cognisability' is produced by Cognition and predicability' is produced by Predication ; so that the use of the Genitive Ending-based upon difference,-becomes quite possible. Nor is there an Infinite Regress; nor the coutingency of Categories other than the six (postulated by us)."
This also is a mere figment of the Opponent's imagination. If the things in question are in their essence of the nature of a Category (Thing) capable of effective action, then, as being capable of effective action, they must be Categories (Things); this being concedod, if they are spoken of by words with case-endings connoting difference in such expressions as the existence of these', only to meet the enquiry as to their being other forms of Categories, then what is the dispute between us? Because though its character is really not different, yet having withdrawn that character from it, if the speaker were to speak of it as if it were different,then there would be no dispute ; because the use of words depends entirely upon the speaker's whim, -as is found in the case of characters created in concocted stories, where extremo degrees of beauty and other qualitios are assumed and described.--(578)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
It has been argued by the other party (under Tett 561, above) that ** the Yarns and the Cloth are distinot things, because their makers and potencies are different, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (579-590). IP IT IS THE DIFFERENCE OF THE CLOTH FROM THE VERY FIRST YARNS THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED, THEN THERE IS THE IRRESISTIBLE DBFECT OF FUTILITY THOSE OTHER YARNS ALSO THAT APPEAR LATER ON, IN ANOTHER STATE
(FORM), CAPABLE OF A PABTICULAR KIND OF USEFUL ACTION, -ARE NOT ENTIRELY DIFFERINT IN CHARACTER FROM THOSE
FIRST YARNS.—(679-580)
COMMENTARY.
If what you are seeking to establish is the clifference of the Cloth from those first yarns which have not yet aequired the name of Cloth, then you are proving what is already admitted. In fact, all things being momentary, it is admitted by us that the later yarns which subsequently come to be called Cloth are actually produced from those first yarns, - though (as a matter of fact) it is not possible for one thing to be produced out of another totally different from it.-(579-580)
If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is the difference of the Cloth from those yarns that have come into existence at the same time as the Cloth, then, the Reasons adduced are such as are not admitted, Unproven'. This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (581-583).
THD INTENTION BEING TO INDICATE THEIR USE IN THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF A SINGLE PURPOSE,—IF EACH YARN WERE SPOKEN OF SEPARATELY, THEN THERE WOULD BE THE DEFECTS OF (a) PROLIXITY, (6) INCAPACITY, AND (C) TUTILITY;-WITH A VIEW TO AVOID THESE, THINKING THAT THERE WOULD BE SIMPLICITY OF USAGE IF ALL THE YARNS WERE MENTIONED BY A SINGLE NAME, PEOPLE MAKING USE OF WORDS HAVE BROUGHT FORTH THE SINGLE TERM AND APPLIED IT TO THE YARNS. BUT THESE (YARNS) DO NOT SERVE TO PROVE THI Cloth, WHICH IS SYNCHRONOUS WITH THOSE YARNS, AS HAVING A DIFFERENT MAKER AND DIFFERENT POTENCIES AND DIFFERENT SIZE.-(581-583)
COMMENTARY
If the Cloth existing at the same time as the yarns were at the time actually known as something different from the yarns, then, in comparison

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EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY- SUBSTANCE'.
with the yarns, it might be recognised as having the characters of having a different maker and the rest (which have been put forward by the other party); as it is, lowever, that Cloth itself is not known as something different from the yarus; as it is this very difference that the other party has proceeded to establish. The mere presence of the two different names' Cloth and Yarna'-does not necessarily prove tho two things to bo different, ug clifferent names may be applied to the same thing for various other purposes, For instance, some particular yarns, having reached a certain condition, become capable of accomplishing the useful purpose of keeping off cold; and there may be other yarns-which, for instanco, have just left the hands of the spinning women, which are not so capable. And with a view to indlicate that the former yarns are capable of accomplishing a single purpose, the single term Cloth' is applied to them by people speaking of them, specially for the purpose of avoiding confusion ; even though, in reality the Cloth is not anything different from the yarns.
Question :-"Why, then, is a single term applied at all ?"
Answer :-If each of the yarns were spoken of separately,-i.e. if each yarn were spoken of one by one, then, there would be the following defects (a) Prolixity ; i.e. as many words will have to be used as there are things capable of accomplishing the same purpose ; and this would be too prolix ; (6) Incapacity; it will not be possible to ascertain the specific forms of each individual; this is what is meant by incapacity (0) Futility : speaking of them as having some imaginary common form, it is better to speak of them by a single word ; and hence there is no use in speaking of each of them separately. On the other hand, if they are all spoken of as a whole, there is the distinct advantage that usage becomes simplified. Just as single comprehensive words are used in speaking of all things by such all comprehensive names as World', 'Three-Worlds', Universe' and so forth. Exactly of the same kind is the name Cloth' (as comprehending all the yarns).
The compound vibhinna, elc. is to ba expounded by making a copuletive compound between Karty' and 'Samarthya, etc., and then taking this copulative compound as qualified by the term 'vibhinna'.-(581-583)
It has been argued (under Tech 462, above) that," if there were no gross Substance, the perception of the Tree and such things would not be possible ; etc., etc." -This is answered in the following
TEXT (584). AS A MATTER OF FACT, THOSE ATOMS THAT HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE AS MUTUALLY HELPFUL,-ARD NOT BEYOND THE SENSES; AS
THEY ARE WITHIN REACH OF THE SENSES.-(584)
COMMENTARY.
The fact of Atoms being beyond the reach of the senses is not admitted ; because such Atoms as have attained a certain condition are actually percepti

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
ble by the serises.- In fact, it is for people who regard Atons us eternal, that the appearance of peculiar features in the Atoms being impossible, they would be always beyond the reach of the senses not so for us.
inyonyablisarah'- as mutually helpful, i.e. as helping each other. -(584)
The following text also shows that Atoms are perceptible by the senses :
TEXT (585).
THE
BLUE AND OTHER SHAPES HAVE BEEN POSTULATED IN REGARD TO THE ATOMS THEMSELVES; AND THE VISUAL AND OTHER COGNITIONS ALSO SERVE TO MANIFEST ONLY THOSE
BLUE AND OTHER SHAPES (585)
COMMENTARY.
Question: "Atoms are lield to exist in a sequential form-one after the other ;-and certainly they are not perceived in that form; then low can they be anid to be perceptible 1"
Answer :
TEXT (586).
THOUGH THEY ARE NOT PERCEIVED IN THE SEQUENTIAL FORM,TET THRIR perceptibility CANNOT BE DENIED,—IT BEING SIMILAR TO
THAT OF DRINKS AND OTHER THINGS.—(586)
COMMENTARY.
The term 'adhyaksatābādha' may be taken as a genitive Tatpuruşu compound, meaning-non-denial of Perceptibility';-or it may not bo treated as a compound but two separate words adhyaksata' and 'abūdha', -the meaning being 'Perceptibility is undeniable': i.e. there being no annulment of it, it cannot be denied.
It being similar, etc.;-.e. its perceptibility remains as undenied as the perceptibility of Drinks and other things. For instance, in the case of a
Drink, the Taptopala (1 Heated or Burnt, Stone, & medicinal preparation), the Satahema' [? Quick-silver and gold, another modicinal preparation, the Makaradhvaja ), and such things, where the constituent atoms are of mixed characters (tastes), they are actually perceived as such. In the case of these things, there is no composite substance ' (apart from the constituent Atoms), the things consisting of heterogeneous elements. In fact, if the Composite were something different from the Atoms, no conjuno. tion arnong thern could be visible; because the substratum of such conjunction -.e. the Atoms-are unseen (ex hypothesi); and if even one of the factors of the Conjunction is not visible, the Conjunction cannot be perceived ; e.g.

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EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY-SUBSTANCE".
the conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost; and the conjunction between the Solar Disc and parts of space and of Akasha. Such being the case, where all the conjuncts-in the shape of Atoms,-are imperceptible, how can the Conjunction subsisting in them be perceptible ? (586)
337
Question: Thus then, the whole matter being uncertain, how can the perceptibility of Atoms be accepted as reasonable?"
Answer:
TEXT (587).
As A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE MATTER OF THE PERCEPTION OF ALL THINGS, WHICH EXIST ONLY IN THE FORM OF mutual exclusion (negation),-THERE IS THE SAME UNCERTAINTY
IN REGARD TO all THEIR CHARACTERS AND FORMS.-(587)
COMMENTARY.
Under the view of the other Philosophers also, whenever anything is apprehended by Perception, there is no certainty in regard to all the forms and characters of that thing; what happens is that it is regarded as perceived to that extent which serves to differentiate it from other things,— and not all its forms and characters. Because even if other factors were perceived, there would be no certainty regarding them, and these would be of no practical use, and as such, would be as good as not-perceived.
The same uncertainly-i.o. as in the case of the apprehended thing. -(587)
Says the Opponent:-"Inasmuch as things are impartite, and everything is actually perceived in its complete form,-why should there be no certainty regarding the whole Thing?"
Answer :
TEXT (588).
EVEN THOUGH, THE THING BEING IMPARTITE, ITS CHARACTER IS APPREHENSIBLE ONLY BY Indeterminate Perception, YET THERE IS
DEFINITE (CERTAIN) COGNITION OF ITS DIFFERENTIATION (FROM OTHER THINGS); AND IT IS THIS
DEFINITE COGNITION THAT IS UNDER
STOOD TO BE THE CAUSE (OF
CERTAINTY). (588)
COMMENTARY
Aksa' is that which pertains to the senses; i.e. perceptional cognition;and this is qualified by the term 'akalpana', 'indeterminate';-though it is apprehensible by indeterminate Sense-perception, yet etc., etc.
22

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER 3.
There is definite (certain) cognition of its differentiation' i.e. certainty as regards its being different; the cause of this consists in Repetition, Close Proxicity, vividness of conviction of difference, and so forth. As a matter of fact, more Apprehension by itself does not bring about certainty, which is brought about with the help of repetition, etc. also. Hence the meaning is that there is certainty where all these conditions are present.
All this we have said on the supposition (for the sake of argument) that Atoms exist and also the external object is actually cognised by Perception; as a matter of fact however, for the Idealist, there is no external object, in the shape of Blue and the like, cognised by Perception ; because in dreams and other such conditions, there is perception of such things as the Bhre, even though such things have no existence at the tine; and this fact makes the ordinary perception of such things also at least doubtful; specially as the form of the Blue' being devoid of the nature of one or many, its cognition must be of the nature of an illusory appearance.-Nor are the Atoms admitted as existent; because they exist in sequential succession, and as they vary in regard to the point of space occupied by them, they cannot be regarded as one. Under the circumstances, in view of such an Atom, how can it be asserted that Atoms are perceptiblo as having the Blue Colour, and that the sequence las no significnnce, being imposed upon it from outside-through illusion ?-(588)
The Opponent might argue that if there were no Composite substance, how could a man with open eyes have the notion of one mountain' in reference to what are only so many Atoms?"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (589).
JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE LAMP IT IS ONLY A SERIES OF SIMILAR FLAMES WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE ILLUSION (OF ITS BEING one);
SO (IN THE CASE OF THIE MOUNTAIN ALSO), TIDERE IS AN ILLUSION OF UNITY, EVEN THOUGH WHAT ARE REALLY COGNISED ARE SEVERAL SUBTLE ENTITIES APPEARING IN CLOSR JUXTA
POSITIOX.-(589)
COMMENTARY. In such things as the Lamp, it is the series of successively appearing similar flames that give rise to the illusion of there being one lamp ,though in reality there are several flames,-in the same manner, in the case of the mountain, what are really cognised are many small and smaller entities appearing in close juxtaposition, and this gives rise to the illusion of one ness' So that there is no incongruity at all.-(589)
Question :- "If then, the Atorns are not perceived as distinct from one another, how do they become perceptible ?"
Answer:

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EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY
SUBSTANCE.
339
TEXT (590).
IF THE PERCEPTIBILITY OF ATOMS IS NOT ADMITTED BECAUSE OF THEIR BEING NOT-DIFFERENTIATED, THEN HOW IS IT SEEN IN THE CASE OF THE LAMP AND SUCH THINGS? OR, IS THE COMPOSITE HELD TO BE OF THAT
KIND!-(590)
COMMENTARY.
If it is held that what cannot be cognised in differentiated form cannot be perceptible, then, how is it that perceptibility is found in the Lamp, wherein also the individual flames appearing in quick succession cannot be differentiated 2-Or is it that the Composite only is a thing that is perceptible, even though its components are not differentiated? The reason this put forwnrd by the Opponent is inconclusive.-(590)
The following Text advises the other Party as to the way in which he should level his criticism :
TEXTS (591-592).
ALL THAT CAN BE URGED IS-" ON THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF
THESE (ATOss), HOW IS IT THAT IT IS NOT REALISED THAT WHAT IS PERCHIVED AS Blue IS THE FORM OF THE Atoms?"
-BUT THAT ALSO CANNOT BE THE CAUSE; BECAUSE THE COGNITION IN QUESTION CANNOT BE WITHOUT AN OBJBOT ; AND YET IT CANNOT HAVE FOR ITS OBJECT A single gross object, AS THERE IS INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN gro88.
ness AND one-ness.-(591-592)
COMMENTARY
*These i.e. of the Atoms.
That also cannot be the Cause etc., etc. ' i.e. the fact of the Atoms being perceived as differentiated from one another cannot be the cause of the fact that the Blue colour is not perceived as belonging to the Atoms: because the certainty regarding this can be got at from other sources. For instance, the upholder of the 'External Thing cannot hold a Cognition to bo devoid of an object; if he did admit it, then his view would come to be the view of pure Idealism'.
Under the circunstances, the Colour, etc. which forin the objects of the Cognition, and appear therein in the gross form,- is it one or many ? If one, is it composed of the components, or not so composed ? In either

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
of these two forms, it cannot be one, as that would be incompatible with Perception.-(591-592)
Question :-"What is that incompatibility (with Perception)" Answer -
TEXTS (593-594).
IF THE GROSS OBJECT WERE OF THE NATURE OF One ONLY, THEN ON EVEN
PART OF IT BEING COVERED BY THE LITTLE LEG OF A FLEA, ALL OT IT WOULD BECOME COVERED, WITHOUT ANY DISTINOTION; -AND ON ONI PART OF IT BEING REDDENBD, ALL OF IT WOULD BECOME COLOURBD RED.–OR, OX THE CONTRARY, THE PRESENCE OF INCOMPATIBLE PROPERTIES WOULD INDICATE
multiplicity.-(593-59-4)
COMMENTARY.
If the gross object were one, then the covering of one part of it would mean the covering of all of it, and the colouring of ono part would mean the colouring of all; as, according to your view, there would be no difference between the covered and uncovered parts, or between the coloured and uncoloured parts. And yet it is not possible for any single object to be poss essed of contradictory properties, -as that would lead to absurdities. Thus the whole universo would become a single substance, and this would involve all the anomalies of simultaneous production of things and the rest. As a matter of fact too, the covering of one part is not seen to lead to the covering of all. Thus the said view is clearly incompatible with perceived facts.
It is incompatible with Inference also: For instance, that which is obsessed by contradictory properties cannot be one,-e.g. the Cow and the Buffalo ;-the gross object is found to be obsessed by the contradictory properties of being perceived and not perceived, as being covered' and
not covered':-hence there is found in it the contrary of the wider condition, (which makes one-niess impossible).-The contingency of the whole universe becoming one would he an Inference that would annul the notion [of the said oneness of the gross object).-(593-594)
Uddyotakaros has argued as follows-"As there can be no diversity in any one thing, the term 'all' cannot be rightly applied to it; then how can there be the use of the term 'all', on the basis whereof all (sarva) of it could be said to be covered ?"
This objection is expounded in the following

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TEXT (595).
“INASMUCH AS THE OBJECT IS OF ONE UNIFORM CHARACTER, TO WHAT WOULD THE USE OF THE TERM sarva' (* ALL') BE DUE ! BECAUSE THAT TERM DENOTES MORE THAN ONE INDIVIDUAL THING, WHILE THE Composite is NOT OF THE NATURE OF MANY IN
DIVIDUALS." -(595)
COMMENTARY.
"As a matter of fact, the term 'all' denotes many more than onethings; while the Composite is not many : how then can the term 'all' be used in reference to it-in such an assertion as all of it would become covered!"-(595)
This argument is answered in the following
TEXTS (596-598). IT IS ONLY SUCH THINGS AS ARE WELL KNOWN IN THE WORLD, SUCH AS Cloth, Body, Mountain AND SO FORTH, THAT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED BY YOU AS COMPOSITES ; --AND AS A MATTER OF FACT, ALL MEN MAKE USE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS THE CLOTH IS RED-ALL OF IT
-WHOLE OF IT-IN ITS TOTALITY-COMPLETELY, ENTIRELY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR WHIM.-THUS THE USE OF VERBAL EXPRES. SIONS BEING DEPENDENT UPON THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER, WE ALSO MAKE USE OF THE EXPRESSION 'all OF THE OBJEOT WOULD BE REDDENED ' ; BECAUSE THERE
CAN BE NO CHECK UPON SPEAKERS.-(596-598)
COMMENTARY,
It is just the well-known things,-like the Cloth, the Body and so forth, -that have been put forward by you as composites; and in regard to all these things the use of such terms as 'one' and 'all' is also well known ; e.g. people are found saying all of this cloth has been coloured' and so forth-Such being the whim of speakers, --when there is a desire to speak of the colouring of things like the cloth-piece which occupy a larger space, we also, on the basis of the ordinary notion, make use of the said expression, for the purpose of bringing out the incongruity involved in your view.
Further, this criticism is applicable to yourself, who regard the gross object as one, --not to us; because we do not regard the gross object to be one.-(596-598)
The following might be urged—"The said criticism cannot apply to us either, because (according to us) the application of the name Cloth' to its

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component yams is only indiroct, figurative, based upon their being its cause ; so thint the use of terms like 'all' would be all right".
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (599). IF THE NAME BR SAID TO BE FIGURATIVE (INDIREOT), THEN THERE SHOULD BE DIFFERENCE IN NUMBER. THERE IS ALSO NO DIFFERENCE IN THE COGNITION, WHICH IS ADMITTED BY BOTH
(THOUGH DIREOTLY AND INDIRECTLY).-(599)
COMMENTARY. Tf it is as you say, then there should be difference in number'; i.e. in all cases, the Plaral number should be used-'all Cloths are coloured'; you do not consider it right to tise the Singular number in regard to things that are many.
It might be argued that," when the term 'Cloth' is used in regard to the component yaros, it is in accordance with the number of the composito object, which term Cloth. therefore does not abandon the gender and number of what is denoted by it"
But this also cannot be right; this is what is shown in the second lineThere is also no difference, etc. etc.; if the applying of the name Cloth' is figurative (indirect), then the distinction between the cognition of what is direct and what is indirect would be only a halting ono ; because ng a matter of fact, there is no difference. For instance, whon the expression is used as "all of the cloth is coloured', the idea that it produces is not that what is coloured is not the Cloths, but the yarns that are its constituent cause !
The particle cha' in the Text implies, the following argument : You do not admit that the cloth, being only one, is denoted by the term 'all'; how then can the term 'all', without the term Cloth', be applied to the components, on the basis of the Number of the Cloth ?
Or, the second line may be explained as follows :-The 'bhada', diversity, of the Cognition, is not present in what are regarded as direct' and
indirect'; i.. different colours are not found in the yarns and the Cloth, in the way in which they are found among Colour. Taste, and other things : and when the forms of the two are not found to be different, they cannot be regarded as direct and indirect.-(599)
The following Text introduces the answer given by Shankarastāmin :
TEXT (600). "INASMUCH AS CONJUNCTION IS NOT ALL-EMBRACING IN ITS CHARACTER, THE COLOURING CANNOT BELONG TO ALL THE CLOTH ; NOR
IS THE WHOLE FOUND TO BE COVERED." -(600)
COMMENTARY He argues as follows:-" The colour spoken of as belonging to the Cloth is of the nature Conjunction (contact) with such colouring substances

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as the red dye, saffron and so forth; and Conjunction is a quality that is not all-embracing; hence when one (part) is coloured, the whole does not become coloured. Similarly when one part of the body is covered by the Cloth, the whole body does not become covered.-(600)
The following Text shows that this explanation is not right :
TEXTS (601-602), WHEN THE SUBSTANCE HAS NO PARTS, WHAT FORM WOULD BE THERE THAT WOULD NOT BE EMBRACED (BY THE CONJUNCTION) ? IF SUCH AN (UNEMBRACED) FORM OF THE SUBSTANCE REMAINED THERE, THEN DIVERSITY BECOMES ESTABLISHED.- EXISTENCE IN SEVERAL PLACES IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SINGLE OBJECT. HENCE IT BECOMES ESTABLISHED THAT THINGS LIKE THE CLOTH ARE DIFFERENT IN FORM FROM THE ATOMS (COMPOSING
THEM).-(601-602)
COMMENTARY.
If the Cloth is a single substance, then in such an impartite substance, what is it that would not be embraced by the Red Colour, by virtue of which the contact of the colour would be not-pervasive? If it is admitted that there is something left unpervaded by the colour, then that alone suffices to establish difference between the two parts, -as it would be impossible for the mutually contradictory peruaded and unpervaded parts to belong to one and the same thing. Nor would it be possible to explain that one part-the one covered by the Colour,-is larger than the other; because the thing has no parts. Otherwise, as all such diverse things as Water, Animal, Elephant and the like would be equally one only, there would be no difference among them and hence there could be no such differentiation as that between large' and 'small':
The difference would be due to the one being made up of a larger number of component parts than the other."
In that case, those parts themselves, appearing in larger or smaller numbers, may be the basis of the notions of gross' and 'subtle', -what is the use of postulating a composite' made up of those components, specially when these latter have not been found to be effective at all!
As a matter of fact, even when there are large and small number of component parts in things, that cannot constitute a difference among the composites themselves, as these latter are impartite; so that there can be no basis for differentiation into gross' and 'subtle'. If the difference were held to be based upon the larger and smaller number of components, that would only imply the admission of the components, as the notion of
gross' and 'subtle' would be applicable to these alone ; and that would mean that the Atom is the only entity; nothing apart from the Atom, either gross or subtlo, being perceived at all.

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Then again, what is the meaning of the assertion that * Conjunction is not all-pervasivo " -If it means that it does not pervade over all (whole) of the sultance, then it cannot be right; because it has been held that the term "all cannot apply to the substance-If it means that " Conjunction sub. sists only in a part of its substratum", -that also cannot be right; as there can be no * part of it-It may be said that what is meant is that "it subsists in a component making up the substance" if that be go, then, inasmuch as what has been coloured are only the components (where alone the contact of the Dye subsists), the colour of the composite would not be red at all; so that what should be perceived should be coloured and not-coloured, at one and the same time-Further, what is called the component making up the substance - if that is of the same form as the composite itsell,then the Conjunction that would subsist there would also subsist only in a part of that component (as Conjunction is non-perusive, ex hypothesi); so that the objection would be equally applicable to this also.--If, on the other hand, the component be held to be of the form of the Atom, then, inasmuch as Atoms are beyond the reach of the senses, the Oonjunction subsisting therein would also be beyond the reach of the senses, so that there could be no perception of the Red colour at all.
The Opponent might argue thus :-* Pervasion is the name givon to that character whereby the shape of the finger is perceived only on the perception of the whole finger; hence when Conjunction is said to be mol-pervasive, what is meant is that in its case it is not that it is perceivod only on the perception of its substratum".
This is not right. As a mattor of fact, Conjunction is never perceived while its substratum is not perceived; 0.g. tho Conjunction between the Jar and the Ghost (which is not perceived because the Ghost is not seen). Thus then, under this explanation, the colour also would not be perceived; it should be regarded to be perceptible only when its substratuin is perceived ; and hence that also would be pervasive in character.
Says the Opponent:"Even when the substance inhering (subsisting) in the other un-coloured components is perceived, there is no perception of the colour, which consists in Conjunction; hence even when its substratum (in the form of the substance) is perceived, the Conjunction is not perceived (and this is what makes it non-pervasive in character] ".
This is not right. In this way, there being only one substance inhering in components some of which are coloured and some un-coloured, even though a component might be coloured, the Colour would be not-perceived (in the Thing) through that perception of colour' ; because even though the substratum would be perceptible, the colour would be imporceptible. Nor is there any other way of perceiving the Conjunction, except the perception of its substratum.
From all this it follows that there is no object' which is of one form. Even when of various forms,-on the strength of being itself, -the difference can lie only in the form of the aggregation of Aloms; specially as the number of possible components can never be one.
Thus it is proved that the Jar and such things exist only in the form of

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Atoms; and hence the Blue and the rest form the shape of the Atoms; there being no other single object possible.-(601-602)
It has been argued above (under Tex/ 562) that "there could be no such word as Alom".
The following Tea:t supplies the answer to this
TEXT (603),
IT IS ONLY PEOPLE WHO HAVE NOT UNDERSTOOD THS REAL NATURE OF THINGS THAT CONCEIVE OF ONE mass'; AND IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THIS ASSUMPTION THAT THE TERM ATOM' IS
USED.-(603)
COMMENTARY. * It is on the basis, elc., etc.'-i.e. these people are cependent upon the slight thread of the said assumption.-(603)
Another answer is supplied in the following
TEXT (604).
Or, TET NAME 'ATOM', AS APPLIED TO WHAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED, MAY BE TAKEN AS BASELESS, DEPENDENT UPON MERE CONVENTION; JUST AS THE NAME 'LORD' IS APPLIED TO
ONE WHO HAS NO PROPERTY AT ALL.-(604)
COMMENTARY.
As applied, etc. etc.', -ie. to what is iinpartite, and has no resistance, Just as even the poor man is praised as 'the Lord', where the name 'lord' is applied without any basis, on the strength of mere convention or custom,so also is the use of the name 'Atom'. So that there is no incongruity at all.-(604)
It has thus been established in a general way that there can be no single groas substance, either made up, or not made up, of component parts. The Author now proceeds to point out the weak points in the notion of that of which the composite is held to be made up :
TEXTS (605-606).
(A) SUCH THINGS AS THE YARNS AND THE HAND AND OTHER LIMIS CANNOT BE PERMEATED BY ANY SINGLE COMPOSITE',- BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE THAN ONE--LIKE SUCH WELL-KNOWN
THINGS AS STRAW, HUT AND JAR.

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OR (B)-TE SUBSTANCB IN QUESTION CANNOT SUBSIST IN SEVERAL COMPONENTS, BECAUSE IT IS ONE,-LIKE THE ATOM.—AND (C) IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUBSISTENCE WOULD BE THE PROOF ANNULLING THE OTHER PARTY'S PROPOSITION.
-(605-606)
COMMENTARY. The arguments are to be formulated as follows:
(A) That which is diverse cannot be permeated by a singlo substance, e.g. the Jar, the Hut and many other things which are many are not per. reated by any single substance the components in question, such as the yarns, the Hand and other Limbs of the body and so forth, are diverse : hence there is found in these a character which is contrary to the larger term of the Opponent's proposition (i.e. to the components being pormented by the single composite).
Or, (B) What is one must subsist in a single substance, like the single Atom ;-and the substance called composite is one ; hence there is found a charactor incompatible with tho larger predicate of the Opponent's proposition.-This is an argument in the forin of a reductio ad absurdum.
(C) In support of both the above arguments, the author adduces a proof annulling the contrary of the Buddhist's conclusion Impossibility of subsistence, etc. etc.':-.e. the fact that the subsistence of the composite in the components cannot be explained on the basis of any means of Right Cognition serves to annul the conclusion (of the other party).-(605-606)
Question —"Why should there be this impossibility ? ** Answers
TEXTS (607-608). (IT THE Composite SUBSISTED IN THE Components] IT COULD SUBSIST
IN ONE Component, EITHER EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT SUBSISTS IN ANOTHER Component, OR IN SOME OTHER FORM. NO THIRD WAY IS POSSIBLE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR IT TO SUBSIST IN ONE EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN
WHICH IT SUBSISTS IN ANOTHER; BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EMBRACED WITHIN ITS FOLD BY THE LATTER. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE SUBSISTING IN THAT EITHNR.
(607.608)
COMMENTARY. When the one Composite which is embraced-sulysists in one of its components in ono form,-is it in the same form that it subsists in another of its components! Or in some other form I-There are only these two alternatives possible; in fact in any case, there can be no other alternative than the thing being one or the other. The former alternative cannot be

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accepted ; as it is entirely embraced within the folds of the first component, how can it have any opportunity of subsisting in the other component at the same time 1 Otherwise, if it subsisted at the same time in the other component also, then it could not have subsisted in the first component in its entirety. It can have no other form in which it could subsist in the other component also; because in that case, it could not be regarded as one-(607-608)
The following Text formulates the argument:
TEXT (609). JUST AS THE BABY DOES NOT OCCUPY THE LAP OF A SECOND NURSE,SO A SUBSTANCE EMBRACED IN ONE COULD NOT SUBSIST IN
ANOTHER (COMPONENT).-(609)
COMMENTARY. The argument may be formulated as follows:When a thing is embraced by one thing, it cannot subsist in another thing at the same time ;-.g. when a baby is occupying the lap of one nurse, it cannot occupy the lap of another nurse the substance (composite) is embraced by one compo. nent and thus there is perceived a character which is contrary to your conclusion.
The substance condid not subsist in another':-this states the first conclusion of the argument.-(609)
The Author next states the argument in support of the contrary of the Opponent's conclusion, which is thus annulled by it :
TEXTS (610-611).
IF THE COMPOSITE ESSENTIALLY RELATED TO ONE COMPONENT SUBSISTED IN SOME OTHER COMPONENT OCCUPYING A PLACE OTHER THAN THAT OF THE SAID COMPONENT, THEN IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE TWO COMPONENTS OCCUPY THE SAME PLACE AND ARE ESSENTIALLY ONE AND THE SAME, BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DIFFERENTIATED. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE COMPOSITE SUBSISTED IN THE OTHER COMPONENT IN ANOTHER FORM, THEN AS OCCUPYING TWO PLACES, THE COMPOSITE COULD NOT BE one; SPECIALLY AS DIFFERENCE IN FORM (AND CHARACTER) MUST CONSTITUTS DIFFERENCE IN THE TRING
ITSELF.-(610-611)
COMMENTARY,
If the composite substance, which has its form and character connected with one Component, subsisted in another Component which occupies another

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point in space,--then the components in question would have to be regarded as occupying the same point in space; which would mean that they are essentially one and the same, being of the same nature.
" Why so?"
Beouse they are not differentiated because they exist without being differentiated from one another.-Otherwise, if they existed in their differentiated forms,-they could not pecupy the same point in space.
If the second alternative is accepted.- i.e. the Composite subsists in the second component in a different form,-then it means that one thing subsists in several components,-which would be inadmissible ; because, as a matter of fact, when one thing differs from another in its nature, it must be different from this latter; as difference in things is always of the nature of difference in their character (and form).-(610-611)
Uddyotakara has argued as follows: "All that the assertion The Composite subsists in the components' does is to mention two objects, ono of which is the substratum (container) and another the subsistent (the contained), which means that the latter becomes the subsistent,—this 'subsistence being of the nature of the contact called "Inherence . (Nyāyjavartika, 2. I. 32, page 217, Line 4, etc.).
The answer to this is provided in the following:
TEXT (612).
IF IT BE KELD TRAT THE SUBSISTENCE OF THE COMPOSITE IN THE COMPONENTS IS OF THE NATURE OF 'INHERENCE ', -THEN THE SAME CONSIDERATIONS AS ABOVE FOLLOW THAT IDEA
ALSO WITH EQUAL FORCE.-(612)
COMMENTARY.
Even in regard to this form of subsistence, the considerations just wged are applicable,--such as does it subsist in another component in the same form and character as in one component, or in some other form t'; they follow this idea also as if in ferocity, in anger-not tolerating the criticisms emanating from the poor intelligence of the other party--(612)
Hitherto the subsistence of the Composite has been discarded without recourse to the alternatives of its subsisting in whole or in part.-Now the author proceeds to show the way of discarding the same by recourse to the said alternatives, --in the manner indicated by actual exporience :

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TEXT (613). OR AGAIN, IF IT (THE COMPOSITE) SUBSISTS (IN THE COMPONENT) IN ITS ENTIRETY,-THEN IT BECOMES LIABLE TO BEING REGARDED AS many; AS TOR ITS SUBSISTENCE in part, THAT IS NOT
WHAT IS HELD (BY THE OTHER PARTY); AND THE COMPOSITE WOULD (IN THAT CASE) NOT BE one ; AND IT WOULD NOT SUBSIST ANYWHERE AT
ALL.-(613)
COMMENTARY. When the substance (Composite) subsists in its components,-does it subsist in each one of them in its entirely? or in part:
If in its entirety, then the entire forn of the Composite should be as many as there are components. Unless it had the same form in each component, it could not be present in each component in its entirely; as there can be no subsistence except in a forma that is fully recognised. Such being the case, if the Composite subsisted in each component simultaneously in its entire form, then it would have to be regarded as many, several ; just like the Lotuses blooming in several ponds.
If the other view be held, that it is in part that the Composite subsists in each component, then there would be an infinity of such parts of the Composite. For instance, those of its parts in which this Composite subsists in each of its components would themselves boite parts, in which also the Composite would subsist in part; and so on and on ad infinitum.
It might be argued that,"Those of its parts through which the Composite subsists in the Components are all its own forms, and not different things; as apart from the Composite itself, there can be no parts of its own. Hence there can be no such infinite regress."
The answer to this is as follows:- The Composite would not be one (in that case); i.e. if such were the case, then, the Composite would not be ons only; as it is only a conglomeration of the components-(and these latter are many); and under the circumstances, the thing (man) may be regarded as consisting only of such of his limbs, Hand and the rest, as are actually seen ; what use then would there be of assuming any others
The Author points out another defect in the Opponent's theory : And it would not subsist anywhere at all'; the term 'vrltah syāt', 'would subsist, has to be supplied. What is meant is as follows If each of the Composites present in each of the components had occupied the same point in space, then alone could the Composite be subsistent in the Component ; as a matter of fact, however, each of the Composites does not occupy the same point in space; because if they did subsist in each of the Components, then they could not occupy the same point in space; specially as there is no other Composite of the same form. How then could it be said to be subsistent in the Components 1-(613)
In the following T'excls, the author sets forth the answer made by Shankarasvāmin -

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TEXTS (614-618).
"WHENEVIR A REASON IS ADDUCED, EITHER DIRECTLY OR IN THE POEM OP Reductio ad Absurdum, -IT BECOMES TRULY APPLICABLE ONLY WHEN IT IS ITSELF APPREHENDED NOT OTHERWISE. AS A MATTER OF FACT, SUBSISTENCE EITHER in whole or in part HAS NEVER BEEN PERCEIVED (BY YOU, BUDDHISTS), -ON THE BASIS OF THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF WHICH IN THE SUBSTANCE, THE SUBSTANOR COULD BE HELD TO BD NON-EXISTENT, OR SOMETHING ELSE.-IY, ON THE OTHER HAND, SUCH SUBSISTENCE HAS BEEN PERCEIVED BY YOU ANYWHERE, THEN IT CANNOT BE DENIED IN THE CASE OF THE SUBSTANOE AND SUCH THINGS.IP THE SAID SUBSISTENCE HAS NOT BEEN PERCEIVED, THEN THE QUESTEON DOES NOT ARISE REGARDING THE DISTINCTION; ALL THAT COULD BE ASSERTED WOULD BE THAT THE SUBSISTENCE IS NOT THERE, AND THIS WOULD NOT BE RIGHT ; AS IT IS SOMETHING DIRECTLY PERCEIVED; AS IS CLEAR IN SUCH NOTIONS AS THIS subsists HERE'-IT IT BE KELD THAT THE FACT OF THIS BEING DIREOT PERCEPTION IS NOT ADMITTED, THEN SOME ANNULLING REASONINO SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD. OTHERWISE, EVEN SUCH COGNITIONS AS THOSE OF COLOUR AND SUCH THINGS MIGUT
CEASE TO BE OF THE NATURE OF PERCEPTION'."-(61+618)
COMMENTARY.
Shankarasuámin argues as follows -" Whenever a Reason is adduced, - either directly or in the form of a Reductio ad absurdum,it becomes applic. able only when it is itself perceived; otherwise it would be open to the charge of being proven'. As a matter of fact, you have not anywhere por. ceived the subsistence of anything either in its entirety or in part ;-hence on the basis of the absence of such subsistence, it does not behove you to regard the composite) substance as non-existent. Or—if it were possible then there would be something else-Component and Composite.
If such subsistence has been perceived by you anywhere, then it could be the same in the case of the Substance, etc. also, which, therefore, cannot be denied.-If, however, the said subsistence has not been perceived, then there does not arise any question regarding the distinction-as to whether the subsistence is in entirety or in part; because it is only when the object itself has been admitted that anything can be denied in regard to it. When however the objeot itself is not admitted, then it is better to deny the object itself, 30 that the assertion should be in the form that there is no subsistence, and not the denial of any particular character in regard to it. But such an assertion-us that there is no subsistence at all'-would not be proper : because the subsistence of the Composite in the components is vouched for by direct Perception.
Question :- What is that Perception ?
"Answer - It is in the form This subsists here' ;-i.e. the Perception is in the form- This-Oloth-subsists in the yaras'.
"It might be argued that this notion cannot be regarded as Perception.

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** In that case, it behoves you to put forward some reasoning in anmılmeut of the said notion; whereby its perceptional character could be rejected. If, even in the absence of such annulling Reason, the notion be not accepted as 'Perception', then, your cognition of oven such things as colour and the like would not bo Perception; as there can be no difference between the two cases."—614-618)
The Author answers the above in the following
TEXT (619).
THAT THE SUBSISTENCE IS NOT THERE 'LAS ALREADY BEEN ESTABLISHED ABOVE, IN A GENERAL WAY AS FOR THE NOTION THAT IT SUBSISTS HERDIN, THERE IS NO SUCK COGNITION AT ALL; AS TRIS EXACT FORM DOES NOT APPEAR
IN ANY COGNITION.—(619)
COMMENTARY Under Text 607-the subsistence of one thing in several things has already been rejected above in a goneral way.
As regards the assertion that "the notion that this subsists herein is vouched for by Perception ",--this also is something out of the common ; because, as a matter of fact, among people, no such notion as the Cow subsists in this Horn'. or that the Oloth subsists in the yarns', -ever appears even in men's imagination; the notion that appears is that the Horn is in the Cow', 'the yarns are in the Cloth':-Nor in any Perception does the Oloth ever appear as something different from the yarns; and unless the two were distinguished, thora could be no such notion as that this subsists in that'. For instance, til discriminating persons have actually perceived the water as something distinct from the Pond, they do not have any such notion as there is Water in the Pond'.-(619)
It has been argued (under Te.ct 615 above) that "subsistence either in entirety or in part has not been perceived by you, ete. ete."--This is answered in the following
TEXTS (620-621). WHAT IS MEANT BY (THE QUESTION CONTAINING THE TERMS IN ENTIRETY
AND IN PART' IS—DOES THE SUBSTANCE SUBSIST AS AN IMPARTITE WHOLE, -IN THE WAY IN WHIOH THE BILVATRUTT LIES IN A DISH? OR DOES IT SUBSIST IN SOME OTHER WAY-AS A CERTAIN PERSON, Chaitra, DOES WHEN LYING DOWN ON SEVERAL SEATS ?
-(620-621)
COMMENTARY. What is meant by the term 'in entirety' is-whether the substance subsists in all its Components in its impartite form, -as is found in the case

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of the Bilma-fruit lying in a dish # or in some other way in the way, for instance, in which a person like Chaitra lies down upon more than one couch. This is what is meant hy subsistence in part'.
Tluis is only by the way.
Vidyolakam has argued as follows (in Nyayavartila on 2. 1. 32, page 216, Bib. Ind.):-" Inasmuch as the terms entire and a part cannot be applied to one and the same Composite, the question raised-as to whether it subsists in its entirety or in part—is an improper one ; as a matter of fact, the term
entire stands for all, excepting nothing, while the lorin a part' stands for one among several; as such, those two terms cannot be rightly applied to any one Composite"
This arguinent becomes rejected by what has been said in the Text: As a matter of fact, in common parlance, the terms whole and in part aro found to be applied to such things as the Fool and the like, in such expressions as Does the whole foot lie in the poad, or only in part ? -Nor can it be right to say that such use is figurative ; because it is never found to fail or falter; as bas been pointed out before.-(620-621)
So far the four kinds of Substance, ending with Air fi.c. Earth, Water, Fire and Air] have been discarded ;—the Substance called Soul' has already been discarded in the chapter on Soul-the Author next proceeds to deny the remaining four kinds of Substance-viz. :--Alūshu, Time, Space and Mind; (and to that end, set forth the arguments whereby the other party seeks to establish their existence]:
TEXT (622).
"SOUNDS MUST SUBSIST IN SOMETHING, BECAUSE OF THEIR perishability AND SUCH OTHER CHARAOTERS; LIKE THE JAR, THE LAMPFLAME AND SUCH THINGS; AND THIS SOMETHING
MUST BE Akasha " -(622)
COMMENTARY.
The existence of the substance called 'Akash' is sought to be proved by the other party in the following manner :
"There must be a Substance named Akasha, permanent, ono and all-pervasive, having sound for its indicative; sound is its indicative in the sense thnt it is its quality.-This argument may be formulated as follows: Those things that are equipped with qualities like perishability and producibility, must subsist in something else ;-and the substratum' of sound can only be Akasha, as that alone has the requisite capacity. Because, the said sound cannot be the quality of the four substances-Earth, Water, Fire and Air,-a) because, while being perceptible, it is not preceded by any quality in itas Cause,-(6) because it does not last as long as the Substance lasts, and (c) bocause it is perceived in a place otler than its substratum and the qualities of all tangible things have been found to be otherwise

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than all this.--The qualification while being perceptible' has been added with a view to those qualities in the Atom which are produced by Firecontact.-Nor can Sound be a quality of the Soul ;-a) because it is perceptible by an external sense-organ-(b) because it is perceptible by other Souls,(c) because it is perceived as distinct from the I-notion'; while all qualities of the Soul, such as pleasure and the rest are otherwise than all this. Sound cannot be a quality of Space, Time and Mind,-because it is appre. hended by the Auditory Organ.-Thus, by elimination, Sound can be the quality of Aleisha, of which, therefore, it becomes the indicative.-This Äkäsha, having Sound as its only common Indicative, and having no other specific indicatives, must be one ;-and as having its qualities perceptible everywhere, it must be all-pervading and having a quality, and itself not subsisting in anything else, it must be a substance ;-and as it is not created (by any one), it must be permanent."
Such is the process of reasoning put forward by the other party (in proof of Alăsha as a Substance).
The following Texts sets forth his roasonings in support of Time being a Substance :
TEXTS (623-624). "THE NOTION OF Priority. Posteriority AND SO TORTH MUST HAVE FOR ITS BASIS SOMETHING OTHER THAN MOBILE SUBSTANCES LIKE THE SUN,-LIKE THE NOTION OF THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS,
-BECAUSE IT IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT IN CHARACTER FROM THE NOTION OF wrinkles, grey hairs, emaceation AND SO FORTH AND IT IS THIS BASIS, CAUSE, WHICH IS HELD TO
BE Time","-(623-624)
OOMMENTARY.
"The term mobilo substances should be taken as standing for * wrinkles', etc.
* Such notion as Prior, applied to the Father ;- Posterior to the Son ; simultaneous', 'for a long time', 'soon, is being done', was done', 'will be done, and so forth-all this notion of Priority and Posteriority, etc. must be based upon (due to) some substance other than the Sun and other mobile substances because they are different in character from the notion of wrinkles','grey hairs' and so forth, like the notion of the Jar and such things and that which is the basis of the said notions must be Time, as that alone has the requisito capacity. For instance, the said notion of Priority and Posteriority cannot be due to Space,-because when the old man is standing in space at the back of the younger man, he is said to be posterior'; and similarly when the Son is standing in space in front of the Father, he is said to be prior!-Nor can the said notion be due to wrinkles, grey hairs and such causes ; because it is entirely different from the notion of those.--Nor can it be due to any Action Movement), because it is different
23

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TATTVASANGRAHA; CHAPTER X,
in character from that also.-To this end is the Sütre (of the Vaisherikas) — * Such notions as Prior, Posterior, Simultaneous, for Long Time, and soon are the indicatives of Time!
* The character of being permanent, one and so forth has to be understood in regard to Tine in the same way as in regard to Akasha."-(023-624)
The following Texly set forth the arguments (of the Opponent) in support of Space' as a Substance :
TEXT (625).
"SIMILARLY Space IS INTERRED FROM SUCH NOTIONS ASTORE' AND
* AFT'."-(625)
COMMENTARY.
Taking one corporeal substance as the starting point, there are, in regard to other corporeal substances, the ten notions as this is to the Tast-to the South-to the West-to the North to the South-East-to the SouthWest-to the North-West-to the North-East,-above-below-oi that'; and that upon which these are based is Space Says The Satra :- That to which the notion that this is from that is duo is the indicative of Space': because these are peculiar notions, and peculiar notions cannot appear in a haphazard manner;-nor are they dependent upon the corporeal substances themselves; as such mutual interdependence would nullify both; hence, there being no other cause for them, these are regarded as indicatives of Space.—Of this Space, the qualities of one-ness, all-pervasiveness and other qualities are to be understood to be like those of Time.—Though space is one only, it comes to be regarded as diverso by reason of the diversity of its effects. The argument may be formulated as follows :-Tho notions of
fore' and 'aft' and the like must be based upon a Substance other than the corporeal substances, because they are different from the notions arising from these, like the notions of pleasure, etc.-(625)
The indicative of Mind is next stated :
TEXTS (625-626).
* THE MIND HAS BEEN HELD TO BE INFERRED TROM THE SUCCESSIVE APPEARANCE OF COGNITIONS ; WHICH REQUIRES A CAUSE DIFFERENT FROM THE EYE AND OTHER SENSE-ORGANS. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR AND SUCH THINGS APPEAR SUCCESSIVELY,-LIKE THE CHARIOT AND SUCH
THINGS." (625-626)
COMMENTARY
Even when the contact between the object and several sense-organs is present at the same time, the cognitions are found to appear one after the

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SUBSTANCE.
355
other; which shows that there is some other cause,distinct from the object and the sense-organ, -the presence and absence of which leads to the appear. ance and non-appearance (respectively) of the cognition. Thus from this appearance of cognitions, in succession, the inforence of Mind is got at. To this effect we have the Sütra-The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously indicates tho Mind'. The argument may be formulated thus :-The Cognition of colour and such things is dependent upon a cause other than the Eye and the other organs,-bocause it appears in succession, like the Chariot and such things.-(625-626)
With the following Text proceeds the refutation of the arguments (urged above, in favour of the existence of Akasha, Time, Space, and Mind as distinct Substances):
TEXT (627).
INASMUCH AS SOUND IS ALREADY ACCEPTED AS HAVING ITS CAUSE IN THE GREAT ELEMENTS THAT HAVE BEEN ACKNOWLEDGED (OR NOT-ACKNOWLEDGED),-IT IS ALREADY ADMITTED THAT SOUNDS SUBSIST IN THOSE ELEMENTS. SO THAT THE FIRST REASON PUT PORWARD (POR THE EXISTENCE OF Akasha) CANNOT PROVE (WHAT IT IS MEANT TO
PROVE).-(627)
COMMENTARY
If it is only the fact of Sounds being subsistent in a general way in some. thing that is sought to be proved, then the Reason is superfluous (proving what is already admitted). Because, as a matter of fact, Sounds are already admitted as having their cause in the Great Elements that have been acknow. ledged (by all parties) and those that have not boen so acknowledged and Sounds are certainly subsistent in those elements which are their cause (source); because effects are always subsistent in their cause, having their appearance (production) inseparably connected with the Cause. The
acknowledged elements are the Chitta (Idea) and the Chaitya (the Ideal), which are accepted (by Buddhists also).—The term 'adi' includes the causality of such elements as are not acionowledged (i.e. Earth etc., which though not acknowledged by the Buddhist, are accepted by the other party).
* Tēsu i.e. in those elements.
Iti'-i.e. therefore.
* The first Reason',-i.e. the one put forward under Text 622 ;-it cannot prove what it is desired to prove ; that is, because it is open to the objection of being superfluous':-(627)
If, on the other hand, what is meant to be proved is that Sounds are subsistent in a particular manner,--that is, subsistent in a substance which is one, incorporeal, external and all.pervading,—then there can be no corrobora. tive Instance possessing the character meant to be proved ; and to that

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTKK X.
extent, the Reason becomes 'inconclusive - This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (628).
THE SUBSISTENCE OF SOUNDS IN Akashit,--WHICH IS one, ALL-pervading AND eternal,-CANNOT BE PROVED (BY THE REASON ADDUCED), BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF POSITIVE CONCOMITANCE';AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE WOULD BE absence of succession AND SO FORTH; AS ALSO
universal contact.-(628)
COMMENTARY.
Na-Esam-goes with the preceding line.
That the Opponont's conclusion is contrary to Inference is shown in the Text by the words and also because, etc.; i.e. what has been said in the foregoing sentence to the effect that the subsistence of sounds is not proved, is so also because of the following reason :-If the Sounds were subsistent in the eternal, one substance, Ākasha,-then like the several Sounds produced at the same time, even Sounds produced at other times would be there at the same time in question, as their cause would be present there always in its perfect condition, and also because they would all be subsisting in the same substratum ;-and it has already been explained that what is eternal cannot be dependent upon anything else ; nor would it be right to regard that as 'subsistent which is of no use. So that the appearance of all Sounds would cease to be successive.
The phrase and so forth' includes the anomaly of all Sounds being heard by all persons. Because the Auditory Organ consists of Alusha, and Akasha is one only-all Sounds would reach the organ of all men and hence become heard ; and on account of the impartite nature of Alūsha, any such restriction would be impossible as that this is my own Auditory Organ and that is of another person's
The following argument might be urged :- When the tympanum of one has been affected by his Destiny, then that portion of the Alaska alone which is circumscribed by that tympanum forms the Auditory Organ of that person ; that is why Sound is not perceived through other openingssuch as the mouth, the nostrils and the like. And when that same Tympanun is hurt, there is deafness".
This cannot be right; because Akasha being impartite, any such partition of it would be impossible. Nor can imaginary component parts bring about, through mere imagination, any effective action which can be done only by real positive entities; merely imagining Water to be Fire does not make the former to burn or flare up.
It might be said that," what is meant by Akasha having a part is that contact with it is not pervasive".
This also has been already answered.
Then again, under the theory in question, the Jar, the 'Tympanum and all such things, as being in contact with one and the same Akasha, would come

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EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY
SUBSTANCE
357
to occupy the same point in space; because when one thing comes into contact with Akasha in one form, the other thing also comes into contact with it in the same form ; 50 that other Jars and other things also would appear at the same place; because these would be in contact with Akasha which is in contact with the former thing just like the Jar already existing there. In this way, all Sounds also would appear at one and the same place; and this would be contrary to the generally accepted notion regarding Sounds appearing far off or close by.
These are the difficulties that appear against the Opponent's theory. -(628)
As regards the arguments put forward for proving the existence of Time and Space, these also are generally open to the charge of being
superfluous'; and particularly, the Reason is devoid of the necessary concomitance, and the conclusion is annulled by Inference. This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (629-630)
THE NOTIONS OF PRIORITY AND POSTERIORITY (AND OF FORE AND AFT') ARE BASED UPON A CONCEPTION ARISING OUT OF PARTICULAR CONVENTIONS ; THEY ARE NOT DUE TO TIME', NOR TO 'Space', INASMUCH AS THESE ARE impartite, ONE, PRIORITY', 'POSTERIORITY' AND THE LIKE ARE NOT POSSIBLE IN THEM. IF THE NOTIONS BE SAID TO BE BASED UPON THE THINGS RELATED TO THEM, THEN THEY THEMSELVES BECOME
USELESS.-(629-630)
COMMENTARY * Particular Conventions',-i.e. the understanding that the epithets prior and posterior are to be applied to things produced before and after, and so forth the conception that arises out of such conventions,-is the basis of the notions in question. Thus it is that there is no mutual interdependence ; as the notion is based entirely upon a particular convention. Thus then, if the other party has set out to prove only that the said notions have a cause, --then it is superfluous (as it is admitted by all parties).
If however he intends to prove that a particiar Substance is that cause, then (1) there is annulment by Inference, (2) absence of concomitance, as before ; and (3) the Reason is contradictory', as it proves what is contrary to the desired conclusion ;-this is what is meant by the words of the Tel- Inasmuch as these are impartite
Related to them',-1.e. to Space and Time.
As a matter of fact, what is desired to be proved is that the notion of * Priority and Posteriority and so forth is based upon the impartite and single substances, Time and Space ;--this is not proved by the Reason

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER X.
adduced). Because a thing becomes the object' (of cognition) when it producos a cognition exactly of the same form as itself: in the case of an impartito substance, there cannot be any differentiation between fore! and aft', to which the notion of 'fore and aft' could be due ; thus by proving the contrary of what is desired to be proved, the Reason becomes * Contradictory'.
If the notions be szid to be twised, etc, etc.':--This anticipates the answer of the Opponent. It might be argued by the Opponent) that-"Such external and internal things as tho Lamp and the Body and the like are related to Space and Time,—there is priority and posteriority among these and it is this priority and posteriority of their relatives that is attributed to Space and Time,-hence the Reason is not contradictory ".
The answer to this is as follows:- Then they themselves become useless' Under the said assumption, Space and Time themselves would be useless; as what is meant to be brought about by them will have been brought about by the things related to them. For instance, Time is held to be the cause of such notions as those of the various divisions of priority and posteriority as are denoted by the terms Kšana', 'Law', Kästha', 'Kala',
Muurla'. 'Ahorätra, Arellamiie' and so forth (the various divisions of Time) and Space is held to be the cause of the notions of East', 'North and so forth and as a matter of fact, all this diversity does not belong to Space and Time; it is present in the divisions themselves; so that the assuming of Time and Space is entirely useless.-(629-630)
As regards the argument adduced for proving the existence of Mind, if the mere fact of certain notions having a cause in general is meant to be proved, then it is superfluous.-This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (631-632).
Mind AS DISTINCT FROM THE EXE, ETC. IS ADMITTED BY US ALSO, THAT
IDEA BEING REGARDED AS 'MIND' WHICH APPEARS IMMEDTATELY AFTER THE SIX (COGNITIONS).-IF HOWEVER THE MIND IS REGARDED AS permanent, THEN THERE COMES TRE ANOMALY OF COGNITIONS BEING SIMULTANEOUS ; THUS THE REASON PUT FORWARD BY YOU BECOMES DESTRUCTIVE OF WHAT IS
DESIRED.-(631-632)
COMMENTARY.
If what is meant to be proved is the eternal and one Mind, then the conclusion is one that is annulled by Inference, and the Reason is Con. tradictory'. This is what is shown by the words If however, etc. etc.'
Destructive of what is desired -because what it proves is only the dependence of the notions cited) upon an impermanent (fleeting) cause which is distinct from the Eye and other organs. Otherwise, if they had

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EXAMINATION OF THE FIRST CATEGORY_SUBSTANCE'
359
an eternal Cause, as the Catase would always be present in its perfect form, the successive appearance of Cognitions would be incongruous.--(631-632)
The following Text jokingly confirms the same contradictory character of the opponent's Reason
TEXT (633). I THINK THAT THE Sūtra (Nyáya-sūtra 1. 1. 36) HAS BEEN COMPOSED FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVING AND DISPROVING THE MIND AS POSTULATED BY THE Buddha AND THE OTHER PHILOSO PHER (RESPECTIVELY),—AND HENCE IT HAS BEEN REPEATED WITH AN ADDE
TIONAL 'A' (* not')-(633)
COMMENTARY. I think as follows The Satra Yugapajjfānnāupapattirmanasolingam' (The fact that cognitions do not appear simultaneously is-and is not-indicative of the Mind,-Nyaya-sūtra 1. 1. 16) is meant to prove the Mind' as conceived by the Buddha.-and to disprove the same as conceived by the other philosopher ; for the latter purpose an additional
a' ('not') being read (before 'lingam', 'indicative "). Such is the sense of the Text as a whole.
The meaning of the words is now described :-The compound Saugata siddhaye' is to be expounded as for the purpose of the proving and disproving, respectively, of the Mind, as postulated by the Bauddha and the other Philosopher
Question :-"How can one and the same Sūtra express two mutually contradictory meanings ?"
Answer: With an additional a (not);-that is to say, as applied to the view of the other philosopher, the words of the Sutra are to be construed as for the disproviny-asiddhi-of the Mind postulated by the other philosopher', -with an 'a' (before lingam ');-and it is different when applied to the view of the Buddhist, in which case it is without the said 'a' ('not').
Question "How can one and the same expression be with, and also without, the syllable 'a' (not')"
Answer It is repealed'; i.e. in such a case, the repetition of the expression is justified.-(633)
End of the Chapter on 'Substance'

Page #355

CHAPTER XI.
On Quality as a Category.
COMMENTARY
The Author now proceeds to discard the categories of Quality and the rest
TEXT (634).
BY TRE REJECTION OF 'SUBSTANCE', 'QUALITY', ACTION AND THE REST, WHICH ARE HELD TO BE SUBSISTENT IN SUBSTANCE,
ALL BECOME DISCARDED, -(634)
COMMENTARY
Quality Action, ending with Specific Individuality, become rejected by the rejection of Substance': because they subsist in this latter; and when the substratum is not there, the subsistents', which are dependent upon it, cannot be there.
Held to be, etc.-ie. held to be subsistent, either directly or indirectly in Substance. For instance, Quality and Action are held to be directly subsistent in Substance; as declared in the Sūtra (Vaishēşika)" Quality is subsistent in Substance, devoid of qualities, not the cause of Conjunction or Disjunction, independent";-which is the definition provided of Quality; similarly the definition of Action provided is-" It subsists in one Substance, is devoid of Qualities, the independent cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions". The term kadravyam 'in this last Sutra means subsisting in one Substance'. -Qualities, on the other hand subsist, some of them, in several Substances : e.g. Conjunction, Disjunction and the rest. The Genus and the Specific Individuality subsist, some of them, in Substances only; e.g. such genuses, as 'Earth and the like, while such genuses as Quality', 'Action and so forth subsist in Qualities and Actions related to Substances.-The Summum genus-which is 'Being subsists in the three categories beginning with Substance' i.e. in Substance, Quality and Action]
Thus, when Substance has been rejected, Quality and the rest become rejected without any effort. What is meant by this is that the final upshot of the examination of the other Categories has been achieved under the examination of Substance itself.-(634)
Opponent:"If that is so, then the Denial of Subsistence should be pro. ceeded with separately."
Answer:

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ON QUALITY' AS A CATEGORY.
361
TEXT (635).
THE RELATIVE (WHEREIN THE RELATION COULD SUBSIST) HAVING BEEN DISCARDED, WHOSE SUBSISTENCE' WOULD IT BE? AND WHERE? STILL A DETAILED DENIAL OF EACH
(CATEGORY) IS GOING TO BE SET FORTH.—(635)
COMMENTARY.
Subsistence is described as `inherence of the five categories'; so that when the substance and other (four) categories-wherein alone the said Relation could subsist,--have been rejected, whose subsistence would it be? and where? That is, of nothing and nowhere ; for the simple reason that all that could be the substratum and the subsistent have been rejected.-(635)
The detailed denial of Qualities is now set forth.
In this connection, the Sutra (Vaishëgika) is as follows "The following are the qualities : Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, Cognitions, Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Exertion"; the particle 'cha', 'and, including Gravity, Fluidity, Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit and Sound.-Colour is what is apprehended by the Eye, and subsists in Earth, Water, and Fire ;Taste is apprehended by the Gestatory Organ, and subsists in Earth and Water ;-Odour is apprehended by the Olfactory Organ and subsists in Earth ;-Touch is apprehended by the Tactile Organ, and subsists in Earth, Water, Fire and Air".
From among these Qualities, the Text sets forth the denial of the first four-Colour and the rest :
TEXT (636).
IF IN A LARGE SUBSTANCE, THE Blue colour IS HELD TO BE one ONLY, TAIN HOW IS IT THAT THERE IS NO MANIFESTATION AND PERCEPTION OF IT WHEN IT IS SEEN IN LIGHT COMING
THROUGH AN APERTURE ?-(636)
COMMENTARY.
Qualities are perceptible only when they subsist in a large substance ; that is why the Text has added the epithet 'large
If it is held that the Blue Colour, --in all its four forms,-that subsiste in a Large Substance is one only and without parts, then, at the time that there is manifestation of the Blue Colour as subsisting in a large substance like the Jar placed in a small room, through lamp light coming through an aperture in the split bamboo or some such thing, -the whole of the Blue Colour subsisting in the whole Jar should be manifested and perceived ; because it has no parts; 29 & single entity cannot have parts, by virtue of which there would be manifestation of one part only.

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XI.
Light coming through an aperture' has been mentioned only by way of illustration.
Similarly when odour in a part of the Earth is manifested by Water, the oclour in other parts of it also should become manifested and perceived.
Similarly in the case of Flames and the Mango and other fruits,--the Touching and Tasting of one part should lead to the perception of the Touch and Taste subsisting in the whole of those substances.-(636)
It might be urged (by the Opponent) that "there do come about the manifestation and perception of the entire Blue Colour !
The Answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (637),
THE BLUE COLOUR IS NOT HELD TO EXIST IN WELL-DEFINED PARTS ; HENCE WHAT 19 MANIFESTED THEN BY THAT (LIGHT) MUST, ON
THAT ACCOUNT, VARY WITH EACH ATOM.(637)
COMMENTARY. Then at that time. * By that by the light coming through the aperture.
What'-i.e. the Blue Colour.
In case it is admitted that the Blue Colour in its entirety varies with each atom,—then that would imply the presence of the Atomic Dimension in the Bine Colour - just as in a Substance; which would mean that the Blue Colour has a quality (Dimension); so that it would have the character of Substanca' (which alone can have a quality), and not that of Quality If things varying like this with each atom, were called 'Quality', then the dispute (between us) would be only in regard to names. When the thing is possessed of the Atomic Dimension, it cannot be right to regard it as a 'Quality', simply on the ground of its subsisting (in a Substance); because there can be no 'subsistence between two things, one of which exista and the other does not; if there were, it would lead to absurdities. That is to say, in that way, on the ground that it subsiste in the Component substance, the Composite Substance would also have to be regarded as a 'Quality':-(637)
"As regards the Quality of Number, it has been defined as the basis of the notions of one and so forth Number subsists in one substance and also in several substances; the Number one' subsists in one substance ; and the numbers beginning with Two' subsist in several substances. Of the Number subsisting in one substance, the eternality and the appearances should be understood to be like those of the Colour and other qualities subsisting in the atoms of Water, etc. ; while of Number subsisting in several substances, the appearance is due to the unities associated with the cognition of several things, and its destruction (disappearance) follows from the dis. appearance of the unitary conception; and in some cases, the disappearance is also due to the destruction of the substratum.-Number of both these

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ON 'QUALITY
AS A CATEGORY.
363
kinds is vouched for by Perception. Others have held it to be established by Inference also, on the ground that all specific cognitions are dependent upon diverse causes."
The denial of this Number is set forth in the following
TEXT (638).
"NUMBER', WHIOR IS HELD TO BE PERCEPTIBLE, DOES NOT APPEAR IN COGNITION AS ANYTHING DISTINCT FROM SUCK NAMES AS
THE ELEPHANT ', sro, WHICH CONNOTE 'NEGATION OF THE CONTRARY'; HENCE IT MUST BE NON
EXISTENT.-(638)
COMMENTARY.
Such names as elephant' are applied to the animals as being the negation of what is not-elephant,guch things as the Aggregate and the like;apart from such names, there is no such thing as Number which is per. ceptible; hence it must be non-existent, like the Hare's Horng'And yet it has been held (by the other party) to be perceptible; as declared in the following Sutra-* Number, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunction, Priority, Posteriority, as subsisting in coloured things are perceptible by the Eye" -(638)
The following Teals show that the existence of Number' is not proved by the Cognition of specific individualities :
TEXTS (639-640). AS IN COGNITION, SO IN THINGS LIKE THE JAR ALSO, THE NOTTON OF
* ONE' AND THE REST IS ONE THAT FOLLOWS ONLY FROM AN IMAGINARY CONVENTION SET UP BY A MERE WHIM. THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENTIATING NUMBER IN THESE (COGNITIONS), BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT 'SUBSTANCE'.-NOR CAN THE NOTION BE SAID TO BE FIGURATIVE', AS IT IS NOT FOUND
TO BE FALLIBLE.-(639-640)
COMMENTARY.
There are such notions as 'one cognition', 'two cognitions' and so forth,-in which the notions of one, two, etc., appear even though there are no such Numbers actually present (in the Cognitions) ;--in the same manner, in the case of a Jar also when it is not accompanied by anything else, there is the notion of its being one'; and this must have its source in the imaginary convention that has been set up by people. Consequently the argument based upon such notions cannot be conclusive.

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XI.
That in Cognitions, no Number exists follows from the fact that Cognitions are not Substance, while Number is a Quality and as such must subsist in a Substance.
It might be argued that in the case of Cognition, the said notion may be regarded as figurative, the sense being that 'Cognition is as if it were one', -and the absence of companion may he taken as the similarity on which the figurative expression is based
The answer to this is as follows:- Nor can the notion, etc., etc. ;-thnt is, the notion in question cannot be rightly held to be figurativo: as it is not found to be fallible. Such figurative expressions as the Ploughman is an ox' mean that the man is as if it were an ox, and not that he is an ox itself-as he clues not have the dewlap and other distinguishing features of the ox-there is no such failure (negation) in the case in question, the notion being that the cognition is one', not that it is as if it were one': as a matter of fact, the notion in regard to the Cognitions is just as infallible ay that in regard to the Jar and such things.-(639-640)
The Opponent may urge the following"The notion is described as figurative', not on the basis of similarity':--but what is meant is that the notion of 'one', etc. in regard to Quality. Action, Subsistence and so forth is based on the ground that these subsist in the same substratum as the 'oneness'. ote. subsisting in the Substance that forras their own substratum ".
This is the explanation anticipated and set forth in the following: -
TEXT (641). “THE NOTION OF One IN REGARD TO COGNITIONS IS ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE One-ness SUBSISTING IN THAT SAME SUBSTANCE, ON ACCOUNT OF THEIR SUBSISTING IN THE SAME
THING",-IF THIS IS ASSERTED [then the answer is as in the following Texl]-(641)
COMMENTARY. The answer to the above is provided in the following
TEXTS (642-643). THE NUMBER ONE' MAY SUBSIST IN THE ONE COGNITION ; BUT ON WEAT BASIS DOES THE NOTION OF TWO PROCEED, IN REFERENCE TO COGNITIONS ? OR EVEN IN REGARD TO THE
Six CATEGORIES AND THE REST -THE NOTION TOO OF ITS 'SUBSISTING IN THE SAME THING' CAN ONLY BE FIGURATIVE, AND FENCE FALLIBLE,-LIKE THE NOTION OF FIRE' IN REGARD TO THE BOY.-(642-643)
COMMENTARY. If the notion of one-ness' is due to subsistence in the same substance, - then it may be so in regard to one Cognition, as also to Pleasure and the

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ON
QUALITY AS A CATEGORY.
365
rest,-in which case the notion of one' is due to their subsisting in the samo substance Soul' (which is one);- but what would the basis of such notions as two cognitions', 'three Cognitions and the like ? Certainly duality, etc. do not subsist in the Soul (in which the Cognition subsists).
The assertion too that is made.-such as Sis Categories', the two, Pleasure and Pain the two, Desire and Hatred ', 'Five kinds of Action
Two kinds of Genus, the Higher and the Lower One Being', 'One Subsistence and so forth. --what would be the basis for such notions! In these cases, there is no Number subsisting in the same thing.–So that this assumption also is not comprehensive enough; hence it cannot be right.
Further, Subsistence in the same thing and such other basis, are asserted ; and yet the notion of such subsistence, even if it appeared, could be only figurative,-because there are no other things ; and hence the notions would be fallible ; just like the notion of 'Fire' in regard to the Boy, where there is no real ground for applying the word to him. And, yet the notion is not fallible. So that the objection urged above still remains in force. (642-643)
The following Text anticipates the arguments set forth by Aviddhakarna for the proving of the existence of Number :
TEXT (644).
"THE NOTION OF Number IS ESTABLISHED ON THE BASIS OF ITS BEING
DIFFERENT FROM THE NOTION OF THE ELEPHANT' AND OTHER THINGS; THE SAID NOTION (OF NUMBER) MUST ARISE FROM THINGS OTHER THAN THOSE, JUST LIKE THE NOTION OF THE BLUE CLOTH' AND THE LIKE." -(644)
COMMENTARY. He argues as follows:-" The notion of Number must have a basis other than such things like the Elephant, Horse, Chariot and the like,-because it is different from the notions of the Elephant, etc.,-- like the notion of the
Blue Cloth'.- Must arise from things, etc., etc., i.e. it should arise from a thing other than the said elephant, etc."-(644) The Author answers this argument in the following
TEXT (645). WHAT IS DESIRED TO BE PROVED COULD BE PROVED AS BRING DUI TO SUCH CAUSES AS AN IMAGINARY CONVENTION ARISING FROM MERE WHIM AND SO FORTH. THE EXISTENCE OF NUMBER IN COGNITION AND OTHER THINGS ALSO MAY BE DUE
TO THE SAME CAUSE.-(645)
COMMENTARY. Causes apart from the Elephant, etc.' are already admitted (by us also ) in the shape of imaginary Convention and the like ; so that the argument adduced is entirely futile (the conclusion being admitted by us).

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The term and so forth' is meant to include tho Remembrance of Convention and such other things.
If however what you intend to prove is the fuct of the notions in question having causes other than the said Imaginary Convention and the like, then the reason adducod is inconclusive. This is shown by means of a Reductio ad Absurdum- The existence of Number in Cognition, etc., etc.'- The same cause',-1.e. the fact of being different from the notions (of Elephant etc.). What is meant is that the Number' involved in such notions as
One Cognition', 'Two Cognitions', Five Actions', would be due to the same Cause; as here too 'the difference from the said notions is present : As a matter of fact the said Number is not dne to this circumstance; hence the Reason is Inconclusive.-(645)
Further, you have explained that the number Two which subsists in more than one substance is brought about by several unities' associated with the several Cognitions. But as a matter of fact, there can be no basis for such an assertion. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (646).
IF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE NUMBER BE EXPLAINED AS DEPENDENT UPON COGNITIONS, -THEN, WHY CANNOT THE NOTION BE
ACCEPTED AS DUE TO MERE CONVENTION -(646)
COMMENTARY.
The term 'mere ' is meant to exclude such notions as 'one', two' and the rest, the genus constituted by these, and the relationship of these.
Why cannot the notion, etc., etc.;-i.e. the notion of 'two, three four' and so forth, that appear in connection with the numbered things, why cannot this be accepted as brought about by mere Convention ? The advantage in this would be that it would not involve the assuming of the cansality of anything whose potency is not perceived; for if such causality were assumed, then there would be an infinite number of such 'Causes'. It is far more reasonable therefore to postulate the unitary conception itself as the requisite cause,-on the strength of positivo and negative con. comitance. Otherwise, it might be assumed that 'deities, getting at the Haritali, bring about the movement of the bowels (not the Haritaki itself). As a matter of fact too, 'duality and the rest, which have been held to be perceptible apart from things excluded from the aggregate and such entities, are never perceived ; nor are they compatible; because the existence of 'one' in many' has been denied, and 'genus' and 'subsistence' are going to be denied.-(646)
The following Text proceeds to deny Dimension':

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TEXT (647). DIMENSION HAS BEEN CLASSED AS LARGE', 'LONG' AND THE LIKE ; -WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS DUE TO DIVERSITY OF FORMS
IN THE THING ITSELT 1-(647)
COMMENTARY The theory of the other Party is as follows:
Dimension is the basis of all notions of size ; it is of four kinds-(1) Large, (2) Small, (3) Long, (4) Short.-The Large Dimension again is of two kinds-eternal and non-eternal ;-the eternal, as also the Largest, Dimension subsists in A keäsha, Time, Space and Soul; the non.eternal' Dimension subsists in the Triad and other substances.Similarly the Smal!" Dimension also is of two kinds- eternal and non-eternal ;-the eternal and also the smallest, Dimension, subsists in the Atom and the Mind, in the shape of the 'atomic globule'; and the non-eternal Dimension subsists in the Diad only ; it is also used in connection with such things as the Pearl, the Amalaka-Fruit, the Bilva-fruit and the like, which are really large':but only figuratively, on accoumt of the absence of much largeness' in their
large dimension, e.g. the Large Dimension of the Pearl is not of the same degree as that of the Amalaka; and so on in regard to all things.Question: What is the difference between the Largeness and Length as subsisting in the Triad and the Smalln888 and Shortness subsisting in the Diad? - Answer As rogards Largeness and Length, there is mutual dis. tinction ; for instance, we come across such varied expressions as 'from among the Large things, bring tho Longer one fromu umong the Long things, bring the larger one'. As regards the distinction between smallness' and shortness', it is perceptible only to Mystics who alone see them."
In this scheme the Large 'and the rest are held to be something different from Colour and the rest,-on the ground that they are apprehended by Cognitions other than cognitions of these latter, like Pleasure, oto.-In thus Rcasoning, if the Reason adduced is meant to consist in the fact that ** Largeness, etc. are the objects of Sense-perception different from the Senseperception of Colour and such things ", then, such a Reason is one that is * unproven', not admitted; bocause as a matter of fact any such thing as the 'Large and other Dimension' is never found to appear in any Senseperception, apart from the Colour and other things as they exist.-If thon, it be held that the notion of small', 'large' and the like is a cognition that is entirely different from the cognition of Colour, etc., then the Reason becomes *fallible', 'Inconclusive '; 8. there is nothing to invalidate a contrary conclusion. As a matter of fact there is nothing that really forms the object of the notion in question, as what is held to be such is a mere verbal figment. All that happens is that when the same Colour is seen turning towards the same direction,--and it is desired to bring out the difference between that Colour and other Colours,—there appears the notion, based upon preconceived convention, that it is largel. And this does not

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justify tho conviction that it is something altogether different. Conse. quently t o is nothing apart from Colour, etc., that could be regarded as the object of tiut notion; and hence the Reason is one that is unproven'.
The Proposition (or Conclusion) also is contrary to Perception; inas. much as the large and other dituensions, which are meant to be perceptible, are nover perceived apart from Colour and other things.
Thus then, why cannot the Dimension of things bo regarded as of tho santa nature as Colour and the rest, but based on this difference, turning towards a direction different from that towards which other things turn? In so doing, the assumption of unseen and unreasonable things is avoided. This is what is implied by the particle éva' in the Text.-Thus when several Colour, etc. are seen or touched, as turning towards the same direction, people come to speak of it is long'; and when the Colour, etc. seen or touched are fewer as compared to the former, they speak of it as 'short'. The same explanation may be applied to the notion of 'Large', etc. also.
As in the case of the denial of Colour and other qualities, so here also, the denial of the 'Largo' and other dimensions may be set forth, on the basis of the altornatives-is it one or many :-(647)
Further, inasmuch as the Reason adduced is found ovon where the Probandum (character to be proved) is ahsent, its 'inconclusiveness becomes all the more pronounced. This is shown in the following
TEXTS (648-649). A Line of Mansions IS CONCEIVED OF AS 'LARGE'; AND YET NO DIMEN
SION 'COMMENSURATE WITH THE FORME OT THE LINE IS ASSUMED, IF IT BE SAID THAT IT IS SPOREN OF AS SUCH ON THE BASIS OF THE QUALITY SUBSISTING IN THE SAME OBJECT (MANSION), -THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT NEITHER'LARGENESS NOR'LENGTH ' IS EVER MEANT TO BELONG
TO MANSIONS.—(648-649)
COMMENTARY Even where the Largeness' as conceived by you is not present, in such things, for instance, as the Line of Mansions--the notion of largeness" is found to appear.
It will not be right to assert that "The largenes& subsists in the same Houses wherein the quality of line' (being in a line) is present, and on the strength of this inherence in the same thing, the Line comes to be spoken of as Large" ;-because this would be contrary to the Opponent's own doctrine. This is what is meant by the words of the Text-Neither Length, etc., etc..
Dluamasu '-in the Mansions, Palaces; the Dimension-extending to a mile and so forth,-is not meant (by the Opponent) to be present in the Palaces.-(648-649)
Question :-"Why cannot such Dimension subsist in the Houses ? Answer:

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TEXT (650). THE 'PALACE' IS HELD BY YOU TO BE A CONGLOMERATION, WHICH IS
A QUALITY, WHICH, AS SUCH, CANNOT HAVE DIMENSION (WHICH IS ANOTHER QUALITY); NOR CAN THERE BE ANOTHER LINE' OF IT. NOR CAN RECOURSE
BR HAD TO FIGURATIVE EXPRESSION.-(650)
COMMENTARY. That is to say, you regard the 'Palace' to be of the nature of Conjunction, Conglomeration, and hence a Quality; and not a composite substance, as it is not productive of heterogeneous substances. The said Quality cannot have Dimension; because your doctrine is that Qualities cannot reside in Qualities. For the same reason the Palace, which is one quality, cannot have a line' (or series), which is another quality; the expression line of Palaces itself would be an absurdity; whence then could it be large or small'? To explain further Line (series) is held to be of the nature of Number'; and Number, as a Quality, can subsist only in a Substance, never in a Quality - Even if 'line' or series' be regarded as of the nature of a Composite', even so, the substratum of a Substance manst be a Substance, not a Quality; so that the Line (A Substance) cannot subsist in the Palace (a Quality). If Line' be held to be of the nature of Genus, even so, as the Genus subsists in its complete form in every one of its com ponent Individuals, even a single Palace could be called a "Line 's-like the Tree. This has been thus asserted— Though the House is a Conglomeration (Conjunction), how can there be a line of it! If it were a genus, then even a single Palace might be called & Line',-With regard to the Line (series) also, the notion of 'Long, Large and so forth is equally impossible ; as in the Palace, of which it is a substratum, the quality of 'one-ness' and the like is not present; and as regards the Wood and other materials (that go to make up the Palace), the intended Length, etc. are absent in them.
Then again, when there are several 'Lines of Palaces, it would not be possible to have the notion of Line' and 'Line' extending over all; ag one genus cannot have another genus. This has been thus asserted—Where there are several Lines, how can that term be applied ? The genus cannot have another genus !
Nor can it be right to seek shelter under figurative expression'; as the notion of largeness' is not found to be fallible in reference to things like the Line ; and hence it cannot be regarded as figurative. What is not different from the direct connotation cannot be regarded as 'figurative'; otherwise it would lead to absurdities. This has been thus declared The notion of Largeneas in regard to the Line, which has been held to be figurative, cannot be figurative, as it is the object of a Cognition which is in no way different from the direct connotation of the term '.-(650)
"There is the notion that this is separate from that'; and on the strength of this notion even a thing that is in contact with another thing is differentiated from it and that which is the cause or basis of this differentia.
24

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XI.
tion is called 'Separateness (a distinct Quality-according to the Naiyāyikas). This Separateness' is soraething different from the Jar and other things.because it forms the object of a cognition different from the cognition of these latter, as in the case dealt with before."
Such is the view of the other party (the Naiyāyika). Here also, as in the case of Dimension, the Reason is open to the charge of being 'Unproven' and 'Inconclusive '-With this idea in his mind, the Author adds the following
TEXT (651). THE NOTION OF BEING APART, WHICH IS ASSUMED AS BEING DUE TO THE QUALITY OF SEPARATENESS '; -WHY HAS IT NOT BEEN HELD TO REST IN THE VARIOUS THINGS OP DIVERGENT
CHARACTERS ?-(651)
COMMENTARY. That is to say, as a matter of fact, no such thing as 'Separateness' as distinct from Colour, etc. ever appears in Perception; so that the fact of its being cognised by a cognition different from the cognition of Colour, etc. cannot be admitted. Henco inasmuch as, while being perceptible, the intended quality is not perceived, it must be taken to be non-existent, Nor can it be regarded as proved by the definite cognition this is separate Because those same flings, Colour and the rest,-existing in their owu character when conceived of in relation to other things, from which they are found to be differentiated, -become the basis of the notion of the things being separate?; and hence the said notion cannot prove the existence of any other thing (apart from those things themselves).--Hence the notion of being apart, which is described as proceeding from the quality of
separateness, why onnot that notion be held to rest in heterogeneous and homogeneous characters? That is, it is best to regard it as resting upon that. This shows the inconclusiveness of the Reason adduced by the other party. The compound 'vibhinna, etc.' is to be expounded accordingly. -(651)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason cited is present in the contrary of the Probandum alsa -
TEXT (652) JUST AS COGNITION, PLEASURE AND THE REST, BEING DIFFERENT FROM ONE ANOTHER, ARE SPOKEN OF ASSEPARATE', AND HENCE BECOME THE BASIS OF THAT NOTION OF SEPARATENESS), IN.
DEPENDENTLY OF ANYTHING ELSE, SO
WOULD OTHER THINGS ALSO.-(652)
COMMENTARY. In Pleasure and other Qualities, the Quality of separateness' cannot subsist; because Qualities are devoid of Qualities (under the Opponent's

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doctrine); and yet they are spoken of as separate, in the sense that they are mutually exclusive ; and as such they become the basis cause of that notion of being separate'. In the same manner, the Jar and other things also, wluch have been regarded as substance', should be devoid of any such quality as Separateness', distinct from themselves.-Nor can the said notion be said to be figurative; as it does not differ in any way from the direct' notion.-Such is the sense of the Text.
Or, the Text may be taken as showing the notion of being separate' to be not based upon anything apart from the things concerned, and thereby points out the annulment of the Opponent's Conclusion by Inference. This Inference may be formulated as follows:--Things that are mutually exclusive are not the substrata of any such quality as "separateness', apart from themselves,-like Pleasure, etc.,-Jar and other things are mutually exclusive hence this is a natural Reason (for believing that the Jar, etc. cannot be the substratum of any such quality as 'Separateness).
It is impossible for any one thing to subsist in many things. As for Subsistence (which the Naiyāyika postulates as subsisting in many things). it is going to be rejected later on; and hence there can be no such relation as 'Subsistence. An argument annulling the said notion is also available in the shape of the possibility of such relation being not present in Pleasure and the rest.—(652)
The Author next proceeds to criticise the qualities of Conjunction and Disjunction :
TEXT (653).
Conjunction AND Disjunction AS RESTRICTED TO SUBSTANCES HAVE BEEN POSTULATED BY OTHERS AS CAUSES OF THE NOTIONS OF BEING JOINED AND THE LIKE; THESE ARE ENTIRELY
USELESS.- (653)
COMMENTARY.
The Opponent's scheme is that " Conjunction and Disjunction are the bases, respectively, of the notions of being joined and being disjoined: they consist in the contact of what has not been in contact, and the ceasing of contact of what has been in contact and that they are brought about by the action of either one or of both, as also by Conjunction and Disjunction ".
All this is a mere scheme ; and there is no proof for the idea that these are real entities; hence they have been needlessly postulated by the other philosophers.
This argument may be formulated as follows That in support of which there is no proof (no means of Cognition) can never be regarded by intelligent persons as existing',-.g. the Son of the Barren Woman:the other party lave no proof in support of Conjunction and Disjunc

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tion'; hence thone is non-perception of the wider condition (which makes the less extensive conclusion impossible).—(653)
The following Texts (654-663) set forth the arguments adduced by Udliyotabara, which are calculated to show that the Author's own Reasons are Unproven' (Not admitted) :
TEXTS (651-657),
"IF THERE WERE NO Conjunction, THEN THE Som, The SeeD, THE WATER AND THE EARTH AND SUCH THINGS SHOULD BE ALWAYS PRODUCING THEIR EFFECTS; AS THERE WOULD BE NO GROUND FOR DIFFERENTIATION. -AS A MATTER OF FAUT HOWEVER, THE Son, THE SEED, THE WATER AND SUCH THINGS ARE ALWAYS FOUND TO RIQUIRE SOMETHING ELSE IN THE PRODUCING OF THEIR EFFECTS LIKE THE STICK, THE WHEEL AND WATER, ETC, (IN THE MAKING OF JAR). THAT THING WHICH THEY REQUIRE IS Conjunction; AND AS IT HAS A PARTICULAR CHARACTERISTIC, IT IS REGARDED AS DISTINCT FROM OTHER THINGS). WHEN ONE IS TOLD TO BRING TWO CONJOINED THINGS, HE BRINGS ONLY THOSE TWO THINGS IN WHICH HD PERCEIVES THE CONJUNCTION, AVOIDING EVERY
THING ELSE." -(654-657)
COMMENTARY
Uddyotakara has argued as follows (in Nyaytvartika on 2. 1. 33, Page 221, Bib. Ind.]:-"If Conjunction were not a distinct thing, then, of such things as the soil, the seed, etc.-each itself being always there, they would always produce their effects in the form of the sprout, etc. As a matter of fact however, they do not do so. Hence from the fact of the non-production of the effects always, it is understood that the soil, ete, require the help of some other thing, in the producing of the effect in the shape of the sprout: just as in the producing of the Jar, the Clay, the Stick, the Water, the Thread, eto, require the help of the Potter. Hence it is established that this something else that they need is Conjunction.
*Then again, the Conjunction between two substances is perceived as a qualification of those substances, and hence it is directly perceived as something different from those substances. For instance, when someone is told by another person to bring two conjoined things', he brings only those two things in which he perceives the Conjunction, and not any Substance at random. If the Conjunction were not something real and different, he might bring anything.
"All these arguments put inversely are to be used in proving the existence of Disjunction."-(654–657)

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TEXT (658).
"IF CONJUNCTION AND DISJUNCTION WERE NOT THERE, THEN TO WHAT WOULD SUCH DISTINCT NOTIONS BE DUE AS- THIS THING IS ATTACHED TO ITTHIS IS DETACHED
FROM IT'?”—(658)
COMMENTARY.
"Further, even when there is no other difference between two things, one is said to be attached to it', and another to be detached from it-how could there be such diverse notions, if Conjunction and Disjunction did not exist, as something distinct, in the two things Y A particular notion in regard to a thing cannot be possible without the presence of something peculiar ; otherwise everything would bo possible always and everywhere." -(658)
TEXTS (659-660).
"IT SOMETIMES HAPPENS THAT EVEN WHEN ONE THING IS REALLY detached FROM ANOTHER, IT IS PERCEIVED AS attached TO IT, AND WHEN THE THING IS REALLY CLOSE TO ANOTHER, IT IS TER
CEIVED AS detached FROM IT ;-THERE ARE THESE TWO MISCOXCEPTIONS. AND A misconception HAS ALWAYS SOME PRIMARY FACTOR AS ITS COUNTERPART. THIS PRIMARY FACTOR HAS TO BE POINTED OUT IN THE TWO MISCONCEPTIONS CITED. IF SUCH A PRIMARY FACTOR IS ASSERTED, CONJUNC. TION AND DISJUNCTION BECOME
ESTABLISHED."-(659-660)
COMMENTARY.
"Further, it so happens sometimes that, even the Dham And Khaira trees are really detached from one another, and to a man standing at a distance, they appear to be close (attached) together; and in the case of the line of Cranes seated on the thin top of a tree, even though they are close together, yet they appear as if detached; both these cognitions—apprehending things as they are not,--are false, misconceptions. And as a matter of fact, no misconception is ever produced without the apprehension of a primary factor ; for instance, unless a man has had the perception of the Cow, he cannot have the inisconception, as Cow', of the Gavaya ; so that there must be somo primary factor pointed out as the basis of the said two mis. conceptions. When such a primary factor is pointed out, the existence of Conjunction and Disjunction would become established. Apart from these two, there can be no basis for the said notion."-(659-660)

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TEXTS (661-663),
"THEN AGAIN, ON WHAT BASIS IS THE NOTION OF THE MAN WITH EARRINGS' PRODUCED IT COULD NOT PROCEED FROM THE MORE PRESENCE OF THE MAN AND THE Ear-ringFOR IN THAT CASE, THE SAID NOTION WOULD BE THERE ALWAYS.-FURTHER, IT IS ONLY SOMETHING THAT HAS BEEN PEROEIVED TO BE PRESENT IN ONE PLACE THAT IS DENIED IN ANOTHER PLACE. IF CONJUNCTION HAS NOT BEEN PERCEIVED, THEN HOW DOES IT COME TO BE DENIED IN SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'CHAITRA Is without Ear-rings'1 HENCE IT FOLLOWS THAT THERE IS SOMS SUCH REAL THING IN THE SHAPE OF CONJUNCTION, WHOSE AFFIRMATION AND
DENTAL PROCEED WITH DUE DISTINCTION."-(661-663)
COMBIENTARY.
"Then again, when there appears the notion that 'Devadatta is wearing Ear-rings', -on what basis does it appear! This needs to be explained. The said notion cannot be due to the mere presence of the Man and the Ear-ring; as Devndatta and the Ear-ring being lasting entities, the notion should appear constantly (even when Devadatta would not be wearing the Ear-ring).
“Further, it is only when a certain thing has been perceived to be present in a certain place that the notion of the negation of its presence is found to appear in reference to another place ; under the circumstances, if you have never perceived Conjunction to be present, then how conld you have the distinct notions of Chaitra being with Ear-rings and without Ear-rings': What is denied by the expression Chaitra is without Ear. rings' is not the Ear-ring, because it having been assumed to be existent in another place and at another time, it could not be denied entirely. Nor can it be the denial of Chaitra, the man; as he stands on the same footing as the Ear-ring. Hence what is denied must be Chaitra's contact (Conjunction) with the Ear-ring.-Similarly by the affirmative expression Chaitra with the Ear-ring', what is affirmed is neither the Ear-ring, nor Chaitra, as both these are well-established entities -hence, by elimination, all that can be affirmed is the Conjunction between these two, which has not been cognised by any other means.-From all this it follows that, there is such a real thing as Conjunction (and Disjunction), by virtue of which there appear auch distinct affirmative and negative notions as Chaitra with Ear-rings' and Chaitra without Earrings
** The term 'adi' is meant to include the notion of qualification', as pointed out before." (661-663)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to answer the above argu ments of Uadyotakara:

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TEXT (664).
THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS:-THE WATER AND THE REST DO NOT REMAIN THE SAME, AS ALL THINGS ARE MOMENTARY - EVEN WHEN EXISTENT, THEY STAND IN NEED OF THAT CONDITION IN WHICH THERE IS NOTHING
INTERVENING BETWEEN THEM.-(664)
COMMENTARY.
It has been arglied under Text 654 above that" Seed, etc. would always be producing their effects"; but the reason that has been urgedthat they are not differentiated-i.e, they remain the same,- is not true, not udmitted by us; because all things being in perpetual fux', it is only in a particularly differentiated condition that they are productive of their effects.
It has been argued under Text 655 above, that "The soil, etc. are dependent upon something else, etc.".-If this is meant to prove merely the general fact that they are dependent, then the argument is superfluous (proving what is already admitted by us); this is what is shown by the words. Even when existent, etc. etc.'; that is, it is held by ns also that the saed, etc.-even when existent,---become capable of producing their effects in the shape of the sprout only when they are in that condition in which there is nothing intervening between them and so forth; so that on this point the argument of the Opponent is superfluous.-The term 'avyava. dhana' means that condition in which there is nothing intervening and so forth. -The phrase so forth includes such factors as the absence of obstruction, ete. ; that is to say, that particular condition in which (a) there is nothing intervening, (b) there is no remoteness among them, (c) there is no obstruction by a contrary force all these being obstacles to the appear. ance of the effect. And as the condition of & thing is nothing different from the thing itself, the argument put forward does not prove the existence of Conjunction as something distinct.
If then what is intended by you to prove is the fact of the Seed, etc. being dependent upon a different thing in the shape of what you call 'Conjunction, then, as your Reason, not being found to be concomitant with any such character, becomes Inconclusive '; and the Corroborative instance also is devoid of the Probandum. This is what is meant by the Text.-(664)
The following might be urged :-*How do you know that the soil and the rest are dependent upon a particular condition of their own, in becoming the canse of producing the effect in the shape of the sprout, and they are not dependent upon the Conjunction of something different from themselves ? and it is on the strength of this that you urge against us the fact of our argument being superfluous if mere dependence is meant to be proved".
The answer to this is provided in the following

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TEXT (665). IF THE WATER, ETO. NEEDED THE CONJUNOTION ONLY, THEN THEY WOULD APPEAR IMEDIATELY ON THEIR COMING TOGETHER (CONJUNCTION).
-OR NOT APPEAR AT ALL.-(665)
COMMENTARY If the Soil, Water and the rest needed only their Conjunction to bring about their effect in the shape of the sprout, then it should come about as soon as they come into contact with one another; because the Cause would be there in its perfect form,-exactly as it does later on. If the effect does not appear immediately on their first contact, then it should not appear at all, even later on; as the Cause would even then be as defective as on the previous occasion. Nor would it be reasonable to suppose that the soil, etc. Are dependent upon Conjunction which does not help them at all; as sneh a theory would lead to absurdities.-Nor again is it right to regard the Conjunction ns appearing only occasionally; as the cause (basis) in the shape of the soil, etc. is always there.-It might be held that-"in the bringing about of the Conjunction also, there is noed for such forces as those of * Destiny' and the like "-But this cannot be right : because the same objec. tion would be applicable against that view also. For instance, what would be the answer to the question- Why does not the said Destiny bring about the effect at once ?!-The answer might be that it does not do so, be: cause the requisite urge is absent in the Cause" -Then comes the Question -why should there be this absence of the requisite urge ?-Such Questions would be everywhere inevitable under the theory of Causes being permanent entities.--For one, on the other hand, who holds all things to be impermanent (momentary), -as the chain of all (momentary) causes is beginningless, there can be no possibility of the anomaly of all things being produced at one and the same time; because the succeeding causes would all be restricted by the preceding ones (in the same Chain), and hence the Causes of these could not be present at the same time by reason of their own causes not being present in their perfect condition. Thus it is only under your doctrine that there is possibility of the anomaly of the Soil, etc. prociucing the wprout at all times; hence it becomes established that the Soil, etc. do not reqnire any such distinct thing as Conjunction':-(665)
It has been asserted (under Tert 656 above) that-'as Conjunction has a particular characteristic it is regarded as distinct".--This is answered in the following
TEXT (666). WHEN A MAN SEES TWO THINGS HAVING COME CLOSE TOGETHER BY THEMSELVES, HE BRINGS THOSE THINGS IN THAT CONDITION (WHEN
TOLD TO DO SO).—(666)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, what falls within the range of the perceiver's vision is not any distinct thing in the shape of Conjunction, by noticing which he

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brings up the 'Conjoined things'; what happens is that ho notices that the two things, which were previously in the condition in which there was an interval of space between them, have subsequently come into the condition in which they have come into juxtaposition,-these things come to be spoken of as 'conjoined things'; as it has been already proved that the term Conjunction connotes only a particular condition of things. So that whenever one finds two things in this particular condition in which they become expressible by the term 'conjoined things, one brings these, and none others. No intelligent person ever acts on the strength of words, in regard to what is not expressed by those words.--(666)
It has been argued (under Text 658, above) that-"To what would such distinct notions be due as this thing is attached to it-this is detached from it'?
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (667).
WHEN A THING IS PRODUCED IN THE detached FORM, IT BECOMES THE
BASIS FOR THE NOTION OF BEING DETACHED '; ON THE OTHER HAND, WHEN IT IS PRODUCED IN THE attached FORM, IT BECOMES THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF BEING ATTACHED JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THE House, THE Vindhya mountain AND THE Himalaya
mountain.-(667)
OOMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, it is a distinct object that is produced in a particular form that becomes the basis of a distinct notion; hence the Reason urged by the Opponent is Inconclusive. This is the upslot of the Text as a whole.
The construction is the tling that is produced in the detached form becomes the basis for the notion of being detached'. On the other land, - i.e. when it is produced as not-detached.
Just as in the case of the House, etc. etc.';-these form examples of the said two notions.-Even under the doctrine of the opposite party, when two Houses have been produced is attached to one another, and are therefore of the nature of Conjunction itself, there is no other Conjunction which serves as the basis of their being attached':-similarly when two Houses have been produced as detached, there is no other Disjunction which forms the basis of the notion of their being detached'.- In the case of the Elimälayt and Vindhya Mountains also, the notion of their being detached' is not dus to any other thing in the shape of Disjunction 's--because your own idea is that · Disjunction consists in separation following after Contact [and certainly there never has been any contact between the two mountains). -(667)

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It has been argaed (under Text 659, above) that the notion of being attached that appears with regard to wint is detached, etc. etc."-The answer to this is penvided in the following
TEXTS (668-669).
A MESCONCEPTION DOES NOT APPEAR ALWAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH A PRIMARY CONCEPTION; FOR INSTANCE, THE NOTION OF Two MOONS' APPEARS INDEPENDENTLY OF ITS SIMILARITY TO ANY OTHER (PRIMARY) NOTION, THROUGH SOME INTERNAL DERANGEMENT, WHILE THE MIND IS TURNED ELSEWHERE.-OR, THE REQUISITE PRIMARY' IN THE CASE IN QUESTION MAY BE THAT SAME THING WHICH HAS BEEN PRODUCED IN THE allached FORM AND THE LIKE (BUT IS MISCONCEIVED AS BEING detached OR OTHER
WISE).-(668-669)
COMMENTARY. That all Misconceptions appear only throngh the perception of similarity (to a primary) cannot be admitted ; because there are some misconceptions which are produced, independently of all similarity, merely through some disorder in the sense-organs. For instance, when a man has the fancies of his Mind turned elsewhere, though what is actually before the eyes is a single Moon, yet, on account of the sense-organ concerned (the Eyes) being deranged by disease and darkness, there appears the cognition furnished by the form of Zwo Moons; and this is quite clear and free from all taint of being entirely fenciful.
The phraserhile the Mind is turned elsewhere shows that the notion of two moons' is entirely indeterminate in character; the idea being that in an indeterminate notion, there can be no perception of similarity; as this latter is always in the form of the cognition of some sort of unity between the thing seen now and that seen previously; and as such, it must be of the nature of some verbal expression relative to the previously perceived thing.
Or, granting that the previous Misconception is in the wake of a Primary Cognition,-oven so, what the other party desires cannot be proved.-This is what is shown by the words-Or, the requisite Primary, etc. etc. The phrase "and the like' is meant to include the thing born in the detached form. What is meant is that the same thing, produced as attached or detached, - when conceived of as precluding things of the other kind, comes to bo spoken by a name applied to it in accordance with that (attached or detached) form which has been perceived first; and this may be regarded as the Primary (of the later misconception of the same attached thing as detached, or vice bersa). So that the argument adduced by you does not prove what is desired by you.-(668-669)

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It has been argued (under Text 661. above) that-"The notion of the man with the Ear-riny, etc. etc." -This is answered in the following
TEXT (670).
THE NOTION OF THE MAN WITH THE EAR-BING'ARISES ONLY WITH
REFERENCE TO Chaitra (THE MAN) AND TEE EAR-RING, IN WHOM A PARTICULAR CONDITION HAS COME ABOUT ; AND IT ONLY APPEARS AS IF THE COGNITION WERE OF
CONJUNCTION' (BETWEEN THE TWO) -(670)
COMMENTARY. Just as what is called Conjunction comes into existence only when Chaitra and the Ear-ring appear in a certain state-and not always: in the same manner, the notion also of the man with the Ear-ring' is due to a particular state of things, and as such, why should it appear always !
The compound Jalavasthāvishēsayoh' is to be explained as the two, Chaitra and the Ear-ring, in wliom a particular state has been produced '. -(870)
It has been argued (under Text 662, above) that. It is only something that has been perceived to be present in one place that is denied in another place, etc. etc.".-The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (671).
IT IS THE ONE peculiar condition SEEN IN ONE PLACE WHICH 18 DENIED
IN ANOTHER PLACE.-AS REGARDS THE NOTION CHAITRA IS without THE EAR-RING, IT IS NOT Conjunction THAT IS DENIED : FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THIS Cox
JUNCTION HAS NEVER BEEN SEEN.-(671)
COMMENTARY
The notion in question has been explained as being based upon a certain state of things, and when this state of things, which should be perceptible, is not perceived under another state of things, then there is its denial (in regard to this latter state of things);- and what is denied is not the Conjunction that is assumed by you. For the simple reason that the Conjunction has never appeared in any Cognition, apart from the things to which it is held to belong

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Thus Our Roason is not open to the charge of being Unproven':-(071)
The following might be urged (by the Opponent)- "If we have not heen able to produce proofs in support of Conjunction, -what is your proof in annulmont of it?"
The answer is provided by the following
TEXTS (672-674).
THE NOTION OF THINGS BEING CONJUNOT' CANNOT BE DER TO THE
Conjunction POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY,-(A) BECAUSE IT IS THE NOTION OF BEING CONJONCT, -LIKE THE NOTION OF BEING CONJUNCT' IX CONNECTION WITH THE MANSION AND SUCH THINGS; -OR (B) BECAUSE IT APPEARS ONLY WHEN THERE IS MORE THAN ONE THING, LIKE THE COGNITIONS OF SEVERAL DIFFERENTIATED YARNS.-THE SAME TWO ARGUMENTS MAY BE URGED mutatis mutandis, AGAINST Disjunction ALSO- AND THE REA. SON ANNULLING (BOTH THESE CONCEPTIONS OF CONJUNCTION AND DisJUNCTION) CONSISTS IN THE FAOT THAT IT CANNOT BE RIGHT FOR ONE THING TO SUBSIST IN MORE THINGS THAN ONE
(672-674)
COMMENTARY.
The arguments may be formulated as follows:-The notion of being conjunct' is based upon the mere Object, which has nothing to do with the
Conjunction postulated by you, just like the same notion in such expressions as the conjunct louses', -and the notion of Chaitra with the Enrring' is the notion of being conjunct'; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the thing itself). Or, that which appears on the coming together of several things follows from the things themselves entirely devoid of the Conjunction' postulated by you, -as the notion of several yarns lying apart from one another the notion of being conjunct is a notion of this kind ;-hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the things themselves).
Yuktadhi)':-.e. the notion of two things being conjunct.
These same two arguments may be put forward also for denying Disjunc. tion :-(a) Because it is the notion of being disjunct', -or (b) because

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its appearance is dependent upon the absence of several things, the notion of being disjunct", in the case of two rams and such things, must be due to the particular things themselves, irrespectively of the Disjunction' postulated by the other party, just like the notion of being disjunct that appears in relation to two Rams living far apart, or that which appears in relation to the Himalaya and the Vindhya Mountains.
Question :-"What is the reason that annuls the conclusion contrary to the Probandum in the above reasonings—which would preclude the presence of the Reason in something where the Probandum is known to be absent ?"
Answer: The reason annulling, etc. etc. That is, the fact that the subsistence of one thing in several things cannot be right, has been shown in detail in the Chapter on the Composite Whole', under Text 607 (above): hence it is not set forth here.—(672-674)
The author proceeds to set forth objections against the Qualities of * Priority' and 'Posteriority :
TEXTS (075-676),
THE NAME (AND IDEA) OF PRIORITY' AND 'POSTERIORITY HAVE BEEN ASSUMED AS THE BASIS OF THE NOTIONS OF FORE AND AFT, AS
THESE NOTIONS CANNOT BE DETERMINED IN REFERENCE TO Space AND Time.-BUT JUST AS THE BLUE AND OTHER COLOURS, WHICH COME INTO EXISTENCE IN SUCCUSSION (ONE AFTER THE OTHER), COME TO BE SPOKEN OF 'PORE 'AND AFT, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO DISTINCTIONS DUE TO ANY OTHER CONDITIONS,—50 WOULD THE SAID NOTIONS BE IN REGARD TO OTHER THINGS ALSO.
(675-676)
COMMENTARY.
[The position of the Nyaya-vaishesika is as follows]— " That from which arise the notions 'this is beiore and this is after' are the Qualities named
Priority' and Posteriority, which are the basis of the said notions of fore' and 'aft respectively.-The term 'adi' is meant to include the idea also of 'fore ' And aft'. The argument may he formulated as follows:The idea of 'fore' and aft' must be based upon something other than the Jar and other things, because it is different in character from the idea of these latter,-like the idea of Pleasure, etc.-For instance, when two objects are standing towards the same direction, there appears the notion this is

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fore and that is aft'; this notion cannot be due to Space (Direction);-nor can it be due to Time ; because even when two persons, one old and the other young, are present at the same time, but in uncertain directions, there appears the distinct notion of fore and aft' (Senior and Junior); Ro that this distinction is there even though there is no difference in Time. Apart from these two-Space and Time, there is nothing else which could be regarded as the basis of the notions in question. Hence it becomes established that what form the basis of these notions are the Qualities of • Priority' and 'Posteriority! These notions cannot be determined reference to Space and Time':-that is to say, it cannot be held to be in reference to near and far objects in contact with points in Space and Time.
-The terms 'Space' and 'Time' are used here figuratively, in the sense of objects in contact with points of Space and Time. So that what is meant is that Priority and Posteriority,-both kinds--have been explained by other people as being due to Space and Time. The manner in which these aru said to be produced by Space is as follows:When two objects are standing in the same direction,—then, in reference to the point near any one observer, taken as the standard-point, there appears, in regard to the object wherein Posteriority subsists, the notion of its being "Far oft' and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of the further point in Space, the Quality of Posteriority becomes procluced and taking a point further removed from the observor us the standard-point, there arises the idea of the object being near', in reference to the object wherein Priority subsists; and from the contact of this with another point in Space, the Quality of Priority becomes produced.-The manner in which these Qualities are produced in reference to Time is as follows Between an old and a young man standing at the present time, in varying directions, with regard to that person whose contacts with strise and sunset are deduced to have been larger in number,-from his wrinkles, grey hairs, growing beard and so forth, there arises the idea of huis beingold' (Prior) in reference to the standard-point provided by the other man; and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of another point of Time, the Quality of Priority' becomes produced ;-and from the standard-point provided by the older man, the idea of the other man having had lesser contacts with sunrise and sunset is deduced from the fact of his being beardless and so forth,-from which arises the idea of nearness' (proximity) in regard to the younger man; and through this idea, out of the contact of another point of Time, the quality of 'Posteriority' becomes produced."
The Tect proceods to show tliat tile above Reasoning in support of Priority and Posteriority is 'Inconclusive ', on account of the Reason being present in the contrary of the Probandum algo—Just as the Blue, etc. etc.
- Bhava' is existence, and the vyavasthiti qualified by this is coming into existence; when thuis is 'Teramêna', in succession, [it serves as the reason for what is going to be said). That is to say, in the case of Blue, etc., on account of their coming into existence in succession (one after the other), the whole phenomenon is regulated by the conditions of Time, not by the conditions of any Quality,--and hence we have such notions of Priority and Posteriority as this is the prior or earlier Blue' and that the posterior

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or later Blue', even in tlie absence of any such Qualities as Priority and Posteriority ; because no Quality can subsist in a Quality:-why cannot the same be accepted in the case of the Jar and other things also ?
What is meant by this is as follows If what is meant by the Opponent is to prove the mere fact of being dependent on something else, then the Reason adduced is 'Inconclusive', as it is present in the contrary of the Probandum also.-If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion in question is based upon the particular Quality brought about by the eternal substances of Time and Space,-then there can be no Corroborative Instance. -The conclusion is also annulled by Inference for instance, it is possible to set up the following inference The notion of Fore' and 'Aft' is based upon a certain regularity in the successive appearance of things without any such quality as has been postulated by the other party--because it is the notion of Fore' and 'Aft-like the notion of Fore' and 'Aft' in regard to Colour and such things tho notion in question in regard to Jar, etc. also is such a notion of Fore' and 'Aft:hence it is a natural reason (for regarding it as being based upon the said regularity, etc.).
It might be argued by the Opponent that-"In the case of the Blue, etc., the notion of Priority of Posteriority is figurative, based upon the notion subsisting in the same object as the Blue, etc.; and hence the Reason is not open to the fallacy of 'Inconclusiveness'; and inasmuch as, in the case of the Blue, etc. also, the qualities of Priority, etc. are admitted to form the basis of the said notion, the Corroborative Instance cited is not devoid of the Probandum."
But this cannot be so ; it has been already answered by the statement that as the notion is not found to be fallible, it cannot be regarded as * figurativo '; and further, as the two qualities are not perceived even in their own substratum, it is not right to accept any notion as based upon it; how then could it ever be based upon it in the case of Blue and the rest 2-What too could be assumed to be the basis in the case of such things as Pleasure and the like? As there is no co-subsistence in the same substratum.
Further, as Time and Space have already been rejected abovo, they cannot be regarded as existent; the * Priority' and Posteriority based upon these should also be regarded as non-existent ; bow then could the notion be believed to be based upon those ? Consequently any such idea cannot save the Reagon from being *Inconclusive '.-According to you again, Time and Space have no parts, from contact with which, as associated with unitary conception', the notion of Priority and Posteriori by could be produced; the reason for this lying in their being essentially one and without parts. Nor can it be right to seek explanation for a state of things in a merely imaginary
part' conceived figuratively; as all such assumptions are restricted within well-defined limits by the real state of things; and what is merely figura. tive' is essentially unreal and false. Hence our Reason is not Inconclusive.
As for the Reason adduced by the Opponent, it may be pointed out that it is . Upproven , not admissible':-(676-676)
With the following Texts, the Author anticipates and answers the arguments adduced in favour of such qualities ng Number and the rest :

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TEXTS (677-678).
IF IT BE HELD THAT" Number, Conjunction AND THE REST CANNOT BE
NON-DIFFERENT FROM Substance, BECAUSE THEY SERVE TO CHARACTERISE AND DIFFERINTIATE THIS LATTER, -LIKE THE Stick", -THEN (OUR ANSWER IS THAT THERE IS PROVING OF WHAT IS ADMITTED BY US, IF WHAT IS MEANT IS THAT THEY HAVE AN ILLUSORY EXISTENCE'; BECAUSE WHAT IS IMAGINARY' CANNOT BE DEFINED EITHER AS THIS OR NOT THIS'.
(677-678)
COMMENTARY.
Says the Nyāya-Vaishēsika-" All the above-mentioned qualities, Number and the rest, cannot be non-different from Substance,-because they serve to characterise and differentiate Substances; -wlien one thing differentiates another, it cannot be non-different from the lattor, just as the stick, which differentiatos Devadatta, cannot be the same as Dovadatta."
If what is meant to prove by this argument is simply the denial of these being the same as Substance, then it is open to the charge of being futile. Because all things that have an illusory or imaginary existence' are non entities, and as such it cannot be asserted in regard to them as to whether they are the same as, or different from, anything. And this is what is admitted by us also.-(677-678)
The following Text anticipates the Answer given to the above by Aviddhakarna
TEXT (679).
IF THE FACT OF THE GROUP' AND SUCH THINGS BEING undefinable
IS DENIED BY THE OPPONENT) ON THE GROUND THAT THEY HAVE DISTINOTIVE FEATURES, JUST LIKE Colour, SOUND, TASTE AND OTHER THINGS,- (then our answer is as
given in the next Text].—(679)
COMMENTARY.
He las argued as follows:- The particular states of the Group and the Chain are not incapable of being defined as this or nol-this,-because they are endowed with distinctive features - just like Colour, Taste and such things."-(679)

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The following Text supplies the answer to this argument (of Aviddhakarna)
TEXTS (680-681).
IN REALITY, THE GROUP' IS ABSOLUTELY FEATURIO-LESS; TIENCE, LIKE
THE SKY-LOTUS ', IT CAN HAVE NO SPECIFIO PROPERTIES ; THEY ARE ALL FIGMENTS OF IMAGINATION.--EVEN WHEN STATED IN THIS FORM, THE REASONING ADDUCED WOULD BETALLIBLE', IN VIEW OF THINGS LIKE THE
SKY.LOTUS'. IN FACT, NON-DIFFERENCE AS WELL AS DIFFERENCE 'RESTS ALWAYS
IN AN OBJEOT.-(680.681)
COMMENTARY.
I! what is meant to be the Ronson is the presence of real specific pro. perties, then it cannot be regarded as 'ndmitted by both parties) : bocanse for the Bawlitha, it cannot be admitted thnt the 'Chnin' and other things which have merely illusory existence' are endowed with any real specific properties. ---If however the Reason is meant to be put forward only in a vague generul sort of wny, then such imaginary properties as non-existonce! *incorporeality' etc. are present also in the sky-lotus' and such things; - hence the Reason adduced becomes 'fallible', 'inconclusive
Even when stater in this form '; -i.e. if the assertion is made in a vagne general sort of way, without reference to any woll-cotermined specific properties.
For the following reason also the Reason is 'fallible-inconclusive' Because non-clifference '- sameness—and difference being something else, rcst alunys in an object, -not anywhere else. The Chain' and other things have a more ideal ' existence, and as such are not oljects : how then conla there be any difference or non-difference from there?
Thus then, it has been shown that, in the first argument (propounded by Apildhakarna), it whnt is monnt to be provod is merely the donial of the non-difference of Numbor, etc. from Substance, then thore is "futility'. —(680-681)
It might be nrgued that-"it is not more denial of non-difference that wa seek to ostablish, but, in view of the fact that two negatives make ono affirmativo, hy manns of the two negativos we are seeking to prove the difference of Numbor, otc. from Substance". This is the reasoning that is refuted in the following text :
25

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TEXT (682).
THUS THEN, IF WHAT 18 MEANT TO BE ASSERTED IS THAT NUMBER AND THE REST ARE OTHER THAN (DIPERRENT FROM) SUBSTANCE, THEN THE REASON BECOMES OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF
HAVING NO SUBSTRATUM, -BECAUSE NUMBER AND THE REST ARE NOT ADMITTED AT ALL,
-(682)
COMMENTARY.
That is, what the other party seeks to prove is not thint they are not non-different, but that they are different.-(682)
The following Tery shows how Number nnd the rest ore devoid of substrntum :
TEXT (683)
IF IT IS SUBSTANOE ITSELF, AS DIVERSIFIRD THROUGH GROUT', ETC.,
THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS SUCH, THEN WHAT THE ARGUMENT WOULD PROVED WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE OF SUBSTANCE FROM ITSELF-TUUS INVOLVING SELF-CONTRADIOTION.
(683)
COMMENTARY
Is spoken of 28 such ;-.e. as ono', 'two' and so forth.
It might be argued that," what is to be proved in the difference of Number, etc. which are only forns of Substance."
The answer to this is what the argument would prove, etc.' ;-i.e. no entity can be different from its own form; as it would become devoid of its own character.- Self-contradiction', i.e. contradiction of one another ; because Difference' and 'Non-difference, being of the nature of exclusion and inclusion, connot co-exist in any single object.
Thus livo all qualities onding with l'osteriority' been rejected. The rest of tho qualities (postulateal hy the Nyiya. T'aishēşikay-beginning with Cognition and ending with effort-leve beon held to sulxist in the Soul. They should therefore be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Suul itself.
As a matter of fact however, the Soul cannot be the substratum oi these qualities. Because the Soul could be the substratum of these, either as being the cause of their production, or as being the cause of their subsistence. It cannot be the cause of their production, because,

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the Cause (Soul) being always there in its perfect form, Pleasure and other effects would be produced always ; nor can there be any dopondence upon auxiliaries for a Cause in which no peculiar properties can be produced by anything else; As has been reiterated hundreds of times.-Nor again can an eternal Substance have the capacity of producing effects; as such pro. duction could only be either successive or simultaneous, and it has been oxplained that in the case of an eternal substance there is incongruity both in successive and simultaneous activity --Nor again can the Soul be the cause of the subsistence of the Qualities in question); becouse sub. sistence' has no other form than that of the Subsistent' itself: so thnt if the Soul were said to be the case of subsistence, it would mean that it is the cause of the subsistent thing itself; and this idea has just been rejected. Then again, the subsistent thing being a well-established entity, it can have no cause at All; as there would be nothing therein that could be done by the Cause. Even if the subsistence were something different from the subsistent thing, there could be nothing done by the cause in the latter, as it will linvo brought nhout only the subsistence, which eclypothesi is something different. And thats not producing anything in the subsistent thing, how cond the Soul bo its substratum -Nor will it be right to urge thuat-** in. Aamush * the Soul will lavo produced the subsistence related to the sub sistent thing, it would be a helper of the latter, because the said relationslup is not yet proved.-As a matter of fact, the Soul cannot be regarded as the cause of the subsistence; because an eternal thing can have no such causal potency, -as has been explained before.
Further, the entity (in the shape of subsistence) that is established (by the Soul)-would it be of permanent nature ? or evanescent If the lattor, then how can it be established by something else? It would lose its character. If, on the other hand, it is permanent, then also its establisher (Cause) would be futilo ; as by its very nature, the subsistence would be there always.
Further, as regards corporeal things, it is possible to assume for them, a substratum which prevents their falling downwards; for the things in ques. tion however, which are incorporeal, such as Pleasure and the rest,--theru can be no falling doronuard; then what would the substratum' do for them ?
Lastly, for what cannot be spoken of either as existent or as non-existent, there can be no subsisting at all.
In this manner Pleasure and other Qualities many be shown mualis mutandis to be incapable of being regarded as subsistent; from which it follows that there can be no such thing as Quality
Then again, Budhi has been nccepted by the other party as being of the nature of Jñāna, Cognition,-as declared in the following Sūlra—" Buddhi, Upalatulhi, Jhāna, are synonyms" (Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 15). Even though Buldhi is of this nature, yet the other party have not admitted any such form of it as is apprehended by itself; in fact they regard it as apprehended by another Buddhi. This, not having a self-sufficient existence, like Colour and other things,-it cannot rightly be regarded even as Buddhi. This is going to be explained later on:-(683)

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Pleasuro, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Effort, -Aro Qualities that have been held to be distinct from Cognition (Buddhi). These we are going to reject in comune of the examination of the Means of Right Cognition (Chapters 17, 18 and 19).
As regards the Qualities of Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity,—these are to be rejected in the same way ns Colour and the rest.
In viety of this, the Author proceeds next to reject the Quality of Momentum (Sanşkāra) :
TEXTS (684-685).
MOMENTUM HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS BEING OF THREE KINDS-NAMED
* Vēga", VELOCITY, Bharyana , IMPRESSION, AND Sthitastha. paka', 'ELASTICITY - ALL THIS HOWEVER IS NOT COMPATIBLE ;-BECAUSE THINGS BEING momentary, THERE CAN BE No action IN THEM, OF THE CON. TINUITY OF WHICH THE MOMENTUM NAMED VELOCITY' COULD BE THE CAUSE.
(684-685)
COMMENTARY.
There are three kinds of Momentum : Volocity, Impression and Elasticity.
Of these the Momontum nnmed ' Velocity subsists in the five corporeal substances, Earth, Water, Fire, Air and Mind, and is produced by an action due to Effort and Propulsion. It is the case of action proceeding in a particular direction, and provents contact with tangiblo substances. For instance, in the Arrow, it is due to action produced by a particular effort; by virtue of which it falls on the head of a remote object. That is why it is accepted as having its existence indicated by particular effects. In such things as the branch of a troe, the same quality is due to the inovoment produced by the stroke of the stone hurled at it.
The Momentum called 'Impression' is a quality of the Soul ; it has been said to be produced by Cognition, and also to be the Cause of Cognition. It is nccepted as having its existence indicated by such particular effects as Rempeinbranco and Recognition.
As regards the quality of Einsticity, it belongs to corporeal substances; it is the quality that brings its solidl and lasting substrntum back to it previous position from which it lud been tom away Isy some one's effort; for instance, whon the Palm-leaf which has beon rolled up for a long time is spread out, and then let off,--it reverts to its former (rolled) position. The effect of this quality is seen in such things as the Bow, the Trec-branch, the Horn, the Teeth and also in Cloth and so forth, when tlsay ure bont and straightened.
All this', -i... all the three kinds of Momentum.
Of the Momentun called Velocity', any such effect as connection with an action is not admitted ; because it has been provod that all things are in perpetual flux (momentary); lenco immediately upon things coming into

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existence, they cease to exist; so that no action is possible in them, of tho continuity of which action, Velocity could be the cause-If by continuity of action' is meant the production of things that is perceived to be soparnto from its constituent causo,-theu even so, the Ronson remains Inconclusive (Falliblo). Because what are inferred from the said continuity of action' are the previous Caurul Ideas of things produced in that way.—and not any such thing as the said Momentum'; because concomitance with this latter has nowhere been perceived. Further, if the not-falling of the arrow were due to the quality of Velocity, then it should nover fall at all; as the Velocity preventive of stich falling would be always there. Under the circumstances, what could be the explanation of the fact of the arrow falling while moving in a particular region of Akasha - It cannot be said that"the falling is due to the cessation of Velocity on account of its force having been destroyed by contact with such kolid substances as Air and the like"; as, in that case, the folling should come about before it does; as the Air obstructing it is there all along.-It might be argued that—" Before the Arrow actually fulls, the force of the Velocity is very strong, it pierces through the obstacle due to the Air, and carries the Arrow further to another place", -If that be so, to what is its subsequent weakness due whereby it does not carry the Arrow still further : As a matter of fact, in all cases, it is found that the Arrow falls in the way, while moving through Aläsha, over the whole of which the contact of Air is equally present. It emot be said that the Volocity becomes altered later on; as there is no cause which could produce this altoration in the Velocity; as its inherent cause in the shape of the Arrow is the same all through. It cannot be right to say that what qualifies it subsequently is the cause called ' Karma' ("Action'). Because that also would be open to the same objection. Even if the subsequent Velocity be different from the initial ono), as there would be no cause for the destruction of the former Velocity, it should continue as before and there should be no falling down of the Arrow,—The Contact of Air cannot be destructive of the previous Velocity; as if that were so, then the Arrow should fall down before it does, -as pointed out above, the Air being the same all through, its contact also would be there all through. So there is nothing in this explanation.-(684-685)
The following Teat states the objections against the Momentum named Impression
TEXT (686). THE MOMENTUM CALLED IMPRESSION IS OF THE NATURE OF AN IMTRESS ON THE MIND, IT CANNOT BE A QUALITY OF THE SOUL ; BECAUSE
THIS HAS BEEN REJECTED.-(686)
COMMENTARY. It Impression is postulated only in a general way as the causo of Romnombrance, then the argument proves what is already admitted and is therefore futile. Becauso it is already admittod (by us) that the causo of Remembranco consists in Impression which is a form of the Mind itself,

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being i potency produced in it by a previous apprehension; this is known by the name of 'Vâsana'. Conception '.- If what is meant to be proved is Impression as 1 Qulity of the Soul, then, as such an impression will nover have been found to be concomitant with Romeinbrance, the Roxon would be Inconclusive; and the Conclusion also would be one that is annulled hy Inforence. And inasmuch as its intended sustratum, the Suul, Jux Trency been discarded before, and hence cannot exist, it ulity alsu Wote ha non-existent. This argument may he furinukuted as follows What ? number of things subsist in another thing, they can have no subsistence if the latter thing is non-existent.--.g. the picture cannot exist if the wall is not there and under the Opposite party's view, the Momentuin in question is subsistent in the Soul ;-lience there is found in it # character that is contrary to what is concomitant with the Probandum. Honce what is desired is not proved. Specially as the Soul itself has been previously discarded. Thus the net result of the means of Right Cognition hearing upon the matter is that Impression should bo regarded as being of the nature of an impress upon tho Mind, and not a quality of the Soul. The conse is that whilo the former view is supported by proofs, the Inter is not 80 supported.—(686)
The following Text points oat objections against the third kind of Momentum (i.e. Elasticity)
TEXT (687). THERE CAN BE NO SUCH QUALITY AS ELASTICITY, BRCAUSE THINGS ABN
IN A PERPETUAL FLUX, AND HENCE NOTHING CAN BB LASTING (sthila); IF THERE WERE ANY SUCH THING, IT SHOULD
CONTINUE TO EXIST IN TIAT SAME VORM.-(087) [The name of this Quality appears throughout in this work in the forın Schilasthapake, though the form in which it is known from the Ngãy. Vaishanike books is Stittathāpaka'. That the former forra is not an error of the copyist or the printer is clear from this Teadl, where the first term in the compound is clearly stated to be sthita'.)
COMMENTARY That is to say, the Sthila, lasting', thing, of which this Qulity is muid to be the Sthika', 'ro-establishor,-is that tlung hy itself nollasting? Or is it loy itself lastiny? Only theso two alternatives are possible If it is not-lasting, then as in a moment it will lave ceased to exist, what would be there which the Quality in quostion would re-establish? Ou the other hand, if it is, by itself, lasting,-then, if the thing in question would be existent,-then, as all existing things continne to exist in their own form,i.e. without deviating from it,--the thing would continue in the same form; and in that case, what would be the need for assiuning a re-establisher of it, which would have nothing to do 1-(687)
It might be argued that "Even though all things are momentary, as each of them would exist for a moment, and would continue in the con.

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ON QUALITY AS A CATEGORY.
391
timious Chain',-it is in regard to this that the Quality in question is said to function ",-then, the answer is as follows:
TEXT (688).
TU MOMENTARY EXISTENCE OF A THING CONSISTS MERLY IN ITS BEING
PRODUCED FROM ITS CAUSE ; AND THE CONTINUITY IN THE CHAIN' Also (OF EVERY SUCCEEDING THING) IS DUE TO
BEING PRODUCED FROM EACH PROCEDING THING.-(688)
COMMENTARY.
Mornuntary things are adinitted to exist only as being produced from thoir coses: and what is called their sthiti', 'status', consists only in their acquiring their own selves, -and not in their taking up their form fubsequently to their having acquired their status; as by themselves all things are momentary, and hence incapable of staying at any tine subsequent to their coming into existence. Or, if the thing did 50 exist, it would never cease to exist, it should be there as before, and even subsequently, it would renain the same; or else, it would have to renounce its own nature. -In the Chain, the production of each succeeding Product is due to the immediately preceding cause. So that even here, there is nothing that could be done by the Momentum in question. (688)
Says the Opponent-"Woll then, the Momentum in quostion would oktablislı wlut is not-momentary ".
dnswer:
TEXTS (689.690).
OF
WHAT IS NOT-MOMENTARY DOES NOT APPEAR IN ANY OTHER FORM WHAT THEN COULD THE MOMENTUM BE THE ESTABLISHER'? NOR HAS THIS MOMENTUM BEEN YOUND TO HAVE-CAUSAL CHARACTER; THE CAUSE THEN MAY CONSIST OF THIS MOMENTUM OR SOMETHING ELSE. FURTHER, THE MOMENTUM IN QUESTION HAS BEEN HELD TO BE A QUALITY THAT RE-ESTABLISHES WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY PRODUCED, -SUONTOR EXAMPLE, AS THE Cloth.-WHAT THERE. FORE HAS BEEN CALLED A QUALITY AND MOMENTUM IS NOT
POSSIBLE.—(689-690)
COMMENTARY. It has been already pointed out that the thing that is not-momentary can never become otherwise than it is, and hence its status is there always,

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so tut there would be nouluing to be established by thu qunlity in question, establisher of status, Elasticity.
It might be argued thu Thu Qulity muy not to the catabiliser ; it muy bo the practicer of the Moment itself".
The answer to this is that this Momentum lucts not lees jounil to have causal character; the conviction regarding the mality of the truth about things is always dependent upon the Meous of Right cognition; and as a matter of fact the causal character of Moznentuin,--s someiling different from well-known causes-is not detinitely recognised in things like the Clotil by Perception and Non-apprehension, or as something difforent from the ordinary effects, as in the organs like the eyes; lience the notion in question cannot be based upon any such character.
If it be argued that--"evon though its causul potency has not been perceived, yet the fact of its being the Cause might be prostuvod".
If that be so, thon Momentum, or anything else, like the Porrot, the Orane, etc., might be the Cause,-i.e. presumed to be as such. The fact of its not being perceived does not constitute a positive peculiar fenture, by virtue of which it could be only by presuming the Morgentum, -and nothing olsu,-even though its potency has not been porceivod,--that you should be satisfied.
As a matter of fact, the Momentum in question has not been held by you to be the cause of production ; in fact it is held to be a quality in a thing 8.g, the Cloth is already produced, which re-establishes its former status ; and in this it is of no use, as already explained above.-And it is on admitting (for argument's sake) the possibility of its being the cause of production, that the above objection has been urged; the idea being that thore may bo some one who may cross beyond the limits of oven his own doctrine.
The last sentence- What therefore, etc. etc. * -sums up all that has been said above.-(689-690)
The Author next points out objections against the Qualities of 'Morit and Domerit'
TEXT (691).
Mind, Mind's Contact AND THE SOUL HAVING BEEN PREVIOUSLY DIS. CARDED, -THERE CAN BE NO UNSEEN FORON' OF THE KINDS
POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY - (691)
COMMENTARY. "The Unseen Force (Dostiny) is what brings the fruits of an act to its Door,-it is a Quality of the Soul,-is produced by the contact of the Soul and Mind, and is destroyed by its own effect; it is of two kinds--the two kinds being Merit and Demerit; of these Merit becomes the cause of the Doer's happiness, welfare and liberation ; and Demerit bocoraes the cause of his happiness, calamities and sin."

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393
Such is the account of the Unseen Force provided by the other party.
Inasmuch as the Soul, the Mind, and the contact of these which live been regarded as the cause of the said Foros, -bave been already rejected before, there can be no Cause for the said Force; and hence it is concluded that it cannot be existont.
As regards Sound, that luas boen hold to be the Quality of Arusha, - it has buon already rejected above, when it cauno under review, apart from its proper place. Hence objections against it are not repeuted loro.-(691)
End of Chapter XI.

Page #389

CHAPTER XII.
Examination of the Category of Action'.
COMMENTARY.
The Author next proceeds to set forth the objections against the Vaishesika category of Karma', Action:
TEXT (602).
IN THINGS THAT ARE IN A PERPETUAL FLUX', ANY ACTION, IN THE SHAPE OF THROWING UP AND THE LIKE, IS IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE IT
CEASES AT THE VERY PLACE WHERE IT IS BORN, AND HENCE IT CANNOT GET AT ANY OTHER
PLACE. (692)
COMMENTARY.
"The Sutra on this point is Going up, going down, contracting, expanding and moving-are the five Actions'.-Of these, going up is that act which is the cause of the Conjunction and Disjunction with upper and lower space (respectively). That is to say, when, by virtue of effort and such other agencies, there arises, in some part of the body, or in some such solid substance as the clod of Earth which is connected with the body,an action which becomes the cause of the conjunction of that thing (Lumb or Clod) with the upper layers of Akasha, and also of its Disjunction with the lower layers of it,-that Action is called 'going up '.-The Action which is the cause of effects contrary to these is going down'.-When a straight object becomes curved, this Action is called 'contracting; as has been thus described-When of a straight object like the arm, the foreparts in the shape of the Finger and the rest, become disjoined (separated) from the points of Akasha with which they have been in contact,-while the hind part still remains in contact with those points, then the whole object in the shape of the Arm becomes curved; and this action is called Contracting. When the Conjunction and Disjunction appear in a manner contrary to the one thus described, the whole object becomes straightened again; this Action is called Expanding'.-That which becomes the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with several stray objects in diverse places, is the Action called
Going. The first four forms of Action are the cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions with well-defined parts of Space and Akasha, while Going brings about Conjunctions and Disjunctions with sundry points in space in various directions. Thus there are only five kinds of Action. Such other actions as Going Round, Flowing, Evacuating and the like are all included under

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EXAMINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF ACTION.
395
* Going '-All these five kinds of Action are established as having their existence indicated by such effects as Conjunction and Disjunction sub. sisting in solid objects. Conjunction and Disjunction are the effects common to all Actions ; this is what establishes the existence of the effects of Action. It is proved by direct Perception also ; as has been thus described – Nurnber, Dimension, Separateness, Conjunction, Disjunetion, Priority and Posteriority and Action subsist in coloured (Holid) objects, and hence are perceptible tu the Eye' (Vaishēsika-sūtra)."
Such in brief is the scheme of the other Party.
As regards this, Conjunction and Disjunction having been already rejectod, what has been put forward as the 'Effect of Action cannot be admitted. If what is put forward as the Reason for postulating Actiou is its effect in the shape of such Conjunction and Disjunction as consist of being produced in jutaposition and so forth, even so, the Reason would be 'fallible' (and Inconclusive); because the concomitance of such Conjunction and Disjunction with Action is in nowise admitted (or proved).On the other hand, the Reason is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum; so that it is also contradictory - If merely the existence of a Cause is meant to be proved, then the Reasoning is superfluous; because the fact of Air and such other things being the cause of the said Conjunction and Disjunction is accepted by us also.-1f a particular character (of the Cause) be meant to be proved, then the Conclusion is annulled by Inference. For instance, when the Action Appears in a Substance, does it appear in a momentary substance ? Or in a non-momentary (permanent) substance ? It cannot appear in the momentary substanco, because it ceases to existbocomos destroyed-at the very spot where it comes into existence, and henco it cannot got at any other spot. This Inference may be formulated 24 follows:When a thing ceases to exist at a certain spot, it cannot subsequently got at any other spoty-eg, the Lamp and such things ;-all the things in question do cease at the very spot where they come into existence ;-hence there is all apprehonsion which is contrary to a character wiclor than the one desired to be proved by the opposita party).-(692)
The following Teat shows that the Reason set forth by the Buddhist, in the Inferonce just cited) is not Fallible (or Inconclusive)
TEXT (693)
THE OTHER PARTY ALSO HAVE ASSERTED THAT THE TIME OF ACTION 15 SUBSEQUENT TO THE TIME OF THE BIRTH OF THE OBJECT,-EVEN IN SUCH THINGS AS THE LAMP-FLAME, WHICH ARE ADMITTED (BY HIM ALSO) TO BE FLEETING
IN THEIR CHARACTER.-(693)
COMMENTARY Some things are adınitted to be fleeting in their character ;-.g. tho Lamp-flame is admitted to be something which ceases very quickly; and

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XI.
ovon in Non, Actit appears only after they are born,-i.. come into oxistence : 40 live been luild to last only for six moments, and only to that uxlent, Nolwentary (lasting).-(693)
The following Teat shows how this is su
TEXTS (694-695).
(1) (AT THE FIRST MOMENT) THERE IS CONTACT WITH THE CAUSE,
(2) THEN THE APPEARANCE OF THE GENERIC CHARACTER, - THEN (3) SOME COMMOTION IN THE PARTS OF THE OBJECT, -THEN (4) TAN DISRUPTION OF THE PARTS, THEN (5) THE DESTRUCTION OF THE CONTAOT, THEN (6) THE DESTRUCTION OF THE OBJECT IN THIS WAY, EVEN IN THE CASE OF THE LAMP-ILAME AND SUCH THINGS, WHAT HAS BEEN HELD IS THAT THEY LAST TOR sit moments ONLY.
(694-695)
COMMENTARY.
For instanoe : (1) what comes first is the moment of contact with the Cause,-(2) then the moment of the appearance of the generic character of the
Thing produced, -3) then action among the component parts,—then (4) the moment of disjunction of the Composite,-then (5) the destruction of the Conjunction that produced the object,-then (6) the destruction of the object itself ;-in this way, in the case of things like the Lamp-flame, what has been held is that they last for sit moments only. Thus, there being no momentary object (for the Opponent) which could have any action, the Action of all active objects must bo such as appears after the birth of the objects.So that our Reason is not 'unproven', as there cua bo nothing else that could be momentary (for the other party).-(694-695)
It might be asked—" Even if we admit the momentary character of Things, why cannot their action appear at the time of their birth "
The answer to this is provided in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF ACTION'.
397
TEXTS (696-697).
IT IS ONLY WHEN THERE IS SEPARATION FROM THE POSTERIOR SPOT, AND
CONTAOT WITH THE FRONTAL SPOT, THAT THE OBJECT MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE GOING' (' IN MOTION'), OR TO BE THE SUBSTRATUM OF ANY OTHER ACTION. WHEN THE MOBILE PERSON DOES NOT LAST EVEN FOR A MOMENT, -- EVEN THOUGH SUCH A PERSON BE EXTREMELY SMALL, THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF PASSING OVER TO ANOTHER SPOT REMOVED BY THA MINUTEST
POINT.-(696-697)
COMMENTARY.
When it is possible for an object to become separated from the place behind it, and to come into contact with the place before it, then it can be said to be going'; or for another thing, to be the substratum of such actions as Expanding and the rest ; all this cannot be said in regard to any other things - such as Aleasha.-The object that lasts only for one moment however cannot be so long as to admit of its abandoning the place behind it and then passing over to that before it; because at the moment of ita existence itself it is within the clutches of disappearance (destruction); and as such it is unable to pass over to the other place.-Hence no Action is possible even at the time of the birth (of the object). Nor is it possible at either of the two ends; because at the time in question, this cannot be determined. Thme thon, as regards the object which does not last even for a single moment, the possibility of its passing over to a remote place may rest awhile; it is not possible for it to pass over even the minutest space. Under the cireumstances, how can there be any Action in what is momentary 1-(696-697)
Nor can there be Action in a non-momentary object;this is what is shown in the following
TEXT (698). IN CASE THE OBJECT IS SOMETHING lasting, 'GOING' AND THE REST ARE ALL IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE SUCH AN OBJECT SHOULD REMAIN
THE SAME UNDER ALL CONDITIONS.-(698)
COMMENTARY. That objoet is said to honon-momentary' which remains in the same form always; it is all the more impossiblo for any Action to appear in such an object; as, like Akasha, it remains always in the same condition. This argument mny bo this formulated :If an object romains always the same, it can have no Action, as in the case of Alaska ;-the object regarded as non-momentary is always of the same condition - hence thore is appre

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TATTVASANGRAUA : CHAPTER XII.
hension of something contrary to what is wider (than the Conclusion of the Opponent).—(698)
The following night bo urged: Even if the non-moinentary object is always the same, -ingamuch as, hy its very nature, it has the form of the
moving entity': it could have Action; hence our Ronson is not Incon. clusive".
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXTS (699-700). IF THE ACTION OF Going AND THE REST CONSTITUTED THE VERY ESSENOR OF THE MOVING ENTITY'-THEN, THIS LATTER COULD NOT
STAY IMMOBILE FOR EVEN A SINGLE MOMENT; BECAUSE EVEN WHEN THE Going, ETO. ARE NOT THERE, THEY SHOULD CERTAINLY BE THERE,INAS. MUCH AS THE OBJECT HAS NOT RENOUNCED ITS
PREVIOUS FORM, AND IS EXACTLY AS IT WAS AT THE TIME OF THE APPEARANOT
OF THE Going, ETC.-(699-700)
COMMENTARY If such objecte as Devalalta and the like, which are held to be nonmomentary, were, by their very nature, connectod with the Actions of Going, Throwing up and the rest,then, they should never stand unmoving : as the Going nature would always be there. Hence in the case of these, Deva datta, etc., who are endowed with the action of Going,-even when there is no Going-i.e. even when they are standing immobile,-the said actions of Going, etc. should be there,-just as at the time of the appearance of those acte ; because the objects will not have abandoned their previous form or nature.-699-700)
TEXTS (701-702), Ir, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE OBJECTS WERE, BY THEIR NATURE, OF THE NATURE OF THE IMMOBILE ENTITY, THEN absence of going SHOULD BE THERE ALWAYS, AND THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT OF ANY KIND EVEN FOR A MOMENT. BECAUSE, EVEN WHEN going MIGHT BE THERE, THE OBJECT WOULD STILL BE OF THE NATURE OF THN
TMMOBILI ENTITY, BECAUSE IT WILL NOT HAVE RENOUNCED ITS PREVIOUS NATURA, - JUST AS AT THE TIME WHEN
IT WAS NOT MOVING.-(701-702)
COMMENTARY If, from fear of the above criticism, it be held that the object, by its nature, is immobile,-then the absence of going, etc. should be there always; because the object is of the same form always, like Akasha.

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EXAMINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF
ACTION'.
309
The particle 'adi, eto,'; is meant to include the actions of Throwing up and the rest.
Under such circumstances, even when there would be actual going, etc., the object would be immobile ; because it has not renounced its immobile nature.-exactly as in the unmoving condition.
Praspanda' is Action.
In the term 'nishchalātmakakālavat, the Vati'-affix has been added to the compound with the Locative ending the meaning being * as at the time, etc, ete.' (701-702)
It might be argued that it is not of the samo form; it is of both forms, going (mobile) and not going (immobile); hence the criticism irged is not applicable; and the Reason too is unproven'."
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXT (703). LF THE OBJECT WERE mobile AT ONE TIME AND immobile AT ANOTHER
THEN, INASMUCH AS TWO MUTUALLY DIFFERENT CHARACTERS WOULD BE THERR, IT WOULD BE TWO DIFFERENT
OBJROTS.-(703)
COMMENTARY. Tho cha' after Skada should be construed after punah,
What is meant is that, in the manner suggested, as the mutually con. tradictory characters of mobility and immobility would be imposed upon it, the object would cease to be one.—(703)
The following Text shows that for the above reason, it becomes crtablished that the object is momentary S
TEXT (704). IT IS CLEARLY SEEN THAT THE TWO ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERENT : BECAUSE OF THE PRESENCE OF CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES ;-LIKE TWO THINGS OF WHICH ONE IS MOVING AND ANOTHER NOT
MOVING.—(704)
COMMENTARY. The two-i.e. things in the mobile and immobile statos.
Like two things, etc. elo',-.e. such things as the Croopor (moving) and the Mountain (not moving).-(704)
Having thus established the annulment of the Opponent's conclusion by Inference, the Author proceeds to show that it is annulled by Perception alsos

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XII.
TEXT (705).
THE ACTION THAT IS REGARDED AS visible TS NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE object. EVEN SUCH EXISTENCE OF IT AS WOULD BE COMPATIELE WITH REASON, IS NEVER ACTUALLY
PERCEIVED.-(705)
COMMENTARY.
If a perceptible thing is not perceived, it comes to be regarded by intelligent men as non-existent'; - Cloth not perceived ntn certain place and Action is never perceived as apart from the Colour, etc. (of the object); hence this is a reason for regarding it as noturally not-perceived (and henco non-existent). As a matter of fact, Action never becomes manifest in any Sense-perception, as anything apart from the Colour, etc. of the object as produced in a different position. As regards such notions associated with verbal expressions, as "Throwing up!, Throwing down and the like, - they cannot be Perception, for the very reason that they are associated with verbal expression. Nor are they compatible with reason, if taken as associated with a distinct entegory in the shape of 'Action', because what are really seen are only the Colour, etc. as produced imdor certain conditions ; and the verbal expressions (names) also are applied only to these lattor, in accordance with Convention. This bas just been explained, when it was pointed out that no movement is possible in things either pormanent or impermanent
Thus it is not proved, as asserted, that the existence of Action is proved by Perception itself.-(705)
The nbove arguments are swined
in the following
TEXT (706).
THUS GOING' AND TIL REST ARE IMPOSSIBLE EITHER IN PERMANENT OR IMPERMANENT THINGS; BECAUSE IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR THEM RITHER TO BE SEPARATED FROM THEIR TORMER PLACE,
OR TO GET AT ANOTHER PLACE.—(706)
COMMENTARY.
TILS,-i.c, bocause it has been discarded by Inference and Perception, as just alıown above.
Because it is not possible, etc. etc.' ;-.. because separation from the former place is not possible; and because junction with another place is not porrible. The words are to be construed in the respective order.-(706)
Question-" If this is so, then how is it that people spenk of Going?" Answer :

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EXAMINATION OF THE CATEGORY OF ACTION.
401
TEXT (707). THE NOTION OF 'GOING' IS AN ILLUSION, AS IN THE LAMP-FLAME,
DUE TO THE APPEARANCE OF DIFFERENT BUT SIMILAR THINGS
BUINO FOUND CONSECUTIVELY IN DIVERSE PLACES (707)
COMMENTARY.
Different out similar things'; different and similar are compounded first, then that compound is compounded with things'.Of these different and similar things,—there is appearance (birth)—which is consecutive,-.e in a place other than that of its own Cause, when such appearance is seon, there arises, from it, the notion that it is going';
- just as in the case of the Lamp-flame, when it is being carried by someone, there appears the notion that the Lamp-fame is moving '; while certainly the same Lamp-flame does not move from one place to another ; because it has been held (even by the Vaishēşika) to last for six moments only. Further, what is called the birth ' (appearance) of a thing consists in mere Being, entirely devoid of any preceding or succeeding end ; and the apprehension of such 'birth' or appearance' is only natural.
Or janmanah' may be construed as Ablative; the sense beingbecause things are born consecutively, therefore different and similar things are perceived in different places -(707)
End of Chapter on Action!
26

Page #397

CHAPTER XIII. Examination of Sāmānya', the Universal'. With the following Tect the Author begins the criticism of the Category of The Universal':
TEXT (708). 'SUBSTANCE' AND OTHER CATEGORIES HAVING BEEN REJECTED, THE 'UNI. VERSALS' ALSO HAVE BECOME REJECTED; AS THEY HAVE ALL BEEN ASSUMED TO SUBSIST IN THE THREE CATEGORIES.-(708)
COMMENTARY. The Universals ',-1.6. the Genuses. These are held to be subsistent in the three Categories,-Substance, Quality and Action; and hence become discardod by the rejection of these Categories themselves; as without the Substratwn, the Subsistent cannot exist anywhere ; for if it did, it would not be subsistent at all.
The mention of the Universalis only by way of an illustration : the Ultimate Individualities also are held to be subsistent, as subsisting in Ultimate Substances; honce these also become discarded by the rejection of their substratum.-(708)
Even though the Universal' has been discarded, yet the Author is desirous of putting forward special objections against it; and as until the character of the thing is known, a criticism of it is not possible, he proceeds to describe the character of the Universal and the Particular':
TEXTS (709-711). THE UNIVERSAL '18 POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY IN THE FOLLOWING MANNER: "IT IS OF TWO KINDS-BEING' IS A UNIVERSAL' WHICH IS 'UNIVERSAL' ONLY,-AS IT PERVADES OVER ALL THINGS;
SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST, WHILE BEING UNIVERSALS', ARE ALSO SPOKEN OF AS 'PARTICULARS'; BECAUSE IN REGARD TO THEIR OWN SUBSTRATA, THEY BROOME THE CAUSE OF THEIR COMPREHENSIVE NOTION, AND ALSO SERVE TO DIFFERENTIATE THEIR SUBSTRATA FROM ALL THINGS BELONGING TO OTHER UNIVERSALS'; -AND IN THIS WAY THEY ALSO BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE EXCLUSIVE NOTION OF THOSE
SUBSTRATA."-(709-711)
COMMENTARY. The Universal' is of two kinds—the Higher and the Lower; Being' is the highest Universal'; it is called Universal', common, because it

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EXAMINATION OF SĀMĀNYA', THE UNIVERSAL.
403
forms the basis of only a comprehensive notion in regard to all its three substrata-Substance, Quality and Action ; for this same reason it is not a * Particular' at all.
The Lower kind of Universal' is in the form of 'Substance, Action and so forth; this kind is called 'Universal' (Genus, Class) in so far as it is the basis of the comprehensive notion of its substrata, in the shape of Substances, etc. --and though being Universal', it is also called Particular, in so far as it serves as the basis of the exclusive notion of its substratum as distinguished from things belonging to other Universals' For instance, in regard to Quality, there arise such exclusive notions as it is not-Sub. stance', 'it has no qualities and so forth; and the cause (basis) of these must consist in such Universals as 'Substance' and 'Quality', -not in anything else; because there are no such things as 'not-Substance and so forth. There is no incongruity in the same thing being both 'universal and particular', when it is taken relatively to other things. This is what the Text means.- (709-711)
The Author states the definition of Ultimate Individuality', as provided by the other party :
TEXT (712).
"THERE ARE SOME PARTICULARS' WHICH SERVE AS THE BASIS OF
EXCLUSION' ONLY; THEŞE HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES SUBSISTING IN
WTERNAL SUBSTANCES."-(712)
COMMENTARY.
There are some 'Particulars which are held to be 'Particulars' only, not Universala; because they serve as the basis of exclusion-ie. of exclugive notion-only,
"Which are theso ?”
Answer ' These have been defined, etc. etc.; it has been declared (in the Vaishēzika-Sutra) that-" Ultimate Individualities subsisting in eternal Substances are the ultimate (differentias),-'Subsisting in eternal Substances, i.e. subsisting in Atoms, Aküsha, Time, Space, Soul and Mind. As Atoms are the two ends-beginning and end of the Universe, and liberated Souls and liberated Minds continue to exist till the end of the Birth rebirth-Cycle, and hence forming one end,--the Specifio Individualitios subsisting in them las ve been called ultimate; specially as it is only in these that the said Individualities are more clearly perceived. Their Sub. sistence too is always in the eternal Substance, like the Atom. This is the reason why they have been doscribed both as 'ultimate and as subsisting in eternal Substances '.-These are called Vishëşa', 'Specifc Individualities, because they serve as the basis of the absolute exclusion of the eternal Substances from one another, and hence serve to specify', 'distinguish', their substratum from everything else.-(712)

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TATIVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIII.
Specific In
The question arising-" How is the existence of the dividualities proved ? "- the following answor is given :
TEXT (713). "INASMUOH AS IT IS ON THE STRENGTH OF THESE THAT MYSTIOS HAVE THE NOTIONS,-IN CONNECTION WITH THE ATOM AND OTHER ETERNAL SUBSTANCES, THAT THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM THAT', THESE ARE REGARDED AS SUBSISTING IN EACH OF THESE
SUBSTANCES."—(713)
COMMENTARY.
It is found that poople like ourselves have, in regard to the Ox,-the notion of the Ox' as distinguished from the Horse', through the presence of a particular shape, qualities, action and constituents, these notions nppearing in the form respectively of the Ox, white, fast nuoving, fat-humped, with a large bell';-in the same mannor, in people different from 129, sieh as Mystics, there appears,-in regard to each of the eternal objects, Atams, Liberatod Souls and Libernted Minds,--the exclusive notion that this is different from that'; and also when the same object is seen at another time and place, there is recognition of it as 'this is the same '; of such notions there being no other basis,-that to which they are due is held to consist in the ultimate Specific Individualities, whose existence is inforred from the peculiar experience of the Mystics.-Each of these Individualities subsista in its own substratum, and their existence is proved by the direct perception of the Mystics.-(713)
Question-How is the existence of Universals (Genuses, Oommunities) proved ?
Answer:
TEXT (714). "SUCH UNIVERSALS (COMMUNITIES, GENUSES) AS BEING ', Cow' AND THE LIKE ARH VOUCHED FOR BY DIRECT PERCIPTION; AS THE NOTION OF BEING AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO APPEAR ONLY WHEN THE SENSE-ORGANS
ARE FUNCTIONING."-(714)
COMMENTARY.
It is a well-established principle that when one thing follows the presence and absence of another thing, the former proceeds from the latter ;--in regard to Substance and the rest, the appearance of the notion of Being' (Existence), etc. follows the presence and absence of the functioning of the Sense-organis;

Page #400

EXAMINATION OF SĀMĀNYA, THE UNIVERSAL',
405
wherefore then could the said notion not be regarded as produced by the Sense-organs, just like any other Cognition through the Sense-organs? If it were not so regarded, then it would lead to an absurdity, 4714)
The following Text seeks to prove the existence of Specific Individual ities' by means of Inference also :
TEXT (715).
** THE EXISTENCE OF THESE IS COGNISED BY MEANS OF INFERENCE ALSO: A DISTINOTIVE NOTION MUST BE DUE TO A
DIFFERENT CAUSE." -(715)
COMMENTARY,
A distinctive notion -a notion of a kind different from that of things like Substance, etc.
Due to a different cause', whose birth is due to other causes.
The inference may be thus formulated :—When one notion is different in form from another, it must be due to a cause other than the latter, like the notion of Colour in regard to the Cloth, the Leather and the Blanket ;-of this same kind is the notion of being 'in regard to Sabstanco, eto. hence this is a natural reason [for assuming a different cause for it, in the form of the Universal').-Such is the view of the other Party (the Nyāya. Vaishëgika).-(715)
The sense of the same argument is shown by setting forth the arguments propounded by Bhavivikta :
TEXTS (716-720). (A) " IN REGARD TO THE COW AND THE ELEPHANT, THE PECULIARITIES OF NAME— Cow' AND `ELEPHANT ', -AND IDEAS-MUST BE DUE TO CAUSES OTHER THAN CONVENTION, SHAPE, BODY, BTO, BECAUSE WHILE APPERTAINING TO THE COW AND THE ELEPHANT, THEY ARE DIFFERENT FROM THE NAMES AND IDEAS OF THESE LATTER :-JUST LIKE THE NAMES AND IDEAS WITH CALF' AND WITH THE GOAD (RESPECTIVELY) AS APPLIED TO THE SAME COW AND ELEPHANT. THE QUALIFYING CLAUSE HAS BEEN ADDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING THE
HARE'S HORNS AND SUCH OTHER NON-ENTITIES. THE NAME AND IDEA OF THE OTHER THINGS ARE THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE
per DISSIMILARITY.

Page #401

406
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIII.
(B) "THE IDEA PERVADING OVER ALL COWS PROCEEDS FROM SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE BODY OF THE Cow.—BECAUSE IT APPEARS AS A DIFFERENTIATOR,—LIKE THE IDEA OF THE
BLUE' AND THE LIKE.
(C) "THE UNIVERSAL' Cow is SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE
INDIVIDUAL' Cow --BECAUSE IT FORMS THE OBJECT OF A DIFFERENT IDEA-LIKE THE IDEA OF THE COLOUR AND OTHER QUALITIES OF THE SAME Cow, -ALSO BECAUSE IT (THE UNIVERSAL) IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO THAT (THE INDIVIDUAL), JUST AS THE HORSE
IS SPOKION OF AS BELONGING TO Chailre."(716-720)
COMMENTARY
Bhävivikta has argued as follows " In regard to such things as the Cow, Horse, Buffalo, Boar, Elephant, etc., the peculiarities of Name-Cow', ete.-and I don must be due to a cause rolntod to the form of each animal, but different from sneh causes as Convention, Shape, Body and the likethis is the Pronouncement (of the Conclusion). [The Reason is this) Because while apportaining to the Cow, etc., they are Namos and Ideas different from the Names and Ideas of the Body, etc. ;-just like such peculiar Names and Ideas relating to the same animals as the Cow with the calf',
the Bullock with the load', 'the Boar with the dart, the Elephant with the goad' and so forth.-The Corroborative Instances per dissimilarity are the Names and Ideas of the forms of the Body and other things.-It follows from this that this other cause must be the Universals', Cow!, Elephant' and so forth."
The term ' abhidhāna' stands for Name; prajñāna' for Idea, Cogni. tion-the peculiarities in the shape of these two are meant by the compound abhidhanaprabanruishesả'.
Samaya' is Convention ;- Akri-Shape; - Pinda'-Body ;-the term etc. includes Colour and such details. Different from these are the Causes related to and in keeping with the form of each of the animals in regard to its Namo and Idea.
Or the compound may mean that the Causes of the names and notions of Being' and the rest are different from Convention and the rost. The rest being understood as before.
Proclamation - Proposition, Conclusion.
In order to avoid the fallibility due to the Reason otherwise applying to non-entities like the Hare's Horn (which also has a distinct Name and Idea relating to it),--the qualification has been added in the form while appertaining to the Cow, etc..
The compound setting forth the Reason is to be exponnded as-Because they have Names and Ideas different from the Names and Ideas relating to the Body, etc.'. The Names and Ideas of the Body' serve as the Corrobora. tive Instance per dissimilarity; as in this instance, the presence of a cat.ee

Page #402

EXAMINATION OF SAMANYA, TEE UNIVERSAL.
407
other than the Names and Ideas of the Body is absent; and hence the Reason adduced is also absent in them.
Uddyotakara (under Nyāyazārtila on 2. 2. 61, page 319 et seq.] has stated the argument as follows "The Idea pervading over all Cows proceeds from a Cause other than the Body, etc., --because it appears as a differentiator,like the Idea of the Blue, etc.-Or again, the Universal' Cow is something different from the individual Cow,—because it is the object of a different Idea,-like Colour and Touch, etc.,-elso because it is spoken of as belonging to this latter,-- just as the Horse is spoken of as belonging to Chaitra, and as something different from Chaitra."
All these arguments have been set forth in these Texts. They are easily intelligible.-(716-720)
The Author answers all these arguments in the following
TEXTS (721-722).
ALL THIS HAS NO ESSENCE IN IT; IT IS AN ELABORATION OF A MER THEORY, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE AT ALL IN SUPPORT OF IT. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE NOTIONS OF BEING ', ETO. ARE NOT FOUND TO PROCEED FROM THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENSE-ORGANS ; THEY ARISE TROM A BODY OF
CONVENTIONS.-(721-722)
COMMENTARY
It has been argued (under Text 714, above) that the fact of the notions of Being ', etc. being of the nature of Sense-perception is deduced from the presence of the operation of Sense-organs.-If, by the Reason here adduced, it is meant that the said notions follow immediately after the operation of the Senses, then it cannot be admitted ': because as they are of the nature of 'determinate Cognitions, the body of Conventions (bearing upon the verbal expression) must interpose (between the Sense-operation and the resultant Determinate Cognition).-1721-722)
It might be urged- without it comprehensivo something, how can mutually distinct entities become the basis, directly or indirectly, of the notion of identity or unity ?"
In anticipation of this question, the Author supplies the following explanation:

Page #403

408
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIII.
TEXTS (723-726). IN THE CASE OF THE Dhatri, Haritaki, ETO., IT IS FOUND THAT THERE IS
PRESENT IN THEM, EITHER SINGLY OR COLLECTIVELY, THE POTENCY TO REMOVE VARIOUS DISEASES; AND YET THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL (COMMUNITY) IN THEM WHICH HAS THAT POTENCY; BECAUSE THE CURE OF THE DISEASES IS FOUND TO BE QUIOK AND DRLAYED. - NOR CAN ANY DIVERSE PEQULIAR PROPERTIES BE PRODUCED IN THE * UNIVERSAL', THPOUGH THE DIVERSITIES OF THE SOIL, ETO. BECAUSE IT REMAINS ALWAYS IN ONE AND THE SAME PORM, THE SAID DIVERSE PROPERTIES, HOWEVER, ARE PRESENT IN THE Dhuitri, DTO. THUS THOUGH, AS A RULE, THINGS ARE ENTIRELY DIFFERINT, YET SOME OF THEM HAVING WELL-DEFINED POTENCITOS ARE CONCEIVED OF AS similar, AND HENCE THESE THINGS BECOME THE BASIS OF THE CONCEPTION OP similarity, ETC.,-NOT OTHER THINGS.-(723-726)
COMMENTARY. Dhātri and some other fruits, though of entirely different forms, are yet, severally or jointly, endowed with the capacity to remove various disenses,-evon without any comprehensive entity embracing them all.It cannot be right to urge that—"even in this case it is only a comprehensive
Universal' that does the effective act", for the simple reason that there is no such common Universal' over them capable of performing the various fruitful acts. If there were such a common Universal', there could be no possibility of the notion that people have, of the capacity of removing diseases quickly or slowly that is found in only some Dhätri, etc. and that At only certain times; as the Universel' would be of only one uniform character.-Nor can it be right to assert that," the said Universal itself performs the diverse fruitful acts, when it acquiros certain peculiar properties due to the soil as watered by milk and such things ";-because the Universal is, ex hypothesi, eternal, and hence incapable of having any peculiar properties produced by anything else ; and hence no such properties could be produced in it by the diversities of Soil and such things ; because the Universal' is always of one and the same form. As for the Dhātri, etc.; on the other hand, they are evanescent things and hence diverse properties are produced in them by the diversities of Soil, etc; and hence they become endowed with the diverse potencies of curing diseases. In the same mamer, other things also, like the Jar, are produced out of their Causal Ideas in such forms that by their very nature they come to be conceived of as of one and the same torm. Hence there is no difficulty in this case.
The term 'elc.' in the expression the basis of the conception of similarity, etc., is meant to include the capacity to perform such fruitful acts as the holding of water and the like.-(723-726)
The question being-"How is it proved that the Body of Conventions' comes between the functioning of the Senges and the appearance of the notions of Names, etc.) "—the Answer is provided in the following

Page #404

EXAMINATION OF SAMANYA', THE UNIVERSAL'.
TEXTS (727-729).
ALL THAT THE EXPRESSION BEING (EXISTENCE) IS MEANT TO CONVEY IS ONLY THE IDEA OF capacity for action; IT IS IN THIS SENSE THAT THE CONVENTION IS ESTABLISHED, IN REGARD TO THE THINGS IN QUESTION, OR TO ANY OTHER THING, ACCORDING TO THE WHIM (OF PEOPLE). PERSONS USING THE TERM go' (Ox OR Cow') ESTABLISH THE CONVENTION IN REGARD TO THE TERM AS APPLICABLE TO THINGS SERVING SUCH DIVERSE PURPOSES AS
*
carrying, yielding milk AND SO FORTH.-THUS IT IS THAT ALL THESE NOTIONS OF BEING AND THE REST ARE FOUND TO PROCEED FROM THE CONCEPTION OF THESE CONVENTIONS, AND NOT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE FUNCTIONING OF THE SENSEORGANS.-(727-729)
3
409
COMMENTARY.
The notions of Being' and the rest can never appear in persons who are not cognisant of the Conventions bearing upon those terms; if they did, then there would be no use in establishing the Conventions at all. Thus it is that the makers of Convention apply the term existent' (Being), on noticing a certain identity (among things) indicated by the fact of their performing similar functions; and it is in regard to such things that the notion of Being appears.
'Or to any other thing' ;-i.e. of the expression Entity'.
Similarly in the case of the terms go' ('Ox' or Cow') and the rest the Convention bearing upon them is made upon their capacity for such actions as carrying and the like. Hence, after the Convention has been made, when people come to use the term, even when the Ox is seen, the previous Convention steps in and the name 'Ox' comes to the mind; and the idea that it exists' comes only later in a clear form. In some casos, through repeated use, the whole process passes through the mind so quickly that every step in it is not fully realised; but it is quite clearly distinguished by persons who have used the term for only a short time.
The whole matter is thus summed up :-From all this, it follows that on account of the intervention of the body of Conventions, the notions in question cannot be said to be directly perceptible; because it is not reasonable to regard as perceived' things that are cognised only indirectly; as such a process would lead to absurdities.-(727-729)
4
The following Text proceeds to show that for the following reason also, the notions of Being', etc. are effects of memory, and have to be treated as so many Remembrances, and cannot be regarded as 'Perception':

Page #405

410
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XII.
TEXT (730).
AT FIRST, EVERY COGNITION APPEARS IN A FORM FREE FROM VERBAL EXPRESSION; THEN COMES IN THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS ; HENCH THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION PARTAKE OF THE NATURE OF Remembrance,FOR THAT REASON
ALSO,-(730)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, there is no Convention bearing upon the Specific Peculiarity' (of Things); and it is only after one has seen the entity, prior to its determination, only as a point of Specific Peculiarity, free from all contact with verbal expression, -that there follows its Cognition based upon the functioning of the Sense-organ ;-then there comes to the mind, the body of Conventions bearing upon that same entity--then there appear the notions of Being and the rest,-in accordance with the said! Conventions, in regard to the thing that has been seen; and these notions embody all the determination' with reference to the thing, and give verbal expression to them. How can those notions escape from being regarded as 'Remembrance'?
For that renson also,-jebecause they are determined ' as seen. The notions in question',-.e. those of Being' and the rest.—730)
Question-"Whence has this sequence in the appearance of Cognitions been deduced ? " Answer:
TEXT (731). IT IS BECAUSE THE PROCESS IS AS DESCRIBED THAT WHEN A MAN HAS
HIS MIND TURNED SOMEWHERE ELSE, THERE APPEARS ONLY THE VAGUE APPREHENSION OF THE MERI thing APART FROM
ALL SPECIFIC PECULIARITIES. (731)
COMMENTARY It is because the notions of Being', etc. appear in the above-mentioned sequence, that when a man has his mind fixed elsewhere, -i.e. he is absent. minded,-if he sees a thing lying before himself,- until there come to his mind the conventions and conceptions bearing upon that thing, the first perception that appears is that of the mere thing, entirely devoid of all specific peculiarities. If it were not so,-if this first Cognition were in the full-fledged form equipped with the verbal expression and all the rest of it, then, why should the absent-minded man apprehend the mere thing devoid of all quali. fications ! It is not possible for two determinate Oognitions with verbal expressions to appear at the same time.
Thus it is proved that the assertion that "the notions of Being', etc. are positively and negatively concomitant with direct Sense-functioning" is not true.-(731)

Page #406

EXAMINATION OF SAMĀNYA', THE UNIVERSAL,
411
It has been argued above (under Text 716) that—"In regard to the Cow and the Elephant, the peculiarities of Name and Idea must be due to causes other than Convention, etc. etc.".--This is answered in the following
TEXT (732).
AS REGARDS THE FIRST REASON ADDUCED, IT IS SUPERFLUOUS; AS THE FACT OF THE NOTIONS BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS IS ALREADY ADMITTED (BY US): AND THAT SAME RELATIVE (BODY OF CONVENTIONS) 18 WHAT IS POSITIVELY AND NEGATIVELY CONCOMITANT.
(732)
OOMMENTARY. If All that is sought to be proved is the general fact that the notions in question are due to other causes related to the character of the things concerned, then it is superfluons-proving what is already admitted. Because the Body of Conventions bearing upon the Cow, etc. is that other cause related to and in keeping with the character of the things ; as the said notions appear only when this Body of Conventions is there, and they do not appear when what is there is some heterogeneous Body of Conventions; which shows that it is this Body of Conventions, which is positively and negatively concomitant with them, that is the Cause of the notions in question ; us these are found to follow on the wake of the positive and negative concomi. tance of these Conventions. Thus the attempt to adduce Reasons for this is entirely futile.—(732)
TEXTS (733-734). IF THE SAID 'BODY OF CONVENTION 'IS INCLUDED IN THE SUBJECT' (OT THE INFERENCE PROPOUNDED BY THE OPPONENT), THEN THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE CITED BECOMES DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM '; AS THE EXTERNAL THINGS MENTIONED, -THE Calf AND THE Goad, ETO.- ARE NOT THE DIRECT CAUSES OF THE NOTIONS ; BECAUSE THE NAMR AND SUCH OTHER QUALIFICATIONS HAVE NO BEARING UPON THE SPECIFIO PECULIARITY OF THINGS; AS THE SprorFIC PECULIARITY OF THINGS IS SOMETHING BEYOND TRE REACH OF VERBAL Ex
PRESSION.-1733-731)
COMMENTARY If the Conventional Conception' is included in the Subject (of the Opponent's Reasoning), and then it is sought to be proved that all these

Page #407

412
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIU,
notions are due to their connection with an eternal and all embracing Entity named Universal', which is apart from all those,-then what has been cited as the Corroborative Instance would be devoid of the Probandura': because the concomitance of the things with such a Probandum has nowhere been perceived. As a matter of fact, the Oaly, the Goad and such things that have been cited as the cause (basis) of the notion of the Cow being with Calf, or the Elephant being with the Goad, have not been proved to be so. Specially because when theso things—the Calf and the Goad, -revert to the position of their specific Peculiarity', they are not found to be the direct cause of any Names and Ideas, for the simple reason that all Specific Peculiarity' is, by its very nature, beyond the reach of verbal expression. Thus the Corroborative Instance cited is devoid of the Probandum'
If they be regarded as the indirect cause of the notions, then that would lead to an absurdity, becanse indirectly, everything is of use in the producing of everything.-(733-734)
Question-"How is it then that people regard such external things (as the Calf and the Goad) as the cause of the notions (of the Cow being with the Calf, and the Elephant being with the Goad) ?"
TEXT (735).
IN FACT, ALL THESE NOTIONS PROCEED ON THE BASIS OF THINGS LIKE THE Goad, WHICH CONSIST IN MERE IDEA' AND ARE ILLUSORY,
ON WHICH EXTERNALITY' IS IMPOSED.-(735)
COMMENTARY.
It has been already pointed out that the Specifie Peculiarity of Things hich forms the root-cause of the Idea of the Good and such things, is not tonched by an imposition' (or qualification). As regards the
Illusory' form of things, it is a mere product of the art of Imagination ; it consists in mere Idea, and is not an external object. People regard it as an external thing', because they are unable to distinguish between what they see and what they imagine, and hence they regard the form cognised as external'; so that the external existence of the Goad and such things cannot be admitter
Avalambya' is to be construed with ankushādikam'.
What is meant is that the notions proceed to apply to the Goad, etc. which are purely illusory, which consist in mere Idea' and on which the external character is superimposed.
Antarmātra' is Buddhi, Idea, Cognition.-(735)
In the same argument (under 716), the Opponent has introduced the qualification " while pertaining to the Cow". This again is not right; as it cannot exclude anything (and hence is useless as a qualification).This is what is shown in the following

Page #408

EXAMINATION OF SÄMĀNYA', THE UNIVERSAL
413
TEXTS (736-737). THE NBGATION OF ACTION, QUALITY AND NAME IS ALSO DOSORTBED (BY YOU) AS THE CAUSE OF THE NOTION OF NON-EXISTENCE'; HENCE THE QUALIFICATION SERVES NO USEFUL PURPOSE. THE SAID DESCRIPTION OF THE CAUSE OF THI NOTION OF NON-EXISTENCE) ALSO IS NOT RIGHT; BECAUSE IT IT IS A CAUSE, THEN IT MUST BE A POSITIVE ENTITY, AS POSSESSING A DEFINITE PO TENCY. LASTLY, THE NOTION OF NON-EXISTENCE' WOULD BE AP
PLICABLE TO BEING' AND SUCH UNIVERSALS ALSO.
-1736-737)
COMMENTARY. Of the notion of non-existence also, the 'Negation of action, quality and name' has been described as the Cause,-This cannot be right; because what has been said to constitute the character of the Cause' is the potency to produce the effect; this Potency can reside only in a Positive Entity; as the Positive Entity alone is characterised by the said Potency. If then, Negation also had the said Potency imposed upon it, how could it not attain the character of the Positive Entity 1 As the presence of that Potenoy alone constitutes the nature of the Positive Entity. In this way the Negation would lose its negative character itself. As negation consists only in the cessation of the character of the 'Positive Entity'.
Then again, if the negation of Action, Quality and Name' were the Cause of the notion of Non-existence, then the notion of being non-existent' would apply to 'Boing' and other Universals also; as therein also is present
the negation of Action, Quality and Name -just as much as in such nonentities as the 'Hare's Horns':-(736-737)
The following Text shows that the Reason cited (by the Opponent under Text 716) is 'unproven' (not admitted) :
TEXT (738). THE FAOT OF THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION BEING DIFFERENT TR NOTIONS OF THE BODY, SHAPE, ETO. IS NOT ADMITTED (OR PROVED); HENCE THE REASON PUT FORWARD IS ALSO OPEN TO THE CHARGE OF BEING UN
PROVEN'-(738)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, the notions of the Cow and such things do not have for their objective anything other than the Body, etc. (of the animals); by virtue of which they could be held to be distinct from these latter.-(738)

Page #409

TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER XILI.
The Conclusion also (of the Opponent's Argument) is annulled by Inference:
TEXT (739)
THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION (OF ALL Cows, FOR INSTANOE) MANIFESTS WITHIN ITSELF THE verbal expression AND THE CONSTITUENT. IN. DIVIDUALS; WHILE THE UNIVERSAL' IS DESCRIBED AS DAVOID OF ALL TINGE OF colour, shape and verbal
expression.—(739)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant is as follows:- What is meant by you to bo proved is the fact that the basis of comprehensive notions consists of something differont from the Body, etc. this howover is not right; as no such thing enters into the notions at all ; and also because what does appear in these notions is something quite different, in the shape of Colour, Shape, etc. That is to say, you describe the Universal' Cow to be devoid of all tinge of Colour, Shape and Verbal Expression; and yet the actual Cognition that appears is always apprehended as accompanied by the manifestation of Colour, etc.; how then could the basis of such Cognition consist of what is devoid of Colour, etc. Certainly a Cognition of one form cannot have its basis in something of an entirely different form; if it did, it would lead to absurdities.
The argument may be formulated as follows:When & Cognition manifests an object distinct from some other object, it cannot be regarded as apprehending this latter object;-.g. the Cognition of Sound cannot be regarded as apprehending Colour and as a matter of fact, the comprehensive notion manifests within itself Colour and the rest which are something ditforent from the pure Universal ;-so that what is actually porceived is contrary to the premiss (oited by the Opponent).
Manifests toithin itself the Verbal Hacpression, etc. etc. ;-verbal expres. Rion', i.e. the name Cow';- constituent individuals', in the form of colour, shape and the rost; avabhasaurin', containing the manifestation of these.
"Akşara', 'Letters, stands for tho verbal expression 'gaula', which is made up of the letters 'au' and the Visarga.-(739)
Sharikarasvāmin has argued as follows:- The Universal' Blue also is of the form of Blue; it it were not so, then there would be no such comprehensive idea es Blue'; thus the Reason adduced by the Buddhist being not admitted, there is no annulment of the Naiyāyika's Conclusion by Ioference (as urged in the preceding Tect, by the Author)."
This is answered in the following

Page #410

EXAMINATION OF SÄMĀNYA' THE UNIVERSAL',
415
TEXTS (740-742).
LY THE UNIVERSAL ALSO WERE IN THE FORM OF BLUE', THEN, WHAT WOULD BE ITS DIFFERENCE FROM QUALITY AS A MATTER OF FACT, HOWEVER, NO ALL-COMPREHENSIVE BLUE' IS EVER PERCEIVED. EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE MANIFESTING ITSELI, IT IS NEVER PERCEIVED IN A DIFFERENTIATED FORM. UNDER THE CIROUM. STANCES, HOW COULD THE Idea AND Name APPLY TO THE INDIVIDUAL, ON THE BASIS OF THE SAID OOMPREHENSIVE NOTION ?-FURTHER, THE OTHER PARTY HOLDS THE NOTION OF THE UNIVERSAL TO BE DEFINITE AND CERTAIN; CONSEQUENTLY, ITS NON-PERCEPTION CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THAT WOULD IMPLY THAT
IT IS INCOGNISABLE.—(740-742)
COMMENTARY.
Such being the case, there can be no difference between the Quality Blue' and the Universal' Blue; as, ex hypothesi, both have the same form.
It might be urged that the Quality Blue' is not something com. prehensive, while the Universal' Blue embraces all that is blue at all times and at all places; and in this sense there is a difference between the forma of the two".
The answor to this is that no all.comprehensive Blue is ever perceived That is, as a matter of fact, any such comprehensive 'Bhe' as distinct from the Quality Blue,-embracing all that is of the form of Blue, is never perceived to manifest itself; as all that appears in Perception is a specific * Blue alone by itself. Even in the deterrninate' Cognition, there does not appear any second Blue ; is that Cognition only determines what has been perceived (by the previous indeterminate Perception).
It might be argued that," Just as for the Bauddha, the Momentary Character of Things, though apparent, is not actually apprehended in its differentiated form by people with dull intelligence,-60 the Universal also ".
This cannot be right; as even so, the theory propounded by you that "on the strength of the perception of the Universal there appear the single identical Name and Idea in regard to Individuals that are diverse", would become untenable ; because it the qualifying factor is unparceived, there can be no perception of the qualified thing; e.g. until the Stick is seen, there can be no such notion as the man with the stick. Similarly in the case in question. Because the idea put forward by you is that Diversities (Individuals) by themselves are beyond the reach of Verhal Expression and Cognition and those diversities, which are by themselves beyond the reach of Cognition and Verbal Expression, would (under your theory) be cognised only on the strength of the perception of the Universal':-how, then, can the Cogniser not perceive the Universal iteelf ?

Page #411

416
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIII.
Further, for the man for whom Perception is always 'indeterminate', it may he right to say that even though apparent, it is not apprehended': 1s Apprehension involves the functioning of the idea of Certitude; but for you, who hold all Perception to be determinate, it is not right that there should be no apprehension ; ets that would mean that there is no Cognition of it at all. In fact, the apprehension of objects by all certain Cognitions consists in their bringing about certitude: if then, they do not bring about this certitude, it comes to this that they do not cognise or apprehend the object at all.-(740-742)
Evon granting that the existence of something other than the Bluo' is proved, there enn be no proof for what you desire to prove : all your Conclusion itself is barred by Inforence, and to that extent, the Premise also cannot be admitted. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (743). EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE TAKEN AS ESTABLISHED THAT THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION HAVE A DIFFERENT CAUSE, THE EXISTENCE OF THE
UNIVERSAL AS COMPREHENSIVE, AND FREE FROM IMPERMANENCE, DOES NOT BEOOME ESTABLISHED ; BECAUSE THE NOTIONS IN QUESTION APPEAR
IN SUCCESSION.—1743)
COMMENTARY. Free from impermanence',-i.e. free from non-eternality,-eternal. " Why is it not established ? "
Because the notions in question appear in succession': i.e. the notions of the Cow and the rest. If these were due to any such commonality as the Universal', then they would not appear in succession-as their cause being always present in its perfect form, they should all appear simultaneously : just lilce several things produced simultaneously. Specially because à cause that cannot be helped does not need anything else.-1743)
Now, even admitting the Reason, the Author shows that it is 'fallible (not true', 'Inconclusive ')
TEXT (744). ON WHAT BASIS DOES THE TERM CATEGORY' ('Padārtha ") BIOST WHEN APPLIED TO THE SIX (Vaishēşika CATEGORIES) ! As ALSO THE NOTION IT EXISTS' WHICH IS FOUND TO
BE PRESENT IN BEING ', nro. 1—(744)
OOMMENTARY.
There is not even for the Vaishēşika) any such Universal'as Padar. thatva' (the genus Category ') subsisting in all the six Categories on the

Page #412

EXAMINATION OF SĀMĀNYA
THE UNIVERSAL'.
basis of which there should be such a comprehensive notion as 'this is a Category—this is a Category and so forth':-similarly in the Universal', the Specific Individuality' and 'Inherence', the Universal' Being does not subsist; by virtue of which ench of these could be conceived of as * existing'; because (according to the Vaishēşika) Being subsists only in the three Categories of 'Substance', Quality' and 'Action', -As regards the three Categories of Substance and the rest, the Opponents hold the name to be based upon the presence of the Universal'; hence the fallibility of the Reason has not been urged in regard to these. ----(744)
The following argument may be put forward :-“Even in the Categories named, the property of existence' is present in the form of being the object of the right Cognition that it exists'; so that here also the name is due to something other than the object itself; and hence the Reason is not ramtrue",
The answer to this is provided in the following
TEXTS (745-746).
IF IN REGARD TO THE CATEGORIES MENTIONED, THE NOTION THAT IT EXISTS' IS DUE TO SOMETHING ELSE, THEN, IN REGARD TO THIS
SOMETHING' ALSO THE NOTION THAT IT EXISTS' IS PRESENT ; AND SO ON AND ON, THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE REGRESS,AND THE CHARACTER OF "HAVING THE PROPERTY WOULD CEASE, IN VIEW OF THESE, THE REASON WOULD BEOOME FALLIBLE' (UNTRUE).THEN AGAIN THE ALL-EMBRACING CONCOMITANCE OF THE REASON HAS NOT YET BEEN ESTABLISHED.
(745-746)
COMMENTARY.
Even if it be admitted that the notions in question are due to something else, the defect of Fallibility' remains : because even in regard to the property mentioned by the Opponent, there is the notion that it exists', which is expressed by the words this property of existence is there'-30 this notion of is-ness will have to be attributed to something other than * Existence' (or Being); and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress; as also the anomaly that other things also would be receptacles of the Property, and hence things possessing that property '; and the result thus would be that there would be no such restriction of number as that there are only sir Categories which can have properties.- If, in order to avoid the Infinita
27

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIII.
Regress, a further property (of is-ness) is not postulatod, then, in view of these notions, -as appearing in connection with the Categories, or with the property of Ecistence,--the Reason would have to be regarded as fallible' (antrus).
It may be that the 'inconclusiveness of the Reason is not due to its being Too Wide; even so, how could the defect of its negation being open to * doubt be avoided ?- This is what is pointed ont in the words - Then again, etc. etc. what is meant by all-embracing concomitance is the cognition of the fact of the Reason being invariably concomitant with the whole of the thing in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.
The following argument might be urged :-"The required concomitance is there all right; because, if there were no other Cause, how could the notion in question of the Universal Cow', etc.) be different from the notion of the thing itself! There can be no difference among notions of the same object, even when they are many. If there were such difference, then, there could be no diversity even among the notions of different things, like Colour, Taste and so forth; because diversity among things is always due to the diversity among Cognitions."
This is not right; as a matter of fact, there can be no idea of Universal' in regard to the Specific Peculiarity' of tlings. Because the Specific Peculiarity never forms the object of any notion associated with verbal expression.-But,-aven in the absence of any Universal',-it the view be held that each thing by itself is ono only and is uxcluded, from other things, on some basis,-and it is through this basis that there come about various assumptions and verbal expressions of an all-embracing character, in accordance with conventions and the experience of people ;-if such were the view, then there would be no opposition to it. This is the reason why the Text speaks of the 'absence of concomitance' (745-746)
It has been argued (above, imder Text 719) that-" The comprehensive idea that appears in regard to the Cow and other things, etc. etc.".-This is answered in the following
TEXT (747)
THE ARGUMENT IN PROOF OF THE UNIVERSAL' THAT HAS BEEN URGED AFTER THE ONE JUST DISPOSED OF, ALSO BECOMES REJEOTRD BY THIS BECAUSE THE FALLACY OF 'FOTILITY AND THE REST ARE EQUALLY APPLIOABLE TO THAT
ALSO.-(747)
COMMENTARY.
* By this,-i.e. by the refutation just explained.-As the same objections are equally applicable to that also ; for instance, the defect of being futile',

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419
* superfluous' (proving what is already adinitted) and the rest are applicable to this argument also.
The phrase 'and me rest' includes the fallacies of the Corroborative Instance being devoid of the Probandum', the Reason being unproven, and 'fallible (Inconclusive) and so fortlı-(747)
The following Text points out the 'Fallibility of the Opponent's Reason in another manner :
TEXTS (748-749).
WITHOUT ANY ALL-EMBRACING BASIS, THERE 15—(a) A PARTICULAR
COGNITION IN REGARD TO THE 'Cook '; (b) SIMILARLY THERE IS THE NOTION OF NEGATION' IN REGARD TO NEGATION TTSELY; AS ALSO (c) IN REGARD TO PERSONS AND THINGS CREATED BY IMAGINATION, AND (d) IN REGARD TO DEAD AND UNBORN PERSONS.-IN VIEW OF ALL THESE COGNITIONS, THE REASON BECOMES OPEN TO THE FALLACY OF FALLIBILITY":
(748-749)
COMMENTARY.
In the case of the notion of the Cook', the Teacher and the like, there are no such all-embracing bases as the character of being Cook, the character of being the Teacher and so forth, on which comprehensive notions of the
Cook' and the Teacher' could be based. Similarly in regard to the four kinds of Negation,-Prior Negation and the like,-how could there be any such comprehensive notion as Negation'? Certainly there could be no Universal in this case, -as this must rest in positive entities.-Similarly in regard to persons and things created by imagination, such as the poetical character of Chandrápida (in Kadambari) and White Palaces in the sky and so forth,and also in regard to persons dead and unborn-such as Maluisammata. Shantha and the rest,-how could there be any notion without there being any comprehensive character ? Surely there is no Universal' in these cases, which are all based upon individuals.-(748-749)
The following Texts explain the notions of the Cook', etc:

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420
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIII.
TEXTS (750-754)
IN FACT, THERE IS NO SINGLE BASIS FOR THE NOTIONS OF COOK' AND THE REST.-IF IT BE SAID THAT THE ACT (OF COOKING) IS THE BASIS”,THEN, THE ANSWER IS THAT THE ACT VARIES WITH EACH INDIVIDUAL PERSON; AND YOU HAVE POSTULATED THE UNIVERSAL' AS EMBRACING ALL INDIVIDUALS ONLY, ON THE GROUND THAT UNLESS THERE IS AN ALL-EMBRACING ENTITY, THERE CAN BE NO COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF THINGS WHICH ARE DIFFERENT.-IF, EVEN WITHOUT SUCH ALL-EMBRACING CHARACTER, THE ACT BE REGARDED AS THE BASIS (OF THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION) THEN WHY SHOULD NOT THE INDIVIDUALS THEMSELVES BE REGARDED AS CAUSES OF IT -FURTHER (IF THE ACT WERE THE BASIS, THEN) THE NOTION OF COOK' COULD NOT APPEAR IN REGARD TO THE MAN AFTER HE HAS DESISTED FROM THE ACT (of cooling); SURELY EVEN THE OTHER PARTY DO NOT REGARD THE Act AS PRESENT THERE AT ALL TIMES,-LIKE THE 'UNIVERSAL'. - IF IT BE HELD THAT "THE NOTION AND NAME OF THE COOK, ETO, IS BASED ON PAST AND FUTURE ACTION ", THEN SUCH AN ACT CANNOT BE THE CAUSE AT ALL, FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT IT IS NOT
PRESENT AT THE TIME.-(750-754)
COMMENTARY.
It cannot be right to say that the notion in regard to the Coole is due to the act of cooking; because this Action also is held to be different with each person,-just like the individuality.
You postulate the Universal' As embracing all individuals, on the ground that, in regard to diverse things, there could not appear any comprehensive notion, in the absence of an all-embracing entity. Under the circumstances, if even without this all-embracing character, the Action were the basis of regarding diverse things as one, then why should there be an eversion to the individuals, whereby ignoring these, the Universal has been postulated as the basis of that notion ?
Then again, if the notion in regard to the Cool were due to the Action, then after the man has desisted from the Action, and is not doing any cooking, the notion of Coole could not appear in regard to him. You do not regard the Action to be ever present, like the Universal ', by virtue of which the notion could appear even when the Action had ceased. When one thing is due to another, it cannot appear in the absence of this latter.
Nor can past and future Action be rightly regarded as the basis of the said notion ; because what is past or yet to come cannot be there, and what is not there cannot serve as the cause of anything.-(750-754)
Sharkara-svāmin argues as follows:-" The comprehensive idea of the Cook is based upon the presence of that particular Action which is related to the Universal' (or Genus) * Action'; hence, even after the actual act of

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421
cooking has ceased, the permanent basis of it (in the shape of the Universal) is always there, and from that there arises the idea of the Cook" -This view is anticipated in the following
TEXT (755).
IF THE IDEA BE SAID TO BE DUE TO TRE PRESENCE OF THE ACT RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL ' Action, --AND THIS PERMANENT BASIS IS ALWAYS INDICATED BY IT EVEN WHEN THE PARTICULAR ACT HAS CEASED,—then, the answer is as
given in the following Text].—(755)
COMMENTARY.
By it',-i.e. by the action. * Permanent basis', -in the shape of the Universal' Action.-(755)
The answer to this is given in the following
TEXT (756).
WHEN THE PARTICULAR ACT HAS CEASED, THE PERMANENT UNIVERSAL, EVEN THOUGH INDICATED, CANNOT REALLY EXIST; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON TRAT TTS RECEPTACLE HAS CEASED TO
EXIST.-756)
COMMENTARY.
* Its receptacle',-i.e. the receptacle of the Universal; i.e. the particular act.
As a matter of fact, the Universal' cannot be perceived,- or even exist, by itself, apart from its receptacle ; otherwise it would have to be regarded as baseless.-(756)
The following argument might be urged :-"When once the Universal has been indicated and perceived, even if its receptacle, in the shape of the particular act, ceases, the Idea based upon it still continues ".
The answer to this argument is as follows:

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422
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XI.
TEXTS (757-760).
IN THE CASE OF SUCH UNIVERSALS' AS THE 'Sticle', THE Armlet' AND THE LIKE,-EVEN THOUGH THEY HAVE BEEN INDICATED AND PERCEIVED ONCE (IN ONE PERSON),—THE IDEA OF THE MAN WITH THE STICK' (OR THE MAN WITH THE ARMLET') DOES NOT CONTINUE ON THE REMOVAL OF THE STICK OR ARMLET. IF THE UNIVERSAL Cook WERE SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT (FROM THE INDIVIDUAL PERSONS), THEN (AS A PERMANENT ENTITY) IT SHOULD BE PRESENT IN THE NEW-BORN CHILD ALSO, WHO ALSO COULD BE CONCEIVED OF AS A Cook'-IT IT BE HELD THAT, LIKE THE IDEA OF BEING' (EXISTENCE), IT DOES NOT SUBSIST IN A CERTAIN SUBSTRATUM (THE CHILD JUST BORN F.I.),THEN, LATER ON, ALSO IT COULD NOT SUBSIST IN IT; AS THE CONDITIONS WOULD BE THE SAME. IT MAY BE THAT AT THE INITIAL STAGE (WHEN THE CHILD IS JUST BORN) THERE IS NO INHERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO (THE UNIVERSAL AND THE PARTICILAR) BECAUSE OF THE DEFECTIVE CHARACTER OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP. BUT IF SO, THEN, HOW COULD THERE BE THAT INHERENCE, EVEN AFTERWARDS, WHEN THE DEFEOT WOULD STILL BE THERE 1
(757-760)
COMMENTARY.
There would be many absurdities. For instance, such Universals' as Stick' and the like having been perceived once, when Devadatta had given up the Stick, the idea of his being with Stick', or with the Ear-ring', would be there.
Nor is it right to say that even in the man who has given up cooking, the Universal' Cook is present : because, the Universal' being eternal, it would be present in the new.born child also.
The Opponent might argue thus :-" The idea of being existent, though due to the Universal Being' (Existence), does not come about always; in the same way, the Universal' Cook also, being inherent in * certain particular substratum, would not appear at all times ; so that it would not inhere in the new-born child.-Inhering' is mentioned only by way of illustration ; the Universal' would not be manifested this also has to be understood ".
But in that way, it comes to this that it may not inhere in it at all. Because the non-inherence of the Universal' in the new-born child, at the earlier stage, could be due only to some defect in the character of the relation between the Universal' and the Particular Object; and this defect would be present there at the later stages also ;-how then could the
Universal' inhere in it at all ? According to your view, the Object is not momentary,-by which at the subsequent stages the Object (Child) would be a different entity.
That'-i.e. inherence.

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423
Their relationship -i.e. the relation between the Universal' and the Particular Object.
* Tādātmye ',-1.. the previous defective form not having been abandoned.-(757-760)
Even when the Object is admitted to be evanescent, the objection stated remains in force - this is what is shown in the following
TEXT (761). IF THE PARTICULAR OBJEOT BE not permanent, IT MIGHT ACQUIRE ADDITIONAL CHARACTERS: BUT EVEN 50, THE DEFECTIVE NATURE
OF THE UNIVERSAL 'WOULD NEVER CEASE.--(761)
COMMENTARY.
It may be that the Particular Ohjeet, being impermanent, will acquire additional qualities later on; but the Universal', being permanent, will always retain its character of being averse to Inherence ; hence how could it be inherent even at a later stage 1-Nor can it be right to assert that"the Universal' remains for ever in a state which is not a verse to subsequent Inherence" ;-because in that case, the Particular Object also would have to be regarded as eternal; as the Universal ' related to it would be eternal; because in the absence of one relative, the other relative cannot be said to be devoid of the defect preventing ita related nature.-(761)
The following Teax pnts forward the answer given by Uddyotakara:
TEXT (762) * THE NAME 'Cook' IS MEANT TO BE APPLIED TO THAT WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL CAUSE OF THE ACT OF cooking ; AND THIS 'PRINCI.
PALITY' IS PRESENT IN ANOTHER COOK ALSO."-(762)
COMMENTARY. Uddyota kara has argued as follows (in Nyayavártika, Sū. 2. 2. 8, page 320) -" It is through ignorance of our Reason that our Opponent has urged that - just as the term Oook is comprehensive in its connotation, and yet there is no such Universal as Cook -50 also is the comprehensive character of the connotation of the term Cow '. -Because what is meant by our Reason is that Particular Cognition cannot be accidental (without cause)'; and what this means is that the Idea which is different from the idea of the individual object must be due to a different cause and not that all comprehensive ideas are based upon Universals'. Such being the case, that which is the principal cause of the action of cooking is what is spoken of by the name Cook'; and this principal character is present in other persons also ; hence the objection urged against us has no force."

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424
TATTVACANOR HA: CHAPTER SIE.
This argument is answered in the following
TEXT (763).
WHAT IS IT THAT IS CALLED PRINCIPAL CHARACTER'!-IT CANNOT BE A
POTENCY, BECAUSE THIS DOES NOT SUBSIST (IN OTHER INDIVIDUALS). -FOR THE SAME REASON IT CANNOT BE SAID TO CONSIST IN THE NATURE OF THE SUBSTANCE, QUALITY OR AOTIOX,
ETO.—(763)
COMMENTARY
What is this 'Principal Character
If it is a Potency, that cannot be right; as potency in restricted to each individual substratum, and must therefore vary with each individual object, and cannot subsist in another object.
For the same reason, it cannot consist in the nature ' sance, selfsufficiency, -of Substance, etc.; as this also cannot belong in common to several objects.
The term 'etc.' is meant to include any entity that may be held to be distinct from Substance, Quality and Action.
As regards the explanation offered (by Uddyotakara) of the assertion that "the appearance of the notions in question is due to other causes", this has already been answered by pointing out that if some sort of a Cause is meant, then the argument is futile, as we also admit it as being due to Conventional Conception if on the other hand any particular Cause is meant, then there is 'absence of concomitance and also Falsitx, in view of such notions as those of the Cook and the like. (763)
The following Texts sum up the Anthor's position
TEXTS (764-765).
THUS THE NOTION THAT APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE COOK IS DEPENDENT
ONLY UPON THE DIVERSITY OF CONVENTION, AND APPREHENDS ONLY THE FORM THAT PRECLUDES ALL UNLIKE TRINGSFROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL NAMES AND NOTIONS PROCEED DIVERSELY IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONVENTION, WITHOUT THERE BEING
ANY ALL-EMBRAOING ENTITY.—(764-765)
COMMENTARY
Thus, because no other cause is found. on examination, for the notions of the Cook and the rest, therefore,-even in connection with diverse

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425
objects like the Cook, etc., the comprehensive notion-idea-which ultimately apprehends only something distinguished from all things unlike itself-pro. ceeds in accordance with Convention; as this exclusion of the unlike is always present.
Because this is so, therefore it follows that iu the case of the Cow', etc. also, notions partaking of a uniform character, as also Names, should proceed on the basis of Convention,-even without any entity like the Universal'.-So that the Reason put forward by the other party remains Inconclusive, (Fallible, Untrue).-(764-765)
The following Text further supports the argument (urged der Text 748, above) based upon the notion of Nogation with regard to Negation
TEXT (766)
THUS THE NOTION OF NEGATION WITH REGARD TO Negation is NOT INCOM
PATIBLE; NOR IS THE COMPREHENSIVE NAME (INCOMPATIBLE); BECAUSE THEY PROCEED FROM CONVENTION, WHICH DOES NOT INVOLVE THE ASSUMPTION OF ANY OTHER ENTITY.
(766)
COMMENTARY
The only basis for a comprehensive notion, that will apply to all cases, consists in the Body of Convention ; otherwise, the incongruity of the comprehensive notion that we have in regard to all Negations, -as also of the very term 'Negation'-cannot be denied. Because in the case of Negations, there can be no 'Universal', which subsists only in entities (not in non-entities),
Why it is not incompatible is shown by the words - Because they proceed etc., etc.'; the Convention is called "anartha in the sense that it does not involve the assumption of any other entity in the shape of the Universal and so forth; from such convention, they porceed ;-i.e. the Name and the Idea follow the presence or absence of the said Convention.-(766)
The following Texts anticipate and answer Shankarasvamin's answer to the Bauddha's criticisms

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426
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XUL.
TEXTS (767-770).
"SUCH NOTIONS (OF NEGATION) AS THE previous negation OF THE JAR',
THE Destruction OF THE JAR' AND THE LIKE, APPREREND NEGATIONS WITH POSITIVE ENTITIES AS THEIR ADJUNCTS AND THE COMPREHEN. SIVE CHARACTER OF THE SAID NOTION OF NEGATION' IS DUE TO THE COMPREHENSIVE CHARAOTER OF THOSE ADJUNCTS" IP THIS IS URGED, THEN (OUR ANSWER IS THAT THIS CANNOT BE SO; (a) BECAUSE THERE IS DISPARITY AND (1) BECAUSE IT CANNOT REST UPON THAT.-(a) THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF THE 'JAR' MAY BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS BEING DUE TO THAT; NOT SO THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION OF NEGA. TION', THE NOTION OF PRESENCE' (AFFIRMATION) IS ENTIRELY DIF. FERENT FROM THE NOTION OF ABSENCE (NEGATION). (6) THB NOTION OF THE Cow' OR THE 'HORSE' IS NOT HELD TO BE DUE TO THE
UNIVERSAL. Being, IF IT DID, THEN ONLY ONE UNIVERSAL ' WOULD HAVE TO BE POSTULATED AS ACCOMPLISHING EVERYTHING AS BEING THE
BASIS OF ALL NOTIONS).-1767-770)
COMMENTARY.
Shankarasnimin hun prgued thus:-- "The notio.19 of Negations are never found to be free from adjuncts [the Vegation is always of something); for instance, in all such notions of Vegation as the previous negation of the Jar', 'the Destruction of the Jar' and so forth,—they are found to rest upon Negations Associated with certain positive entities as adjuncts ; which shows that in all cases the notion of Negation has its comprehensive character dependent upon the Universal permeating the said adjuncts; so that there is no 'fallibility in our Premiss".
"Tasyāh of the said notion (of Negation).
The above argument is answered in the words. It cannot be so, etc., eto.. - The compound Vailaksanyátadáshrayat may be construed to mean either (a) because there is the fact that it cannot rest upon that, along with the fact that there is disparity', or as (b) because there is disparity, and also because it cannot rest upon that'.
The first of these two reasons because there is disparity'-is explained in detail, in the words- The comprehensive notion of the Jar, etc., etc.';it is not right that notions of diverse forms should be based upon one and the same adjunct ; as in that case a single Universal' would serve all purposes, and it would be useless to postulate several Universals'. Thus then notions of positive entities like the Jar' etc. may be due to the
Universal' 'Jar,-how could the notions of 'Negations be based upon those Universals', being, as they are, entirely different from these latter in character ? For example the notion of the universal Cow' does not proceed on the basis of the Universal Being.-(767-770)
Bhävivikta has argued as follows:-" It is not held that in every case, the Notion is exactly in keeping with its Cause (or basie). For instance,

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427
the number Plurality subsisting (a) in Elephants and Horses, or (b) in the Dhava and Khadira trees, fornes the basis of the notions of (a) the Army' and (6) the Forest'; similarly the mixture of several heterogeneous substances forms the basis of the notions of drinks, fermented gruel' and the like. Otherwise (i.e, if the resultant notion must be exactly in keeping with its basis) the notions in question should have been of (a) Many' and (6) Mixture".
Thuis is the argument that is anticipated and answered in the following
TEXTS (771-772).
"IN ALL CASES THE NOTION IS NOT IN EXACT ACOORDANCE WITH ITS
BASIS, -INASMUCH AS THE NOTIONS OF ARMY FOREST AND THE LIKE HAVE NUMBER, ETC. FOR THEIR BASIS";-IF SUCH BE THE VIEW, THEN, WHY SHOULD NOT THE SAID NOTION IN REGARD TO THESE DIVERSE THINGS ALSO BE HELD TO BE BASED UPON THE DIVERSITY OF THE BODY OF CONVENTIONS SET UP BY ONE'S OWN WHIM !—(771-772)
COMMENTARY. • The said notion', i.e. the Comprehensive notion. The diversity'-i.e. Peculiarity of the Conventions.-771-772)
Question :-" What is the peculiarity on the basis whereof this statement is made !" Answer :
TEXTS (773-774).
WHEN THERE IS COGNITION OF DIVERSITY, THEN THERE ARISES THE DESIRE TO SET UP A CONVENTION ;-THEN THE CONVENTION IS SET UP-THEN COMES THE HEARING OF THE NAME IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT CONVENTION-THEN THE BODY OR * FORM OF THE CONVENTION :-THEN THE notion (IN ACCORDANCE WITH THAT CONVENTION). THAT THIS IS THE CAUSE (BASIS) OF THE SAID NOTIONS IS THUS KNOWN DEFINITELY THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PREMISSES. IN REGARD TO OTHER CAUSES, THERE WOULD BE AN INFINITE
REGRESS.—(773-774)
COMMENTARY. The relation of Cause and Effect is ascertainable only by means of affirmative and negative premisses : and in regard to the comprehensive notion in

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TATTVASANIRAHA : CHAPTER XIII,
question, the only cruise that is so ascertained is the Body of Conventions set itp by the desire of man. For instance, first of all, there appears the cognition of difference among things ;-after this cognition has come, there comes the desire to set mp a Convention from that desire proceeds the setting up of the Convention then the hearing of the same at the time of actual usage of the name from that heering of the lisage, there follows the 'hody or 'form' of the Convention; from this Body of the Convention, comes the Itsing of the name in regard to the diverse things in question ;--and then finally the notions of 'Jar' and the like come into appearance.
Among all people, down to the veriest cowherd, the idea of such being the cause of the notions in question is definitely recognised with certainty.
As for the Universal' on the other hand, its capacity has nowhere been seen; if then it were regarded as the Cause of the notions, it would lead to absurdities; for, after having assumed that as the Cause, why conld you Hot assume another cause, of which also the capacity may not be known and so on 1-1773-774)
The following Texts continue the same line of reasoning
TEXTS (775-776).
THE ASSUMPTION OF SOMETHING ELSE (AS THE CAUSE OF THE COMPREHEN.
SIVE NOTION) IS BASED UPON THE IDEA THAT THE CORRELATIVE OF A THING SHOULD BE OF THE SAME NATURE AS THAT THING. BUT, EVEN SO, WHEN THE NOTIONS ARE DIVERSE, IT IS FAR BETTER TO AODEPT WHAT HAS BEEN JUST SUGGESTED (BY US); AS IN THIS CASE, THE RESTRIC
TION IS DUE TO THE CAPACITY OF THINGS ; AND IT IS FAR BETTER TO ASSUME THAT WHICH HAS BEEN FOUND TO BE TRUE IN REGARD TO THINGS WHOSE CAPACITY IS WELL KNOWN, THROUGH AFFIRMATIVE AND NEGATIVE PREMISSES.
(775-776)
COMMENTARY.
When you were expounding the reason for your conclusions to consist in the fact that they should have a basis similar to themselves, you had to postulate millions of Universals. If the Universal also produces notions of diverse forms, then it is far better to assume this,-that is, that which has been actually found to have the capacity (of producing the said notions). As in so doing, there would not have to be an assumption of anything not actually seen.

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Further, when you are asked the question-How is it that one and the same Universal produces diverse notions 1-You will have to say that "such is the restricted capacity of things that even though itself one, it is capable of producing notions of diverse forms"-If such be the case, then why should not the assumption be that the determining factors consist in the diverse things themselves whose capacities are well known and fully ascertained ? In doing this, nothing would be done which is not in strict accordance with experience.-(775-776)
The following might be urged-- Of the Universal also, the capacity is well known and fully ascertained ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (777).
As A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO AFFIRMATIVE CONCOMITANCE (OF THE NOTIONS) WITH THE UNIVERSALS; AS THEIR NOTION IS NOT ALWAYS PRESENT ; AS FOR NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF
WHAT ARE ETERNAL.-(777)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact the notions of Being and such other Universale do not appear at all times; and hence it can never be right to assert the affirmative coneomitance of these with the Universals. If the notions were really concomitant with the presence of the Universals, then, as the Universals would be there at all times, why could not the notions appear at all times Specially as the Universal does not need anything else; because other things cannot create any peculiar capacities in it. Hence there can be no affirmative concomitance with these Universals.
Nor is negative concomitance possible. Because at the time that the notions of Being, etc. do not appear,-it cannot be said that the canse of this non-appearance lies in the non-existence of the Universal; because eternal things must be always present, and hence their non-existence (absence) is impossible. Consequently there can be no negative concomitance with the Universals.—(777)
Thus then, there being objections against the view that Comprehensive notions should have their cause in something different (from the individual things),--the following assertion of the other party also becomes discarded :* When in regard to Quality, there arises the notion that it is nol-substance, it is not-4ction and so forth, the basis for this lies in the particular Universal Quality'; while Inherence in the same object is the basis for the compre

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430
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XITI.
hensive notion of the Universal' that appears in regard to the pure Univer. sals Being' and the like".
This is wlut is explained in the following
TEXT (778).
THE VIEW THAT " THE UNIVERSAL 'QUALITY' IS THE BASIS OF THE NOTION OF 'NOT-SUBSTANCE' AND THE LIKE” IS NOT REASON. ABLE FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CAN BE NO * INHERENCE IN THE SAME OBJECT' IN THE CASE OF THE NOTION OF THE UNIVER
saL'-(778)
The following Text shows that the Theory in question involves an absurdity also
TEXT (779).
As for ' INHERENCE IN SEVERAL THINGS, THIS IS PRESENT IN NUMBER, ETO. ALSO, JUST AS IN THE UNIVERSALS': HENCE THE NOTION OF 'UNIVERSAL' MUST BE THERE IN REGARD TO
NUMBER, ETC. ALSO.-(779)
OOMMENTARY
If Inherence in several things were the basis of the Comprehensive notion in regard to Universals', then, -as such subsistence in several substances is found in such things also as Number, Conjunction, Disjunction, Composite Substances and so forth.--the notion of Universal should appear in regard to these also: because the basis of sticla notion wonld be equally present in this case also.
As for the charreter of forming the object of one and the same cognition this also is restricted to the universals Being', etc. as appearing in the forms of the existing, etc.; and it does not touch any other Universal': so that, on the strength of that also, the comprehensive notion of 'Universal Universal' cannot appear in regard to the several Universals. Consequently the following assertion of Kumārila is entirely irrelevant :-"The subsistence of one in several different things is the basis of the name Universal' ns applied to Being, etc.; or it may be due to their being the basis of one and the same cognition". (Shlokarārtika-Akrtivada, 24).-(779)

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So far the author has explained the Reason Because there is disparity' [put forward by himself under Text 768, against the opponent's explanation of the comprehensive notion of Negation in regard to the several kinds of Negation). He next proceeds to explaint the other Reason Because it cannot rest upon that':
TEXTS (780-782).
UNIVERSALS CALLED JAR AND THE REST SUBSIST ONLY IN THE JAR; THEY CANNOT SUBSIST IN NEGATIONS; HOW THEN DOES THE COMPREHENSIVE NOTION (OF NEGATION) ARISE IN REGARD TO THESE LATTER ? - TH (COMPREHENSIVE) NOTION AND NAME CANNOT BE APPLIED TO ONE THING ON THE BASIS OF WHAT SUBSISTS IN SOMETHING ELSE; FOR INSTANCE, THE NOTION AND NAME CANOER' CANNOT BE BASED UPON THE UNIVERSAL ELEPHANT '. As A MATTER OF FACT, EVEN SUBSISTENCE IN ONE AND THE SAME THING IS NOT PRESENT HERE. NOTIONS OF TASTE, COLOUR, AND HEAVINESS MIGHT ARISE FROM THEIR SUBSISTENCE IN ONE AND THE SAME THING'; IN THE CASE IN QUESTION (Or NEGATION) HOWEVER, EVEN THIS SUBSISTENCE IS NOT THERE; FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT NEGATION DOES NOT SUBSIST IN ANYTHING AT ALL.
(780-782)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, the Universal' subsists only in the Jar and such entities, never in Negutions, because these latter are non-entities. How then could there appear, in regard to these Negations, any comprehensive notion associated with the form of a Universal, on the basis of the Universal' Jar which subsista in something other than the Negations)? For instance, the Elephant' does not become the basis of a comprehensive notion regarding the Cancer.
"But a notion is actually found to appear in connection with one thing on the basis of something that subsists elsewhere ; e.g. such notions as the sweet Taste is viscid, cool and heavy".
This is answered in the words-Even subsistence in one and the same thing, etc., etc.':- In the example cited, the qualities of 'Coolness and the rest subsist in that same substance wherein the sweetness subsists ; so that on the strength of this subsistence in the same substratum, there is coexistence : while Negation never subsists in any substance along with Universals like the 'Jar'; for the simple reason that that which has no colour and forre cannot subsist in anything.-- (780-782)
The following Text anticipates the answer given by Uddyotakara

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432
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (783-784). IF IT BE ARGUED THAT "IN THIS CASE THERE IS THE RELATION OF
Qualification-and-Qualified ", -THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT SUCH A RELATION IS ASSUMED ONLY WHEN SOME OTHER RELATION IS ALREADY THERE ; FOR INSTANCE, THH RELATION or Qualification and Qualified 18 ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE OLOSE PROXIMITY (CONTACT) BETWEEN THE TWO FACTORS CONCERNED; NN
THE ABSENCE OF SUCH CONTACT, THE RELATION IN QUESTION CANNOT BE POSSIBLE, AS THERE WOULD BE NO BASIS FOR IT.
(783-784)
COMMENTARY Uddyolakara has argued as follows:-"The relation between the Universal. Jar with the particular Jar is of the nature of Inherence, while the relation of Negations is of the nature of Qualification and Qualified ; so in both cases the relation of the same thing is the basis for the common name".
The answer to this is that such a relation, etc., etc.'; that is, the relation of Qualification and Qualified among Entities is always bronght about by some other relation; e.g. the relation of Qualification and Qualified between Devadatta and his stick is due to conjunction (contact) between them, and the same between the King and his officer is due to the relation of Master and Servant. In the case of Negations however, there is no such other Relation which could form the basis of the relation of Qualification and Qualified; how then could any such relation be possible 1 If it were possible, then there would be an absurdity: everything could be the qualification of everything'.-(783-784)
The question then arising as to-"how, in the absence of any other relation, such notions are current among people as the Prior Negation of the Jar' "- the following Tests supply the answer
TEXTS (785-786). As REGARDS SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS THE PRIOR NEGATION OF THE JAR: IT IS A CREATION OF MERE FANCY JUST LIKE THE DESCRIPTION OY BRAVERY IN REGARD TO AN IMAGINARY PERSON. IN CASES WHERE THE RELATION OF Qualification and Qualified is BASED UPON A REAL ENTITY, THERE IS BOUND TO BE SOME OTHER RELATION (REGARDED AS ITS BASIS).-(785-786)
COMMENTARY. When it is found that a thing which was not there has come into existence,-and there is a desire to speak of it, there appears an imaginary

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433
notion which indicates Prior Negation as something different from the thing concerned, and related to it by the relation of Qualification and Qualified; it is on this imaginary basis that the relation of Qualification and Qualified is mentioned, and there is no such relation in reality ;-just as in the case of the picture drawn by an artist, the qualities of bravery' and the like are assumed. In cases where you postulate the said relation of Qualification and Qualified,-some other relation (as its basis) has surely to be looked for ; otherwise there would be no regularity or restriction(785-786)
The following Tect proceeds to show that the answer given by ShankaraSuximin is not relevant to the objection urged by us
TEXT (787).
THE OBJBUTION URGED BY US WAS IN REGARD TO SUOH NOTIONS AS THIS NEGATION','THAT NEGATION. AS REGARDS THE UNIVERSAL'SUBSISTING IN THE ADJUNCT, THAT SUBSISTS
ONLY IN ITS OWN SUBSTRATUM.(787)
COMMENTARY.
What we had urged was as follows:- In the case of the Negation of the Jar, the Negation of the Cloth, the Vegation of the Hare's Horn and so forthwe find the comprehensive notion of Negation' appearing, even when there is no such Universal' as 'Negation', hence in other cases also the assumption of the Universal' is useless; and we did not raise the objection against the 'Prior Negation and other Negations that are conceived of in connection with a large number of things of the same kind.
"If that is so, what then?"
As regards the Universal' subsisting in the adjunct, etc., etc.—That is, the Universal. Jar' subsisting in the adjunct, the particular Jar, subsists only in its own substratum,-i.e, only in the Jar, not in the Cloth and other things. How then could there arise, from that, the notion regarding the 'Prior' and other Negations of such heterogeneous things as the Cloth and the rest ? This is what is meant.—(787)
It might be argued that there is one all-embracing Universal overywhere the answer to that is as follows
28

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIII.
TEXT (788).
NOR IS IT HELD THAT THE SINGLE ALL-EMBRACING UNIVERSAL BEING SUBSISTS IN THEM ALL, BECAUSE NOTIONS OF NEGATION' DO NOT APPRAR APART FROM THE SEX CATEGORIES.
(788)
COMMENTARY.
There is no one Universal embracing several such heterogeneous things as the cloth and the like-upon which the notion in question could be based.--It might be argued that there is the Great Universal (the Summmn Genus) called . Being', and the notion of Negation would arise on the basis of thet" - That however cannot be right; as it is not true; that is to say, you have such notions of Negation as are involved-(a) in the denial of such things as Dissociation from Impurities [' Pratisanichyanirodha, a technicality postulated by the Bauddha, but denied by his opponents] as apart from the six Categories, and (b) in the true denial of such imaginary characters in stories like Kapinjala to which adjunct would such notions of
Negation' be due, which could be regarded as their basis? Surely according to your view there is no real 'Being' (existence) in the case of such things as the said Dissociation from Impurities and the like,
This same argument answers also the following assertion of Kumarita's: "If it be urged that in the case of Prior Negation, etc. there is no Universa! posited the answer is that Being itself is the Universal in these, as qualifier by non-appearance" (Shlokavārtika-A pohaudda, 11); where the last qualification means that the 'Being that subsists in the Negations is qualified by the character of being not-produced.
The objection that we have urged above applies to this view also. Because there can be no 'Being' (Existence, Reality) in the things postulated under other systems, or in character and things created in imaginary tales, eto.-on which basis the notion of Negation could arise in regard to them.
"What is conceived in the case of these things is the imaginary 'Being, which has no counter-part reality in the external world."
If that is so, then why is not the denotation of all terms admitted to consist in mere faney, entirely devoid of any single permanent Universal in the shape of Being Otherwise, if a Universal in the shape of the one eternal Being' be postulated, inasinuch as all such terms as "Being, * Man' and the like would equally connote only the *exclusion of other things, why should there be divergent notions regarding these There can be no answer to this objection.-(788)
It has been urged by the author above (under Text 749) that-'in regard to persons created by imagination, and in regard to dead and unborn persons, ---the notions of Negation appear without any all-embracing basis'. This argument is further elaborated in the following

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TEXTS (789-795).
IN THE CASE OF THINGS CREATED BY IMAGINATION, THERE CAN BE NO
UNIVERSAL SUBSISTING IN THEM; BECAUSE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE INDIVIDUALS (THAT WOULD MAKE UP THE UNIVERSALS). HENCE THE 'FALLIBILITY OF THE OPPONENT'S REASONS REMAINS AS BEFORE. SIMILARLY WITH REGARD TO PAST AND FUTURE THINGS,—IF THERE IS A COGNITION OF AN ETERNAL UNIVERSAL, THEN NO SUCH PURE UNIVERSAL' (WITHOUT THE CONSTITUENT INDI. VIDUALS) CAN EVER BE APPREHENDED. Or, IF SUCH A PURE UNIVERSAL BY ITSELF WERE APPREHENDED, THEN IT COULD NOT BE THE UNIVERSAL' OF ANY PARTICULARS. SUCH A UNIVERSAL COULD NOT BE MANIFESTABLE BY PARTICULARS; JUST AS THE Himalaya Is NOT MANIFESTABLE BY THE Vindhya.-NOR CAN THE UNIVERSAL BE TIED DOWN TO THE PARTICULARS THROUGH ITS BIRTH BEING DBPENDENT UPON THESE.-NOR LASTLY CAN THE UNIVERSAL BE DEPENDENT UPON THE PARTICULARS FOR ITS COGNITION, BECAUSE IT IS ETERNAL AND BECAUSE IT IS APPREHENDED PURELY BY ITSELF.THERE IS ALSO NO POSSIBILITY OF ITS BEING DEPENDENT UPON ANY SUCH THING AS THE CONTAOT OF ITS OWN SUBSTRATUM WITH THE SENSE-ORGAN CONCERNED. CONSEQUENTLY THIS UNIVERSAL COULD EITHER BE APPREHENDED AT ALL TIMES, OR NOT APPREHENDED AT ANY TIME AT ALL.-AS BEGARDS ITS CAPACITY TO BRING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION BY ITSELF, IT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE THIS CAPACITY ; WHICHSOEVER WAY IT IS, IT WOULD ALWAYS REMAIN SO. ITS NATURAL FORM, WITH OR WITHOUT THE SAID CAPACITY,-WOULD BE UNSHAKEABLE, BECAUSE IT IS ITSELF PERMANENT.. WHO THEN, COULD EVER SHAKE WHAT IS UNSHAKEABLE (789-795)
COMMENTARY
The compound ichchhārachita, etc.' is to be expounded as that of which the form is created by imagination: The term 'adi' includes dead. and unborn things.--There is no Universal subsisting in such imaginary things, on which the said notion could be based.
"There may be no Universal in regard to iroaginary things; in regard to the past and future things, the notion could be due to the Universal”.
This is not true; the nature of things subsisting in other things is not such that they exist by themselves, without their substratum : if they did not exist, then they would cease to be subsistent.

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436
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XII.
Even if the subsistent things existed by themselves, - even so, the difficulty remains; because the other party also does not sdmit the apprehension of the Universal by itself. This has been thus declared by them"The Universal depends for its cognition upon the contact of its substratum with the sense organ".
Further, if the Universal could be apprehended by itself, the cognition of the Particular Individuals could not be held to follow from the cognition of the Universal ; because the Particular does not exist at the time that the Universal is apprehended by itselt.
Nor would there be any connection between the Particulars and the Universal, such as is involved in the notion that 'this is the Universal of these Particulars'; as there would be no basis for such a connection.
For instance, if there were a basis for such connection, it could consist either. (a) in the fact of its being manifested by them, or (b) in its being produced by them, or (a) in its cognition being dependent upon their cognition.-(a) The Universal cannot be regarded as connected with these Partionlars on account of its being manifestod by them; because being permanent, it can have no peculiarity produced in it by anything else, hence it could not be manifested by anything else ; when one thing does not confer any benefit upon another thing, it cannot serve as its manifester; for instance, the Himalaya is not the manifester of the Vindhya. The Particulars in the same way cannot be the manifester of the Universal. Hence the notion involved in the proposition is contrary to a wider proposition. If a thing that confers no benefit were to be regarded as the manifester, then there would be the absurdity that everything would be the manifester of everything else.-16) For the same reason, because the Universal is held to be eternal, therefore it cannot be right to regard it as dependent upon the Particulars for its production (c) Inasmuch as there is apprehension of the pure Universal by itself, it could not be held to be dependent upon the Particulars for its cognition. Thus all the three alternatives are impossible.
Hence the assertion that the Universal has its apprehension dependont upon the contact of its substratum with the sense-organ -is not right; because there can be no substratum' for the Universal ; how then could the Universal be dependent for its cognition upon the contact of the sense-organ with any such 'substratum'?
The particle adi' includes such conditions as the contact of the Mind and Soul, and the like (postulated by the Vaishēşika).
Then again, as the Universal is eternal, and hence can have no peculiar features introduced into it by other things,-it cannot be dependent upon anything else. Consequently, if it is capable of bringing about its own cognition, then it shonld bring it about at all times; if it is incapable of bringing it about, then it could not bring it about at any time at all. Whet. evor its nature be capable or incapable--it could not alter it; or else it would lose its permanence; this has been thus declared— Its capacity or incapacity, which reste in its very nature,—who can destroy? As it is eternal and hence not amenable to treatment':-(789-795)

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It has been argued (by Bhāvivikta, under Text 720) that," the Universal Cow is something different from the Cow, etc., etc."-The following Text shows that the Reason adduced there is found to be false, in view of the CASE of such notions as those of the Cook and the like
TEXTS (796-797).
* THE Universal Cow IS SOMETHING DISTINCT FROM THE individual
Cow, BECAUSE IT FORMS THE OBJECT OF A DIFFERENT IDEA, - LIKE COLOUR, TOUCH AND THE LIKE ;- ALSO BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO THAT, JUST AS THE HORSE IS SPOKEN OF AS BELONGING TO CHAITRA", -THIS ARGUMENT MAY BE SHOWN TO BE 'FALLIBLE (UNTRUE)IN VIEW OF THR NOTION OF THE
Cook' AND SO FORTH.-IN THIS SAME MANNER, OTHER WRONG ARGUMENTS ALSO ARE TO BE DISCREDITED.
(796-797)
COMMENTARY.
For instance, even though the Universal Cook’ is not held to be anything different from the individual Cook, yet it does become the object of diverse cognitions, such as this is a cookthat is a cook' and so forth; there are also such verbal expressions as Devadatta's Cook-ship', where the two things are expressed by words with different case-terminations. Thus the Reason adduced by the other party is found to be Inconclusive because too wide'
Other wrong arguments such as those put forward by Kumarila and others.
The following are the wrong arguments set forth by Kumarila :(1) In regard to the diverse particular cows there appears the notion of cow',—this must be due to a single entity in the shape of the Universal Cow':- because it manifests the cow and is of one form -just like the notion in regard to a single individual cow.-Or again (2) The notion of Cow' cannot be due to a particular Cow, the Black one for instance, or it must be due to something different from this particular Cow because it appears oven when this particular Cow is not present just like the notion of being made of Clay' in regard to the Jar.-If it is asked how this Universal is said

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIIL
to subsist in all particular individuals,- our explanation is as follows:- This notion of Cow' (the Universal) has for its object something that subsists in everyone of the individuals ;-because each individual is found to contain the whole form of the thing -like the notion in regard to each individual. The one-ness also of the Universal is fully established. Because even though the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, yet it is ons only, because it is apprehended by a cognition of one and the same forrn; just as the exclusion of the Brahmana by such negative terms as nonbrāhmana'.-It cannot be urged against this that this notion of identical form in regard to things that are different must be wrong, and hence it is not right to determine the nature of things on the strength of that notion'.Because there is no defect in the source of this notion; nor is there any subse. quent cognition that annuls this notion. Hence there being none of the causes of mistake, the assertion that it is wrong cannot be right ".
All these argunents have been this formulated (by Kumārila, in Shlokavärtika-Vanavāda 44-49) "The Idea of Cow in regard to the different individual core is based upon the one Universal Cow',-because it manifests the cow and because it is of one form,- just like the notion of the individual Cow.—The Idea of the Cow cannot be based upon the individual Black Cow,-or it must be based upon something other than this individual,--because it is present even when the individual is not present, just as the notion of being made of clay' in regard to the Jar.-The Idea of the Cow' has for its object everyone of the individuals in which it subsists, because it subsiste in everyone of them in its complete form,-just like the notion in regard to each individual.-Even though the Universal subsists in each individual, yet it is only one,-because it is cognized as one-just like the exclusion of the Brāhmana in the case of the negative term (like
non-brāhmana').—The notion of 'one-ness in regard to the Universal Cow cannot be regarded as wrong because there is no defect in its source, nor any subsequent cognition annulling it".
In the first of these arguments, the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum'; because a single Universal Cow' is not admitted; hence the fact of the notion of the one individual cow being based upon that cannot also be admitted. If what is proved is the general fact of its having a single basis, then it is superfluous; bocause it is admitted by us also that the notion is due to the exclusion of the non-coto, which is one only, which serves to distinguish the Cow from all heterogeneous things.
In the argument that the notion of Cow cannot be based upon any particular Black Cow,- if what is denied is the fact of its being produced directly from it, then it is superfluous; because the producing is interposed by the apprehension of the specific peculiarity and the conception of the Convention'. If what is denied is the fact of even indirect production, of the notion from the individual, then the Proposition is annulled by direct experience and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.
Even when what is meant to be proved is that the notion is based upon something other than the individual, if the fact of the notion being due to something else be sought to be proved even when the Black Cow is close by,then this also is contrary to direct experience. Because as a matter of fact,

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EXAMINATION OF SĀMĀNYA', THE UNIVERSAL.
439
it proceeds from the cognition of the Cow close by. The Corroborative Instance also is devoid of the Probandum.-If, on the other hand, what is sought to be proved is that when the Black Cow is not there, the notion of Cow that appears in the presence of the Cow of variegated colour is due to soroething different from the Black Cow,—then the argument is superfluous. If then what is meant to be proved is the fact of its being due directly to the entity itself, then the Reason is 'inconclusive'; as it has been explained that there is no real entity (like the Universal Cow') which could form the basis of the said notion.
As for the argument that has been adduced to prove that the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, there also is the fact is meant to be proved in a vegue general way, then it is superfluous. Because in regard to every individual thing, its notion is based upon the notion of the thing as excluded from every other thing.
If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion has for its object a real entity called 'Universal' which subsists in its entire form in every individual,—then the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum and the Reason is inconclusive. As the concomitance of such a character is not known of anywhere. If a single thing subsisted in its entire form in several things, then all the diverse individuals would be of one and the same form; because every one of them would be associated with the same entity, Universal', subsisting in every single individual. Or the Universal itself would have to be regarded as being of diverse forms, because at one and the same time, it subsists in its entire form in several things; just like the Bilves and other fruits placed in several yessels kept at varying distances. So that the argument is annulled by this Inference also.
For this same reason, the Assertion that "there is no anoulling cognition to the contrary" is not true. As the annulling cognition has been pointed out above and is also going to be pointed out later on.
As regards the argument in proof of the one-ness of the Universal,--there also, as it is not admitted that the Universal subsists in each individual, the fact of its being apprehended by a single cognition cannot be admitted ; hence the Reason is one whose very basis is not admitted.--As regards the Exclusion of the Brāhmana, it is not really one-because it is a non-entity; hence the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.-If the
one-ness' be meant to be imaginary, then the reasoning is superfluous; because if it is imaginary, then it is already admitted by us in the form of Apoha' (Exclusion of the Contrary).
As regards the statement that there is no defect in the source of the notion ", -that also cannot be admitted, because the defect of the source is always there, in the shape of the beginningless influence of Ignorance.
In this same way all wrong arguments are to be disposed of. (796-797)
Having thus pointed out the defects in the arguments adduced by the other party, for the proving of the Universal, the Author proceeds to advance arguments against the very Conception of the Universal -

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440
TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER XI.
TEXTS (798–801).
IT IS AVERRED THAT THE UNIVERSAL SUBSISTS IN SEVERAL THINGS
WHAT IS THIS SUBSISTENCE MEANT TO BE I-IS TT staying! OR being manifested ? AS FOR 'STAYING', WHICH STANDS FOR not deviating from its own form, --THIS BELONGS TO THE UNIVERSAL BY ITS VERY NATURE; - ANY RECEPTACLE OF IT COULD NOT PRODUCE THIS IN IT, BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THAT SUBSTRATUM COULD BE REGARDED AS TRAT WHICH MAKES IT slay'. AS FOR preventing its movement (WHICII IS ANOTHER FORM OF 'SCBSISTENCE'). IT CANNOT BELONG TO THE UNIVERSAL, AS IT DOES TO THE JUJUBE FRUIT (CONTAINED IN THE CUP); BECAUSE THE UNIVERSAL IS, BY ITS NATURE, IMMOBILE; HENCE IT CANNOT HAVE A RECEPTACLE-IF IT BE HELD THAT STAYING IS inherence, THAT CANNOT BE ACCEPTED; AS IT IS THE EXACT NATURE OF THIS INHERENCE THAT IS BEING EXAMINED. IN THE FORM OF THE RELATION OF THE sustainer and sustained WHICH SUBSISTS ALONG THINGS NEVER FOUND APART FROM EACH OTHER, SICH INHERENCE IS ADMITTED BY US ALSO.-(798-801)
COMMENTARY
It is essential that the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse Individuals should be admitted ; if it were not, then how could there be, ou the basis of that Universal, any comprehensive notion of one and the same form specifically in connection with those things ?-Now this subsistence of the Universal, when it is there, could be eitlur in the form of staying or is that of being manifested. Staying also is of laro kinds not deciatiny from its own form and having its downward movement checked. The former is not possible in the case in question ; because, being eternnd, the Universal would, by its own nature, never deviate from its own form. Nor can it be the latter ; because the Universal is incorporeal and all-pervading, and hence it can have no movement; so that downward movement would not be possible : hence it cannot be right to assume the checking of any movement.
The answer that what is meant by the subsistence of the Universal in the diverse tlungs is its inherence in these, -would be no answer at all; as it is just this Inherence the exact nature of which is being considered. For instance, Inherence las been defined as the relation of sustainer and sustained that subsists in things never found apart from each other. Now what is being considered is whether this character of being sustained is of the nature of its staying being restricted, or of being manifested. In the case of entirely distinct things, it cannot be right to postulate any such distinct thing as 'Inherence' which can serve no useful purpose ; as such postulating would lead to absurdities, as in that case everything would * inhere'in every other thing. Because Inherence has been postulated as that which combines things which are distinguished from one another; but even when there is such a distinct thing as Inherence', tlings which

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441
are essentially different do not assume one another's form ; for, if they did, they would lose their own form.-In giving the name of "Inherence to that other thing, there can be no dispute.-From all this it follows that the
staying (of the Universal in the diverse things) cannot be anything different. -(798-801)
The following Tearts proceed to show that it is absolutely incongruous to assume a receptacle' for the Universal -
TEXTS (802-804). IN THE CASE OF WATER AND SUCH THINGS, THERE MAY BE A RECEPTACLE'
WHICH PREVENTS THEIR DOWNWARD MOVEMENT ; IN THE CASE OF UNIVERSALS HOWEVER, WHICH ARE IMMOBILE, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF RECEPTACLES XIN THE CASE OF WHAT IS CAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF ANY CAUSES OF MANJFESTATION -AND ALSO IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS INCAPABLE OF BRINGING ABOUT ITS OWN COGNITION, WHAT WOULD BE THE USE OF ANY CAUSES OF MANIFESTATION? IF WHAT WAS incapable YESTERDAY WERE MADE capable (TO-DAY), THEN THE THING WOULD BE IMPERMANENT, -JUST LIKE THE JAR MANIFESTED BY THE LAMP.-(802-804)
COMMENTARY Agatinām!, Immobile_which are devoid of movement. The absence of movement in the Universal is implied by its incorporeality and all. pervading character.
Nor can the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals be of the nature of being manifested. Because the manifestation of the Universal could only consist in bringing about its Cognition, not in any strengthening of its character, because the character of an eternal thing cannot be changed. Under the circumstances, if the Universal has the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then why should it need any other cause for its manifesta. tion -If, on the other hand, it does not possess the capacity of bringing about its own Cognition, then it would not be reasonable to assert its dependence on something else, as by its very nature, the Universal is such that nothing can be introduced into it by other things. If it be held that other things do introduce peculiar features into the Universal, then, like the Individual, it would become specific, and cease to be Universal.
The thing, etc. etc. --The entire category Universal' is held to be based upon the name and notion of existence'. [hence bhana' here stands for the thing Universal, in that sense).
Tlie argument may be formulated as follows When there is no basis for one thing subsisting in another, then it cannot subsist in this latter,-.g. the Himalaya in the Vindhya ; there is no basis for the subsistence of the Universal in the Individuals -hence there is non-apprehension of the wider'term' (which implies the negation of the narrower term).-(802-804)
The following Text sets forth another objection

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442
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XIII,
TEXT (805). THE VARIOUS UNIVERSALS, JAR' AND THE REST, COULD SUBSIST EITHER IN THEIR OWN RESPECTIVE RECEPTACLES OR IN ALL PLACES,
LIKE THE HIGHEST UNIVERSAL' (SUMMUM GENUS).-(805)
COMMENTARY. "Ghatādi, etc. .. such diverse Universals' as the Jar. and the rest.
The Universals Jar', Clayey and the like have been described as all-pervasive, and yet would they be described as pervading only over their own substratum-or as pervading over all space, even where there are no individuals at all ?-There are only these two views possible.
Like the Highest Universal':- Being 'is called the highest Universal because it comprises the largest number of things. It is this widest Universal as comprising the largest number of things that has been cited as the instance, and not any such Universal as pervades over only such space as happens to lie between two individuals; as the said character is not perceived in this latter.-(805)
Out of the two alternatives set forth above, the Author sets forth the objection against the first alternative :
TEXT (806). WHEN THE THING COMES INTO EXISTENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE, IT IS NOT UNDERSTOOD HOW THE UNIVERSAL IS PERCEIVED THERE, OR
HOW IT GAINS SUBSISTENCE THEREIN.-(806)
COMMENTARY. When in a place entirely devoid of the Jar, a Jar comes into existence (on being made),-how the particular Universal Jer' comes to be perceived in that Jar,-or how it subsists in it, it is not understood.-(806)
The following Text explains why it is not understood
TEXT (807). THE UNIVERSALS CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE COME INTO EXISTENCE ALONG WITH THE NEW JAR-BEOAUSE THEY ARE ETERNAL; NOR CAN THEY BE SAID TO HAVE BEEN THERE ALREADY, BECAUSE (et hypothesi) THEY ARE NOT ALL-PERVADING ; NOR CAN THEY BE SAID TO HAVE COME FROM HLSEWHERE,
BECAUSE THEY ARE IMMOBILD.-(807)
COMMENTARY. In the said case the Universal . Jar' could either come into existence along with the different individual Jars, -or it would be there already, or

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EXAMINATION OF SAMANYA', THE UNIVERSAL'.
443
it would come in from another place ;-only under these three conditions could the Universal be perceived, or subsist, in the Jar newly come into existence. As a matter of fact however, the Universal could not be produced along with the new Jar, as it is eternal (and hence cannot be produced). Nor could it have been there already, because it is not all-pervading in character. Nor lastly could it come in from elsewhere, because it is immobile. How then could the Universal subsist, or be perceived, in this case ?
The argument may be formulated as follows :-When in any place a thing is not produced, nor has it been already there, nor has it come from elsewhere, then it cannot be perceived, nor can it subsist, -just like the Horn on the Hare's head where the Jar is prodaced in a place which had been devoid of it, the Universal is neither produced, nor has it been there already, nor has it come from elsewhere; hence the wider character is not perceived (which implies the absence of the narrower character).This Reason is not Inconclusive, because there is no other way (apart from the three mentioned) in which the Universal could subsist or be perceived. -(807)
The following Text sets forth the objection against the second alternative view (mentioned in Tect 805, that the Universals "Jar and the like are all-pervading, subsisting in all things) :
TEXT (808)
WHEN THE CONTACT OF ITS SUBSTRATUN WITH THE SENSE-ORGAN AND SUCH OTHER CONDITIONS WOULD BE PRESENT AND BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE UNIVERSAL, THAT UNIVERSAL WOULD BEOOME PERCEIVED EVERYWHERE ; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO DIVISION
IN ITS FORM-(808)
COMMENTARY.
The contact, etc. etc. - i.e. the causes of Perception.
Such other conditions' ;-this is meant to include the contact of the Mind and Soul and so forth.
What is meant is that the Universal being perceived in one particular individual, it should be perceived in other and heterogeneous individuals also, as also in the interval between two individuals; because it is of one uniform character which cannot differ from the one that is actually perceived.—(808)
This same argument is further elucidated in the following Text

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444
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIII,
TEXT (809). (a) IF THE UNIVERSAL (IN THE NEW INDIVIDUAL) BE NOT-DIFFERENT
FROM THAT WHICH HAS BEEN ALREADY PERCEIVED, THEN THERE SHOULD BE PERCEPTION OF THAT UNIVERSAL ALSO; -OR (6) LIKE IT, THE OTHER ALSO SHOULD NOT BE PERCEIVED ; -OR (c) THERE SHOULD BE
DIFFERENCE.-(809)
COMMENTARY. (a) That is to say, if the form of the Universal subsisting in other heterogenous individuals and in the intervals were not different from the form of the Universal subsisting in the Individual that is seen,-then, the former also should be seen, as it would be not-different from what is seen, like the form of this latter.-(b) If however there is no perception of the said Universal, then there should be no perception of that Universal as subsisting in the perceived individual which is non-different from what is not perceived.-(e) Lastly, if the Universal in question be held to be of both kinds,—then that would involve i diversity of nature; two mutually contra. dictory characters being present; and for any clear-minded person, it cannot be right to regard as one what is found to be obsessed by the two mutunlly contradictory characters of perceptibility and imperceptibility; ns such an idea would lead to absurdities: As in that case the whole Universe would be a single substance, which would imply the anomaly of the whole being produced and destroyed at one and the same time. If it were not so, then they would be one only in name; and there can be no difference of opinion regarding mere names.-(809)
Thus having discredited the whole conception of the Universal', the Author proceeds to formulate the arguments against it :
TEXTS (810-811). THE NOTIONS OF TREE' AND SUCH THINGS CANNOT BE BASED UPON THE UNIVERSALS POSTULATED BY THE OTHER PARTY - BECAUSE THINGS APPEAR IN SUCCESSION, AND BECAUSE THEY ARE COMPREHENSIVE,-LIKE THE NOTIONS OF THE COOK' AND SUCH THING8.-THE FACT THAT WHAT IS ETERNAL CANNOT BE PRODUCTIVE (OF EFFECTS) ALSO SERVES TO ANNUL THE OPPONENT'S PROPOSITION. - ALL THE OBJECTIONS THAT WERE URGED AGAINST 'CONJUNOTION' ALSO SERVE TO ANNUL THE OPPONENT'S CON
CLUSION.-(810-811)
COMMENTARY Notions that are endowed with the properties-of appearing in succession, being comprehensive, being entities, being produced, and so forth-cannot

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EXAMINATION OF SÄMÄNYA', THE UNIVERSAL
445
proceed from the eternal, one all-pervading Universal', as conceived by the other party like the notions of the Cook' ;-the notions of the
Tree', etc. are of the said character ; hence there is perception of a character concomitant with the contrary of the Opponent's conclusion. As being in succession and the rest are all concomitant with non-eternality, which is contrary to eternality (postulated by the Opponent). What is eternal cannot have any effective action, either successive or simultaneous,-as both are incompatible; hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be regarded as
Inconclusive'. As regards the fallacy of our Corroborative Instance being devoid of the Probandum', that has been already disposed of by us in detail ; hence the Instance also cannot be said to be unproven'.
The Author states another argument in annulment of the Opponent's conclusion-All the objections, etc. etc. these objections were set forth under Text 674, above, where it has been shown that one thing cannot subsist in several things; similarly in the section dealing with the Composite, under Text 607.-(810-811)
The following Text suns up the section
TEXT (812). THUS HAS BEEN REJECTED THE UNIVERSAL ' AS AN ENTIRELY DISTINCT
ENTITY. AS REGARDS THE UNIVERSAL 'POSTULATED BY THE FOLLOWERS OF Jaimini, THAT IS GOING TO BE REJECTED
UNDER THE CHAPTER ON SYĀDV.DA'
(CHAPTER XX).—(812)
COMMENTARY
The Universal' has been postulated by the Vaishēşika and his followers as something entirely distinct froin the Individuals; and we have stated the objections against this doctrine. The Jainue and the followers of Jaimini have postulated the Universal ' as non-different from the Individual, and also of both kinds; and this will be examined, in due course, under the Chapter on Syadvada'; on the present occasion, we had set out to criticise the doctrine of the Nyāya-vaishēşika; hence we do not take up the other doctrine, which would be somewhat irrelevant to the Context.-(812)
End of the Examination of the Universal',

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CHAPTER XIV. Examination of the Vishēsa : Ultimale Individuality'.
COMIENTARY. The Author sets forth the objection against the Category of Ultimate Individuality':
TEXT (813). THEN AGAIN, THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' THAT HAVE BEEN POSTULATED AS EXISTING IN ULTIMATE ENTITIES, HAVE BEEN ALREADY PROVED TO BE IMPOSSIBLE, BY TRE REJECTION OF THE ETERNAL SUBSTANCE'; THEY ARE MERE MOMENTS-(813)
COMMENTARY. The Ultimate Individnalities have been defined as subsisting in eternal substances and as existing in ultimate substances. This cannot be a definition at all; as it is open to the charge of being impossible ; there is no substance that is eternal; it has been already rejected under the Chapter on the Escamination of Substance ; under the circumstances, how could these Individualities be admitted as subsisting in eternal substances 1-(813)
The existence of these Ultimate Individualities' has been sought to be proved on the basis of the peculiar experience of Mystics ; but the Reason in that case is 'inconclusive'. This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (814–816). AMONG ATOMS, Ākāsha, SPACE AND SUCH THINGS (IN WHICH THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES ARE HELD TO SUBSIST), IF THEIR FORMS ABE DISTINCT FROM EACH OTHER, THEN THE APPREHENSION OF DISTINCTION AMONG THEM NEED NOT BE DUE TO ANYTHING ELSE IN THE SHAPS OF THIS ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITY.-IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY HAVE THEIR FORMS MIXED UP WITH FACH OTHER, THEN, EVEN THOUGH THERE MAY BE DIFFERENCE, THE APPREHENSION OF ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION COULD NOT BUT BE WRONG.--HOW TOO IS THE DISTINCTION AMONG ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' APPREHENDED! IT BY THEMSELVES, THEN WHY IS NOT THE SAME HELD TO BE THE CASE WITH ATOMS AND OTHER THINGS
ALSO 1-(814–816)
OOMMENTARY That is to say, the form of Atoms, eto. may be either distinct from each other, each having its own specific character, or, mixed up. If it is the former,

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EXAMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITY'.
then, as the things would themselves be always apprehended in their unmixed-distinct--forms, the assumption of any further Individualities for the purpose of the Mystics' apprehending their distinct forms would be zzseless.-If the second alternative is accepted, then, even in the presence of the distinct Category of the Ultimate Individualities, how could the Mystics' cognition of the Atoms, etc. as distinct, when their forms are (esc Wypothesi) not entirely distinct-be free from error? It would be clearly wrong. being the cognition of things as what they are not; and the Mystics, in that case, would not be true Mystics, on account of entertaining a wrong notion of things.
Then again, if the distinct cognition of things were not possible without a distinct category in the shape of Ultimate Individualities'-thon, how could there be distinct cognitions regarding these Individualities themselves? As there are no further Ultimate Individualities in them; if they were there, then there would be an infinite regress; it would also be contrary to the Opponent's doctrine that these Individualities are ultimate and subsist in eternal substances; as these other Individualities would be subsisting in the Ultimate Individualities also (which are not Substances). If, for these reasons, it be admitted that the Ultimate Individualities them. selves become the basis of the distinct cognitions of themselves.--then, in the case of Atoms, etc. also, they themselves may be regarded as the basis of their distinct cognitions : why should there be this aversion against them that, even though they have their individual forms mutually exclusive, their capacity to bring about distinct cognitions of themselves is not admitted, while such capacity is admitted in the Ultimate Individualities? We find no reason for this a version, except stupidity.-(814–816)
The following Terls anticipate the answer to the above given by Prashastamati
TEXTS (817-818)
"JUST AS THE UNCLEAN CHARACTER BELONGS TO THE DOG'S FLESH BY
ITSELF, AND TO OTHER THINGS BY CONTACT WITH IT,SO IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO ;--AND JUST AS BETWEEN THE JAR AND THE LAMP, THE LAMP, BY ITSELF, IS ALWAYS THE ILLUMINATOR OF THE JAR, BECAUSE IT IS OF THE NATURE OF LIGHT,—SO ALSO IN THE CASE IN
QUESTION."-(817-818)
COMMENTARY.
Prashastamati has argued as follows -" The Dog's flesh is unclean by its very nature, and other things become unclean by coming into contact with it ; in the same manner, the Ultimate Individualities by themselves are the basis of exclusive notion-on account of their being of the nature of exclusion, -while Atoms and other things become such basis only through the presence in these of the said Individuality.-Then again, even if a thing

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448
TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER XIV.
may not be of a certain nature, yet its notion may come about through the presence of something else; e.g. the cognition of the Jar is brought about by the Lamp; while the cognition of the Lamp is not brought about by the Jar. Ayam stands for the Jar- So also in the exse in question' that is, the apprehension of distinction among Atoms, etc. is due to the pregence of the Ultimate Individualities; while that of the Individualities them selves is due to their very nature."
This is answered in the following
TEXTS (819-822).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS UNCLEAN CHARACTER IS SOMETHING PURELY
illusory, not real; HOW THEN COULD IT BE THERE EITHER BY ITSELY' OR 'THROUGH SOMETHING ELST O R, EVEN IF THE UNCLEAN CHARACTER BE SOMETHING REAL, IT MAY BE THAT OTHER THINGS BECOME UNCLEAN THROUGH CONTACT WITH THE DOG'S FLESH ; NOTHING LIKE THIS IS POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OT ETERNAL SUBSTANCES, BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NO BECOMING' (BEING BORN) FOR THEM.-THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF THE LAMP, MOMENTARY OBJECTS, LIKE THE JAR, THE ORNAMENT AND SO FORTH,--BECOME THE CAUSE OF THE PRODUCTION OF COGNITIONS ; BUT THE APPREHENSION OF DISTINOTION CANNOT COME ABOUT THROUGH THE INFLUENCE OF THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITIES' IN QUESTION - BECAUSE IT COMES ABOUT IN SUCCESSION, LIKE PLEASURE AND THE REST.-(819-822)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, the Unclean Character of things is purely illugory. hypothetical, and not real; because it does not remain fixed; for instance, one and the same substance may appear to be ' unclean' for a Vedio scholar, but quite clean to the Hunter; and it cannot be possible for one and the same thing to combine within itself two mutually contradictory characters; as it would, in that case, cease to be one and the same.
Or, the Unclean Character of things may be something real. Even so, it cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance; because what happens in the case of such things as food-grains and the hike is that when they come into contact with an unclean thing, like the Dog's flesh, they abandon their previous clean character and become born again as endowed with the unclean character; hence it is right that in their case the unclean character is adventitious, due to something else. There is however no such basis in the case of Atoms and other eternal substances; by virtue of which any such adventi. tious distinctive feature could come into them; because they are eternal and hence they cannot be born with the new character.
Similarly, in the case of the Lamp also, the character of being the cause of cognitions, as found in the Jar, may be held to be adventitious, due to something else in the shape of the Lamp).

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EXAMINATION OF THE ULTIMATE INDIVIDUALITY.
#19
The last text sets forth the argument against any such explanation in the case of Ultimate Individualities. The exact form of this Inference and the Premiss upon which it is based may be stated in the manner indicated above.-(819-822)
Ered of Chapter XIT,
29

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CHAPTER XV.
Examination of Sumavāya' (Inherence, Subsistence).
COMMENTARY. The following Texts proceed to set forth objections to the Category of * Inherence:
TEXT (823).
"INHERENCE (SUBSISTENCE) IS APPREHENDED ON THE BASTS OF THE NOTION OF THIS SUBSISTS IN THAT', -STCH AS IS FOUND IS THE EXPRESSIONS THE CLOTH CONSISTS OF (SUBSISTS IN) THESE YARNS, THE MAT CONSISTS OF
(SUBSISTS IN) THE REEDS","-(823)
COMMENTARY.
"In regard to tliings that are inseparable, and among things where one is the container and the other the contained,--there is the notion of this subsisting in that; and the relation upon which this notion is based is * Inherence (Subsistence). This is apprehended as something different from Substance and the other categories, on the basis of the particular notions of
subsistence' present in such conceptions as the Cloth subsists in these yarns. In the case of such Universals as 'Being, Substance and the rest. it is found that they bring abont cognitions like their own, of their substratum,- and on this basis they are regarded us different from one another and also from their substratum; the same is found to be the case with 'Inherence also; in regard to all the other five categories, there are such notions - The Universal Substance subsists in this substance', 'the Universal Quality subsists in this quality', 'the Universal Action subsists in this action, the Ultimate Individualities subsist in these substances and so forth; and on the basis of these notions, it is concluded that Inherence is something distinct from these five (Substance and the rest).—This argument may be formulated thus :-When a notion is found to appear in regard to a thing in a form different from that of that thing, that notion must be based upou something different from that thing, for example, the notion of the man with the stick' in regard to Devadatta of this same kind is the notion of this subsists in that that appears in regard to the five Categories and this is regarded as justifying the conclusion (that the notion is dne to a distinct category in the shape of Inherence)."-(823)
The Author proceeds to explain the character of this Inherence

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EXAMINATION OF SAMAVĀYA' (INHERENOE, SUBSISTENCE).
451
TEXTS (824-826). "IF THERE WERE NO SUCH THING (As Inherence), WHAT WOULD BE THE BASIS OF THE SAID NOTION ? NO PARTICULAR NOTION IS FOUND TO APPEAR WITHOUT A PARTICULAR CAUSE-INASMUCH AS THE SAME NOTION OF 'SUBSISTING HEREIN' IS EQUALLY PRESENT IN ALL CASES, INHERENCE DOES NOT VARY, LIKE CONJUNCTION, IN FACT IT IS PERCEIVED IN ALL THINGS AS ONE AND THE SAME, JUST LIKE 'EXISTENCE'. -INASMUCH AS ITS CAUSE IS NEVER APPREHENDED, IT IS ETERNAL,-LIKE EXISTENCE'. BY NO MEANS OF VALID COGNITION
15 ITS CAUSE APPREHENDED."-(824-826)
COMMENTARY.
"Unless there is some basis for the notion, the notion of existence', etc. would always be there this is the Inferential argument subversive of your doctrine,
"This under the theory of the Vaishēşika, Inherence is inferred from the presence of the notion of 'subsisting in thuis'; while according to the Naiyāyika, it is directly perceived in the notion of subsisting in this'. That is to say, when the sense-organ is functioning, there appears the perception that 'the Cloth subsists in these yarns', and on the basis of this, they declare this notion to be * Perception
"This Inherence (which is a form of Relation) does not vary with the varions correlatives, -as Conjunction does; in fact, like Existenca', * Being-it is one and the same everywhere ; for the simple reason that its indicative feature, the notion of subsisting in this', -is overywhere the same.
"* Like Conjunction '-is an Instance per dissimilarity,
"Having no cause.-Inherence is eternal,-again like existence ? The fact of its having no cause is proved by the fact of no Cause of it being cognised by any means of Cognition."-(824-826)
With the following Text, the Author proceeds to set forth the objections against Inherence:
TEXT (827). AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE DRA OF SUBSISTING IN THIS EXISTS FOR OUR OPPONENTS ONLY; AND IT IS DUE ENTIRELY TO THEIR INTATUATION WITH THEIR OWN DOCTRINE; IT IS NEVER MET WITH IN COMMON EXPERIENCE.
-(827)
COMMENTARY. This points out that the Opponent's Reason is open to the fallacy of its substratum being unknown'. Such ideas as the cloth subsists in these

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TA'TTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XV.
yarns are only assumed through one's infatuation with his doctrines; in ordinary experience, no such ideas are ever found to appear; hence the very basis of the Probandura turns out to be one that does not exist at all. -($27)
The following texts lend further support to tho some objection :
TEXTS (828-829),
IF THE CONTAINER AND THE CONTAINED 'WEKE PERCEIVED AS DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, THEN ALONE WOULD THIERZ BE ANY SUCH NOTION AS THIS SUBSISTS IN THAT',-AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF THE FRUITS AND TU Pir (WHERE THE FRUITS LIE) ;THE CLOTH AND THE YARNS HOWEYER ARE NEVER PERCEIVED AS DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER,-BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THERE COULD APPEAR ANY SUCH NOTIONS AS
THIS SUBSISTS IN THOSE':-(828-829)
COMMENTARY.
It is only when two things have been found to be distinct from one another, when one is found to be contained in the other, that there appears the notion that this subsists in that'; such is our ordinary experience ; es is found in the case of the notion these Bël fruits are contained in this pit? In the case of the Cloth and the Yarns however no such difference has been perceived: in fact, no such difference exists; how thon could there be any such notion as the Cloth subsists in the Yarns'.-(828-829)
The following might be trged :-“It may be that the said notion has been assumed by us on the strength of our own doctrine ; but even so, it behoves you to explain the basis of such a notion."
The Answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (830).
IN THE CASE OF THIS NOTION IMAGINED BY MERE WHIM, AS IN THE CASE OF MERELY ASSUMED THINGS, --IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO
QUESTION THE OTHER PARTY REGARDING ITS BASIS.-(830)
COMMENTARY.
When one does not wish to find a cause, how could he be questioned regarding such cause for an effect which you have yourself assumed In

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EXAMINATION OF SAMAVĀYA' (INHERENCE, SUBSISTENCE).
fast. you have to question yourself, who have assumed the effect, under your own whim; whims do not always follow the real state of things; they Are essentially free from all restraint; hence nothing can be proved on their basis ; as it would lead to an infinite regress. For instance, for what is Assumed by you, another person might assume something entirely different.
(830)
Then again, it is not that notions like this subsists in that do not appoar at all ; in fact, the notions that co appear are to the contrary. This is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (831-834).
THE NOTION THAT DOES APPEAR IN ORDINARY EXPERIENCE IS IN THE
FORM THE BRANCHES in THE TREE, THE STONES in THE HILL: AND THIS NOTION PROCEEDS FROM THE FACT THAT THE TWO (THE BRANCH AND THE STONES) ARE PERCEIVED TO BE IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH THE OTHER PORTIONS OF THE TWO IMMOVABLES' (TREE AND HILL). THE NOTION THAT THOSE TWO (TREE AND MOUNTAIN) subsist in THESE (BRANCHES AND THE STONES) HOWEVER THAT IS PUT FORWARD (BY THE OPPONENT) IS ONE THAT IS BEYOND ALL ORDINARY EXPERIENCE. WHAT SUCH NOTIONS AS 'THIS COLOUR OR THAT ACTION IN THIS JAR' APPREHEND IS identity; THE GENERAL TERMS "COLOUR' (* AOTION), JAR' CONNOTE THESE THINGS GENERALLY, IN ALL STATES AND CONDITIONS; HENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF MENTIONING THEIR PARTICULAR FORMS, THEY ARE SPOKEN OF IN THE MANNER EXPRESSED IN THE SAID NOTIONS; AND IT IS ON THE BASIS OF THOSE PARTICULAR FORMS THAT THE NOTION APPEARS IN THAT FORM, -NOT ON THE BASIS OF INHERENCE': BECAUSE THE DISTINCTION AMONG ALL THESE IS NOT PERCEIVED.
-(831-834)
COMMENTARY.
In ordinary life such notions are met with as The Branches in the Tree', The Stones in the Hill', -and not such as "The Tree in the Branches, *the Hill in the Stones'. That notion also of the Branches in the Tree is not due to Inherence; it is due to the fact that the two (Branches and Stones) are perceived in close contact with portions of the two inamovables', other than the Tree and Stones spoken of,—those other portions being the Trunk of the Tree, and the Base of the Hill.-The term 'immovables is meant to stand for both, the Tree and the Hill, in view of the fact that both are equally immovable.

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454
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER xv.
'Those two'-the Hill and the Tree.
In these ;- in the Stones and in the Branches. Question-" There are many such well-known notions among people as The Colour, Taste, Odour, Touch, and Action in the Jar'; what could be the basis of such a notion, except Inherence ?"
Answer:- What such notions, etc. etc. Identity, i.e. Being of the nature of the Jar; this is what is apprehended by the said notion, or by men. When Colour is spoken of as in the Jar', what is meant is that the Colour is of the nature of the Jar, not that it is the same as the Jar. When tliere is a desire to speak of certain cominon potencies like those of Colour and the rest, and yet to distinguish thoso present in things other than the Jar, one introduces the term Jar' (and uses the expression the Colour in the Jar'). Each of the terms Colour and the rest, by itself, is used for the purpose of connoting the specific capacity of each of those factors to bring about the visual and other cognitions specifically; thus it is that the term • Jar 'just indicates those diverse factors; thus there being no co-ordination between the two, the sameness of form is explained on the basis of different substratum.
- Why then are both the terms used ?"
Answer :- The general terins, etc. etc.':-The term Colonr'connotes Colour in general, in all sorts of conditions ; for instance, just as the Colour in the Jar is spoken of as Colour', so also is the colour in the Cloth; hence the word 'Colour' by itself does not connote anything in particular, -as to which particular Colour is meant. When, however, the expression used is the Colour in the Jar, the Colour connoted is that particular one which is in the form of the Jar, as distinguished from that in the Cloth and other things. Similarly, the term Jar. also connotes the Jar under all conditions, white, yellow, moving, not moving and so forth; hence the word by itself does not connote anything particular ; but when the expression 'the white colour in the Jar' is used, the notion that appears is that of the white Jar as distin. guished from other jars. Thus it is that when one wishes to speak of this particular Jar, the words are used in the form Colour in the Jar'
It is on the basis of such expressions that there appears the notion of the Colour in the Jar, in reference to the Jar. It is not on the basis of any such thing as 'Inherence'. The reason for this is next stated— Because the Distinction, etc. etc.' ;-there is no difference apprehended among
Inherence!, Jar' and Colour', -on the basis of which the said notion could be said to be based upon Inherence '.
What is meant by this is that the Reason adduced by the Opponent is 'inconclusive and his Conclusion is annulled by Inference and other means of cognition.-(831-834)
It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 825, above) that Inasmuch as one and the same notion of this subsisting in that' is equally present in all cases, Inherence does not vary like Conjunction ".This is answered in the following

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EXAMINATION OF SAMAVÄYA' (INHERENCE, SUBSISTENCE).
455
TEXTS (835-839),
IF THERE WERE ONE AND THE SAME INHERENCE IN ALL THINGS, THEN
THE NOTION OF CLOTH' SHOULD APPEAR IN THE POTSTERD ALSO; IT WOULD ALSO FOLLOW THAT THE UNIVERSAL Cow' SUBSISTS IN THE ELEPHANT ALSO; SO THAT THE ELEPHANT ALSO SHOULD HAVE THE FORM OF THE Cow, JUST LIKE THE Variegated Cow.- THE NOTION THAT THE CLOTH SUBSISTS IN THE YARNS' IS BASED UPON INHERENCE; THIS SAME INHERENCE BEING PRESENT IN TH» POTSHERDS ALSO, WHY IS IT THAT THERE IS NO SUCH NOTION AS THAT
THE CLOTH SUBSISTS IN THE POTSHERDS' ?-IF IT BE URGED THAT THIS IS SO FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CLOTH DOES NOT SUBSIST IN THE POTSERDS, THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT IN THE YARNS ALSO, IT SUBSISTS ONLY BY INHERENOE ; IS THIS INHERENCE THEN NOT PRESENT IN THE POTSHERDS 1 IN FACT THE INHERENCE OF THE CLOTH IN THE YARNS MUST BE THE SAME AS THE INHERENCE OF THE CLOTH (READ pațasya' A00. TO COMM.) IN THE POTSKERDS; AND HENCE THERE COULD BE NO RESTRICTION IN THE NOTION AT ALL.-(835-839)
COMMENTARY.
If there were only one Inherence in all the Three Worlds, then, such notions also should appear as 'the Cloth in the Potsherds, and also that the Universal Cow' subsists in the House; and hence just as the notion of
Cow' appears in regard to the variegated Cow, so should it appear also in regard to the Elephant.
Then again, the notion that the Cloth subsists in the Yarns' has been explained as being due to the influence of Inherence; this Inherence of the Cloth is present in the Potsherds also; why then should there not be a similar notion - The Cloth in the Potsherds'-in regard to the Potsherds also ?
It might be argued that "inasmuch as the Cloth does not subsist in the Potsherds, the said notion does not appear."
This cannot be true. Because the notion that the Cloth subsists in the yarns is also said to be so only on the strength of Inherence; is not this same Inherence present in the Potsherds also-on account of which there could be no such notion as the Cloth subsists in the Potsherds' also, just as in the Yarns -As a matter of fact, that Inherence of the Cloth which is said to be present in the yarns should be the same as that of the Cloth in the Potsherds. Under the circumstances, wherefore should not there be an admixture of the notions of things and the consequent confusion)? For these reasons, there could be no restriction in the notion at all, and as a result of this, the relation of Substance, Quality and Action with their respective qualificationis-in the shape of the Universals Substance', 'Quality' and

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456
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XY.
Action',-being one and the same, any division among the said Categories would be impossible.-835-839)
The following Text propounds the possibility of the notion of Cow in regard to the Elephant :
TEXT (840).
SIMILARLY, THE INHERENCE OF THE UNIVERSAL ELEPHANT IN THE ELEPHANT SHOULD BE ONE AND THE SAME AS THE INHERENCE OF THE VARIOUS UNIVERSALS Cow' AND THE REST IN
THEIR RESPECTIVE SE BSTRATA.-(8-40)
COMENTARY.
In the following Texts (8+1-845), the author sets forth the user given by Prashaslamali
TEXT (811).
"EVEN THOUGH INHERENCE IS ONE, THE RESTRICTION OF container and contained IS ALWAYS THERE ; BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THE UNIVERSAL * SUBSTANCE' IS PRESENT IN SUBSTANCES ONLY, AND THE UNIVERSAL ACTION IS PRESENT IN
ACTIONS ONLY,"-(841)
COMMENTARY
Praskastamati has arguiod as follows:-"Though Inherence is one, yet there is no likelihood of an admixture among the five Categories: because there is always a restriction as to what is contained in what; that is to say, the Universal Substance' is contained in Substances only, the Universal
Quality 'is contained in Qualities only, the Universal 'Action is contained in Actions only; and so on, the notion of the Universals Substance and the rest appear as restricted to a particular substratum only."-(841)
In anticipation of the objection that in that case, Inherence would vary with each object ':-Prashastapati offers the following explanation :

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EXAMINATION OF SAMAVIYA' (INHERENCE, SUBSISTENCE).
4.57
TEXTS (842-843).
" FROM THE PERCEPTION OF THE FACT TRAT THE NOTION OF SUBSISTING
IN THIS, WHICH ARISES OUT OF INHERENCE', IS PRESENT IN ALL CASES, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT INHERENCE' IS ONE ONLY; AT THE SAME TIME, FROM THE PERCEPTION OF THE FACT THAT SUCH BASES AS THE UNIVERSALS
SUBSTANCE' AND THE REST ARE ABSENT IN CERTAIN CASES, IT IS CONCLUDED THAT THE NOTIONS OF THESE UNIVERSALS SUBSTANCE AND THE REST ARE
RESTRICTED IN THEIR SCOPE."-(842-813)
COMMENTARY.
"The notion of subsistence in this', which is based upon Loherenee. is found to appear in all cases in one and the same form, from which it follows that Inherence is one only. However, oven though Inherence is one, the notions based upon the Universals Substanco', etc. are fonnd to appear in distinct forms as resting in distinct substrata ; and thus they are found to be absent.--not present-in all cases; from this it is concluded that these Universals are distinct and diverse; so that there can be no admixture of the five Categories."—(842-843)
In answer to the question-How is it that there is this restriction of the Container and Contained. when the relation (of Inherence) is one and the same 2-the following answer is provided (by Praalastamati) :
TEXTS (844-845).
" EVEN THOUGH CONJUNCTION IS ONE ONLY, YET THE RELATION OF
Container and Coniained IS RICSTRICTED TO THE PIT AND THE CURD (PLACED THEREIN); SIMILARLY THERE WOULD BE RESTRIOTION IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO. SO THAT, EVEN THOUGH INHERENCE IS ONE ONLY, YET AS THERE WOULD BE DIVERSITY IN THE CHARACTER OF BEING THR manifester and manifested THERE WOULD BE NO INCONGRUITY
IN IT AT ALL."-(844-845)
COMMENTARY. " Even though Oonjunction is one only, yet in the case of the Curd and the Pit, the relation of Container and Contained is restricted similarly, in the case of the Universals Substance', etc., even though Inherence is one only, yet, by reason of the diversity in the capacity of manifester and

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manifesteil, there would be restriction regarding the relation of Container and Contained.
" In it'-1.8. in the restriction of the relation of Container and Contained." -(844-845)
The answer to the above argunents (of Prashastamata) is given in the following
TEXTS (846-847)
IF INHERENCE IS ONE ONLY, THEN ANY RESTRICTION REGARDING THE
Container and Contained IS IMPOSSIBLE. THE UNIVERSAL SUBSTANCE' IS HELD TO SUBSIST IN SUBSTANCE ONLY -HOW COULD THAT BE DUE TO INHERENCE? THIS SAME INHERENCE OF THE SUBSTANCE IS PRESENT IN QUALITY, ETO, ALSO; AS THESE LATTKE ARE RELATED TO THE UNIVERSALS QUALITY', ETC.;--AND INHERENCE IS THE SAME
IN BOTH.-(846-847)
COMMENTARY.
According to us, there is no such relation of Container and Contained as is held to subsist between the Universal Colour' and the particular Colour; it is admitted by you only; and this is impossible for you who regard Inherence to be one only. These and other incongruities in the Opponent's standpoint are now pointed out.
For instance, the Opponent accepts the restriction that the Universal Substance' subsists in Substances alone; and he does so on the basis of Inherence':-now the Inherence of the Universal as 'Substance is present in Qualities also ; because those are related to the Universal Quality',
Question: "Even though the Relation is there, how is it concluded that that Relation is that of Inherence ?"
Answer :- Inherence is the same in both - Both i.e. the two Universals 'Substance and Quality' Thus the notions having the same bu is in both cases, admixture and confusion are inevitable.—(846-847)
TEXT (848).
IT IT WERE NOT SO, THEN THIS (INHERENCE) WOULD BE DIFFERENT LY THE VARIOUS UNIVERSALS LIKE 'QUALITY ', ETO.,JUST AS CONJUNCTION VARIES WITH EACH CONJUNCT FACTOR,
-(848)
COMMENTARY. If it were not 80':- i.e. if the Inherence of the Universal Quality' in particular Qualities were not the same as the Inherence of the Universal

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*Substance in particular Substances,—then Inherence should vary with each substratum ; just as Conjunction does.-(848)
It has been argued (by Prashastamati, under Text 843, above) that"From seeing the absence of such basis as the Universal of Substance', ete, it is concluded that the scope of these Universals is restricted."- This is answered in the following
TEXT (849).
IT IS NOT POSSIBLIO THAT THERE SHOULD BE ABSENCE OF NOTIONS BASDD UPON THE UNIVERSAL 'SORSTANCE', -WHEN THE BASIS IS THERE. FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CANNOT BE
RESTRICTION OF IT.-(849)
COMMENTARY. So long as the cause is there in its perfect condition, there cannot be absence of the effect; if it were there, then, it would not be the effect of that canse. Thus then the absence of the said notion being impossible, the restriction regarding the relation of container and contained also cannot be right.-(849)
"The restriction could be based upon such common expressions as The Universal Substance is contained-subsists-in Substances only."
Answer:
TEXT (850).
THE EXPRESSIONS OF BEING CONTAINED' AND SUBSISTING' AND THE LIKE ALSO ARE BASED UPON THE SAME 'INHERENCE'; HENCE
THESE ALSO CANNOT BE THE BASIS OF RESTRICTION.-(850)
COMMENTARY.
The use of expressions like being contained', 'subsisting' and so forth also are explained by you as based upon the same Inherenca'; and as this is the same everywhere, how could it serve to restrict anything? Hence these notions of contained in', etc. cannot serve as the basis of restricting the relation of Container and Contained. Because the notions in question stand upon the same footing as this latter relation.-(850)
“In that case the Restriction may be due to the limitations relating to the capacity to manifest and be manifested."
Answer:

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TEXT (851). THE DIFFERENCE IN THE CAPACITY to munifest and to be manifested ALSO IS BASED UPON INHERENCE ITSELF ; IT CANNOT BE DUE TO
ANYTHING ELSE; BECAUSE THERE CAN BE NOTRO
DUCING' OF THINGS THAT ARE ETERNAL.-(851)
COMMENTARY.
Substances have been held to be the manifester of the Universal Substance', -and this on the strength of Inherence itself; because it is on account of the fact that the Universal Substance inheres in a particular substance that it is said to be manifested by it.
It cannot be due to anything else';-.e. to any such circumstance as the production of the character capable of bringing about an idea, which has been postulated by the Buddhist. Because Inherence has been held to exist even in eternal things like · Being and the like--and it is not right that there shonld be any production of what are eternal.-(851)
The same line of argunent is further supported in the following:
TEXT (852)
BY THE MERE PRESENCE OF THE LAMP, THE LAMP DOES NOT BECOME CAPABLE OF PRODUCING ANY NOTIONS; SO ALSO THE UNIVERSALS LIKE JAR' (CANNOT BECOME CAPABLE OF PRODUCING
NOTIONS).-(852)
COMMENTARY
The case of the Pit and the Curd'has been put forward as an example (under Text 844, by Prashastamali'). The following Teal shows that this is not admitted by us :
TEXT (853). THAT THE CONJUNCTION IN THE CASE OF THE CURD AND THE PIT IS ONE ONLY HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED BY US BEFORH ; ANY RESTRICTION ON THAT BASIS IS NOT POSSIBLE; AS THAT
WOULD LEAD TO ABSURDITIES.-(583)
COMMENTARY
Before-i.e. in the Chapter on the Refutation of the Quality of Conjunction.
Conjunction may be one only, yet the objection remains this is what is shown in the text Any restriction, etc..
On that basie', - i.e. on the basis of Conjunction.

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The absurdity' referred to lies in the possibility of such notions as the Pit in the Curd '; as the only ground for it-in the shape of Conjunction, -- would be equally available in this also.-(853)
It has been argued above (under Text 826) that "Inherence must be eternal, because no Cause of it is perceived ".-This is answered in the following
TEXT (854). BY THE ETERNALITY OF INHERENCE ALL THINOS BECOME ETERNAL: BECAUSE ALL THESE ARE EVER PRESENT, BY INHERENCE IN
THEIR OWN SUBSTRATUM. -(854)
COMMENTARY. If Inherence is eternal, then the Jnr and other things also will have to be regarded as eternal; as they exist for ever in their own substratum. In fact, it is on the ground oi Inherence that these things are held to subsist in their substratum, and this Inherence is eternal ;-why then should not the things persist for ever -(854)
In the following Texts, the Author anticipates and answers the Opponent's reply :
TEXTS (855.856). " THINGS BECOME DESTROYED EITHER THROUGH THE DISRUPTION OF THEIR
COMPONENTS, OR THROUGH THE DESTRUCTION OF THESE, JUST LIKE ACTION, ON ACCOUNT OF CONJUNCTION AND SUCH OTHER CAUSES" ;IF THIS IS URGED, THEN, THAT CAN. NOT BE SO BECAUSE THE INHERENCE OF THESE COMPONENTS ALSO IN THEIR SUBSTRATUM IS HELD TO BE ETERNAL. IF THESE CAME TO DESTRUCTION, THEN INHERENCE ALSO WOULD BECOME DESTRUC
TIBLE.”—(855-856)
COMMENTARY. The following might be urged by the Opponent :-"The Jar and other things become destroyed either through the disruption of their component parts or through the destruction of the parts : just as, while the Jar is in the state of being whirled or baked, its action (motion) becomes destroyed by the contact of a solid substance. This has been thus declared- By the contact of solid substances, the action becomes destroyed, as also the action unfavourable to the production of the effect. Similarly one Cognition becomes destroyed through another Cognition; one Sound becomes destroyed through another Sound."
Such is the Opponent's scheme. What he means is that, even though the Inherence may be there as the basis of the object's continued existence,

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if other auxiliary causes are absent, and contrary circumstances become operative, the Jar cannot remain for ever.
This is answered in the words that cannot be so' -What has been urged cannot be rigiit ; because of the said components also there are components wherein their Inherence lies for ever : how then could there be any destruction or disruption ?
This is so not only in regard to the substances composed of those components; it is so in regard to Action, etc. also ; this is what is indicated by the partiele api
If it be admitted that there is destruction of the components of the object, then the Inherence also would have to be regarded as liable to destaruction.-(855-856)
"Why so ?" Answer:
TEXTS (857-858). WHEN THB Relative HAS CEASED TO EXIST, IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE
Relation TO EXIST. WHEN THE conjunct OBJECT HAS BEEN DESTROYED, THE Conjunction CAN NO LONGER BE THDRE. AND JUST AS THE conjuncts ARB THERE WHILE THE Conjunction IS THERE,—SO ALSO THE Inherente SHOULD EXIST WHILE THE INHERENCE IS
THERE.—(857-858)
COMMENTARY He supports the same idea, in the words. When the Conjunct object,
etc. etc.
What is meant is that, on account of the Relative having ceased to exist, the Inherence comes to be non-eternal, just like the Conjunction which censes on the destruction of the Conjunct, Or the other alternative is that the relatives continue to exist, because of the Relation not having ceased; these relatives being like the two substances, the Conjunction between whom has not ceased.-If it were not so, then, in both cases, the Relation in question would lose its character.-(857-858)
The Opponent urges the following argument:
TEXT (859). “EVHN ON THE DESTRUCTION OF ONE RELATIVE, THE INHERENCE CONTINUES TO EXIST, BECAUSE THE OTHER RELATIVE IS STILL THERE.-NOR WOULD THE SAME BE THE CASE WITH CONJUNCTION ; BECAUSE THERE IS DIFFERENCE."
--(859)
COMMENTARY. What the Opponent means is as follows:- In the first Reason (adduced by the Buddhist), if what is meant is the destruction of all Relatives, then

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it is partly unprovenz", not admitted '; because the destruction of all Relatives is not possible ; ax even at Universal Dissolution, the Atoms remain. -If then the Reason is put forward with a view to some sort of Relatives having ceased to exist, then it is Inconclusive ; because even when a certain Relative may have ceased to exist, other Relatives would still be there.It miglit be urged against the Opponent that, by the same reasoning process. Conjunction also should have to be regarded as eternal',- Anticipating this, the Opponent says-It cannot be 80, because there ve difference ; that is to say, Conjunction varies with each conjunct object; hence it is only right to regard it us evanescent; Inherence, on the other hand, is only one in the whole world, because its basis, in the shape of the notion of subsistence herein, remains always the same; hence it cannot be right to regard Inherence as evanescent; as it is always perceptible in another Relative (even on the cessation of one Relative)."-(859)
The above argument is answered in the following
TEXTS (860-864). IF IT IS AS EXPLAINED, THEN WHEN CERTAIN inherent OBJECTS LIKE
THE JAR HAVE CEASED TO EXIST,-WHAT IS IT THAT CONTINUES TO EXIST? (A) IS IT THAT Inherence WHICH HAS BEEN ASSUMED TO CONSTITUTE THE EXISTENCE OF THOSE OBJECTS, WHICH INUERENCE CONTINUES TO EXIST IN THE OTHER RELATIVES ? OR (B) IS IT SOMETHING ELSE, AS IN THE CASE OF CONJUNCTION, PLURALITY AND SO FORTH-(A) IT CANNOT BE THE FORMER IF THE INHERENCE OF THAT KIND CONTINUES TO EXIST, THEN THE SAID OBJECTS-JAR, BTO. ALSO SHOULD BE THERE. IF THEY WERE NOT THERE, THEN THE INHERENCE THAT CONSTITUTES THEIR EXISTENCE COULD NOT REMAIN THERE ; OR IT MIGHT BE THERE IN MERE NAME,-FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT EVEN BEFORE, AS AFTER, THE OBJECTS COULD NOT BE SUBSISTING IN THEIR SUBSTRATUM, THROUGH ANY SUCH THING AS INHERENCE!. THUS THIS SUBSISTENCE OF THEIRS CANNOT BE
REAL.-(860-964)
COMMENTARY
When the Jar, and other things that are held to inhere'in tlieir cause, cease to exist what is it that continues to exist 1-(A) Is it the Inherence that has been assumed as constituting their existence in their cause, this Inherence continuing to exist in Relatives other than the Jar, etc.? -(B) Or is it something else, - like Conjunction and Plurality, which vary with each Conjunct 1-The term adi' is meant to include Disjunction.
If the former alternative is accepted, then the Jar, etc. should still continue to exist, because there would be no falling off of the nature of their existence, which in the shape of Inherence) would be just as it was before

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(c) The doctrine in question goes against the idea of the Eyo, etc. being the cause of Perceptional and other cognitions.
(d) Birth, in the shape of 'Inherence', being eternal, there can be no sequence in the birth of things, which will have to be regarded as simultaneous; this would be an incongruity, and it would also go against the Opponent's own doctrine that "the non-simultaneity of Cognitions is indicative of tbe Mind."
Lastly, the Birth of things being eternal,—the entire world would consist of things which could not benefit, or be benefited by, others; and lience the propounding of the Philosophy would be futile ; and so on and so forth, there would be many incongruities, which would cut off and smash the entire fabric of the Opponent's Philosophy.-(865-866)
End of Chapter XV.
30

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CHAPTER XVI. Examination of the Import of Words.
COMMENTARY.
The Author proceeds to set forth the Introduction to the arguments in support of the view (set forth in Text 2) that the Truth is amenable to Words and Cognitions only in an assumed (superimposed) form':
TEXTS (867-868).
"IF ADJUNOTS DO NOT EXIST IN REALITY, THEN ON WHAT BASTS WOULD
THERE BD SUCH COGNITIONS AND VERBAL EXPRESSIONS AS THE MAN WITH THE STICK','TRE white,' MOVE','EXISTS' cow, HERE' AND SO FORTI ?-THEY CANNOT BE RELD TO BE BASELBSS. NOR CAN THEY APPLY PROMISCUOUSLY TO ALL THINGS."
-(867-868)
COMMENTARY.
"What is apprehended by Word and Cognition is a Real Entity : hence what words express by means of affirmation and denial is only the real state of things":-Such is the view of the Realists. The view of the Negationists (Apohiste), on the other hand, is as follows:- "There is nothing real that is expressed by words; all verbal cognition is wrong, because it proceeds by imposing non difference upon things that are really different ; in a case where there is indirect connection with an entity, there is some sort of agreement with the object, even though the Cognition is really wrong" Such is the view of these people. The one uniform, non-different, form that is imposed upon things proceeds on the strength of the apprehension of things in the form of the exclusion of other things'; and it being itself of the nature of the exclusion or negation of other things, it is mistaken by people tunder the spell of illusion to be one with that which is excluded by it-and it ultimately brings about the appreliension of the thing 'excluded from others for these reasons it comes to be known as 'exchided from other things. On this ground it has been held that what is expressed by words is Apoha, the negation of others'
The Realists urge the following objections (against the Apohist, Negationist, Bauddha) -" If,- according to you,- for Verbal Cognition, there is no real basis as the adjuncts-qualifying factors in the shape of Substance. Quality, Action, Universal, Ultimate Individuality and Inherence, then how is it that among people, there are such verbal expressions and

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cognitions as the man with the stick!, which are all based upon adjunct in the shape of substance, etc. ? For instance, such expressions and notions as the man with the stick', 'the animal with horns are known to be based upon adjuncts in the shape of substances ; such expressions and notions as white', 'black' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of qualities; such expressions and notions as moves', 'wanders' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of Action, such expressions and notions as 'is', 'exists' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of Being '; such expressions and notions as Cow', Horse', Elephant' are based upon adjuncts in the shape of Universals and Particulars; and the expression and notion 'The Cloth in these yarns are based upon Inherence. If then, there did not exist any of these Substance and the rest, the expressions and notions of the Man with the stick' and other things would become baseless.-The term 'adi' goes with every member of the compound. So that every one of such similar expressions and notions become included, as the umbrella-holder', 'the homed animal' and so forth.-As for the Ultimate Individualities, they are cognizable by mystics only; hence these are not meant to be included here.
"And yet it is not right that these expressions and notions should be regarded as entirely baseless. If they were so, they would be equally liable to appear everywhere.
"Nor are they found to apply promiscuously to all things, without distinction.
"From all this it follows that Substance and the rest do really exist.
* The argument may be formulated as follows:- Expressions and notions that appear in mutually distinct forms must have & real basis.- like the Auditory and other notions ;-the expressions and notions of the stickholder', etc. do appear in distinct forms ;-hence this is a natural reason (for regarding them as having a real basis).-If they had no such basis, things would appear in all places without distinction ;-this is the argument setting aside a contrary conclusion."-(867-868)
The Author proceeds to refute the above Reasoning (of the Realist) in the following
TEXT (869).
THE ANSWER TO THE ABOVE IS AS FOLLOWS AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO REAL BASIS FOR THESE EXPRESSIONS AND NOTIONS ;
THE ONLY BASIS FOR THEM CONSISTS IN THE SEED LOCATED IN THE PURELY SUBJECTIVE CONSCIOUS
NESS.-(869)
COMMENTARY,
If what the Realist desires to prove is the fact that the notions and expressions in question have a real basis in the external world, then the Reason adduced is Inconclusive; as there is nothing to annul the contrary conclusion. If what is meant to be proved is only that they have some sort

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
of basis, then the argument is futile ; because we also hold that they hayo their basis in the awakening of the Tendencies and Impressions embedded in the inner consciousness; though not in tho external object; because the first cognition being always verbal, is wrong, and it cannot have any real basis.
Located, etc.'-i.e. embedded in consciousness; i.e. in the form of Tendencies and Impressions.-(809)
This same line of thought is further supported by reference to the scriptures :
TEXT (870).
WHATEVER IS SAID TO BE THE OBJECT OF A VERBAL EXPRESSION IS NEVER REALLY COGNISED ; SUCH IS THE VERY ESSENCE
OF ENTITLES. -(870).
COMMENTARY. Whatever',-. e. Specific Individuality', Universal' and the like.
Such is the very essence of things';-this character, of being beyond the reach of words, forms the very essence of things. This has been thus declareci -By whatever name a thing is spoken of, that thing is not really cognised there ; such is the very essence of things'.
Question :"What is the proof for Verbal Cognition being wrong and baseless?"
Answer:-The proof has already been asserted by us to the effect that inasmuch as Verbal Cognitions impose non difference upon things that are different, they are all wrong. For instance, when one thing is cognised as what it is not, that cognition is wrong; e.g. the cognition of Water in the Mirage Verbal Cognition consists in the imposing of non-difference on what is different ;-hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as wrong). There is no real entity in the shape of the Universal' which could be the object of Verbal Cognition-by virtue of which the Reason might be regarded as 'Unproven. Because the Universal' has been already discarded in great detail.-Even granting that there is such a thing as the Universal' even so, if that Universal is held to be something different from the particular things, the cognition would still be one of non-difference where there is difference; and hence wrong. Because a set of things cannot be the same as others when they are held to contain these. If, on the other hand, the Universal be held to be non-different from the particular things, the entire Universe would really form the single object of the Universal'; and hence the cognition of it as Universal' must be wrong, because the notion of the * Universal' does not appertain to a single thing; as the cognition of the Universal' is always preceded by the perception of diversity.
When Verbal Cognition is thus proved to be wrong, it must also be objectless, baseless; because the object productive of the cognition having surrendered its form, there can be nothing left which could be the basis of the cognition.
Or, we may prove the objectlessness of Verbal Cognitions in another manner: That alone can form the import of words whereto they have been

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applied by Convention; nothing else can form their import; as if it did then that would lead to absurdities. And there is no object wherein the application of any words has been fixed by Convention. Hence all Verbal Cognitions and Expressions must be entirely baseless.
The argument may be formulated as follows:-When words have not been fixed by Convention at their very inception, upon certain things, they do not really denote these things;-e.g. the word 'Horse' which has not been applied by convention to animals with the Dewlap (ie. the Cow) does not denote the cow; all words have not been applied by Convention, at the very inception to any things; hence the wider conception is never appre hended; that is, Denotativeness is invariably concomitant with being fixed by Convention, and this latter is absent in the caso of words.--(870)
The following Text proceeds to show that the Reason adduced is not unproven -
TEXT (871).
SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY, UNIVERSAL', RELATION TO UNIVERSAL', 'SOMETHING ENDOWED WITH THE UNIVERSAL, FORM OF THE COGNITION OF THE OBJECT',-NONE OF THESE REALLY
FIND A PLACE IN THE IMPORT OF WORDS".
-(871) COMMENTARY.
That is to say, when the Import of words is held to consist in an object in regard to which a Convention has been duly apprehended,such import would consist, either (1) in Specific Individuality, or (2) in Universal', or (3) in Relation to the Universal',-the pronoun tal' in the compound 'tadyogaḥ standing for the Universal.-or (4) in 'some. thing endowed with the Universal',-or (5) in the form of the Cognition of the object. These are the only alternatives possible.-In the case of everyone of these, no Convention is possible; and hence it cannot form the Import of Words'.
1
*
Really'-this has been added in order to indicate that the author does not deny the illusory import of words; and hence there is no selfcontradiction in terms; otherwise there would be a self-contradiction involved in his Proposition; inasmuch as it could not be possible to assert that Specific Individuality and the rest do not constitute the Import of words', without speaking of thern by means of these words; so that by speaking of these by their names, for the purpose of proving his proposition, he would be admitting the fact that these are capable of being expressed by words;and yet this fact is denied in the Proposition; so that there would be self. contradiction.
This explanation answers Uddyotakara's assertion to the effect that "if words are inexpressive, then there is contradiction between the Proposition and the Premiss ".-Because we do not entirely deny the fact of words having their import; for the simple reason that this is well-known even

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TATTVASANGRAHACHAPTER XVI.
to the meanest cowherd. What we do ceny, however, is the character of Reality which the other party impose upon the Import, not the Import itself.-(871)
The following Text proceeds to show that Specific Individuality' cannot form the 'Import (or Denotation) of Words' becausu there can be no Convention in regard to it :
TEXT (872).
OP THESE, SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CANNOT BE DENOTED BY WORDS; BECAUSE IT CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH
THE TIME OF CONVENTION AND USAGE.-(872)
COMMENTARY Canna be denoted by words':-that is, beeinse there can be no Conyen. tion in regard to it.
Question :- " Why can there be no Convention in regard to it"
Answer:-Because there is 'viyoga', absence of connection with the time related to Convention and Usage, there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality this has to be supplied).
What is meant is that Convention is made for the purposes of usage ; and not through mere love for it; hence people can rightly make Conventions only with regard to things present at the time related to that Convention and Usage not with regard to anything else. As regards Specific Individuality', it cannot be present at the time of the Convention and Usage ; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.-(872)
Question "Why is it not possible for the Specific Individuality to be prosent at the time of Convention and Usage ?" Answer:
TEXTS (873-874).
THINGS OF THE NATURE OF INDIVIDUALS CANNOT BECOME INTER-RELATED
AMONG THEMSELVES, BECAUSE THERE ARE DIFFERENCES (AMONG THEM) OF PLACE, TIME, AOTION, POTENCY, MANIFESTATION AND THE REST.-FOR THIS REASON, THE THING CONCEIVED BY CONVENTION IS NEVER MET WITH IN ACTUAL USAGE ; AND THAT IN REGARD TO WHICH xo CONVENTION HAS BEHN APPREHENDED CAN NEVER BE COMPREHENDED THROUGH WORDS,-LIKE ANY OTHER THING.-(873-874)
COMMENTARY. The variegated Cow, etc. are so many distinct Individuals.--and as such have their individual forme excluded from each other, through differences of

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place, etc.; and as such, they never become inter-related among themselves. Consequently, when a man has set up a Convention in regard to one of these individuals, he could not carry on usage, on that basis, in regard to other individuals.—In the phrase 'manifestation and the real', the term 'the rest' is meant to include Colour, Shape, Condition and other peculiarities.
18 nover met with in actual usage' ;-what is meant is that, in this way, there being no Convention in regard to it, the Reason adduced by the Author cannot be said to be 'unproven'.
That the Reason is not Inconclusive' is shown by the words- That in regard to which no Convention has been comprehender, etc. etc.'
Like any other thing': -i.e. like things of other kinds. Dhranēh ', -Through Words.
What is meant is as follows: If the Word denoted a thing in regard to which no Convention has been apprehended, then the term 'Cow' also should denote the Horse ; and in that case, the making of Conventions would bo useless. Hence the possibility of this anomaly annuls the contrary conclusion; and thereby the Author's Premise becomes established.
This same Reason, Because no Convention can be made, has been indicated by the Teacher Dirināga in the declaration-The Word denoting a Universal cannot be denotative of Individuals, because of endlessness; whet is meant by endlessness' is the impossibility of Convention.
This also sets aside the following argument of Uddyolakara (Nyāyavārtika 2. 2. 63, p. 327):-"If you make Words' the subject of your argument, then, as endlessness is a property of things (denoted by words), it would be a Reason that subsists elsewhere than the Subject. If, on the other hand, the diverse things themselves are the subject, then neither affirmative nor negative corroborative Instances would be available. So that endlessness cannot serve as a valid Reason",
The same writer has also urged as follows (in Nyāyavartáka 2. 2. 63, page 326) “The objection urged is applicable to those (Buddhists) who hold that what are denoted by words are things without any qualifications ; as for ourselves, what are denoted by words aro Substances, Qualities and Actions as qualified by Being, etc.; so that wherever one perceives the Universal * Being', etc., one uses the word 'existent' and so forth. The Universal 'Being' is one only; hence in regard to things characterised by that Universal, it is quite possible to set up Conventions. So that endlessness cannot serve as a valid reason for you."
This is not right. It has been already proved that there are no such real entities as Universals like 'Being and the rest which are either different or non-different from individual things-But even granting that there is such a thing as the Universal ;-even so, as it is possible for several Universals to subsist in one Individual, there could be no rise of such words as 'Being' and the like, free irom confusion. Further, until it has been explained by means of words that 'Being is so and so', the person making the Convention could not indicate the things denoted by those words by means of 'Being and other Universals ;-and until the Convention has been made, words like Being', etc. cannot be used. So that there would be the incon. gruity of mutual interdependence.

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The following argument might be urged :-" The person concerned himself comes by the usage and then, through affirmative and negative conco. mitance, comes to establish the connection between the word and its denota. tion and therefrom becomes cognisant of the relevant Convention."
This cannot be right. No one person can ever come by the entire usago bearing upon any subsequent thing.
"What happens is that having once found that the term 'existing is frequently applied to things endowed with existence, he concludes that the same word is applicable to even unseen things of the same kind."
That cannot be true; as such is not found to be the case. In fact no Convention can apply to unseen things which are endless and which differ widely regarding their being past and future. If Convention were applicable to such things, it would lead to an absurdity.
One really does comprehend snch Convention in regard to the things when he speaks of them as conceived of by Determinate (conceptual) Cognition (which involves verbal expression also)."
If that is so, then it comes to this that the application of words appertains to only such things as are purely fanciful-and not to real things. So that the past and future not being before the man at the time, if there did appear a determinate cognition of those, it could only be objectless, and hence what is made known by it must be a non-entity.--How then could the Convention relating to such things be anything real? We desist from further augmentation on this point.
Lastly, as our Reason is present in all cases where the Probandum is present, it cannot be said to be Contradictory,
Thus it becomes established that words cannot have Specific Individualities for their import' (denotation),-(873-874)
The following might be urged :-" There are certain things, like the Himalaya Mountain, which remain permanently in one and the same form,so that there can be no diversity in them due to Place, Time and Distinction ; -consequently, as they would be present at the time of Convention and Usage-your Reason becomes partially inadmissible '."
The answer to this argument is as follows:
TEXT (875),
EVEN IN THE Himalaya AND SUCH THINGS WHICH DO NOT DIFFER WITH TIME AND PLACE, THERE ARE ATOMS WHICH ARE DIVERSE
AND MOMENTARY, AS PROVED ABOVE.-(875)
COMMENTARY.
And such things '—is meant to include other mountains like the Malaya.
All these are aggregates of many Atoms; hence there can be no Convention relating to all their component parts; also because it has been proved that all these things are destroyed immediately after their appearance. Thus,

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in the case of these things also, there can ho no presence, at the time of usage, of the character that was present at the time of the making of the Conven. tion. Hence our Reason is not unproven (875)
It is thus been established that there can be no Convention bearing upon Specific Individuality, because Usago being impossible in connection with it, the Convention would be useless. It is now going to be shown that no Convention is possible in regard to it because no Action is possible :
TEXTS (876-877).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO ASSUMPTION OF CONVENTION
IN REGARD EITHER TO THE born OR TO THR unborn THING. THERE CAN BE NO REAL CONVENTION RELATING TO THE unborn,-AS THERE CAN BE NONE RELATING TO THE HORSH'S HORN-NOR ONE IN REGARD TO THE Born THING; BECAUSE CONVENTION IS MADE ONLY ON THE RECALLING TO MIND OF THINGS APPREHENDED BEFOREHAND HOW COULD THIS BE DONE IN REGARD TO WHAT HAS PASSED AWAY LONG AGO?
-(876-877)
COMMENTARY. It has been already proved that all things becomo destroyed imunediately after appearance (birth); if then Convention were made regarding them, it could be made either before they were born, or after they were born ;it is not possible for any real Convention to be made relating to what is still unborn; because what doos not exist can have no character at all and honce cannot be the substratum of anything. The Toxt has used the term
real' in order to oxclude the illusory. Hence the assertion does not become vitiated by the woll-known case of the Convention whereby the name of An unborn son is fixed npon beforehand : because such convention is purely illusory, bearing, as it does, upon an object which is the creation of fancy.
As in the Horse's Horn';-the aftix 'vati' is added to the word onding with the Locative.
Nor can the Convention be made relating to the thing after it is born ; because & Convention regarding anything can be made only when the thing has been apprehended, and this apprehension has been followed by the remembrance of its name and distinguishing features; it could not be made otherwise than this; as it would lead to incongruities. Thus then, at the time of the remembrance of the name and the distinguishing features, the Specific Individuality of the thing-being momentary-will have long disappeared ; so that, as in regard to the unborn, so in regard to the born thing also, there can be no real Convention ; as at the time of the making of the Convention, both would be equally absent. In fact, even at the time at which thing is actually apprehended, the Specific Individuality that forms

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
the basis of that apprehension, being momentary, is not in existence ; how much less possible is it at a later time, when there is remembrance of the uniforinity of things appearing long after that apprehension 1-(876-877)
It might be argued that," the Convention could be made in regard to that inomentary entity in the series of momentary entities born through the potency of the entity apprehended which appears at the moment that the Convention is made" -The answor to this is as follows:
TEXT (878).
AS FOR THE OTHER THING OF THE SAME KIND WHICH APPEARS THROUGH THE POTENCY OF THE THING APPREHENDED AT FIRST, THE BODY OF CONVENTION IS NOT POSSIBLE IN REGARD TO THAT ALSO. AS TOR SIMILARITY, THAT ALSO IS
ONLY IMAGINARY.-(878)
COMMENTARY. Though at the timo of the making of the Convention, another momentary entity is present, yet, as the Convention could not bear upon it, no Convention is possible; when a maker of Conventions apprehends a Horse, and then remembers its name and makes up the Convention, he does not make the Convention bear upon the Cow that may be present at the time, but which has not formed the subject of that Convention.
It might be argued that—"There is a similarity among all Specific Individualities, and on this basis they might be regarded as one and the Convention made regarding them . The answer to this is . As for similarity, etc. etc. ; that is, similarity is imposed upon things by determinate (conceptual) cognitions; 80 that if these are what are denoted by words, then it would mean that the Specific Individuality is not denoted at all.
Thus there can be no Convention in regard to the Specific Individuality of Things). Nor can it be in regard to the Specifio Individuality of the Word. Because all that the maker of Convention does is to apply to a particular thing & particular Name which has been recalled to Memory: while Memory cannot recall the name that has been really apprehended previously, because that ceased to exist long ago ; and the name that he actually pronounces is not the one that he has known previously; so that there could be no real Remombrunce of it, and what has not been appre. hended by the Memory cannot be recalled by it. Hence it follows that what is recalled by Memory and remembered is only a creation of fancy, and not the Specific Individuality (of the word). Thus there can be no Convention relating to any Specific Individuality. Hence it becomes established that Specific Individuality is something that cannot be named at all.-(878)
The Author next states another proof in support of the view that Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words

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TEXT (879).
THE IDEA OF HEAT THAT FOLLOWS ON THE UTTERANCE OF THE NAME (Hor') IS NOT SO CLEAR AND DISTINOT AS THE PERCEPTION OF THE (HOT) THING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE
SENSE-ORGAN -(879)
OOMMENTARY.
The cognition of the Hot thing brought about by the Senses is clear and distinct, not so the cognition that is brought about by the word "hob'; people whose Visual, Gestatory and Olfactory organs have been impaired do not cognise the Colour and Tasto, etc. of things on the hearing of the mere name-mabulinga' (Citron), for instance; while people whose eyes are intact have a clear perception of those through that sense-organ. This has been thus declared 'The man who has been burnt by fire has the idea of having been burnt, on the contact of fire, which idea is entirely different from the idea of burning arising on the utterance of the word burn'.
The perception of the thing, etc. etc.-is an Instance per dissimilarity.(870)
"Even if the idea is not so clear and distinct, why cannot Specific Individuality for the denotation of the word ?"
TEXT (880). IT IS NOT RIGHT THAT THERE SHOULD BE ANY CONNECTION BETWEEN THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE WORD ; NOR DOES THE THING APPEAR IN THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE WORD; JUST AS Taste DOES NOT APPHAR IN
THE COGNITION OF Colour—(880)
COMMENTARY The argument may be thus formulated.—When a thing does not appear in the cognition brought about by a certain other thing, it cannot form the denotation of that;-for instance, Taste in the cognition brought about by Colour Specific Individuality does not appear in tho cognition brought about by Words ;-hence there is non-apprehension of the wider term (which implies the absence of the narrower term)-The Proof annulling the conclusion of the other party consists in the anomaly pointed out here. For instance, when a Word is said to be denotative of a certain thing, all that is meant is that it brings about the cognition of that thing,-nothing else ; and a cognition cannot be said to be of that thing whose form does not appear in it at all; if it did, it would lead to an absurdity. Nor can one and the same thing have two forms—one distinct and the other indistinct,-by virtue of which the indistinct form could be the one denoted by Words;

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
because one is incompatible with two; and it has been shown that things existing at different times are mutually incompatible.—880)
"The Naiyayikas declare as follows:-" The Individual, the Configuration and the Universal,--all these constitute the Denotation of the Word-(Nyāyasūtra, 2. 2. 63).- The term padārtha' here stands for the artha', denotative,
padasya', of the Word. The term "Individual' stands for Substances, Qualities, Actions and Ultimate Differentia ; this has been defined in the Sutra-The Individual consists of particular Qualities, Actions and Sub. stances (Nyâyasätra, 2. 2. 64). The meaning of the Sutra, according to the author of the Vartika (Uddyotakura), is as follows:- Differentia' is that which is differentiated : gunavishēşa' is that which is differentialed from Qualities, i.e. Action. This same term gunavishēra ' taken a second time is meant to be an Elcashesa Compound, standing for Quality; the term 'vishēşa' particular, in this case is meant to exclude the Configuration, which is essentially a form of Conjunction, and Conjunction is included under the category of Quality; hence if the qualifying epithet particular were not thore, Configuration also would become included ; and yet this is not meant to be included imder the 'Individual', as it has been mentioned by a separate word. --The term ashraya', Receptaclo', in the Sūtra stands for Substance ; Substance being the receptacle or substratum of the said particular Qualities and Actions. This Substance has been indicated by the Sutra wherefrom the term tat' has been eliminated. The compound
Gunavishaşishrayah' therefore has to be expounded as-Gunavishēzäh (Particular Qualities)-Gunavishēsch (Actions)-Tadashrayah (Substances), This is a collective copulative Compound, and yet the Neuter ending has not been used as the use of the particular gender depends upon the whim of people. Thus the sense of the Satra comes to be this: That which is gunavishasashraya is the Individual, also called Marts, Composite'. When the name "marti' composite is applied to substance, it is to be taken locatively-as that wherein component parts adhere; when it is applied to Colour, etc., it is to be taken nominatively, in the sense of those that adhereinhere-in substances; as for the term "vyaleti', it is applied to Substances accusatively and to Colour, etc. instrumentally.---According to the author of the Bhagya (Vatsyāyana) however, the Sutra is to be taken exactly as it stands
- That which is the receptacle of distinctive qualities is the Individual, and that also is the material Body? Thus it has been said that-That Substance which is the receptacle of the particular qualities,-Colour, Taste, Odour and Touch, -and also of Gravity, Fluidity, Solidity, Faculty, and also of the non-pervasive Dimension,-is called ' mūrti', 'composite body', on account of its being made up of component parts.-The term *akrti',
Configuration', denotes the contact of the limbs of living beings, in the shape of Hands, etc. along with their components, Fingers, etc. Says the Sutra (Nyāya, 2. 2. 65) Configuration is that which indicates the universal and its characteristics'; on this the Bhāsya says-'That should be known as Configuration which serves to indicate the Universal and the characteristic features of the Universal. This Configuration is nothing apart from the definite arrangement of the parts of an object and the components of those

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parts'.-The term 'arrangement stands for a particular form of contact ; and the term 'definite' serves to exclude artificial contacts.-The characteristic features of the Universal consist of the limbs of living beings, the Head, the Hand and so forth, as it is by these that the Universal (or genus) Cow' and the like is indicated. In some cases, the genus is manifested directly by the Configuration : e.g. when the genus Cow becomes manifosted on the perception of the exact shape of the Head, Legs, otc. ; in some cases it is manifested by the characteristics of the genus ; e.g. when the genus Cow' is manifested by the Horns and other such limbs which are perceived severally. Thus it is that the Configuration becomes the indicative of the genus and of the characteristics of the genus.- The term Jali' .Genus ', denotes that entity which is called Sämänya', Universal, which is the basis of the comprehensive names and notions of things. Henca the next Sutra (Nyāya, 2. 2. 68) Jāti, Universal, is the basis of comprehensive cognitions'; that is to say, the Universal is the source from which comprehensive notions arise."
Of these three-Individual, Configuration and Universal,-the idea of the Individual and the Configuration, being denoted by words, should be taken as rejected by the foregoing rejection of the idea of the Specific Individuality forming the denotation of words.This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (881).
IN THIS SAME MANNER THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE CONFIGURATION ALSO MAY BE REJECTED; INASMUCIC AS OTHERS REGARD BOTH THESE ALSO AS BEING OF THE NATURE OF SPECIFIC
INDIVIDUALITY':-(881)
COMMENTARY
That is to say, the rejection of the Universal will come later. * Rejection '-as forming the import of words.
Why?"
Inasmuch as both these' Individual and Configuration, are held by others to be of the nature of Specific Individuality; 80 that just as
Specific Individuality' cannot be denoted by Words, because there can be no Convention bearing upon it,-80 also, in regard to these two also, there can be no Convention; hence the Reason cannot be said to be either Un. proven', or 'Inconclusive (881)
Further, the Individual', in the shape of Substance, Quality and Particular Qualities, - Configuration, in the shape of Contact - and all these, Substance and the rest,-have been already rejected. For this reason also it cannot be right to regard these as being denoted by Words.--This is shown in the following

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TATTVASANGRANA: OHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (882). INASMUCH AS THE REPUTATION OF SUBSTANCE, ETO. AND OF CONTAOT, HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY SET FORTH,-IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO REGARD THESE AS TORMING THE REAL IMPORT' OF
WORDS.-(882)
COMMENTARY Having thus explained the impossibility of Convention regarding Specific Individualities, the Author proceeds to explain its impossibility regarding the other three-Universal, Connection of the Universal and That Which is Endowed with the Universal (as mentioned under 871) :
TEXT (883). THE UNIVERSAL AND THE CONNECTION HAVING BEEN ALREADY REJECTED IN DETAIL, THE OTHER THREE KINDS OT IMPORT OF WORDS
NO LONGER REMAIN POSSIBLE.-(883)
COMMENTARY The other', i.e. barring Specific Individuality, the three-(1) the Universal, (2) the Contact of the Universal, and (3) the One Endowed with the Universal.-As regards the Universal and its Connection, these simply do not exist ; and hence in regard to what is endowed with the Universal, also no Convention can be possible; as all naming is done only in reference to Universals; and that which is so endowed can only exist in the form of Specific Individuality; so that the objections urged against this last are equally applicable to the other also.
The Universal forms the denotation of words-says Katyāyana. Substance forms the denotation of words, says Vyādi. -Both (Universal and Substance) form the denotation of words, says Panini.-All these views become discarded by what has been said above; because the Universal can have no connection,-'Substance is of the nature of Specific Individuality'; and hence the objections urged against this latter remain applicable to it.-(883)
The Anthor sums up his position in the following
TEXT (884).
FOR THESE REASONS THE ASSERTION THAT THE INDIVIDUAL, THE CONFIGURATION AND THE UNIVERSAL ARE DENOTED BY WORDS IS IMPOSSIBLE; BECAUSE ALL THESE ARE
FORMLESS.-(884)
COMMENTARY. Tat-For these reasons. Formless '-Featureless ; devoid of character.-(884)

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TEXT (885).
As REGARDS THE FORM OF COGNITION, IT RESTS IN THE COGNITION ITSELE, AND DOES NOT FOLLOW EITHER THE OBJECT OR ANOTHER COGNITION : HENCE THAT ALSO CANNOT SERVE THE PURPOSE (OF THD OTHER PARTY); AS THAT ALSO CANNOT REALLY
BE DENOTED (BY WORDS).—(885)
COMMENTARY. As regards the form of Cognition, it is of the same essence as the Cognition itself, and as such rests therein; as such, like the Cognition itself. it does not follow either the Object cognised or another Cognition; consequently, as it cannot be present at the time of the Convention and Usage, no Convention can be made relating to it, just as there can be none relating to Specific Individuality. Even if it were present at the time of the Usage, it is not possible that users should make any Convention in regard to it, As a matter of fact, when a man desires to do something on the basis of certain words, he has got to know the words likely to be useful for that purpose, and then make use of them; and it is under this impression that people make use of expressive words; and not throngh a mere whim. The form of the Cognition, which is rooted in Fancy, cannot be able to accom. plish any such desired purpose as the alleviation of cold and the like; because, in actual experience, it is found that more apprehension does not accomplish any such purpose. Thus then, as there can be no Convention bearing upon this also, our Reason-because no Convention can be made regarding it - cannot be stigmatised as Unproven':-(885)
The following might be urged-" There are other imports of words', in the shape of what is denoted by the verb to be and the like ; and as the Convention could be made regarding these, the said Reason remains Unproven to that extent."
The answer to this is supplied by the following
TEXT (886).
THESE SAME ARGUMENTS SERVE TO SET ASIDE SUCH' IMPORT OF WORDS AS HAS BEEN HELD TO CONSIST IN THE DENOTATION OF THE VERB TO BE' AND THE LIKE. STILL WE ARE GOING
TO SAY SOMETHING REGARDING THESE.-(886)
COMMENTARY. The same arguments',-i.e. thoso urged against Specific Individuality, etc. forming the Import of Words.-These serve to set aside those)—because this also is included under the said 'Specific Individuality, etc.'.-(886)

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
The following Teay proceeds to show what are the denotations of tho verb to he' and so forth :
TEXT (887).
THEY SAY THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE VERB TO BE CONSTITUTES
THE IMPORT' OF ALL WORDS,-IN CONNECTION WITH THE Cow AND SUCH THINGS, IT IS JUST AS IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE Apūrva (UNSEEN FORCE), Dēvală (Deity) AND
Svarga (HEAVEN).-(887)
COMMENTARY. The particle ili' is misplaced; it slould be construed with aslyarluan What is meant is as follows:-What is cognized as denoted by the verbs
to be' forms the 'Import' of all words; ie, it represents the denotation of all words ; i.e. it iorms the 'Import of words. Hence, in the case of the Cow and such objects, what forms the import of the words.Cow' etc. is similar to the Inport of such words as . Unseen Force', Deity and Heaven':This is what these people say. That is to sny, the word . Unseen Force does not introduce into the Cognition the form of any object,-and all that is understood from it is that such a thing does exist to which the term
Unseen Force' is applied So also is the case with words the things expressed by which are visible--such as the word Cow' for instance, Because from these words also what is understood is that there is a thing which is spoken of by the word 'Cow', or which is related to the Universal Cow. As regards the particular form of this cognition, which enters into the consciousness of some people, that is due to the influence of their own doctrines.-(887)
Text 886 has spoken of denotation of the verb to be and the like': the term and the like is a reference to certain other theories that have been propounded regarding the 'Import of Words'. These theories are now set forth (under Texts 888 to 892)
TEXT (888)
SOME PEOPLE ASSERT THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS IS (a) AN AGGREGATE FRER TROM DISTRIBUTIVE AND COLLECTIVE DETER.
MINATION, OR (b) AN UNREAL RELATIONSHIP, -(888)
COMMENTARY.
(a) Some people assert that what the word brühmana' for instance denotes in the aggregate of austerity, caste, learning. etc. without any conceptual determination either collective or distributive ; just as the word forest' denotes the Dhava and other trees. That is to say, when the word

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"forest' is uttered, the notion that appears is not a determinate or well-defined, one, either of the Dhava or the Khadira or the Palasha or any particular tree (distributively), or of the Dhava and the Khadira and the Palasha and other trees (collectively); it is only a vague indefinite conception of the Dhava and other trees in general ;-similarly when the word "brahmana' is uttered, the notion that appears is not a well-defined one either of Austerity or Caste or Learning, (distributively), or Austerity and Caste and Learning (collectively): what are cognised are Austerity and the rest conceived of as one aggregated whole as differentiated from other correlatives.-The term
vikalpa' in the Text) stands for the distinct conception of any one individual from among a group consisting of an indefinite number of individuals; and
Samuchhaya stands for the distinct conception of a definite number of individuals related together ;-and the notion brought about by words is free from both these conceptions.
(6) Others however have held that what is denoted by the word is the relation of a thing-substance, f.i-to an undefined Universal
Substance , fi. ;-and this is said to be unreal' because the individual correlatives are not really denoted by the word.-Or, it may be that, like the dark complexion and other properties, Austerity, Caste, etc. also appear in the notion as a single unity.—and hence it is the relationship of these that is called 'unreal'. Because these are not really apprehended together in their own forms; what is apprehended is only the aggregate of these perceived like the whirling fire-brand, without reference to the individuals making up the Aggregate.-(888)
TEXT (889).
(c) OR THE REAL WITH UNREAL ADJUNOTS IS THE IMPORT OF WORDS',- (d) OR 'IMPORT OF WORDS MAY CONSIST IN THE WORD ITSELF IN THE STATE OF * abhijalpa
(COALESCENCE).-(889)
COMMENTARY.
Others have declared that the Real with Unreal adjuncts is what is denoted by words. For instance, the adjuncts, in the shape of such details as bracelets, rings and such things, are unreal' so far as the denotation of the word is concerned ; and yet these adjuncts belong to something that is
real in the shape of the Gold which has a generic form and permeates through a number of particular things. This 'Real with Unreal adjuncts forms the Import of Words, i.e. is what forms the denotation of the word.
Others again declare that it is the word itself in the state of Coalescence' that constitutes the Import of Words.-(889)
The following Text explains what is meant by this Coalescence:
31

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI,
TEXT (890),
WHEN THE FORM OF THE WORD BEOOMES IDENTIFIED WITH THE OBJECT
THROUGH THE CONCEPTION THAT THIS IS THAT', THAT WORD
THEY REGARD AS IN THE STATE OF COALESCENCE',-(890)
COMMENTARY.
When the character of the object is imposed upon the Word-by such expressions as Word is the Object'; on the basis of this imposition, when the form of the Word becomes identified with the Object,- the Word in the state of this unification with the object is said to be in the state of coalescence',-(890)
(e) Others have held the following view :-"When the form of an external object is impinged upon the Idea, and is apprehended as an external object, it becomes manifested in the form of the Idea ; and it is this Idea that is denoted by Words". This is the view set forth in the following
TEXT (891).
WHEN AN OBJECT FORMS THE CONTENT OF THE IDEA, ON THE BASIS OF AN EXTERNAL OBJECT, AND IT COMES TO BE COGNISED AS AN EXTERNAL OBJECT; THIS (MIXTURE OF IDEA
OBJECT) HAS BEEN REGARDED BY SOME PEOPLE AS FORMING THE IMPORT OF
Words':-(891)
COMMENTARY.
Content of the Idea', i.e. revolving in the Idea, subsisting in the Idea.
On the basis of an external object':-.e that for the manifesting of whose form recourse is had to the real-unreal external thing,-in the shape of the letter-symbols.
'It comes to be cognised as an etternal object'; i.e. manifested in the form of the Idea, but apprehended as something external. That is to say, so long as the form of the Idea is not impinged upon the objects and is cognised, on due consideration, as Idea itself, -it is not recognised as forming the import of words ; because what is purely subjective can have no connection with any form of activity; for instance, actions spoken of in such words as

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Bring the Cow', 'Eat the Curd, are not possible for the mere Idea; and what words denote is a thing capable of action: hence what is apprehended as an Idea cannot be denoted by words, When, however, the form of the Idea becomes impinged upon the external object, the observer becomes influenced by its external character and comes to regard it as capable of action, and thus it becomes denoted by words.
Question:-"What is the difference between this theory and the theory of Apoha? The upholder of Apoha also asserts that what is denoted by the word is the form of the Idea apprehended as something external: as has been declared in the following passage: There is nothing incongruous in the statement that that object forms the Import of words which follows from the impinging of the form of the Idea and the cognisance of the exclusion of other things'."
This is not right. The upholder of the Theory of the Idea-form being impinged upon things holds that what is denoted by the word is what has a real existence in the form of the Idea, and is impinged upon Substance and other things, which also are real,-and which therefore along with its object is not false or wrong; and he does not admit that the said idea is without real basis, and rests entirely on the imposition of non-difference upon things that are different, and is, on that account, false (wrong), and dependent entirely upon mutual exclusion among things [as held by the upholders of Apoha]-If the upholder of the Theory under review really held the view held by us and expressed in the following declaration-all this apprehension of things as one is a false notion,-its basis lies in mutual exclusion, which is what is expressed by the name',-then his argument would be entirely superfluous [as what he would be seeking to prove would be what is already admitted by us]. This is what is going to be asserted later on in the passageIf the basis of this lies in mutual exclusion, then that is exactly our view'.. -As for the Apohist, on the other hand, he does not hold anything denoted by words, or the form of the Idea, to be real. Because what he holds is that that alone forms the Import of the word which appears to be apprehended by the verbal cognition; and (under the Theory under review) what is apprehended by the verbal cognition is not the form of the Idea, but the external object which is capable of effective action.-And yet the external object is not really apprehended by it,-because the apprehension is not in strict accordance with the real state of things; on the contrary the thing is accepted in accordance with the apprehension; so that the Import of words is something that is superimposed; and what is superimposed is nothing; so in reality, nothing is denoted by words. As for what has been said by the Apohist (in the passage quoted by the other party in line 21 on the preceding page of the Text) regarding that being the denotation of words ',-that has been said with a view to the superimposed object. The upholder of the Theory however, regards the form of the Idea to be really denoted by words. Thus there is a great difference between the two theories.-(891)
Others have held that-" By repeated usage Word comes to produce an intuition, and it does not actually denote any external object".-This view is set forth in the following

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484
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (892).
IN SHORT, ALL WORDS ARE PRODUCTIVE OF INTUITION, THROUGH REPEATED USAGE ; AS 18 FOUND IN THE CASE OF MAKING THINGS
KNOWN TO CHILDREN AND ANIMALS.-(892).
COMMENTARY.
* Repeated usage ', -finding the word applied to a certain object again and again.
"Intuition ', -is a mental capacity which tends to bring about the notion of a certain activity as due to a certain cause; this capacity is produced by the word as associated with frequent usage; it varies with each sentence and with each person; as its diversity is illimitable, on account of the usage of words being endless, it cannot be described; hence all that is said is that it is like maling things known to children and animals the stroke of the driving Hook, used for making things known to the elephant, comes to produce an Intuition in the animal; in the same manner all expressive words, such as tree', etc. etc.-through repeated usage, come ultimately to produce only an Intuition and they do not actually denote anything directly. Otherwise, how could there be mutually contradictory interpretations of Texts? How too could there be any imaginary stories and other compositions which speak of things created by the imagination of the writer ? -(892)
The Author now proceeds to refute the various theories (regarding the Import of Words, that have been set forth in Texta 887-892)
TEXTS (893-894).
What is expressed by the Verb "to be 18 SAID TO BE DENOTRD BY WORDS: IS IT MEANT TO BE THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS? OR THE UNIVERSAL' OR THE CONTaor? OR SOMETHING ELSE WHICH REFLBOTS THE COGNITION ? -THE OBJECTIONS TO EVERYONE OF THOSE ALTERNATIVES HAVE BEEN ALREADY SET FORTH ABOVE. FURTHER, AS FOR what is expressed by the Verb to be', WHICH HAS BEEN HELD TO FORM THE IMPORT OF WORDS,—THERE CAN BE NO DIVERSE USAGE BASED UPON
THAT.-(893-894)
COMMENTARY If what is expressed by the Verb to be is held to be of the nature of what has been expounded before,—then it is open to the same objections that

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have been previously set forth.-Further, as no definite form can be conceived of in regard to what is expressed by the verb to be', --if that alone were denoted by Words, there could be no such divergent usage of words as
Cow', gavaya', Elephant' and so forth; as these animals wonld not be denoted by the words at all.-(893-894)
The following text anticipates the answer of the other party
TEXT (895). "IT (USAGE) WOULD BE BASED UPON THE MERE 'Being of things as
QUALIFIED BY THE UNIVERSAL 'Cow' AND THE WORD ('Cow'); AND THE OPINION THAT HAS BEEN HELD IS DUE TO THE FACT THAT THERE ARE SUCH DIVERSITIES OF FORM AS THE PRESENCE OF HORNS, THE PARTICULAR SHAPE, THE PARTICULAR COLOUR BLUE AND SO
FORTH."-(895)
COMMENTARY, The following may be the answer of the other party :-"The diverse 11sage would proceed on the basis of the cognition of the mere Being' of the Thing concerned (which is what is expressed by the verb 'to be'), as qualified by the Universal Cow and the word (Cow'), but devoid of such distinctions as being of variegated colour and so forth.-If that is so, then why is the denotation of the word said to consist in only what is expressed by the Verb 'to be when such particulars as the Cow', etc. are also said to be denoted 1-The answer to this given by the other party is- The opinion, etc. etc. ;-that is, as a matter of fact, the idea of the Horn and other particulars does not proceed from the word ; it is for this reason that the opinion has been held that what is denoted is what is expressed by the verb to be, and not the Universal Cow, etc.'; the reason for which opinion lies in the fact that the qualifying factors--the Universal Coo and the word (name) 'Cow'-are not cognised through the word.—Hence there is no incongruity in our opinion."-(895)
The above is refuted in the following
TEXT (896) IF THIS BE SO, THEN THERE SHOULD BE DENOTATION OF THE THING AS
EQUIPPED WITH THOSE, AS ALSO OF THE DIVERSE PARTICULARS. AND IN THAT CASE, THE SAME OBJECTIONS WOULD BE APPLICABLE. APART FROM THESE, THERE IS FOUND NOTHING' EXPRESSED BY THE VERB to be ':-(896)
COMMENTARY. If the view is that the object alone as qualified by the Universal Cow', etc. is denoted by the word, then it becomes admitted that there is denota.

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tion of the object as possessing that Universal'. In that case, as the
Universal' and also its Inherence ' have been already rejected, there would be no possibility of there being any object equipped with these ; so that the same objections would be applicable.
Further, as the object equipped by these particulars would be of the nature of the Specific Individuality', there could be no Convention bearing upon it, and there could be no usage of words; the notions obtained too would be hazy-as already pointed out before.
If it be said that What is expressed by the verb to be' is something different from Specific Individuality and other things, then the answer to that is that, apart from these, etc. i.e. apart from Specifio Individuality and other things, there is nothing expressed by the verb to be' which is within the range of our cognition.-(896)
The following text sets forth the objections against the theory of the * Aggregate' being denoted by Words (as expounded under Text 888) :
TEXT (897).
UNDER THE VIDW THAT WHAT IS DENOTED IS THE AGGREGATE', THERE IS CLEAR CONCEPTION OF UNIVERSALS' AND PARTICULARS, AS WHAT ARE DENOTED ARE AUSTERITY, CASTE, CONDUCT
AND THE REST COLLECTIVELY,-(897)
COMMENTARY.
Even under the view that what is denoted is the Aggregate', a much clearer conception of Universals and Particulars, in the shape of Austerity and the rest,-is admitted ; hence all the objections that have been urged against the denotation of each of these singly, are all applicable to the view in question.-(897)
The author next states the objections against the two views set forth (under Texts 888 and 889) regarding the Unreal Contact, ete. :
TEXT (898).
ANY SORT OF RELATION AMONG SUBSTANCE AND THE REST, WHOSE XATURE HAS BEEN DULY ASCERTAINED, AS ALSO ANY REAL UNIVERSAL,
-HAS BEEN ALREADY DISCARDED.-(898)
COMMENTARY
In course of the examination of the Six Categories, any such relation as Conjunction and Inherence has been rejected under the examination of the Sankhya doctrines, we have rejected the idea that the Universal' is real and consists of the three Attributes, and is not-different (from the Particular

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Products); and the Universal' as something different from the Particulars has been rejected in course of the examination of the Six Categories ;hence the Import of Words cannot consist either of the conjunction of the Unreal', or of the Real Universal with Unreal Adjuncta'-(898)
The following Text points out objections against the view that what is denoted is Ooalescence'
TEXTS (899-901).
INASMUCH AS THE IMPORT OF WORDS CANNOT CONSIST OF PARTIOVLARS OR UNIVERSALS, THERE CAN BE NO FORM OF THE WORD AS COALESCED (IDENTIFIED) WITH ITS DENOTATION. THEN AGAIN, THIS COALESCENCE ALSO MUST RESIDE IN THE COGNITION ITSELF, INASMUCH AS IT IS DIFFERENT FROM EXTERNAL RELATIONSHIP, UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, WHAT WOULD BE THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THIS VIEW AND THE VIEW THAT THE COGNITION OR IDEA ITSELF CONSTITUTES THE IMPORT OF WORDS ?AS REGARDS THE VIEW THAT THE FORM OF THE IDEA (OR COGNITION) IS WHAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS, THAT KAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED, ON THE GROUND THAT IT WOULD BE NOTHING DIFFERENT FROM THE IDEA AND AS SUCH COULD NOT
BE PERVASIYE.-(899-901)
COMMENTARY.
If there were such a thing as the denotation of the word, then it might become coalesced with it; but in so far as it has been proved that no denotation of the Word is possible, in the form of Specific Individuality' and the rest,-how could there be any coalescing with it?
Then again, the said 'Coalescence' also must reside in the Cognition only. Because the external Word and the external Object (denoted) must be distinct by reason of their being perceived by different sense-organs and so forth; hence any real coalescence or identification of these cannot be right. The Coalescence', therefore, that is proper is only of such Word and Object as reside in the Cognition. So that when the Word, having taken up the form of the denoted Object, has its verbal character obscured, and appears in the Cognition,-it introduces the objective element into its subjective form; and it is then that it comes to be described as "abhijalpa',
Coalescence'. This must be a form within the Cognition itself, and nothing exterior to it; because what is exterior must be of an entirely distinct character.
Under the circumstances, what would be the difference between this view and the other one by which the Cognition or Idea itself is regarded as the Import of Words -None at all. In both cases the denotation would he purely subjective; the only difference being that the word and the denotation had coalesced and become one.

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Both these views would be open to the same objection. How could that which is non-different from Cognition be something different ? This is what is shown in the words - As regards the view that the form of the Cognition, etc. etc. '-(899-901)
The Author points out the objections against the view that it is 'Intui. tion that is brought about by words (set forth in Text 892):
TEXTS (902-905).
AS REGARDS INTUITION', WHIOR HAS BEEN REGARDED AS THE IMPORT OF WORDS';-IF IT APPERTAINS TO THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, THEN, INASMUCH AS THE EXTERNAL OBJECT HAS ONE PARTICULAR CHARACTER, HOW COULD THERE BE VARIOUS INTUITIONS'?-IF THE 'INTUITIONS' BE HELD TO BE OBJECTLESS, AND EXISTING ONLY IN THE FORM OF FACULTIES, TEEN HOW COULD THERE BE EITHER COMPREHENSION OR ACTIVITY REGARDING EXTERNAL THINGS? -IF IT BE HELD THAT THESE TWO (COGNITION AND ACTIVITY) ABANDON THE EXTERNAL FORM AND REST WITHIN THEMSELVES, THEN THE IMPORT OF WORDS BECOMES UNREAL, FALSE-AS PROCEEDING THROUGH ILLUSION.-NOR CAN INTUITION BE KELD TO BE BASELESS; AS IN THAT CASE, IT SHOULD APPEAR EVERYWHERE. IF THE
EASIS OF IT BE HELD TO CONSIST IN THE MUTUAL EXCLUSION' AMONG THINGS, THEN TRAT IS EXACTLY
OUR VIEW,-(902-905)
COMMENTARY. If "Intuition is really based upon the external object, then it cannot be possible for various Intuitions to appear in persons living at mutually incompatible times, relating to any single thing like Sound; because what is one cannot have several natures.
If Intuitions are devoid of objects, then Activity and Comprehension in connection with objects should not be possible; as the word wonld have no connection with objects.
If it be held that,"the Comprehension and Activity come about under illusion, the object being imposed upon what is objeotless",—then the Import of Words becomnes illusory, mistaken; and of this Illusion, some cause has to be found; otherwise, if there were no cause of the Musion, it should appear everywhere and at all times. If the mutual exclusion among things be held to be the cause of the illusion, then you support our own view, and 8s such your argument becomes superfluous.-(902-905)

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The following Text sets forth the objection that applies to all the various theories on the subject :
TEXT (906).
AGAIN, IS ALL THIS MOMENTARY OR NOT? IF IT IS MOMENTARY, THEN THERE CAN BE NO CO-ORDINATION. IN OTHERWISE, THERE
SHOULD BE NO SUCCESSIVE COGNITION.-(906)
COMMENTARY. All this,'Specific Individuality', Universal' and so forth (which has been held to be denoted by words) is it momentary or not-momentary ?
-In the former case, as there could be no co-ordination between what existed at the time of the Convention and what exista at the time of Usage,-no Convention could apply to the case at all.-It, on the other hand, it be held that it is all not-momentary, then,-inasmuch as what is successive cannot proceed from what is not successive, there would be no cognition relating to Words and their Import,-as such cognition can only be successive.
Otherwise i.e. if it is not-momentary (906)
Other people have asserted as follows:-"The Word brings about the Inference of the desire to speak (of a certain thing), as declared in the statement that There is no other means save the Word of inferring the desire to speak."-This is answered in the following
TEXT (907).
THIS SAME ARGUMENT SERVES TO SET ASIDE THE DESIRE TO SPEAK' AS (HELD TO BE) COGNISED THROUGH WORDS. WHEN, AS SHOWN ABOVE, THERE CAN BE NO DENOTATION OF WORDS, HOW COULD THERE BE ANY DESIRE TO SPEAK'?
OR EVEN THE WORD ITSELF?- (907)
COMMENTARY. If the desire to speak' is really held to be appurtenant to the real Import of Words', then it is 'unproven'; because there can be no 'Import of Words in the shape of any such thing as . Specific Individuality and the rest. Hence there can be no real 'desire to speak of any object; as there is nothing to which the word may be related.
Nor can there be a word denotative of the object; this is what is stated in the words or even the word itaelf'.- Shruti' stands for the Word. If the desire to speak', is what is expressed by the Word, then the Word cannot be applied to any external object; as it would not be expressed, like any other thing.—(907)
The idea may be that "there is some sort of similarity between what appears in the desire to speak' and the external object, and on the basis

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of this similarity, tle word may be applied to the external object, even though it may not be directly expressed ; as happens in the case of twins"
This is answered in the following
TEXT (908). HOW CAN THE WORD BE APPLIED, -MERELY THROUGH SIMILARITY,-TO WHAT IS NOT EXPRESSED BY IT? AND THE VIEW THAT IT IS THROUGH SIMILARITY, AS IN THE CASE OF THE NAMES OF TWINS, IS ALSO DISCARDED BY THIS SAME
ARGUMENT.-(908)
COMMENTARY.
Such being the case, the application of words to external objects can never be possible; in fact it might be possible to apply the word to an object not figuring in the desire to speak at all; as in the case of twins.
The Vaibhāşikar postulates, as mark of the object called 'Name' and Basis', a distinct faculty.-This theory also becomes discarded by this same argument. Because if the said 'Name' is momentary, then there can be no co-ordination; if it is not-momentary, then there can be no succession : and there is the anomaly of the word being applied to an external object; and it could not always be on the basis of similarity.--All these objections descend upon this theory in a body.
Or the phrase 'by this same argument' may be taken to refer to the objections urged against Specific Individuality and the rest. That is to say, in the present connection also, it may be said that the nature of the Name, etc., which contains nothing else, is such that there can be no Convention in regard to them; similarly what does not exist cannot be denoted by words '-(908)
It has been asserted above by the Author that if words denote things that figure in the desire to speak', then they cannot apply to external objects. The following Text anticipates the Opponent's answer to this
TEXT (909),
" WHEN TWO PERSONS THINK OF THE FORM FIGURING IN THE DESIRE TO SPEAK ' AND IN THE INFERENCE'AS SOMETHING EXTERNAL, THEN THE WORD BECOMES APPLIED TO IT" IF THIS VIEW BE HELD, THEN THAT AGAIN IS EXACTLY
OUR OPINION.-(909)
COMMENTARY.
"The 'Desire to speak' is present in the Chain of the Speaker, and the "Inference based upon that Desire is present in the chain of the Hearer;

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the form that is connected with these two,-i.e, which figures in these ; when the two persons-the Speaker and the Hearer-think of the object as so figuring,—then the Word comes to be applied to that external object. That is to say, though in reality what the speaker is cognisant of is what is figuring in his own consciousness, yet he thinks that he is speaking to the other man of an external object; and the Hearer also has the impression that this man is speaking to me of an external object; hence, just as two men suffering from defective vision see two moons, so also is all this use of words."
If this is so, then, you have fallen on our side ; and all your argumentation is futile.
Again',-i.e. once you had come to our side when you postulated the "Intuition as the 'Import of words '.
It is thus established that the Reason (put forward by the Author) * because no Convention can be made ', -cannot be regarded as 'unproven. The idea that it may be 'Inconclusive' or Contradictory' has been already rejected before.-From all this it follows that all that is brought about by words is the 'Apoha!, Exclusion of others'.-(909)
On hearing the term Apoha', the other party, having his mind perturbed, and not knowing the exact nature of this Apoha, proceeds to urge against that doctrine the fact of its being contrary to experience
TEXTS (910-911).
"WHY DO YOU SAY THAT THE WORD BRINGS ABOUT THE EXCLUSION
OF OTHERS'? As A MATTER OF FACT MERE NEGATION IS NOT APPREHENDED IN THE IDEA BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE WORD; ON THE CONTRARY, IN THE CASE OF ALL SUCH WORDS AS 'Cow!, Gavaya', 'ELEPHANT', 'TREE' AND SO FORTH,—THE VERBAL COGNITION THAT RESULTS IS ALWAYS IN THE POSITIVE
FORM."
COMMENTARY.
The particle 'iti' is to be taken as understood after anyāpohakrt. The meaning is-"Why do you say that what is brought about by the word is the exclusion of others !"
Why should not this be asserted ?
* Because, as a matter of fact, mere negation, etc. etc.; that is, the exclusion of others' is intended to be a mere negation; and mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition ; on the contrary, Verbal Cognition is always found to apprehend the positive form of things, and what does not figure in Verbal Cognition cannot be rightly regarded as the import of words'; as such an idea would lead to absurdities. Thus the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to experience."-(910-911)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
The next three Terts state the fact of the Buddhist's Proposition being contrary to experience, in accordance with the opinion of Bhanaha
TEXT (912) * IF THE WHOLE PURPOSE OF THE WORD "Cow' IS SERVED BY THE
EXCLUSION OF OTHERS, THEN, PLEASE FIND SOME OTHER WORD WHICH BRINGS ABOUT THE NOTION OF Cow' IN REGARD TO THE COW ITSELF."-(912)
COMMENTARY "If the word 'Cow' only serves the purpose of denoting the exclusion of others, then, as it would be taken up in that,—that term Cow' could not bring about the idea of the animal with the dewlap; hence it would be necessary to seek for some other word which could bring about the notion of Cow' in regard to the said animal with the dewlap."-(912)
It might be said (by the other party) that one and the same word Oow would bring about both the notions, and hence the second word need not be sought after"--To this, Bhämaha makes the following reply:
TEXT (913).
"IN FACT, COGNITION IS THE FRUIT OF WORDS ; AND NO SINGLE WORD CAN HAVE TWO FRUITS. HOW TOO COULD BOTH Affirmation and
Negation BE THE FRUIT OF ANY ONE WORD?"-(913)
COMMENTARY 4 Words have for their fruit the cognition of affirmation and of negation. What then 1-No single word can have two fruits ; of any one word, be it affirmative or negative, there cannot be two fruits appearing at one and the same time; that is, no such is ever found.-Nor again is it possible for mutually contradictory cognitions of affirmation and negation to be the fruit of a single word."—(913)
In the following Text, Bhämaha puts forward his comprehensive argument (against 4 poha)
TEXT (914).
"WHEN ONE HEARS THE WORD 'Cow' UTTERED, HE SHOULD, FIRST OF ALL HAVE THE IDEA OF THE non-cow,---AS THE WORD Cow' WOULD HAVE BEEN UTTERED FOR THE PURPOSE OF
NEGATIVING THE NON-Cow1"-(914)
COMMENTARY. "If it is the negation of the non-cow that is mainly expressed by the word 'Cow, then, on hearing the word 'Cow', the first idea in the mind of

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the hearer would be that of the non-cow'; because that is held to be the
import of the word the notion regarding which appears directly and immediately after the word ; the notion of the negation of the non-cow does not appear directly and immediately after the word Cow',-Thus, on account of the incongruity of there being no notion of the Cow, and on account of the incongruity of the first appearance of the notion of the noncow, Apoha (Negation of others) cannot form the Import of Words." -1914)
The Author next proceeds to set forth objections against Apoha, from the point of view of Kumārila:
TEXT (915).
“THOSE WHO HAVE ADMITTED THE UNIVERSAL NEGATION OF THE
NON-COWAS THE IMPORT OF THE WORD HAVE, BY THE EXPRESSION, ADMITTED THE UNIVERSAL 'Cow' AS
AN ENTITY."-(Shloka vārtika-Apoha 1]-(915)
COMMENTARY.
Kumarila has argued as follows When the Universal Negation of the Contrary' is asserted to be the Import of words, it could be either in the form of Preclusion or the negation of what is possible':-If it be the former, then the Proposition is open to the charge of being futile', inasmuch as we also hold that what is denoted by the word 'Cow' is the Universal named 'Cow; and this is exactly what you also assert in other words when you declare that what is denoted by the word Cow is the Uni. versal in the shape of the negation of the non-cow'; so that the dispute is only in regard to the name (of the Universal)."-(915)
Question :-How is it the same thing asserted in different words? Answer
TEXT (916).
"INASMUCH AS ALL INEXISTENCE HAS BEEN HELD TO BE OF THE NATURE OF SOME OTHER EXISTENCE, PLEASE SAY WHAT THAT INEXISTENCE' IS WHICH IS OF THE NATURE OF THE NEGATION OF THE HORSE (AND OTEHR
NON-Cows)'”—[Ibid. 2]—(916)
COMMENTARY.
"Since all'Inexistence in the four forms of Previous Inexistence And the rest, has been found to be of the nature of existence';-as declared in the following words, while the Curd is not present in the Milk, it is called previous Inexistence; when the Milk is not present in the Curd, it is called

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
Inexistence per Destruction; the absence of the House, etc. in the Cow is called mutual Inexistence; when portions of the head of the Hare are flat and devoid of a hard protuberance, it is said to be absolute Inexistence, in the shape of the Hare's Horn ... These this are not so many kinds of non-entity. Hence Inexistence must be an entity' (Shlokavnika: Abhāva, 2-4 and 8).-What is meant is that it is Milk itself which, while not present in the form of the Curd, comes to be known as the Previous Inexistence (of the Curd); and similarly with other forms of Inecistence.--Thuis Inexistence being only a form of w.cistence, what is that Inexistence which is meant by you to be the 'Negation of the Horse, etc.'; please tell us this."-(916)
The Bauddha might say-What is to be said? What we mean is none other than the Specific Individuality of the Cow.
"The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (917-918).
"YOU DO NOT ADMIT OF ANY INDIVIDUALITY IN THE NATURE OF SOME
THING uncommon (UNIQUE), BECAUSE IT IS DEVOID OF OON. CEPTUAL CONTENT; SO ALSO (YOU DO NOT ADMIT) THE
VARIEGATED ANIMAL' AND THE LIKE; AS IN THAT CASE THE IMPORT WOULD NOT BE UNIVERSAL (COMMON). HENCE THE IDEA OF THE Cow MUST BE BASED UPON THAT FORM WHICH SUBSISTS IN COMMON IN EVERY SINGLE INDIVIDUAL (Cow); (AND IN THIS THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE BETWEEN US]."-[Ibid.
3 & 101–1917-918)
COMMENTARY.
That which is the unique (uncommon) Individuality is not held by you to constitute the negation of Horse and other non-cows'; why 1-because it is devoid of conceptual content (or determination): that is, all determination ceases in it; it is only the Common Universal that is held to form the object of determination (conceptual thought); while that entity which is uncommon, unique is beyond all determination; as declared in the following words
What is perceptible by the senses is the self-cognisable, inexplicable forma. The ground for regarding anything as an Individual consists in its uncommon (unique) character; hence what is meant by the words of the Text is that which is an Individuality by reason of its uncommon character.
Hitherto the Text has made only & general statement. It reasserts same thing in reference to a particular instance So also, etc. etc.':-that is, just as you do not admit of the Import of the word 'Cow' to consist in any unique individual in the shape of the negation of the Horse and other noncows', so also you do not admit of any positive entity in the form of the

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* negation of the Horse, ete.' as forming the Import of such words as the
variegated cow' and the like.--Why not -Because in that case the Import would not be universal ;-that is, if it were so admitted, then, the Universal could never form the Import of the word; as it would have no connection with the word. Because it is so, therefore there can be no common entity in the shape of the negation of the Horse, etc.'; consequently the conclusion must be that the idea of Cow' is based upon that character which resides completely in each one of the members of the same class—the variegated and other cows; and this can be only the Universal Cow':-I you speak of this same as the negation of the non-cow', then the difference is only in name and your proposition thus is open to the charge of being *superfluous':-(917-918)
The following Text takes up the second alternative (mentioned under Text 915)—that the 'A poha' is of the nature of the negation of what is possible':
TEXT (919).
"IF THE IMPORT OF WORDS BE ASSUMED TO BE OF THE NATURE OF MERE NEGATION, THEN IT WOULD ONLY BE ANOTHER KIND OF 'VOID SPOKEN OF BY MEANS OF THE NEGATIVE WORD."
-(919)
COMMENTARY. Spoken of by means of the negative word' the Negative Wurd' is the word expressive of the negation in the form of the negation of the noncow'; and what would be denoted by this word would only be the. Void, the absence of the external world; since the form of the entity' would be denied.
Another kind'; this. Void' you (Buddhist) had postulated, and we had rejected under the chapter on Idealism. (Vijñänavāra of the Shlokarartika); and on the present occasion of examining the nature of the Import of Words, the same 'Void' is again put forward under the garb of ' Apoha' which denies the object whose existence is vouched for by experience.-(919)
"Where is the harm if that is so ?” Answer:
TEXT (920).
“IN THAT VOID THERE WOULD BE AN APPREHENSION OF THE CHARACTER OF THE cognitions THEMSELVES OF THE HORSE AND OTHER
THINGS; AND IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE USELESS TO POSIT THE ' Apoha (NEGATION) OF OTHERS' AS THE
IMPORT OF WORDS." [Ibid. 371-(920)
COMMENTARY If the 'Void' is what is denoted, then it comes to this that in all Verbal Cognitions what is comprehended is only the factor of Cognition itself :

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As ec hypothesi, there can be no apprehension of the form of any thing external. -"Even so, what is the harın 1-In that case, it would be futile to assert that the Apoka is denoted by words; as what would become the Import of Words would be the form of the Cognition which would be a positive entity independent of all tinge of anything external. What is meant is that in this way there would be a contradiction of your own doctrine-by this Proposition of yours.-(920)
The same idea is further explained
TEXT (921).
" IN THAT CASE, THE FORM OF THE COGNITION, WHICH IS POSITED AS THE IMPORT OF WORDS, WOULD BE THE Universal."
[Ibid. 38)—(921)
COMMENTARY
That is to say, the form of the Cognition itself, in the form of the positive entity, Universal',-would be the Import of Words.-(921)
The following might be urged- Even without a substratum in the external world), the cognition in question would appear in the form of the * exclusion of the heterogeneous Cow, etc.'; hence the postulation of the dpoka' is quite right.
This is answered in the following
TEXT (922).
"AS A MATTER OF FACT, WHENEVER THE SAID COGNITION APPEARS IN CONNECTION WITH THE IMPORT OF WORDS, IT IS ALWAYS IN THE FORM OJ A POSITIVE ENTITY; HENCE IN SUCH CASES, THE IMPORT COULD BE ASSUMED TO CONSIST OF
THE POSITIVE ENTITY ONLY,-A COGNITION Not OF THE NATURE OF
Apoha'."-[Ibid. 391—(922)
COMMENTARY Vastrerupa'; the form of a positive entity.
The said cognition', i.e. the cognition the Horse, without a real substratum in the external world.
* In connection with the Import of Words', -as relating to the Horse and other things conceived of.
To consist of a positive entity in the shape of the Idea embracing the notion of the Horse and other non-cows.

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The effect of the emphasis is explained-a cognition not of the nature of A poha : i.e. that Import of Words, in the shape of Idea, wherein the Apona does not enter at all; the compound buddhyanapohakam' being expounded as 'the non-exclusion of the Idea' i.e. without any exclusion of other Ideas.-Or the compound buddhyanapohakan 'may be explained as follows
apohaka' is that which excludes,- anapohaka' is that which does not exclude ; --the compound thus standing for that which does not exclude the Idea'. -What is meant is as follows:- Though one Cognition is always different from another Cognition, yet when it appears, it does not tend to the exclusion of the other cognition; it always tends to the positive cognition of such entities as the Horse and the like. Consequently the most reasonable thing is to accept the view that what is denoted is a positive entity, not Apoha; because one Cognition cannot exclude (be of the nature of the Apoha, negation, of) another.-(922)
Then again, this Apoha that you have postulated as the Import of Words, -has been held to be denoted by the word as taken out of a Sentence; but what is expressed by the Sentence must be of the nature of Intuition ; as has been declared in the following-" Hitherto has been discussed the denotation of the Word as taken out of a Sentence; but what is brought about first of all is what is expressed by the Sentence, which has been called Intuition ".-In this connection we have the following Text :
TEXT (923).
“ EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE CORRESPONDING EXTERNAL OBJECT THERE IS Intuition EXPRESSED BY THE SENTENCE; SIMILAR MAY BE THE CASE WITH WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD ALSO; WHY SHOULD THB Apoha BB POSTULATED
AT ALL?"[Ibid. 431-(923)
COMMENTARY.
Just as, even in the absence of an external object denoted by the Word, you describe the meaning of the Sentence to be of the nature of Intuition, not of the nature of ' Apoha'-oven so, the meaning of the word, like the meaning of the Sentence - also may be of the nature of Intuition. Under the circumstances, why is any such thing as 'Apoha postulated at all ? That is to say, the Import of both Sentence and Word may be of the positive character.-(923)
The following might be urged In the case of Intuitions also, there is always exclusion of one Intuition by another; hence 4poha is postulated.
The answer to this is as follows:
32

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TEXT (924).
f
"IN THE CASE OF A COGNITION, NO EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER COGNITION IS APPREHENDED IN FACT, APART FROM THE COMING ABOUT OF ITS OWN FORM, THE COGNITION CARRIES WITH IT NO OTHER FACTOR."-[Ibid. 41]-(924)
COMMENTARY.
It might be said that-" even though it is not apprehended, it may be there all the same "; hence it is added-In fact, etc. etc.; even though there may be exclusion of one Cognition from another, yet the Word has got nothing to do with it. Because as a matter of fact, when the Cognition is brought about by the Word, it does not bear within itself any factor expressed by the word, apart from its own appearance, in the shape of the exclusion of other Cognitions; on the contrary, it is always found to appear in the positive form. And the factor of an entity which is not expressed by the word cannot form the Import of that word; otherwise we would be landed in an absurdity.
The sense of all this is that the Proposition (of the Buddhist regarding Apoha) is annulled by actual experience.-(924)
Kumarila again shows, by means of an Incongruity, that the doctrine of Apoha is contrary to experience :
TEXT (925).
"IF Apoha FORMED THE IMPORT OF WORDS, THEN ALL WORDS WOULD BE SYNONYMOUS, THOSE THAT DENOTE DIVERSE UNIVERSALS, AS WELL AS THOSE THAT DENOTE PARTICULARS."-[Ibid. 42]-(925)
COMMENTARY.
The words denotative of diverse Universals,-like 'Cow', 'Horse', etc.as well as those denotative of Particulars,-the Variegated Cow', etc.would all become synonymous for you; as there would be no difference in their meanings, just like the words vrksa' and 'padapa (both of which denote the tree and are hence synonyms).-(925)
•
Question-Why is there no difference in the meaning? Answer:
C
TEXT (926)
"THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE AMONG Apohas, BECAUSE THEY ARE NON-ENTITIES, AND DEVOID OF ALL SUCH CONCEPTIONS AS RELATED, ONE' AND 'MANY-[Ibid. 45]-(926)
4
COMMENTARY.
Such conceptions as 'related', 'one' and 'many are possible only in regard to an entity, not to a non-entity; and as Apohas are non-entities,

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there can be no such conceptions in regard to them as being mutually related and so forth; how then can there be any difference among them !-(926)
** If difference is admitted among Apohas, then surely they become entities": -This is shown in the following:
TEXT (927).
"IF THE Apohas ARF DIFFERENT, THEN THEY MUST BE ENTITIES, BECAUSE OF THAT DIFFERENCE, JUST LIKE THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY
OF THINGS. IF THEY ARE NON-ENTITIES, THEN THEY CANNOT BE MANY, AND HENCE THEY CANNOT ESCAPE
FROM BEING SYNONYMOUS."-[Ibid. 46]—(927)
COMMENTARY
"Vastus-states the Probandum.
The argument may be formulated as follows :-Those that differ among themselves must be entities, like the Specific Individualities;- Apohas differ among themselves ;-hence this is a natural Reason (for regarding them as entities); and if they are entities, then it becomes established that the Import of Words is positive.
This means that the Proposition of the Apohist is annulled by Inferential Reasoning,
On the other hand, if Apohas be held to be non-entities, then, there can be no plurality among them; and under the circumstances, it is certain that they are synonymous.-(927)
The following text anticipates the Bauddha's answer to the above :
TEXT (928).
THERE WOULD CERTAINLY BE DIFFERENCE AMONG Apohas, BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE AMONG THE HORSE AND OTHER
THINGS. [Ibid. 47]-(928)
COMMENTARY.
This argument has been thus stated :- They are diverse, through the diversity of the things excluded; but they are absolutely inert in the matter of difference among themselves'. So that, even though there is no difference among the Apohas themselves, yet, as there is difference in the Horse and other things excluded (by the Apoha denoted by the word "Cow'), there would be difference among the Apohas also, which are of the form of the

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI,
exclusion of non-core (and non-cows are many and diverse); thus they could not all be synonymous.-(928)
This answer is rejected in the following
TEXT (928). ** IN FACT, THERE CAN BE NO DISTINOTION AMONG Apohas—EITHER
BY THEMSELVES, OR THROUGH OTHERS." [Ibid. 47]—(928)
COMMENTARY.
There can be no diversity or plurality in the Apoha itself, because it is of the essence of mere negation. If it were diverse through others,-then this could be only imaginary, not real. Because it is not right that a nature that does not belong to a thing by itself should come to it through others, -(928)
Why should not this be right : Answer
TEXT (929),
** WHEN EVEN THE SUBSTRATA TO WHICH THEY ARE RELATED DO NOT MAKE ANY DIFFERENCE IN THE FORM OF THE Apohas,—THAT THEY
WOULD BE DIFFERENTIATED BY THE excluded things, WHICH ARE EXTERIOR TO THEM, WOULD BE AN ASSUMPTION THAT IS TOO FAR-FETCHED."
[Ibid. 521–929)
COMMENTARY.
That is to say, when the things to which they are related, the variegated and other Cows—which are their substrata-enter into their very constitution, are unable to produce any difference in the essence of the Apohas, -inasmuch as even among the several cows, variegated and the rest, the Apoha, in the shape of the Exclusion of the non-cow', is held to be one only,then how could this 4 poha be rendered diverse by the objects excluded -such as the Horse, etc.- which are exterior to it! A thing that cannot be diversified by that which enters into its very constitution cannot certainly be diversified by what is exterior to it; as in that case the latter would cease to be exterior.
For this reason, what has been suggested is too much of an assumptionThis has been said in a joking spirit.-(929)
It might be argued that-in that case the inner correlates in the shape of the substrata themselves may be taken as serving the purposes of the differentiation.
The answer to this is provided in the following

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TEXTS (930-931).
"IN THE SAME MANNER, ITS DIVERSITY CANNOT BE DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF ITS SUBSTRATUM-DIVERSITY IN THE RELATIVE OF A THING DOES NOT JUSTIFY THE ASSUMPTION OF DIVERSITY IN THE
THING ALSO. HOW MUCH LESS THERE IS EXCLUSION POSSIBLE FOR THAT WHICH IS A NON-ENTITY, UN RELATED, UNDIFFERENTIATED, UNSPECIFIED,
VAGUE AND UNDETERMINED "
[Ibid. 48-49]—(930-931)
COMMENTARY. Its-of Apoha. Why is it not possible ?
Answer Diversity in the relative, etc. etc.':-the idea that the nonentity cannot be diversified by the diversity of its relative-because it has no character at all,-may rest for a while; as regards entities also, no diversity is ever found to be due to the diversity in relatives ; for instance, when Deuadatta, who is a single entity, occupies, either simultaneously or successively, different seats, he continues to be perceived as the same without having become diverse. How much more so is this then in the case of the
exclusion of others', which is a pure non-entity? Because it is a non. entity, therefore it is unrelated'-not connected with anything, undifferentiated. 'not distinguishod irom anything heterogeneous, simply because it is a non-entity; for the same reason, it is also unspecified '; -how can such a non-entity acquire diversity merely through diversity in its relatives - (930-931)
"Further, it may be granted that diversity is due to diversity in relatives ; even so, as you do not admit of the Universal' as an entity, it is not possible for your Apoha to have the relative, in the shape of its substratum ; the diversity of which conld account for the diversity in the Apoha".-This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (932).
"AS A MATTER OF FACT, NO ONE CAN CONCEIVE OF THE COW AND OTHER THINGS-ANY SIMILARITY OF FORM AMONG WEOM IS NOT ADMITTED, -TO BE THE SUBSTRATUM
OF A poha."-(932)
COMMENTARY If a real similarity among Cows were admitted, then they could be accepted as the substratum of the Apona, of Horse and other things, on the basis of that common similarity-not otherwise ; hence one who desires

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
to have these Cows as the substratum of Apoha, must admit of the similarity; and in that case, that similarity as the Universal' would form the Import of the Word, and there would be no use for the assuming of Apolo.
The term . Visaya' in this Text, stands for substratum or receptacle; just as in such expressions as 'Jalavişaya matsyah ':-(932)
For those people also who assume the diversity of Apoha to be based upon what is excluded (by it),-even that diversity is not possible without an entity in the shape of the Universal'.--This is shown in the following
TEXT (933).
" IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMMON PROPERTY, IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE TEINGS EXCLUDED (BY A poha). FOR THIS REASON
ALSO THERS CAN BE No Apoha."-[Ibid. 72)—(933)
COMMENTARY.
If there were some property common to the Horse and all other nonCows, then they could all be exchided by the word 'Cow; not otherwise ; as no other ground for distinction is perceptible. If such a common property is admitted, then the postulating of the Apoha becomes useless. Thus, for this reason, there can be no Apoha.-1933)
"Further, it is held by you that the Apoha is indicated by the Word and by the Inferential Indicative; now both these, Word and Indicative, cannot be operative in the absence of a positive Universal '; hence (for you) how is the Apoha indicated ? "
This argument is set forth in the following
TEXT (934). "OF THE WORD AND THE INDICATIVE, NO OPERATION IS POSSIBLE WITH
OUT CONCOMITANCE; AND WITHOUT THESE (WORD AND THE INDICATIVE), THERE CAN BE NO A poha; AND THERE CAN BE NO CONCOMITANCE FOR WHAT IS UNCOMMON
(UNIQUE, SPECIFIO)."-[Ibid. 73)—(934)
COMMENTARY.
Anvayavinirmukta Sie, without co-ordination.
These-i.e. the Word and the Indicative.-Without these, the Apoha cannot be apprehended', this has to be taken as understood.
It might be said that "the Word and the Indicative may operate on the basis of concomitance with the Specifio Individuality".
The answer to this is that there can be, etc. etc.!. That is, the Specific Individuality is something uncommon, pot partaking of anything else; how

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503
can there be any concomitance with it -Thus Word and Indicative can bave na bearing on the assumption of * Apoha':-(934)
"Even if there be operation of Word and Indicative,—the anthority or validity attached to these (by the Apohist) becomes shaken."
This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (935). " WHILE THE Apoha ITSELF HAS NOT BECOME ACCOMPLISHED, -WHERE
COULD THE CONCOMITANCE BE ASSERTED (WHICH IS NECESSARY FOR THE PROPER YUNOTIONING OF ALL INDICATIVES) AND
IF THE CONCOMITANCE IS NOT PERCEIVED,—THERE WOULD BE NO VALIDITY IN THESE (WORD
AND INDICATIVE)." [Ibid. 741—(935)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, Word and Indicative can be valid only when there is no absence of concomitance of what is to be affirmed in the case in question, Apoha is what is meant to be affirmed now, as it is of the form of mere Negation, and hence devoid of any (positive) character, it cannot be an accom. plished entity; under the circumstances, wherein could the concomitance", or absence of non-concomitance of the Word and Indicative be asserted ?
What would be the use of asserting the concomitance ? Answer if the concomitance is not perceived, etc. etc.
In these in Word and Indicative. Because validity consists in absence of non-concomitance.-(935)
It might be argued that even without their concomitance being apprehended, the Word and the Indicative would indicate their object merely through the non-perception of the heterogeneous.
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (936).
“THEY COULD NOT SIGNIFY ANYTHING BY MERE non-perception ; BECAUSE NON-PERCEPTION BEING COMMON IN ALL CASES, THERE
COULD BE NO DISTINCTION-[Ibid. 75)--(936)
COMMENTARY.
Mere':-this server to exclude the perception of concomitance. Question Why could not they signify it ?
Answer :- Because non-perception, etc. etc. In all cases '-i.e. in regard to heterogeneous things, to homogeneous things, and also to the particular thing concerned.--Hence there could be no such distinctive cogni.

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
tions as this is the thing itself', and that is something else; in fact, the word could not indicate its own objective; as the concomitance would be not-apprehended there also, just as in any other thing.
In some places the reading is pratyāyyo' (in place of pratyayo"); in which case the meaning is that there could be no distinction in the thing indicated; i.e. it could not differ,
In this way, there being a possibility of the loss of validity of the operation of Words and Indicatives, it cannot be right to regard the Apoha as the Import of Words.-(936)
It has been argued (under 932, above) that—" no one can conceive of any similarity of Cow, etc. etc."-The following Text anticipates the Buddhist's answer to that argument -
TEXT (937). "IT MIGHT BE ARGUED THAT EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OY SIMILARITY OF FORM, THERE COULD BE ASSUMPTIOX OF Apoha:-THEN WHY IS THE Apoha of the non-cow ' NOT ASSUMED IN THE CASH
OF THE Cow and the Horse ? "-[Ibil. 76]—(937)
COMMENTARY.
If, even in the absence of similarity, the apoha of the non-Cow be assumed in the case of the Variegated and other Cows,-then why can it not be assumed in the case of the Cow and the Horse also ? The absence of similarity would be common to both cases.
The Author has used the form gavuskvayoh', evidently forgetting the rule embodied in the Sutra Gavāshraprabhrtini cha sanjñdyam':-(937)
The said presence of common conditions in the two cases is further explained
TEXT (938). "Difference from the Spotted Coto IS THE SAME IN THE Black Cow and IN THE Horse. SO THAT IF NO OTHER COMMONALTY' IS ADMITTED, WHERBTO WOULD THE Apoha of the non.Com
APPLY ?"-[Ibid. 77]—(938)
COMMENTARY
Whereto, etc. etc. Just as the Apoha of the non-Cow' is not applied to the Horse, on the basis of its diference from the Spotted Cow,-80, inas. much as the Black Cow also is different from the Spotted Cow, the said ' A poha of the non-Cow should not apply to the Black Cow also. So also to the spotted and other Cow; difference being equally present in all cases. (And the Buddhist does not accept any such commonally as that subsisting among all Cows, but not in any other animal.)(938)

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS,
505
Further, just as it is not right to regard the Specific Individuality and other things as denoted by words--on the ground of the absence of Convention-so also it cannot be right in the case of a poha also ".-This is shown in the following
TEXT (939).
*As A MATTER OF FACT, THE Apoha of the non-Cow HAS NEVER BEEN
PREVIOUSLY PERCEIVED BY THE SENSE-ORGANS AND THE OPERATION OF WORDS DOES NOT LIE ANYWHERE ELSE. ON THE PERCEPTION OF WEAT THEN WOULD THE
WORD BE USED ?"-[Ibid. 78]—(939)
COMMENTARY,
The Convention-maker sets up the Convention on the basis of his firme: conviction regarding the denotation of the word ;-the Apoha however is never perceived by the Sense-organs; previously i.e. prior to the using of the word, at the time of fixing up the relation between the name and the named.-It cannot be perceived, because it is a non-entity, and Sense-organs operate only upon entities.
It night be argued that the Word could be used on the apprehension of the Specific Individuality as differentiated from other things.
The answer to that is that the operation of words, etc. etc.' ;-anywhere else',-i.e. in anything other than the Apoha of others in the shape of the Specific Individuality.- (939)
It might be argued that," the Apoha may not be apprehended by the Sense-organg; it could be apprehended by means of Inference ".-This is answered in the following
TEXT (940).
* BY WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE, THERE CAN BE NO INFERENCE BITHER, IN THIS CASE ; AND FOR THE SAME REASON THERE CAN BE NO CON
CEPTION OF ANY CONNECTION OF THIS."-[Ibid. 79]—(940)
COMMENTARY.
What has gone before ', -under Text 934, above.
There can be no, etc. etc.' ;-connection of this-i.e. with the Word.
The particle 'api' is meant to imply that the said absence of diversity is not the only reason.
* Tana '--for the same reason.
Thus it has been shown that the Reason adduced by the Bauddha (against the denotation of Words) because no Convention can be made-is'incon

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TATTVARAŃCRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
clusive': inasmuch as the application of words to the Apoha is admitted, even though no Convention can be made in regard to it.-1940)
The following text again proceeds to show that there can be no Convention in regard to the Apoha
TEXT (941).
"How COULD ONU APPREHEND THE FACT OF SOMETHING NOT BEING DENOTED BY THE WORD 'Cow - IT COULD BE LEARNT FROM THE FACT THAT THE WORD Cow WAS NOT FOUND TO BE APPLIED TO IT AT TEE MOMENT OF THE APPREHENSION OF THE CONNECTION OF THAT WORD. THIS IS WHAT
THE BAUDDHA MAY SAY.]”-[Ibid. 81]-(941)
COMMENTARY.
It behoves you to explain tliis : How do you know that the Horse and other non-Cows are denoted by the word 'non-Cow' -i.e. they are not denoted by the word 'Cow'?
The Baudha answers- It could be learnt, etc. etc.'-' at the moment, elc. etc.',-i.e. at the time of the comprehension of the Convention.-(941)
The Opponent (Kumārila) rojects this explanation (provided by the Bauddha)
TEXT (942).
"IN TRAT CASE, ALL THINGS, WITH THE SOLE EXCEPTION OF THE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL COW, WOULD BECOME EXCLUDED BY THE Apoha; AND IN THAT CASE IT WOULD NOT BE PROVED THAT ANY commonalty CONSTITUTES THE IMPORT
OF WORDS."-[Ibid. 82]—(942)
COMMENTARY.
If it is your opinion that the word 'Cow' cannot apply to anything except the one that was perceived at the time of the apprehension of the Convention,-then, with the exception of the one Spotted Cow which has been the object of the Convention, every thing else, even the Black and other Cows, -would have to be excluded by the word 'Cow'; and in that case, it could not be established that any Commonalty is denoted by the Word.-1942)
The following text shows that no Convention could be made regarding the Apoha, as it would involve mutual interdependence :

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
507
-
TEXTS (943-944).
IT IS ONLY A WELL-ESTABLISHED ENTITY IN THE SHAPE OF THE NONCow THAT COULD BE EXCLUDED BY THE Apoha (DENOTED BY THE WORD Cow'); AND THE non-Cow IS OF THE NATURE OF THE negation of the Cow ;-HENCE IT HAS TO BE EXPLAINED WHAT THIS Cou IS WHICH IS NEGATIVED (IN THE NON-Cow).-IP THIS Cow IS OF THE NATURE OF THE negation of the non-Cow, THEN THERE IS MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE.IF THE COW IS ADMITTED AS AN ENTITY FOR THE SAKE OF THE Apoha, THEN THE POSTULATING OF THE Apoha BECOMES FUTILE."-[Ibid.
83-847—(943-944)
COMMENTARY.
The Cow is apprehended through the exclusion of the non-Cow' the non-Cow is of the nature of the negation of the Cow ;-hence the second term in the word 'non-Cow' has got to be explained, which is negatived by the negative particle in the word 'non-Cow'; there can be no negation of anything, the exact nature of which is not known.
It might be argued that what is it that has to be explained ? It is already known that the Cow is of the nature of the negation of the non-Cowo.
The answer to that is 'If this Cow, etc. etc.' ; 'this stands for the Cow. Thus then, the Cow being of the nature of the negation of the nonCow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the non. Cow ; -and the non-Cow being of the nature of the negation of the Cow, it could be apprehended only through the apprehension of the Cow ;-thus this would be a clear case of mutual interdependence.
It might be argued that, The Cow that is negatived by the word non-cow is a well-established positive entity, for the sake of A poha,-i.e. for the fulfilment of the Apoha in the shape of the exclusion of the non-cow, --so that there would be no interdependence.
The answer to this is—'If the cow is an established entity, etc. etc.; That is, if that be so, then it is useless to assume that Apoha forms the denotation of all words; inasmuch as you admit the Import of words to consist of a positive entity. Consequently (to be consistent) you should not admit of any positive entity to be denoted by a word ; and if you do not admit it, then the objectionable 'interdependence' becomes inevitable. (943-944)
The following Text sums up the same mutual Interdependence :

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (945). "UNLESS THE Cow IS ESTABLISHED, THERE CAN BE NO non-Con ; AND IF THERE IS NO Non-Cous, HOW CAN THE COW BE THERE? BETWEEN TWO NEGATIONS, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH RELATION AS THAT OF THE Container and the Contained AND
THE LIKE."—[Ibid. Apoha 85)-(945)
COMMENTARY
For the purpose of proving the relation of qualification and qualified (between the two), the Teacher Dinnaga has declared as follows Such terms as Blue Latus and the like signify things qualified by the negation of other things
The Opponent shows the impropriety of this view, in the wordsBettween two negations, etc. etc. '-When between two things, a real relationship is known to exist, then it may be correct to say that one is qualified by the other; in the case of the Blue-Lotus however, inasmuch as the two are of the nature of the negation of Blue and negation of Lotus, which are mere negations, and hence devoid of any form,--there cannot be any such relation between them as that of Container and Contained and the like.
The term and the rest, includes such relations as those of Conjunction, Inherence, Inherence in a common substratum and so forth.
In the absence of any real relation, it is not right that there should be a notion of one being qualified by the other. If it were so, then there would be an incongruity--(945)
The following might be urged by the Bauddha): It is not meant by us that in the case of the expression Blue Lotus, the negation of the nonLotus is qualified by the negation of the non-blue; hence the said objection cannot apply to us. What we mean is that there is an entity which is excluded from the non-blue and the non-lotus ; and what is denoted by the word is that entity as qualified by the exclusion of other things.
This is answered in the following
TEXT (946).
"As A MATTER OF FACT, ANY THING UNCOMMON (UNIQUE, SPECIFIC) IS NEVER COGNISED AS QUALIFIED BY THE Apoha. HOW TOO COULD ANY RELATIONSHIP BE ASSUMED BETWEEN AN ENTITY AND
A NON-ENTITY ? "--[Ibid. Apoha 867—(946)
COMMENTARY.
That is, because the Specific Individuality cannot be expressed by words, and also because all the objections urged against that view are applieable in the present case also.

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
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Even if the uncommon entity be apprehended-even so, it cannot be qualified by the exclusion of other things, this is what is shown by the words
How too, etc. etc. ;the non-entity' is the Apoha, the Entity is the uncommon thing; and there can be no connection between the entity and the non-entity ; because connection always rests upon two entities.-1946)
"Further, the connection may be there; even so, the Apoha cannot be regarded as the qualifying factor" this is shown in the following
TEXT (947). “IN FACT, NOTHING CAN SERVE AS A qualification, BY ITS MERE EXISTENCE ; IT IS ONLY WHEN IT COLOURS THE qualified WITH ITS OWN COGNITION THAT IT BECOMES ITS qualification." [Ibid.
Apoha 871-(947)
COMMENTARY.
The Blue does not become a qualification of the Lotus by its mere existence :-what then ?- When one thing, on being cognised, colours the qualified thing with the cognition tinged with its own form, then alone it is said to be the qualification of that thing. (947)
This process of qualification is not possible in the case of Apoha; this is what is shown in the following
TEXT (948).
« THE TERMS HORSE' AND THE REST DO NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE Apoha; AND THE IDEA OF THE qualified THAT IS HELD IN THIS CONNECTION CANNOT BE ONE IN WHICH THE qualification is NOT COGNISED."-[Ibid.
Apoha 88]—(948)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, the cognition of the Horse and other non-cowe does not apprehend the Apoha ; it apprehends a positive entity: and thus there being no possibility of the Apoha being cognised, it cannot colour the Horse, etc. with its own cognition.
It might be urged that "Even without being itself cognised, the Apoha could be the qualification".
The answer to this is that the idea of the qualified, etc. etc. ';-there can never be a cognition of the qualified thing of which the qualification is not apprehended.-(948)

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
** Granting that there is cognition of the Apoha,-even so, inasmuch as there can be no cognition of that form in regard to any thing, it could not rightly serve as its qualification". This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (949).
"THE QUALIFICATION CANNOT BRING ABOUT A COGNITION WHICH IS LIKE SOMETHING TOTALLY DIFFERENT; TOR HOW CAN THAT BE SAID TO BE THE QUALIFICATION IN A COGNITION WHICH IS LIKE SOMETHINC DIFFERENT - Ibid.
Apoha 89]—(949)
COMMENTARY.
Every qualification is found to bring about in regard to the qualified thing a cognition in keeping with its own form; and one kind of qualification does not bring about a cognition like something else ; e.g. the Blue does not produce in regard to the Lorus the cognition of Red; nor does the sticke bring about in regard to the Stick-holler, the idea of his wearing earrings.-In the case in question also, the verbal cognition that appears in connection with the Horse, etc. is not coloured by negative character; on the other hand, it partakes of the positive character.
It might be argued that," Even when bringing about a cognition unlike itself, a qualification can be so called."
The answer to that is—'How can, etc, etc. Like something different', - i.e. unlike the qualification itself.—(948)
What would be the harm if it did ?
Question :- Aneuer
TEXT (950).
"IF A QUALIFICATION BB REGARDED AS SUCH EVEN IN REGARD TO THE QUALIFIED THING WHICH IS TOTALLY DIFFERENT, THEN, EVERYTHING CAN SERVE AS THE QUALIFICATION (OY
EVERYTHING)."-[Ibid. 4poha 901—(950)
COMMENTARY.
If, for you, there were an assumption of something being a qualification, even in regard to a Qualified thing, which is unlike, and not like, in accordance with the form of,—that Qualification,—then everything,Blue and the rest,-could be the Qualification of everything; and there would be no restriction at all.-(950)
It might be argued that the Apolia does colour the Qualified Entity with its own Cognition (Idea)'.
The answer to that is as follows:

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
511
TEXT (951).
"IF THE QUALIFIED TRING IS COGNISABLE IN THE FORM OF NEGATION, THEN IT CANNOT BE AN ENTITY ; CONSEQUENTLY FOR YOU, THERE CAN BE NO ENTITY THAT COULD BE DEXOTED BY WORDS AS QUALIFIED BY A poha."-[Ibid.
Apoha 91]—(951)
COMMENTARY.
Negation-i.e. the 4 poha; cognisable in the form i.e. cognised as being of the same form as if the Qualified thing has its character such that it is cognisable in the form of negation ;-i.e. if the thing is cognised in the form of Negation.--then it ceases to be a positive Entity; as the negative' and 'positive are contradictory terms.
The argument is summed up in the words-Consequently, for you, etc. etc. '-(951)
The following might be urged-As a matter of fact, Words and Inferen tial Indicatives are found to operate only in regard to things as excluded from others, and not as devoid of such exclusion (A poha); and it is on that ground that it is asserted that the Apoha is established by Words and Indications, and it is not on the basis of the pointing out of what is eccluded ; so that all that has been urged regarding the theory being contrary to experience is not relevant ab all'.
This is answered in the following
TEXT (952).
* EVEN THOUGH THE WORD AND THE INDICATIVE MAY NOT OPERATE UPON ANYTHING DEVOID OF Apoha,-YET THE COGNITION RESTS UPON THE ENTITY WHICH IS WHAT IT APPREHENDS."-[Ibid.
A poha 92)-(952)
OOMMENTARY
Even though the thing may be excluded from others', -yet when Coguition arises in regard to it, through Words and Indicatives, it does not rest upon that Exclusion of others which may be there, but upon the element of Entity; as it is to this latter that it is attached. That factor of the thing which is apprehended by the Verbal or Inferential Cognition is really the object of that Cognition, and not anything else which, even though prosent, is not apprehended. For instance, even though the smell and other properties of the flower are there, yet these are not held to be denoted by the word 'Malati --(952)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
Nor is it right to assert that the Word and the Indicative operate upon the thing as excluded from others-This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (953).
*As A MATTER OF FACT, THE Uncommon THING NEVER FIGURES IN THE COGNITION : NOR AGAIN CAN IT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS Cognisable, BECAUSE IT IS INDETERMINATE'."
[Ibid. A poha 931—(953)
COMMENTARY.
When a thing is excluded from others, it can, under your doctrine, be only the Uncommon Specific Individuality-and yet it is your view that this latter does not figure in Cognition brought about by Words and Indi. catives on the ground that it is apprehensible only by 'indeterminate, non-conceptual cognition', while Cognition born of Words and Indicatives appertains to commonalty.
If it be held that this latter Cognition does apprehend the Specific Individuality,then this cannot be in accordance with Renson; this is what is shown in the words- Nor again can it be rightly, etc. etc.'—that is to say, the Uncommon (Specifie) Entity cannot be apprehended by Cognition born of Words and Indicatives; because all conceptual ideas are absent in that Entity : as Conceptual Thought operates only through the contact of the
Universal' and such other qualifications and never through the pure Thing: in-itself:-(953)
It might be argued that Even though the Uncommon Entity may not be apprehended by Words, it can be said to be qualified by E.cclusion'
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (954).
* THE STATEMENT THAT WHAT IS NOT APPREHENDED BY THE WORD IS YET QUALIFIED IS TOO BOLD. FOR ALL THESE REASONS THE Commonalty SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THE OBJECT OF WORDS AND INDICATIVES."-[Ibid.
Apoha 94]—(954)
COMMENTARY.
The author proceeds to prove, in another way, the fact of Commonalty (Universal) being a real entity

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TEXT (955). ** WHEN INDIVIDUALITIES COULD NOT BE WHAT IS EXCLUDED BY A poha
BECAUSE THEY ARE NOT DENOTED BY WORDS, THEN THE COMMONALTY (UNIVERSAL) ALONE IS WHAT COULD BE EXCLUDED '; AND BECAUSE OF ITS EXCLUSION, IT MUST BE AN ENTITY."-[Shlo-Vă.
A poha 95]—(955)
COMMENTARY Individualities'.-That is, the Uncommon (Specific) Entities-cannot be expressed by words; herice they cannot be regarded as excluded '; because what is not spoken of cannot be denied (or excluded).
The Commonally alone is what could be excluded.--that is, because that alone is what is expressed by words.-(955)
It might be asked if the Commonalty (or Universal) were excluded, even so, how could that establish it as an entity ?!!
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (956).
MORB NEGATIONS CANNOT BE OBJECTS OF 'EXCLUSION -FOR, IF THEY WERE, THEY WOULD LOSE THEIR NEGATIVE CHARACTER. CONSEQUENTLY, IT IS CLEAR THAT WHEN THERE IS AN
EXCLUSION' (Apoha) OF ANOTHER 'EXOLUSION (A poha), IT CAN BE ONLY OF A POSITIVE ENTITY IN THE SHAPE OF THE COMMONALTY (OR UNIVERSAL)."-[Shlo..
Vå. Apoha 96]—(956)
COMMENTARY.
Negations '-i.e. Apohas, Exclusions.
If there were exclusions of these Exclusions, they would be positive entities.
The reason for this is set forth- For if they were, etc, etc.—That is, the negative character would be abandoned by those exclusions. What is meant is as follows :-If Exclusions were excluded, then their negative character would be denied ; and when there is this denial, the Negations would abandon their negative character; and thence the Negations in the shape of the Eaclusions having abandoned their negative character, they would become positive entities.-This is the explanation given by some people.
Othere explain tho words of the text abhāvābhāvavarjanat' to mean * because there can be no negation of negations ; i.e. it is not right that
Exclusions' (A pohas) which are negative should be excluded'; because all'exclusion (denial) is of the positive entity.
33

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From all this it is clear that when there is (exclusion of one A poha, the Cow, in another Apoha, the Horse,-it could be an exclusion of the
Universal' only. It is established therefore that the Universal, being the object of 'Exclusion', must be a positive entity.-(956)
Then again, the Apohas could be either different or non-different among themselves. If they are held to be different, then there are objections to that view.-This is shown in the following
TEXT (957) * IF THE NEGATION OF A NEGATION IS DIFFERENT FROM IT, THEN IT MUST BE A POSITIVE ENTITY. IF NOT, THEN THE Cow WILL BE THE SAME AS THE Non-CoW FOR YOU."- [Shlo.-V&.
Apoha 97]—(957)
COMMENTARY
If, of the negation '-i.e. of that negation which is denoted by the word non-cow!,- the negation i.e. that which is denoted by the word 'cow, were different from the former Negation,-i.e. something other than it,
then it would be a Positive Entity: because the positive character consists only in the absence of negation.
If it is not different from it, then, for you, the Cou also should be NonCow; because what is not different must be understood to be the same.--- (957)
The following might be urged—'What are excluded by the words Cow and Horse are only the Specific Individualities as excluded from one another ; and it is not Negations that are excluded; hence the contingency of their becoming positive entities cannot be unacceptable to us!
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (958). “THOUGH IN THE CASE OF OTHER WORDS, A POSITIVE ENTITY MAY BE. WHAT IS EXCLUDED YET IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'SAT (BEING'), NOTHING APART FROM NEGATION 'IS REGARDED AS EXCLUDED'.
(Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 98]—(958)
COMMENTARY.
In the case of words other than 'Being -.g. such words as Cow" and the rest,-it may be that what is excluded is an entity, in the form of the Hill and other things; but in the case of the word "Being' itself, there is nothing that could be held to be excluded except that which is called "Negation; that is, Negation alone can be excluded; because the word

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Being' is used only in the sense of excluding what is non-being. Nonexistent).-(958)
Question - Answers
What is the harm if that is so '
TEXT (959). “IN THAT CASE, EVEN THE Non-existent (NON-BEING) WOULD HAVE A POSITIVE CHARACTER; WHICH WOULD BE A GREAT CALAMITY. AND WHEN THERE IS NO NEGATION, THERE WOULD BE NO Existence (POSITIVE AT ALL ; AND AS A CONSEQUENCE) Non-existence ALSO WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE."—[Shlo. Vă. Apoha
991–1959)
COMMENTARY
As shown before (under 956, above) 'Negations would abandon their negative character ' hence if there were exclusion of the non-existent, it would be a positive entity; and as this would involve the idea of the nonexistent also being a positive entity, which would be contrary to the Apohist's doctrine,—this would be a great calamity for him.
It might be said The Negation may be an entity, what then I
The answer is- When there is no Negation, etc. etc. When there would be no Negation, there would be no existence of anything at all; because, according to your view, existence is only the exclusion or negation of non-existence; so that, when Negation is excluded', it becomes an Entity, and loses its character; hence there can be no non-existence either; as that also is only the exchision or negation of existence, and existence does not exist, as shown above.-(959)
It has been asserted before-la) that they would be differentiated by the excluded things' (Text, 929), and (b) that 'there can be no difference among Apohas because they are non-entities' (Text, 926). These arguments have been thus answered by oertain Bauddhas - The difference among Apohas is due, not to the difference of substrata, nor to the difference among the excluded things; what happens is that on diverse external objects there are superimposed Apohas which are themselves featureless, and consist only in the form of those objects, and hence appearing as diverse; they are so superimposed by cognitions, which, though rather objectless, rest upon diverse unreal objects, and are related to variegated conceptual Impressions extending over all time without beginning and being thus superimposed, these Apohas appear as diverse and as existing ; 80 that the diversity and positive character of Apohas would be due to the diversity of the said Impressions
This is answered in the following

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TEXT (960).
" EITHER DIVERSITY OR TEH POSITIVE CHARACTER OF A pohas CANNOT BE ASSUMED TO BE DUE TO THE DIVERSITY OF IMPRESSIONS; BECAUSE IMPRESSION CANNOT BE HELD TO EXIST WHEN THERE IS
NO ENTITY."-[Shlo. Vă. Apoha 100)-(960)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, no one holds the view that Irapressions or Tendencies belong to the non-entity. That there is no objectless Cognition has also been thoroughly discussed and proved in course of our examination of Idealism. Hence there can be no conceptions based upon unreal objects; how then can there be any Impression resting upon such conception !
* A vastuni',-i.e. when there is no Entity which could be its substratum ; and when there can be no Cognition without objects, -as there could be no cognition that could produce the Impression-how could there be any Impression ? And when there is no Impression, how could the diversity among Apohas or their positive character, be due to Impressions -(980)
Having thus discarded . Apoha' as the denoted', the Opponent of the Buddhist proceeds to discard it also as held to be the denotative':
TEXTS (961-963).
« YOU CANNOT BASE THE DIVERSITY AMONG Words ALSO UPON THE
SAID CONDITIONS. THERE CAN BE NO UNOOMMON DENOTATIVE WORD, AS NO SUCH COULD HAVE BEEN PERCEIVED BEFORE. UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF A COMMONALTY' WERE ASSUMED IN THE SHAPE OF THE Apoha (EXCLUSION) OR OTHER WORDS, AS IT COULD ONLY BE A NON-ENTITY, AS SHOWN ABOVE, THERE COULD BE NO DIVERSITY AMONG WORDS.-JUST AS AMONG DENOTATIVE WORDS, SO BETWEEN THE DENOTED AND DENOTATIYE ALSO THERE COULD BE NO DIFFERENCE. THAT THERE CAN BE NO DIFFERENCE BASED UPON THE DIFFERENCE IN THE EXCLUDED THINGS' HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPLAINED."-[Shlo.- Vă. Apoha 102, 104, 105] (961-963)
COMMENTARY. The term Shabdabhidah' stands for the mutual difference among words denotative of diverse Universals and those denotative of Particulars.
"Upon the said conditions', -ie. based upon the diversity of Impressions or on the diversity of the 'Excluded A pohas',
Objection Among words, diversity is clearly perceived, as based upon their source and upon the imposition on them of mutually contradictory characters.
Answer: There can be no uncommon word, etc. etc.'What is said here is with reference to the denotative word; and what is meant is that

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the uncommon word, which is apprehended in auditory Perception, as of the nature of a Specifio Individuality', cannot be denotative.-Why ?Because no such could have been perceived before ; that is, the Word that is there at the time of usage will not have been perceived before that usage, i.e. at the time of the making of the Convention relating to it; and the word that was perceived at that time will have long censed to exist, so that there could be no usage of that word ; nor is it right that there should be any usage based upon the word that was not perceived at the time of the Convention ; as that wonld lead to incongruities.-From all this it follows that the Specific Individuality cannot be denotative.
In fact, among you yourselves, there is a difference on this point; as it has been stated (by one of yourselves) that-'no particular thing can be denoted, and no particular word can be denotative, because it has not been perceived before ; it is the Commonalty (Universal) that will be ao, as is going to be explained'.-Hence no objection can be taken to what we have said regarding the denotative word.
Such being the case, il it be held that what is denotative is the Exclusion of other words, in the form of the Word-Universal ', - in the same way ae the 'Exclusion of other things' is of the form of the Thing-Universal', then, as shown above, under Text 926,-48 there can be no diversity among the denoted 4 pohas, so there can be no diversity among the denotative Apohas also ; because these latter are featureless.
And just as there can be no difference among the denotative Apohas, No also there can be no difference between the denotative and the denoted Apohas: because these also are featureless.
It might be argued that there may be difference among these, due to the differences among the Excluded things.-The answer to that is that there can be no difference, etc. etc. that is, how there can be no difference due to difference among the excluded things has been already explained above, under Text 928.-1961-963)
So far it has been shown that the Proposition of the Bauddha) is contrary to experience and to his own doctrines. Kumärila now proceeds to prove that it is open to the charge of involving the incongruity of the relation of denoted and denotative' being impossible, and also to that of being contrary to the Opponent's own doctrines -
TEXT (964). “THERE COULD BE NO RELATION OF denoted and denotative BETWEEN
THE TWO A pohas, BECAUSE THEY ARE NON-ENTITIES, UNDER YOUR VIEW; JUST AS THE SKY FLOWER' AND THE 'Hare's HORNARE, ACCORDING TO ORDINARY PEOPLE.”—
[Shlo. Vā. Apoha 108)—(964)
COMMENTARY. The relation of denoted and denotative cannot lie between what are non-entities; eg, there can be no such relation between the Sky flower'

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and the 'Hare's Horn;-and the denoted and denotative Apohas are both non-entities ;-hence there is perception of a character contrary to the character of wider extension. (964)
Objection against the above - There is cognition of the absence of Rain from the absence of clouds (where both are non-entities); hence the Reason put forward is not conclusive.
Answer:
TEXT (965).
"IF SOME ONE, PERCEIVING THE SAID RELATION BETWEEN THE NONEXISTENT RAIN AND THE NON-EXISTENT CLOUD, WERE TO URGE
INCONCLUSIVENESS AGAINST OCR REASON, -THEN, ACCORDING TO OUR VIEW, THERE IS AN entity IN THE CASE CITED ALSO, BUT HOW COULD IT BE UNDER YOUR VIEW ? "-[Shlo..
Vå. Apoha 109]—(965)
COMMENTARY.
On seeing that between the Rain and the Cloud both of which are non-existent, i.e. mere negations['asal' in the compound standing for the abstract noun 'asattu', non-existence),—the relation of denotative and denoted (indicator and indicated) is present, if the Bauddha were to argue that our Reason, because they are non-entities'-is "Inconclusive!,- then that cannot be right; because According to our view, in this case of the Cloud and Rein also there is an entity present, in the shape of the clean sky; because according to us Negation is an eptity. For you, Bauddha, on the other hand, how could it be? That is, how could there be the relation of Indicator and Indionted in the case cited ? It could not be possible at all.
The particle 'api', also, is misplaced ; it should have come after adah'; so that the meaning is as follows :-It is not only in the case of the two Apohas that it is not possible for you to liave the relation of Denoted and Denotative (Indicator and Indicated), it is not possible also in the case of the Rain and the Cloud.-(965)
" Then again, you hold the opinion that the Word and the Inferential Indicative,-in both of which affirmation forms the subordinate, and negation the predominant factor,-are expressive of their objects; and you have also made the following statement-'When the denotation of another word has not been perceived, the relationship of the Word is easily deduced from the perception of even a part of what is denoted by it; and there can be no fallibility in this'-All this is not right, under the theory of Apoha. " This is what is shown in the following

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TEXT (966). * WHEN ONE DOES NOT ADMIT THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD TO POSITIVE AFFIRMATIVE) IN CHARACTER, TRERE CAN BE NO NEGATION ALSO FOR HIM; AS THIS IS ALWAYS PRECEDED BY THAT."-[Shlo. Vā.
Apoha 110]—(966)
COMMENTARY.
Preceded by that',-i.e. preceded by affirmation; that is Negation is only the denial of what has been affirmed.
Further, under the Apoha-theory, there is no possibility of the relation of qualification and qualified between Blue and Lotus, and the co-ordination between them,--which is perceived in actual experience.-(966)
* With a view to explaining these, the relation of qualification and qualified and the co-ordination, the Bauddha has made the following statement :-*Words denote diverse things on account of the diversity of the things 'excluded'; they are ineffective in the matter of their own diversity. They become the qualification and the qualified when bringing about the same effect; and the difference being based upon that fact alone, it is not abandoned by their own Commonalty; and yet the said difference has not been asserted, as there is doubt regarding it; and when the two are equal and similar, then they serve the same purpose
The following Text proceeds to show that all this cannot be right :
TEXTS (967-969).
TT IS HELD THAT WHAT IS DENOTED IS Apoha ONLY : UNDER THIS THEORY,
THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF THE RELATION Or qualification and qualified OR OF co-ordination, IN THE CASE OF SUCH VERBAL EXPRESSIONS AS BLUE-LOTUS, WHICH HAVE A MIXED CONNOTATION; BECAUSE THE EXCLUSION OF THE non-blue' DOES NOT INVOLVE THE EXCLUSION OF THE non-lotus ', -NOR DOES THE LATTER INVOLVE THE FORMER. HENCE THE RELATION OF qualifica. tion and qualified 18 NOT POSSIBLE (BETWEEN THE BLUE COLOUR AND THE LOTUS).-NOR WOULD THE SAID RELATION BE POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE WORDS APART FROM WHAT THEY DENOTE."-[Shlo.-Vā. A poha 115-117]-(967-969)
COMMENTARY. What was rejected before was the possibility of the relation of qualification and qualified between the things denoted; what is rejected now is the same relation between words; hence there is no repetition.
The relation of qualification and qualified consists in each of the two serving to differentiate the other, and this is held to be present only in

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& number of words connected together, uch as "Blue lotus'. It appears also in the case of expressions where the terms are not co-ordinated ; e.g. in the expression King's officer. It is said to be a case of co-ordina. tion when two words, having different connotations, are applied to the same object; such co-ordination is held to be present only in compounds like "Blue-lotus
Now in regard to such verbal expression as 'Blue.lotis, and the like, whose connotation is mixedthere is co-ordination, and this would not be possible under the Apoha-theory.
Mixed connotation '-.e. a connotation of mixed character. As declared in the statement The Blue Lotus is neither Blue only nor the Lotus only, because what is denoted is the combination of both
Question :- Why is this not possible under the A poha-theory?
Answer:- Because, etc. etc.'. Because on the exclusion of the nonblue, there is no 'exclusion of the non-lotus. Nor does the latter—i.e.' Exclusion of the non-Lotus '-involve the former i.e. the exclusion of the non-blue',- [In some texts, the reading is 'itara' for itara)'; where the Feminine form may be taken as with reference to the term Chyutih'; * itara' thus standing for the Chynti, exclusion, of the Non-Blue).-What is meant is that these two do not stand in the relation of container and con. la ined, because both are featureless. And when there is no relation, there can be no relation of qualification and qualified; if there were, we would be landed in absurdities.
What is meant by this is that under your theory there can be no mixed connotation, as all words denote mere negation; and hence the relation of qualification and qualified is not possible.
It might be argued that there may be no relation of qualification and qualified between what are denoted by the words,-why should it not subsist between the words themselves !!
The answer to this is-Nor would, etc. etc., that is, it is only through their denotations that the relation of qualification and qualified becomes attributed to the words; hence when the said relation is not possible between what are denoted, how can there be any attributing of it to the denotative words 7-967-969)
Kumarila now proceeds to deny co-ordination'
TEXT (970). "CO-ORDINATION IS NOT POSSIBLE, AS THE Apohas ARE DIFFERENT - IF IT BE HELD TO SUBSIST ON THE BASIS OF WHAT IS DENOTED. THEN WHAT SORT OF 'SUBSISTENCE WOULD THERE BE BETWEEN THE TWO ?"-[Shlo. Vā.
Apoha 118)—(970)
COMMENTARY. It is only when two words are applied to the same object that there is co-ordination between them; and (under the Apoha-theory) it is not possible

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for the words 'blue' and 'lotus' to apply to the same object; because what are denoted by them are, respectively, the exclusion of the non-blue and the exclusion of the non-lotus, - and these two are distinct. For instance, it has been asserted by yourself that words have diverse denotations because the things excluded by them are diverse'. The argument may be formulated as follows:-Words like Blue Lotus' cannot form the object of co-ordination, because they pertain to different things, like the words 'jar, cloth' and so forth.
It might be argued that the exclusion of non-blue also stands where there is exclusion of non-lotus; and thus the Apohas denoted by the two words may be applied to the same thing; and hence, through these denotations, co-ordination may be said to lie between the words also'. Tat stands for co-ordination.
The answer to this is- What sort of subsistence, etc. etc. - Tayoh* between the two'. -i.e. between the 'Exclusion of the non-blue' and the 'Exclusion of the non-lotus'. That is to say, there can be no real subsistence in these : as what is formless cannot subsist anywhere, like the son of the Barren Woman (970)
Then again, there may be some sort of subsistence in the case of things like the Blue and the Lotus; but even though present, it could not be expressed by words.-This is shown in the following
TEXT (971).
" AS A MATTER OF FACT, NOTHING UNCOMMON 'IS EVER APPREHENDED AND ANYTHING ELSE DOES NOT EXIST FOR YOU. WHERE THEN WOULD BE THE USE OF THE CO-ORDINATION OF WORDS, WHICH IS NOT APPREHENDED AT ALL ?"
(Shlo. Vā. Apoha 119]-(971)
COMMENTARY
No uncommon thing in the shape of the Blue Lotus and the like is ever apprehended throngh words, because all conceptions are absent therein, - as has been declared (by the Apohist).- Under the circumstances when the thing which is the substratum is not known, how can the subsistence of the Apohas subsisting therein be cognised ? That is, the cognition of the property is concomitant with that wherein the property subsists.
It might be argued that as there is a substratum of these Apohas which is entirely different from the Uncommon Entity, the said objection is not relevant
The answer to this is— Anything else does nol exist--for you'.
It might be urged that even if the co-ordination is not actually cognised, yet it is there all the same, in the actual state of things?
The answer to this is Where would be, ete. etc. - Aikarthyam' is coordination.

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Where would be the use-i.e. now here at all.-Because even if a thing exists, if it is not cognised (known), it cannot form part of the usage of people. -(971)
The following might be urged: If it were mere exclusion that is denoted by the word, then there would be room for the said objection; as a matter of fact, however, what is denoted is the entity along with the exclusion : consequently the two words having the two exclusions as their adjuncte could very well apply to a single entity alone with the Apoha; Bo that the co-ordination would be there all right.
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (972).
"IF IT BE SAID THAT WHAT IS DENOTED IS THE ENTITY ALONG WITH THE Apoha, -THERE ALSO, CONCOMITANCE WITH THE WORD WOULD
BE UNATTAINABLE, AS IT WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON
SOMETHING ELSE."—[Shlo.- Vă. Apoha 120]—(972)
COMMENTARI
There also ', -i.e. in the Entity along with the Apona being regarded as denoted by the word, the concomitanoe 'i.e. indication-of the various variations of the non-blue Lotus with the word 'Blue-would be unatainable ;-why ?--because the word-Blue-would be dependent upon something else ; inasmuch as it denotes the object only as subordinate to the Ecclusion, and not directly; and as there is no direct denotation, there could be no indication of its variations : just as the word 'sweetdoes not indicate the white colour; though as things stand, the white colour is a variety of the non-sweet, yet, the potency of the word lies in the indication of the varieties of only that which it denotes directly, and not in that of the variety of what is denoted through the intervention of something else. Consequently, as there would be no indication, by the word 'blue', of the varieties of the Lotus, this latter could not be its variety; and when it could not be its variety, no co-ordination would be possible.
Thus, then, the objection that you have yourself urged against the denotation of the Individual as endowed with the Universal,-by the statement that 'the word cannot denote that which possesses the Universal, because it is not independent',-is applicable also to the view that what is denoted is the entity along with the ecclusion. This is what has been made clear by the Text. That is to say, if the denotation of the word consisted of the Entity along with the Universal', then the word 'Sat', 'Being', 'Existence, would express the substance with the form of the Universal as its subordinate factor, and not directly ; because it does not indicate the varieties in the shape of the Jar and other things; and in the event of the varieties not being indicated, there can be no co-ordination, as already pointed out. This same incongruity is equally applicable to the view that what is denoted is the entity along with the Exobion; as in this case also the word 'sat' would

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express the substance with the Exclusion as its subordinate factor, and not directly; and the non-indication of varieties would be present here also. What then would be the difference between the Universal' and the 'Exclusion' or between that having the Universal' and that having the Exclusion'?
(972)
The following Text points out another objection:
TEXT (973).
** THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE Apoha AND GENDER,
NUMBER, ETO. AS THE INDIVIDUAL IS INEXPRESSIBLE, THERE CAN BE NO CONNECTION THROUGH THAT
EITHER."--[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 135)-(973)
COMMENTARY. Cender-Masculine, Feminine and Neuter. Number -Singular, Dual, Plural.
Etcetera'Stands for the connection of Action (Verb}, Time (Tense) and so forth.
There can be no oonnection botween those and Apoha, as this latter is a non-entity; while the factors mentioned are all properties of Entities. Nor can the word over denote anything devoid of the said Gender, etc. What is meant is that in this way the Proposition (of the Apohist) is contrary to experience.
It might be argued that The Particular (Individual) which forms the substratum of Exclusion is an entity, and it can therefore have the necessary connection with Gender, etc. and through that, these can be attributed to the Apoha also
The answer to this is As the Individual, etc. etc.; that is to say, the said Individual, being indeterminate' (hence inexpressible), cannot be spoken of as connected with Gender, Number, etc.; how then could these be attributed to the Apoha, through the Individual 1-(973)
The following Test proceeds to show that what has been held regarding Apoha being the denoted and denotative is not all embracing (not applicable to all words).
TEXT (974).
"IN THE CASE OF VERBS, THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' IS NEVER COGNISED ; BECAUSE IN THEIR CASE THERE IS NOTHING TO BE DENIED WHICH COULD FORM THE OBJECT OF EX
CLUSION."—[Shlo.-Vā. Apoha 1397—(974)
COMMENTARY
In the case of Verbs-words with conjugational endings, like pachati' 'cooks'), gachchhati' ('goes') and the like, wherein action forms the

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predominant factor, no exclusion of others' is apprehended ;-why ? because in their case, etc. etc.'; in the case of nouns-terms like .ghafa (Jar), oto.-with declensional endings, there are certain well-established entities in the shape of the non-jar, etc. which are negatived and can figure in the exclusion' (expressed by the word Jar'); not 50 in the case of verbs, like 'pachati', etc. where no well-established counter-entities are ever apprehended.-(974)
The following might be urgedThere may be nothing to be negatived actually figuring in the exclusion, even so, there may be a probable counterentity (na-pachati) of which there could be negation in the form na-na-pachali.' [So that the denotation of the verb pachati would be na-na-pachali]:
This is answered in the following
TEXTS (975-976).
"EVEN WHEN na-na WOULD BE UTTERED, THERE WOULD BE NEGATION
OF NEGATION ONLY; SO THAT THE pachati (ACTION OF cooking) WOULD REMAIN THERE IN ITS OWN (POSITIYD) FORM.SIMILARLY IN THE CASE OF VERBS THERE IS THE IDEA or being in course of accomplishment, AS ALSO THAT OF THE past, ETC.; AND AS Apoha IS SOMETHING WELL-ESTABLISHED, THESE IDEAS WOULD BE BASELESS (IF Apoha WERE ALL THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS)."[Shlo. Va. Apoha 140-141)
(975-976)
COMMENTARY.
Even when the expressionna-na-pachati' is uttered, what is expressed is only the negation of a probable negation.
What is the harın in that ?
Answer-So that the pachati' éto sto; that is to say, two negatives alwaye denote an affirmation; so that on the use of the suid expression, the action of pachati' remains there in its positive form ; hence the denotation of the word would be positive (not negative, in the shape of Apoha).
Then again, the verb pachati' signifies an act in the course of being accomplished; and that action is regarded as in the course of being accomplished of which some portions have been accomplished while some are still unaccom. plished, and of which therefore the portions happen to be in a certain order of sequence.-Similarly in the case of such verbs as 'abhūt' (Past Tense) and bhavisyati (Future Tense), there are ideas of past and future points of time.

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- In regard to the Apoha however, no such ideas of being in course of accomplishment, etc. is possible ; because it is a fully accomplished thing con. sisting entirely of Negation. Consequently, under the view that Apoha is denoted by words, the idea of being in course of accomplishment and also the idea of 'past', 'future and the like can have no basis at all; hence it is contrary to experience.
Bhutädirūpanam', -the conception, idea, of the Past, etc.-1975-976)
The following lects proceed to show that the theory cannot cover all cases and as such it is contrary to experience :
TEXTS (977-979).
" IN THE CASE OF THE WHOLE MASS OF DENOTATIONS LIKE Injunction
AND THE LIKE, THERE IS NO IDEA OF TRE' EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'. How COULD THERE BE ANY A poha EVEN WHEN THE NEGATIVE IS COUPLED WITH NEGATION -PARTICLES LIKE Cha" AND THE REST CAN HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH THE NEGATIVE; HENCE HERE ALSO NO Apoha IS POSSIBLE. IN THE CASE OF WHAT IS EXPRESSED BX A SENTENCE, THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS CANNOT EVEN BE IN. DICATED.-IN THE CASE OF SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS 'ananyāpoha (NON-EXCLUSION OF OTHERS'), NO DENOTATION IS APPREHENDED AT ALL APART FROM THE POSITIVE).-WHEREFORE TOO COULD THERE BE ANYTHING EXCLUDED IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS As Pramēya' AND Tñeya' (WHICH EMBRACE ALL CONCEIVABLE THINGS) ?"_[Shlo. Vă. Apoha 142-1441-(977-979)
COMMENTARY.
* And the like is meant to include Invitation, Addressing and the like.
There is no idea-apprehension of the exclusion' - denial-of other things, and the reason for this lies in the fact that there is nothing to be denied that could figure in the denial', as pointed out above (under Text 974).
In such expressions as 'na na-pachati devadattah' ('Devadatta is not non-cooking'), where one negative is coupled with another negative, what sort of Apoha could be possible ? None at all; since two negatives always imply the affirmative.
Furthor, in the case of particles like 'cha'-i.e. of all nipāta adverbs, prefixes, prepositions, and so forth, all which have been regarded as words;

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and yet these can have no connection with the negative, as such a combination would not be expressive of anything at all. That is to say, in the case of the word 'Jar', when it is connected with the negative in the expression 'non-jar, one has the notion of something else, in the shape of the Cloth; and hence the denotation of the word Jar' without the negative is held to consist in the 'negation (exclusion) of that other thing (Cloth)'; in the case of the particles cha' and the like, there is no connection with the negative, in such expressions as 'na cha'; and what is not connected with the negative cannot be negatived (or excluded). Hence in this case no Apoha is possible; i.e. there must be absence of Apoha.
Further, in the case of sentences, what is expressed by them is held to be of one mixed form, like the variegated colour; consequently the exclusion of others' cannot be indicated in their case; because there is no counterentity known to exist in any accomplished form. It has been asserted that in the case of such sentences as Chaitra, bring the cow, the exclusion of others' is assumed to be in parts-such as that of non-chaitra' and the rest. But this would be a case of denotation of words, not of the Sentence. As it is one impartite whole, and does not admit of such dissection. Thus then your theory of the denotation of words does not cover all cases.
Then again, in the case of such expressions as Na anyapohaḥ Ananyapohaḥ, there is nothing apprehended as denoted, except something positive,Because what is understood to be denoted is not merely the form of the Apoha; as the double negative always expresses the positive.
The particle adi (in the compound ananyapohashabdädau") stands for such synonyms as 'ananyavyävrtti, ananyavyavachchheda and so forth. Objection: What is said here has already been said (under 977) in the words' Nañashchapi naña, etc.; so that there is needless repetition'.
True. But the reiteration is made with a view to showing that the words of the Apohist himself-that the denotation of words consists in the Exclusion of Others-show that he regards the denotation to be positive. Because what the term 'anyapoha', 'Exclusion of Others', excludes (or denies) is what is denoted by the term 'ananyapoha', 'Non-exclusion of Others'; and this latter is clearly understood to be positive.
Then there are such words as 'cognisable', 'knowable', 'predicable' and so forth; and there is nothing that is excluded by these; as all things are 'cognisable, etc. by their very nature. If anything were assumed to be excluded by these words, it would be entirely cognised in the form of "exclusion'; and as such would remain cognisable'; because what is not cognised cannot be excluded. Then, as there is nothing that could be excluded in this case, the theory of the Apohist cannot be universally true.(977-979)
Objection-In the Hatumukha (a work of that name) it has been declared that there is Inference of the Cognisable as consisting of the Exclusion of the Non-cognisable which is assumed for the purpose. So that how can our Apoha-theory fail to apply to the case of these words?'
Answer:

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TEXTS (980-981). " RATHER THAN ASSUME THE THING TO BE EXCLUDED, IT IS FAR BETTER
TO ASSUME THE ENTITY ITSELF.-AS THE IDEA OF THINGS BEING OF THE FORM OF COGNITIONS HAS BEEN REJECTED, WHAT IS DENOTED CANNOT BE ANYTHING INTERNAL (SUBJECTIVE); NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR ANY SUBJECTIVE THING TO BE EXCLUDED'. THUS THERE CAN BE NO A poha IN THE CASE OF THE WORDS IN QUESTION.- LASTLY, IN THE CASE OF SUCK WORDS AS 'ēva', NOTHING IS FOUND TO BE EXCLUDED'.[Shlo. Vă. Apoha 145-146)
-980-981)
COMMENTARY. If all that is cognisable is assumed to be excluded as cognisable ,then it is far better to admit the positive entity itself to be denoted by the word; which is what is accepted by all men. That is to say, in so doing there would be no assumption of the Unseeni, nor the denial of the Seen. That is why it is spoken of as 'far better'.
Some (Buddhists) have held the view that what is denoted by all words is only the reflection of conceptual thought, and it is this that is excluded, differentiated and expressed'.
The answer to this is-As the idea of things, etc. etc. That is, we have already rejected the idea that things are of the nature of cognitions; and we have done so on the ground that Cognition is formless, while the thing has a form and is clearly perceived as existing in the external world; consequently there being no internal (subjective) form resting in Cognition, it cannot be right to regard any such thing as denoted by words.
Nor is it possible for any such subjective thing to be rejected, for the same reason that no such thing exists.
In the case of the words in question—i.e. words like 'Cognisable'.
Then again, there are such words ag évam' ('thus '), ittham' ('in this way ') and so forth; in the case of these, nothing is iound that can be ex. cluded ': & there is no counter-entity in this case, in the form of what could be excluded.
It might be argued that in such expressions as 'na evam' ('not thus') there is something probable that could be regarded as excluded'.
This also is not possible in this case, as already pointed out. Because here also, in the expression 'na nawam', there is negation of negation; and the 'évam' remains in its own unnegatived-positive-form. So the same reason that we had urged before becomes applicable here also.—(980-981)
All the above has been set forth as put forward by Kumärila. With the following Teacts, the Author proceeds to set forth objections put forward by Uddyotakara against Apoha [In Nyayavartika on 2. 2. 63, pp. 332-333]:

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TEXTS (982–988).
* IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'ALL' (sarva') WHAT IS IT THAT IS ASSUMED
TO BU THE EXCLUDED'? THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS THE non-all, WHICH COULD BE EXCLUDED.-IF IT BE URGED THAT'one AND THE REST'ARE THE non-all, THEN IT COMES TO BE THE EXCLUSION OF THE DENOTATION ITSELF; AS THE parts WOULD BE EXCLUDED, AND NO whole IS ADMITTED.-SIMILARLY, IN REGARD TO THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD GROUP (Samüha '). THE CONSTITUENTS WOULD BE EXCLUDED; AND NOTHING APART FROM THIS IS ADMITTED, HENCE ALL SUCH WORDS BECOME DEPRIVED OF THEIR MEANING.-AS REGARDS THE WORDS TWO AND THE REST, WHICH ALSO ARE APPLIED TO groups, AS THE 'ONE' AND OTHER CONSTITU. ENTS WOULD BE EXCLUDED, THEY COULD NO LONGER BE SO APPLICABLE.-THEN AGAIN, THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD Cow' is SAID TO BE THE 'NON-NON.Cow'; - NOW IS This positive or negative ? IP IT IS positive, IS IT THE COW OR THE Non-cow ?-IF IT IS THE Cow, THEN THERE IS NO DISPUTE, AS THE DENOTATION TURNS OUT TO BE OF THE POSITIVE CHARACTER. ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT IS THE non-Cow THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD Cow, THAT WOULD EXHIBIT A WONDERFUL INSIGHT INTO THE MEANINGS OF WORDS INDEED-NOR CAN IT BE negative; AS, IN THAT CASE INJUNCTION AND THE REST WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.-NOR DOES ANY ONE EVER COMPREHEND A negation FROM THE WORD Cow."-(982-988)
COMMENTARY.
U&dyotakara has argued as follows:-"It cannot be right to say that words denote the Apoha of other things; because this explanation cannot apply to all words; that is to say, in the case of words where there are two mutually exclusive contradictions, it may be that when one is affirmed the other is denied; as for instance, it may be true that when the word 'Cow' is heard, the Cow is affirmed and the non-Cow is denied. But this is not possible in the case of the word 'Sarva' ('all'), as there is no such thing as non-all, which could be denied by the word 'all'--' But in this case also, there is denial or preclusion of ons and the rest; so that our explanation takes in this case also' You mean that one and the rest are the contradictories of all, the non-all which are excluded by the word 'all'But this is not right; as it involves the incongruity of words abandoning their own meaning. If the word "all' excludes one and the rest,-inasmuch as these latter are what go to make up the Au, and (for the Buddhist) the whole has no existence apart from its constituents, the exclusion of one and the rest would mean the exclusion of everything that goes to make up the An, and there would be

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nothing left for the word 'all' to denote : and this word would thus become meaningless.-[The word 'anga' stands for part).-Similarly all collective words, like group and the rest, would become meaningless, if they were used for the exelusion of their own constituents; as it is held that the group has no existence apart from the members that take up that group. -As for the words 'two' and the rest, they also pertain to groups (of Two, Three, etc.); so that, if they denoted the exclusion of one and the rest -as these, being precluded, would not be there to make up the said groups, the words would become meaningless."
This is the argument that is indicated by the words They would not be so applicable (Text 985). What is meant is that the words in question are accepted as applicable to groups; but they would cease to be so applicable.
"Further, when it is asserted that what the word Cow' denotes is the • Apoho of other things i.e. something that is not non-Cow';—is this something (A) Positive or (B) Negative 1-(A) If it is Positive, is it the Cow or the non-Cov? If it is the Cow, then there is no quarrel between us.If it is the non-cow that is held to be denoted by the word Cow'; this shows a wonderful insight into the meanings of words -(B) Nor can it be something Negative; as nothing negative can form the subject of any injunc. tion or comprehension thereof; as a matter of fact, when one hears the word
Cow', 'neither the Injunction nor its comprehension pertains to anything merely negative."
This is the argument that is indicated in the words 'Nor can it be negative, etc., etc.'-* Praisa' stands for Praisana, Injunction; that is, the urging of the hearer by the Speaker to something; this belongs to the Speaker; while . Comprehension' belongs to the hearer.-The term ' and the rest' is meant to include such nouns as carrier", milker and the like.
Lastly, it is by actual experience that the meaning of words is comprehended ; and as a matter of fact, no one ever comprehends negation from the word 'Cow':-(982–988)
"Further, Apoha, Exclusion, being an Action, it behoves you to point out its object (i.e. the object excluded). That is to say, you explain Apoha' as 'not being the non-Cow'; now is this object of the Apoka, the Cow or the non-Oow 2-If it pertains to the Cow, how can there be negation of the Cow in the Cow itself ?-If, on the other hand, it pertains to the non-Cow, how can the Apoha or Exclusion of one thing (non-Cow) lead to the comprehension of another thing the Cow)? Certainly, when the Khadira tree is cut, the outting does not fall upon the Palasha tree.-Further, if the phrase "the Cow is not the non-Cow' is explained as the negation, in the Cow, of the non-Cow, then you should explain who has ever conceived of the Cow as the non-Oow,—which conception would be negatived by the said Apoha ?"
The Arguer regards the first two alternatives as irrelevant, hence he sets forth the third alternative (that there is preclusion, in the Cow, of the non-Cow]:
34

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TEXTS (989-994).
* WIY IS THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD (Cow') HELD TO BE THE
A poha—IN THE FORM THE Cow is not non-Cow'! WHO HAS EVER ATTRIBUTED THE CHARACTER OF THE non-Cow TO THE Cow—THAT IT IS DENIED HERE ?-IT IS HELD THAT IT IS THE EXCLUSION OF THE non-Cow' IN THE Cow, WHICH FORMS THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD IS THIS HELD TO BE SOMETHING DIFFERENT FROM THE Cow! OR NON-DIFFERENT !-IF IT IS different, DOES IT ABIDEOr not ABDR-ANYWHERE? IF IT DOES ABIDE, THEN IT BECOMES A Quality, AND THE WORD CANNOT BE DENOTATIVE OF THE Substance ; -AND THUS AS THE WORD Cow' WOULD DENOTE ONLY A Quality. THERE WOULD BE NO CO-ORDINATION IN SUCH EXPRESSIONS AS THE Cow MOVES, THE COW STANDS'.-IF IT DOES NOT ABIDE IN ANY THING, THEN WHAT WOULD BE THE SENSE IN WHICH IT COULD BE MENTIONED, FOR THE PURPOSE OF exclusion, BY THE TERM Agok,
OF THE NON-Cow'?-IF, LASTLY, THE "A poha', EXCLUSION OF OTHERS IS HELD BY YOU TO BE non-different (FROM THE Cow), THEN IT COMES TO BE THE SAME As Cow; WHAT MORE WOULD, IN THAT CASE, BE EXPRESSED (BY THE TERM ' Apoha') ? "-(989-994)
COMMENTARY
The particle cha' in Text, 989) has the collective sense; what is meant by the sentence is—why do you assert the denotation of the word 'Cow" to be the Apoha in the form of 'Not non-Cow'?
Why should it not be 80 asserted'? (asks the Buddhist). The answer is— Who has, etc. etc.?
* For the following reason also Apoha cannot be accepted :-Because none of the alternatives possible under that theory is admissible : The A poha, or Exclusion, of the non-Cow in the Cow, is this (A) Different, or (B) Non-different-(from the Cow)(A) If it is different; (a) does it abide (in the Cow)? Or (6) does it not abide in it a) If it does abide in it, then, inasmuch as it abides in it, it becomes a Quality; that is, the word Cow' denotes a Quality, and not the Substance, the animal, Cow; and under the circumstances, there can be no such Co-ordination as that expressed in the words 'the Cow is standing', 'the Cow is moving':-(b) If, on the other hand, it does not abide in it, then what is the significance of the Genitive ending in the phrase 'agoh apohah' ('the Apoha of the nonCor) -(B) II, lastly, the Apoha is non-different from the Cow, then it is the same as the Cow, and the postulating of it is entirely sutile."-(989994)

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TEXTS (995-996).
"Is This Apoha ONE AND THE SAME IN CONNECTION WITH ALL THINGS? OR IS IT SEVERAL I-IF ONE, THEN, BEING RELATED TO SEVERAL
COWS, IT WOULD BE THE SAME AS THE UniversalCow':-IF IT IS SEVERAL, THEN IT WOULD BE ENDLESS, -LIKE SO MANY INDIVIDUAL OB. JECTS. CONSEQUENTLY, JUST LIKE THE DIVERSE INDIVIDUALS, THIS ALSO COULD NOT BE DENOTED' -
(995-996)
COMMENTARY.
[Uddyotakara continues]—"You should explain whether this Apoha is one and the same in regard to all things? Or is it different with each individual thing? If it is one and the same, and is related to several cows, then it is the same as the Universal Cow. If on the other hand, it is many (differing with each individual cow), then it is as endless as the individual objects themselves ; so that no conception of it would be possible; which means that it cannot be denoted."-(995-996)
TEXTS (997-1000).
THIS Apoha. EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS '-IS IT ITSELF denoted Or not-denoted ? EVEN IF IT is denoted, IS IT DENOTED AS SOME THING positive ? OR ONLY AS THE 'NEGATION OF OTHER THINGS? -IF IT IS DENOTED AS SOMETHING positive, THEN YOU SHOULD ABANDON YOUR EXTREMIST VIEW, WHEREBY IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED THAT'in every case it is the exclusion of other things THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS.'-IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SAID'EXCLUSION (Apoha) IS DENOTED IN THE FORM OF THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS,THEN SUCH A VIEW WOULD INVOLVE AN INFINITE BEGRESS.
-IP THEN IT BE HELD BY YOU THAT THE SAID Apoha (EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS) IS not denoted, THEN YOUR ASSERTION, THAT *THE WORD ALWAYS BRINGS ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS, WOULD BECOME ANNULLED."-(997-1000)
COMMENTARY
* You have to be questioned-is this Apoha denoted or not denoted! If it is denoted, is it denoted as something positive? Or as the 'exclusion of other things I-If it is denoted as something positive, then the assertion that "The denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things'.

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is not universally true.-If it is denoted as the exclusion of other things, then that exclusion of others' would itself have to be denoted as another
exclusion of other things'; and so on and on, there would be no end to it. -If then the Apoha is held to be not-denoted, then that would contradict the statement that the word brings about the exclusion of what is denoted by other words!."-(997-1000)
All this has been set forth by Uddyotakara. In answer to this, the revered Dirinaga has declared as follows = In all cases, the substratum being the same, there is no disruption, and all that is desired is duly accomplished; hence in due course, all characteristics of the Universal', such as one-ess, eternality, complete subsistence in every component-subsist in the Apoha itself. Consequently, on account of the superiority of its excellence, the only theory that is right is that the denotation of words consists in the exclusion of other things.
In reference to this, Kumärila argues as follows, thereby summing up the arguments against the doctrine of A poha:
TEXTS (1001-1002).
"FURTHER, one-nesa, eternality and subsistence in every individual,
ONE WHO WOULD ATTRIBUTE THESE TO Apohas WHICH ARE FEATURELESS, WOULD BE MAKING CLOTH WITHOUT YARNS.FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ELEMENT OF
EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' COULD BE PRESENT ONLY IN THE DENOTATION OF THOSE WORDS WHEREIN THE NEGATIVE TERM IS PRESENT; IN ALL OTHER CASES THE THING ITSELF IS WHAT IS DENOTED." [ShlokaVartika-Apoha-163-164.]
-(1001-1002)
COMMENTARY.
In those words alone where the negative term is present', -e.g. in such expressions as abhakeyo grāmasukarah', 'the tame hog is not-to-be-eaten!
The thing itself-in the positive form.
In all other cases where the negative term is not present.-(10011002)
Having thus set forth the opinions of others, in order of importance, the Author set forth the answer to these :

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TEXTS (1003-1004). ALL THESE ARE WRONG VIEWS BASED UPON IGNORANCE OF WHAT IS MEANT BY THEA poha, NEGATION, OF OTHER THINGS PEOPLE WHO ARE THEMSELVES DAMNED DAMN OTHERS ALSO.-AS A MATTER OF FACT, A poha IS OF TWO KINDS DUE TO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN-(1) Paryudāsa (RELATIVE NEGATION, CONTRADISTINCTION, EXCLUSION) AND (2) Nişēdha (ABSOLUTE NEGATION, DENIAL, PROHIBITION) Paryudāsa AGAIN IS OF TWO KINDS -(a) DUE TO DIFFERENCE OF Conception (IDEA), AND (6) DUE TO DIFFERENCE OF CONCEPT (OBJECT).
(1003-1004)
COMMENTARY. Due to difference, etc. etc. .e. because there is Relative Negation and Absolute Negation, there are two kinds of Apoha, Negation.
Due to difference in Conception, etc. etc. i.e. due to difference of the nature of the Conception, and due to difference of the nature of the Concept. Of these the nature of Conception consists in the appearance of cognition of several things in one comprehensive form ;-and the nature of Concept consists in the nature of the object, as contradistinguished from unlike objects, i.e. in the form of Specific Individuality'; and the two kinds of Paryudisa are based upon difference of these two;- such is the sense of the compound.-(1003-1004)
The following Text points out the form of Negation (Paryudas, Exclusion) in the form of Conception
TEXTS (1005-1006). IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED ON A PREVIOUS OCCASION (TEXT 723) THAT THINGS LIKE THE Haritaki AND OTHER THINGS, THOUGH DISTINCT FROM ONE ANOTHER, BECOME THE BASIS OF UNITARY CONCEPTION. Ox THE BASIS OF SUCH THINGS, THERE APPEARS A reflection IN THE DETERMINATE COGNITION, WHICH REFLECTION IS DEFINITELY APPREHENDED (CONCEIVED OF) AS 'OBJECTS, EVEN THOUGH THE OBJECTIVE CHARACTER IS ABSENT IN IT. (AND IT IS THIS CONCEPTION OF THE REFLECTED IMAGE THAT
IS CALLED ' Apoha').-(1005-1006)
COMMENTARY. On a previous occasion '--.e, in the chapter on the examination of the 'Universal', under Text 723 et seq. It has been explained there that,

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many such things as the Haritaki and the rest, without any commonalty among them, perform the same function of allaying fever and other diseases -and exactly in the same manner the Black and other Cows, even though different among themselves, become, by their very nature, the basis of the unitary conception, even without any such entity as the Commonalty or the Universa).
Abhayādisamak':-.e. bke the Haritaki, etc.--the similarity consisting in fulfilling the same purpose.
On the basis of such things, etc. etc.;-on the basis of consisting in objects like the Haritaki and the rest.-brought about by the apprehension of the action of such causes,—is the determinate Cognition in this cognition there is the reflection, reflected image of the objects, i.e. there appears a reflection which is apprehended as the same as the objects ;-and it is to this apprehension that the name 'Apoha' has been applied.
Determinate', - this is an adjective qualifying cognition'.
* Arthätmata haue' ; -even though the character of the external object'is wanting.
Nishchitam-definitely apprehended.-(1005-1006)
Question :-"Why has the name 'Apoha' been given to it!" Answer
TEXTS (1007–1009). (1) BECAUSE IT APPEARS AS EXCLUDED (DISTINGUISHED) FROM
APPEARANCES',-(2) BECAUSE IT IS THE BASIS (OAUSE) OF THE COGNITION OF A THING AS EXCLUDED FROM OTHERS,-(3) BECAUSE IT IS COGNISED THROUGH AN ENTITY 'EXCLUDED (FROM OTHERS),AND (4) BECAUSE IT IS APPREHENDED IN THE FORM OF THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY CONSISTING IN THE EXCLUSION OF UNLIKE THINCS, BY PERSONS CONFOUNDED BY ITS SAMEWERS-THE NAME ' Apoha, ExCLUSION, OF OTHERS' HAS BEEN GIVEN TO IT, ON THE SAID
BASIS. (1007-10098)
COMMENTARY.
The name Apoha' has been applied to it on four grounds :-(1) Firstly and chiefly, because it itself appears as excluded (distinguished) from the appearances imposed by other conceptions,-the name 'A poha of others' has been applied, in the sense of what is excluded—* apohyata' from other s—anyasmāt':-On the other three grounds the name rests only indirectly (figuratively). (2) For instance, through imposing the character of the Effect upon the Ortuse ; as when the name is applied because it is the cause of the cognition of a thing as excluded from others ;-(3) it is applied

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through imposing the character of the Cause upon the Effect; as when the name is applied oshlistavastu-dvära': i.e. through - by means of an *entity which is 'ashlissa -i.e. excluded from others'; i.e. it proceeds from the apprehension of the said conception :-(4) the fourth ground lies in the fact that it is apprehended by persons confounded by its sameness with the exclusion of unlike things
Its sameness' i.e. the sameness of the reflection of the object in the conceptual thought.
On the said basis -i.e, on the basis of the four facts, in the shape of its appearing as excluded from other appearances and so forth.--(1007-1008)
The following text shows the form of the Apoha in the form of the object :
TEXT (1009),
SO ALSO, IN REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE SAID ' EXCLUSION'; -ON THE GROUND THAT THERE
I$ IN IT THE 'EXCLUSION OF OTHERS.-(1009)
COMMENTARY.
the grotte, unlike: What is
The words of the preceding text-the name Exclusion of others has been given to it on the said basis '; -have to be construed along with this text also.
The basis (for this Apoha) is pointed out on the ground, etc. etc.' ;-that is, on the ground of the presence therein of the differentiationexclusion from other i.e. unlike, heterogeneous,-things; i.e. because the exclusion of unlike things is there. What is meant by this is that to the
Specifio Individuality', the name 'Apoha, Exclusion, of others is applicable in its primary sense.-(1009)
The following Text points out the form of epoha in the form of Negation Absolute
TEXT (1010).
NEGATION ABSOLUTE' WE HAVE IN SUCH INSTANCES AS THE Cow IS NOT non-Cow'; IN THIS THE NEGATION OF THE OTHER' IS
VERY CLEARLY APPREHENDED.-(1010)
COMMENTARY.
Having thus set forth the nature of the three kinds of A poha, the Author proceeds to connect it with the subject matter under discussion, the Denotation of Words

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TEXT (1011).
IT IS THE first OF THESE A pohas THAT IS EXPRESSED BY WORDS ; BECAUSE THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY WORDS APPREHENDS THE
EXTERNAL OBJECT.-(1011)
COMMENTARY. First-.e. that which consists in the Reflection of the object, as described above (in Text, 1006).
The reason for this is explained- Because the cognition, etc. etc.that alone should be regarded as the denotation of words' which actually appears in the Verbal Cognition ;--and as a matter of fact, in Verbal Cognition, there is no apprehension of Negation Absolute, nor that of the Specific Individuality', as there is in Sense-cognition; what actually appears in it is that Verbal Cognition only which apprehends the external object. Hence it is only the reflection of the External Object, which appears directly in Verbal Cognition as identical with it, that can be rightly held to be the denotation of the word.-(1011)
As regards the well-known relation of the denotative and denoted which subsists between the word and its denotation,-it is none other than the relation of Cause and Effect; in fact it is of the nature of the relation of C and Effect itself. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1012).
WHEN THE COGNITION OF THE REFLECTION IN THAT FORM HAS BESULTED FROM THE WORD, THERE HAS COME ABOUT THE RELATION OF Denoted and Denotative, IN THE SHAPE OF Cause
and Effect.-(1012)
COMMENTARY
The Reflection in that form is that reflection which is of the nature of the apprehended external object; when the birth-appearance of the cognition of that-has been brought about-produced, -the relation that has resulted is, on reflection, found to be that of Carse and Effect. For instance, the Word, as bringing about the Reflection, is called denotative'; and the Reflection, brought about by the Word, is the denoted'.
Thus the assertion made by the Opponent--that 'mere negation does not figure in Verbal Cognition (Text, 910)—is irrelevant; because mere negation is not regarded as the denotation of words.-(1012)
It has been shown that Apoha, in the form of Reflection, being brought About directly by words, forms the primary denotation of words. The Anthor now proceeds to show that there would be nothing incongruoua in

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describing the other two kinds of Apoha (described under 1007-1008) as forming the secondary (indirect) ' denotation of words':
TEXTS (1013-1015).
THE DIRECT FORM (OF Apoha) HAVING BEEN EXPLAINED AS ABOVE, Absolute Negation ALSO IS APPREHENDED BY IMPLICATION IN THE FORM THAT THE NATURE OF THIS THING IS NOT THE NATURE OF THE OTHER THING-WHEN THERE IS CONNECTION (OF THE WORD) WITH CERTAIN THINGS, THERE COMES ABOUT, BY IMPLICATION, THE APPREHENSION OF
EXCLUDED THINGS ALSO.-HENCE THIS ALSO IS FIGURATIVELY SPOKEN OF AS THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD.
THESE TWO KINDS OF VERBAL A poha ARE NOT DIRECTLY SPOKEN OF AS SUCH.
-(1013-1015)
COMMENTARY.
. As above-as something brought about. Question :-"How is Absolute Negation apprehended by implication ?"
Answer:-That the nature, etc. etc.—That is, on the basis of the fact that the nature of this thing-the reflection of the Cow-is not the nature of the other thing-the reflection of the Horse and other things.
Having this shown that the notion of the Apoha in the shape of Absolute Negation forms, on the ground of invariable concomitance, the secondary denotation of words, the Author proceeds to assert the same in regard to * Specific Individuality also :- When there is connection, etc. etc.' ;-the
connection of the Word with the object meant here is the indirect one of invariable concomitance in the shape of that of Cause and Effect; in the follow. ing way - First of all there is the apprehension of the object as it stands i then the speaker's desire to speak of it, then the movement of his palate and other organs of speech; then the utterance of the word ; in this way when there is this indirect connection between the word and the objects spoken of-such as Fire and the like,-then there follows the cognition, through Presumption, of the object as 'excluded from unlike things'.
Thus both these kinds of Apoha,- Absolute Negation and that in the form excluded from others, -are figuratively spoken of as denoted, by the word.
This also';-i.e. the Specific Individuality; also refers to the Absolute Negation.-(1013-1015)
As against the Revered Dinnāga, Uddyotakara has urged the following (in Nyayavārtika, 2. 2. 63, pages 333-334) :-"If the Apoha is not denoted
word (Apoha), then you have to explain what the word can signify apart from what is denotable by it? If that same (Apoha itself) forms

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the denotation of the word, then, this would be incompatible with your declaration that 'a word is said to denote something when it is found that it brings about, in its denotation, the exclusion of what is denoted by other words '; as the only meaning that this declaration could have (under the theory that Apoha is not denoted) would be that the non-denotative word denotes something-(which is absurd)".
The following Text proceeds to explain that this assertion has been made through ignorance of the meaning of the words (of the Teacher), and to show that there is no incongruity in those words -
TEXT (1016).
WHEN THE WORD BRINGS ABOUT THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS, IT IS SAID TO 'denote ITS OWN MEANING'; AND THERE IS NO
INCONGRUITY IN THIS.-(1016)
COMMENTARY
The Specific Individuality also is the word's own meaning ', by implication,-as explained before and when in its own meaning in the shape of the Specific Individuality, the Word brings about produces the ex. elusion of other things '-i.e. the Apoha in the form of Reflection, as excluded (distinguished) from other Reflections, then it is said to denote' it. And there is nothing incongruous in the words of our Teacher.--(1016)
The following Texts explain this same declaration of Dirnāga's :
TEXTS (1017-1018).
The WORD IS SAID TO DENOTE BECAUSE IT PRODUCES A REFLECTION OF THE CONCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL THING; IT DOES NOT TOUCH THE EXCLUSIVE FACTOR IN THE SHAPE OF THE SPECIFIO INDIVIDUALITY; APART FROM THE SAID PRODUCTION OF THE REFLECTION, THERE IS NO OTHER DENOTATIVE
FUNCTION OF THE WORD.--(1017-1018)
COMMENTARY.
What the revered Teacher means is as follows :-Of the word, there is no function of denoting external things, other than the producing of the Reflection of the Conception apprehending those things; because all entities are devoid of activity. Hence when the word produces the Reflection of the conception tending to the apprehension of the external thing, it is said that it denotes its meaning It does not touch the exclusive factor, in the shape of Specifie Individuality as excluded (distinguished) from like and unlike things, as this would serve no useful purpose.

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Apart from, etc. etc.' ;-i.e. apart from the producing of the said Reflection, there is no other denotative function of the word.-(1017-2018)
Having thus explained the nature of Apoha, the Author now proceeds to meet and set aside the objections urged by others.
It has been urged (by Bhumaha, under Text 912) that," if the word Cow serves the only purpose of excluding other things, then please point out some other word which would produce the notion of Cow in the Cow."
This is answered in the following
TEXT (1019).
IT IS ONLY WHEN THE REFLECTION HAS BEEN COGNISED THAT THERE FOLLOWS THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS' BY IMPLIOATION; BECAUSE THE IDEA OF OTHERS' DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE REFLECTION AT
ALL.-(1019)
COMMENTARY.
It is the idea of the Cow itself which is produced by the word ; as regards the 'exclusion of others, that is understood only by implication,-end from the word itself ; because the Reflection of the Cow is free from the touch of any other appearance (or reflection). Tf it were not so, then, it would never be apprehended in its specific form. That is why, for the bringing about of the idea of the Cow, another word is not sought after ; because the said idea of the Cow is produced by the word 'Cow' itself.(1019)
It has been urged (under 913 above) that," words have their froits in Cognitions, and any one word cannot have two fruits, etc. eto."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1020). AS IN THE CASE OF THE SENTENCE SPEAKING OF NOT EATING AT NIGHT', THE WORD IN QUESTION HAS TWO FRUITS (RESULTANTS), -ONE DIRECT AND THE OTHER BY IMPLICATION; AND IT IS SO BDOAUSE THERE IS NO AFFIRMATION ENTIRELY
WITHOUT NEGATION.-(1020)
COMMENTARY.
In the case of the sentence 'Fat Devadatla does not eat during the day, the direct meaning consists of the denial of eating during the day, and the implied meaning consists of the affirmation of eating during the night'; in the same manner, in the case of the word Cow', which is affirma

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
tive (positive) in character, the idea of affirmation is the direct resultant, and the idea of negation is the indirect resultant due to implication.
The reason for this is stated- And it is because, etc. etc.' ;- because there is no affirmation without negation; in fact, aflirmation is always con. comitant with the negation of the unlike; as there can be nothing which is not excluded (differentiated) irom things unlike itself.
Thus there is nothing incongruous in a single word having two resultants.-(1020)
Why is it so ?”
Question - Answer:
TEXT (1021).
BECAUSE THE WORD DOES NOT DIRECTLY BRING ABOUT BOTH THESE, (1) THE IDEA OF ITS OWN DENOTATION, AND (2) THE EXCLUSION
OF ANOTHER THING.-(1021)
COMMENTARY. There would be incongruity if it were held that both the resultantsaffirmation as well as negation-are brought about by the word at the same time; when however, the view is that, -as in the case of 'not eating during the day':only one is brought about directly, while the other is got at only by implication, then there is no incongruity.
As for the argument (urged in 014) that-"on hearing the word cow uttered, the first idea that one should obtain would be that of the nonDow", -thie also is rejected by what has been just said ; because no such view as indicated has been held by us ; that is to say, we have never held the view that the negation (erclusion) of the non-cow is done by the word directly, in fact, it has been already explained that this is obtained only by implication.-(1021)
It has been argued (by Kumarila, under Text 915, above) that-" Those who have accepted the commonalty in the shape of the negation of the noncow as denoted by the word, have admitted the positive entity, the Universal * Cow' to be so denoted".
This is answered in the following
TEXT (1022).
THE Universal Cow 'ALSO IS HELD TO BE AN APPEARANCE OF THE SAME KIND; INASMUCH IT IS APPREHENDED AS COMMON TO ALL
COWS—THE Variegated AND THE REST (1022)
COMMENTARY.
of the same kind', -that is, superimposed upon, reflected in Cogoition, as something external.
the

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The reason for this view is next stated-Inasmuch as, elc. etc.; all cows, variegated and the rest, are apprehended as Cow', 'Cow, as of common form; and it is on this account that this is called 'Commonalty or Universal '-(1022)
As regards its externality, that also is spoken oi as such only by persons tinder illusion; it is not real.-This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1023).
BECAUSE IT IS COGNISED AS A POSITIVE ENTITY, THEREFORE IT IS CALLED A 'POSITIVE ENTITY; THIS MISTAKEN COGNITION IS
PRODUCED QUICKLY FROM ITS SHED.-(1023)
COMMENTARY.
Objection : "If in any case, there were a positive entity in the shape of the Commonalty based upon an external object actually apprehended, then it might be possible to have an illusion of the Cormonalty based upon similarity; when however, there is no real primary Commonalty' (according to the Buddhist), the said illusion of commonalty is not possible for you."
Answer: This mistaken cognition, etc. etc. _ Quality' -.e. the cognition in question appears, independently of the perception of any real Commonalty,—through some internal aberration, like the conception of *two moons'; all illusions do not really proceed from the perception of similarity; they appear through mental aberration also. Hence there is no incongruity in our view.-(1023)
The following Text proceeds to show that our view is not open to the charge of 'futility -of having a Probandum that is already proved :
TEXT (1024). THAT SAME FORM OF THE COGNITION' CALLED THE ' Apoha', IS THE DENOTATION OF THE WORD, ALSO (REGARDED AS) A POSITIVE ENTITY', IN THE FORM OF THE COMMONALTY'; ON ACCOUNT OF ITS BEING APPREHENDED AS SUCH,
THROUGH MISTAKE (1024)
COMMENTARY.
The form of the Cognition described above, as imposed upon it as something external, is called Apoha', which is the denotation of the word '; and it is spoken of as an external thing, in the shape of the Commonalty (or Universal).
The reason for this is stated— On account, etc. etc.;-.e. because it is apprehended in the form of the Commonalty, and in the form of a positive entity.

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The reason for its being called the denotation of the word ' and the Apoha' has already been explained above, under Texts 1017 and 1007.(1024)
Question-"Wherefore is not that a real Commonalty (Universal) ?" Answer:
TEXT (1025)
IT IS NOT RIGHT TO RECARD ITS CHARACTER OF Universal entity, AS REAL; BEING NON-DIFFERENT FROM THE COGNITTON, HOW COULD IT
APPERTAIN TO ANOTHER THING ?-(1025)
COMMENTARY
In reality, the Apoha is not anything entirely different from the Cognition ; how then could it appertain to another thing,-by virtue of which appertenence, it could be the commonalty' of several things 1 It has been declared above-How can what is non-different from the Cognition appertain to another thing?!
For this same reason, our reasoning is not open to the charge of being redundant' (seeking to prove what is already admitted); because you do not admit the Universal named 'Cow' to be of the form of Cognition and not of the form of an entity, on the other hand, you postulate the Universal * Cow as a real entity embracing all cows-variegated and the rest. Hence our reasoning is not redundant
It has been urged (under 919) that,"If mere negation be assumed to be the denotation of words, this would be only the void expressed differently". As no such assumption is made by us, it does not affect our position.-(1025)
It has been urged (under 920, by Kumarila) that--" There would be apprehension therein of part of the cognition of the Horse itself, etc. etc".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1026). THOUGH THIS FORM OF Apoha' IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THE FORM OF THE COGNITION, YET ITS external character TS APPREHENDED
ONLY BY DELUDED PERSONS.-(1026)
COMMENTARY.
This is easily understood.-(1026)
It has been argued (under 921, by Kumarila) that—"if the denotation of words is independent of things, then the assumption of Apoha is useless"
The answer to this is as follows:

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TEXT (1027). TT IS NOT ENTIRELY INDEPENDENT OF THE OBJECT, INASMUCH AS THE
NOTION OF THAT COMES IN INDIRECTLY; AND YET IN THAT
FORM, THE CHARACTER OF POSITIVE ENTITY DOES NOT BELONG TO IT, AS EXPLAINED
BEFORE.-(1027)
COMMENTARY.
There is an indirect concomitance with the object; hence, even though the conception is primarily mistaken and illusory.-yet it is not entirely in. dependent of the oxternal object; just as the idea of jewel' in the brigirt, ness of the jewel (though wrong, is not independent of the jewel). Hence independence of the external object' is something not admitted by us.
As regards the argument (urged in Text 922, by Kumarila) that "the cognition that is produced in regard to the denotation of words is in the forin of the positive entity", -the answer is given in the words— and yet in that form, etc. etc., that is, even though the cognition is in the form of the positive entity, yet, the positive character that belongs to it is not in the form of something external, nor in the form of another cognition; as has been explained under Text 1014.-This also sets aside the view that the Apoha of other Cognitions' is not apprehended by a Cognition; because it is actually apprehended indirectly, by implication (1027)
It has been urged (under 923, by Kumūrila) that— Even in the absence of the external thing, just as there is Intuition denoted by the Sentence bo would it be in the case of the word also".
This is answered in the following
TEXT (1028).
THAT A poha, WHICH IS IN THE FORM OF REFLECTION, AND WHICH ALSO IS CALLED 'INTUITION', IS PRODUCED BY THE WORD ALSO ; AND WE READILY REGARD THIS AS THE
DENOTATION OF WORDS(1028)
COMMENTARY.
We have described the meaning of the Sentence as of the form of Reflection, named 'Intuition': so also is the meaning of the word described. Because by the Word also, what is produced is the Apoha in the form of Reflection; so that for us the Apoha in the form of the Reflection is held to be the denotation of the Word also, not only of the Sentence. This is what is meant by the term also. Thus there being no difference of opinion between us, the complaint against us is not right.-(1028)

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TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER XYI.
It has been argued (under 924, by Kumārila) that "the exclusion of one Cognition from another is not apprehended ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1029).
OWING TO THE TAOT OF ITS NOT BEARING ANY FACTOR APART FROM THE APPEARANCE OF ITS OWN FORM, ITS EXCLUSION FROM ANOTHER
COGNITION' BECOMES DULY APPREHENDED.-(1029)
COMMENTARY.
It is because the Cognition does not bear within itself any factor spart from the manifestation of its own form, that-on account of its being restricted within its own form,-the exclusion of one cognition from another becomes apprehended; otherwise, if the Cognition bore the form of another, how could it be apprehended as excluded from that another?
For that reason-i.e. because it does not apprehend any form other than its own.-(1029)
It has been argued (under 925, by Kumarila) that "Words that are denotative of diverse Universals and those that are denotative of Particulars would all be synonyms ".
This is answered as follows:
TEXT (1030).
HE CASE OF WHAT DOES NOT EXIST, ANY DIFFERENCE THAT MAY BE THERE CANNOT BE REAL; SO ALSO WOULD BE ITS NON-DIEFERENCE ; AND BENCE THE WORDS WOULD CERTAINLY
BE SYNONYMOUS.-(1030)
COMMENTARY.
A poha, being featureless, has no form; and hence it is said that there is no difference among Apohas ; similarly it is said that there is no non-difference among them. Thus there being no really non-different thing how can the contingency of all words being synonymous be urged against us 1-(1030)
This same idea is explained more clearly in the following

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TEXT (1031) NON-DIFFERENCE CONSISTS IN being of the same form ; HOW OAN THIS BE THERE IN WHAT ARE formless? WORDS BECOME SYNONYMS ONLY WHEN WHAT IS DENOTED BY THEM
$ ONE AND THE SAME.-(1031)
COMMENTARY. Question -" If there is no one form in formless things, why should words not be synonymous ? "
Answer :- Words become synonyms, etc. etc. (1031)
The following might be urged-" If among formless things, there cannot be presence of the same form, in reality.-even so it would be there in imaginary form ; and on the basis of that the incongruity of all words being synonymous can be rightly urged ".
Anster
TEXT (1032) JUST AS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF FORM, THERE IS IMAGINARY UNITY (UNIFORMITY), IN THE SAME MANNER, difference ALSO COULD
BE IMAGINARY ; WHENCE THEN COULD THE
WORDS BE SYNONYMOUS ?-(1032)
COMMENTARY. In the absence of form '-i.e. in the absence of any characteristic features. -(1032)
Question :-" If that is so, then how is there any such notion among people that these words are synonymous, and those others are not synonymous ? Answer:
TEXT (1033).
IN REALITY, WORDS ARE NEITHER SYNONYMOUS NOR NOT-SYNONYMOUS ; AS IT HAS BEEN EXPLAINED THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THEM
IS NEITHER one and the same NOR diverse.-(1033)
COMMENTARY.
If what is denoted by words were really different or non-different, then they could be either synonymous or not-synonymous. As a matter of fact, however, it has been explained above (under Tect, 871) that neither Specifio Individuality, nor the Universal, nor what is possessed of the Universal, can be really denoted by words.-(1033)
35

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"How then is there the restriction regarding words being synonymous and not synonymous ?" Answer -
TEXT (1034).
BUT WHENEVER MORE THAN ONE THING IS SEEN TO BE PERFORMING ONE AND THE SAME FUNCTION, THE PROPERTY OF ONENESS IS IMPOSED ON THEM AND THE SAME WORD IS
APPLIED TO THEM.—(1034)
COMMENTARY.
Even without there being any Commonalty (or Universal), there is restriction regarding the application of a common word to a mumber of things, and the basis of such application lies in the fact of several things performing the sexe fruitful function. By their very nature, some things, even though many, perform the same fruitful function; and for the purpose of expressing the fact of their performing the same initful function, people speaking of them,for the sake of brevity-impose upon them & common form, and apply to them a common name. For instance, when the various things—Colour, etc.-are found to perform the same function of containing Honey, Water and other things, the name Jar' is applied to them.-(1034)
Question :-"Without a single comprehensive (All-embracing) factor, how can a single word be rightly applied to several things ?
Answer—
TEXT (1035).
IN THE CASE OF THE EYE AND OTHER THINGS, ALL. TENDING TO BRING ABOUT THE SINGLE EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF THE COGNITION OF COLOUR, IF SOMEONE WERE TO APPLY A COMMON NAME,
EVEN WITHOUT A COMPREHENSIVE (COMMON) ELEMENT (IN THE SAME MANNER WOULD IT
BE IN OTHER CASES ALSO) -(1035)
COMMENTARY As a matter of fact, the application of words to things depends entirely upon the whim (of people). For instance, the Eye, Colour, Light and Mind, all tend to bring about the single effect of Colour.cognition; if some one, through sheer whim.-even without there being a common element, were to apply a single word (name) to them,-would there be any one to prevent him from doing so ? Among all these things, the Eye and the rest, there is no Common Element, in the form of being productive of visual perception'; specially because you regard the Universal, the Ultimate Differentia and Inherence also to be productive of visual perception'; and in the things in question, there is no Universal or Inherence either ;

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because the Universal cannot belong to a Universal, and in Inherence also there cannot be a second Inherence.-(1035)
Says the Opponent: "How can the Jar and such things be spoken of as performing the same function—when, their actions, in the shape of holding water and the rest, -as also the Ccgnitions apprehending them,difier from one another, on the ground of the difference among their specific Individualities'?" Answer
TEXTS (1036-1037). THOUGI THE ACTION OF THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS, IN THE SHAPE OF HOLDING WATER, ETC., AND ALSO THE COGNITION OF THOSE THINGS-ARE DIFFERENT (DIVERSE), -YET, AS IT FORMS THE BASIS OF A SINGLE (COMPREHENSIVE) CONCEPTION, THE COGNITION IS SAID TO BE one ONLY; AND AS THIS COGNITION FORMS THE BASIS, THE THINGS ALSO ARE SPOKEN OF AS XOT
DIVERSE (ONE).-(1036-1037)
COMMENTARY.
Even though the effects differ on account of the difference in their *Specific Individualities', yet the effect in the form of Cognition, inasmuch as it serves as the basis of the single comprehensive conception,
-is spoken of as one ; and on account of this one Cognition being the basis, the things,-in the shape of the Holding of Honey, Water, etc., and in the shape of the individual Jar, etc., -also are spoken of as one. This is what is meant by the text And as this cognition, etc. etc..
The previous singular form 'uchyats has, in construing, to be changed into the plural form ' uchyantē'.
The particle 'api' is to be construed after arthāh.
In the way shown, it is quite reasonable to regard these as performing the same fruitful function'.
Objection:-“But in this way there would be infinite regress. The said Conception also would be diverse on account of the diversity of the Specific Individualities : so that that also could not be accepted as one; hence for establishing the oneness of that, it would be necessary to postulate a further comprehensive conception, and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress. So that there being no single effect or action, it would not be possible to apply a single name to several things."
Answer: It is not so; the oneness of the comprehensive conception is not attributed to the performance of a single function; it is based upon the fact of its apprehending the same thing. So that there will be no infinite regress. Because all comprehensive conceptions by their very nature apprehend one and the same thing. The meaning of this therefore comes to be this:-Inasmuch as it is the basis of one uniform comprehensive

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
conception, the effect in the shape of Cognition is spoken of as one; and because of its being the basis again, the things-Jar, etc.-also come to be spoken of as 'one',-(1036-1037)
Thus then, even without a positive entity in the shape of the Universal, the words "Jar, etc. come to be the common denotative of several things. This is the conclusion asserted in the following
TEXT (1038). OF THESE, WORDS LIKEJAR' HAVE BEEN SAID TO BE COMMON DENOTATIVES, ON THE SINGLE BASIS OF THE REFLECTION DISTINGUISHED
(EXCLUDED) FROM UNLIKE THINGS'.-(1038)
COMMENTARY. The following text shows that even with regard to one and the same thing,-even without a positive 'Universal' or Particular there is application of several words independently of one another :
TEXT (1039).
SIMILARLY, WHEN PERFORMING SEVERAL FRUITFUL FUNCTIONS, EVEN A SINGLE THING IS SPOKEN OF AS IF IT WERE MANY,-BY VIRTUE OF THE MULTIPLICITY OF THE EXCLUSIONS OF THINGS NOT
PERFORMING THOSE FUNCTIONS.(1039)
COMMENTARY. Sometimes, even while only one, by its nature, a thing comes to perform several functions, through the intervention of other accessories; and in such cases, even without any diverse elements in the shape of positive commonal. ties and the like, several characters are imposed upon it on account of the multiplicity of exclusions of things not performing those functions; and as a consequence of this, several words come to be applied to that thing.-(1039)
An example of this is cited in the following
TEXT (1040).
FOR INSTANCE, Colour IS SPOKEN OF AS AN OBSTACLE AND ALSO AS
VISIBLE'-AND Sound IS SPOKEN OF AS 'COGNISED AFTER EFFORT', AND ALSO AS AUDITORY' OR 'AUDIBLE'.-(1040)
COMMENTARY Colour is spoken of as an obstacle' when it prevents the appearance of another colour in its own place; and it is also spoken of as visible, because it serves to bring about visual perception.

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A second example is cited: And Sound, etc. etc.' even though sound is a single entity, yet, on being the resultant of the cognition following upon effort (of the speaker), it is spoken of as - Cognised; and as the resultant of auditory perception, it is spoken of as 'auditory'; shravana' stands for
shruti', audition, i.e. Auditory Perception : and what appears therein is auditory! Or the term 'shrāvanamay be explained as perceived by the auditory organ'-(1040)
It has thus been shown that several words are applied to a thing which, as performing a single function, is one only. It is now shown that in some cases, words are applied even on the basis of the diversity of other causes :
TEXT (1041). IN SOME CASES, THE WORD IS APPLIED, ALSO ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF OTHER Causes; E.G. SOUND ARISING FROM EFFORT, AND THE HONEY PRODUCED BY THE LARGE BEES.-(1041)
COMMENTARY. * Produced by the large bees ', as distinguished from that produced by the smaller bees.-(1041)
Thus it has been shown that diverse words are applied to the same thing, on the basis of the multiplicity of effects (function) and causes. The following Text is going to show that diverse words are applied to the same thing, even without a commonalty, where there is desire to express only the exclusion of its effect and cause :
TEXT (1042). IN SOME CASES, THE WORD IS APPLIED ON THE BASIS OF THE EXOLUSION
OF THE EFFECT AND CAUSE OF THE THING; AS FOR EXAMPLE, Colour IS SPOKEN OF AS 'INAUDIBLE', OR Lightning is SPOKEN OR AS 'NOT PRODUCED BY EFFORT ':-(1042)
COMMENTARY. The term 'Kāryahētu' stands for the things of which the previouslymentioned factors are the Effect and Cause ;-the Vishlşa' of these is their exclusion (denial).
" What are the words like this ? "
Inaudible, etc, etc.':-Colour is spoken of as 'inaudible', when what is meant is the exclusion of Sound which is the effect of Auditory Perception; similarly, for the purpose of excluding things produced by effort, the torm not produced by effort is applied to Lightning.--(1042)
Having thus explained that, even in the absence of any positive entity in the shape of a Commonalty, Words are applied with distinction merely on the basis of exclusion, the Author proceeds to show that there is no possibility of the incongruity of all words becoming synonymons

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (1043-1044). DUE TO THE SAID AND OTHER DISTINCTIONS, EXCLUSIONS' ARE POSTULATED ON THE BASIS OF DIFFERENTIATED THINGS; AND SO ALSO ARE THE WORDS AS APPLIED TO THOSE THINGS. THUS WORDS, AS DENOTING DISTINOT THINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH CONVENTION, ARE APPLIED WITH DUE DIFFERENTIATION; AND AS MUCH THEY ARE NOT SYNONYMOUS UNDER OUR VIEW.
-(1043-1044)
COMMENTARY. The term 'other-includes words expressive of different ages such as child and the like, and also such words as 'nairātmya', ('absence of soul', or featurelessness ),
On the basis of differentiated things':-.e. exclusions, of which the basis consists in things differentiated from one another.
"So Associated with exclusion'.
* Applied to those things':-i.e. applied to the excluded' i.e. differentiated) things.-Because, indirectly, they are the cause of the apprehension oi the said denotation of the word.
* Skrulayah-Words.-(1043-1044)
The following inight be urged :-" The words may not be synonymous,because a distinction is assumed in the things; but how can there be the difference between words denoting Universals and those denoting Particulars, unless there are Universals and Particulars ? " Answer:
TEXT (1045).
NOR IS THERE ANY INCONGRUITY IN UNIVERSALS AND PARTICULARS BEING DENOTED BY WORDS, AS APPERTAINING TO LARGER AND SMALLER NUMBER OF THINGS-ON THE BASIS OF THE INFERENCE
OF THE RELEVANT CONVENTION.-(1045)
COMMENTARY.
For example, the word 'Tree brings about the Reflection' inferred in the shape of the 'Exclusion of non-trees, in regard to all trees—the Dhava, Khadira, Palusha and so forth; hence, as appertaining to a larger nuraber of things, what is denoted by the word is spoken of as the Universal' (Commonalty-On the other hand, in the case of the word
Dhava', there is exclusion of the Khadira and other trees', which brings about the conception of only a few of the trees (the Dhaua ones only); hence what is denoted by it is said to be a Particular -(1045)
In regard to what has been asserted (under Text 928, as coming from the Bauddha), the Author says:

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TEXT (1046). THE SAID 'EXCLUSIONS OF THINGS, CREATED BY MERE ASSUMPTION,
CANNOT REALLY DIFFER, THROUGH DIFFERENCE IN THE 'EXCLUDED THINGS, OR THROUGH THAT IN THE
SUBSTRATUM.-(1046)
COMMENTARY. If the diversity in the Apola were held (by us to be real and based upon the diversity of 'excluded things', or upon the diversity of the 'substratum,
- then the objection urged would have been applicable. As a matter of fact, however, the Exclusions are not real, but assumed on the basis of the diversity among like and unlike things.-(1046)
The following Text shows that the said ecclusions appear as distinct things, only on account of the said assumption, not in reality :
TEXT (1047). The externality THAT IS ATTRIBUTED TO THESE EXCLUSIONS IS ONLY ASSUMED IMAGINARY), NOT REAL. IN REALITY, DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE SUBSIST ONLY IN REAL
THINGS.-(1047)
COMMENTARY. Question "Why is it not real ?" Answer In reality, etc. etc. ':-(1047)
The following Texts proceed to show that in reality it is the assumptions (Assumed conceptions) only that differ among themselves :
TEXTS (1048-1049). WHAT DIFFER AMONG THEMSELVES ARE THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS
APPREHENDING THE SAID EXCLUSIONS--AND THOSE DIFFERENCES ARE DUE TO THE INFLUENCE OF THEIR ROOT, THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM SEVERAL THINGS, AND CON. VENTION. THINGS, CONSISTING OF SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIES DO NOT BEOOME EITHER UNIFIED OR DIVERSIFIED IN PARTS ; IT IS ONLY THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT
THAT VARIES.-(1048-1049)
COMMENTARY Their Root', --in the shape of Wind and other Humours, and the Tendency to conceptual thought the thing as differentiated from several things, and the Convention ;-it is due to the influence'-force-of these that the conceptual Contents, apprehending the thing as excluded from several

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unlike things, become diversified; it is not the things that are diversified. For instance, the Dhava and other trees do not become unified in the form of the Universal Tree'; nor do they become diversified, in parts, in the form of the momentary individual trees; all that varies is the conceptual content. This has been thus declared Things by themselves do not become either aggregated or diversified, in reality ; that their form is one or many is due to the fluctuations of the Cognition :-1048-1049)
It has been argued above (under Text 932) that-"No one can be able to conceive, in regard to the Cow, the unknown similarity in the object of A poha, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1050). EVEN THOUGA THERE IS NO COMMON PROPERTY, YET what are excluded AND WHAT ARE CONTAINED IN THE Exclusion ARE APPREHENDED AS DIFFERENT, BY REASON OF THEIR APPEARING AS DIVERSE IN THE SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATE
JUDGMENT.-(1050)
COMMENTARY The compound 'apohyâpohagocharāḥ' is made up of the apohya' * what are excluded i.e. (in the case of the word 'Cow") the Horse and other animals, -and the apohagochara', 'what are contained in the exclusion', - i.e. the Variegated and other Cows; these are so spoken of as the 'exclusion of the non.Cow' pertains to them.
Thus, though there is no concomitance of any commonaly, yet, those that bring about the determinate judgment of non-different things are regarded as having their similarity well known, while those that bring about the determinate judgment of diverse things, -are regarded as other wise (i.e. as having their similarity unknown). (1050)
The following might be urged-" In the absence of some one Commonally, how can the things that bring about a single determinate judgment become diverse ?"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1051). IT WOULD BE ONLY A FEW THINGS WHICH, WHILE BEING DIVERSE BY THEMSELVES, WOULD BRING ABOUT A SINGLE DETERMINATE JUDGMENT; AS ALREADY EXPLAINED
BY US.-(1051)
COMMENTARY It has been explained in course of our examination of the Universal that the Dhätri (Amalaki and other fruits), without commonalty, come to

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perform a single fruitful action; in the same way, it would be only a few things that would bring about the single determinate judgment and yet be many and diverse.-(1051)
It has been argued (under Text 934, by Kumarila) that "Words and Inferential Indicatives do not apply to what is devoid of concomitance. etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1052). THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' CONSISTS OF THE THING-BY-ITSELF, AS
EXCLUDED FROM WHAT IS NOT ITSELF '; --AN ASSERTION OF CONCOMITANCE CAREFULLY MADE IN THIS FORM WOULD
NOT BE INCONGRUOUS.-(1052)
COMMENTARY
Even though there is no entity in the shape of the Commonalty (Universal), yet, if an assertion of concomitance is made in regard to mere
Specific Individuality' as excluded (differentiated) from unlike things, that would not be incompatible (with our view).-(1052)
Question :-"Why so " Answer
TEXTS (1053-1054).
THAT WHEREIN SUBSISTS THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY (Smoke) DIFFERENTIATED FROM Non-smoke, - IN THAT SAME SUBSISTS ALSO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY (Fire) DIFFERENTIATED FROM Nonfire ; AS IN THE Kitchen ; AND HEREIN (IN THE HILL) THERE IS THE Specific Individuality differentiated from Non-smoke; HENCE the Specific Indivi duality differentiated from Non-fire ALSO
MUST BE THERE.-(1053-1054)
COMMENTARY.
* That 'ie. that place.
Herein'-subsists the Specific Individuality distinguished from nonsmoke; this proposition asserts the presence of the Inferential Indicative (Probans) in the subject of the Inference (Hill).
Hence, etc. etc.'-asserte the resultant cognition (Conclusion) brought about by the Premises.
Or, the meaning may be that all the five factors of the Inferential Process may be shown by indicating the concomitance in connection with Specific Individualities.-(1053-1054)

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The above is an example of the Inference where the Probans is the effect of the Probandum. The following texts cite an example of the Probans in the form of the nature of things -
TEXTS (1055-1056).
THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY THAT IS DIFFERENTIATED FROM MAN's HORNS AND OTHER NON-EXISTENT THINGS IS ALSO DIFFERENTIATED FROM PERMANENT THINGS, -JUST AS THE COGNITION, THE LAMP-TLAME, ETO. ARE THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY or SOUND, ETC. IS NOT A non-existent thing.-IN TRIS WAY THERE CAN BE THN ASSERTION OF CONCOMITANCE THROUGH DIFFERENCES AS
INDICATED.-(1055-1056)
COMMENTARY.
That Specific Individuality which is differentiated from the non-existent, because it is not non-existent,-is also differentiated from Permanent Things, -as we find in the case of Cognition, Lamp-flame and such things.
The necessary concomitance can be asserted in this way, without touching upon any particulars; and there would be nothing incongruous in this.
The concomitance shown here is in regard to the Probans because it exists' (the inference being in the form- The Specific Individuality of Sounds, etc. is differentiated from Permanent Things, because it exists,-like Cognition, Lamp-flame, etc. ').-(1055-1056)
Question: "If there is concomitance with the Specific Individuality only, then how is there Inference in regard to things partaking of the nature of the Universal ?"
Anstoer
TEXT (1057).
THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY ITSELF, WHEN ITS DISTINCTION IS NOT MEANT TO BE EMPHASISED, HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS CONSTITUTING THE UNIVERSAL (OR COMMONALTY) :NOTHING ELSE; AS NOTHING ELSE IS
ACCEPTABLE.-(1057).
COMMENTARY That same Specific Individuality, when its distinctive features are not meant to be eraphasised, --constitutes the Commonalty'; as has been already explained.

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The term Sämanyalaksana' means that which is indicated by the common character, not taking into account the distinctive characters.
Nothing else in the shape of the Universalas postulated by the other philosophers. As such Universal' cannot be acceptable to the Buddhist.
This has been thus declared :-* As it is apprehended through its own form as well as through another, its object has been held to be two-fold', and again-Inasmuch as it is based upon the Thing-by-itself as differentiated from things not of that form, the Indicative of the absence of diversity has been declared to appertain to the Commonalty
For this reason, the concomitance also, of the Inferential Indicative and the Word, is declared to pertain to the Specific Individuality itself.
Thus we conclude that there is no Inferential Indicative in support of the conclusion contrary to ours,-not merely from the fact that no such Indicative is actually perceived, but because there is non-apprehension of a particular kind.-(1057)
It has been argued above (under Text, 938, by Kumarila) that-"The difference from the Variegated Cow is equally present in the Black Cow and in the Horse, etc. etc".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1058). THE DIFFERENCE FROM THE Variegated Cow BEING EQUALLY PRESENT IN THE Black Cow AND THE HORSE, WHY IS IT THAT THE UNIVERSAL 'Cow, AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM THE Horse,
SUBSISTS IN THAT ?-(1058)
COMMENTARY.
It behoves you to say when the Horse is equally different from the Variegated Cow and the Black Cow-how it is that the Universal Cow', as differentiated from the Horse, subsists in the Variegated and other Oows, and not in the Horse -(1068)
The reply to this may be as follows:-"What is there to be said here? It is clear that it is only the Variegated and other Conos—and not the Horsethat are capable of manifesting the Universal Cow'; hence the said Universal subsists in the Cows, not in other things. Nor will it be right to urge the question-'why the Variegated and other Cows alone have the capacity to manifest the said Universal. Because such restriction is due to the very nature of things, and there can be no complaint against the nature of things; as all such restrictions are due to the series of causes that have brought about the things."
The answer to this is as follows:

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TEXT (1059). IF IT BE HELD THAT THAT ALONE HAS THE CAPACITY TO MANIFEST IT -THEN, EVEN THOUGH THE SUBSEQUENT DETERMINATH JUDGMENT IS THE SAME, THAT ALONE HAS THE CAPACITY TO PRODUCE IT, AND NOT THE Horse.-(1059)
COMMENTARY. Manifest it'-.e. the particular Universal Cow! * That alone',- i.e. the Variegated and other Cowe, not the Horse.
If that be so, then, even when there is diversity, and there is no Commonalty, the variegated and other cows alone, not the Horse would have the capacity to bring about the determinate judgment; even though this judgment would be the same. This view of ours also would not be incompatible.-(1059)
Question :-"What is the upshot of all this?" Anstver
TEXT (1060) THUS THEN, IN WHATEVER THING THE SAID DETERMINATE JUDGMENT IS PRESENT TO THAT THE EXCLUSION OF THE NON-COW 'BECOMES APPLICABLE-EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF THE UNIVER
SAL 'cow'-(1060)
COMMENTARY. In whatever thing-Variegated Cow, eto.--the said determinate judgment is present-in the form 'this is a Cou", that is a Cow', -to that, -even in the absence of the Universal Cow', as a positive entity--the exclusion of the non-Cow', in the form of the Reflection becomes applied.-(1060)
It has been argued above (under Text, 939, by Kumārila) that "The Exclusion of the non-Cow is not apprehended, at first, by the Sense-organs, etc etc".
The following Tects show that this statement is not admissible :
TEXTS (1061-1062). THAT THING WHICH IS DIFFERENT FROM THE non-cow' IS CERTAINLY APPREHENDED BY THE SENSE-ORGANS, THE REFLECTION ALSO WHICH IS SUPERIMPOSED UPON IT IS APPREHENDED BY ITS OWN COGNITION. IT IS ON NOTICING THIS THAT PBOPLE USE THE WORD; THE RECOGNITION OF ITS RELATION ALSO BEOOMES CLEARLY EXPLAINED
ON THE SAME BASIS.-(1061-1062)
COMMENTARY, The Apoha in the shape of the Specifio Individuality' is apprehended through the sense-organs themselves.

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As for the Apoha in the form of the Reflection of what is denoted by the Word, it is really of the nature of Cognition itself, and as such vouched for directly by its own cognition (it being self-cognised).
The particle cha' is meant to include the Apohas not directly mentioned. So that the Apoha in the form of Absolute Negation also is apprehended by implication; as has been shown under the Text 1014, by the words the nature of one is not the nature of the other'.
Thus it is on noticing the Apoha in the form of Specific Individuality' and the rest, that people come to use words,-not on noticing a positive entity in the shape of the Universal ; because no such Universal exists and because no such Universal figures in any cognition. And that through perceiving which people use the words must also be the basis upon which rests the relations of those words,-pot on any other basis ; if it did, it would lead to absurdity.-(1061-1062)
It has been argued above (under Text 941, by Kumurila)-"How could the fact of anything being denoted by the word 'non-cow' be cognised ?"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1063).
WHEN, IN REGARD TO ANYTHING, THERE IS NO SUCH DETERMINATE JUDGMENT, THE FACT OF ITS BEING DENOTED BY THE WORD
NON-COW BECOMES CLEARLY PERCEIVED.-(1063)
It has been argued above (under T'eacts, 943-944, by Kumarila) that* It is only the well-established non-Cow that could be excluded, and it is of the nature of the negation of the Cow, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1063-1065).
The Cow AND THE Non-cow ARE BOTH WELL-ESTABLISHED,-AS THERE ARE DISTINOT DETERMINATE JUDGMENTS IN REGARD TO BOTH; IT IS ONLY THE WORD THAT IS NOT WELL-ESTABLISHED; AND HENCE IT IS APPLIED ACCORDING TO THE SPEAKER'S WIIM.-As A MATTER OF FACT, A DISTINCT THING DONS NOT NEED FOR ITS APPREHENSION, THE APPREHENSION OF ANOTHER THING; HENCE THERE IS NO ROOM HERE FOR THE CHARGE OY MUTUAL
INTERDEPENDENCE (1063-1065)
COMMENTARY As & matter of fact, things like the Cow, by themselves, bring about distinct determinate judgments regarding themselves, and as such, are well

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known in their distinct formos. For the purpose of speaking of them, people make use of words, which are not well known, through their whims. Under the circumstances, if the form of a distinct thing required, for its own apprehension, the apprehension of another different thing.--then there might have been mutual interdependence. Ass matter of fact, however, the distinct thing is apprehended without the apprehension of another thing; and when it is definitely known as something distinct bringing about a distinct determinate judgment, and then the Convention is made in the form 'this is a Cow that is a Cow' and so forth.-according to the man's wish, how then, can there be any mutual interdependence !
* Vittau stands for ' vittyartham', for the apprehension.-(1064-1065)
It has been argued (under Text 945, by Kumarila), that—"There can be no relationship of Container and Contained, etc. between two negations ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1066-1067). AS A MATTER OF FACT, VERBAL COGNITION, NOT TAKING COGNIZANCE
OF ANY ESTERYAL OBJECT, APPREHENDS ITS OWN MARK AS SOMETHING EXTERYAL, ON ACCOUNT OF STRONG ILLUSION. -THIS IS ALL THAT IS DONE BY WORDS; AND WORDS
DO NOT EVEN TOUCH THE OBJECT ; NOR IS ANY OBJECT DENOTED AS QUALIFIED BY
Apoha.-(1066-1067).
COMMENTARY. In reality, no object qualified by Apola is denoted by words. Because it has already been explained that no object is touched by Words anywhere, for the simple reason that the necessary conditions are absent. For example, Verbal Cognition, even though not pertaining to any external object, actually appears as apprehending its own marl-i.e. form- something external; and it does not really touch the form of the object; because its apprehension is not in accordance with the real state of things.-(1066-1067)
Question :-" If that is so, then, why has the Teacher declared that words like Blue-Lotus express things qualified by the exclusion of other tvings ? " Answer
TEXT (1068). AS FOR THE STATEMENT MADE BY THE AUTHOR OF THE Laleşana-THAT * WORDS EXPRESS THINGS QUALIFIED BY THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER
THINGS, WHAT IT MEANS IS AS FOLLOWS.-(1068)
COMMENTARY. Question :-"What does it mean?" Answer -

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TEXTS (1069-1070). THOSE THINGS THAT ARE QUALIFIED BY THE Exclusion of other things,
EITHER AS THEIR CAUSE OR THEIR INSTRUMENTS-ARE DEFINITELY COGNISED AS NOT MIXED UP WITH THINGS OF OTHER KINDS. THE WORD EXPRESSES THESE THINGS. AND, BECAUSE IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION APPREHENDING THOSE THINGS, THERE IS DENIAL OF THE UNIVERSAL' AND SUCH OTHER COM
MONALTIES.-(1069.1070)
COMMENTARY Things are of two kinds-external and imposed upon the Cognition; in regard to the external thing, there is no denotation by words; and it is only on account of words bringing about the conceptual content pertaining to them that it is said, figuratively, that the word denotes things': and the purpose served by such figurative expression is the denial of the denota. tion of the Universal. Such is the meaning of the Texts as a whole.
The meaning of the words is explained By the exclusion of other things';i.e. by differentiation from other things ;--this differentiation being either the Cause or the Instrument,--the Tree and other things are definitely Cognised as qualified ; that is they are definitely differentiated from other things. This shows that in the compound arthāntaranivettivishistān', the term 'niurtti' is to be construed as with the Instrumental Ending
Dhuānais Word.-(1069-1070)
As regards the thing imposed upon the Cognition, that is denoted by words primarily and directly. This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1071).
THOSE THINGS HOWEVER WHICH APPEAR IN THE COGNITION-THESE INTERNAL (SUBJECTIVE) THINGS THE WORD DENOTES DIRECTLY ; AND THE FACT OF THESE THINGS BEING QUALIFIED BY EXCLUSION
HAS JUST BEEN EXPLAINED.-(1071)
COMMENTARY.
Ayam stands for the word.
Question: "How can the character of being qualified by the exclusion of other things be attached to them ? "
Answer The fact, etc. etc.
Just'--that is, under Text 1069, it has been explained that things imposed upon the Cognition are excluded (or differentiated) from other things.-(1071)

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Objection - "If no objective factor is expressed by the word, then how is it that the Teacher has declared that it is only a certain part of the Thing that is apprehended by the exclusion of other things'?" Answer
TEXT (1072).
WHEN IT IS SAID THAT A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE THING IS APPREHENDED BY THE Exclusion of other Things', -IT IS THE SAID REFLECTION
THAT IS MEANT. -(1072)
COMMENTARY
Objection:“Reflection being a property of the Cognition, how can it be a portion of the object'" Answer -
TEXT (1073).
IT IS SPOKEN OP AS A PORTION OF THE OBJECT, BECAUSE IT PROCEEDS ON THE BASIS OF THE PERCEPTION OF TRE OBJEOT AS 'EXOLUDED FROM OTHER THINGS, AND BECAUSE IT IS SUPER
IMPOSED UPON THE OBJECT.-(1073)
OOMMENTARY.
Because it comes about through the perception of the object 'excluded from other things, and because it is superimposed upon it-i.e. upon the Object excluded from other things by deluded persons,—therefore that same Reflection is figuratively spoken of as part of the object':-(1073)
In the following Text the author applies the Instrumental ending in the compound 'arthäntaraparāvrtiya' in the case in question :
TEXT (1074).
AS BEFORE, THE INSTRUMENTAL ENDING MAY SIGNIYY EITHER THE Cause OR THE Instrument. OR IT MAY SIGNIFY THAT IT IS IN THAT TORM'-IF THE THING WERE NOT DIFFERENTIATED FROM UNLIKE THINGS, THEN IT COULD NOT
BE SO.--(1074)
COMMENTARY.
As before';-.e. just as under Texts 1068-1070,—where it is said that the Word expresses things as qualified by the exclusion of other things,
30 the same may be applied here also.-Or in all cases, the Instrumental Ending may be taken as signifying the idea of being in that form : this is what is montioned by the words 'tēna vātmana'.

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Question :-"The ecclusion of other things is a property belonging to the Object; as such, how can it be either the Cause or the Instrument of the appre. hension of the Reflection ?"
Answer - If the thing, elc. etc. That is, if the Thing were not excluded (and differentiated) from unlike things, then, in the form of its Reflection, it could not be apprehended as something excluded from unlike things. That is why the exclusion from other things is to be regarded as the Cause and the Instrument.-- (1074)
It has been argued above (under Text, 949, by Kumarila) that one kind of qualification cannot bring about the cognition of a different kind, etc. etc. " -This is answered in the following
TEXTS (1075-1077). WHAT IS MEANT BY (THE Cow) BEING DIFFERENT' IS ONLY THE
EXCLUSION OF THE NON-Cow?; AND THIS exclusion TS OF THE NATURE OF THAT SAME DIFFERENCE.-EVEN WHEN THE DIFFERENCE HAS BEEN ASSERTED, THE THING ITSELF DOTS NOT ENTIRELY DISAPPEAR. THUS EVEN WHEN IT HAS THE NATURE OF THE QUALIFICATION, THE COGNITION OF THE THING DOES NOT CEASE. EVEN WHEN THERE IS NON-DIFFERENCE, THE QUALIFICATION IS THERE AS A CREATION OF TANCY. THAT CHARACTER, HAVING BEEN WITHDRAWN THEREFROM, HAS BEEN PLACED THERE AS IF DIFFERENT, WHEREBY IT BECOMES ITS QUALIFICATION, LIKE THE STICK AND OTHER THINGS. -(1075-1077)
COMMENTARY.
If the exclusion of other things were meant to be something positive qualifying the Thing, then all the objections urged would be apphcable. As a matter of fact, however, the 'exclusion of other things' which is held to be the qualification is in the form of the thing itself; so that the notion of the qualified is naturally in accord with that of the qualification. For instance, when one speaks of the exclusion of the Cow from the nonCow', this "exclusion' is only of the nature of the difference of the Cow from the Horse and other things '-not anything else.Hence, even though the exclusion, of the Cow, from the non-Cow, is mentioned in the negative form, when all that is meant is the negation of other things,- yet in reality, it forms the very essence of the Cow itself, just like the difference; that is, difference is not anything different from the different thing, it is that same; otherwise that thing could not figure in the difference at all.
"Tat-i.e. thus even when the exclusion of others' is of the nature of the qualification, the idea of the Thing itself does appear in regard to what is qualified by that qualification.
It might be argued as follows :-"In ordinary life the qualification is known to be something different from the qualified, as the stick of the Nan
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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
(stick-holder); and Exclusion is (as you say) not different from the Thing; how then can this Exclusion be the qualification of the Thing?"
The answer is- Even when there is non-difference, etc. etc. In reality, nothing can be qualified by anything; because what does not accord any help cannot be a qualification;-if the according of help be admitted, then, in cases where the Cause may not exist at the time of the coming about of the effect, there could be no relation of qualification and qualified between the two things not existing at the same time; while in the case of both existing at the same time, as the things would be already there in their accomplished forms, there would be no mutual help; and hence there could be no relation of qualification and qualified. Consequently, in the case of all things, what happens is that, though each of them stands separately, on its own footing, like so many iron-bars, yet there is a jumbling up of them as a creation of fancy.
562
Thus then, though, in reality, there is no difference between the Exclusion and that wherein the Exclusion subsists, yet, on the basis of an imaginary difference, there would be the relation of qualification and qualified between them.-(1075-1077)
It has been argued above (under Text 955, by Kumarila) that "when Individuals, not being denoted, cannot be excluded', then what would be 'excluded' would be the Universal".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1078-1079).
"
DISCRIMINATORS OF TRUTH DECLARE THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD IS MERE REFLECTION. PEOPLE, NOT KNOWING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT IS PERCEIVED AND WHAT IS *FANCIED REGARD IT TO BE SOMETHING EXTERNAL. -AS THAT IS WHAT IS APPREHENDED (BY WORDS), INDIVIDUALS are DENOTED BY WORDS.-IN
REALITY HOWEVER THERE IS NOTHING THAT
+
IS DENOTED BY WORDS, AS HAS BEEN PROVED ALREADY.-(1078-1079)
COMMENTARY.
The reason because Individuals are not denoted is not-admitted. Because the non-denotability' of words that we have asserted is only in view of the real aspect of things, not in regard to the illusory aspect. Under the illusory aspect, it is only Individuals that are denoted, as is happily accepted by people wanting in true insight, and is well known; so that the Reason adduced is not-admitted.
What is perceived is the external thing, in the shape of Specific Individuality; what is 'fancied',-imaginary-is the Reflection that figures in Determinate Conception.

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If the Reason adduced by you is the real non-denotability of Individuals', then we also do not admit of any real "exclusion of Individuals ; so that in that case your argument proves only what is already admitted by us, and is, as such, superfluous, futile. This is what is shown by the sentence- In reality, etc. etc.':-(1078-1079)
The following Text reasserts the fact of the Opponent's Reason being *not-admitted':
TEXT (1080). THUS, INDIVIDUALS BEING DENOTED BY WORDS, THEY ARE ALSO CAPABLE OF BEING EXCLUDED AS REGARDS THE UNIVERSAL, THERE CAN BE NO EXCLUSION. EVEN IF THERE WERE EXCLUSION OF IT, IT COULD NOT HAVE THE CHARACTER OF THE
* ENTITY':-(1080)
COMMENTARY It has been asserted (under 965) that—" in that case what would be excluded would be the Universal; and ag subject to Exclusion, this Universal would be an entity"; and the author now shows that the Reason-Because Individualities cannot be excluded' is 'not admitted' and it is also Inconclusive by the words As regards the Universal, etc. etc.'—there can be no exclusion of it; because it has been shown that there can be exclusion of Individuals only.
Even if there were, etc. that is to say, it the said Reason is put forward in support of the conclusion contrary to the Opponent's, there would be nothing to set aside such a conclusion.-(1080)
It has been argued (under Text 956, by Kumārila) that-"Nogation cannot be subject to exclusion, etc. etc".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1081) NEGATION IS NOT EXCLUDED' (DENIED) IN THE WORDS NEGATION IS NOT NEGATION; IT IS HOWEVER CLEARLY EXCLUDED (DENIED) IN SUCK EXPRESSIONS AS THE ENTITY IS NOT
OF THE NATURE OF NEGATION' -(1081)
COMMENTARY. Negation is not 'excluded in the words 'Negation is not Negation', -by virtue of which it would abandon its negative character (as urged by Kumärila). But, what is an Entity has the positive character, and as such remains distinct from the Negative; hence by implication, the Negation becomes subject to Exclusion'; this is what is meant by us.-(1081)
This same idea is further clarified in the following

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TEXT (1082). WHEN ONE THING IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF ANOTHER, IT IS CALLED ITS Apoha' (EXCLUSION, NEGATION), AND THE ENTITY IS NOT OF THE NATURE OF NECATION. BUT EVEN THOUGH THERE IS A poha' OF NEGATION, IT DOES NOT ACQUIRE THE CHARACTER OF THE
POSITIVE ENTITY,-(1082)
COMMENTARY Though in this way, there is Apoha of Negation, yet it does not become a positive entity.-(1082)
The author is going to cite an example which is accepted by both parties, and through that, is going to make it clear how the Reason of the Opponent is Inconclusive':
TEXT (1083).
EVEN THOUGH IT IS URGED THAT THINGS ARE NOT PRODUCED BY PRIMORDIAL MATTER OR GOD AND SO FORTH, THE character of being produced by Primordial Matter, God and so forth DOES
NOT BECOME A POSITIVE ENTITY.-(1083)
COMMENTARY. You, Mimāmsakas, also do not admit the fact of Things having been created by Primordial Matter, or God, or Time and other Causes ; but the negation (denial) of this fact does not make it a positive entity ;-in the same manner, even though there is Apoha (negation, denial) of Negation, yet that does not make the Negntion a positive entity. Consequently, the Reason adduced by you is Inconclusive.-(1083)
It has been argued (under Test 950, by Kumärila) that," there would be a great calamity in that the Non-existent would become a positive entity".
The following Text shows that this also becomes answered by the above pointing out of the Inconclusive character of the Opponent's Reason:
TEXT (1084).
THUS THEN THERE IS NO SUCH CALAMITY AS THAT OF THE NON-EXISTENT BECOMING A POSITIVE ENTITY. IN FACT, EVEN ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NEGATION, THE existence REMAINS THERE (IN THE ENTITY), AND THE NON-EXISTENCE (OF THE NEGATION) BEOOMES ESTABLISHED THEOREBY.-(1084)
COMMENTARY. It has been argued (under the same Text 969) that-"if Non-existence is not established, there can be no Existence; nor can Non-existence

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be established " -The answer to this is that-aven on the establishment of the Negation, in the above manner, the existence of the Positive Entity cloes become established ; as that rests upon its own nature. And the abovementioned establishment of Negation also constitutes its non-existence.
The answer to this argument has been made out of its turn (along with that to Kumarila's argument put forward under 955 et seq.), because the same answer is applicable to both. (1084)
The Author now reverts to the order of sequence of the Opponent's arguments, and takes up that put forward in Text 957, to the effect that"If the Negation of the Negation is different in character from the Negation itself, then it becomes a positive entity".
The answer to this is as follows
TEXT (1086). The Cow, WHICH IS THE YEGATION OF THE Nox-Cow' IS HELD TO BE A POSITIVE ENTITY, AND OF A CHARACTER DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE NON-COW; BUT BY THIS THE Non-cow DOES
NOT BECOME THE Cow, FOR ME.-(1085)
COMMENTARY. That it would become a positive entity doos not indicate an undesirable contingency for us ; as it is quito agreeable to ns. Because the Cow is actually held by us to be a positive entity quite different in character from the 'Noncow' in the shape of the Horse and other animals,-it is not held to be of the nature of Negation. So that it would be a positive entity. And as the difference of the Cow from the Non-cow is what is admitted by us, there is no such contingency as that of the Non-cow becoming the Cowe(1085)
It has been argtied (under Test 960, by Kumūrila) that." Impressions cannot pertain to the Non-entity " -The following Texts show that this is both Not-eclmitted' and Inconclusive'
TEXTS (1086-1087). EVEN IN REGARD TO NON-ENTITIES, THERE CAN BE IMPRESSIONS, ORNATED
ONLY BY THE MIND (COGNITIONS),JUST AS IN THE CASE OF THINGS OF VARIOUS KINDS CREATED BY IMAGINATION. THIS DIVERSITY AMONG Apohas, AS ALSO THEIR POSITIVE CHARACTER, WOULD BE ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY AMONG IMPRESSIONS; JUST AS IN THE CASE OF CREATIONS OF
IMAGINATION.-(1086-1087)
COMMENTARY
That the Mind (Cognition) does not operate upon non-entities cannot be admitted. Because, the Mind (Cognition) does operate through the

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imposing of the form of things created by mere imagination ; and the Mind (Cognition) thus does create Impressions in the subsequent mind, which tende to bring about future homogeneous conceptual contents. Becanse, again, through the development of the Chain', it may get at an awakening cognition, which brings about a similar Mind (Cognition). In the same manner, in the case of Ajohas, there would be difference among themselves and also the positive character, due to the influence of assumptions and imagination.
Thus the Reason adduced by Kumärila is 'inconclusive
The meaning of the words of the Text is clear; hence we have not explained them in detail.-(1086-1087)
It has been argued (under 961, by Kumārila) that-"you cannot secure diversity among words also, on the basis of Impressions".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1088).
JUST AS WE HAVE EXPLAINED THE FACT OF THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS BEING DENOTED BY WORDS,-EXAOTLY IN THE SAME MANNER SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD THE EXCLUSION OF
OTHER words' ALSO.-(1088)
COMMENTARY.
Just as, etc. etc.'-i.e. as being in the form of Reflection; of which the difference from other Reflections is clearly perceived.
Hence what has been discussed in detail (hy the Opponent) is entirely irrelevant.--Such is the sense of the Text.-(1088)
It has been argited (under Text 964, by Kumärila) that "There could be no relation of Denoter and Denoted between two Apožas " -The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1089).
INASMUCH AS THE Apohas ARE APPREHENDED AS THINGS', THEY
CANNOT BE REGARDED AS NON-ENTITIES; THTS IS WELL KNOWN AND ADMITTED AS PERTAINING TO THE Illusory ASPECT OF THINGS. AS REGARDS THE Real ASPECT, WHAT THE OPPONENT SEEKS TO PROVE IS ACCEPTED BY
US ALREADY.-(1089)
COMMENTARY.
If by the reason adduced " Because they are non-entities"-it is meant to be a general statement of fact, then that is not admitted ; because the two Apohas in question-which are in the form of Reflections-one of which is the denoter and the other is the denoted, are actually recognised by deluded

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persons as external things; and hence they are endowed with illusory reality.-- (1089)
If, on the other hand, the Reason adduced pertains to the Real Character of 'Entity', then the argument is superfluous. Because in fact, we do not accept anything as being the denoter or denoled, in reality.- This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1090).
In reality, THERE CAN BE NOTHING THAT CAN BE EITHER denoter
OR denoted,-AS ALL THINGS BEING IN PERPETUAL
FLUX, NO CONCOMITANCE IS POSSIBLE.-(1090)
COMMENTARY.
Because no concomitance is possible that is to say, the Specific Individuality cannot be concomitant with present at the time of-tho making of the Convention and that of the using of the word.—(1090)
The following might be urged by the other party :-"We are not denying the real relation of Denoted and Denoter; what we are denying is the illusory relation of Denoted and Denoter which is based upon the real fact of the two Apohas being non-entities; so that our Reason is not notadmitted ; nor is our conclusion open to the defect of being superfluous"
The following Teacts proceed to show that, if both are regarded to be illusory and real, then the two objections do become applicable :
TEXTS (1091-1092).
IF IT IS THE fllusory RELATION OF DENOTER AND DENOTED THAT IS
DENIED, ON THE BASIS OF THE real FACT OF THE TWO Exclusions BEING NON-ENTITIES,-EVEN SO, FALSITY' BECOMES UNAVOIDABLE; IN VIEW OF SUCH WORDS AND THINGS DENOTED BY THEM AS ARE THE
CREATION OF IMAGINATION.-(1091-1092)
COMMENTARY.
Under the circumstances, the Reason would be Inconclusive; as in the case of such creatures of imagination as Mahashvēta and the like, and also words denoting these,-even though they are non-entities in reality, yet the illusory Relation of Denoter and Denoted is actually present. -(1091-1092)
The following might be urged by the other party :-" In the case of things like Mahishvēra, the denoted thing, in the shape of the Universal, is

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real and also the word denoting them; and hence their cnse does not falsify our Premiss."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1093). AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL (COMMONALTY) IN THE CASE OF THE THINGS IN QUESTION, WHICH COULD BE DENOTED; NOR IS THERE ANY UNIVERSAL WORD DENOTATIVE OF THAT UNIVERSAL; NOR DOES THE DENOTATIVE CHARACTER BELONG TO THE WORD, AS SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIBS
ARB ALL IN PERPETUAL FLUX.-(1093)
COMMENTARY.
In course of our examination of the Universal ', we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the Universal; hence the assertion that the Universal' is the denoted and denoter in the case in question makes the Reason "false" (Inconelnsive).
* Tasya of the Universal.
The term Universal' has to be taken as understood after denotative which connects it with the context.
It might be argued that-" Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the denotative certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word 'Mahashxéta, etc.".
The answer to this is- Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.;-that is, it has been shown that the 'Perpetual Flux' embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention ; also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.(1093)
The following T'est sums up the argument
TEXT (1094).
HENCE BOTH OF THESE SHOULD BE HELD TO OONSIST IN THE ILLUSORY REFLECTION' ETC.-THUS IN VIEW OF THESE, THE FALSITY'
REMAINS UNSHAKEN.-(1094)
COMMENTARY. Both'-.e. the denoted thing as well as the denotative Word.
Reflection, etc. The etcetera' is meant to show that even under the view that Ideas (Cognitions) are formless, it would be necessary to admit the existence, within the Idea itself, of another specifio Idea in the form of the conception of object' where there is no real object.

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In view of these '-.e. things created by imagination.
Tat stands for lasmāt', 'therefore, thus'. Or it may mean of that'-.e of the Reason, the 'falsity remains unshaken.-(1094)
It has been argued under Text 906, by Kumarila) that-"one for wlion there is nothing positive denoted by words,- for him there can be no negation either".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1095.1096).
FOR THE MAN BY WHOM THE DENOTATION OF WORDS IS NOT ADMITTED
TO BE ANYTHING POSITIVE, THE MIND (COGNITION) REFLECTING THE THING IS WHAT IS BROUGAT ABOUT BY THE WORD, AND THIS COGNITION ULTIMATELY BRINGS ABOUT THE IDEA OF THE THING. WHEN WORDS EXPRESS THEIR MEANINGS, THERE IS, BY IMPLICATION, THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS; AND THROUGH THE PRESENCE OF THIS THERE IS negation ALSO, AS PRECEDED BY THE APPREHENSION OF THE positive THING.
(1095-1096).
COMMENTARY.
It is not that we absolutely do not admit the fact of words denoting positive things by virtue of which you have urged the undesirable con. tingency against us. As a matter of fact, it is admitted by us that the word produces the mental condition' (Cognition) which ultimately provides the idea of the Thing; so that in our opinion also what is denoted by the word is a positive entity which is illusory in character. In reality however, there is nothing that is denoted by words; hence it is only the real positive character of things that is denied by us ;—so that the illusory positive character of the thing denoted by words being accepted by us, whenever there is anything positive denoted by the word, the negation of other things becomes apprehended by implication; and hence it is quite possible to have this negation as preceded by the apprehension of the positive thing.-(1095-1096)
The following might be urged by the other party "If it is admitted that the Word does denote positive entities, then, how is it that in the

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
impossibility of the
Hétumulcha, the Laksanalara has spoken of the positive "
The answer to this is as follows
TEXT (1097).
THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE POSITIVE' HAS BEEN AVERRED ON THE GROUND THAT SUCH THINGS AS THE UNIVERSAL ' AND THE LIKE CANNOT FORM THE SUBJECT OF WORDS AND
DETERMINATE CONCEPTIONS.-(1097)
COMMENTARY.
Inasmuch as there are no real denoted things' or denotative words in the shape of the Universal' and the like,-there can be no real subject for Words and Determinate Conceptions.-it has been asserted by the great Teacher,-in view of the real state of things.-that there is impossibility of the Positive; hence there is no contradiction at all. (1997)
It has been argued (under Texts 967, etc., by Kumarila) that--"If it is held that it is mere Apoha that is denoted, etc. etc.", -The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1098).
FROM THE TERM BLUE-LOTUS, ONLY ONE THING IS COGNISED, -AND THAT IS THE REFLECTION EXCLUDED (DIFFERENTIATED) FROM
THE NON-BLUE AND THE NON-LOTUS '-(1098)
COMMENTARY.
What the term 'Blue-lotus' expresses is, not mere negation, but-the single Reflection of the object-as excluded from the non-blue' and the * non-lotus' partaking of the nature of both. Consequently, in the case of words like 'Blue-lotus', there certainly is the denotation of things of mixed character, which has to be admitted on the strength of actual cognitions appearing in that form ; and on the basis of this the necessary coordination becomes quite possible.-(1098)
It has been argued (under Text 972, by Kumārila) that," If it be asserted that what is denoted is the thing endowed with the Apoha, eto.
eto."
The answer to this is as follows:

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TEXTS (1099-1101).
WE DO NOT HOLD THAT WHAT THE WORD DENOTES IS THE THING UNDOWED
WITH THE 'EXCLUSION (Apoha) OF OTHER THINGS'; BECAUSE FOR US, THERE IS NO EXCLUSION' OTHER THAN THE THING EXCLUDED FROM SOMETHING ELSE, HENCE THE OBJECTION THAT IT IS DEPENDENT UPON SOMETHING ELSE' IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE 'DENOTATION OF WORDS' AS HONESTLY EXPLAINED, IN THE WAY THAT IT IS TO THE THEORY OF THE UNIVERSAL ' (BEING DENOTED BY WORDS). BECAUSE THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE Relation of qualification and qualified AND CO-ORDINATION CONSEQUENTLY THERE IS NO INCONGRUITY IN THE THEORY THAT IT IS Apoha THAT IS DENOTED BY WORDS.-(1099-1101)
COMMENTARY.
If excelsion were something entirely different from the Thing excluded, then there would be the possibility of the incongruity that has been urged against the view that 'what is denoted is the Thing as endowed with the Apoha". As a matter of foot however, for us, exclusion is not something different from the Thing excluded from others; in fact, it is the eccluded thing itself that is spoken of as 'exclusion', when what is meant to be stressed is the mere negation of other things.-Consequently, the incongruity that has been urged against the Denotation of Universals, --in the form that, if the Universal is what is primarily denoted by words, the denotation of the Thing endowed with that Universal would be dependent upon that (Universal), and consequently there being no indication of the varieties of the said Thing, there is no possibility of co-ordination or any other relationship with it, does not apply to the theory of Apoha, as there is no denotation (under this theory) of anything equipped with the 'Exclusion of other things', as something different.
This is what is meant by the words. Hence the objection, etc. etc.'. Tat- tasmāt'-Hence.
Avadātam, etc. etc, i.e. to the denotation of words as expounded by the Teacher Divinäge, with the purest conviction.
The grounds for this inapplicability are next stated- Because there is no difference, etc. etc.'.-That is, there the Denotation of words in the shape of the Exclusion of other things'is not different from, -not anything other than that which is excluded from others,
Qualification and qualified, etc. etc... This is easily understood. - (1099-1101)
The following Texto show how co-ordination, etc. is not incompatible:

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (1102–1104). WHEN THE WORD BLUE 'IS UTTERED ALONE, THE PARTICULAR REFLEC
TION THAT APPEARS IS ONE THAT SCINTILLATES THROUGH ALL BLUE THINGS SUCH AS THE CUCKOO, THE LOTUS, THE BLUE BEE AND THE LIKE.—WHEN THE WORD "LOTUS IS ADDED TO IT, THEN THE CUCKOO, THE COLLYRIUM AND OTHER BLUE THINGS BECOME EXCLUDED, AND THE RESULTANT REFLECTION IS ONE THAT IS FURTHER PARTICULARISED AND BEOOMES DEFINITELY APPLIED TO ONE BLUE THING ONLY TRUS THE NECESSARY CO-ORDINATION IS NOT RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE. ALL THIS EXPLANATION IS ABSOLUTELY IMPOSSIBLE UNDER THE THEORY OF THE OTHER PARTY.
(1102–110)
COMMENTARY That is to say, when the word 'blue' is prononnced, there appears the Conceptual Reflection (the Image) of a doubtfnl form, inasmuch as it serves to exclude the yellow' and other colours and things having these colours, and envisages all blue things, such as the Blue Bee, the Cuckoo, the Collyrium and so forth.-When the word "lotus' is added (to the word
blue'), the same Reflection becomes apprehended as differentiated from the Cuckoo and the rest, and particularly restricted to the thing excluded from the Non-lotus. Thus in relation to the said Conceptual Reflection, there is a mutual relation of differentiation and differentiated between the two words
blue' and 'lotas', and hence there is nothing incongruous in their being related to each other as qualification and qualified.
Or (another explanation possible is that) both the words together express the thing in the form of a single Reflected Image excluded from the nonblue' and the non-lotus'; so that both pertaining to the same thing, there is co-ordination between them.
Such is the meaning of the Texts as a whole. The meaning of the words is as follows:- Scintillating -i.e. not restricted to any particular thing, doubtful.-The word "pika here stands for the Cuckoo.-The rest is easy.
It might be argued by the Opponent) that—" under our theory also, the co-ordination would be all right".
The answer to this is- All this explanation is, etc. eto.' ;-that is, the above-described explanation of co-ordination, etc.-(1102-1104)
Question :- "Why should it be impossible under our theory ? " Answer:

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TEXTS (1105-1106).
BY THE SINGLE WORD, THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY BEOOMES EXPRESSED
IN ITS ENTIRETY ; AND WHEN THAT HAS BEEN DENOTED, WHY SHOULD THERE BE NON-COGNITION OF OTHER THINGS, FOR THE SAKE OF WHICH ANOTHER WORD WOULD BE PRONOUNCED,—WHEN, IN REALITY, THE THING HAS DEEN DENOTED IN ITS ENTIRETY -IF NOT, THEN IT BECOMES more than one.
-(1105-1106)
COMMENTARY
Under the theory of those who hold that words denote positive entities when the single word blue' expresses the Specifie Individuality of the Lotus and other (blue) things-why should there be any absence of cognition of such other particular things as the Lotus and the Collyrium, since the Blue Thing has been denoted in its entirety? Because the idea that one and the same thing should be both known and unknown to the same person involves self-contradiction. This is what is pointed out in the text by the words. Why should there, elc. etc.' – Non-Cognition stands for bad cognition, ie, doubtful and wrong cognition
Thus there being no doubtful or wrong cognition, there can be no desire on the part of the speaker to pronounce any other word, such as Lotus and the like. This is shown by the words for the sake of which, etc. etc.
For the sake of which',-i.. for the purpose of removing which non. cognition.
It might be argued that," when the Blue thing has been denoted by the single word 'blue, it has been denoted only in part, not in its entirety ; hence for the purpose of speaking of other characteristics of the Blue Thing, another word is sought after".
The answer to this is— When in reality, etc. etc.'. There are no parts in any single object, by virtue of which there could be denotation in part; because the ons (whole) and the many parts) are mutual contradictories, one being the negation of the other; so that what your explanation does is to establish as many distinct things as there may be parts; and hence there would be no such concepts as 'one' and 'many':-(1105 1106)
The following might be urged by the other party "The word 'blue' does not denote a particular substance; it denotes either the quality called
Blue or the Universal 'Blue' inhering in that quality; the word lotus" also denotes the Universal Lotus', not any particular substance; hence, as the two words denoto two different things, it is only right that there should be a need for the word 'lotus' (after the utterance of the word 'blue')."
The answer to this is as follows:

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XYI.
TEXTS (1107-1108). IF THE UNIVERSAL BLUE, OR THE QUALITY Blue, IS DENOTED BY THE WORD 'BLUE', THEN THE WORD "LOTUS' (PRONOUNCED WITH THAT WORD) SHOULD DENOTE ANOTHER UNIVERSAL'Lorus'; -SUCH BEING THE CASE, THERE WOULD BE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO WORDS, JUST AS THERE IS BETWEEN THE WORDS Balcula" (A KIND OF FLOWER) AND Utpala' (Lorus); SO THAT ANY CO-ORDINA. TION, ETC, BETWEEN THEM WILL BE ALL THE MORE IMPOS
SIBLE.-(1107-1108)
COMMENTARY. The compound anyềndivarajāti' is to be taken as & Karmādhāraya, - 'anyā' qualifying indivarajätih'.
- Vyavasēyā'i.e. should be denoted. • Utpalashruten' - has the Ablative ending.
Thus under this theory co-ordination would be all the more impossible ; since, like the words "bakula' and 'pala!, the words 'blue' and lotus would not be applicable to the same thing. There can be no such expression as bakulam upalam'-(1107-1108)
The following might be urged by the other party :-" Thongh the word blue denotes a particular Universal and a particular Quality, yet, through those, it also denotes the substance related to the Blue Quality and the 'Blue Universal ;-similarly the word 'lotus, through the Universal 'Lotus', denotes the substance in this way their application to the same thing being possible, there would be co-ordination between them ; which would not be possible in the case of the words "bakula and upala."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1109-1110). IF IT IS THE SUBSTANOD RELATED TO THE QUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL THAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD 'BLUE', THEN THE WORD 'LOTUS WOULD BE USELESS. AS WHAT IS RELATED TO THE SAID TWO FACTORS (QUALITY AND UNIVERSAL) IS EXACTLY WHAT IS EQUIPPED WITH THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS '; AND AS THIS WILL HAVE BEEN ALREADY EXPRESSED BY THE WORD 'BLUE', THE WORD LOTUS 'WOULD BE USELESS.
(1109-1110)
COMMENTARY. The Quality'-called 'blue':-the Universal 'as the Universal blue'; that which is related to these is .Gunatajjātisambaddham!

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The word Lotus would be reless',-as the substance will have been already expressed by the word 'blue'. This is explained by the words • As what is related, etc. elo' the two factors are the Quality and the Universal.
The following might be urged (by the other party)—"Even though the word 'blue denotes the substance possessing that quality and belonging to that Universal, yet, inasmuch as the word 'blue' has been found to be applicable to several substances, the man who hears the word pronounced does not obtain any definite idea of the Lotus, specifically as the Cuckoo and other things are also 'blue', hence, the use of the word 'lotus becomes useful, in that it serves to dispel the suspicion that other substances might be meant
This is not right; as this assertion is made because the person making it does not know the subject under consideration. The subject under dis. cussion is that under the theory that words denote positive things, there can be no co-ordination, etc. If then, the word 'lotus' is used only for the dis. pelling of the said suspicion, and not for the denoting of a substance, then, in that case, a positive entity would not for the denotation of the word; as all that the word 'lotus' will have done would be the dispelling of the form wrongly imposed upon it. Then again, it is a self-contradictory statement that is made, when it is asserted that "the word 'blue denotes the substance Lotus" and yet " there is no certainty produced in the mind of the bearer. That cannot form the denotation of a word, in regard to which no certainty is produced. If it did, that would lead to absurdities. Nor again is there any room for suspicion in what has been cognised with certainty; as Certain Cognition and Uncertain Cognition' are mutually destructive.
It might be said that "Even though the words Blue and Lotus are not applicable to the same thing, yet what are denoted by them-viz. the Quality and the Universaldo subsist in the same substance,-and hence through their denotations, there would be co-ordination between them."
This cannot be right; as it would lead to absurd contingencies. In the manner stated, there would be co-ordination between the words Colour and Taste' also; as what are denoted by them—i.e. Colour and Tastesubsist in the same substance, Earth. Further (under the explanation offered) there would be no possibility of the expression 'blue lotus' bringing about the cognition of a single thing; as the two words would be separately denoting the Quality and the Universal subsisting in the single substance ; and unless the words bring about the cognition of the same thing, there can be no co-ordination between them.-Enough of this (1109-1110)
The following might be urged "The word 'lotus' does not denote exactly the same thing that is related to the quality Blue and the Universal
Blue'; it denotes something different. Hence the word lotus cannot be useless."
The answer to this is as follows:

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (1111).
IF WHAT BELONGS TO THE UNIVERSAL LOTUS? IS DIFFERENT FROM WHAT IS RELATED TO THE QUALITY AND UNIVERSAL (BLUE), THEN THE WORDS BLUE' AND 'LOTUS CANNOT BE
CO-SUBSTRATE (CO-ORDINATED).-(1111)
COMMENTARY.
There is a hiatns after the particle.yadi ("if ').
They cannot be co-substrale' ;-i.e. they cannot be co-ordinated. (1111)
The following might be nrged : -" Though the same Substance is denoted by the word 'blue', and also by the word Lotus ', - yet the word blue denotes the Substance, not as something related to the Universal Lotus', but as related to the Quality Blue and the Universal 'Blue'; consequently, the word “Lotus' is used for the purpose of expressing the fact of the substance being related to the Universal 'Lotus'; and as such it cannot be useless."
This argument is raised and answerod in the following: -
TEXTS (1112-1114). IF THE WORD BLUE' DOES NOT DENOTE THE SUBSTANCE RELATED
TO THE QUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL (BLUE) AS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL LOTUS-THEN THE SUBSTANCE AS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS SHOULD BE SOMETHING TOTALLY DIFFERENT ; AS A MATTER OF TAOT, WHAT IS RELATED TO THE UNIVERSAL 'LOTUS' IS THAT SAME SUBSTANCE THAT IS RELATED TO THE OTHER TWO (QUALITY AND UNIVERSAL Blue'); AND THAT SUBSTANCE HAS ALREADY BEEN EXPRESSED, IN ITS ENTIRETYNOT IN PART, BY THE WORD BLUE',- AND HAS ALSO BEEN APPREHENDED BY THE VERBAL COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THAT WORD SO THAT THE WORD 'Lorus' WOULD BE ENTIRELY USELESS.-(1112-1114)
COMMENTARY
If the word 'blue' does not denote the Substance related to the Quality and the Universal 'Blue', as related to the Universal Lotus ', -thon (there is the following incongruity).
The substance as related to the Universal Lotus' is not something entirely different from the substance as related to the Quality and Universal Blue', on the basis whereof on the denotation of the Substance related to the Quality and Universal 'Blue', there might be no denotation of the Substance as related to the Universal 'Lotus'. As a matter of fact, however, there is

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no difference between the correlatives in the two cases; and hence the two substances must also be the same ; and hence it cannot be right that on the denotation of one there should be no denotation of the other.
Further, even aclmitting what has been said, -the substance related to the Universal Lotus may be different from that related to the Quality and the Universal 'Blue', even so the word 'Lotus' would be useless. Because that impartite thing which is related to the Universal 'Lotus' is exactly what is related to the two factors of the Quality and the Universal Blue', - it is not anything different from it; and as that thing is impartite, it must have been denoted in its entirety, by the word 'blue'; and it would also have figured in the Verbal Cognition-brought about by that word; hence what would be left there undenoted in the denoting of which the word 'Lotus' would have its use 1-( 1112-1114)
Uddyotakara las argued as follows:-" The assumption (made by the Buddhist) that the object being impartite, whenever it is cognised, it is in its entirety, not in part' is not possible ; because the word "sarva ', ( entire * whole "), is applied to things not-one (several), while the word "Blea' is applicable to the part."
Anticipating this argument, the Author provides the following answer to it
TEXTS (1115-1116).
IF (IT BE SAID THAT), IN REGARD TO A THING DEVOID OF PLURALITY, THE ASSUMPTION OF THE ALTERNATIVES OF ENTIRETY' AND * SEVERAL TY' ( PLURALITY ') IS NOT POSSIBLE, SUCH AN ASSERTION COULD ONLY PROCEED FROM IGNORANCE OF THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE (USED BY US). WHAT WE MADE CLEAR WAS THAT THE FIRST WORDBLUE ' ITSELF EXPRESSED ALL THAT HAD TO BE EXPRESSED, AND NO PART OF ITSELF WAS LEFT (UN
EXPRESSED).-1115-1116)
COMMENTARY.
Deroid of plurality'-.e. the thing without parts.
* The assumption, etc. etc.', -the assumption of the alternatives—viz. : whether what figures as the object of the cognition is the thing in its entirety, or in parts.
This assertion proceeds from ignorance of what our statement means For instance, what is meant by our statement that by the very first word
blue the thing has been expressed in its entirely is as follows:- What has been expressed is the thing exactly as it stands, and no aspect of it has been left out, for the denoting of which the word 'lotus would be required: because the thing has no parts.-Such being our meaning, the argurent urged

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
by Uddyotakara is in the nature of Verbal Casuistry (attributing a meaning to our statement never intended by us).-(1115-1116)
Thus, just as the word "lotus would be useless, so also the use of such words as non-eternal' would be uselese; or if they were used, they would be only synonyms,-like the words laru' and půdapa' (both of which stand for tree).This is the application of the said reasoning to other cases indicated in the following
TEXT (1117).
IN THIS SAME WAY, THE UTTERING OF OTHER WORDS ALSO WOULD BE FRUITLESS. IN FACT, THE UTTERANCE OF SUCH WORDS WOULD
ONLY MEAN SO MANY SYNONYMS (1117)
COMMENTARY.
Udiranam'-i.e. use, ntterance. Uktau '-i.e. in the uttering.
This ides has been expressed in the following statement :- A certain thing having been entirely taken up by a word-or by an idea,—there remains nothing else that could be expressed by another word or Idea; hence these would be synonyms',-1117)
The following might be urged "Under the theory of the Buddhist also, when a certain thing has been expressed by a word, there could be no doubtful or wrong cognition in regard to other aspects, and hence why should there not be the incongruity of no other words being used 7" Answer:
TEXTS (1118-1119).
FOR US, NO EXTERNAL THING IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD ; NOR IS ANY IDEA OF EXTERNAL THINGS HELD TO PROCEED FROM WORDS, BY VIRTUE OF WRICH, THE THING IN ITS ENTIRETY HAVING BEEN TAKEN UP BY THESE TWO, ANY SUBSEQUENT WORD WOULD BE A MERE SYNONYM OF THAT
WORD.—1118-1119)
COMMENTARY,
These tu i.e. the said word and the said Idea. Subsequent ',-coming later on.-(1118-1119)
Question :-"Why is not the objection regarding the absence of coordination applicable to the view under which the denotation of words is 'illusory'"
Answer

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
579
TEXTS (1120-1121).
WHAT IS PRODUCED BY THN WORD, IN DUE COURSE, IS ONLY THE Reflection;
AND IT IS THROUGH DELUSION THAT THIS APPEARS AS one AND AS external. THE CO-ORDINATION AND OTHER RELATIONS ARH DUE TO THE REFLECTION. IX REALITY, ALL THESE WORDS ARE
HELD TO BE OBJEOT
LES$.-(1120-1121)
COMMENTARY.
When the word 'blue' is uttered, what it brings about first of all is the conceptual Reflection, excluded (differentiated) from all non-blue things, and scintillating over the Lotus and other (blue) things and hence not excluding these latter, and conceived (objectively) in the external form; then when subsequently, the word 'Lotus' is uttered, what it brings about is the conceptual Reflection, excluded from all that is non-lotus, and with the form of only one external thing superimposed upon it in this way, in due course, there is brought about an ilkisory (conjunct) conceptual Reflection, excluded from the non-blue' and the non-lotus', with the one external form imposed upon it, and it is in consequence of this that an illusory co-ordination becomes possible.
* Why is it not so, in reality ?"
Answer SIn reality, all these words are held to be objectle88.-(11201121)
there can be
It has been argued (inder Text 973, by Kumārila) that no connection between the Apoha and Gender, Number, etc".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1122). AS FOR THE CONNECTION OF GENDER AND NUMBER, IT IS NOT PRESENT IN INDIVIDUALS ALSO ; IN FACT, SUCH CONNECTION IS BASED ENTIRELY UPON CONVENTIONS SET UP BY THE WHIMS
OF PEOPLE; IT IS NOTHING REAL-(1122)
COMMENTARY.
The fact of Gender, Number, etc. belonging to things is not admitted. In fact it is due entirely to Conventions set up at whim.
"In Individuals also the term also is meant to include the Apoha.
The argument may be formulated thus :- When one thing does not follow the presence and absence of another thing, then it cannot belong to it; e.g. Coolness and Fire ;-Gender and Number do not follow the presence and absence of individual things,--hence there is non-perception of the wider term (which implies the non-existence of the narrower).-(1122)

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580
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
The following Text shows that the Renson just adduced cannot be said to be * not admitted -
TEXT (1123).
THERE ARE THREE WORDS (DENOTING THE SAME THING) - Tatah (MASCULINE) Tatam' (NEUTER) AND 'Tati' (FEMININE); AND YET ANY ONE THING CANNOT HAVE THREE FORMS; FOR IT IT DID, THEN, ALL COGNITIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE VARIEGATED IN
CHARACTER.--(1123)
COMMENTARY
If Gender really belonged to things, then, on account of the three words- tatah, lalamandra in three gonders, being applicable to the same thing (Bank of rivers); the thing would have three forms; and it is not possible for one and the same thing to have the three forms-Masculines, Neuter and Feminine; if it did, it would cease to be one thing. If, uven in the presence of mutually incompatible properties, thing, were to be one, then the entire universe would become a single thing; and in that case it would all be produced and destroyed at one and the same time.
Then again, on accomt of all things being expressed, by either one word or by another, as having the three genders, all cognitions relating to them would have to be variegated in character. (1123)
The following might be urged :-"Even though all things may have three genders, yet the cognitions of things would appear exactly as envisaging that form alone which the speaker may desire to speak of ; hence they conld not be of variegated character."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1124).
IF THEY WERE DEPENDENT UPON THE SPEAKER'S WEIM, THEN THE COGNITIONS WOULD NOT ENVISAGE THB THINGS AT ALL. UNDER
THAT WHIM, THE COGNITIONS SHOULD BE OF OND TORM, AND YET THE THING IS NOT OF
ONE FORM.-(1124)
COMMENTARY
'T/ they, etc.'-.e. if the cognitions were dependent upon the whim.
If, through the Speaker's whim, the Cognitions be of one form, then the Cognitions in question could not envisage things of three kinds (ae having three Genders); because no single thing has that (mixed) form; and it would thus be as objectlees as the visual cognition of sound!
Tadvashat':-.e. through the speaker's whirn (1124)

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EXAMINATION ON THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
581
Some people think that "the three genders in the case of the words cited may be explained as pertaining to the three states of the thing con. cerned (River-bank),--the three states being those of destruction, appearance and continuance".
That this also cannot be right is shown in the following
TEXT (1125). IF THE APPLICATION OF THE GENDERS WERE BASED UPON THE STATES OF continuance, appearance and destruction,-THEN, ALL THE TERDE GENDERS WOULD BECOME APPLICABLE
TO ALL THINGS.-(1125)
COMMENTARY
There is a hiatus after syāt' (the conditional clause ending there).
Tf the application regulation of genders were based upon the states of continuance and the rest, then all the three genders would be applicable to all things, like the River-bank, the Chain and so forth. Because, as in the case of the River-bank, so elsewhere also, all the three states of continuance and the rest would be there. Otherwise, there should not be three genders in the case of the three words 'tatah', 'lali and 'tatam' also ; es there is no difference between the two cases. Thus the definition proposed becomes too wide.-(1125)
The definition is 'too narrow also, because it is not true in all chees-- this is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1126). THERE ARE THREE WORDS USED (IN CONNECTION WITH NON-ENTITIES) · Abhavah' (MASCULINE), “Nirupadhyam' (NEUTER) AND * Tuchchhată' (FEMININE); WHAT SORT OF CONNECTION WITH THE STATES OF continuance, ETC. COULD
BE ASSUMED IN REGARD TO THE NONENTITIES (SPOKEN OF BY THESE
WORDS)-(1126)
COMMENTARY.
Even in the case of non-entities,-euch as the Hare's Horn and the lake, the states of continuance, etc. are not there, and yet in regard to them words of all three genders are applied-in the shape of abhāvah' (Masculine Non-existent), Virupakhyam' (Neuter, Featureloss) and Tuchchhatā (Feminine, Insignificant). So that the proposed regulation of genders cannot include such cases ; hence it is too narrow.—1126)

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582
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (1127-1130).
OF THINGS, APPEARANCE is Birth; "DESTRUCTION' IS perishing :
AND CONTINUANCE' IS the Thing in its own form. Now IN Birth THERE IS NO perishing; WHY THEN IS IT SPOKEN OF AS * Utpatti) (FEMININE) ? NOR IS THERE existence in its own form ; WHY THEN IS IT SPOKEN OF AS 'janma (NEUTER)! In Desiruction ALSO, THE OTHER TWO STATES ARE NOT THERE; WHY THEN IS IT SPOKEN OF AS `tirobhāvah' (MASCULINE), 'nāshah' (MASCULINE) AND 'tirobhavanam' (NEUTER)? AS REGARDS Continuance Also, ON WHAT GROUND IS IT SPOKEN OF AS 'sthitih (FEMININE) AND * svabhāvah' (MASCULINE) ?-IF THE FORM OF THESE IS NOT DIFFERENTIATED, THEN THEY SHOULD ALWAYS BE IN ONE AND THE SAME GENDER.—(1127-1130)
COMMENTARY.
For the following reason, the explanation provided is too narrowBecause in connection with the same said states of Continuance and the rest, it is found that to each of these, words of all the three genders are applied. For instance, Appearance is spoken of as 'upāda!' (Birth, Masculino); Destruction is spoken of as näshah (Perishing, Masculine); Continuance is spoken of as 'atmasuarüpam' its own form, Neuter).—Now as regards Appearance, there can be no continuance or destruction' in it; how then could such words as 'utpatti (Feminine) and 'ganma' (Neuter) be applied to it! Similarly as regards Destruction, there can be no con. tinuanco' or appearance in it; how theu could it be spoken of by such terms as "tirobhüvah (Masculine), vinüshah (Masculine) and tirobhavanam' (Neuter) _The particle 'api' in the Teas serves to show that Destruction itself could not be spoken of by that same word.—Similarly, as regards Continuance, Destruction and Appearance being impossible therein,-it has to be explained on what grounds it is spoken of as sthitih' (Feminine) and 'Swabhāea' (Masculine).
It might be said that-"inasmuch as these, Continuance and the rest, are not differentiated among themselves, each of them may be capable of taking all the three Genders".
The answer to this is stated in the words- If the form of these, etc. etc.' ;that is, if the form of these is not differentiated from each other, then there should, in reality, be only one, not three, Genders.-(1127-1130)
The other party says: The Feminine, Masculine and Neuter are so many different Universals, like the Universal Cow and the like."
The answer to this is as follows:

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
583
TEXT (1131). IF THE FEMININE AND THE BEST BE HELD TO BE SO MANY DIFFERENT UNIVERSALS,—THEN ALL SUCH SHOULD BE REGARDED AS
DISCARDED BY THE REJECTION OF THE
UNIVERSAL ITSELF.-(1131)
COMMENTARY.
On a previous occasion, in course of the Examination of the Universal', all particular Universals also have been discarded; hence there can be no such particular Universals as Feminine ' and the rest. Hence the definition provided is an impossible' one.-(1131)
Then again, in connection with the particular Universals, we find,-even without any other Universal, the application of such words as jätih' (Feminine), bhavah? (Masculine), samanyam' (Neuter) ;-hence the definition provided turns out to be too narrow'.-This is what is shown in the following:
TEXT (1132).
SUCH WORDS ARE APPLIED TO PARTIOULAR UNIVERSALS, AS jātin' (FEMININE), bhāvah '(MASCULINE) AND samanyam' (NEUTER). NOR IS IT POSSIBLE FOR UNIVERSALS TO SUBSIST IN
OTHER UNIVERSALS THEMSELVES.-(1132)
COMMENTARY.
Nor is it possible, etc. etc..-Because the doctrine of the other party) is that Universals are devoid of Universals. This has been said on the basis of the doctrine of the Vaishēşiktas.
The Vaiyāloraranas, Grammarians, however regard Universals as subsisting in Universals also; ay declared in the following passage-'Even when the object and the Universal are denoted, all words are denotative of the Universal, inasmuch as all things exist in the form of their functions (Vakya padiya, 3. 16), -What these people mean is as follows The theories laid down in regard to Universals by other philosophers need not necessarily be accepted by Grammariang; as a matter of fact, Universals are inferred from the effects of the functions of the connection between the word and the resultant cognition, and there can be no limit placed upon such Universals. Hence the basis of the term 'Universals' consists in that Universal which has a common substratum as inferred from the perception of the effects of the said functions. What is meant by the Universal existing in the form of their functions' is that their special character is restricted by the functions of the word and the resultant Idea.
This theory should be taken as rejected by what has been said (under Text 1131, second line) that all such Universals should be taken as dis

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584
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
carded by the rejection of the Universal itself in the charter on Universals).'(1132)
The following Text states the objection that is equally applicable to all :
TEXT (1133).
HOW TOO CAN THERE BE SUCH WORDS AS Abhāval' (MASCULINE), "Nirupakhyam' (NEUTER) AND Tuchchhata' (FEMININE)?FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT THE ENTIRE SCHEME OF THREE GINDDRS IS PURELY CONVEN
TIONAL.-(1133)
COMMENTARY.
There is no Universal in non-entities like the Hare's Horns ; because it is & property of entities; consequently the appliction of the words abharat and the rest to non-entities should be impossible. Consequently the said rule regarding Genders is 'too narrow,
Thus it follows that the entire scheme of the three Genders is based Bolely upon Conventions made according to the whim of speakers.-(1133)
The following Test shows that Number also like Gender) cannot follow the presence and absence of the real state of things :
TEXT (1134).
Number ALSO IS PURELY CONVENTIONAL, AND IS ASSUMED THROUGH THE WHIM OF THE SPEAKER, EVEN WHEN THERE IS DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN DIFFERENCE AND NON-DIFFERENCE; AS IS FOUND IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE 'Dārā' (WIFE), ETC.
AND 'Vipina' (FOREST), ETC.-(1134)
COMMENTARY.
Number also is purely conventional, not real. In the case of words like 'dārā' (which stands for wife, and is yet treated as Masculine, and alwaya Plural), though there is no difference (in what is denoted by this word and that denoted by other words like patni', etc.), yet its peculiar gender (and number) has been determined by mere whim.
Thus the Reason put forward by us cannot be said to be Unproven For instance, the Plural or the Singular Number of words is not always based upon the real multiplicity and singularity of things; e.g, in the case of

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
585
such words as "därāk', 'sikata, varsa', etc.-even though there is no real multiplicity, yet they are used in the Plural Number. Similarly in the case of such words as Vana', 'Tribhuwana, Jagat, Sannagari', even though there is no singularity, yet they are used in the Singular Number. Hence our Reason cannot be said to bo 'Uoproven
Nor is our Reason Inconclusive '; for, if it were so, then everything would belong to everything.
Lastly, because our Reason subsists in things where the Probandum is known to be present, therefore it cannot be said to be Contradictory':(1134)
In the following Texts the Author urges the fallacy of being unproven' against the Buddhist's Reason-from Kumarila's point of view
TEXTS (1135-1136).
"IF WORDS LIKE Darāļ ' ARE USED IN REFERENCE TO THE INDIVIDUAL AS WELL AS THE UNIVERSAL, IT IS SO APPLICABLE ON THE BASIS OF TRE NUMBER OF EITHER INDIVIDUALS OR THE COMPONENTS, THE WORD Vana' DENOTES EITHER INDIVIDUALS AS QUALIFIED BY THE NUMBER OF THE UNIVERSAL, OR THE UNIVERSAL AS SUBSISTING IN A PLURALITY OF INDIVIDUALS." (Shlokavārtika-Vanavāda
92-94.11135-1136)
COMMENTARY
Kumārila argues as follows :-"The word dārāk' is applied sometimes to the Universal and sometimes to the Individual; when it is applied to the Universal, then it is nsed according to the Number of the Individuals, and these Individuals consist in the many toomen ; when however it is applied to the Individual, then it is used in accordance with the Plurality of the Components of the Individual, in the form of her hands, feet and other limbs. -In the case of the word 'Vana', what are denoted are the Individuals, in the shape of the Mango, Khadira, Palasha and other particular trees, as qualified by the Number (Singular) of the Universal Tree' subsisting in all those individual trees; and that is why the word is used in the Singular Number 'nam'; as what it denotes is the Substance qualified by the Number of the Universal. Or what is denoted by the word "vana' is the Universal itself as subsisting in the Individual trees, Dhava and the rest ; hence it is used in the Singular Number, the said Universal being one only." -(1135-1136)
The answer to the above is as follows:

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586
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER IVT.
TEXT (1137).
IN THIS WAY ALL WORDS IN THE SINGULAR NUMBER BECOME DOOMED. IF IT BE ARGUED THAT IN THE CASE OF OTHER WORDS (IN THE SINGULAR NUMBER) THE SPEAKER'S WISH DOES NOT LIE THAT WAY", -THEN THAT wish ITSELF MIGHT BE THE BASIS IN THE CASES IN
QUESTION ALSO.-(1137)
COMMENTARY. In the way described above, all words in the Singular Number -like * vrkşah-become doomed, --discarded ; as the said reasoning would apply everywhere. As in regard to every word in the Singular Number, it might be said that "if the word is used in reference to the Individual, etc.", (Kumärila's words in the preceding Text.)
It might be argued that" in the case of other words,-like 'vrkşahthe Speaker's wish does not lie towards speaking of the Individuals and the Universals".
In that case, Nuber in words) would not be in accordance with the number of things,-on the contrary, the presence and absence that would determine the Number (in words) would be the Speaker's wish itself. In that case, in the case of words like dārāh also, that same wish may very well form the determining factor; the idea being that, even when there is no diversity (multiplicity) in the thing, the Plural Number is used because there is the Speaker's wish to speak of it as many.
Thus our Reason is not unproven :-(1137)
It has been asserted (by Kumarila, quoted under Text 1136) that "the word 'vana' denotes the Individuals as qualified by the Number of the Universal".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1138).
THERE CAN BE NO NUMBER IN THE UNIVERSAL AT ALL.-EVEN IF THE NUMBER WERE THERD IN THE UNIVERSAL, HOW COULD THE INDIVIDUALS BE QUALIFIED BY THAT NUMBER 1-"[THEY COULD BR SO QUALIFIED) THROUGH THE connection of what is connected (INDIRECTLY), OR THROUGH DIRROT CONNECTION ITSELF ".-[IF THIS BE HELD THEN THE ANSWER WOULD BE AS IN
THE FOLLOWING Text.]-(1138)
COMMENTARY. There can be no Number in the Universal; as it subsists in substance only,

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
587
This has been said in accordance with the doctrine of the Vaishēşikas. In case that doctrine is not accepted, and it is held that Number does belong to the Universal--then, in what way could it be established that the Individuals, Dhava and other trees, are qualified by that Number (of the Universal) ?
The following explanation might be offered - It conld be so established either (indirectly) through the connection of the connected, or through direct Connection itself ; that is, if the Nurnber is something different from the Universal, then the Universal would be connected with the Singular Number, and without Universal there would be connection of the Individuals, trees, Dhard and the rest ; thus the qualifying of the Dhava and other Individual Trees would be done indirectly ;-if, on the other hand, the Number is not something different from the Universal, then that would be directly connected with the Individual Trees, which would thus become qualified by that Number. In this way it would be established that the Individuals are
qualified by the Number of the Universal (1138)
The following Text supplies the answer to the explanation given in the latter part of the preceding Text) -
TEXT (1139).
IF IT BE SO, THEN EVEN A SINGLE TREE COULD BE SPOKEN OF AS' Vana' (FOREST)SEVERAL TREES ALSO ARE SPOKEN OF AS SUCH ONLY THROUGH Connection, AND THAT IS PRESENT IN THE
SINGLE TREE ALSO.-(1139)
COMMENTARY
If the application of the word vana' to Individual Treen, Dhard and the rest, be due only to the presence of the connection of the Connected, or of Connection itself, then even a single tree could be spoken of as Vana'; as the basis of the application would be present there. For instance, even the several trees-Dhava and the rest-are spoken of as Vana', only through the connection of the Number of the Universal,—and not through anything else; and this connection is present in the single Tree also why then should this also not be spoken of as 'vana'?-(1139)
It has been asserted (in Tesce 1136, by Kumarila) that "the word vana! may be taken as denoting the Universal subsisting in the many individual trees)".
The answer to this is as follows:

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588
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (1140). THAT (UNIVERSAL) WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE many INDIVIDUAL TREES IS THE SAME THAT SUBSISTS IN THE SINGLE INDIVIDUAL (TREH), THE BASIS THEREOV BEING THE SAME IN BOTH CASES ; CONSEQUENTLY, THE IDEA OF 'Vana' (FOREST) SHOULD BE THERE IN CONNECTION WITH THE SINGLE TREE ALSO.-- (1140)
COMMENTARY. Under the said view also, & single Tree could be spoken of as 'Vama. Because what the word "vana' denotes is the Universal as subsisting in the many Individuals, and that same Universal subsists in the single Individual tree, Dhava also ; thus the basis of the notion of "vana' being the same in all cases, why should the notion of vand not appear in connection with the single tree also 1-(1140)
In the following Text, the Anthor sums up his Reasoning :
TEXT (1141). THUS THE USE OF WORDS IN THE SINGULAR AND OTHER NUMBERS SHOULD BE REGARDED THROUGH CONCOMITANCE AND NON-CONCOMITANCE, AB DEPENDING ENTIRELY UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, NOT UPON THE REAL STATE OF THINGS; AS IT IS NOT ALWAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THIS LATTER.— (1141)
COMMENTARY. As it is, etc. etc.: because the real state of things is not exactly as expressed by the words.(1141)
It has been argued (under Text 973, by Kumārila) that," the Apoha can have no connection with Gender and Number, etc.''; where the .etcetera' is meant to include the connection of Action, Time and so forth.
This is answered in the following
TEXT (1142) Tun CONNECTION OF ACTION, TIMH, ETO. HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED BEFORE. HENCE ALL THESE ALSO ARE PURELY CONVENTIONAL, AND DO NOT really SUBSIST IN INDIVIDUALS
ALSO.(1142)
COMMENTARY Before ', - i.e. in course of the rejection of such concepts as Action, Time and so forth, the connection also of Action, etc. has been discarded; hence these also cannot belong to things.
* Conventional-created by Convention.-(1142)

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HXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
589
Even granting that these (Gender, Number, Action, etc.) belong to things, -inasmuch as the Apoha in the form of the Reflected Image' is apprehended by deluded persons as something external, through this apprehension, connection with Gender, Number and the rest would be there through the Individual-Henco what has been asserted (by Kumärila, under 973) to the effect that the Individual being something that cannot bo spoken of by words, the connection cannot be through that either", -is Incon. clusive
It is also unproven ', unadmitted'under the theory that all this is purely illusory*; this latter fact is shown in the following
TEXT (1143).
IN FACT, THE Apoha Is DENOTED AS APPREHENDED IN THE FORM OF THE INDIVIDUAL; AND THE APOHA THEREFORE IS CONNECTED WITH
GENDER, ETO, THROUGH THAT INDIVIDUAL (1143)
COMMENTARY.
• Apoha is denoted by the Word.
Tat-Therefore. * Asya -of the Apoha.-(1143)
It has been argued (under 974, by Kumarita) that" in the case of Verbs, the exclusion of other things is not apprehended".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1141).
TYE WORD IS USED ONLY FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINCING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE THING INTENDED; HENCH THE EXCLUSION OF WHAT IS NOT-INTENDED BECOMES APPREHENDED
BY IMPLICATION.-(1144)
COMMENTARY.
That "in the case of Verbs the exclusion of other things is not apprehended " cannot be admitted. Because when a person uses a word, it is not because he is addicted to such use, but for the purpose of bringing about the cognition,- in the person hearing the word-in regard to a cortain thing that is intended, desired, to be known. Consequently, when the desired thing is apprehended, the exclusion of the undesired thing also becomes apprehended by implication; as the desired and the undesired' are mutually exclusive.-(1144)
It might be argued that "all things are desired":—The answer to that is as follows:

Page #585

590
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (1145). ALL THINOS CANNOT BE desired; AS, IN THAT CASE, THERE WOULD BE NO RESTRIOTION REGARDING ANY DENOTATIONS. HENCE IN THE
CASE OF WORDS LIKE 'COOKS' AND THE LIKE, THERE IS CLEARLY SOMETHING EX
CLUDED:-(1145)
COMMENTARY
If all things were desired' (to be expressed), then there could be no restriction regarding the denotation of words; in that case, it would not be possible for the hearer to undertake any activity that might be called for on the hearing of the word ; consequently it cannot be right that all things are desired (to be expressed).
From all this it follows that in the case of words like cooks' (Verbe) there is exclusion of the undesired, by inaplication, and it is quite clearly apprehended.-(1145)
The following Texts also proceed to show how the said "exclusion of the unintended' is expressed by implication :
TEXTS (1146-1147).
WHEN THE VERB' pachati' (* Cooks') IS UTTERED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS THAT HE IS NOT DOING NOTHING, NOR IS HE eating or gambling - WHERE THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER ACTS IS CLEARLY APPREHÜNDED. THUS, WHATEVER IS INTENDED (TO BE SPOKEN), THERE IS ALWAYS SOMETHING EXCLUDED' BY THE RELATIVE NEGATION, THIS SOMETHING BEING DOING NOTHING AND ALSO OTHER AOTS (THAN THE ONE MEANT TO BE SPOKEN
OF BY THE VERB USED).-(1146-1147)
COMMENTARY.
From the above it is clear that the verb pachati' (cooks) excludes "doing nothing', and also other acts like Wating, Gambling and the like, which thus are the "excluded', through 'Relative Negation. Hence the assertion that "there is nothing that is denied in the form of Relative Negation" (Text 974) is not true.
In the compound Paryudāsātmakāpohyam - paryadāsatmakam' is to be taken as qualifyingapohjan
Whatever is intended to be spoken of'-by that, there is something to be excluded through Relative Negation, in the shape of doing nothing and the rest.-(1146-1147)

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
591
It has been asserted in Text 975, by Kumarila) that," the cooking remains un-negatived in its own form ".
The following Text shows that this assertion involves self-contradiction on the part of Kumarila
TEXTS (1148-1149).
YOUR ASSERTION THAT "THE Cooking REMAINS UN-NEGATIVED IN ITS OWN FORM" INVOLVES SELF-CONTRADICTION; BECAUSE THE WORDS IN ITS OWN FORM CAN ONLY MEAN THAT THERE IS NEGATIVING OF THE FORM OF OTHER AOTS' OTHERWISE THE EMPHASISING WOULD BE
MEANINGLES8.-(1148-1149)
COMMENTARY
Question :-"In what way is there self-contradiction ? "
Answer - Because what the worde, etc. etc. That is, when it is asserted that the Cooking remains un-negatived in its own form ', the emphasis laid upon the last phrase indicates that the Cooling remains itself by negativing the forms of other acts. If that were not the meaning, then the emphasis that you have laid upon the phrase "in its own form' would be meaningless, as there would be nothing that would be precluded by that emphasis.-(1148 - 1149)
It has been argued (under Text 976, by Kumarila) that—" the idea of something to be accomplished, as also the idea of the Past, etc. would be baseless"
This is answered in the following
TEXTS (1150-1151).
Apoha BEING FEATURELESS, WHAT SORT OF ACCOMPLISHMENT' COULD
THERE BE OF IT? CERTAINLY THERE IS NO 'ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE SKY-LOTUS' ETO. IF IT BE URGED THAT “IN. ASMUCH AS IT IS APPREHENDED AS A thing, IT APPEARS AS with features", -THEN (WE ASK) WHAT IF IT IS SO IT MAY BE SAID THAT] "FROM
THIS IT WOULD FOLLOW THAT IT HAS THE SAME PROPERTIES AS
ENTITIES."-(1150-1151)
COMMENTARY
If the Apoha has been apprehended by you as featureless, then how can you say "because it is accomplished " 7 Certainly there is no accom

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592
TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER XVI.
plishment of such things as the sky.flower; and that bearnse all such are featureless,
The following might be urged--"Even though Apoha is fentaureless in reality, yet by delnded persons it is conceived as something oxternal, and hence, it comes to appear as with features"
The answer to this is- What if it is so ? That is, even if the Apoha appears to be with features, how does that help you in the present context ?
• The other party replies-" In that case, etc. etc. that is, what follows from it is that, just as the positive entity is apprehended in accomplished form, so Apoha also, being cognised as having the same properties as positive entities, is apprehended as something accomplished; hence the assertion that it is accomplished' is quite right ".-(1150-1151)
The answer to the above argument of the opponent is that, if it is as just explained, then you yourseli have shown the basis of the notion of being accomplished' and of that of past and so forth, and consequently you should not say that all this becomes baseless.
This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1152).
THUS THEN, THE NOTION OF BEING ACCOMPLISHED, AS ALSO THE CONCEPTION OF THE PAST 'ETO., -BEING OF THE SAME FORM AS POSITIVE ENTITIES,COMES TO BE BASED UPON
THAT SAMB.-(1152)
COMMENTARY.
. Based upon that same',-1.e. based upon the apprebension of the fact that they are of the same character as Positive entities.-(1152)
It has been argued (under Text 977, by Kumärila) that," In the case of all such denotations as Injunction and the rest, there is no idea of the exclusion of other things".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1153)
IN THE CASE OF ALL SUCH DENOTATIONS AS THE Injunction AND THE LIKE,—WHAT IS EXCLUDED' (NEGATIVSD) IS 'NON-EXISTENCE, ETC., --EXACTLY THAT WHICH IS NOT MEANT TO BE SPOKEN
OF ; BOT THIS IS DONE BY IMPLICATION,
NOT DIRECTLY BY THE WORD.-(1153)
COMMENTARY.
All such Denotations as the Injunction and the like are always differentiated from Negation' and the resty and are apprehended as ench;

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so that what is excluded' and negatived in their case is 'non-existence, which is what is not meant to be spoken of by the word concerned. Thus there is here also the apprehension of the exclusion of other things, (1153)
It has been argued (under Text, 977, by Kumarila) that "In the case of a negative appearing with another negative, what sort of Apoha could be thore »
The answer to thie is as follows:
TEXTS (1154–1156).
OF SIMILAR KIND WOULD BE THE Apoha, WHEN A NEGATIVE IS JOINED
WITH ANOTHER NEGATIVE; JUST AS IT IS APPREHENDED WHEN THERE ARE FOUR NEGATIVES. IN SOME CASES, WHEN A NEGATIVE IS ASSOCIATED WITH ANOTHER NEGATIVE, WHAT IS APPREHENDED FROM IT IS SOMETHING POSITIVE ; THE THIRD NEGATIVE EXPRESSES THE NEGATION (ABSENCE) OF THAT POSITIVE THING; AND WHEN FOR THE NEGATIVING OF THAT AGAIN A FOURTH NEGATIVE IS USED, IF THAT IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF, WHAT IS DENOTED BY IT IS THE * EXCLUSION OF ANOTHER :-(1154-1156)
COMMENTARY.
Tachchatustaya, etc. where there are four negatives, Question :-"In what form is it apprehended ?"
Answer :- When a negative, etc. etc. '.-The word "arthah' is to be taken as co-ordinated with the word " vidhih.
Negation of that',-i.e. the negation of the said positive thing.
For the negativing of that,-i.e. for the negativing of what has been expressed by the third negative (by itself), as apart from the positive factor.
Turiyah-is fourth ;—the form being due to the rule which lays down the addition of the affix ' yat' in the sense of making up, to the term chatur, and the elision of the first letter.
If that is meant to be spoken of i.e. on the use of the fourth negative. By it i.e. by the fourth negative.
* The exclusion of another is denoted' -ie. it expresses the Reflection, in the positive form, as differentiated from the negation expressed by the third negative.-1154-1156)
The Author makes this same idea clear by means of an Example :
38

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (1157-1158). WHEN IT IS SAID Wisnu na pachali' ('IT IS NOT THAT HE DOES NOT COOK) WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS THAT HE COOK'; IF A THIRD NEGATIVE IS ADDED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS EITHER THAT
HE IS DOING NOTHING OR THAT HE IS DOING SOMETHING OTHER THAN COOKING '; -AND WHEN A FOURTH NEGATIVE IS ADDED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD IS SOMETHING DIFFERENTIATED FROM THIS LAST, THAT IS, HE IS COOKING. SO THAT HERE THE EX. CLUSION OF ANOTHER' 18 STANLAR TO THAT IN THE CASE OF THB affirmative sentence.(1157-1158)
COMMENTARY.
Differentiated, ec. -i.e. from the idea of his doing nothing, or of his doing something other than cooking.
Exclusion of another is similar to that in the case, etc. etc. Just as in the case of the affirmative sentence 'He is cooking', what is expressed by implication is the negation of his doing nothing or doing something else, - so also in the case of the second negative, it is seen that it expresses the negation of the same doing nothing, etc. It is only for the purpose of making things clearer that the use of four negatives has been cited.-(1157-1158)
It has been argued (under Text 978, by Kumarila) that-"in the case of the particles cha and the rest, there can be no connection with the negative ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1159). OF PARTICLES LIKEcho THE MEANING INTENDED IS SOMETHING LIKE
OOMBINATION'; AND THUS THERE WOULD BE EXCLUSION', BY THAT, OF THINGS OTHER THAN THAT, IN THE SHAPB OF
OPTION' AND THE LIK.-(1159)
COMMENTARY
The term 'adi' is meant to include such terms as 'd', which denote option, the term api.which denotes probability, connection, eto..the term 'tu' which denotes qualification, and the term fēva' which denotes emphasis.
Other than that', - i.e. Other than Combination, etc. * By that'-i.e. by the term 'cha'-(1159)

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It has been argued (under Text 978, by Kumārila) that-" In the case of the meaning of the Sentence, exclusion of other things cannot be indicated ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1160-1161).
THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS' IS CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD IN THE CASE OF THE MEANING OF A SENTENCE. IT IS ONLY THE DENOTATIONS OF CERTAIN WORDS CONSTRUED TOGETHER THAT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE'; WHAT WOULD BE'EX. CLUDED BY THESE WORDS WOULD CLEARLY BE THE THINGS DIFFERENT FROM THOSE DENOTED BY THESE WORDS; SO THAT THE SAME WOULD BE 'EXCLUDED BY THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE ALSO. BECAUSE THE meaning of the Sentence IS NOTHING APART FROM THE MEANINGS OT
THE WORDS (COMPOSING IT).-(1160-1161)
COMMENTARY
Construed together -Related, as cause and effect. * Things excluded'-by the words.
Objection:-The denotation of words is one thing, and totally different from that is the meaning of the Sentence ; why then is it said that what are
excluded by the denotation of the words would also be excluded by the meaning of the sentence ?"
Answer: It is nothing apart from that';-the meaning of the sentence is not anything different from the denotations of the words-in the shape of something of a mixed character, like the colour of the Kalmāşet ; because such a thing, if it existed, would be perceived, and yet it is not per: ceived.-(1160-1161)
This game idea is made clearer by means of an Examples
TEXT (1162). WHEN THE MEANING OF THE SENTENCE-Chaitra, BRING THE COW ,HAS BEEN COMPREHENDED, WHAT IS UNDERSTOOD, BY IMPLICATION, IS THE Apoha (EXCLUSION) OF OTHER AGENTS, OTHER OBJECTS AND SO FORTH (TRAN THOSE EXPRESSED BY THE WORDS OF
THE SENTENCE).-(1162)
COMMENTARY.
In the case of the said sentence, nothing else comes into the mind except what is expressed by the words—' Chaitra' etc.-composing it; and

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when Chaitra has been comprehended, the exclusion of non-chaitra also becomes comprehended througli implication. Otherwise, if the exclusion of other Agents, etc. wore not meant, then the mention of Chaitra, etc. would be meun. ingless; and hence no such sentence could be addressed by any person to any one ; and there would be an end to all usage in the world.-(1162)
It has been argued (under Tex: 979, by Kumarila) that" nothing is comprehended in the case of such words as 'Non-exclusion of others (* ananyāpoha')".
The answer to this is as follows :
TEXT (1103).
IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS 'ananyāpoha' (NON-EXCLUSION OF
OTHERS'), WHAT IS COMPREHENDED CANNOT BE SOMETHING POSITIVE, AS DESIRED BY THE OTHER PARTY, BECAUSE THE UNIVERSAL AND SUCH OTHER LIKELY POSITIVE DENOTATIONS HAVE BEEN
ALREADY DISCARDED.-(1163)
COMMENTARY.
It is true that, in reality, nothing positive, in the shape of the Universal, etc. is comprehended ; because all these have been rejected in detail in the Chapters dealing with the Universal, etc.—(1163)
Question :-"What, then, is it that is comprehended ?" Answer:
TEXT (1164).
IN FACT, THE CONCEPTION THAT TOLLOWS FROM THIS WORD ENVISAGES
SOMETHING POSITIVE; AND IT IS ONLY LATER ON THAT THERE APPEARS THE IDEA OF THE NEGATION (EXCLUSION) OF
WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD ' Apoha'.-(1164)
COMMENTARY.
Objection : "If it is held that there appears the idea of the negation of what is denoted by the word "Apola —then a poha only should not be regarded as the denotation of the word : as that is negatived by it."
Answer:

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TEXT (1165). WORDS LIKE THIS, HOWEVER, ARE UNCONFORMABLE, AS THERE IS ABSENCE OF CONNECTION, ALL VERBAL COGNITIONS DO NOT ALWAYS
ENVISAGE THINGS AS THEY ACTUALLY EXIST. (1165)
COMMENTARY. "Words like this i.e. Like ananyapona's
Unconformable ,-i.e. not in conformity with any real state of things. Question :- Why so ? "
Anguer :- As there is absence of connection':-.e. there is no connection with any such thing as is expressed by the word ; because any positive entity in the shape of the Universal, etc. as denoted by words has already been rejected.
Question: "If that is so, then how is it that the word ' Ananyapoha' brings about the idea of the negation of what is denoted by the word Apoha (as just declared by you)?"
Answer - Alt verbal cognitions, etc. etc.'.-That is, there are some verbal cognitions, as arising out of impressions due to repeated false conceptions, which envisage things that do not exist; and either the existence or non-existence of things cannot be proved on the basis of such cognitions.(1165)
It has been argued (under Text 979, by Kumarila) that" in the case of such words as cognisable, lenouable and the like, there can be nothing that is exchided".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1166). IN THE CASE OF SUCH WORDS AS 'COGNISABLE' AND 'KNOWABLE', WHICH IS IT IN WHOSE CASE THERE IS NOTHING'EXCLUDED CERTAINLY, SUCH A WORD IS NEVER USED BY INTELLIGENT MEN, ALONE BY ITSELF AND
SUDDENLY.-(1166)
COMMENTARY. Among the words 'cognisable and the like, which is it in whose case it is said that there is nothing 'excluded ' -If it is said in regard to the word 'knowable alone by itself, apart from any sentence, and independently of all connection with other words, then the argument is superfluous; because a word alone by itself is never used, and hence has no meaning at all.
This is what is shown in the text by the words Certainty such a word, etc. etc.; alone, without any other words. - Suddenly - without any context.
As a matter of fact, it is for the benefit of the listeners that words are uttered, -not because the speaker has the habit of using them; and single word could not confer any benefit on the listener, in the shape of remov

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TATTVASANGBAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
ing his doubt or ignorance. For instance, if the word did bring about in the listener a cognition free from all doubt, after setting aside his doubts and misconceived notions,--then it would have conferred a benefit on him ; no such benefit can be said to be conferred by any word used singly, by itself. -1106)
In fact, the use of the word has its use only in helping to remove the doubt and ignorance of the listener and bring about his well-ascertained cognition; and hence it can be usefully used only in a sentence ;-this is what is shown in the following
TEXTS (1167-1168), IN FACT, THE WORD IS USED BY INTELLIGENT PERSONS ONLY FOR THE
PURPOSE OF REMOVING THE DOUBTFUL AND WRONG IDEAS THAT SOME ONE MAY HAVE IN REGARD TO A CERTAIN THINC. CONSBQUENTLY, IT IS ONLY WHEN USED BY SUCH MEN AND WHEN BRINGING ABOUT COGNITIONS FREE FROM DOUBT AND MISTAKE THAT THE WORD BBCOMES USEFUL.-(1167-1168)
COMMENTARY Ārēka' is Doubt. Some one i.e. the listener. In regard to a certain thing some object. For removing it, etc.'-i.e. for reinoving doubt and wrong notions. Tēna '-by such words as knowable and the like. Tai by the intelligent persons.-(1107-1168)
If what the opponent has said is with reference to the words in question as occurring in a sentence,-then what is said cannot be admitted.--This is shown in the following
TEXTS (1169-1170). WHAT IS REGARDED BY DULL-WITTED PERSONS AS OPEN TO DOUBT IS WHAT IS 'EXOLUDED BY THE WORD IN QUESTION; OTHERWISE, THE UTTERANCE OF THE WORD WOULD BE USELESS. IF HE DOES NOT REGARD ANYTHING AS OPON TO DOUBT, THEN WHY DOES HE ASK (ANOTHER PERSON) ABOUT IT ? - IF ONE UTTERS A WORD THAT DOES NOT BRING ABOUT EMBELLISHMENT (ENLIGHTENMENT), HOW CAN HE BE REGARDED AS A SANE-MINDED PERSON 1-(1169-1170)
COMMENTARY. What is excluded by the word 'knowable' occurring in a sentence is just that which is regarded by dull-witted persons-persons with dull in

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telligence,-es open to doubt. Hence it cannot be admitted that in the case of words like "knowable', there is nothing that can be excluded.
Otherwise if it does not exclude' what is doubted by dull-witted persons.
It might be argued that- The listener may have not doabted anything".
The answer to that is- If he does not regard, etc. etc. ' -If the listener has no doubts regarding anything, then why does he seek for advice from another person? It is only for ascertaining things that one questions another person ; otherwise he would be mad.
It might be argued that-"Even if the listener has any doubts regarding anything, that doubt cannot be removed by the word in question."
The answer to this is- If one utters a word, etc. etc.;-- Samskāna is embellishment, in the form of the removal of the listener's doubt, the word that has this embellishment is one that brings about the said removal; the attix kap' is added according to Pānini's Sutra Shësãd vibhāşa'.
Brunan',--the explainer using the word.
How can he, etc. etc. '--That is, he would be insane. Because it is only for the embellishment (enlightenment) of listeners that words are used. - (1169-1170)
Question :-"What, and in what sentence, is that which is open to doubt in the mind of the dull-witted person,—which is excluded' by the word in question ?" Answer -
TEXT (1171).
WHEN IT IS ASSERTED THAT COLOUR IS cognisable BY VISUAL PERCEPTION -THIS CERTAINLY SERVES TO EXCLUDE (DENY) SOMETHING
SUPPOSED BY SOME PERSON.-(1171)
COMMENTARY.
This i.e. the sentence Colour is cognisable by Visual Perception. -(1171)
Question :-" What is it that is supposed ?" Answer
TEXT (1172).
THE SUPPOSITION IS]" IT IS NOT BY THE COGNITION THROUGH THE EYD ALONE THAT THE BLUE AND OTHER COLOURS ARD COGNISABLE,BUT ALSO BY THE ONE ETERNAL COGNITION, THROUGH
THE Ear ALSO."-(1172)
COMMENTARY.
The dull-witted man might suppose that Colour is cognisable also by the Eternal Cognition through the Ear-and it is this supposition that is excluded' (negatived) by the sentence Colour is cognisable by the

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TATTVASANGRAFA CHAPTER XVI.
Cognition through the Eye'; the meaning being thin-'Colour is cognisable by Cognition through the eye only, not by Cognition through the Ear anil other organs!:-(1172)
TEXTS (1173-1174). THE WORD COGNISABLE' IS USED WHEN THERE ARE SUCH DOUBTS AS(a) ARE ALL THINGS COGNISABLE AS MOMENTARY, OR NOT I(6) ARE ALL THINGS COGNISABLE BY THE COGNITION OF AN ALL-KNOWING PERSON? (c) ARE NEGATIONS, WHICH DO NOT BRING ABOUT ANY COGNITION, COGNISABLE -
(1173-1174)
COMMENTARY
(a) 'Are all things cognisable as momentary, or not?!-(6) "Are all things cognisable by the Cognition of an Omniscient Person ?-(c) 'Are Negations, which are of the nature of the absence of all determining features, and which do not even bring about a cognition-cognisable ? - When such doubts appear, then, it is said all things are cognisable as momentary ;and they are cognisable by an Omniscient Person and Negations also are cognisable'.-And in all these what is excluded "(negatived) is the supposition that 'things are cognisable as non-momentary and so forth.—1173-1174)
Question :-"Is all this supposition negatived by the mere assertion (of cognisability in a certain form) ?"
Answer
TEXT (1175).
THAT THEY ARE cognisable IN THE FORMS ASSERTED FOLLOWS FROM THE FACT THAT IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT ALL THINGS ARE momentary AND 30 TORTU. NEGATION ALSO IS cognisable as illusory, us
IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT IT IS IN THAT FORM.-(1175)
COMMENTARY,
In the forms asserter i.e. as 'momentary and the rest ; as all this has been established by proofs.
Question :-"How is Negation cognisable "
Answer:- Negation also is cognisable, etc, etc.' ;- in that form ',-i.e. in the form of Negation.
As a matter of fact, even non-entities are also somehow proved to exist, hence they are regarded as cognisable; if they were not so, then there could be no usage regarding them.-- (1175)
Says the Opponent :-" Are Words cognisable as evanescent (non-eternal), or not?-When this doubt is raised, and the answer is-'cognisable;

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if the man who is ignorant of the context in which the word 'cognisable? has been uttered, hears only the word 'cognisable, there does appear in him some sort of a cognition of a nebulous character.-If then the word * cognisable by itself (apart from a sentence) had no denotation, then how is there the said cognition that is expressed by it?"
dnswer
TEXTS (1176-1178).
THAT WORDS LIKE KNOWABLE OOGNISABLE SERVE AS THE MEANS
OF PRODUCING COGNITIONS (IDEAS) HAVING BEEN PERCEIVED ONLY WHEN THEY APPEAR IN A SENTENCE, IF, AT SOME OTHER TIME, THEY ARE FOUND TO BE USED ALONE BY THEMSELVES, THE IDEA THAT IS PRODUCED BY THEM, N REGARD TO THINGS THAT ARE NEBULOUS, IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH WHAT HAS BEEN FOUND IN THE CASE OF THEIR USE IN A SENTENCE.-IN FACT, IN THE CASE OF WORDS LIKE 'JAR' ALSO, IT IS THE SAME; SO THAT THE WORDS
KNOWABLE AND THE LIKE ARE JUST LIKE THE WORDS "JAR' AND THE REST,-(1176-1178)
COMMENTARY.
What the whole of this means is as follows:--As a matter of fact, there is no Cognition following from the hearing of the word ('cognisable') by itself ; what happens in such cases is that the man has previously heard the word used in a sentence as conveying a definite meaning, -50 that when he subsequently hears it pronounced alone by itself, he lias his mind influenced by the similarity of the word in the two cases, and he comes to presume that he has understood its meaning. That this is so is shown by the fact that under this latter presumption, the nebulous and wavering idea that the listener has is of those same things which he cognised on previous occasions, when the word was used in sentences. This is exactly the same as in the case of the ordinary words like "Jar: -For instance, the question having been put-Shall I bring water in a Jar or in the Hands ?—The answer is 'In the Jar'; if the man who hears this last word alone is ignorant of the context in which it has been uttered,--the idea that he has is in accordance with the meaning of the word 'Jar' that he had understood in those previous sentences that he had heard with that word in them.
Thus then it follows that words like cognisable are just as denotative of particular things as other denotative words. This is what is pointed out in the Tect by the words- So that, etc. etc.'-(1176-1178)
It has been argued (under Text 980, by Kremärila) that-"Rather than assume the Thing excluded', it is far better to assume the thing itself".
This is answered in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA! CHAPTER XVI.
TEXTS (1179-1180)
THE STATEMENT THAT," RATHER THAN ASSUME THE EXCLUDED THING IT IS TÁR BETTER TO ASSUME THE THING ITSELT", IS SELF-CONTRADICTORY; AS IN EVERY CASE THERE IS EXCLUSION OF SOME OTHER THING' THAT THING ALONE IS ASSUMED WHICH IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OX; HENCE THERE IS IMPLICATION OF THAT WHICH IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OP; BUT ALL THINGS ARE NOT
MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF.-(1179-1180)
COMMENTARY.
Thing itself, etc. etc. It is an Entity, not not a non-entity-meant to be spoken of, which is assumed by las, on the basis of actual cognition, to be
denoted by the word; hence when that is apprehended, there is, through Implication, the Exclusion of what is not meant to be spoken of ; so that our explanation of the word and its denotation does not fail to apply in any cuse.
In fact, it is in reference exactly to those cases where doubts are likely to arise in the mind of the dall-witted person that our Teacher has made the following statement :-Having assumed the non-cognisable, through the exclusion of that, we have the inference of the cognisable':-(1179.1180)
It has been argued (under Text 980, by Kumārila) that-" Inasmuch as the idealistic form of things has been denied, nothing internal (purely sub. jective) can be denoted by words".
The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (1181-1183).
AS FOE THE DENIAL OF THE Idealistic form of things, SUCH DENTAL IS
IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THE FACT IS SELF-EVIDENT; AS AOTUALLY THERE ARE SEVERAL IMPOSITIONS WITHOUT ANY BASIC REALITY.IT HAS TO BE ADMITTED THAT THERE MUST BE SOMETHING IN THE IDEA (OR COONITION) ITSELF WHICH APPERTAINS SPECIFICALLY TO EACH OBJECT ENVISAGED BY IT, AND THAT IS PRECISELY ITS
NATURE':-AND THIS SAME NATURE OF THE IDEA HAS BEEN SPOKEN OF BY US AS 'FORM', REFLECTED IMAGE, APPEARANCE'
FIGURING, MANIFESTATION'. SO THAT THERE IS ONLY A DIFFERENCE IN THE NAME, WITHOUT ANY REAL DIFFERENCE.-(1181-1183)
COMMENTARY
Impossible-to make.
Question :-"In what way is the fact of the Thing being of the form of the Idea (cognition) self-evident ? "

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Answer: As actually there are, etc. etc.'.In Dreams and other forms of cognition, it is found that, even in the absence of a real substratum, there are imposed cognitions, clearly known to the meanest cowherd.--and this fact is self-evident to every man in his own experience. It cannot be right to say that "in these cases what is cognised is the real thing as existing at other places and at other times" ;-because the thing cognised is not cognised in that form ; and one thing cannot be cognised in the form of any other thing: for if it did, then it would lead to an absurdity.
Further, you will have to admit that there is some peculiarity in the Cognition itself due to the cognised object-by virtue of which, even though as Cognition, every Cognition is the game, yet every individual cognition differs from the other, so that in one there is apprehension of the Blue, not of the Yellow colour; and on this basis there is a differentiation in Cognition. And when you admit this, then, by implication, it would also become admitted that the Cognition has form. Because without such form it would be im. possible to definitely ascertain the particular nature of the Cognition. Hence what you speak of as the nature of the Cognition is nothing other than what we speak of as 'Form, Figuring and so forth; so that the only dispute between us is one regarding names.-(1181-1183)
It has been argued (under Test 981, by Kumārila) that-"Nothing excluded is noticed in the case of such words as vam' and the like",
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1184).
IN THE CASE OF THE WORD 'ēvam' (THUS), THERE IS ' naivam. (NOT THUS) WHICH IS CLEARLY EXCLUDED '; IN THE SENSE OF IN
ANOTHER MANNER':-(1184)
COMMENTARY.
It is thus-and not thus, in this way there is the idea of another manner' which is what is excluded-differentiated-by the word "evam', * Thus'; and this is clearly apprehended. So that our theory of Verbal Denotation does not fail to apply to this case also.-(1184)
In this way the criticisms urged by Kumarils have been answered. The Author now proceeds to answer those urged by Uddyotakara.
It has been argued (under Text 982. by Uddyotakara) What is it that is assumed to be excluded in the case of the word 'sarua', 'all "
The answer to that is as follows:

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVL
TEXT (1185).
IN THE CASE OF THE WORD ALL' ALSO, AS PRESENTED IN ACTUAL USAGE, THERE IS SOMETHING EXCLUDED; AND WHAT IS REGARDED AS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF HERE ALSO IS THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS (1185)
COMMENTARY.
Here also, as in the case of words like knowable', the word 'all' is never used alone by itself; it is always used in a sentence; hence what is 'excluded by it would be just that in regard to which there may be doubt in the mind of dull-witted persons.
Abhidhitsitaḥ-meant to be spoken of.-(1185)
Question: What is it that is meant to be spoken of ?" Answer:
TEXT (1186).
3
All THINGS ARE SOULLESS, all MEN ARE GONE-IN SUCH SENTENCES, WHAT IS APPREHENDED IS entirety, AND WHAT IS IS A CERTAIN FACTOR.-(1186)
COMMENTARY.
Question: What is the factor that is excluded? Answer:
EXCLUDED
TEXT (1187).
THERE ARE SUCH MISCONCEPTIONS AS-ONLY EXTERNAL THINGS LIKE THE JAR ARE SOULLESS, ONLY SOME MEN CAN GO; AND IT IS THESE THAT ARE EXCLUDED-(1187)
COMMENTARY.
It has been argued (under Text 983, by Uddyotakara) that "If it be held that one and the rest are excluded by the word all', etc. etc". The answer to that is as follows:
TEXT (1188).
IN THE CASE OF THE WORD ALL, THE NEGATION OF ALL PARTS IS NOT WHAT IS MEANT TO BE SPOKEN OF; HENCE THE INCONGRUITY OF THE EXCLUSION OF ITS OWN MEANING THAT HAS BEEN URGED HAS BEEN SO UNDER IGNORANCE.-(1188)
COMMENTARY.
If it were meant that when the word all is used in a sentence in the course of usage, there is negation of all parts,-then there might be 'exclusion
"

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of its own meaning':-As a matter of fact however, what is held to be negatived is only that which is open to doubt by the dull-witted person ; how then can there be any exclusion of its own meaning'?
The same reasoning applies to the case of such words as * adi and the like.-(1188)
It has been asked (under Text 986)—"Is it positive or negative " The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1189).
IT IS NEITHER Positive NOR Negative ; IT IS NEITHER diverse Nor same; IT IS NEITHER subsistent, NOB non-subsistent ; IT IS NEITHER
one NOR many—(1189)
COMMENTARY
Question :- "Why is it not positive ?" Answer
TEXT (1190).
IN RDALITY, IT DOES NOT EXIST IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT IS APPREHENDED; HENCE IT CANNOT BE POSITIVE. NOR IS IT NEGATIVE, AS IT
IS APPREHENDED AS AN ENTITY.-(1190)
COMMENTARY.
By deluded people it is apprehended as something external, and yet it does not exist in that form; and as having no external form, it is not Positive.
Question :-"Why cannot it be negatius?"
Answer Nor is it negative, because it is apprehended as an entity'; and yet, as it presents itself as something external, it cannot be said to be entirely negative.(1190)
Why cannot Apoha be of the nature of diversity' or of
Question: *58 menesa"
Answers
TEXT (1191).
DIVERSITY' (DIFFERENCE) AND 'SAMENESS' (NON-DIFFERENCE), ETC. ARE RESIDENT IN entities; WHILE THE 'DENOTATION OF WORDS' IS ENTIRELY FEATURELESS; HENCE THE SAID
CHARACTERS HAVE NO PLACE HERE.-(1191)
COMMENTARY. Diversity and sameness, etc. -i.e. Difference and Non-difference, etc. the etc. including 'being subsistent' and 'non-subsistent' and so forth.

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All these are properties residing in Entities only: how could they reside in the Apoha wluch has its body created only by the artist of Conceptual Thought ?
It has been argued that-"A poha being of the nature of Action, its objective has to be pointed out"
The reason put iorward is not admitted ; because the Apona denoted by the Word is of the nature of a 'Reflected Image'; and this Reflected Image, being in the form of the apprehended external object, cannot be a mere negation.
For the same reason there is no room for the optional alternatives set forth (by Uddyotakara)-as to whether it has, for its objective, the Cowe, or the Non-Cow; as it is always apprehended as something positive, appertaining to the Cow (hence the question of its pertaining to the Non-Cow does not arise).—(1191)
It has been asked (under Text 989) "Who has attributed the character of the Non-Cow to the Cow, that it has to be negatived' (by the Apoha) ?"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1192-1194). FOR US THE WORD DOES THE NEGATIVING OF OTHER THINGS 'DIRECTLY ;
AND AFTER THE negativing HAS BEEN DONE BY THE WORD, IT BECOMES APPREHENDED THROUGH ITS OWN FORCE --IN THE FORM
ITS NATURE IS NOT THE NATURE OF ANYTHING ELSE-AS LAS BEEN EXPLAINED IN DETAIL (UNDER T'ext 1013); HENCE WHAT IS URGED ON THE PRESENT OODASION-WHO HAS ATTRIBUTED THE CHARAOTER OF THE Non-Cow TO THE Cow, THAT IT HAS TO BE NEGATTVED ? '-IS THROUGH IGNORANCE OF THE VIEW OF THE OTHER PARTY. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THIS IS NOT WHAT IS HELD TO BE NEGATIVED BY THE WORD DIRECTLY.-(1192-1194)
COMMENTARY.
What has been urged would have been true only if the Word had expressed the negation of others primarily; as a matter of fact, however, what the Word produces, first of all, is only the Reflected Image of the Thing (spoken of); and it is only after that has been comprehended that, through the force of its implication, the said negation' (exclusion) becomes comprehended. Apparently this doctrine of ours is not known to the other party, and what he has urged is something insignificant, beneath notice. Such is the upshot of the Text. The rest is easy.-(1192-1194)
As regards the optional altornatives put forward-regarding Apoha being different or non-different and so forth-all that has been already discarded.
It has been asked (under Text 997, et seq., by Uddyotakara)-whether the Apoha is denoted or not denoted, etc. etc.
The answer to that is as follows:

Page #602

EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
607
TEXTS (1195-1199). THE DENOTABILITY THAT YOU ASK ABOUT-IS DENOTABILITY' BY
WHICH word ? IS IT DENOTABILITY' BY THE WORD 'Apoha' OR BY THE WORD JAR' AND THE REST ?-AS REGARDS THE QUESTION-WHETHER THE Apoha THAT IS DENOTED IS ITSELF OF THE NATURE OF Apoha (NDGATION, EXCLUSION) OR IT IS SOMETHING POSITIVE, WHEN WE COME TO THINK OF IT, WHAT IS COGNISED IS THE Apoha THAT FIGURES IN THE COGNITION-OUR VIEW IS THAT WHAT IS DENOTED BY THE WORD DIRECTLY IS THE REFLECTED IMAGE-AND AS REGARDS THE NEGATION OF OTHER THINGS, LIKE THE UNIVERSAL ETO., THAT IS COMPREHENDED ONLY INDIRECTLY, THROUGH IMPLICATION.-WHAT ALL SUCH WORDS AS JAR', ' TREE AND THE LIKE DENOTE IS THE SAID REFLECTED IMAGE, AS IT IS THE COGNITION OF THIS THAT THEY PRODUCE DIRECTLY; AND ANYTHING ELSE, THEY IMPLY ONLY INDIRECTLY.-THUS THEN, THERE IS NO INOONGRUITY REGARDING THE POSITIVE CHARACTER ; NOR IS THERE ANYTHING UND ESIRABLE FOR US.- AS REGARDS THE ALTERNATIVE OF A poha NOT BEING DENOTABLE, THAT WE DO NOT ACCEPT ; AND HENCE THAT IS NOT OUR VIEW.-(1195—1199)
COMMENTARY.
As regards the alternatives set forth regarding the denotability of the exclusion of others',-if it is urged in regard to the term 'exclusion of others --then, inasuch as it is held by us that what is denoted by this term is something positive, -that should not have been urged against us as an undesirable contingency.
That is to say, when the question is raised -as to whether what is denoted by the word is something positive, or the exclusion or negation of others '-and it is said that it is the negation of others that is denoted by the word ', there appears in the listener the idea envisaging the negation of others', in the form of a Reflected Image ; and if there is an idea of the negation of positive entities as forming the denotation of the word, that comes only by implication.
It what is urged is with reference to the words Jar' and the like, then, what these words bring about directly is the Apoha in the shape of the Reflected Image, which is denoted by those words in the positive form, and the idea of the negation of others' is obtained by implication ; so that there is no undesirable contingency for us.
Nor is our view open to the objection that there would be no resting ground or finality in the Assumption of Apoha after Apoha); because the
negation of others is held to be comprehended only by implication, and hence to be only an appendage to actual Denotation the view that it is not expressed is not accepted by us; and hence there can be no room for those incongruities that have been urged against that view. This is what is indicated by the words - As regards the alternative, etc. etc.':-(1195-1199)

Page #603

608
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
It has been urged (under Text 1001) that-*Singularity, eternality, etc. cannot be attributed to 4 poha".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1200),
THE IDEAS OF ONE-NESS ETERNALITY AND THE LIKE ARE PURELY IMAGINARY, NOT REAL. HENCE YOUR LAUGHTER AT US ON THIS POINT IS INDICATIVE OF A VERY HIGH GRADE OF
LEARNING (ON YOUR PART) (1200)
COMMENTARY.
If one-ness' and the rest had been mentioned by us as real, then thered might have been some cause for your laughing at ns. As a matter of fact, however, it has been mentioned by our Teacher only as something purely imaginary (subjective, conceptual), and he has mentioned it only in view of common misconceived notions. Under the circumstances, how can a learned person find any cause for laughter in this ? On the contrary, yon yourself, by criticising what you have not understood, have become an object of derisive laughter.-(1200)
It has been assertod (under Test 1002, by Kumärila) that,"for these reasons, the element of the negation of others could be there only in the case of words that are associated with the negative particle, etc. etc."
The answer to this is as follows
TEXT (1201). EVEN IN CASES WHERE THE THING ITSELF IS APPREHENDED, THE EXCLUSION OF OTHER THINGS' IS ALSO APPREHENDED, AS IS INDICATED BY THE FORCE OF THE EMPHASISING TERM (USED BY YOU); IF IT WERE NOT, THEN, THE EM
PHASISING WOULD BE USELESS.-(1201)
COMMENTARY
The factor of the exclusion of other things 'is cognised, not only in cases where the negative term is present : also where the negative term is not present, the same is cognised. This has been made clear by yourself when you said that the Thing itself is apprehended', where you have ernphasised the 'itself'. If this is not what you mean, then that emphasising word is useless. Thus when it is said that the thing iself is cognised', it is all the more clearly implied that the exclusion of others is also cog. nised.—(1201)
In the following Text, the other Party proceeds to show that the Buddhist theory of Apoha cannot apply to all cases.

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EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OV WORDS.
609
TEXT (1202).
" IN THE CASE OF SUCH TERMS AS SON OF THE BARREN WOMAN WHERE THERE IS NO EXTERNAL OBJECT WHICH WOULD BE THE
CONTRARY' (EXCLUDED), -WHEREIN WOULD THE A pohu SUBSIST WHICH IS SAID TO BE DE
NOTED BY IT?"-(1202)
COMMENTARY.
"In the case of the term 'son of the Barren Woman', there is no such thing as the external son, which would be the contrary, and hence the object of the exclusion; then wherein would that Apoha rest which is said to be denoted by that term! It is essential that there should be an entity which is the substratum or object of the Apoha: as such substratum would be non-different from wluut is excluded by another."-(1202)
The above is answered in the following
TEXT (1203),
AS NON-ENTITIES HAVE NO FORM, WORDS APPERTAINING TO THOSE CANNOT BE EVEN SUSPECTED OF BEING DENOTATIVE OF THE UNIVERSAL AND SUCH THINGS. IN FACT, IT HAS BEEN FULLY ESTABLISHED THAT THEY ARE ONLY INDICATORS
OF THE REFLECTION.-(1203)
COMMENTARY.
Such non-entities as the son of the Barren Woman have no form, no character ;-hence words relating to those cannot even be suspected of being denotative of the Universal, etc. It is only in the case of words relating to entities that there could be any question as to whether what is denoted by them is some form or only a Reflection. As regards non-entities (or Negations) they are entirely different from Entities, hence how could words applied to them be even suspected of pertaining to entities? From this it is clear that the words in question have no object (denotation at all); all that they produce is the mere Reflection of things; and this Reflection is what is actually apprehended. Thus there is no room for the objection that has been urged.
The same is further explained :
39

Page #605

810
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
TEXT (1204).
WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY WORDS IS ONLY THE REFLECTION THAT APPEARS. AS CREATED SOLELY BY IMPRESSIONS MADE BY OBJECTLESS
(EMPTY) CONCEPTIONS.-(1204)
COMMENTARY.
* Words --like Son of the Barren Woman',-(1204)
Those words however that relate to entities, denote only the Reflection; --the formal proof for this is stated in the following
TEXT (1206).
THE WORDS IN QUESTION ARE DIRECTLY FXPRESSIVE OF THAT (REFLECTION) ALONE, BECAUSE THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON CONVENTION,-LIKE WORDS EXPRESSING
IMAGINARY THINGS.-(1205)
COMMENTARY.
[The argument may be forinulated thus) Words that are dependent upon Convention are expressive of only the Reflection of the Conceptual Content produced by the impressions made by objectless (empty) conceptions, as for instance, words like the son of the Barren Woman' the words in question i.e. words like Jar' and the like, which form the subject of the present discussion, are dependent upon Convention; and this is a natural reason (for holding that they are expressive only of the Reflection, etc. etc.). -(1205)
Having established his own position, the Author next proceeds to adduce arguments for rejecting the views of the other party :
TEXT (1206).
THESE WORDS ARR NOT DENOTATIVE OF THE SPECITIO INDIVIDUALITY" AND THE REST, THAT HAVE BEEN ASSUMED BY OTHERS. HENCE THESE SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD TO BE LIKE THOSE
JUST MENTIONED.-(1206)
COMMENTARY.
Bhada' stands for Specific Individuality
And the rest'-includes the Universal, etc. *Hence',-i.e on accout of their being dependent on Convention.
Like those's like words speaking of imaginary things.-(1206)

Page #606

EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
611
The Author shows that the two Reasons adduced are not 'Inconelusive'
TEXT (1207).
THAT THERE CAN BE NO CONVENTION IN REGARD TO SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE REST HAS BEEN ALREADY PROVED BEFORE. HENCE THE REASONS ADDUCED ARE NEITHER
DOUBTFUL' NOR CONCOMITANT WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE PROBANDUM', -(1207)
COMMENTARY.
It has been already proved before-on the ground of the 'Impossibility of Conventions' (under Text 876 et seq.) and on that of its 'not bearing upon anything else', -that Convention is impossible and also useless.
"Tat'-Hence, therefore.
The two Reasons are not Doubtful or Concomitant with the Contrary of the Probandum.-- (1207)
In the following l'exts, the Opponent argues that the first of the two Reusons adduced is 'Inconclusive'
TEXTS (1208-1209). " UNDER THE THEORY OF A poha also, HOW IS CONVENTION POSSIBLE ? HOW TOO IS IT FRUITFUL ?-WEEN IT CANNOT BE KNOWN TO BOTH, THE SPEAKER AND THE LISTENER ; AS THE IDEA OF ONE CANNOT BE KNOWN TO THE OTHER, WHAT TOO WAS SEEN AT THE TIME OF THE MAKING OF THE CONVENTION IS NOT SEEN AT THE TIME OF THE USE OF
THE WORD."-(1208-1209)
COMMENTARY. "Just es, in the case of Specific Individuality and the rest, there is impossibility of Convention and Futility, so it would be also in the case of Apoha; so that, inasmuch as there would be no Convention made, the denotation by words of the Apoha alone cannot be right; hence the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.
"How too is it fruitfull-That is, how is fruitfulness possible- Tasya - stands for the Convention.
Question :- Why is Convention not possible in this case ?
Answer Because it cannot be known to both.—The term 'hi' denotes reason; the meaning being-Because the Apoha in the shape of Reflection cannot be one and the same, as the object of Convention, for both, the Speaker and the Listener.
Why?
* Because the Idea of one, etc. etc. people of limited vision are cognisant of only their own ideas; no one with limited vision can be cognisant of the

Page #607

612
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
idea in another's mind, and in reality the Apoha in the form of Reflection is nothing different from Idea (Cognition): so that as between the Speaker and the Listener, what would be know as the subject of Convention could not be known to the other; hence wherein could the Convention be made or comprehended ? Unless the Speaker kmows the thing, he cannot make any Convention relating to it; nor can the Listener comprehend it. If he did, it would lead to absurdities. For instance, the Reflection of the object, which is what the Speaker cognises as figuring in his cognition, is not cognised by the Listener; and what is cognised by the Listener is not cognised by the Speaker ; as every man is cognisant only of what appears to liimself.
"The futility of Convention is next shown-'What too, etc. etc.The Reflection that was apprehended at the time of the making of the Convention, by the Listener or by the Speaker, is not apprehended at the time of the use of the word; as the former, being in a perpetual flux, luas long ceased to existence; and that which is apprehended at the time of the 18e of the word was not seen at the time of the making of the Convention ; as what was apprehended at that time was something entirely different. And it is not right that usage should be based upon a Convention that rests upon something different, as such usage would lead to absurdities." (1208-1209)
This argument is answered in the following--
TEXT (1210).
EVEN THOUGH HACH PERSON IS COGNISANT OF WHAT APPEARS TO HIM - SELF, YET THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE COGNITION OF EXTERNAL
THINGS WHICH IS COMMON TO BOTH PERSONS.—(1210)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact, the form of the cognition also is not accepted by us to be denoted by words,-in view of which the impossibility of Conventions relating to that could be reasonably urged against us. Because, for us. all verbal usage is purely illusory, being assumed in accordance with the notions of individual persons,-it is as illusory and false as the idea of two moons that appears in the man of disordered vision; all that is produced by words is a Conceptual Content relating to the Thing, through the arousing of the Impressions of objectless conceptions; and it is the Reflection of this that is called the Denotation of words, because it is produced by words, not because they are denoted (expressed) by them. So that though, in peality, the Speaker and the Listener are cognisant of what appears in their own consciousness, yet inasmuch as the root of illusion is equally present in both men, just as in the case of the man with the disordered visionthe apprehension that the two men have of the external object is similar; and yet the idea in the mind of the Speaker is that the thing that I cognise is also cognised by this man'; the Listener also has the same idea.It might be asked-How is the fact of both of them apprehending the same thing known to each of them 1-The answer to that is that in reality it

Page #608

EXAMINATION OF THE IMPORT OF WORDS.
613
is known to them; and yet the source of the Illusion being there, equally in both, there is—as already explained by sa mistaken usage in accord ance with each man's own apprehension, just as in the case of the perception of two moons by the man of disordered vision.-Thus then, both men having the apprehension of the same thing, the making of Convention is quite possible.-(1210)
An example is cited to illustrate the above :
TEXT (1211).
JUST AS THE MAN WHOSE EYE HAS BEEN ATTACKED BY A PISORDER SAYS TO ANOTHER LIKE HIMSELF THAT THERE ARE TWO MOONS!,
-80 ALSO IS ALL VERBAL USAGE.-(1211)
COMMENTARY
* Who is like himself',-i.e, to the other man, with disordered vision. (1211)
Nor is the Convention futile in this case
this is shown in the following
TEXT (1212).
THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE CONVENTION HAS BEEN ACCEPTED ONLY ON
THE BASIS OF THE NOTIONS OF MEN; IN FACT, ALL COGNITIONS
BROUGHT ABOUT BY WORDS ARE ULTIMATELY FALSE,-(1212)
COMMENTARY
The idea that the Convention is concomitant with the two points of time,-that of its making and the consequent usage—is admitted only on the basis of the apprehension of Reflection of the Thing apprehended by the Speaker and the Listener; it is not really true; the idea, in fact, is based upon the fact that at the time of usage both the Speaker and the Listener have the (false) notion that the thing seen now and that seen at the time of the making of the Convention are one and the same.
Question :-"Why is this not accepted as being so in reality ?" Answer In fact, all cognitions, etc. etc.':-(1212)
End of Chapter XVI.

Page #609

CHAPTER XVII
Examination of the Definition of "Sense-perception".
COMMENTARY On the subject of the Means of Right Cognition, there are four kinds of difference of opinion bearing upon (1) their Nature, (2) their Resultant, (3) their Object, and (4) their Number. And by setting aside these diverse opinions, the clear idea of the Means of Right Cognition can be obtained. In order to show this and to support the idea that 'the Truth is ascertained by means of Two Means of Right Cognition which are endowed with the true characteristics of the Means of Right Cognition' (as asserted under Text 3, of the Introduction).--the Author proceeds with the following
TEXT (1213).
THE SENSE-PERCEPTION AND THE INFERENCE, WHICH OTHERS HAVE PUT FORWARD, IN PROOF OF THEIR CONCEPTS,-ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE.
THEY ARE OF THE NATURE DESCRIBED BELOW.-(1213)
COMMENTARY. 'In proof of their concepts i.e. such concepts as-Quality, Substance, Action, Universal, Inherence and so forth.
Others 'The Vaishēsila and others. fuam' s going to be described. --(1213)
Sense-perception as a Means of Cognition consists of the Eye and the rest and is (a) conceptual (determinate), or (b) of the nature of
Non-cognition'. Such is the diversity of opinion regarding the nature of Sense-perception-By rejecting this, the Author propounds his own definition of it :
TEXT (1214). Sense-perception is FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND NOT ERRONEOUS.- CONCEPTUAL CONTENT IS IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH VERBAL EXPRESSION ; IT IS NOT REGARDED AS THE
BASIS OF VERBAL EXPRESSION, ETC.(1214)
COMMENTARY The character of being 'Sense perception is what is predicated of that Oognition which has been described as 'free from conceptual content and not erroneous': as in every case, it is the defined thing (distinguishing

Page #610

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF
SENSE-PERCEPTION". 615
feature) that is predicated. [The meaning therefore is—' That Cognition which is free from conceptual content and is not erroneous is Sense-perception') as is found in the case of such expressions as That which shakes is the 4shattha' -The thing defined here is Sense perception; as it is the definition of this that forms the subject matter of the present Context. It is not the definition of freedom from conceptual content and non-erroneousness that is the subject matter of the Context; by virtue of which this latter could be taken as predicated in the sentence.
The Cognition has not been mentioned, because it is already implied in the negation of Conceptual Content'; just as in the case of the sentence
Bring the mileh one without the calf, where the cow is not mentioned, as it is already implied by the negation of the calf.
Question :-*What is it that is meant hy the term Conceptual Content' ('Kalpana'), freedom from which serves as the differentia of Sense-perception ?
Answer Conceptual Content is idea associated with verbal expression
Question: "Is that Kalpanā also to be admitted, against which, in the character of being the basis of verbal expression, Sharkarasvāmin and others have urged objections in great detail ?"
Answer :-No; it is not the basis of verbal expression ;-regarded as '-- this has to be taken as understood. Hence the objections that have been urged on that score are not applicable to our view ; because we do not accept that view.
Kirpti' is verbal expression (being spoken of', being named "): and the basis for such expression consists of the Universal, the Name and so forth: since there can be no speaking of things without such distinguishing features as consist of the Universal, etc.
The term *adi (etcetera)—in the text is meant to include such characteristics as Doubt and Deliberation, as leading to association with words etc., and also the Assumption of the apprehender and the apprehended and so forth.
* Abhilūpa'-is expressive word; and it is in a generic form; that Idea which appears as associated with that word is called abh ilapini':-(1214)
Question :-"How is it known that there is such an Idea (or Cognition)?" Ansler
TEXT (1215).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, THE COGNITION THAT IS CAPABLE OF CONNECTING THE THING AND THE WORD ALWAYS APPEARS AS associated with verbal expression (words),-EVEN WHEN THE WORDS
LIKE 'TRER' AND THE LIKE-ARE NOT
ACTUALLY USED.-(1215)
COMMENTARY The construction may be as- even when the words like tree, etc. are not used '; -or as which is capable of connecting the thing and the word, in the shape of tree, etc.'.

Page #611

616
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVIL
This indicates the conceptual Content as something directly perceived ; the said Idea being recognised by the experience of all living beings.-(1215)
The following Text shows that the said Conceptual Content is well known as the source of all activities of persons from infancy onwards :
TEXT (1216). THROUGH THE CONTINUANCE OF THE IMPRESSION LEFT BY THE CON. STANT ASSOCIATING OF THE THING AND ITS NAME DURING PAST LIVES,-EVEN THE NEW-BORN INFANT BECOMES CAPABLE OF ACTIVITY, BY REASON OF THE SAID CONCEPTUAL
CONTENT.-(1216)
COMMENTARY
Afisa-bhava' is past lines :-during these there has been nämärthabhavan', constant associating of things with their names this constant associating leaves its' Fasana', Impressions, or capacity in the mind;-through the 'antaya'. continuance of this capacity, even the infant has ideas associated with words; and it is through the presence of this Conceptual Content (Idea associated with words), that the infant becomes capable of activity,--such as smiling, crying, sucking the breast, becoming pleased and so forth. From this effect its canse in the shape of the said Conceptual Content is assumed in the infant. This has been thus declared All activity in the world is based upon words, which even the infant has recourse to, through the inpressions left by past lives
This Conceptual Content, presenting the object, as associated with vague verbal expressions and existing only in the subjective form, -as if it were something external.- appears in the mind of Infants also, by virtue of which in their later life, they become capable of comprehending the relevant Conventions.-(1216)
The Author shows again how the existence of the Conceptual Content is vonched for by Perception :
TEXT (1217).
THAT WHICH IS CLEARLY COGNISED AT THE TIME OF REFLECTION AND IMAGINATION AS IF INTERPENETRATING THEM,-CANNOT BE
SET ASIDE BY MERE WORDS.-(1217)
COMMENTARY The following Text shows that the existence of Conceptual Content is proved by Inference from its effect in the shape of Verbal Usage :

Page #612

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE PERCEPTION”.617
TEXT (1218).
THE CONNECTION BETWEEN WORDS AND THINGS, DUE TO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, IS ILLUSORY ; HENCE AS IT CANNOT BE BASED UPON ANYTHING ELSE, IF THERE WERE NO CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, THE SAID CONNECTION, EVEN AS IT
IS, WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE.-(1218)
COMMENTARY.
Any real connection between Words and Things has been negatived by our predecessors, and it has also been proved that it is all illusory. Under the circumstances, if this Conceptual Content were not there, then the said connection,-even as it 18i.e. even in the illusory form,—would not be possible ; ns that connection is based upon the Conceptual Content, and as it has been proved that anything external,-in the form of Specific Individuality, Universal and the like-cannot form the denotation of words. -(1218)
Question : "Other people describe the Conceptual Content not only as *the idea associated with words, but also as that which is capable of being connected with the Universal, Quality, Action and so forth. Why do not you accept these"
Answer:
TEXT (1219).
SOME PEOPLE HAVE REGARDED THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT TO BE TLAT WHICH IS CAPABLE OF BEING CONNECTED WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST -THAT VIEW CANNOT BE RIGHT, AS THE UNIVERSAL, ETC. HAVE ALL BEEN REJECTED, AND THEY ARE NEVER
PERCEIVED.-(1219)
COMMENTARY
• They are never perceiverli.e. the Universal. etc. are never actually perceived.
This answer has been given on the assumption (for the sake of argument) that the Universal, etc. do exist.-(1219)
of the Universal, etc. is further emphasised
The said non-perception in the following

Page #613

618
TATTVASANGRARA: CHAPTER XVII.
TEXT (1220),
THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST BEING NEVER PERCEIVED, AND THEIR CONNECTION BEING NEVER MANIFESTED, -HOW CAN THEIR ASSOCIATION WITH THINGS BE POSSIBLE,-AS BETWEEN
MILK AND WATER, ETC.?-(1220)
COMMENTARY
Like Mill and Water, etc. -When Milk and Water are mixed up, they do not appear separately, and hence it is no longer possible to connect the two ; in the same manner, even if the Universal and the rest do exist, they never appear as distinguished from their substratum ; and hence it is not possible to connect them with their substratum.-(1220)
"If there the Conceptual Content in the form of association with the Universal is not possible, then, how is it that the propounder of the definition (Disināga in his Nyāyamukha) has asserted that Conceptual Content' consists in connection with Name, Universal and so forth'?"
The Answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1221)
TWO KINDS OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT HAVE BEEN MENTIONED IN THE TWO ASSERTIONS, IN ORDER TO SET FORTH THE TWO VIEWS THAT HAVE BEEN HELD BY PERSONS BELONGING TO OUR OWN PARTY AND BY THOSE BELONGING TO OTHER PARTIES, IN ORDER TO SHOW WHICH IS TO BE ACCEPTED AND
WHICH TO BE REJECTED.-(1221)
COMMENTARY
What is to be rejected is the Conceptual Content in the form of connection with the Universal, etc. which is the view accepted by the other party : and what is to be accepted is the view of our own party that it consists in association with name. In order to set forth this distinotion, both view's relating to Conceptual Content have been asserted.
Question :-"How do you know that it is so ?"
Answer:-By the two assertions that is the words used by the Teacher are 'nāmajātyädiyojana', -connection or association with Name and Universal, etc.', where both the Name and the Universal, etc. have been mentioned, as representing tho two views. If this were not intended, then the expression used would have been either association with Name, etc.? or association with the Universal, etc. Nor is the enumeration meant to

Page #614

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 619
be exhaustive; as in that case the addition of etcetera' would be meaningless. -(1221)
Says the Opponent :-"Conceptual Content is a property of the Cogni. tion; what forms the subject matter of the present context is the view that the said Content is absent (in Sense-perception): as it is Sense perception that is being considered ; and it is not intended to expound the absence of the Object; as regards the 'association of Name, Universal, etc.', on the other hand, it is a property of the Object, not of the Cognition. So that what the propounder of the Laksana has usserted appears to be entirely irrelevant."
Anticipating this criticism, the Author supplies the following answer :
TEXT (1222)
Tuts CONNECTION WITH NAME, ETC. ' REMAINS THERE AFTER HAVING INDICATED ITS OWN IMMEDIATE CAUSE ; FENCE THE ASSERTION IS
NOT IRRELEVANT. - (1222)
COMMENTARY.
Anantaram'- immediate-nimittam '-cause; and that cause is in the form of the verbally associated Idea ;-and this is called 'connection because it appears in a form envisaging two things ;-and there is no con. necting of one thing by another ; es properties of things have no functions to perform
The indication of this immediate cause is done in two ways; and why this connection comes in has been explained.
The compound 'nāmádiyojanj' is to be explained as that whereby the connection of the two things is bronght about'; there being Bahuvrihi com. pound even when there is no co-ordination between the factors concerned. Or the compound may be explained on the basis of the assumption that the Cause is spoken of as the Effect. The purpose served by this indirect expression is that it serves to bring out the efficiency of the cause as bringing about an effect different from other causes.
[So that the expressionnāmadiyojana' stands, indirectly, for the Con ceptual Content itself. (1222)
Or, the expression numajatyädiyojanā may be explained in another way (as standing for kalpanā, Conceptual Content, itself) - Yojana' is that wherewith one is connected and this 'yojanaof 'Name, Universal, etc.' would be the same Conceptual Content, explained as Idea associated with verbal expression'; so that there is nothing defective in the definition propounded by Dinnaga.
This is what is explained in the following

Page #615

620
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
TEXT (1223).
NAME, UNIVERSAL AND ALL THE REST ARE connected by the SAID CONCEPTUAL CONTENT; HENCE WHAT IS SPOKEN OF (BY DINXĀGA'S DEFINITION) IS THE SAME CONCEPTUAL CONTENT WHICH HAS BERN DESCRIBED AS THE IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH
VERBAL EXPRESSION :-(1223)
COMMENTARY.
(turged
The following Teal supplies another answer to the criticism against Dinnāga's definition) :
TEXT (1224).
OR, WHAT HAS BEEN SPOKEN OP (IN THE DEFINITION IN QUESTION) IS THE SAME Conceptual Content THAT WE HAVE OURSELVES ASSERTED; -(THIS INTERPRETATION) BEING BASED UPON THE FACT THAT IN ALL CASES THINGS ARE SPOKEN OF BY THEIR NAME (THIS BEING THE MEANING OF THE COMPOUND
'nāmidiyojana ').-(1224)
COMMENTARY.
Question :- If it be as asserted above, then how do you explain the explanatory words of the Teacher ? For instance, he has declared as follows :-In the case of Proper names, like Pittha, what is denoted is an object qualified by a Name; in the case of common nouns like Cow' what is denoted is the object qualified by the Universal Cow'; in the case of adjectives, like 'white', what is expressed is the object qualified by the Quality of whiteness'; in the case of verbal nouns what is denoted is the object qualified by the Action; and in the case of words speaking of substances,-like stick-holderhorned and the like—what is denoted is the object qualified by the substance.-By this text the Teacher has made it quite clear that things qualified by the qualifications of the Universal', etc. are also separately denoted by words."
The answer to this is that 'In all cases, etc. etc.'-' In all cases '-i.e. even in the case of words denoting the Universal, etc.-What is meant is as follows Just 88 when Proper names are pronounced, what is denoted is the object qualified by the Name,-90 also in the case of words expressive of the Universal, etc.,-like Cow'—what is denoted is the object grualified by that Name :--similarly in all cases (what is denoted is an object qualified by, connected with, a name]. -(1224)
Question :-" In that case, how are we to construe the Instrumental in the-words jātya ', gunena' etc. (by the Universal, by the Quality) ? "
Answer

Page #616

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION".
TEXT (1225).
IT IS THROUGH THESE THAT THE INSTRUMENTAL ENDING BECOMES USEFUL; SO THAT THE MEANING COMES TO BE THAT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT BECOMES CONNECTED WITH THE NAME, THROUGH THE INSTRUMENTALITY OF THE UNIVERSAL, ETC.-(1225)
COMMENTARY.
The particular thing spoken as 'Cow is that which is connected with that Name through the Instrumentality of the Universal; similarly, through the instrumentality of the Quality, etc. It is in this sense that the Universal, etc. become the Instrument (of Connection), and thus the Instrumental Ending becomes useful.
621
Question" If that is so, then how are the words (of Dinnaga)nāmajātyādiyojana-to be construed?"
Answer: It is through these, etc. etc,. That is the words are to be construed as nämnaḥ jätyädibhik yojana', [' connection with the Universal, etc., of the Name'].
*
Seyam'-This stands for the Conceptual Content itself, which is implied by the force of the compound, which is to be explained as follows:- Jätyä. diyojana' means jätyädibhiḥ yojana', 'connection with the Universal, etc.;namajätyädiyojana' means namnaḥ jatyadiyojana', 'connection with the Universal, etc., of the Name-(1225)
Objection:-"If that is so, then in the case of Proper Names, there would be nothing to denote the Universal, etc., and hence the said explanation. cannot apply to their case."
In anticipation of this objection, the Author provides the following
answer :
TEXT (1226).
INASMUCH AS THERE is THE UNIVERSAL EXPRESSED BY THE PROPER NAME, THE EXPLANATION SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS NOT
APPLICABLE TO IT. IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED SEPARATELY
ONLY IN VIEW OF POPULAR USAGE.-(1226)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant is as follows:-Such words as Dittha' which are known As Proper Names, also take up a Universal' as their denotation, which

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
Universal subsists in an entity restricted within a limited period of time; they denote such a Universal because they are incapable of denoting any object marked by a momentarily fluctuating character, while each of these (Proper Names) continues to remain attached to one entity from birth to cleath. If the Proper Name did not denote such a Universal, then, having been applied to the individual in his childhood, how could it denote that same individual in his old age, who would have become a different individuality - Even for those persons who hold the view that the body is not momentary, but lasts for some time, it is admitted that in course of time, the component parts of the body go on deteriorating, by reason of which deterioration-or by reason of its connection with such deterioration of the componente,—the body in a later age is different from that in the earlier age.--Even under the view that it remains the same body undergoing developments and changes,-the Name that has been associated with a certain thing at one stage of its development, could not depote the same thing when it has reached a further stage of development; e.g. the name milk' which has been associated with the Milk in the first stage, is not applicable to the Curl, which is only a later stage in the development of milk. In the same way in the case of the Body also, the name applied to it in childhood could not be applied to it in youth or old age. For these reasons, the Universal must be admitted (even in the case of the Denotation of Proper Names),
Or, even if there be no such entity as the Universal (in this case), even so, our explanation does not cease to apply to the case of Proper Names. Because it is only the diverse Individnals that are conceived of as commonwhen their distinct individualities are not meant to be emphasised, when they become included under Common names denotative of the Universal '. Consequently the Teacher propounding the definition under question has mentioned the Proper Names separately from Common names. This is what is explained by the words. It has been mentioned separately, etc. etc.'. In common parlance, the word 'Cow' is known as a common name (denoting & Universal) while the word 'Chitrangada 'is known as a Proper Name (applied to a single Individual); that is why the two have been mentioned separately. -(1226)
The Opponent raises the following objection:
TEXT (1227).
"INASMUCH AS THE EXCLUSION (Apoha) OF OTHERS' IS THE ONLY DENOTATION OF WORDS, ALL WORDS SHOULD BE COMMON ONLY. OR, IN ASMUCH AS THEY ARE DEPENDENT UPON THE SPEAKER'S WHIM, THEY SHOULD
ALL BE 'PROPER ONLY" -(1227)
The answer to this is given in the following

Page #618

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION
623
TEXT (1228).
IT IS TRUE THAT WHAT THE PROFESSOR OF THE SCIENCE OF REASONING HAS SAID IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE POPULAR IDEA OF THINGS; AS IT IS ONLY ON THESE LINES THAT VERBAL USAGE ACTUALLY
PROCEEDS.(1228)
COMMENTARY.
On these lines': .e. under the fiveiold division of Proper Name, Universal, Quality, Action and Substantive.-(1228)
Says the Opponent-"If what is meant by Dinnāga, is the 'Kalpana', Conceptual Content, as understood by the Buddhists themselves, then how is it that, having asserted that others have held that things are denoted by words which have no corresponding objects', he has, later on, stated his own view of 'Kalpanā,"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1229)
The said 'Universal' and the rest are nothing different from what is known by these words among people ;-IT WAS WITH A VIEW TO EMPHASISE THIS FACT, THAT THE STATEMENT OTHERS
ETC. HAS BEEN MADE.-(1229)
COMMENTARY
What is meant is as follows:-As a matter of fact, anything in the shape of the Universal, as apart from the Individuals-spotted cow and the like-has no real existence, it is all purely illusory it is with a view to emphasise this fact that the Teacher has made the assertion in question, and not with a view to indicate a separate kind of . Kalpand!
Others'-other Buddhists.
Words which have no corresponding objects'.-i.e. words which denote only Apona, independently of any such things as Universal' and the rest.
Such is the meaning of the passage quoted from the Teacher's work. (1229)
It is not only we who regard the Conceptual Content as 'Idea associated with words, in fact, others also have got to accept it as such ; otherwise there would be no usage in the world.-This is what is shown in the following

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TATTVASANGRAUA : CHAPTER XVII.
TEXTS (1230-1233). EVEN THOSE WHO ARE WEDDED TO THE NOTION THAT CONCEPTUAL
CONTENT CONSISTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST, HAVE TO ADMIT THAT IT IS 'IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH WORDSOTHERWISE, JUST AS THE TWO CONNECTED THINGS ARE NON-EXISTENT, SO THEIR Connection ALSO WOULD BE NON-EXISTENT, -ALL THINGS BEING CONCEIVED SEVERALLY EACH BY ITSELF; AND THERE WOULD BE NO NEED FOR POSTULATING THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE RESULT OF THIS WOULD BE THAT THERE WOULD BE NO USAGE IN THE WORLD; BECAUSE USAGE HAS BEEN REGARDED AS ASSOCIATED WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST,-- AND ASSOCIATION WITH THE UNIVERSAL AND THE REST IS INSEPARABLE FROM ASSOCIATION WITH WORDS. THUS ALONE COULD THE EXPRESSION SPOKEN OF USED BY THE TEACHER BE TRUITFUL. -(1230-1233)
COMMENTARY. Even when Conceptual Content is regarded by others as association with Universal, Quality, Action and Substance', -in reality association with Name alone constitutes the conceptual Content. Because as a matter of fact, whenever a thing is apprebended as distinguished by tlie Universal, ete. it is so only through the Name: if it were not so, then-like the apprehension of several distinct things, there being connection independently by itself, how could there be any Conceptual Content'? And the result of this would be that the world would become dumb. It is for this reason that even on seeing the man with the stick, one does not connect the varions factors implied in the notion of the stick holder'. until he recalls the particular Name.
Just because all such connection is invariably concomitant with the (tssociation of worris, the words of the Teacher-to the effect that what is spoken of in the case of words like Cow' is the thing qualified by the Universal '-become fruitful (have some sense). Otherwise, without the Name, how could the (passive) term is spoken of be used 2-As the action of speaking (expressing) belongs to the word.-(1230-1233)
The following Teac sums up the argumente in favour of the notion of the Conceptual Content
TEXT (1234). Trus CONCEPTUAL CONTENT IS SOMETHING THAT CAN BE EASILY PROVED WITHOUT EFTORT, AS THERE IS NO DISPUTE REGARDING IT AMONG TEACHERS WHO TAKE THEIR STAND
UPON ALL TRUE DOCTRINES.-(1234)
COMMENTARY.
The following Text explains what Dinnaga really means by asserting the Conceptual Content in two forms.

Page #620

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 625
TEXTS (1235-1236).
IT WAS IN VIEW OF ALL THIS THAT THE ASSERTION OF NÁME, UNIVERSAL AND THE REST' WAS MADE; AND HEREIN THE TEACHER MADE MENTION OF HIS OWN VIEW AS ALSO TRE VIEW OF OTHERS; WITHOUT INDICATING THE DIFFERENCE BY ACTUALLY SAYING THAT MY OWN VIEW IS SO AND SO'. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT HE SUBSEQUENTLY ADDED THE STATEMENT THAT OTHERS
HAVE VELD, ETC.'.-(1235-1236)
COMMENTARY As to which of the two views is to be accepted and which rejected has been already indicated by us when we showed that even association with Universal, etc.' is invariably concomitant with association with Name'.
The assertion of Name, etc. this is to be construed with "akarot, 'made in the second line).
The assertion of his own view as also the view of others has been made for the purpose of showing which is to be accepted and which to be rejected.(1236-1236)
Question :-" How then are the words of Dinnaga in lus Nyāyamukha to be construed ?" Answer
TEXT (1237). THUS IN THIS WAY IS THE PASSAGE FROM THE Nyāyamukha TO BE EXPLAINED. BY MENTIONING THE COGNITION, IT IS THE IDEA ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS THAT HAS
BEEN INDICATED.-(1237)
COMMENTARY.
The relevant passage from the Nyāyamulcha is as follows:- That Cognition of the form of things which, through the imposed identity of the qualifying and denotative adjuncts, appears as non-determinato, in connec. tion with each of the sense-organsis Sense-perception ' Here the qualify. ing adjunct stands for the Universal, eto.- and the denotative adjunot' for the Name; the 'imposition of the identity of these two with the things possessing the Universal, etc. and also with the thing bearing the Name.The 'imposition of identity' is mentioned only by way of illustration ; in some cases where the adjunots are apprehended as distincte.g. when it is said the Universal Cow subsists in this', 'the name of this is so and so ',there also the presence of the Conceptual Content is admitted.
Objection :--"It has nowhere been said that the subsequent resultant Idea constitutes the Conceptual Content ; how then do you get at the idea of the said Conceptual Content (from the words of the passage oited) ?"
40

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626
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
Answer By mentioning the Cognition, etc. etc. That is to say, when the passage, in contradistinction to the Conceptual Content, mentions the Cognition as Sense-perception, it clearly indicates that the Conceptual Content is a property of the Cognition. Thus the meaning of the passage comes to be this - That Cognition, which, through the imposition of the identity of Name, etc. appears as nondeterminate, is Sense-perception; that Cognition, on the other hand, which is determinate is of the nature of the Conceptual Content, and hence it is not Sense-perception; and the implication of this is that Conceptual Content consists in the Idea associated with words as contradistinguished from Sense-perception. In this way the passage has presented the Teacher's own is also other people's views. 1237)
Or, it may be that in the passage under reference, the Teacher las stated only his own view.—This is explained in the following
TEXT (1238). OR, THE TERM 'vishēşuna' ['QUALIFYING ADJUNCT", AS OCCURRING IN THE PASSAGE QUOTED FROM THE Nyāyamukha, ON P, 372, Borrom] MAY BE TAKEN AS STANDING FOR DIFFERENTIATION, EXCLUSION',
-BY VIRTUE OF WHICH WORDS BRING ABOUT THE • Apoha, EXCLUSION, OF OTHERS '; [IT IS CALLED * DIFFERENTIATION') BECAUSE IT DOES THE differentiating (OR excluding) OF THE
UNIVERSAL, ETC.-(1238)
COMMENTARY
In the compound 'vishëşanábhidhayakabhedopachāra' in the passage quoted from the Nyāyamulcha, in the commentary of Text 1237), the term visha sana' stands for differentiation, i.e. exclusion ;-and the Word is the abhidhayala', denoter, of this Exclusion, not of Universal, etc.; and there is 'imposition of the identity of this; in this way is the compound to be explained.—1238)
Objection : "If Conceptual Content is 'Idea associated with words, then it is something having properties, an object; it is not likely for one object to belong to another object, in view of which its negation or denial could be brought about as a property of it ; hence what is asserted is most incoherent. Thus if Sense-perception is free from conceptual content, then how is it spoken of by the word 'Sense-perception'?"
This is the objection that is urged by Bharga, Bharadexija and others, who think that the term free from Conceptual Content' is synonymous with * inexpressible by words!
The Author says that this objection has been answered already:

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION”. 627
TEXTS (1239-1242). CONCEPTUAL CONTENT BEING HELD TO BE AS ACTUALLY UNDERSTOOD
AND DESCRIBED ABOVE, IT IS THE DENIAL OF THE SAMEXESS OF THIS WITH SENSE-PERCEPTION THAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED; AND THIS IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH THE FACT OF ITS BEING SPOKEN OF BY SUCH WORDS as Adhyaksa (Pratyalesa') AND THE LIKE. IN SENSE-PERCEPTION THERE IS ABSENCE OF CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, BUT CONCEPTUAL CONTENT' IS NOT THE SAME AS EXPRESSED BY WORDS'. OTHERWISE, COLOUR, ODOUR AND THE REST WOULD BECOME DETERMINATE (AS THEY ARE EXPRESSED BY WORDS '). THUS THERE IS NO ROOM FOR WHAT THE DULL-WITTED PERSONS HAVE URGED.-IF THE WORD "SENSE-PERCEPTION' ACTUALLY DENOTES Sense-perception, THEN HOW CAN ITS BEING SAID TO BE
FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT BE HELD TO BE IMPROPER - (1239-1242)
COMMENTARY. Denial of the sameness ;-when Dirināga says that where there is no Conceptual Content, that is Sense-perception' what he does is to deny the sameness of the two; the meaning being [that Sense-perception is] that Cognition which is not of the nature of the said Conceptual Content ;-it does not deny what is contained in the content'
This disposes of the first objection.
The second objection also is not proper; because 'freedom from Conceptual Content' is not inexpressibility by words', it is only freedom determining concepts. Even though the Cognition is non-determinate, yet it is regarded as expressed by words, by reason of its being actually found to be so expressed ; and yet it does not become 'determinate, being, in this respect, like Colour and other things (which, though expressed by words, do not become determinate on that account). This is only by the way.-(1239-1242)
The following might be urged : “ Conceptual Content may be as described. But how does Sense-perception become proved to be free from Conceptual Content'?" Answer:
TEXT (1243). THAT SENSE-PERCEPTION IS FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT IS BECOGNISED VERY CLEARLY; SINCE IT IS FOUND THAT EVEX WHEN ONE HAS HIS MIND ATTRACTED BY SOMETHING ELSE, HE HAS THE PERCEPTION OF THE BLUE COLOUR AND OTRER THINGS THROUGH
HIS SENSES.-(1243)
COMMENTARY. This shows that the absence of Conceptual Content is clearly perceived in one's own experience.-(1243)

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
It might be urged that " It is the conceptual Content itself attracted by other things, which perceives the Blue Colour and other things ".
Answers
TEXT (1244)
THIS SAME CONCEPTUAL CONTENT DOES NOT APPREHEND THE SAID OBJHOT; BECAUSE IF IT DID, IT WOULD ABANDON THE EXPRESSING OF TRE PAST', ETO. AND THERE WOULD BE THE INOONGRUITY OF ITS BEING CONNECTED WITH
THE NAME OF THAT OBJECT.-(1244)
COMMENTARY.
If that same Conceptual Content apprehended the said object (Blue Colour, etc.), then it would abandon the signifying of past and other things, and would contain within itself the name of the Blue' itself.
The 'abandoning of the signifying of the past and other things' has been asserted, because the Conceptual Content cannot be associated with two sets of words.
The Compound lannāma, eto.' is to be explained as— There would the incongruity of the connection of the name of the objeot before the perceiver - (1244)
It might be argued that—"In that case, there may be some other Conceptual Content that would apprehend the object :-why is not this view accepted ?"
Answer
TEXT (1245). AT THE PARTICULAR TIME, THERE IS NO OTHER CONCEPTUAL CONTENT WHICH IS ASSOCLATED WITH THE NAME OF THAT OBJECT ; BECAUSE THERE IS NO RECOGNITION OF ANY SUCH PERCEPTIBLE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, AND THE SIMUL TANEOUS PRESENCE OF BOTH CANNOT
BE DESTRABLE.-(1245)
COMMENTARY.
There are two answers pointed out in due sequence (1) the opponent's idea being contrary to perceived facts, and (2) its being contrary to his own doctrines; inasmuch as it involves the presence of two Conceptual Contents at the same time.
Both-i.e. the two Conceptual Contents.-(1245)
The following Test surns up the subject

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 629
TEXT (1246).
As A MATTER OF FACT, WHAT MAKES THE COGNITION DETERMINATE APPEARS ALONG WITH THE COGNITION ITSELF; HENCE THE COGNITION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE SENSES IS CLEARLY non-determinate
(FBEE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT).-(1246)
The Opponent might urge that the fact of the determining factor appearing along with the Cognition cannot be accepted. This is the argument put forward in the following
TEXT (1247),
IF IT BE HELD THAT " COGNITIONS APPEAR IN SCOCESSION (NEVER SIMULTANBOUSLY), AND THE IDEA OF SIMULTANEOUS APPEARANCE IS DUE TO THE QUICKNESS OF THE SUOCESSION; AS IN THE CASE OF THE WHIRLING FIRE-BRAND "[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS STATED IN
THE FOLLOWING TEXT]-(1247)
COMMENTARY.
The question being raised as to why the Cognitions are perceived as appearing simultaneously, if, in reality, they appear in succession, the Answer given is that the idea of simultaneous, etc. etc.'; as in the case of the whirling fire-brand. That is, in the case of the whirling fire-brand, it is found that when the whirling is done very quickly, the idea produced is that of a single flaming circle; all the several perceptions being mixed up as one ; in the same manner, cognitions appearing very quickly one after the other, there is the idea of their appearing together as one.
Or, the term alāta' may be taken as standing for the perceptions of the fire-brand, the cognition being spoken of figuratively as the object; the sense of the affix 'vali' remains the same as before, in this interpretation also. -(1247)
The above argument of the Opponent is answered in the following
TEXT (1248). WHAT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IS THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT WHICH IS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NAME OF THE
OBJECT BEFORE THE MAN'S EYES.-(?)-(1248)
COMMENTARY.
What is meant is as follows What is being dealt with is not the fact of the two appearing together, but the absence of Conceptual Content in the

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
Perception; and this absence is proved by the fact that even when a man has his mind elsewhere at the time of the apprehension of the object before his eyes, he does not apprehend the otherwise apprehensible Conceptual Content associated with the name of that object. And the Opponent has urged no criticism against this. Because, even if the two cognitions are actually apprehended in succession, the Conceptual Content is not apprehended; so that the attack does not affect our main position.-(1248)
The following Text shows that the idea of the simultaneous appearance of the two cognitions is entirely mistaken -
TEXT (1249).
THAT THE SAID IDEA (OF THE SIMULTANEITY OF THE OTHER CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE COGNITION) [CANNOT BE WRONG HAS JUST BEEN MADE CLEAR. AND THIS SAME SIMULTANEITY BETWEEN THE OBJECT AND THE COGNITION IS ALSO QUITE CLEAR FOR THAT SAME
REASON.-(1249)
COMMENTARY
It cannot be wrong-such is to be the construction along with what has gone before.
Its idea-i.e. the idea of the two appearing at one and the same time.
As a matter of fact, an idea is regarded as wrong when it is annulled by a valid cognition to the contrary, in the present case there is no such cognition to the contrary, by virtue of which the idea in question could be regarded as wrong.
"How do you know that there is no such cognition to the contrary ?"
Answer: This has just been made clear that the cognition of the object before the man's eyes appears at the same time as the mind is attracted by something else is clearly perceived ; and it is this cognition that is called *Sense-perception '; -wherefore then is there anything wrong in this 1(1249)
It is not only that there is nothing to prove that the idea of the said simultaneity is wrong,-in fact, there is proof to the contrary to show that it is not wrong). This is what is shown in the following

Page #626

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION”.631
TEXTS (1250-1253).
IN THE STATE OF THINGS ATTENDING UPON THE WATCHING OF THE DANCING
GIRL, THE WHOLE LOT SENSATIONS IS APPREHENDED AT ONE AND TER SAME TIME, EVEN THOUGH THERE ARE MANY INTERVENING FACTORS. IF THIS ALSO WERE REGARDED AS A MISTAKE DUE TO THE QUICK SUCCESSION IN WHICH THE SENSATIONS APPBAR, -TAEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) THERE IS STILL QUICKER SUCCESSION IN THE CASE OF COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE TWO WORDS "lala' AND 'tala' WHEN PRONOUNCED TOGETHER; WHY THEN IS THERE NO IDEA OF SIMULTANEITY IN THIS CASE-THEX IN A CASE WHERE THE OPERATIONS OF THE MIND ALONE ARE CONCERNED, NO SUCCESSION SHOULD BE PERCEIVED, BECAUSE ALL COGNITIONS (MENTAL OPERATIONS) OCOUR IN QUICK SUOCESSION AND DO NOT STAY FOR ANY LENGTH OF TIME. SO THAT IN ALL THESE CASES (OF QUICK SUOCESSION), NO SUCCESSION COULD BE PERCEIVED. THE NOTION OF SIMULTANEOUS COGNITION HOWEVER WOULD BE THERE, JUST AS IN THE CASE OF PERCEPTION OF SOUND, ETC. (IN THE CASE OF THE DANCING GIRL). (1250-1253)
COMMENTARY.
Under such conditions as the witnessing of the dancing girl, we find that each single sensation, even though intervened by five other sensations, appeara to be close to, and inseparated from, the other; for instance, at the same time that one sees the girl dancing, he also hears the song and its accompani. ments, goes on tasting the camphor and other spices, smells the sweet fragrance of flowers placed before the nostrils, touches the air proceeding from the fans and things of making presents of clothes and ornaments. (All this goes on simultaneously.) Thus even when there are so many intervening factors, among the several cognitions, there appears the illusion that all these appear at one and the same time, this illusion being due to the quick succession in which the cognitions appear ;-such being the case even when there are several intervening factors, it becomes all the more possible that there should be the notion of the letters being pronounced at one and the same time, in cases where two words like 'latā' and 'tala':-or sarah' and 'rasah' are pronounced, where the utterance of the syllables is so much quicker; that in the case of such utteranoes as "sarah-rasah', when the words are heard, there should be no recognition of the two different words or the two different things denoted by them.--Further, in a case where there is Conceptual Content in the form of pondering over several philosophical and literary problems,---which ponderings are not interrupted by heterogeneous sensations through the Eye, etc., the appearance of the ideas is extremely quick; and hence it would not be possible to form any idea of succession in them, And as all Cognitions are momentary, and cannot continue for any length of time they always appear quickly; so that the cognition of nothing could be successive at all ;-'just as in the case of the perception of sound, etc.';i.e. just as in the

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
case of the perception of sound, tante, etc. while seeing the girl dancing.(1250-1253)
As regards the instance of the Whirling Fire-brand', it is 'devoid of the Probandum' ;-this is shown in the following
TEXTS (1254-1256).
IN THE CASE OF THE WHIRLING FIRE-BRAND, THE ILLUSION OF SIMUL
TANEITY APPEARS IN THE FORM OF THE CIRCLE; THIS NOTION OF THE CIRCLE IS NOT DUE TO THE CONNECTING OF THE VARIOUS PER.. CEPTIONS OF THE FIRE-BRAND AS IT IS WHIRLED ROUND; BECAUSE THE CONTINUOUS) CIRCULAR FORM IS CLEARLY PERCEIVED. IN TAOT, THE SAID CONNEOTING OF THE VARIOUS PERCEPTIONS COULD BE DONE ONLY BY REMEMBRANCE, NOT BY DIRECT PERCEPTION; AS NO PERCEPTION CAN APPREHEND WHAT IS PAST AND GONE. THE OBJECT ALSO OF THE REMEMBRANCH COULD NOT BE VERY CLEAR, AS IT HAS ALREADY DISAPPEARED; FOR THIS SAME REASON, THE APPEARANCE OF THE CIROLE ALSO COULD NOT BE VERY CLEAR (IF IT WERE DUE TO THE REMEMBRANCE OF THE MANY COGNITIONS). -(1254-1256)
COMMENTARY.
When this mental illusion appears, it does not appear as combining the several visual perceptions (of the Fire-brand); it appears only as the Sense-born single perception of the Circular form, through the force of certain accessory circumstances; that this is so is clear from the fact that the perception is quite clear; and it would not be so clear if it were accompanied by the Conceptual Content. Because such combination of perceptions could be done only by Remembrance, not by Sense-born Perception; as the latter functions only when the object perceived is close by, and hence it could not apprehend what is past and gone. The object too of such a Remembrance could not be clear ;-why ?-because it will have already disappeared.Hence, as the perception of the Whirling Fire-brand, if it were an illusion, would be indistinct,-it cannot be an illusion; in fact, it is a sense-born regular Perception. Thus the Instance cited by the Opponent is devoid of the character sought to be proved.-(1254-1256)
Having thus established by means of Perception itsell—the fact of Sense-perception being free from Conceptual Content':-the Author proceeds to prove it by means of Inferences

Page #628

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION".
633
TEXTS (1257-1260).
OR AGAIN, WHEN THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF A THING IN A
CERTAIN FORM, THAT THING IN THAT FORM IS NOT ADMITTED AS REAL, BY THE WISE. FOR INSTANCE, THE WHITE HORSE IS NOT ADMITTED TO BE THE COW BECAUSE THE DEWLAP AND THE OTHER FEATURES OF THE Cow ARE NOT PRESENT IN THE HORSE. IN THE CASE OF SENSE-PERCEPTION THERE IS NO REASON FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE determinate character (THE CHARACTER OF BEING ASSOCLATED WITH CONCEPTUAL CONTENT), WHICH COULD BRING ABOUT THE APPREHENSION OF THE THING ALONG WITH ITS PROPERTIES, -SPOTTED AND OTHER COWS ARE INSTANCES TO THE CONTRARY. IF IT WERE NOT SO, IT WOULD LEAD TO ABSURD CONTINGENCIES.THE REASON ADDUCED CANNOT BE SAID TO BE UNPROVEN' (OR NOT-ADMITTED); AS THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER QUALIFYING FACTORS HAVE ALL BHEN REJECTED. NOR ARE THE PROPERTIES COGNISED AS APART FROM THOSE FACTORS. NOR ARE THERE ANY SUOH PROPERTIES.-(1257-1260)
COMMENTARY.
The argument may be thus formulated :-When the basis of the idea of a thing in a certain form is absent, that thing is not accepted by intelligent persons to be of that form for instance, the White Horse is not accepted as of the form of the Cow, because the basis of the cow-idea, in the shape of the dewlap and other characteristics of the Cow, is absent in the Horse ; in the case of Sense-perception, which is produced on the basis of the specific object Blue, the basis for its being regarded as Associated with Conceptual Content (i.e. Determinate), in the form of the apprehension of the object along with its proporties, is absent, and thus there being no apprehension of the Cause (the effect, in the shape of its being associated with Conceptual Content cannot be there). The Spotted and Black Cows supply the Corroborative Instance per contra. Lastly, there is the possibility of the incongruity that all things might become accepted to be of all forms and that the person accepting things would come to be regarded as stupid. Such is the upshot of the Inference put forward.
Karka' is white Horse. Universal, etc. Si.e. the qualifying factors (postulated by the Realists).
Even if the Universal and the rest are real entities, our Reason is not Unproven ' ;-this is what is meant by the words-Nor is the thing, etc.': i.e. as apart from Colour and the rest which have been held to be qualified by the Properties (Universal, etc.).
Question : "If there is no cognition of Properties as distinct from what is qualified, then, why should it not be a qualifying factor 7"
Answer:- Nor are there any such Properties -ie, as differentiated from the thing.

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
From all this it follows that there is no apprehension of anything along with its properties. Hence the Reason adduced by us cannot be said to be Unproven-(1257-1260)
634
It might be argued that "There may be no qualifying Properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest; the form of the word itself will be the distinguishing property."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1261-1263).
4
THE NAME ALSO, WHICH WOULD BE THE 'SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THE WORD, CAN NEVER BE DENOTATIVE; AS THE IDEA OF THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY BEING THE DENOTER OR THE DENOTED HAS BEEN ALREADY REJECTED. IT IS FOR THIS REASON THAT THE IDEA OF THE DENOTER AND DENOTED HAS BEEN REGARDED AS SOMETHING SUPERIMPOSED (UPON THINGS); WHILE WHAT ONE APPREHENDS BY SENSE-PERCEPTION IS SOMETHING WHICH IS NOT SUPERIMPOSED; BECAUSE THIS PERCEPTION IS THERE ONLY WHEN THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY' IS THERE, AND IT IS NOT THERE WHEN THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY IS NOT THERE-THROUGH THE INTERVENTION OF SOMETHING ELSE OR SOME SUCH REASON.-(1261-1263)
COMMENTARY.
There can be no Convention in regard to the 'Specific Individuality'.not even to the Specific Individuality' of the Word; for the simple reason that there can be no connection with Convention at the time of usage; and apart from its' Specific Individuality', there is no other form of the Word; nor again can the Word be connected with anything with regard to which there has been no Convention; if it did, it would lead to absurdities;-nor can there be any Conceptual Content without connection with words;from all this it follows that the whole idea of the Denoter and Denoted is something superimposed '-imaginary-not real.
It might be argued that-"even so, the Perception shall become associated with Conceptual Content (Determinate) through apprehending the superimposed' thing."
"
1
The answer is that what one apprehends, etc. etc.
When it is not there'.-i.e. through its absence,-the word 'vyatirekalaḥ' being construed here; the sense being that 'it is through the absence of the Specific Individuality (that the Perception also is absent)'.
Question:-"When is there absence of the Specific Individuality?"

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 635
Answer - Through the intervention, etc. etc. -The term 'some such reason' stands for the distance of time, place and so forth.-(1261-1263)
The following Text adduces another proof for the same
TEXT (1264).
THE NATURE OF THE BLUE AND OTHER THINGS, BEING INDIVIDUALLY SPECIFIC, IS INCAPABLE OF HAVING ANY CONVENTION IN REGARD TO IT; THE PERCEPTION OF THESE THINGS, THEREFORE,
CANNOT BE ASSOCIATED WITH WORDS,(1264)
COMMENTARY
The nature-essence-of the Blue and other things is such that no Convention can be made in regard to them.
The question being—"why is it so?",-the answer is being individually specific'; that is, it is incapable of being present at the time of usage; and Convention is for the purpose of usage alone ; hence there can be no Convention in regard to it.
Further, there is Convention only when the thing concerned has already become cognised, --not while it remains uncognised, unknown; and until the Perception has come about, it cannot apprehend the Blue, etc.; and as soon as it has come about, it would (according to the Opponent) at once associate it with words; but at the time that the Perception actually appears, -and also at the time of the apprehension of the related verbal expression, the perceived thing, being momentary, cannot be present, and hence the Perception cannot apprehend it; by what then, and with what, would the Word be associated ? From all this it is clear that the nature of the Blue and other things is incapable of having any convention in regard to it.
of these'-i.e of the Blue and other things.
'Cannot be associated, etc. etc.'-i.e. the verbal expression cannot enter into it.
The argument may be formulated thus:--When a thing is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,-there can be no determinate Percep. tion of it,-.g. the Visual Perception of Odour ;-and the Perception of the Blue, etc. is such that no Convention is known in regard to it,-hence the idea of the Perception being determinate' would involve a notion contrary to a wider proposition.-(1284)
In the following texts, the Author sets forth the inadmissible character of the Reason put forward by himself (under Texts 1257-1260),—this criticism being urged from the standpoint of the Digambara (Jaina) philosopher, Sumati :

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TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER XVII.
TEXTS (1265-1267).
" NAME (UNIVERSAL) AND THE REST MAY NOT BE THE DISTINGUISHING
PROPERTIES PERCEIVED, IN THE OBJECT (OF SENSE-PERCEPTION) - EVEN SO, THE REASON PUT FORWARD DOES NOT CEASE TO BE inadmissible ; BECAUSE IF THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE THING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER THINGS, THEN, THERE WOULD BITHER BE AN APPREHENSION OF THE THING BY ITSELF ONLY, OR NO APPREHENSION AT ALL; A$ IN THE CASE OF THE JAR,—IF THERE IS NO APPREHENSION OF THE JAR AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER JARS, THEN THERE IS EITHER APPREHENSION OF THE JAR BY ITSELF ALONE, OR NO APPREHENSION OF THE JAR AT ALL."-(1265-1267)
COMMENTARY.
Sumati describes all things as existing in two forms-the Universal and the Particular; the Universal again is of two kinds-one determined by the Particular, o.g. the Cow, and that not so determined (conceptual), e.g.
Being , 'Entity! That Universal which exists only in the undetermined (non-conceptual) form is of only one form and is amenable to non-conceptual Perception (Perception free from Conceptual Content), in the form of mere observation, purely subjective Ideation; while the other-i.e. the Universal determined by particulars—is amenable to Conceptual Perception.-Such is Sumatis scheme of Perception.
Kumarila however describes the Non-Conceptual Perception, purely subjective Ideation, as apprehending the Specific Individuality of the particular (or Individual); and the Conceptual Perception as apprehending the Universal '.
Sumati, in examining the nature of Perception in the form of purely subjective Ideation as posited by Kumärila and others, has argued thus"One who holds this view should be asked the following question. In this Perception, is the Thing before the eyes of the observer apprehended purely by itself, as characterised by its own form which is impossible anywhere else? Or is it not so apprehended ?-If he says it is not so perceived, then our answer to him is as follows - If there is non-apprehension of the Thing in a form distinguished from other things that is, in a form distinguished from a thing other than the intended thing, i.e. the form or character of the intended thing which is not present in the other thing :-if there is non. apprehension of the Thing as qualified by such a form, -then, either there would be apprehension of the Thing itself only,-i.e. the said Thing even without the character impossible in other things or, if even this is not apprehended, then there would be no perception of the Thing at all. As in the case of the Jar',this cites an examplo.
This example is explained in the next text (1267) "In the case of the perception of the Jar, if there is no apprehension of the Jar in the form that is impossible in another Jar, to which it may be compared, then either there would be apprehension of the Jar by itself alone,-without any quali.

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF “SENSE-PBROEPTION ", 637
fication as that of being of silver or of copper and so forth;or, if there is no apprehension of the Jar by itself, then there would be no apprehension of any Jar at all, not even of the one in tended; so that there would be no apprehension of the Jar at all.-In the same manner, in the case in question if the distinguishing character is not apprehended, there would either be apprehension of the thing alone by itself, or there would be no apprehension at all; there could be no escape from these alternatives".-(1265-1267)
[Sumati's] Parvapaksa (Criticism) against us thus would be as follows:
TEXT (1268).
"IF PERCEPTION IS REGARDED AS APPREHENDING THE THING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM OTHER APPREHENSIBLE THINGS, THEN THIS COGNITION WOULD BE Conceptual (DETERMINATE), JUST LIKE THE
COGNITION OF THE TREE AND OTHER THINGS."-(1268)
COMMENTARY.
"If Sense-perception is intended to be apprehensive of the Thing as characterised (distinguished) by a character not found anywhere else, - then it becomes Conceptunl; because it apprehends the thing as characterised or qualified by some character; just like the Perception in the form . This is a tree."-(1268)
The following argument might be urged against Sumati :-* There is no such thing as the Thing itself which could be apprehended as qualified by a character; what there is is only that qualified thing which is held by you, and also by me, to be the Particular (or Individual); it is this only that exists and is apprehended'.
To this Sumati makes the following answer :
TEXT (1269). "THERE IS NO PARTICULAR (OR INDIVIDUAL) WITHOUT A TOUCH OF THE UNIVERSAL. IF THIS IS NOT TOUCHED IN THE APPREHENSION, THEN THE PARTICULAR, BECOMING DEVOID OF BEING,
CANNOT BE APPREHENDED."-(1269)
COMMENTARY.
"The term 'matra', 'itself, in the Opponent's statemente stands for the Universal, that which is called 'Being '; and absolutely independent of this Universal, there is no Particular (or Individual) which could be appre. hended.-It might be said - Under your view there may be such a Universal, but this is not touched at all at the time of the apprehension' -Our answer to that is-If this is not quite clear in the apprehension, that is due to its having

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TATIVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
become devoid of Being :-that is, if, at the time of apprehension, the said Universal · Being is not touched by Sense-perception,--and the Particular (or Individual) alone is apprehended, then this Particular by itself, if apprehended at all, would be devoid of existence, as devoid of the character known as Being and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by Sense-perception, because it would be devoid of Being,--having lost its Being or Existence, and become like the sky, flower."-(1269)
TEXT (1270).
"THE ASSERTION THAT THE COGNITION APPREHENDS A qualified THING, AND YET IT IS NOT Conceptual IMPLIES GREAT TEMERITY INDEED! CERTAINLY, NO QUALIFICATION IS POSSIBLE EXCEPT THROUGH CONNECTION WITH QUALIFICA
TIONS."-(1270)
COMMENTARY.
"From all this it follows that your assertion that the Cognition apprehends a qualified object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great ternerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition."
This sums up the criticism against the Buddhist doctrine.
* The Reason for this is provided, in the words. Certainly no qualification, etc. etc. that is to say, just as a man does not become a stick-holder, without the stick, -50 a thing cannot be qualified without connection with qualifications.--Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is 'Conceptual' (with Conceptual Content).
"The argument may be formulated as follows:-The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, is Conceptual, because it appre. hends a qualified thing. --like the cognition 'This is a piece of Cloth." (1270)
The following Test proceeds to answer the above criticisms of Sumati :
TEXT (1271).
WIEN TIE COGNITION IS HELD TO APPREHEND THE QUALIFIED THING, IT IS BY REASON OF ITS APPREHENDING THE THING AS DIP. FERENTIATED FROM OTHER HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS THINGS-AND NOT OF THE CONNECTION
OF QUALIFICATIONS.—(1271)
COMMENTARY.
If what is meant by Sumati's Reason-because it apprehends the qualified thing is the presence of a qualification which is something distinct

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 639
from itself, then it is inadınjssible', because for the Buddhist, there is no such thing as the qualification through connection with which the cognition would apprehend things along with qualifications ; according to the Buddhist, what is apprehended is only the Thing itself as differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things; and it is by reason of this latter apprehension that the Cognition is said to apprehend the qualified thing:-(1271)
being
Question -" Then are all such expressions as qualified', distinguished ', qualified character', and so forth purely negative ?"
Answer -
TEXT (1272).
WHAT IS MEANT BY BEING QUALIFIED ' (DISTINGUISHED) IS DIFFERENCE -NOT THE connection of qualifications. BUT THE IDEA ALSO THAT THIS IS different 'IS NOT COGNISED AS ASSOOLATED
WITH WORDS.-(1272)
COMMENTARY. Difference-i.e. Differentiation (Preclusion) from homogeneous and heterogeneous things and this is not anything different from the thing differentiated; it is the thing itself which is spoken of in that form, through the exclusion of other things, when this exclusion is meant to be emphasised.
The following might be urged—"If there is always the apprehension of the Thing as distinguished from homogeneous and heterogeneous things, then the Apprehension becomes determinate (Conceptual); because it appears in the Verbal form *This is different. Otherwise how could it apprehend the difference', if it appeared in any other form? When a certain apprehension appears in one form, it cannot be said to apprehend another: if it did so, it would lead to an absurdity,"
The answer to this is— But the idea also, etc. etc,'-(1272)
Question :-"How is it then that it is said to be different '7" Answers
TEXT (1273).
IT IS ONLY AFTER THE THING HAS BEEN APPREHENDED AS THE NEGATION OF ALL THINGS OTHER THAN ITSELF, THAT THERE APPEARS THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION IN THE SAID FORM.
-(1273)
COMMENTARY
Svabhāvāt other than its own self.-When the Thing has been appre. hended as the negation of—as differentiated from all other things, and when the (non-conceptual) perception in the specific iorm of the Blue has

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TATTYASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
appeared, then there follows the Conceptual Content associated with the words 'it is different'. If this were not so, then it would be something of the nature of purely verbal expression, or the essence of the thing as associated with the verbal expression, through which the thing could be associated with the name 'different or non-different', and apprehended as such.
From all this it follows that our Reason is not inadmissible':-(1273)
In case the Reason adduced by the Opponent because it apprehends a qualified thing is based on the idea that through 'negation' (differentia. tion) itself the thing becomes qualified, even though it be not qualified in the sense of being connected with a qualification in the shape of some other thing, even so our Reason cannot become * Inconclusive': This is what is shown in the following
TEXT (1274).
OTHER PEOPLE REGARD THE UNIVERSAL AS NOT DISTINGUISHED BY QUALIFICATIONS, WHICH UNIVERSAL THEY REGARD AS APPREHENDED BY NON-CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTION. WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS APPLICABLE TO THAT
AL.S0.-(1274)
COMMENTARY.
The Universal has been held to be of two kinds-(1) distinguished by qualifications, and (2) not distinguished by qualifications. That which is not distinguished by qualifications has been held to be apprehended by Non-conceptual Perception.
To that'-.e. to the Universal. Hence the charge of being apprehended by Conceptual Perception would apply to these also.-(1274)
Question Answer.
"How so?"
TEXT (1275).
THE UNIVERSAL IS RECOGNISED AS DISTINGUISHED' FROM THE PARTIOULAR; HENCE THE PERCEPTION OF IT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED (UNDER THE OPPONENT'S CONTENTION) 48
CONCEPTUAL.-(1275)
COMMENTARY
That is understood to be the Universal which is qualified-i.e. distinguished '--from the Particular; if it were not so, then there would be no Universal at all, if it were not excluded distinguished-from the Particular. -Such being the case, the Perception that apprehends this Universal, as distinguished from the Particular, becomes 'Conceptual', as it apprehends

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 641
something that is qualified. And yet, according to your view, this cognition is not conceptual; hence your Reason is itself Inconclusive.-(1275)
The said Sumati himself, anticipating the objection that his own Reason becomes * Inconclusive hy the case of the Universal, has answered it. This answer is shown in the following
TEXT (1276).
WA THING IS CALLED UNIVERSAL WHEN IT IS APPREHENDED WITHOUT DISTINCTION; HENCE IT IS NOT RICHT TO REGARD THE UNIVERSAL AS SOMETHING DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PARTICULAR."
-(1276)
COMMENTARY.
There is no Universal apart from the Particulars, by virtue of which on being apprehended it would be amenable to Conceptual Perception; in fact, it is only when the Particulars are apprehended without distinction that they are called "Universal'; that is to say, when they are not cognised, each in its own distinctive form, they are called 'Universal'. Consequently, how could the Univorsal be distinguished' from the Particulars, by virtue of which its apprehension would become conceptual'.-(1276)
Question :- How then can there be a clear division between the Universal and the Particular ?
Answer (provided by Sumati) :
TEXT (1277).
* WHEN THESE (PARTICULARS) ARE OOGNISED AS SIMILAR OR DISSIMILAB, THEY INDICATE TRE EXISTENCE IN THEMSELVES, OF THE CHARACTER OF THE UNIVERSAL' OR THE
PARTICULAR '."-(1277)
COMMENTARY.
“These same Particulars, according as they are cognised as similar or dissimilar, become spoken of as Universal' or 'Particular, respectively

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
and in this way they bring about a division between the use of the two names, Universal' and Particular -(1277)
The above criticism of Sumati's is answered in the following
TEXTS (1278-1279).
IF THE SAID SIMILARITY' AND DISSIMILARITY' ARE HELD TO DIEFERENTIATED, THEN THE FACT OF THE UNIVERSAL BEING DISTINGUISHED FROM THE PARTICULARS REMAINS AS BEFORE.-IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THEY ARE NOT HELD TO BE DIFFERENTIATED, THEN, HOW CAN THE CLEARLY MARKED DIVISION BE POSSIBLE, WITHOUT CROSSING EACH OTHER ? THERE IS NO OTHER WAY IN WHICH THEY COULD BE CONCEIVED.
(1278-1279)
COMMENTARY.
Differentiated' -Not mixed up: i.e. the Universal being one thing and the Particular being another thing.
That the Universal is distinguished from the Particular is said only by way of illustration; in fact the Particular also is distinguished from the Universal; as both these having distinct characters are clearly distinguished from one another
The fact, elo. Asandirna' is unmixed. This has been declared by the same Sumati in the following words-" The Particular is perceived only as infused with the character of such Universals as 'Being' and the like, not otherwise ; hence it is only right that what is qualified should form the object of # qualified (determinate, conceptual) Perception; as for the Universal, on the other hand, it is capable of being perceived independently of all Particulars; and hence there can be nothing incongruous in its forming the object of the non-conceptual Perception " -This clearly marked distinction would not be there.
It might be argued that "It is not held to be either distinguished or undistinguished."
The angwer to that is How can, etc. etc. '-As a matter of fact, among things so related that the presence or absence of one must imply the absence or presence of another, the negation of one is inseparable from the affirmation of another; consequently, there can be no other alternative.-(1278. 1279)
Then again, to speak of the Particulars as apprehended without distinction' involves a contradiction in terms. This is what is shown in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 643
TEXTS (1280-1281). OF THE PARTICULAR THINGS THERE IS NO OTHER CHARACTERISTIC EXCEPT THAT OF BEING 'PARTICULAR' (OR DISTINCT'); HOW THEN CAN THERE BE ANY APPREHENSION OF THEM WHICH DOES NOT ENVISAGE TRE DISTINCT' FORM! EVEN IF THEIR FORMS ARE ENVISAGED, THEY ARE APPREHENDED ONLY AS DISTINCT FROM OTHER PARTICULARS; SO THAT THEIR PERCEPTION WOULD BE CONCEPTUAL'.
- (1280-1283)
COMMENTARY There is no Particular' apart from the various Things. If then, the Particular were not envisaged in the apprehension of the Universal, how could the various Things be apprehended ? That is to say, being non-different from the nature of what is not apprehended, the Particulars also would be not-apprehended.
If it be held that the various Things are apprehended, then, if these forms are envisaged, -and are apprehended, the Particular also would be apprehended, being, as it is, non different from what has been apprehended. So that, in regard to these varions things, the Cognition that is held to be apprehensive of the Universal turns out to be conceptual.-(1280.1281)
Further, it may be that the Universal being non-different from the Particulars, it may not be distinguished' from those ; even so, the Universal would certainly be distinguished' from such featureless non-entities as the 'Hare's Horn'; and it would thus become apprehensible by Conceptual Perception ; and yet it is not so; hence your reason remains Inconclusive,
This is what is pointed out in the following
TEXTS (1282-1283). THE UNIVERSAL IS COGNISED AS DISTINGUISHED' (DISTINOT) FROM THE featureless THING; HENCE FOR YOU, IT SHOULD BE COGNISABLE BY CONCEPTUAL PERCEPTION.-IF IT BE URGED THAT "THE UNIVERSAL CANNOT BE REGARDED AS distinguished FROM A NON-ENTITY”,-THEN (WE ASK) IS IT OF THE SAME NATURE AS THE NON-ENTITY ? IF NOT, THEN WHY IS IT NOT ADMITTED THAT IT IS DIS
TINGUISHED FROM IT -(1282-1283)
COMMENTARY.
The following might be urged :-"There can be no distinction made between the Universal and the Non-entity; nor can there be any similarity

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
between them. Because that is supposed to be a non-entity which is not anything; and such a thing cannot be either distinguished' from, or similar to, the Universal. If it were, it would be an Entity.--Even if the Void-ie. the Non-entity--were distinguished from the Universal, then also it would be an entity: because a non-entity cannot have the character of being distinguished'; and without the character of being distinguished'a thing cannot be regarded as distinguished'.-Nor can the Non-entity be similar to the Universal; es even so it would have to be an entity. A non-entity cannot have a form similar to something else ; and unless a thing has a forma similar to another's, it cannot be regarded as similar to it; as otherwise it would lead to an absurdity. Hence relatively to the Void (Non-entity), the Universal cannot be said to be either distinguished (distinct) or similar. Because when one thing is either distinct or similar in relation to another thing, then this latter also has to be regarded as distinct from, or similar to, the former. If it were not so, then the others also could not be perceived as distinct from, or similar to, it.-Further, there is no such thing as 'non-entity' apart from entity; when an entity is not found to be another entity, it is called 'nonentity' in relation to it; how then could it be distinguished '?"
All this has been argued by Sumati; as against all this, the Author proceeds to urge as follows:
TEXT (1284),
As A MATTER OF FACT, IN THE CASE OF THE entity ALSO, BEING 'DISTINGUISHED' CONSISTS IN not being that same; AND AS THE UNIVERSAL 19 not the same AS THE NON-ENTITY, WHY CAN YOU NOT REGARD IT AS BEING DISTINGUISHED 'FROM THE NON-ENTITY?
-(1284)
COMMENTARY, In the case of the entity also, when it is distinguished' from Non-entity, this being distinguished' is not anything different, it is only the negation oj sameness; the meaning being that it is not the same as the other; and this can be equally so in the case of the Universal also, in relation to the Non. entity, like the Hare's Horn. Because the Hare's Horn is a non-entity in the sense that it is not capable of any action whatever the Universal on the other hand is not regarded as so incapable :-90 that its being distinguished from the Non-entity is quite clear. That there should be the distinction of the Universal from the Non-entity, and yet the Non-entity does not become an entity-that is nothing very important.
As regards the Non-entity, the assertion (made by Sumati) that it is nothing different from Entity and so forth, it is clear that the writer has not pondered over the meaning of his own Assertion : Because when it is said that an Entity is not found to be another entity', the fact of its being distinguished from it becomes asserted; because it speaks of its preclusion from it.-AN

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 645
that has been urged, therefore, is only the effect of blindness. Hence we desist from further argumentation.-(1284)
The upshot of his whole argument is stated by the Author in the following
TEXT (1285).
FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT WHATEVER COGNTTION APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS APPERTAINS TO WHAT IS BEYOND THE RANGE OF WORDS AND IS
HENCE non-conceptual (1285)
COMMENTARY
With the following Tects, the Author proceeds to present the view of Kumarila ; and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss) - put forward (under Text 1257 above), to the effect that when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real ', -that it is partly inadmissible as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning :
TEXTS (1286-1288).
“ AT FIRST THERE IS ONLY A pre-cognition, WHICH IS non-conceptual,
LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE INFANT AND THE DUMB AND THE LIKE ;
-IT IS BORN PURELY OF THE THING (COGNISED); AT THAT MOMENT, NEITHER THE UNIVERSAL NOR THE PARTICULAR CHARACTER IS APPREHENDED; ALL THAT IS APPREHENDED IS ONLY A CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL WHICH IS THE SUBSTRATUM OF BOTH THOSE CHARACTERS. -(Shlokavārtika-Sense-perception, 112-113).-SUBSEQUENTLY, THE THING BECOMES APPREHENDED ALONG WITH THE PROPERTIES OF THE CLASS-CHARACTER ' AND THE REST; AND THE COGNITION ALSO BY WHICH IT IS THUS APPREHENDED IS REGARDED AS SENSE. PERCEPTION',- (Shlokavārtika—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 120)."-(12861288).
COMMENTARY
All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premies of the Buddhist)—that the basis of conceptuality, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there is not admissible. Because, as a matter of fact, except in the initial Pre-cognition, in all other Sense-perceptions, the apprehension of the thing as qualified by qualifications' is present.-If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the Pre-cognition, then the argument is superfluous.
Such is the view of the Opponent (Kumärila).

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TATTVASANGRAHA: OHAPTER XVII.
Like the cognition of the infant and the dumb' i.e. like the infant's cognition, and like the dumb person's cognition. And the rest is meant to include the man in a swoon. The only point of similarity in all these cases is the absence of association with words.
Purely' what is meant by this 'purity' is freedom from the two Universals.
This same idea is made clearer in the second text (1287) Neither the Universal nor the Particular, etc. etc. The term * Particular' stands for the intermediate Universal, Cow' and the like ; and Universal' for the Summum Genus, 'Entity' and the like. The substrahim of both these' ; --this indicates the pure thing.
Subsequently, etc. --This makes clear the partial 'inadmissibility of the same Premiss. Subsequently'-ice after the apprehension of the apprehension of the pure thing,—that cognition, by which the thing is apprehended along with the qualifications of the class character and the rest, is also regarded as 'Sense-perception :
By the class-character, etc.' This indicates the apprehension of the Thing as qualified by qualifications.
Tbis shows that the said cognition apprehends what has not been already apprehended and also that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) is inadmissible. (1286–1288)
TEXT (1289).
"AGAIN AND AGAIN, AS MORE AND MORE CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS COME LY, THERE FOLLOW FURTHER APPREHENSIONS, IN CONNECTION WITH THE SAME ; AND ALL THIS IS REGARDED AS' SENSEPERCEPTION'."-Shlokavārtika-SENSE
PERCEPTION, 125).-(1289)
COMMENTARY.
Again and again' i.e. at the third and subsequent moments.
There follow further apprehensions ',-i.e. such as apprehend what has not been already apprehended.
In connection with the same';ie. in accordance with the connection of the sense organ concerned.-(1289)
The following might be urged (against Kumarila) If, at the first operation of the Sense-organ concerned, the Thing does not appear as equipped with all its properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest,--then, it should not so appear even subsequently; as the circumstances are the same in both cases.
The answer to this is provided in the following

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TEXT (1290).
"WHEN A MAN RETURNS FROM BRIGHT LIGHT INTO AN INNER ROOM, TRINGS DO NOT MANIFEST THEMSELVES TO HIM IMMEDIATELY UPON HIS ENTRANCE ; BUT THAT DOES NOT MEAN THAT LATER ON HE DOES NOT PORCEIVE THOSE THINGS BY HIS SENSEORGANS." -(Shlokavārtika-SENSE-PERCEPTION, 126).
-(1290)
COMMENTARY. * Uenat 1.e. from bright light.
The construction is 'unit pravistamātrānām', who have just come in from bright light
He does not perceive, etc. etc. The particular intonation implies that things are actually apprehended by the sense-organs.-(1290)
Having thus cited the Example, he applies the same idea to the case in questions
TEXT (1291).
"JUST AS, IN THE FIRST INSTANCES, KE PERCEIVES A MERE SEMBLANCH OF THE THING AND SUBSEQUENTLY HE PERCEIVES THEM IN THEIR TRUE FORM,—30 ALSO WITH THE PROPERTIES OF CLASSCHARACTER' AND THE REST." -(Shloleavartila
SENSE-PERCEPTION, 127).-(1291)
COMMENTARY.
In the inner room, the Man apprehends the mere semblance of the thing; later on he apprehends the thing more specifically as 'blue' and so forth in the same manner in the case in question, having. At first apprehended the thing in its mere outline, one would subsequently come to have the Perception of the thing equipped with the Class-character and other properties. So that there is no incongruity at all.-(1291)
If such be the case, and all the cognitions that appear after the initial Pre-cognition are valid, -then, in a case where the man has had the pre-cognition of the thing, and then closing his eyes, conceives of the thing as connected with the Class-character and other properties (as the Conceptual Content), then, inasmuch as this latter apprehends things not apprehended before, this also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception
The answer to this (from Kumarila) is as follows:

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
TEXT (1292).
"IF AFTER HAVING PRE-COGNISED THE THING, THE MAN CLOSES HIS EYES AND THEN IMPOSES CONCEPTUAL CONTENTS, THIS LATTER WOULD NOT BE SENSE-PRECEPTION -BECAUSE IT IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONNECTION (OF THE SENSEORGANS)."-(Shlokavārtika SENSE-PERCEPTION, 128),
-(1292)
COMMENTARY. Having pre-cognised i.e. having apprehended by Pre-cognition. Eyes to be construed with closes
It is not in accordance, etc. etc.:i.e. it has not been brought about by the contact of the sense-organ concerned. This has been thus asserted by Kumarila—"Thus then the process of conceptual content being similar in the two cases, that cognition which follows upon the contact of the sense-organ has the character of sense-perception ; - this is well-known among people, even without any definition". (Shlokavārtika-Senseperception, 254).—(1292)
To all these arguments of Kumārila, the answer is as follows:
TEXTS (1293-1294).
WHAT HAS BEEN URGED IS NOT RIGHT. IF THE COGNITION IN QUESTION APPERTAINS TO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THE THING,THEN, EVEN ON THE APPREHENSION OF THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER PROPERTIES, IT SHOULD REMAIN FREE FROM VERBAL EXPRESSION, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN PROVED BEFORE THAT THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS CANNOT BE DENOTED BY WORDS; HENCE THE COGNITION THAT RESTS UPON THAT MUST BE FREE FROM CONCEPTUAL CONTENT (AND ASSOCIATION WITH WORDS).-(1293-1294)
COMMENTARY.
Even on the apprehension, etc. The word "even' means even granting that the Universal exists'. In reality, the Universal, etc, having been already rejected, how could there be any validity in the apprehension thereof? Well, granting that they do exist, even so, on their apprehension, the Cognitions that appear subsequently to the initial Pre-cognition, having only the Specific Individuality of Things as their object, must be free from Conceptual Content; just as the Pre-cognition is. Because the Universal and other properties have been held to be not-different from the Specific Individuality.

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The argument may be formulated as follows That Cognition which apprehends the Specific Individuality must be free from Conceptual Content, -like the Pre-cognition ;-the Cognition that is held to be the subsequent Perception does apprehend the Specific Individuality ;-80 this is a natural reason (proving its non-conceptual character).
This argument is only in the nature of a Reductio ad absurdum.-The Reason cannot be said to be Inconclusive. Because, that the Specific Individuality cannot be denoted by words has already been proved in the Chapter dealing with the 'Exclusion of other Things' (as forming the denotation of words).
Nor is the Reason Contradictory; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to exist.-(1293-1294)
It might be urged that-The Reason is Inadmissible, as it pertains to the Universal only".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1295).
IF THE UNIVERSAL ALONE WERE APPREHENDED, THEN THE QUALIFICATION (PROPERTY) WOULD BE SOMETHING AHSOLUTELY DISTINCT ; AND THIS IS NOT WHAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE OTHER
PARTY, AS ASSERTED (BY HIMSELF).- (1295)
COMMENTARY. The qualification would be something absolutely distinct from the Thing qualified.
This is not acceptable to the other party', -i.e. this absolute distinction between the qualification and the qualified.
"How do you know that it is not acceptable ?" Answer:- As has been asserted'-i.e. hy himself.-(1295)
Question :-"What is it that has been asserted by him?" Answer Kumarila says as below)
TEXT (1296).
"IF THE QUALIFICATION WERE ABSOLUTELY DISTINCT FROM THE QUALIFIED, THEN HOW COULD IT BRING ABOUT IN THE qualified A COGNITION IN KEEPING WITH ITSELF?"-Shloka.
vürlilu-SENSE-PERCEPTION, 142].-(1296)
COMMENTARY.
The term "absolutely' has been added in view of the fact that some sort of indirect distinction is admitted ; inasmuch as his view is that the

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Universal and other qualifications are different as well as non-different (from the qualified), but not absolutely different, or absolutely non-different. He has asserted as follows:-"As their cognitions are distinct, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same; what is held is that they are one as well as diverse, as conceived in the form of Being (when they are one) and in the form of Colour, etc. (when they are diverse)" -(Shlokavārtika, Senseperception, 158). He has again assorted that-"For us, the Universal and the rest are not other than the Individual "-(Shlokavārtika, Senseperception, 141).- Paratvam', difference ', here stands for other than'.
In keeping with itself-i.e. tinged with the form of the qualifying factors; as the qualification is so called only because it brings about the apprehension of the qualified thing which is tinged by the qualifying factor; otherwise, it would not be & qualification et al; as it has been declared that-'The Qualification is so called because it colours the qualified thing with its own cognition':-(1296)
The following might be urged :-"As a matter of fact, the subsequent cognitions envisage both (the Universal as well as the Particular), inasmuch as what they apprehend is the Particular as characterised by the Universal; so that they cannot be said to apprehend the Specific Individuality only ".
The Answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1297).
ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION CANNOT COMPREHEND BOTH THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL, BECAUSE, IF SUCH A COGNITION WERE 'CONCEPTUAL', THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE FORMER, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE
LATTER. (1297)
COMMENTARY.
It is not right that one and the same Oognition should apprehend the Specific Individuality as well as the Universal.-Because, would that Cognition be Conceptual or Non.conceptual? If it were Conceptual. Determinate.there could be no apprehension of the former,-i.e. the Specific Individuality.-If otherwise, i.e. if it is Non conceptual, then there could be no apprehension of the latter '-.e of the Universal.-(1297)
It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be 'Non-conceptual --The Author now proceeds to show that-even granting that the said cognitions are Conceptual', as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previons Non-conceptual Cognition), no validity could attach to those Cognitions :

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TEXT (1298). ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING XO ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL AND THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY),-IP THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER PROPERTIES HAVE BECOME ALREADY APPREHENDED BY THE INITIAL COGNITION, THEN THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION WOULD BE APPREHENDING ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED,AND IT WOULD THUS BE LIKE
REMEMBRANCE.-(1298)
COMMENTARY. The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual; as has been declared by Kumarila (in Shlokavārtika, Senseperception, 141) that The Universal and the rest are not anything other than the Individual". Under the ciroumstances, as the Universal and the rest will have been already apprehended by the initial (non-conceptual) Pre-cognition, the subsequent definite (conceptual) cognition of the same Universal and the rest would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended,-and thus being like Remembrance, it must have to be regarded as invalid.
This argument may be formulated as follows :-The Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended cannot be valid, -e.g. Remembrance the conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended ;-hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).-(1298)
[Says the Opponent) _“If the Reason adduced here is that "the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions),- then it is one that is not admitted'; if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference"
This is the argument that is set forth in the following
TEXTS (1299-1300). " (AT THE INITIAL STACE), THERE IS ONLY A VAGUE IDEA OF SEVERAL
UNIVERSALS, AND THERE IS NO DEFINITE IDEA OF ANYTHING; THE DEFINITE IDEA COMES ONLY LATER; AS THIS APPREHENDS THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM ALL IMPOSITIONS (DOUBTS AND MISCONCEPTIONS). JUST AS INFERENCE APPREHENDS THE OBJECT AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM IMPOSITIONS, SO ALSO DOES THE (LATER) DEFINITE COGNITION."-(1299-1300)
COMMENTARY. "At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form; the well-defined cognition comes only

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later, and this is valid, as it apprehends the Thing as differentiated from impo. sitions,-like Inference. For instance, after the subject, Sound, has been apprehended by Perception, there appears, through the fact of its being a product, the well-defined (inferential) idea that it is non-eternal; and this subsequent Inferential Cognition of the non-eternality of sound is valid ; in the same manner the subsequent Peroeptional Cognition becomes welldefined when it apprehends the thing as differentiated from impositions. On this point of well-defined cognition apprehending things differentiated from imposition, you also do not hold a different opinion; as is clear from your assertion to the following effect Between well-defined cognition and imposed cognition subsists the relation of the annuller and the annulled; and it is understood that the well-defined cognition becomes operative on the thing being differentiated from impositions'."-(1299-1300)
The answer to the above is as follows:
TEXTS (1301–1303). As A MATTER OF FACT, THE VALIDITY OF INFERENTIAL COGNITION DOES
NOT REST UPON ITS APPREHENDING A THING DIFFERENTIATED FROM IMPOSITIONS ; IF THAT WERE SO, THEN REMEMBRANCE ALSO WOULD RAVE TO BE REGARDED AS valid. WHAT REALLY HAPPENS IS THAT AFTER THE SENSE-PERCEPTION (OF A CERTAIN THING) THERE APPEAR CERTAIN IMPOSITIONS (DOUBTS AND MISCONCEPTIONS), AND IT IS BY REASON OF SETTING ASIDE THESE IMPOSITIONS THAT INFERENTIAL COGNITION HAS BEEN REGARDED AS VALID.-THIS IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR YOU; BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF SUCH COGNITIONS AS THE WHITE-COW-WALKING'-AFTER THE SENSE-PERCEPTION, NO IMPOSITION IS FOUND TO APPEAR, WHICH COULD BE NEGATIVED (BY THE SUBSEQUENT VALID COGNITION).-(1301-1303)
COMMENTARY
The validity of Inference lies in its precluding the imposition that has crept in, and not merely in precluding an imposition; in the latter case validity would attach to Remembrance also. In the case of the initial non-conceptual) Perception being followed by the conceptual perception of the whitecow-walking, there is no preclusion of an imposition that has crept in, because no such imposition has actually come in.
"How do you know that it has not come in ?"
Answer - In the case of such cognitions, etcetc. ' ;—when & Concept does come in, it does not remain uncognised; hence, being capable of being cognised, if the Imposition is not cognised, it follows that it has not come in at all.—(1301-1303)
All this has been said after taking it for granted that the Universal and the rest do exist. Now the Author proceeds to show that in reality, the

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF
SENSE-PERCEPTION". 653
Universal and the rest do not exist at all, and hence the Perception appre. hending them cannot be conceptual:
TEXTS (1304-1305).
AS A MATTER OF FAOT, UNIVERSAL AND THE REST DO NOT EXIST, EITHER AS NON-DIFFERENT, OR AS DIFFERENT, FROM (INDIVIDUALS),-BY VIRTUE OF WHICH THE CONCEPTUAL COGNITION OF THOSE COULD HAVE THE CHARACTER OF PERCEPTION'.- (a) (THEY CANNOT BE THE SAME AS THE INDIVIDUALS] BECAUSE THERE IS NO COMPREHENSIVENESS. (b) NOR CAN THEY BE DIFFERENT FROM THE INDIVIDUALS] BECAUSE THEY DO NOT APPEAR AS DIFFER. ENT FROM THE INDIVIDUAL.-(c) [NOR OAN THEY BE BOTH DIFFERENT AND NON-DIFFERENT] BECAUSE Difference and non-difference ALWAYS REMAIN MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE. (1304-1305)
COMMENTARY.
The Universal and the rest (if they existed) could be either (a) nondifferent from the Individuals,-or (b) different from them,-or (c) both, different and non-different.
(1) The first alternative cannot be right; because there is no comprehensiveness ; i.e. there is absence or negation of pervasion ; that form is called
Universal which pervades over several things; there is no such pervasion' among individuals, whereby they themselves could become the Universal': if there were such pervasion, the entire universe would come to be of the same form; so that there could be no Universal at all; as the Universal must subsist in several things.
(2) Nor is the second alternative possible (i.e. the Universal, etc. cannot be different from the Individuals]; because they do not appear as different from the Individuals';-the term bhedalt stands for Individuals and what does not appear cannot be perceived. This has been thus declared * Individuals do not pervade over one another; there is no other pervasive entity; how then can anything be different from Cognition !!
(3) Nor is the third alternative possible; because the two views of difference and non-difference are mutually exclusive that is to say, when two things are mutually exclusive, the negation of one must mean the affirmation of the other; and difference and non-difference are so mutually exclusive, because the nature of one is such that it must proclude the nature of the other. Hence there can be no third alternative (in addition to difference and non-difference),—(1304-1305)

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Says the Opponent:"If Sense-perception is non-conceptual, how is activity carried on on its basis - This is a means of bringing happiness
this is a source of unhappiness, one always makes up his mind definitely on these lines and then betakes himself to activity for the securing of the former and the avoiding of the latter.-Further (under your view) there can be no idea of Inference or Inferred; because at the time of Inference, the character in question, as also the subject wherein it is sought to be proved, must be such as have been previously cognised in a definite form and they could not be regarded as definitely cognised by a Perception that is itself uncertain. Nor could it be regarded as cognised by Inference; as that would mean an infinite regress of Inferences. There is no third Means of Right Cognition (for the Buddhist, except Perception and Inference). So that under your view, there would be an end to all forms of activity.-From all this, and on the basis of the Reason that activities are actually carried on on the basis of Inference, etc., it becomes established that the idea of Perception being non-conceptual is ruled out by Inference
To one who would argue thus, the Author offers the following answer :
TEXT (1306).
AS A MATTER OF FAOT, EVEN TRE non-conceptual PERCEPTION HAS THE POTENCY TO BRING ABOUT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT ; HENCE THROUGH THAT, IT BECOMES A FACTOR IN ALL ACTIVITY.
(1306)
COMMENTARY
Through thal'.-That is, through the Conceptual Content, the Non-conceptual Perception also becomes the cause of definitive cognition and thereby becoines a factor in all activity. For instance, even though Sense-perception is free from Conceptual Content', yet, whenever it appears, it appears as qualifying, through the manifestation of its form in consciousness, the Thing perceived-like Fire, for instance-as differentiated from all other homo. geneous and heterogeneous things ;-and as this perception apprehende one definite thing with a well-defined form, and is also accompanied by the idea of the thing as differentiated from other homogeneous and heterogeneous things,-it renders manifest, in that same thing, certain positive and negative concepts-such as this is Fire', this is not a bunch of flowers'; as these two concepts are only indirectly related to the Thing concerned, they are not regarded as valid, even though thoy are in perfect accord with the real state of things; and the reason for this lies in the fact that it involves the unification of what is seen and what is conceived, and as such cannot be regarded as the apprehension of what is not already apprehended, (and hence valid),
It is for the reason stated above that the non-conceptual Perception, being the cause of the said two concepts, becomes the cause of the indication of a third kind of negation also. For instance, whenever a cognition appears

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 655
in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thing from all else; in connection with all things, there are these two poleswhat is perceived and what is other than the perceived; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.
"If that is so, then, if the Subject, Sound, for instance-has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of non-eternality that appears in connection with it cannot be valid".
That does not affect our position. Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be apprehended (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception,-even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for leading itself to activity, it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended ; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid -no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.
Question: "What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite ?"
Answer :—The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been apprehended it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite; because it depends upon other causes, in the shape of repetition, the man's interest, the vividness (of the original perception) and so forth. Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is My Father is coming', not my Teacher is coming :-(1306)
Bhāvivikta and others, who take exception to the idea that the nonconceptual Perception leads to activity through bringing about the Conceptual Content", bring forward certain arguments these are set forth in the following
TEXT (1307). « THE non-conceptual CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, (a) BECAUSE THEIR OBJEOTS ARE DIFFERENT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITION OF COLOUR, ETC,, -AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS non-conceptual—LIKE TRE EYE, ETC."
(1307)
COMMENTARY. The cognition produced by the Senses (which is non-conceptual) cannot bring about the conceptual cognition, which is mental, a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognitions of Colour, Touch, etc.; and also (b) because it is non-conceptual,-like the Eye and other organs.

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TATTVASANGRAHA CHAPTER XVII.
In support of the Reason Because their objects are different, the instance cited is as in the case of the cognitions of colour, etc.'; and in support of the Reason. Because it is non-conceptual', the instance cited is Kike the eye, etc. (1307)
The following Text points out the defects in the above reasoning :
TEXT (1308). THERE IS NO INCOMPATIBILITY BETWEEN THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND THE SAID REASONS; NOR IS THERE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR OBJECTS; AS THE OBJECT APPREHENDED BY THE ONE IS THE SAME AS THAT APPREHENDED
BY THE OTHER.-(1308)
COMMENTARY. Both the Reasons adduced in the preceding Text) are Inconclusive'; es no incompatibility has been indicated between the Reasons and the contrary of the conclusion sought to be proved by them.
* Anayoh'-of the two Reasons.
Nor is there difference, elc. etc.; that is to say, even though the Conceptual Content is objective (has an object), yet the assertion that their objects are different' is 'inadmissible-(1308)
In reality however the Conceptual Content is not objective, it is without an object; hence the Reason cited is all the more inadmissible. This is shown in the following
TEXT (1309). IN REALITY, THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT PROCEEDS WITHOUT ANY OBJECTIVE BASIS; IT HAS NO OBJECT AT ALL, WHICH COULD DIFFER FROM ANYTHING ELSH.-(1309)
COMMENTARY. The following Teart shows that the Corroborative Instance (cited by Bhāvivikta, in 1307 above)" as in the case of the cognition of Colour, etc.", is devoid of the Probandum (the character sought to be proved)
TEXT (1310). AMONG THE COGNITIONS OF COLOUR, SOUND, ETC., MUTUAL CAUSAL RELATION IS ACTUALLY PRESENT ; HENCE THE INSTANCE THAT HAS BEEN CITED IS ONE IN WHICH THE PROBANDUM
IS NOT KNOWN TO EXIST.—(1310)
COMMENTARY. -As among the Cognitions of Colour, Sound, etc., mental causal relation is actually present,-consisting in the fact of their following in the wake of one another.-(1310)

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 657
Again, the Text is going to show that the reason "Because their objects are different” (cited by Bhāvivikta in Teart 1307) is Inconclusive, by reason of its presence in a thing where the Probandum is definitely known to be absent
TEXT (1311). INASMUCH AS BETWEEN THE Cognition of Fire AND THE Cognition of Smoke, THERE IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFÈT, THE SAME COULD BE POSSIBLE IN THE CASE IN QUESTION ALSO; HENCE THE REASON CITED IS FOUND TO BE INOONCLUSIVE ALSO.-(1311)
COMMENTARY. • Elasmin' stands for the Reason cited " Because their objects are different".
The Cognition of the Middle Term Smoke' is the cause of the cognition of the Major Term Fire', even though the objects of the two cognitions are different. The same may be the case here (with the non-conceptual and the conceptual). So that the Reason adduced is Inconclusive.-(1311)
Having thus proved the fact of Sense-perception being free from Conceptual Content, the Author next proceeds to explain the use of the other qualification, 'not erroneous (in the definition of Sense-perception propounded by himself under Text 1214):
TEXT (1312). THE EPITHET 'NOT-ERRONEOUS' HAS BEEN ADDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXCLUDING SUCH ILLUSIONS AS THOSE OF THE** Keshondraka' (HAIR-TUFT) AND THE LIKE; AS THESE ARE NOT REGARDED AS 'VALID COGNITION ON THE GROUND OF THEIR BEING ERRONEOUS (1312)
COMMENTARY. The term 'not-erroneons should be understood as not incongruent. -and not as having for its basis a form as it really exists'.-If this latter were meant, then, as under the view of the Yogāchāra (the extreme Idealist) there can be no real basis, the definition, thus interpreted, would not be applicable to Sense-perception as accepted by both theorists (the Realist Sauträntika and the Idealist Yogächāra).-As regards being non-incongruent', what it means is 'the presence of the capacity to envisage & thing which is capable of the intended fruitful activity', -not actually envisaging it; as obstacles are likely to appear in the actual envisaging.
.Keshondraka', Hair-Tuft-It is not clear what is meant by this. It is supposed to stand for the idea one has on closing the eyes of tufts of hair floating in the regions of the eye; which idea is erroneous, as there is no real Hair Tuft there.

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TATIVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
Question: "If that is so, then let there be only the qualification not erroneous'; what is the use of mentioning the freedom from conceptual content'?"
Answer :-That cannot be right; as in that case the inferential concept Also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception.-(1312)
TEXTS (1313-1314).
SOME PEOPLE HAVE HELD THAT ILLUSION IS PURELY mental. BUT THAT
IS NOT SO; AS IT IS FOUND TO APPEAR ONLY WHEN THE SENSEORGAN IS PRESENT (AND OPERATIVE) AND TO CEASE WHEN THIS LATTER (BECOMES DISORDERED, CHASES). IF IT WERE PURELY MENTAL, IT SHOULD CBASE LIKE THE ILLUSION REGARDING A SERPENT, EVEN WHEN THE DISORDER OF THE SENSE-ORGAN HAS NOT CEASED; AND YET IT CONTINUES TO BE PERCEIVED QUITE CLEARLY.
-(1313-1314)
COMMENTARY
The idea of these 'some people' is that it is not necessary to add, to the definition of Sense-perception, the qualifying term 'not erroneons' (for the purpose of excluding Illusion which, being purely mental, can never be Sense-perception ').
Against this view the following might be urged Granting that Illusion is mental; even so, it is not necessary to add the qualifying term 'not erroneons; because what the person propounding the definition under review wanted to do was not to provide a definition of only that 'Sense. perception' which is brought about by the Sense-organs, but also of that Sense-perception which appears in the Mystic and which is purely mental; 28 in this latter Dream.cognition also is non-conceptual, as it appears quite distinctly; and yet it is not 'non-errongeus'; hence for the exclusion of this, the addition of the qualifying term 'non-erroneous is necessary.
This is true; but there are Illusions possible through the Senses also (and they are not always mental); hence the said view of 'some people' is not right.
The author explains how Illusions may be sense-born- But that is not so, etc. etc.'-The illusion appears only when the Sense-organ is there, and when the Sense-organ is in any way disordered, i.e. burt-the Illusion ceases; which shows that like any other sense-born cognition, this Illusion of the Hair-tuft' and the like also is Sense-born.
Further, if the Illusion belonged entirely to the Mind, then the mental aberration would be the sole cause of the Illusion, and hence the Illusion would coase on the cessation of the mental aberration, though the disorder

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 659
of the Sense-organ may still be there. The illusion regarding the serpent and such things is cited as an example.
That the Illusion should not be very clear is another incongruous possibility cited. What is mixed up with Conceptual Content cannot bring about a very clear apprehension of the Thing; as the said Content operates only through the presentation of the Universal (which is always vague).(1313-1314)
The following texts sets forth the objection of the other party :
TEXTS (1315-1320).
"(a) As REGARDS THE REASON THAT THE ILLUSION IS THERE ONLY
WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN IS THERE', IN ITS DIREOT SENSE, IT 18 INADMISSIBLE ; AND IN ITS INDIRECT SENSE, IT IS INCONCLUSIVE ; AS IT IS PRESENT IN REMEMBRANCE ALSO.-(b) AS REGARDS THR REASON 'ILLUSION IS AN ABIRRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE DISORDER OF THE SENSE-ORGAN'; -THAT IS CLEARLY FOUND ALSO IN THE CASE OF EFFECTS PRODUCED INDIRECTLY,-FOR EXAMPLE, IN THE CASE OF THE Mule AND SUCH THINGS.-(c) AS REGARDS THE IDEA THAT ALL. MENTAL ILLUSIONS CEASE AFTER REFLECTION', THIS ALSO IS not quite true (INCONCLUSIVE), IN VIEW OF SUCH IDEAS AS
ENTITY' AND 'UNIVERSAL IF IT BE HELD THAT THESE NOTIONS DO CEASE ON THE SUBSEQUENT NOTION THAT THESE ARE NOT FOUND IN THE SPECIFIO INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS ', -THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT SUCH CESSATION IS POSSIBLE ALSO IN THE CASE OF SUCH ILLUSIONS AS THAT OF 'Two Moons' -IF IT BE URGED THAT THE existence OF THESE DOES NOT CEASE, THEN, THE SAME MAY BE SAID IN REGARD TO THE NOTIONS OF THE UNIVERSAL, ETC. ALSOAS REGARDS THE ILLUSIONS REGARDING GOD AND SUCH OTHER BEINGS, APPEARING IN PERSONS WHO ARE BEST UPON BELIEVING IN THEM, THERE IS NO CESSATION AT ALL, EVEN ON LISTENING TO MILLIONS OF REASONS ; IN FACT, THESE DULL-WITTED PERSONS DECLARE THAT THESE REASONS ARE NO REASONS AT ALL."-(13151320)
COMMENTARY.
(a) If the fact of Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as a Reason in the direct sense, then it is Inadmissible for one or the other of the two parties : for the other party, it is not proved that Illusion is produced directly from the Sense-organs; as that is exactly what is still to be proved. On the other hand, if it is meant in the indirect sense, that the Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as the Reason ; -then it is Inoonclusive ; because such indirect concomitance with the Senseorgan is present in Remembrance also (which is not regarded as Senseborn).

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660
TATTVASANGRAHA; CHAPTER XVII.
(6) As regards the Premiss that the Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the Sense-organ, that also is Inadmissible in the direct sense; and if taken in the indirect sense, this also is Inconclusive ; as in the case of the Mule, which is born of the Mare from the Ass, all the embryonic stages intervene between the contact of the animals and the birth of the Mule-and it is only when the final product is subsequently found to resemble the Ass that the idea comes about that it is born of the Ass; but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is produced from the Ass directly.
(c) The assertion that "Mental Illusion ceases on reflection is also Inconclusive,- in view of the ideas of Entity and Universal'. That is, for you the Buddhist, who, relying on Reasoning, hold that there is no such thing as the Universal,—the generic idea that there is in regard to things like the Jar being entities' or 'universals does not cease at all. If you think that," when one comes to reflect over them, the said ideas do disappear, through such notions as these ideas do not appertain to the Specific Individuality" —then we say that this is no answer at all. In the case of the Illusions regarding Too Moons and the like, when one comes to ponder over them, they also cease through the notion that these do not appertain to the Specific Individuality'; and yet these do not become mental'.
It might be urged that "the existence of these does not cease".
The same may be said in regard to the notions of the Universal, etc. also; as the existence of these also does not cease.-(1315-1320)
The following Texts supply the Author's answer to the above arguments
TEXTS (1321–1323).
THE IDEA OF THE ILLUSION BEING THERE WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN IS
THERE CANNOT BE SAID TO BE INADMISSIBLE', IN ITS DIRECT SENSE. BECAUSE THERE IS NO INTERVENTION BY ANY UNMISTAKEN (RIGHT) NOTION; AS NO SUCH INTERVEWING RIGHT NOTION IS EVER APPREHENDED.-EVEN WHEN THE MAN HAS HIS MIND NOT TURNED TO OTHER THINGS, HE HAS THE CONTINUOUS PERCEPTION OF TWO MOONS '; WHICH SHOWS THAT THE PRODUCTION (OF THE ILLUSION, BY THE SENSE-ORGAN) IS NOT indirect.-AS REGARDS THE IDEAS OF
ENTITY', 'UNIVERSAL ' AND SO FORTH, - WHERE THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR BEING RETRACTED,-CESSATION IS QUITE POSSIBLE, IF THE PERSON SO WISHES. SO ALSO IN THE CASE OF THE IDEA RELATING TO GOD.-(1321-1323)
COMMENTARY.
* Cannot be Inadmissible', -i.e, it must be admissible.- Why Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken notion of the One Moon

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PEROEPTION". 661
because while it would be cognisable if it were there, no such notion is cognised at all.
This same idea is made clear in the sentence Roen when the man, etc. etc.':- Continuous'-is to be construed with perception of the Two Moons.
For this same reason the Premiss, that 'illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the Senge-organ', also is not Inconclusive'. As this also is not interrupted, --in view of which the case of the Mule would render it false, inconclusive.
As regards the notions of Entity, Universal' and so forth, -when the person retraets them by his own wish, there is cessation of these also.
But in the case of the Illusions like that of the Hair-tuit', there can be no retraction at will; hence our premiss is not Inconclusive.
It might be argued that,"even in the case of Perception through the Senses, there can be cessation at will, by closing one's eyes for instance".
The Visual Perception does not cease immediately on the appearance of the wish; in fact what is bronght about by the man's wish is only the closing of the eyes, and it is only when the Eyes have ceased to function that the Visual Perception ceases. In the case of mental Illusion, on the other hand, it ceases directly after the wish of the man; hence the two cases are not analogous. It has to be borne in mind that, when the Eyes are fixed upon & thing, even though the man may not wish to look at the thing, the thing is actually seen; so that the wish has no direct influence upon the Visual or other Perceptions.--(1321-1323)
TEXT (1324)
THERE ARE OTHERS WHO DECLARE TRAT-NOTIONS LIKE THE YELLOW CONCH-SHELL', EVEN THOUGH ILLUSORY, ARE VALID, -INASMUCH AS THEY ARE NOT INCONGRUENT WITH EFFECTIVE
ACTION."-(1324)
COMMENTARY
There are some people belonging to our own party (Buddhists) who do not wish to have the qualification not-erroneous' (in the definition of Sense-perception); because they argue that even the illusory idea of the Yellow conch-shell'is Sense-perception. Because it cannot be Inference, as it is not brought about by an Inferential Indicative. And that it is valid is clear from the fact that it is not incongruent with reality. It was for this reason that the Teacher Dinnāga did not introduce this qualification not erroneous '-in his definition of Sense-perception. Error. Illusion, Ignorance,

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
Inference-these he has mentioned as having the Semblance of Perception, which shows that the definition intended by him was that it is free from Conceptual Content and is not incongruent with the real state of things. He has also included the taimiram (among the Semblances of Perception), where timira (Darkness) stands for ignorance-as found in such expressions as Timiraghnancha mandānām': and that which proceeds from T'imiraIgnorance-is 'Taimira', i.e. incongruent.-(1324)
The answer to the above is provided in the following
TEXTS (1325-1326)
THIS CANNOT BE RIGHT. THE EFFECTIVE ACTION AVAILABLE IS NOT
IN KEEPING WITH THE PORM APPREHENDED. OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE INCONGRUITIES; AS IN THE COGNITION WHERE THERE IS APPEARANCE OF THE Hair AND SUCH THINGS, THERE IS COMPATIBILITY, THOUGH ONLY WITH THE LIGHT (WHICH IS NOT APPREHENDED) AND OTHER DETAILS; HENCE THB VALIDITY OF THIS WOULD BE IRRESISTIBLE (UNDER THE OPPONENT'S VIEW).
-(1325-1326)
COMMENTARY
The validity of a cognition is of two kinds-(1) when there is com. patibility with the appearance, and (2) when there is compatibility with the Apprehension. In the case in question of the idea of the yellow conch. shell '), the absence of incongruence Wi.e. compatibility)-is not in accord. ance with the appearance, as what appears-what is apparent–is the yellow conch-shell ; and yet what is found (on touching) is not the yellow thing; nor is its compatibility in accordance with the apprehension, because it is the yellow thing itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity; and yet no fruitful activity in that form is actually found.-Nor can there be validity even when there is compatibility with what is not apprehended at all; as that would lead to absurdity; as in the case of the cognition of the Hair-tuft also, what is actually got at ig only the light (whose reflections create the impression of the Hair-tuft).-(1325-1326)
If you think that "though the apprehended Colour is not obtained, yet the shape is certainly obtained "-then our answer is as follows:

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION ", 663
TEXT (1327). THERE CAN BE NO shape APART FROM THE Colour ; AND WITH THE APPARENT COLOUR, THERE IS NO COMPATIBILITY (IN THE CASE
IN QUESTION).-(1327)
COMMENTARY This is easily understood.-(1327)
The Author now sums up his arguments
TEXTS (1328-1329). IT, WITHOUT REGARD TO THE FORM OF THINGS, validity WERE PRESUMED ON THE GROUND OF MERE COMPATIBILITY WITH FRUITFUL ACTION,
THEN HOW WOULD THIS NOT CONTRADICT SUCH ASSERTIONS (OF YOURS) AS THAT THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THE THING IS IN THE FORM OF THE THING'? AS REGARDS THE POSSIBILITY OF COMPATIBILITY' (IN THE CASE OF THE NOTION OF THE 'YELLOW CONCH-SHELL '), THAT CAN ONLY BE THE RESULT OF THE IMPRESSION (OF A PREVIOUS COGNITION).-1328
1329)
COMMENTARY. Validity cannot be presumed merely on the basis of the compatibility of effective action, without regard to the form; as in that case the cognition in the form of the thing itself might have to be regarded as invalid.
In the form of the thing i.e. in the form that appears in the cognition.
Such assertions as ';this is meant to show that the presumption in question would go against such assertions of the Teacher ag— As the form of the thing figures in the Cognition, in that form is the thing rightly cognised':
As regards compatibility with effective action', (in the case) in question. it should be understood to be the result of the Impression left by previous apprehensions. That is to say, the idea of the yellow conch-shell' is the effect of the Impression left by a previous apprehension of the white conchshell. And the compatibility with effective action (that has been said to be present in the case) is due to this Impression.-(1328-1829)
The Author now proceeds to show how the character of Sense-percep. tion' belongs to the Sensation of Pleasure, etc. :

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664
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII,
TEXT (1330).
THE REASONING THAT IS USED IN PROVING THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CHARACTER OF THE COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE MENTAL SENSE-ORGAN, ALSO SERVES TO PROVE THE NON-CONCEPTUAL CLARACTER OF THE SENSATIONS OF
PLEASURE, ETC.-(1330)
COMMENTARY
The Reasoning, etc.--that is, the argument based upon the impossibility of Conventions and so forth.
Even though this Reasoning has nowhere been urged specifically in rogard to mental cognition, yet the Reasoning that has been urged in regard to Cognitions through other Sense-organs,-in the shape of the impossibility of Conventions,-is equally applicable to Mental Cognitions also.
Or, the mental cognition meant here may be the cognition of the Mystic, which is going to be referred to later on. The Mental Perception has not been defined here, as its character is well-known to Buddhists.
What the Text means is that the fact of the Buddhist view of the sensatione in question being not annulled by any means of right cognition, has been fully explained by the Teacher; hence we do not seek to prove it here.-(1330)
The following Text sets forth the Vaishesika view (regarding the exact nature of the sensations of Pleasure, etc.) :
TEXT (1331).
"THEY (PLEASURE, ETC.) ARE NON-APPREHENSIVE OF ANOTHER THING; HOW THEN CAN THEY CARRY THEIR OWN COGNISANCE WITH
THEM? IN FACT, THEY BEOOME COGNISABLE ONLY BY THE COGNITION WHICH SUBSISTS IN THE SAME SUBSTRATUM AS THEMSELVES "-IF THIS IS URGED-[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS IN
THE FOLLOWING Texts).—(1331)
COMMENTARY.
"It is not only that they are not self-cognised; they are not apprehensive of any external thing either; that is, they are of the nature of Cognition. In fact Pleasure, etc. become cognised only by that Cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves-i.e. the Soul".
Such is the doctrine of the Vaishesikas.-(1331)
The above view is answered in the following

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION".
665
TEXTS (1332-1339).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, PLEASURE, ETC. ARE FELT IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE PERCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, WHY IS IT THAT THEY ARE ALWAYS FEUT AT THAT SAME TIME 1-IT IS REGARDED AS cog. NISED BY MENTAL PERCEPTION; BUT THIS PERCEPTION IS NOT THERE AT THE TIME; AS COGNITIONS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS APPEARING in succession (NOT AT THE SAME TIME).-IF IT BE URGED THAT " IT IS ONLY SIMULTANEOUS birth OF COGNITIONS THAT IS NOT ADMITTED, NOT THEIR SIMULTANEOUS existence " THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT THERE CAN BE NO (CONTINUED) existence OF ANYTHING; AS ALL THINGS HAVE BEEN PROVED TO BE MOMENTARY - IF IT BE URGED THAT THERE IS AN ILLUSION OF SIMULTANEITY, DUE TO THE QUICK SUCCESSION OF THE COGNITIONS" THIS ALSO HAS BEEN REJ DOTED ALREADY. IF THE PLEASURE, ETC., WERE AMENABLE ONLY TO REMEMBRANCE, THEN THE FEELING COULD NOT BE VIVID (AS IT IS).- IF IT BE ASSUMED THAT THE SAID ILLUSION IS IN THE FORM OF 'AGREEABLE' AND 'DISAGREBABLE', THEN IT COMES TO THIS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN RESTS IN THEMSELVES (AND THEY ARE THUS SELF-COGNISED), WHEN THE MYSTIOS COGNISE, BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, THE PLEASURE, ETO. OF OTHER PERSONS, TUEN, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SIMILARITY OF EXPERIENCE, THEY WOULD THEMSELVES BE UNHAPPY (AT THE UNHAPPINESS OF OTHER PEOPLE). FOR YOU, THE FEELING OF PAIN CONSISTS, NOT IN THE EXISTENCE OF THE PAIN ITSELF, BUT IN THE COGNITION OF WHICH THAT PAIN IS THE OBJECT; AND THAT IS ANOTHER CHAIN'.
-THE SAME APPLIES TO THE INTERENCE OF ANOTHER PERSON'S PAIN ALSO, AS INFERENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED (BY OTHERS) AS objective (WITH OBJECT), AND NOT PURELY subjective (NOT TOUCHING OBJECTS). -(1332–1339)
COMMENTARY
It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the Vaishafika) is contrary to perceived facts.
When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest,-then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended 1-Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object; as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only. And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.
It might be held that," it is only the birth of Cognitions that has been held to be in succession, not their existence".

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
That cannot be right; as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.
As regards the explanation that there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession", - this has been already refuted.
Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of joy and grief, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception; and Mental Perception is ConcepDual; and what is conceptual cannot make the appearance of things quite clear. Under our view on the other hand, what is regarded as Sense-percep. tion is that which is bronght about by the Cognition brought about by the Sense-organs, which is aided by the object coming into existence immediately after the object of the said Sense-perception.
Further, if Pleasure and Pain were actually apprehensible, their mani. festation would be as something separate, as in the case of the Blue and other things; and yet if they were separated from the cognition, they could not be felt as agreeable and disagreeable.
It might be argued that-"as there is no difference from the Cognition, the idea of agreeableness and disagreeablenere must be wrong".
In that case it becomes established that the existence of Pleasure and Pain rests in their own cognition; because Pleasure and Pain have no other form apart from what is agreeable and disagreeable ; and if it is admitted that the Cognition has this form, then it also becomes admitted that Pleasure and Pain also are of the nature of Cognition itself. Any other form not being admitted, it cannot be admitted that they are mere illusions.
"Agreeable is that which is favourable, and the opposite of this is disagreeable!
The term and the rest' (after Pleasure') includea Indifference.
If then the existence of Pleasure, etc., consists only in the appearance of their own Chain',-and it is not accepted that the same constitutes their apprehension also,—but it is held that their apprehension must consist in the appearance of the cognition regarding themselves,-then, in that case, when Mystics apprehend the Pleasure, etc., of other persons, they should be Just as unhappy as the persons actually experiencing the Pain, etc., and it is not open to you to say that it cannot be so, as they belong to separate chains" : because you do not admit that their continuance consists in the fact of their appearance in the same chain'; what you accept is only the appearance of the Cognition of the Pain; and the cognition is present in the chain of other people also; so that the incongruity remains.
If, as the cause of Pleasure, etc. you accept both-then, inasmuch as the Pleasure, etc. would be present in their own chains', it becomes proved that they are self-cognised. In this way, presence in one's own chain serves to distinguish them from those present in other chains'.
Question :-"If Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of their own cognition, then, how can the said incongruity of mystic perception be urged against those-Mimämsakas for instance, who do not admit of any mystics ?"

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION".
667
Answer: The same applies, etc. etc.-Except Buddhists, there are no philosophers for whom Inference is, in reality, devoid of objectivity: hence, for one who infers the pain of other persons (just as the Mystic who perceives it), there would be the same experiencing of pain [so that the said incon. gruity would be there all the same]. (1332-1339)
TEXT (1340).
[SAYS Sharikarauimin]-"PLEASURE, ETO. ARE APPREHENDED ONLY AS * PLEASURE, ETC.', TREY ARE NOT APPREHENDED AS 'COGNITION '; CONSEQUENTLY LIKE THE JAR, ETC., THEY CANNOT
BE Cognition."-(1340)
COMMENTARY. Shankarasinīmin says :-* Pleasure, etc. cannot be of the nature of Cognition, hecause they are never spoken of as Cognition ;-just like the Jar, etc." -(1340)
The objection to this view is as follows:
TEXT (1341). IF DIFFERENCE IS TO BE ACCEPTED ON THE BASIS OF CONVENTION, THEN COGNITION ITSELF MAY NOT BE SPOKEN OF ASCOGNITION '; -AND ON THE BASIS OF THAT, COGNITION WOULD BECOME
NON-COGNITION.-(1341)
COMMENTARY If difference of nature were based upon Convention (i.e. the use of words, which is purely a matter of Convention).-then, there may be some one who might set up the Convention that the Cognition should be spoken of as 'non-cognition', and in accordance with this Convention, Cognition would become Not-cognition, for you -(1341)
TEXT (1342) IP IT BE URGED THAT-" BEING CLEARLY OF THE NATURE OF LIGHT, IT COULD NEVER BE AS ALLEGED "-THEN, YOU ARE FACED WITH THIS CONTING ENOY-IS NOT ALL THIS THE SAME IN THE
CASE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN ALSO 1-(1342)
COMMENTARY.
If the view is that—"Cognition, being of the nature of Light, can never be non-cognition ",—then the answer is that all this is equally there in the case of Pleasure and Pain also.
The Reason also is false, Inconclusive, so this is nothing.-(1342)

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668
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
TEXT (1343).
AS REGARDS THE MYSTIC'S COGNITION, WE ARE GOING TO DESCRIBE IT, ON THE BASIS OF SPOTLESS REASONS, AS ARISING OUT OF THE CONTEMPLATION OF THINGS AND BEING FREE FROM
CONCEPTUAL CONTENT AND ERROR.-(1343)
COMMENTARY We are going to describe, under the chapter on The Omniscient Being.–(1343)
The Author next proceeds to set aside the diversity of opinion regarding the 'Frut' (ultimate effect) of 'Sense-perception as a means of Cognition :
TEXT (1344).
The cognition of the object IS HELD TO BE THE FRUIT OF THE MEANS OT COGNITION,—WHEN TRE MEANS OF COGNITION CONSISTS IN THE SAMENESS OF FORM' (BETWEEN THE COGNITION AND THE COGNISND); -OR Apprehension of itself IS THE FRUIT, AND THE MEANS, IN THIS CASE, CONSISTS IN CAPABI
LITY '-(1344)
COMMENTARY.
(a) When the external object is what is cognised, then the cognition of that object is the Fruit, and Sameness of form the Means, of the Cognition ; as even in the case of the self-cognition, the Cognition is of the same form as what is cognised. (b) When what is cognised is of the nature of Cognition, then the apprehension of itself' is the fruit, and capability the Means, of the Cognition. The said capability belongs to the Cognition only which carries with it the cognisability of its own function; by virtue of which capability, it is cognition alone and not the Jar and such things, that apprehends itself ;-hence it is by the instrumentality of this capability that Cognition is found to be self-manifested; hence Capability is said to be the 'Mears, the Instrument, of the Cognition of the Cognition itself. This has been thus declared–The Cognitions of Cognitions themselves, being neither the one nor the other, are capable of such self-apprehension; hence their capability is the Instrument (Means) and they themselves are the cognised, and their own apprehension is the fruit':-(1344)
In the following the Author sets forth the objection urged by Kumāriia

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION".
669
TEXT (1345).
JUST AS, WHEN THE CUTTING WEAPON STRIKES AT THE Ichadira-TREE, THE RESULTANT Cut DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE Palasha-TRED, IN THE SAME WAY NOWHERE IN THE WORLD IS THE (CUTTING) AXE FOUND TO BD THE SAME AS THE Cut ITSHLT" (ShlokarirtikaSENSB-PERCEPTION, 75).
(1345)
COMMENTARY.
The Bauddha has addressed the following argument to the person who asserted that the Means of Cognition was different from its Fruit :-If there is difference between the Means of Cognition and its Fruit, then the objective of these two-the Means of Cognition and the Fruit of Cognition also must be different; and yet this cannot be right; when, for instance, the cutting weapon, the Axe, is struck at the Khadira-tree, the Cut does not appear in the Palasha-tree; hence it must be admitted that the objective of both is the same and hence there is no difference between them.
It is in answer to this that Kumarila says "If one who desires the objective to be the same should declare the Means of Cognition to be the same as its Fruit, then he would be setting aside the well-known distinction between Cause and Effect; just as, when the cutting weapon strikes at the Khadira-tree, the Ort does not appear in the Palāsha-tree, so also no. where in the world is the Axe found to be the same as the Cut itself" (Shlokertvirtika-Sense-perception, 74-75).
The word 'Ohhedana', Cutting weapon, stands for that by which something is cut-(1345)
The following Text supplies the answer to this argument of Kumirila's :
TEXT (1346).
THE DISTINCTION OF 'CAUSE AND EFFECT' DOES NOT REST UPON THE SUBSTRATUM OF THAT DISTINCTION; COGNITION BRING FORMLESS,
TEE SAID DISTINCTION CANNOT BE POSSIBLE.—(1346)
COMMENTARY.
The apprehension of Blue is not the apprehension of Yellow, this distinction in the cognition of things is based upon the sameness of form, nothing elke ; so that the distinction of Cause and Effect is made through the relation of what is distinguished and what distinguishes, not through the relation of the Produced and Producer; because the relation of the Acting Agent, the Instrument and the rest is not real; because all things being momentary, they cannot bave any action. When the Cognition is produced in the form

Page #665

670
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
of the Object, it appears to be characterising the object and hence active. Herein lies the action of the Cognition in presenting the object--not in mere invariable concomitance. For instance, the sprout does not cense to be invariably concomitant with the seed. This the Cognition itself cannot be the Means of Cognition. It is for this reason that the nature of the Means of Cognition is stated through the distinction that it is the Cognition with a form, not the formless Cognition-which is the Means of Cognition. This distinction too should be understood to be made through the Conception that follows in the wake of the Cognition.-(1346)
The following Text shows that the Buddhist view is not nullified by common experience :
TEXT (1347).
THUS THEN, THE COMMONLY KNOWN) DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE COGNITION AS Meana AND COGNITION AS Fruit) IS PURELY IMAGINARY,-AS IN THE CASE OF THE Bow. THE DISTINCTION CANNOT BE HELD TO BE BASED UPON THE RELATION OF THE Producer
and Produced.—(1347)
COMMENTARY.
In connection with the Bow, there are such notions as-(a) The Bow pierces', (b) 'He pierces with the Bow', (c) 'the arrow proceeding from the Bow, pierces, where the same Bow is spoken of as (a) 'Agent, (6) Instrument, and (c) 'Ablative and this distinction is only imaginary (not real) ;' and yet it is not incongruous; so it is in the case in question also.-(1347)
TEXT (1348)
WHEN THE COMPACT FIBRE OF THE WOOD IS RENT ASUNDER BY THE CUT OF THE AXE, THE AXE IS (POPULARLY) CALLED THE CUT' ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO THE FIBRE ; AND IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT THERE IS sameness (BETWEEN
THE AXE AND THE CUT).-(1348)
COMMENTARY.
When the cutting of the Trees with the Axe comes to be examined, it is found that the cut consists in the entering of the Axe into the wood. fibre; and this entrance is a property belonging to the Axe itself; so that in this sense there is sameness between the Axe and the Out; and there is no incongruity in this.-(1348)
The same idea is further elucidated :

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EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION ON "SUNSE-PERCEPTION".
671
TEXT (1349).
WHEN ONCE THE DISTINCTION HAS BEEN MADE, IT MAY BE ASSUMED TO BE OTHERWISE ALSO IT IS ONLY THE FORM OF THE DISTINCTION THAT IS SPOKEN OF IN THE FORM
OF THE Producer and Produced.—(1349)
COMMENTARY.
Kumärila has in his Shlokavārtika (Sense-perception, 78), in the words The Cognition can be the Means as bringing about the apprehension, etc. etc.-based the distinction between the Means and Fruit on the relation of Producer and Produced. And in this there is nothing incompatible with our view. As our Teacher has declared as follows:- The attributing of the name Pratyaksa to the Eye and other causes is not incompatible':-All that we say is as follows:-It is essential that in the beginning the relation of Catise and Effect can be based only upon the distinction previously made: iuntil the difference in the Cognitions has been distinctly recognised, nothing can proceed on the basis of the difference in abjectives ; and for the recogni. tion of the difference among Cognitions there can be no basis other than the sameness of form; and from this it follows by implication that the sameness of form is the most efficient instrument, and it is on the basis of this sameness of form that the Cognition proceeds to prompt people to activity, and the fact of the prompter being the Means of Right Cognition can be determined only by one who is seeking to engage in the activity concerned ; and not merely as a whim. It has been thus declared-Every wise person seeks to determine what is the proper means of cognition and what is not so, only for the purpose of some fruitful activity. It is for this reason that that factor alone in the Cognition has to be brought out by which it serves to prompt men to activity. But in drawing the distinction between the Means of Cognition and its fruit on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced, there is no recognition of that sameness of form which is the only prompting factor; consequently the said distinction between the Means of Cognition and ita fruit on the said basis would be absolutely useless. This is the reason why the Teacher had recourse to a figurative indirect) interpretation, as he felt that the determining of the character of the Means of Cognition on the said basis cannot take any part in the prompting to activity,
Thus when the distinction has once been made, it may subsequently be explained on the basis of the relation of Producer and Produced and there would be nothing objectionable in that only the initial distinction has to be made first, and hence it cannot be due to that relation)-(1349)
The following Texts sets forth the character of the Fruit as proposed by Kumarila:

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672
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
TEXTS (1350-1351).
*THE FRUIT' CONSISTING IN THE APPREHENSION OF THE OBJECT, THE
CHARACTER OF THE MEANS OF COGNITION MUST BELONG TO WHAT GOES IMMEDIATELY BEFORE IT. HENCE IF THE COGNITION BE HELD TO BE THE MEANS', THEN THE FRUIT' MUST BE SOMETHING ELSE.—IT CANNOT BE RIGHT TO ATTRIBUTE THE CHARACTER OF THE
FRUIT TO THE SELF-RECOGNITION (BY THE COGNITION), AS THIS IS GOING TO BE REFUTED LATER ON, NOR CAN IT BE RIGHT TO ASSERT THAT THE MEANS' CONSISTS IN THE FORM OF THE OBJECT (COG. NISED); AS IN THAT CASE THERE WOULD BH A DIVERSITY OF OBJECTIVES" (Shlokavártika-SENSE-PERCEPTION, 78-79).-(1350-1351)
COMMENTARY
What goes, etc. etc.-.e. the Eye and the other sense organs.
The Fruit must be something else' ;- in the form of rejecting or acquiring or ignoriny the thing cognised this also has been declared by Kumarila himself.
As regarde self-recognition' (by the Cognition), that has been refuted ; hence that cannot be regarded as the 'Fruit of Right Cognition.
If the form of the object be held to be the Means of Cognition, then the objectives of the Means and the Fruit would be different ; for instance, the form of the object would be something external (objective), while the self-recogni, tion of the Cognition would have the form of the Cognition itself (which is purely subjective).-(1350-1351)
The above argument is answered in the following
TEXT (1352).
"SELE-RECOGNITION CANNOT BE DENIED; AS THAT WOULD INVOLVE THE
INCONGRUITY OF THERE BEING NO COGNITION AT ALL.-Nor CAN THE OBJECTIVES BE DIFFERENT; AS SELF-RECOGNITION ASLO IS HELD TO BE THE COGNITION OF THE
OBJEOT.—(1352)
COMMENTARY In accordance with the maxim-He who has no apprehension of Senseperception can have no perception of anything '--there would be incongruity of there being no perception of anything, if the cognition of the cognition itself were denied; hence this self-recognition cannot be denied.
Nor can it be right to hold that the two cognitions have two different objectives ; because 'self-recognition also is held to be the cognition of the object, because it is the effect of that, not because it consists entirely of that;

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as it has been explained that the self-recognition has the same form. Hence there is no incongruity at all.(1352)
-
Shankarasvumin urges the following argument :
TEXT (1353).
"As A MATTER OF FACT, THE MEANS OF COGNITION MUST BRING ABOUT AN EFFECT OTHER THAN ITSELF, BECAUSE IT IS AN ACTIVE AGENT, LIKE THE HATCHET" ;-IF THIS IS URGED
[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS] (1353)
COMMENTARY.
* The Means of Cognition must be one that brings about an effect different from itself, because it is an active agent,-like the Hatchet, etc."-(1353)
The answer to the above is as follows:
TEXTS (1353-1355).
THE ARGUMENT IS FUTILE ; AS A DIFFERENT FRUIT HAS BEEN ADMITTED AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH REASONS ALREADY BXPLAINED (UNDER Tect 1348), THERE IS NO DIFFERENT FRUIT AT ALL.-As REGARDS THE MEANS OF COGNITION BEING AN ACTIVE AGENT',-THAT IS NOT ADMISSIBLE BY US. IF WEAT IS MEANT BY IT IS THAT IT IS productive; IF WHAT TS MEANT IS THAT IT IS THE Regulator, THEN THERE CAN BE NO OBJEOTION TO IT; AND IN THAT CASE THE REASON BECOMES INCONCLUSIVE, AS IT INDICATES NO INCON
GRUITY.-(1353-1355)
COMMENTARY. utile' because it seeks to prove what is already proved ; inasmuch as different 'fruit' or 'effect' has been already admitted in the form of
characterisation (specification).-The particle "hi' connotes reason for what is said).
The corroborative instance cited like the Hatcher', is one that is devoid of the Probandum': because it has been already shown that the Hatchet is the same as the Cut (vide Teat, 1348).
The premiss- because it is an active agent-is inadmissible' if what is meant is that it is productive of its effect ; if it is meant that it is the Regulator, -then that is accepted by us.
43

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
But even if it is meant that it is the Regulator, the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity (indicated).
If activity' in general be what is meant, then also the Reason is Inconclusive, as there is no incongruity indicated.--(1353-1355)
Objection :-"If the Cognition were of the form of the Object, then the sameness of the object might constitute the character of the 'Means of Cognitiou; as a matter of fact, however, the Cognition that is brought about is only of a form similar to that of the Object, and of the same character hence it cannot be as suggested : just as the Colour and Taste of a thing belong to a category quite different".
This is what is anticipated and answered in the following
TEXTS (1356-1357),
IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—"THE COGNITION CANNOT HAVE THE SAME
TORM AS THE OBJECT APPREHENDED, BECAUSE IT BELONGS TO A DIFFERENT CATEGORY,-LIKE THE COGNITION OF COLOUR, TASTE, ETC.", -[THEN THE ANSWER IS AS FOLLOWS] IN DUE ACCORDANCE WITH OUR DOCTRINE WE HAVE CLEARLY EXPLAINED THIS AND ALSO OTHER THINGS IN COURSE OF OUR REJECTION OF THE IDEA OF A real OBJECT BEING
APPREHENDED.-(1356-1357)
COMMENTARY.
We who are followers of the doctrine of Idealism readily accept what has been urged; it does not affect our position at all. In fact, the objection that you have urged against the object apprehended has been only indistinctly (vaguely) stated; while this is exactly that we have stated qnite clearly, while examining--.e. rejecting-the idea--conviction—that there is something real that is apprehended.-(1356-1357)
What is that clear statement in proof of your doctrine ?
Question :- Answer -
TEXT (1358).
IF THERE WERE ABSOLUTE sameness of form, TREN Cognition WOULD BECOME Non-cognition; AS FOR PARTIAL sameness of form, THAT WOULD MAKE EVERY COGNITION APPREHENSIVE
OF EVERYTHING.-(1358)
COMMENTARY,
Absolute sameness of form' would consist in the fact of the Cognition being excluded' from exactly those homogeneous things from which the

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cognised object is excluded'; -while partial sameness' would consist in exclusion from only a few of thoso.-(1358)
Question: "If that is so, then, why has the validity of the Cognition been said to consist in its being of the same form as the Object?"
Answer:
TEXTS (1359-1361).
BUT UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF THE REALITY OF THE EXTERNAL WORLD,
THE POSSIBILITY OF THE sameness of form HAS TO BE ACCEPTED; THAT IS WHY IT HAS BEEN MENTIONED.-UNDER THE DOCTRINE, HOWEVER, OF COGNITION BEING A MERE REFLECTED IMAGE, EVEN IF THE Cognition DIFFERS FROM THE cognised OBJEOT, THE sameness of form BELONGS TO THE REFLECTION; AND THE COGNITION CAN BE ONLY FIGURATIVE,-LASTLY, FOR ONE WHO DOES NOT ADMIT THE COGNITION TO BE THE RECEPTACLE OF THE SEMBLANCE OF THE OBJECT, -THERE IS NOT EVEN THE SAID METHOD POSSIBLE FOR THE COGNISING OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT.-(1359-1361)
COMMENTARY. It has, etc.'.-'It stands for the possibility of the sameness of form', or the 'form itself.
Nirbhäsi', Reflected Image':- Nirbhasa ', . Reflection', is sameness of form with the object; and that which has this sameness of form, is the Reflected Image!.
From the cognised object', - i.e. from the external object.
Belongs to the Reflection,-i.e. to the Reflection in the form of the Cognition.
Sameness of form '; -with the object. * Figurative ', - Indirect, Secondary. Cognition '-.e of the object.
Receptacle'-substratun.
As regards the divergence of opinion regarding the object of Cognition, the Universal as a real entity has been already rejected; hence for Perception which has been regarded as having an entity for its object, there can be no other object except the Specific Individuality, and this having been already pointed out as being got at by implication, no special effort has been made for setting aside the said divergence of opinion.
Some people have argued as follows (against the Buddhist's definition of Sense-perception) S" The definition suggested is not a proper one ; the definition put forward is that of the Means of Cognition, with the view that other people may, through that definition, come to understand what the Means of Cognition is, and then regulate their action accordingly; and it is not

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
put forward only for satisfying & whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is free from Conceptual Content and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it."
This is not right. The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one's wish; by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out. For example, one points out 'rough. ness as a characteristic of the Earth. If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an 'impossible' one.
As regards Sense-perception, there is nothing else to indicate its character, except 'freedom from Conceptual Content and freedom from errorFor instance, it must be free from error, because it is a valid means of Cognition, and it must be free from Conceptual Content, because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from association with words. -It is for this reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason.
Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons. For instance, in connection with such cognitions as a) the Idea of the Jar, the action of Throwing up, the Universal, the Number and so forth, (b) the idea of Recogni. tion, and (c) the idea of the yellow conch-shell ', -some persons have been led to regard all these as 'Sense-perception', in accordance with the definition provided by other parties, and then they find that all these are either Conceptual or Erroneous, and then,-in accordance with the definition provided by us, they conclude that these cannot be Sense-perception'; thereupon they desist from (give up) the notion that Number and the rest are real entities and they also conclude that what is an entity is only that Specific Individuality of the Blue' for instance, which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.-How even the non-conceptual Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before.
Says the Opponent :-" If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition-free from Conceptual Content', and 'free from error' need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition ; and no unknown thing: as the latter is as good as non-existent. And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding "freedom from error cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken ; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect; because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects; it has been shown above that truthful.

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677
ness' -.e. conformity with the real state of things of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised. So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose ; as after that, there is no further activity."
AnswerThere is no force in this objection. It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification free from error, in order to save the definition from the defect of being too wide' by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the 'Hairtuft', etc. being regarded as valid cognition.-As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition, this also is Inconclusive. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything; which would mean that they are unconscious beings; because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that this thing brings pleasure', 'that other brings pain, and are found to act accordingly, even before their present activity, and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother's breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth, even without remembering any points of similarity, etc.- it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition. In a case where there is no repetition, there alone,-not everywhere-is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects.
This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like Smoke ; as here also, the effect, in the shape of Smoke, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference.
Says the Opponent :-"The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place; it has to be explained how that first activity comes about ".
Answer: That activity proceeds from the doubtful cognition.
Question: "How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity!"
Answer:-How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty ?
"It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity."
This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt.
Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted; nor does it lead to desisting from activity ; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man. Otherwise,

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TATTVASACRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
from Perception leading to Doubt, no one could act or desist from acting. But this does not so happen ; on the contrary, it so happens that that activity is all the more powerful which proceeds on the part of persons who -do not apprehend any evil consequences from the activity in question. So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no difference between the Perception leading to Doubt and that leading to Certainty. It is only where the Perception brings about a cognition entirely contrary to the thing cognised,
or where it brings about no cognition at all, that there is no activity on the part of the man seeking for something; and hence it is only this Perception that is invalid, -not any other.-(1359-1361)
End of the Chapter on Sense-perception.

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CHAPTER XVIII.
Inference.
COMMENTARY The Author proceeds to state the definition of Inference -
TEXTS (1362-1363). INFERENCE IS HELD TO BE OF TWO KINDS, AS DIVIDED INTO-(1) For one's own benefit, AND (2) for the benefit of others. (1) INFRRENCE
FOR ONE'S OWN BENEFIT' CONSISTS IN THE COGNITION OF THE INFERRED OBJECT DERIVED FROM THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS; AND (2) INFERENCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF OTHERS' CONSISTS IN THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS. THAT PROBANS WHICH HAS ONLY one or two FHATURES (OUT OF THE NECESSARY THREE) IS REGARDED AS A SEMBLANCE OF THE PROBANS'.
(1362-1363)
COMMENTARY.
Inference is of two kinds-as divided into "for one's own benefit' and for the benefit of others ':-The former should be understood to be that Oognition of the inferred object which is derived from the three-featured Probans', -the Indicative that fulfils the three conditions of (1) being present in the Subject, (2) being present in that wherein the Probandum is known to be present', and (3) being entirely absent where the Probandum is known to be absent' -The Inference for the sake of others should be understood to consist in the verbal expression of the said three-featured Probans.
Question :-"Why has not the definition of the Wrong Inference been provided ?"
Answer - That Probans which, etc. etc. Sound is eternal, (a) because it is a product, and (6) because it is corporeal, and (c) because it is noncognisable', in this Inference only one of the three features' is present in each ; e.g. in (a) the character of being a Product fulfils the single condition, of being present in the subject (Sound) (while it does not fulfil the condition of being present where the Probandum is lenown to be present, as the Probandum, Eternality, is known to be present in Äkäsha, Soul, etc., which are not Products: nor does it fulfil the condition of being absent where the Probandum

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
is absent, as the Probandum, Eternality, is absent in the Jar, where the character of being a Product is not absent]:-(b) the character of being corporeal, fulfils only the second condition, of being present where the Probandum is known to be present and does not fulfil the first condition of being present in the subject (Sound), because Sound is not corporeal; nor does it fulfil the third condition of being absent where the Probandum is absent. as it is not absent in the Jar (which is corporeal) where the Probandum (Eternality) is known to be absent; and (c) the character of being noncognisable fulfils only the third condition, of being absent where the Proban. dum (Eternality) is known to be absent (e.g. in the Soul, etc. which are cognisable) [and it does not fulfil the other two conditions, as it is not present in the Subject, Sound, which is cognisable ; nor is it present where the Probandum is known to be present, e.g. the Soul, etc. which are cognisable). ---Those fulfilling only two of the three conditions are the Probans in the following argument-Sound is non-eternal, (a) because it is visible, (6) because it is audible, and (c) because it is incorporeal';where respectively only the following conditions are not fulfilled—a) Because it is visible does not fulfil only the condition of being present in the subject; (b) 'Because it is audible' does not fulfil the only condition of being present where the Probandum is known to be present; and (c) 'Because it is incorporeal' does not fulfil the only condition of being absent where the Probandum is known to be absent. This has been thus expressed. Sound is eternal, because it is a product, because it is corporeal and because it is non-cognisable ;and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible - (1362.1363)
In the following Text, the Author sets forth the objection urged by Patrasänvin
TEXT (1364).
"THE CHARACTER OF THE VALID PROBANS IS FOUND IN WHAT IS IM POSSIBLE OTHERWISE ', -AND NOT WHEN THIS CONDITION IS NOT FULFILLED, EVEN WHEN THE THRES FEATURES' ARE PRESENT. HENCE THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS ARE IMPOTENT (INFRUC
TUOUS),"-(1364)
COMMENTARY.
Pätrasvāmin argues as follows "The Probans is valid only when it is found to be otherwise impossible'; and not when it has the 'three features'. Because it is found that even when the Probans has the said three features, it is not valid, when it does not fulfil the condition that it is otherwise impossible'; e.g, in the case where the Probans is cited in

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소
INFERENCE.
681
"
the form 'Because he is the Son of so and so [therefore he must be dark]'. Consequently the three-featured' Probans are infructuous, inefficient".
In the term otherwise impossible", the term otherwise' stands for without the Probandum; that is to say, the valid Probans is that which exists in the Probandum only.-(1364)
In the following Texts, Patrasvamin justifies the view that the true Probans is that which has the one characteristic of being otherwise impossible', by showing in detail that there is positive as well as negative concomitance (between the definition and the thing defined) :
TEXT (1365).
+
"THAT WHICH IS OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE IS HELD TO BE THE PROBANS, WHILE THIS IS ONLY "ONE-FEATURED; IT MAY OR MAY NOT BE REGARDED AS FOUR-FEATURED"." (1365)
4
COMMENTARY.
One-featured-That which has only one characteristic, that of being otherwise impossible'; that alone-none other,-is regarded as Probans", by ordinary men as well as by investigators. Through Presumption this same character implies the three features of Being present in the Subject' and so forth; and hence it may be regarded as 'four-featured';-or it may not be so regarded, because in several cases, the Probans is found to be valid even when it has only one or two or three features.
Inasmuch as being otherwise impossible is its one characteristic feature, it is called one-featured-Along with being otherwise impos. sible', if it is found to exist in like things and not to exist in unlike things, then, it becomes two-featured'; and when along with being otherwise impossible', it is also existent in like things and also to be absent where the Probandum is known to be absent, then it is three-featured'; and it is not called three-featured on account of the presence of the three features of presence in the Subject' and the rest (mentioned in the Buddhist's definition); because a Probans of this latter kind cannot bring about a valid cognition. (1365)
4
"Or, the Probans is spoken of as one-featured in view of the one character of being otherwise impossible', because this is its principal characteristic; and it is not spoken of in terms of the other features of 'presence in the Subject and the rest, because these latter are secondary, or because
they do not serve any useful purpose."-This is what is shown in the following

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
TEXT (1366).
"JUST AS AMONG PEOPLE, THE MAN WHO HAS three SONS IS SPOKEN OF AS HAVING ONE SON, ON ACCOUNT OF THE ONE SON BEING Å GOOD SON -S0 IT SHOULD BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE
PRESENT INSTANCE ALSO."-(1366)
COMMENTARY Says the other party On account of the relation of Invariable Con. comitance, the character of the Probans should be rightly attributed to the *three-featured' Reason only.
The answer to this (from Patrusvämin) is as follows:
TEXT (1367).
"As A MATTER OF FACT, THE RELATION OF INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE IS NOT PRESENT IN THE THREE-FEATURED' REASONS; IT IS REALLY FOUND ONLY IN THOSE REASONS WHICH HAVE THE ONE CHARAOTERISTIC FEATURE OF BEING
OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE'."-(1367)
COMMENTARY.
The compound anyathasambhava, etc.' is to be expounded as those Reasons in whom there is the single character of being otherwise impossible! -(1367)
The same idea is re-affirmed in the following
TEXTS (1368-1369).
*THAT ALONE IS THE TRUE PROBANS WHICH HAS THE CHARACTE
BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE'; AS FOR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCES, THEY MAY BE THERE, OR THEY MAY NOT; AS THEY ARE NOT THE MEANS. IF THE CHARACTER OF BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE ' IS NOL THERE, WHAT IS THE USE OF THE THREE FEATURES AND IT THE CHARACTER OF BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE' IS THERE, WHAT IS THE USE OF THE THREE
FEATURES "-(1368-1369)
COMMENTARY.
* Corroborative Instances ', - in the form similarity and dissimilarity,
They are not the Means-of proving the Probandum.

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683
It would be better to read the second line of 1369 before the first line(1368-1369).
The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no Invariable Concomitance in the three-featured Probens :
TEXT (1370).
"THE REASONING IN THE FORM—HE MUST BE DARK, BECAUSE HE IS
THE SON OP SO AND SO,-LIKE OTHER SONS OF HIS WHO ARE FOUND TO BE DARK', -CONTAINS THE THREE FEATURED PROBANS, AND YET IT CANNOT LEAD TO ANY VALID
DEFINITE CONCLUSION."-(1370)
COMMENTARY In the following Texts, it is shown, by a number of examples, that it is only the one-featured Probans that has the requisite capacity (of leading to a valid conclusion) :
TEXT (1371). * AN EXAMPLE OF THE One-featured PROBANS WITHOUT CORROBORATIVE INSTANCES, WE HAVE IN THE REASONING- POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ENTITIES ARE ESSENTIALLY existentBECAUSE THEY ARE CAPABLE OF BEING APPRE
HENDED SOMEROW?."-(1371)
COMMENTARY.
The Reasoning is in the form 'Positive and Negative entities are some. how existent, because they are apprehensible somehow '.-In this case there are no external corroborative Instances, either of similarity or dissimilarity, either in the form of a statement or in the form of actual things; because all things have been included under the Subject (Minor Term) 'Positive and Negative entities'; and there is nothing apart from these. As regards the character of being present in the Minor Term ', this is otherwise impossible, and is nothing apart from this latter ; hence the Probans here is onefeatured'
Somehow ', -under some such term as Cognisable or its synonyms.
Are essentially existent', -*somehow' has to be construed with this also.--Hence the full Reasoning is— Because they are somehow apprehensible, therefore they are somehow existent',-(1371)
In the following Texts, examples of the 'two-featured cited:
Probans are

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TATTYASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVIII.
TEXTS (1372-1379). " (1) "The Shasha-lañchhana (HARE-MARKBD) IS NOT Non-Moon,
BECAUSE IT IS SPOKEN OF AS THE Moon'; - HERE WE HAVE A
TWO-FEATURED PROBANS.—(2) ANOTHER IS THUS STATED :-'I THINK THAT THIS PAIN OF MINE HAS BEEN CAUSED BY THE FALLING INSECT, BECAUSE ITS APPEARANCH WAS FELT ON THE TOUCH OF THE FALLING INSECT '-(3) 'IN BRINGING ABOUT THE EFFECT IN THE SHAPE OF THE PERCEPTION OF COLOUR, THE EYE IS ENDOWED WITH A UNIQUE POTENCY, BECAUSE IT IS USED FOR THAT PURPOSE, OR, BECAUSE COLOUR IS FOUND TO BE ACTUALLY PERCEIVED BY ITS MEANS (4) THE SOUL, THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE SOMEHOW ESSENTIALLY non-excistent, -BECAUSE THEY ARE SOMEHOW INAPPREHENSIBLE IN ANY WAY, LIKE THE HORNS OF THE HARE'.-(5) EVEN THE HARE'S HORN AND SUCH THINGS ARE SOMEHOW EXISTENT, -BECAUSE THEY ARE SOMEHOW APPREHENSIBLE, JUST LIKE TEH SOUL, THE JAR AND SUCH THINGS'. -(6) 'IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT YOUR FATHER IS IN THIS HOUSE, BECAUSE YOUR FATHER'S VOICE IS HEARD IN THE HOUSE':-(7) IN THE CASE OF WORDS, LAMPS AND SUCH THINGS, IT IS FOUND THAT THEY ARE ACTUALLY INDICATIVE OF THINGS) THROUGH THE CHARACTER OT BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE', EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT RESIDE IN THE SUBJECT (MINOR TERM) -HANCE FOR US, IT IS THE ONE-TEATURED PROBANS THAT SHOULD BE REGARDED AS THW INDICATIVE (PROBANS), -ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING THE MOST IMPORTANT; WHAT IS THE USH OF ASSUMING SUCH CHARACTERS AS 'RESIDING IN THE SUBJECT AND SO FORTH?"-(1372-1379)
COMMENTARY
The proposition may be stated either in the form . The Hare-marked is not Non-Moon', or The Hare marked is the Moon'; and the Probans is because it is spoken of by the well-known popular name Moon' or because it is spoken of as the Moon' the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity being supplied by the ciod of earth and such things.
(2) Another Probans is next mentioned, which is "two-featured': This pain of mine has been caused by the falling insect, -because its appear. ance was felt on the touch of the falling insect' i.e. the 'udaya', appearance, of which was pratilabdha, felt, on the aparsha', touch, of the falling insect.-The feminine affix 'tap' is not added at the end of the compound, because it is intended to be a common factor.
(3) (Another example The Eye has the potency of the most effective instrument in bringing about the apprehension of the Colour existing at the present time,-because, while it is not damaged, it is that which is used as the Instrument, by a man who desires to see Colour and acts intelligently -or-' because it is actually found to bring about the cognition of Colour';

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INFERENCE.
685
the Ear, etc. being the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.- Tasya' of the Colour.
In all these three Reasons, there being no Corroborative Instances per Similarity, they have only two features.
(4) [Another example)-The Soul, the Jar and other things are somehow essentially non-existent, because they are somehow not-apprehended,like the Hare's Horn '.-In this case, there is no Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity; as the Jar and other things' inchide the entire group of Positive Entities and they have been mentioned in the Proposition as essentially non-existent; and the negative entity has been put forward as the Instance; and apart from the 'Positive and the Negative, there is no third category, wherein it could be pointed out that the exclusion of the Probandum implies the exclusion of the Probans.
(5) [Another example) Things like the Hare's Horn are somehow essentially existent, as they are somehow apprehensible; the absence of the Instance per dissimilarity here also may be explained as above.
(6) [Another example) - This house is understood as having your father within-because your Father's voice is heard'.—Here also there is no Instance per Similarity; hence the Probans is only 'two-featured'.
(1) In the case of Words, Lamps and such things, it is found that, even though they do not subsist in the Subject (Minor Term), yet they indicate (make known) things, in the same way as the Inferential Probans in the shape of Smoke, eta. Words and Lamps are not properties subsisting in the Jar and such things indicated by them; and yet the Thing is actually apprehended through them; hence in this case the two conditions are present that of 'absence where the Probandum is known to be absent, and being otherwise impossible'; hence the Probans here is a two-featured one. (1872-1379)
The following Text supplies the answer to the above arguments of Patrastiimin -
TEXT (1380)
IS THE PROPOSED DEFINITION MEANT TO BE GENERAL! OR, IN REFEBENCE TO A particular SUBJECT ON WHICH KNOWLEDGE IS SOUGHT?
OR IN REFERENCE TO THE Instance !-(1380)
COMMENTARY.
The proposed definition of the Probans is that it is otherwise impossible', which means that) it should not exist apart from the Probandum ;
(1) now is this meant to be general (applicable to all Probans)? Or is it meant to be applicable to any particular object ? and in the latter case, (2) is it meant to be in reference to a particular object in which the existence or otherwise of the Probandum is sought to be known? Or (3) in reference

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to that object which forms the Corroborative Instance. These are the alternatives possible.-(1380)
The following Text points out objection against the first alternative :
TEXT (1381).
IF IT WERE UNDERSTOOD TO BE general, THEN, WHAT WOULD BE INDICATED WOULD BE TUB EXISTENCE OF THE PROBANS IN THE OBJECT WHERE THE PROBANDUM IS PRESENT ; AND IT WOULD NOT ACCOMPLISH WHAT IS SOUGHT TO BE
ACCOMPLISHED.-(1381)
COMMENTARY
The mere fact of its not existing apart from the Probandum, -withont the other fact of its existing wherever the Probandum is known to exist, does not make visibility -[which does not exist apart from the Probandum, Non-eternality; but is not present in all cases where Non-eternality is present]
does not prove the Non-eternality of Sound.--Hence the first alternative cannot be right.
It would not accomplish, etc. etc. that is, it could not establish the desired conclusion regarding the presence of the Probandum in the object. -(1381)
Question :-" Why so ?" Answer:
TEXTS (1382-1383).
FOR INSTANCE, VISIBILITY IS KNOWN TO BE INSEPARABLE (NOT EXISTING APART) FROM DESTRUCTION', IN A GENERAL WAY; AND YET IT (VISIBILITY) CANNOT PROVE IT (DESTRUCTION) IN SOUND.IF, THEN, IT BE SAID THAT ITS PRESENCE IN THE OBJECT IS MEANT,—THEN, IN THAT CASE, UNDER YOUR VIEW ALSO, THE PROBANS BECOMES 'THREE
FEATURED' AS BEFORE.-(1382-1383)
COMMENTARY. Tat -Visibility. Tasya'-of Destruction, Cannot prove it'-cannot indicate its presence,

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INFERENCE.
687
It might be said that-"in order to guard against the said objection, recourse may be had to the qualification that the Probans should be actually present in the object ".-In that case, under your view also, the Probans comes to have the same three-featured character that it had under ours.(1382-1383)
Question : -"How so?” Answer:
TEXT (1384).
BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE' INCLUDES POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE ; AND BY ITS presence in the object ITS PRESENCE
IN THE MINOR TERM BECOMES ADMITTED.-(1384)
COMMENTARY.
Positive Concomitance is presence wherever the Probandum is known to be present.
* Negative Concomitance -is absence where the Probandum is Inown to be absent.
Samshraya '-is admission, i.e. acceptance.-(1384)
The following Tears shows that there is no incompatibility with the opinion of our Great Teacher:
TEXT (1385).
A SIMILAR ABBREVIATED DEFINITION HAS BEEN IN DIOATED BY OUR TEACHER ALSO : WHO SAYS THAT THE PROBANS EXISTS IN THE COGNISABLE OBJECT AND IS PERVADED BY A PART
OF IT':-(1385)
COMMENTARY.
Grünyadharmah', - i.e. existing in the cognisable object,-i.e. the object in which the Probandum is sought to be proved ; i.e. in the Minor Term. (1385)
The following Texts point out the objections against the second alterna. tive noted above (under Text 1380) :

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVILI.
TEXTS (1386-1388).
IF THE PROPOSED DEFINITION OF THE PROBANS IS MEANT TO BE ONE
THAT IS FOUND IN THE MINOR TERM ONLY,-TREN THAT SAME MEANS OF COGNITION WHICH HAS MADE THE PROBANS KNOWX WOULD MARE KNOWN THE PROBANDUM ALSO. IF THE PROBANDUM DOES NOT BEOOME KNOWN, THEN THE PROBANS ALSO CANNOT BECOME KNOWN. THUS THE PROBANS WOULD BE USELESS, THE PROBANDUM HAVING BECONE KNOWN BY OTHER MEANS.THERE WOULD BE THE INCONGRUITY OF MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE' ALSO, IF THE DEFINITE COGNITION OF THE PROBANDUM FOLLOWED FROM THE PROBANS; AND BETWEEN THESE TWO, THE COGNITION OF ONE WOULD BE DEPENDENT UPON THE COGNITION OF THE OTHER.-(1386-1388)
COMMENTARY.
The Probans may be defined as being inseparable from the Probandum in the Minor Term only.--as asserted in the following words-" The character of the Probans is held by others to exist in the Instance and to be not seen apart from the Probandum ; in my opinion however, it is that which does not exist in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum; the followers of Shabara derive this knowledge from Presumption, and the followers of Bhikou, from Inference ; for us, Inference is something totally different, like Narasimha (having a dual character)".
[In this passage] – Dharmime-In the Minor term ;-ie. that in which the existence of the Probandum is sought to be proved Amună i.e. what is sought to be proved. That which is incapable of existing in the Minor Term apart from the Probandum ; this is meant to be the definition of Probans).
If such be the definition of the Probans, then that same Means of Cognition by which the Probans would be known as inseparable from the Probandum, as existent in the object where the Probandum is sought to be proved, that same Means of Cognition would have made known the Probandum also (as present in the Minor Term) ;- so that the Probans would be entirely useless.
If the Probandum is not known, then the Probans also is not known; because the Probans has been defined as what is present in the Minor Term inseparably from the Probandum; and this inseparability from the Probandum cannot be known if the Probandum is not known; so that the Probandum would remain unknown', because the cognition of inseparability depends upon the Cognition of both.
It might be urged that, "The Probans may be known by other means of cognition";then what is the use of the Probans, the Probandum having become known already?
Further, if the definite cognition of the Probandum were dependent upon the Probans, then there would be the incongruity of mutual interdependence.

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INFERENCE
689
Question: "How?"
Answer: If the definite Cognition, etc. etc. the cognition of the Probandum would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probans, -as therein alone lies the use of the Probans,--and the cognition of the Probans, which is characterised by inseparability from the Probandum, would be dependent upon the cognition of the Probandum ; thus there would be clear mutual inter-dependence'-(1386-1388)
The following Text-takes note of the third alternative set forth above (under Text 1380) :
TEXT (1389).
EVEN IF THE PROBANS WERE KNOWN AS EXISTENT IN THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE, THAT WOULD NOT BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF THE PROBANDUM IN THE MINOB TERM. BECAUSE IT'S INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE WILL NOT HAVE BEEN DEFINTTELY COGNISED ALL
OVER. - (1389)
COMMENTARY. In the Corroborative Instance',-1.e. in the object that serves as the Corroborative Instance, which object is different from that in which the Probandum is sought to be proved.
If it were known',-i.e. if the Probans were known.
What is meant is as follows: If the inseparability (concomitance) of the Probans is held to be in the object which forms the Corroborative Instance, and which is something different from the Minor Torm, in which the Probandum is sought to be proved, and not all over 'everywherealong with the Minor Term, then how could such a Probans bring about the cognition of the Probandum in the Minor Term ?
Why it could not bring it about is explained – Because its invariable concomitance, etc. etc.:-(1389)
With the following Text, the author proceeds to point out defects in the examples cited (by Patrasvamin, in Texts 1371 to 1378) :
TEXT (1390). AS REGARDS THE PROBANS THAT HAS BEEN PUT FORWARD (UNDER 1371). IN THE FORM BECAUSE IT IS APPRERENDED SOMEHOW, THE OBJECT OF THIS IS NOT OPEN TO UNCERTAINTY ;
HENCE IT IS USELESS.-1390)
COMMENTARY. As regards the Probans that has been put forward, in the form Because it is somehow apprehended', - this is absolutely futile : as its object is not open to doubt; that is, it asserts what is already known; and what is already

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690
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
known cannot be the objective of the Probans; it is only a doubtful matter that is dealt with by the Probans; because '& Reason is stated only in reference to what is doubtful'.- What too is known only in an isolated forma cannot be the substratum of the Probans; as the Probandum would be already known (under the definition propounded by Patrastūmin).-(1390)
It might be urged that,"here also what forms the object of the Probans is what is open to doubt".-The answer to that is as follows:
TEXT (1391).
THAT THE POSITIVE ENTITY IS ESSENTIALLY EXISTENT IS KNOWN TO ALL PERSONS ; THEN HOW IS IT SAID THAT IT IS KNOWN
somehow 1-(1391)
COMMENTARY. When all persons somehow know it for certain that the Positive Entity is existent, why do you state your Proposition in the form The Positive Entity is somehow existent -
Tadātmatvam'-being essentially existent.
The mention of the Positive Entity' is only by way of illustration; the Negatite Entity is also meant.
Somehow i.e. in the form of being cognisable, it is known for certain that all this is existent; hence the Probans is absolutely futile. (1391)
It might be argued that the said fact is not admitted by the Sankhya and others; hence it is sought to be proved
The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (1392-1393).
EVEN UNDER THE DOCTRINE THAT "ALL THINGS ARE ONE", -ON ACCOUNT OF THE DIVERSITY IN THE NATURE OF THE MODITIOATIONS, WHAT IS MANIFESTED IS ALWAYS IN SOME DEFINITELY CLEAR FORM. EVEN THOSE WHO REGARD ALL THINGS AS FEATURE
LESS (DEVOID OF CHARACTER), ALWAYS HAVE RECOURSE TO SUCH QUALIFYING TERMS AS 'TRULY' AND THE LIKE.-(1392-1393)
COMMENTARY. The doctrine of all things being one is the one that is held by the Sankhyas ; for those who take their stand upon this doctrine, what is mani. fested-apprehended-is always in some definite form.
Question "How so?"
Answer on account of, etc. etc. - nature of the Modifications, i.e. in the form of Modifications.

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INTERENCE.
691
The term 'adi' is meant to include the unmixed (Pure) Primordial Mattor, consisting of Pleasure, Pain, etc.' sud 'the Spirits au clistinguished from one another, and from Primordial Matter
Even those' -i.e. the Madhyamikas. Idealists. These also, in asserting the "featurelessness of all things, always add the qualifying term 'truly, and they do not assert them to be absolutely so; becanse they do admit of their being produced at least in the Ideation.
Truly '-.e. strictly logically,
The term 'adi' includes such qualifying terras as in reality and the like.
In fact it must be admitted by all men that the fact that a thing is somehow existent is quite certainly recognised.-(1392-1393)
TEXT (1394). OTHERWISE, IT CANNOT BE ADMITTED THAT IT IS SOMEHOW APPREHENDED -IF IT IS Uange THAT IS SOUGHT TO BE PROVED, THEN SOMETHING WELL KNOWN SHOULD FORM THE
CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE.-(1394)
COMMENTARY. Otherwise',-i.e. if what has been just said is not admitted, then-the Probans in the form because it is somehow apprehended' cannot be adınitted
Previous to this the defect pointed out in the statement of the other party was that it was futile; it is now pointed out that it is inadmissible.
If it is Usage that is meant to be proved, then the Corroborative Instance could be found in the case where the use had been made; and in this case, the Probans would become three-featured'. Otherwise, if there were no Corroborative Instance, the Usage also could not be known.-(1394)
The following Text points out the defect in the second Reasoning put forth (by Patrasvāmin, in Text 1372, where the two-featured' Probans is exemplified) :
TEXT (1395). AS REGARDS BEING SPOKEN OF AS THE MOON', THIS IS PRESENT ALSO IN THINGS WHERE THE PROBANDUM IS KNOWN TO BE PRESENT
OR IT IS ALSO SOMETIMES PRESENT IN THE Man (WHO IS SPOKEN OF AS THE MOON), OR IN Camphor, Silver AND SUCH OTHER THINGS (WHICH ARE
ALSO CALLED MOON").-(1395)
COMMENTARY i.e. in Man.-(1395)
Mänavaka
Objection :-"If a three-featured Probans is possible, for the proving of the Moon', then how is it that your Teacher has asserted that, when

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man declares that the Moon is not the Moon,- for the proving of its being the Moon against such a person, there can be no Inference, as he has asserted in the following passage- In the case where there can be no Inference on account of the thing in question being unique, it is excluded by its contrary which is well known in its verbal form; when, for example, it is said that the Hare-holder is the Moon because it is an entity : in a case like this there is no Minor Term "
In anticipation of this objection, the following answer has been provided :
TEXT (1396).
THERE WOULD BE 'UNIQUENESS' ONLY IF THE PROBANS WERE MEANT TO PROVE 'MOON-NESS'; AS, IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY WELLKNOWN FACT REGARDING TT, IT WOULD BE BASED ENTIRELY UPON THE NATURE OF THE THING
ITSELF.-(1396)
COMMENTARY. It would be based entirely, etc.;-.e. it is in regard to the Probans in the shape of the existence or non-existence of things, that Uniqueness has been asserted, not in regard to a Probans in the form of a well-known fact; because in the case of the latter, as it is dependent upon the wish of the speaker, the necessary concomitance would always be there. The Inference, without a Corroborative Instance, has been spoken of only in the case where the other party holds a different opinion and denies all experience, and consequently cannot be convinced of the thing being the Moon on the basis of any well-known fact,- nor is there any Inferential Indicative (Probans) based upon the capacity of things by which the Moon-ness could be proved in reference to the Hare-holder, because the name 'Moon' is based upon the mera whim of the speaker and is not an inherent property of the thing concerned. That this is so is clear from the following statement - One who does not wish to attribute Moon-ness to the Hare holder,—what sort of wellknown cognition could he want? It is for this reason that the Inference addressed to him has to be without a Corroborative Instance, and hence unique, too specific.
In place of 'chandratuzsūdhane', 'To prove Moon-ness, some texts rend 'achandrasddhana', 'to prove that it is not-Moon'; and with this reading, the explanation would be as follows - Where the other party has asserted that The Hare-holder is not the Moon, because it exists', when the Prabans, because it exists', has been cited by that party for proving the
Non-moon-character',--then, the person who proceeds to answer him by proving the Moon character', has a reason why he cannot put forward an Inference of uniqueness'; and it is this reason that the Teacher has indicated by asserting that where, on account of uniqueness, there is no Inference, etc. etc.', which refers to the absence of an Inferential Indicative in the shape of the character of the thing concerned, as apart from any well-known fact (which could be cited).(1396)

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INFERENCE,
693
The following Text points out the defect in the third argument (put forward by Patrasuimin, in Text 1373, regarding the falling insect');
TEXT (1397).
THERE IS NO DISTINCTION PERCEIVED BETWEEN 'BEING BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE FALLING INSECT' AND 'HAYING ITS APPEARANCE
FELT ON THE TOUCH OF THE FALLING INSECT :-(1397)
COMMENTARY.
"There is no distinction perceived',-between the Probans (Premiss) and the Proposition (Conclusion); that is, the Probans is a part of the Proposition itself. In the case in question, what is meant to be proved is the fact of the Pain being due to a particular insect, and the same fact is asserted, in different words, in the Probans (Premias). Hence there is no difference between the Premiss and the Conclusion.-(1397)
The following might be urged -" If the epithet falling is not introduced, And the Probans (Premiss) is stated in the general form because its appearance is felt', then the Premiss cannot be a part of the Conclusion." Answer:
TEXT (1398).
FALLING' MUST BE MADE A QUALIFICATION IN THE PROBANS; OTHERWISE 'INCONCLUSIVENESS (FALSITY) WOULD BE
INEVITABLE.-(1398)
COMMENTARY.
The qualification must be there; otherwise the Premiss would be falsified by reference to the Pain caused by other insects.--(1398)
TEXT (1399).
IF WHAT IS MEANT TO BE PROVED (ASSERTED IN THE CONCLUSION) IS THAT BETWEEN THE TWO (THE PAIN AND THE INSECT) THERE IS THE RELATION OF CAUSE AND EFFECT, WHICH HAS BEEN FORGOTTEN, -THEN THE PROBANS WOULD BE THREEFEATURED, AS THERE WOULD BE A CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE PROVIDED BY PREVIOUS
EXPERIENCE.-(1399)
COMMENTARY
It might be urged that "what is meant to be proved is the relation of Cause and Effect--for the benefit of one who has forgotten it.-ther, in

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII,
that case, the Probans would become three-featured', as the Corroborative Instance would be provided by such well-known cases as that of Smoke and Fire.-(1399)
The following Text supplies the answer to the argument stated (by Patras ūmin, in Text 1374) regarding the Eyes having the peculiar potency for bringing about the effect in the shape of Colour-pereoption",
TEXT (1400).
AS A MATTER OP FACT, THE VERY eristence OF THE EYE, WHICH IS THE SUBJECT-IS STILL UNCERTAIN; AND THE PROYING OF THIS (EXISTENCE) CANNOT BE BIGHT.-AS IT WOULD BE OPEN TO THE DEFECTS OF INADMISSIBILITY
AND THE REST.-(1400)
COMMENTARY.
There is a stop after 'na' (in the second line).
Inadmissibility and the rest':-The term and the rest includes 'falsity' and 'contradiction
What is meant is that if Eristence is to be proved, then the Probans put forward is open to all the three defects of the Probans. For instance, if the character cited as the Probans is something positive, then it is inad. missible':-if it is both (positive and negative), then it is 'Inconclusive'; -if it is negative, then it is contradictory-This has been thus declared
The positive property is not admitted; both positive and negative would be Inconclusive, and the negative one would be contradictory; how then can Existence bo proved ?'
If what is sought to be proved is the potency in the Eye, the Subject, to bring aboul visual perception,-even so, inasmuch as potency', 'existence' eto. are synonymous, the proving of Potency would involve the proving of Existence.-On the negative aspect also, inasmuch as the Potency, being beyond the reach of the senses, would not be well-known, the Probans would become fallacious, as having no well-known substratum.
Similarly, the Probans, in the form because of the perception of Colour would be something not present in the Subject, and hence it should be understood to be Inadmissible.-1400)
Question "How then can you also prove the existence of the Eyes and the other sense-organs?"
Anster

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INFERENCE
695
TEXT (1401).
BUT SOMETIMES, EVEN THOUGH COLOUR AND OTHER THINGS ARE THERE, VISUAL PERCEPTION DOES NOT TAKE PLACE; HENCE IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT THAT (PERCEPTION) ALONE CANNOT BE A REASON (FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE
EYE).- (1401)
COMMENTARY.
Sometimes, when, for instance, the Eyes are closed.
We never seek to prove the existence of the Eyedirectly as this is the Eye'; what happens (according to us) is that it is found that the Perception appears only when certain things, in the form of Colour, etc. are there,
and it is so found that it is present when these things are there, and it is absent when they are absent and what we seek to prove is that the Perception could not have those things alone as its cause,-that it must have some other cause; so that the Subject (of our Inference) is the said Perception, which cannot be said to be unknown'.-What this other cause is comes to be spoken of as the Eye
The basis of our conclusion is the practical notion of diversity.- (1401)
The following might be urged: "It may be that, in the manner shown, the Perception may be the Subject; even so, the Probans remains only twofeatured ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1402).
THE SPROUT IS ACTUALLY FOUND TO EXIST AS HAVING ITS BIRTH IN. SEPARABLY CONNECTED WITH ITS CAUSE ; AND THIS IS ALWAYS AVAILABLE AS THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANOD; THE INSTANCE PER DISSIMILARITY IS TOO CLEAR
(TO BE STATED).(1402)
COMMENTARY Inseparably connected with its Cause invariably concomitant with its Cause-is the birth-appearance, coming into existence of the Sprout. Things like the Sprout, having their birth dependent upon their Cause and hence coming into existence only occasionally, are possible as the Corroborative Instance (in the proving of the Visual Perception as being due to the Eye): the argument being formulated thus:-Those things that appear on the presence of something else, only occasionally, cannot be regarded as produced from that alone, they must be regarded as dependent upon other causes, for instance, even when the soil and other things are there, the Sprout is found to appear or not to appear according as the seed is there or not there ;

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696
TATTVASANGRAHA OHAPTER XVIII.
even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said danial would be contrary to a wider proposition; while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.(1402)
The Text now takes up the argument put forward (by Patrascāmin) under Text 1375, to the effect that "the Soul and the Jer are somehow nonexistent, etc. etc
TEXT (1403).
IN PROVING THAT THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE SOMEHOW NONEXISTENT", -THE PROBANS IS FOUND AS, IN A PREVIOUS CASE,
TO BE FUTILE AND ALSO INADMISSIBLE'(1403)
COMMENTARY. Here also, there would be proving what is already admitted as the fact of the Jar, etc. being somehow nonexistent is already admitted.
In case it is not admitted, then the Probans also, in the form because it is not apprehended , cannot be admitted ; so that the Probans becomes Inadmissible!
In this way, the defect in the Probans may be pointed out,-just as it was in connection with the argument seeking to prove that the things in question are existent.-- (1403)
It has been argued that "there being nothing where the Probandum ve known to be absent, there can be no Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity". -The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (1404-1405),
HERE ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE per dissimilarity;
THAT SAME FORM OF THE THINGS BECOMES the thing where the Probandum is lenown to be absent.-IN THE PROVING OF THE CHARACTER OF BEING SOMEHOW EXISTENT' TX REGARD TO NON-ENTITIES, THERE WOULD BE PROVING OF WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED '; ALSO INADMISSIBILITY, AND THE CONCOMITANOR OF THE CONTRARY CHARLOTER IN
THAT WAY.-(1404-1405)
COMMENTARY
That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended, if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would

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INFERENCE.
697
also serve as the Instance per dissimilarity; because in that character, the Probans-being unapprehended will have ceased to exist.
Similarly in the case of the argument regarding things being somehow existent, the defect of 'futility' would be present.
Nirātmasu '-i.e. in non-entities.
Concomitance of the contrary character;- .e. the contrary character, -in the shape of the cessation of the Probandum-would be pervaded by (concomitant with) the absence of the Probans.
In that uy-i.e. by the possibility of the Instance per dissimilarity.(1404-1405)
The following Terts point out the defects in the argument propounded (by Patrasvämin), in Text 1377, regarding " Your father being present in the house, etc. etc." :
TEXTS (1406-1407).
WHEN THE PRESENCE OF THE FATHER IN THE HOUSE IS SOUGHT TO BE
PROVED BY THE HEARING OF THE FATHER'S VOICE, THE PROBANS IN THIS CASE 19 CLEARLY THEBE-FEATURED '. As, SURELY, AT SOME TIME PREVIOUSLY THE CONCOMITANCE OF THE VOICE HAS BEEN PERCEIVED: IF IT HAS NEVER BEEN SO PERCEIVED, THEN THE * INADMISSIBILITY OF THE PROBANS WOULD BE IRRESISTIBLE.
(1406-1407)
COMMENTARY
Tasya--the voice as belonging to the Father must certainly have been heard before. If it had not, then the Probank would be inadmissible.(1406-1407)
The said three-featured character of the Probans is shown in the following:

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698
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
TEXTS (1408-1415).
IN THAT HOUSE WHEREIN THE FATHER HAD BEEN FOUND BEFORE, AND
ALSO IN THAT WHEREIN HE HAD NOT BEEN FOUND BEFORE, THERE IS THE CONCOMITANCE, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE, OLEARLY PERCEIVED. -AS REGARDS THE WORD, IT DOES NOT MAKE KNOWN ANY EXTERNAL OBJECT AT ALL; BECAUSE IN THIS CASE, THE CHARACTER OF BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE' IS NOT PRESENT; THE WORD CAN ONLY BE THE INDICATOR OF THE SPEAKER'S WISH (TO SPEAK OF A CERTAIN THING). IF THIS (SPEAKER'S WISH) WERE MEANT TO BE WHAT IS EXPRESSED BY THE WORD, THEN ITS DIFFERENCE IS QUITE CLEAR. BECAUSE WHEN THE SPEAKER'S WISH IS NOT THERE, THE WORD CANNOT BE USED.-AS REGARDS THE LAMP, IT DOES NOT MAKE THE Blue AND OTHER THINGS KNOWN BY BECOMING THE INDICATIVE (INFERENTIAL) : ALL THAT IT DOES IS TO MAKE THINGS CAPABLE OF BEING COGNISED ; AND IT IS ONLY IN THIS SENSE THAT IT IS CALLED A MEANS OF COGNITION. ONLY IN CASE THE WORD WERE AN INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE, WOULD IT BE NECESSARY TO CONSIDER IF IT FULFILS THE CONDITIONS OF BRING present in the Subject (MINOR TERM) AND SO FORTH OTHERWISE, WHY CANNOT THE SAME BE URGED IN CONNECTION WITH THE EYE AND OTHER ORGANS (AS MEANS OF COGNITION) 1-EVEN THROUGH THE CHARACTER OF BEING OTHERWISE IMPOSSIBLE', Visibility CANNOT PROVE ANYTHING, UNLESS IT IS PRESENT IN THE SUBJECT (MINOR TERM).-THUS 'ONEFEATURED PROBANS ARE ALL IMPOTENT.-IN THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN CITED AS ONE-FEATURED' PROBANS, THE PRESENCE OF two PEATURES BECOMES CLEARLY INDICATED; AND IN THOSE THAT HAVE BEEN CITED AS TWO-FEATURED', THE PRESENCE OF three FEATURES BECOMES CLEARLY INDICATED; BECAUSE EVERY PROBANS MUST RESIDE IN THE Subject (WHICH THEREFORE IS AN ADDITIONAL CONDITION THAT MUST BE FULFILLED).- IF IT BE ARGUED THAT THIS FEATURE IS IMPLIED BY THE CHARACTER OF being otherwise im. possible", -THAT CANNOT BE SO ; BECAUSE IN THE CASE OF SOUND. THOUGH Visibility MAY BE OTHERWISE DESIRET, IT IS NOT PRESENT IN SOUND (WHICH IS THE SUBJECT).-(1408-1415)
COMMENTARY. In the case of Words, the character of being otherwise impossible cannot be admissible, -in reference to external things; because it cannot serve as an Inferential Indicative of these latter,-being, as it is, dependent entirely upon the Speaker's wish-If the said character is asserted in the case of words, in reference to the object that figures in the cognition (brought about by the words),--then, there are all the three features present, as in the case of Smoke (indicating the Fire). Because, if the Speaker's wish is not there, words cannot be used, the use must be regarded as the effect of that wish;

Page #694

INFERENCE
699
and as such it is indicative of the thing spoken of, just as the Smoke is of Fire ; and this is accepted by us; but not as being expressive of the thing,
As regards the Lamp, it is not admitted to be even the Indicator like Smoke: all that is admitted is that it has come to be popularly regarded as the Indicator (making things known) by reason of its making the Jar, etc. (objects cognised) capable of bringing about the cognition ; but the words are not inferential Indicatives ; hence any discussion as to the Indicative subsisting in the Subject cannot arise in this case. If it did arise in this case, then why could not the same discussion arise in the case of the Eye and the rest (which are the means of Sense-perception, not Inferential Indicatives)?
Otherwise, etc. etc.' ;-this sums up the subject matter under consideration. The sense is that, even though Visibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternality, it does not prove this non eternality in Sound.
Thus then, inasmuch as in all cases, the condition of subsisting in the Subject must be present, by admitting this as a necessary condition, those Probans that have been cited as one-featured', must, necessarily, become
two-featured',-and those cited as two-featured' must become threefeatured'. Thus, on account of the necessity of subsistence in the Subject, it is the one featured Probans that are really impotent.
It cannot be right to argue that such characters as subsisting in the Subject are all implied by that of being otherwise impossible, and hence they cannot form so many different independent characteristics of the Probans"_because the other party has himself asserted that there is the character of being otherwise impossible', even when subsistence in the Subject is not there, in the following passage-" Through the character of being otherwise impossible the Lamp and other things are actually indicative of things, even though they do not reside in the subject (Text 1378, above)".
In the case of Visibility, even though non-eternality' is otherwise impossible', visibility does not subsist in the Subject. So that in every way what has been asserted is entirely doubtful.(1408-1416)
It has been argued above,--under Text 1370—that " in the case of the Reasoning He is dark because he is the son of so and so , even though the Probans has all the three features, yet it is not conducive to certainty of cognition ".
The answer to that is as follows:
TEXT (1416). IN THE CASE OF SUCH PROBANS AS BECAUSE HE IS THE SON OF SO AND so ', THE CONTRARY BEING OPEN TO DOUBT, THE three CONDITIONS ARE NOT PRESENT; BECAUSE WHAT IS CITED IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE CONTRARY,
-(1416)
COMMENTARY. It may be possible that the child may be the son of the man and yet be not darl;—there being no incompatibility in this, the absence of the Probans

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where the Probandum is lenour to be absent is open to doubt [and this is one of the three features) ; so that the Probans is not three featured'; hence the example cited (by Patrasvimin) is not relevant.—1416)
The following might be urged — " Certainly there is incompatibility : even when there is no difference in the cause, if there were difference in the effect-then the Affect would be causeless"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1417-1418).
EVEN WHEN THE CHILD IS BORN OF A CERTAIN PERSON, THERE IS ALWAYS A LIKELIHOOD OF DIVERSITY IN ITS FEATURES, BY REASON OF THE PECULIARITIES OF SUCH CAUSES AS THE DESTINY' (OF THE CHILD) AND FOOD OF THE PARENTS) AND SO ORTH.FURTHER, (a) WHAT IS OITED AS THE PROBANS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE THE nature (OF THE PROBANDUM); (0) NOR IS THAT ITS Effect; (C) NOR IS IT OF THE NATURE OF THE NON-PERCEPTION OF THE PERCEPTIBLE' ;- AND APART FROM THESE (THREE) THERU IS NOTHING THAT CAN MAKE THE PROBANB * INFALLIBLE' (TRUE).
(1417-1418)
COMMENTARY
Through such causes as the peculiarity of past good deeds (Destiny) and eating of hot food and other diverse circumstances, diversity in the features of the child-such as fairness and the like-are possible : wherefore then can there be any incompatibility where a diversity in the causes is well known
Then again, the Premiss-Because he is the son of so and so is not pl natural' Reason,- as being a product is (in the proving of non. eternality); in the latter case, being a product can have no other character save that of non-elernality; while in the case in question it is not that there is no other character for being his son': because the appellation of his son' is applied, -not on the ground of the son being darle, but on the basis of the aggregate of five ingredients (of which the body of the child consists).
-Nor is the Probans one based on effect'; as there is no causal relation known to subsist (between Being his son and Darkness).-Nor (lastly), is it of the nature of the non perception of the perceptible', as what is cited is in the positive form ; also because there being no incongruity between the two, tha Probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than the Dark

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701
Apart from these three there can be no Inferential Indicative,-because of the absence of Invariable Concomitance' in all other cases); without Invariable Concomitance, there can be no proper indicative character: for, if there were, it would lead to absurdities.
Thus then, what has been cited is neither a 'Probans', nor is it threefoutured'. How then could there be 'Infallibility' in it
Non-perception of the perceptible is the non-apprehension of something which fulfils all the conditions of apprehensibility.—(1417-1418)
In the following Texts, the author sets forth certain objections against the 'infallibility' put forward as constituting the character of the true Inferential Indicative
TEXTS (1419-1421).
** THE SAID "INFALLIBILITY' IS SEEN IN OTHER CASES ALSO : For INSTANCE, (1) THE BLOOMING OF THE LILY AND THE RISE IN THE SEA HAVE THE RISE OF THE MOON FOR TREIR'INDICATIVE. (2) FROM THE PRESENCE OF SUN-LIGHT, THE PRESENCE OF SHADE ON THE OTHER SIDE IS INFERRED.-(3) WHEN THE HALF-BURNT WOOD-PIECE IS SEEN IN THE DARK FROM A DISTANCE, IT BRINOS VP THE IDEA OF SMOKE.—(4) FROM THE RISE OF THE Krttikā (ASTERISM) IS INFERRED THE PROXIMITY OF THE Rohini (ASTERISM)." -
(1419-1121)
COMMENTARY
(1) From the Rise of the Moon-follows the inference of the Blooming of the Lily and the Rise in the sea.
The term 'adi' is meant to include such cases as the Blooming of the Lotus inferred from the Rise of the Sun.
(2) From the presence of sun-light, there follows the inference of the shadow on the other side.
(3) When from a distance one sees in the darkness a half burnt piece of wood, he inters the presence of smoke.
(4) From the rise of the asterism Krttikti, one infers the proximity of the asterism Rohini; since it is well known that the asterisms rise in the same order in which they are enumerated in the list beginning with Ashvini.
All these are not included among the three kinds of Probans (mentioned in Texts 1417-1418). Why then should it be asserted that there can be no * Infallibility' in any Probans other than those of the said three kinds - (1419-1421)
The answer to the above is as followe:

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TEXTS (1422-1423).
THE BLOOMING AND THE REST, WHEN PRODUCED, ARE PRODUCED AT THE SAME TIME AS, AND FROM THE SAME PARTICULAR CAUSES AS, THE SAID (MOON-RISE, etc.). SO THAT HERE WE DO HAVE THE INFERENCE OF THE CAUSE FROM THN EFFECT. IF THERE WERE NO SUCH STRIOT RELATIONSHIP, THEN EVERYTHING COULD BE INFERRED FROM EVERYTHING.
-1422-1423)
COMMENTARY
When the said Blooming and the rest-Blooming of the Lily, Rise of the Ses and the Blooming of tho Lotus and the Shadow and Smoke are pro. duced, -in what way 1-ot the same time as the said Moon rise, Sun-light and the Half-burnt Wood-piece, which are known to be the effects of the same Causes; that is to say, that which is the cause of the Moon rise, etc., which appear at the same time as the Blooming of the Lily and other phenomena, becomes also the auxiliary cause in the bringing about of the Blooming of the Lily, etc. the said Moon-rise, etc., while leading to the inference of their own causes, lead to the inierence also of the effects appearing at the same time, in the form of the Blooming of the Lily, etc.; and they do not do this directly. In this way, the Probans in the case in question is one based upon the character of the Effect!
That this is so has to be admitted : because if the Probans were to lead to the inference of things without some such relationship, then they might lead to the inference of anything and everything; because the absence of relationship would be equally present in all things. Hence in the cases in question also, some sort of relationship has to be pointed out, and this relationship can only be one of Cause and Effect as just explained-(1422-1423)
Question :-"What sort of relationship is there between the Proximity of the Rohini-asterism and the Rise of the Kristika-asterism?" Answer:
TEXTS (1424-1425).
A PECULIAR ATMOSPHERIC CURRENT IS THE CAUSE OF THE Rise of the Kyttika-asterism; THAT SAME, IN CONTINUATION, ALSO BECOMES THE CAUSE OF TAE Proximity of the Rohini-Asterism. HENCE ITS COGNITION TS HELD TO BE DUE TO THE COGNITION OF THAT ; AND THERE IS NO OTHER COGNITION OF IT
WHICH IS INDEPENDENT.—(1424-1425)
COMMENTARY
Prabhañjana'-is Air-current.
Here also there is Inference from a particular Probans which is dependent upon the same auxiliary circumstances. This has been this declared

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703
Being dependent upon one and the same set of auxiliary circumstances is what leads to the inference of a particular cause of a particular thing,-as is found in the case of Smoke which is a product of balf-burnt fuel':-(14241425)
Objection :- In the case where the Reflection leads to the Inference of the object reflected,--the Probans cannot be included under any of the three kinds of Probans.--because the Reflected Image is a non-entity (and has no real existence): hence the definition provided by you is too narrow
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1426). THE INFERENCE OF THE REFLECTED OBJECT PROCEEDS ON THE B. OF THE INFERENTIAL INDICATIVE IN THE SHAPE OF THE REFLECTION; THIS IS ONLY RIGHT ; AND THE INDI. CATIVE FROM WHICH IT PROCEEDS IS NOT DIFFERENT FROM THAT WHICH RESTS ON THE NATURE OF THE
EFFECT-(1426)
COMMENTARY
the
In the following Text the author sets forth the objection from Opponent's standpoint
TEXT (1427).
“THE REFLECTION CANNOT BE AN ENTITY, BECAUSE TWO THINGS CANNOT EXIST TOGETHER AT THE SAME PLACE; THEN HOW CAN IT BE BEGARDED AS AN Effect, WHICH MUST BE SOMETHING REAL";-IF THIS IS URGED (THEN THE ANSWER
IS AS IN THE FOLLOWING T'ext].-(1427)
COMMENTARY.
For the idea that the Reflection cannot be an entity, the Reason istwo things cannot exist together; the Reflection is perceived as occupying the same place as the reflecting surface of the Mirror, and it is not possible for the forms of two things to be seen at the same place; as there would always be an obstacle ; hence it cannot be possible for any two things to exist at the same place. Hence the idea must be regarded as illusory.
Or [there may be another explanation of the Text]-Two things cannot exist together at the same place ;—which two things ? -The surface of the reflecting mirror and the Reflection of the Moon; the surface of the Mirror occupies one point in space, and the Reflection of the Moon occupies a different point in space, inside the Mirror; like the water at the bottom of the well. When a thing is produced in one place, how can it be perceived in another place ? Hence it follows that there is no such Entity as the Reflection; and

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unthink.
the perception is due to the force of the attendant circumstances able indeed are the diverse forces of things H 1427)
The above objection is answered as follows:
TEXTS (1428-1429).
EVEN THOUGH THE CHARACTER OF THE EXTITY' DOES NOT BELONG
TO THE REFLECTION AS A CORPOREAL OBJECT, YET HOW CAN THE COGNITION ENVISAGING THE RELECTION BR REGARDED AS Objectless ? AND IT IS THIS LATTER (COGNITION), THAT IS REGARDED HERE AS THE * EFFECT AND THE Inferential INDICATIVE'; AND THOUGH ITSELF WITHOUT A MATERIAL BASIS, THE COGNITION APPEARS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE REFLECTED OBJECT WHICH IS THEREFORE REGARDED AS ITS Cause.
-(1428-1429)
COMMENTARY. It is only the Cognition of the form of the Reflection that is regarded as the effect, and hence the Inferential Indicative, and not any external object in the shape of the Reflection':-(1429-1429)
Objection : "It has been asserted under Text 1363 that– Inference for the sake of others consists in the statement of the three-featured Probans? Why has this been so asserted, when other people have described the Inference for the sake of others as consisting of the statement of the Proposition, "Final Conclusion and Re-affirmation also ?"
This is what is anticipated and answered in the following
TEXT (1430). THE Inference for the sake of others HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY OTHERS AS THE STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION AND THE REST'.BUT, NOT BEING AN INTEGRAL PART OT PROOF (PROV
ING'), THE PROPOSITION IS OF NO USE. (1430)
COMMENTARY. The author rejects the said view of other people, in the words - But, nol, etc. etc. - Sadhana', 'Proof', (here) stands for the proving; i.e. the cognition of the object to be cognised the Proposition is not an integral part-i.e. the cause of the proving; this is what is meant by the compound * asādhanangabhūtam'.

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Not being an integral part of the proving, the Proposition is of no use, and hence need not be stated.
* Of no use' may be explained as not a cause; in which case, the phrase would form part of the conclusion set forth here (which would be that the Proposition is not a cause of the proving).-(1430)
Question :-"How is the Proposition not an integral part of the Proving ?” Answer:
TEXTS (1431-1433). FOR WANT OF RELATIONSHIP, THE PROPOSITION CANNOT BE RIGHTLY
REGARDED AS PROVING THE THING directly; NOR CAN IT BE RIGHTLY REGARDED AS DOING IT indirectly, BECAUSE IT DOES NOT INDICATE WHAT IS POSSIBLE. IF IT BE REGARDED AS PART OF THE proving, ON ACCOUNT OF ITS PRESENTING THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PROBANS AND THE PROBANDUM, LIKE THE STATEMENT OF THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE, THEN IT WOULD BE LIKE WORDS CONVEYING AN ORDER, AND IN VIEW OF THIS THE REASON GIVEN WOULD BE FALLIBLE, AND AS MERELY THE OBJECTIVE WILL BE INDICATED, THE SAID STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSITION WOULD BE USELESS ALSO.-(1431-1433)
COMMENTARY.
'It does not indicate what is probablet-because it only states what is meant to be proved.
What is meant is as follows:-As words have no connection with things the statement of the Proposition cannot serve any directly useful purpose ;nor indirectly, like the statement of the Probans, because it does not indicate what is possible as declared in the following passage They made the assertion of the Minor Term, for the purpose of intimating their intention, which shows where the doubt lay; hence it does not serve any directly useful purpose in the actual proving; and as it states only what is meant to be proved, it cannot help indirectly either'.
Some people hold the following opinion The Proposition has to be stated, in the same way as the Corroborative Instance is stated, -because, even though it does not form a part of the Inference, yet it presents the objective of the Probans and the Probandum; as declared in the words
Since the two forms that remain are shown in the Corroborative Instance'; that is, the statement of the Corroborative Instance, even though it does not form a separate factor of the Inference, is yet stated for the purpose of show. ing the two features of the Probans-other than the feature of subsisting in the Minor Term".
The answer to these people is provided in the words Like the Corroborative Instance, etc. etc. - Words conveying an order, such as 'Do this, Prove the Sound to be non-eternal-The term 'adi' includes words conveying a request and so forth. [Under the opinion put forward) it would be necessary
45

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to put forth such expressions also ; on the ground that in the absence of these also, it is not possible to propound an Inference all on a sudden.
Useless' because the Probandum would become cognised even without it. For instance, if the inference is stated simply as whatever is producer is non-eternal--and Sound is produced, the cognition comes about that
Sound is non-eternal', even without the statement of the Proposition(1431-1433)
Question :-"How then can there be any distinction made regarding the Sapaksa' (That in which the Probandum is known to be present) and so iorth?"
This is the question stated in the following) -
TEXT (1434). How THEN CAN THERE BE ANY DISTINCTION MADE REGARDING THE * Sa paksa' (THAT WHEREIN THE PROBANDUM IS KNOWN TO EXIST ') AND SO FORTH, WHEN THE SUBJECT (MINOR TERM) 18 NOT ACTCALLY STATED ? Tur 'THREE-FEATURES ALSO CANNOT BE THER; AS THAT TOO IS DEPEN. DENT UPON THAT "-IF THIS IS URGED THEN THE ANSWER IS AS GIVEN IN THE
FOLLOWING Text].
COMMENTARY. "That is to say, 'Sapaksa' is the name given to that object which is similar to the Minor Term, in the sense that what is gought to be proved (the Probandum) is present in it and that where there is no such similarity is called the asa paksa' or 'Vipaksa'). If the Proposition were not stated, then the three features' (of the Probane), which is dependent upon that,i.e. upon that which is the substratum of the Sapaka -would not be there, and the entire fabric (of Inference) would become shattered to pieces." (1434)
The answer to the above is as follows:
TEXT (1435). IN THE MERE STATEMENT OF THE PROOF (INFERENTIAL), THERE IS NO DISTINCTION MADE REGARDING THE 'Sapaksa' AND THE REST. IT IS ONLY IN A SCIENTIFIC TREATISE, THAT THEY ARE DISTINGUISHED AND DIVIDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF EXPLAINING) THE USAGE.
-(1435) COMMENTARY,
That is to say, even a barbarian who knows nothing of the distinction of Sapalsa etc., when it is stated to him that where there is smoke, there is

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INFERENCE
707
Fire, -and there is smoke at this place',-he grasps the positive and negative concomitance between Smoke and Fire, and hence comes to recognise that * Fire is there':-without knowing anything about the Sapaksa' and other details.-Hence it follows that at the time of the actual proving, there need be no distinction as regards the * Sapaksa' and the rest.
Question "Where then is this distinction made ?" Answer—In a Scientific Treatise.-(1435)
Or, oven at the time of the statement of the proof, if the said distinction were made,-there would be nothing in it that would be incompatible with our view. This is what is explained in the following
TEXT (1436).
EVEN WHEN IT IS BASED UPON THE SUBJECT-MATTER IN QUESTION, IT IS NOT INCOMPATIBLE; THE DISPUTANT DOES NOT STATE THE PROOF EVEN FOR THE OTHER PARTY, ALL OF A
SUDDEN.-(1436)
COMMENTARY. Though the statement of the Proposition is not made at the time that one actually propounds the Premiss, yet if the said distinction is made in regard to the matter under disputo,-.e. the Subject-there is nothing incon. gruous in it.-Nor can it be urged that at the time of the propounding of the Peorniss (Reason, Probans), there is no maller under dispute";-because, even for the other party.--.e. for one who makes the statement of the Proposition,--the disputant does not put forward his Premiss, all of a sudden, without reference to some subject under consideration.-(1436)
The question arises still-" The object whose particular character one wishes to ascertain may be the subject under consideration; even so how can the said distinction be made in reference to that subject under consideration."
The answer is provided in the following
TEXT (1437).
The character of residing in the Minor Term (Subject) FOLLOWS ITS PRESENCE IN THE SUBJECT WHOSE CHARACTER IS MEANT TO BE ASCERTAINED; AND THE 'Sapaksa' IS THAT WHICR IS SIMILAR TO THAT SUBJECT ; AND THE Vipaksa' IS THAT WHERE THE SAID CHARAC
TER IS ABSENT.-(1437)
COMMENTARY This is easily understood.-(1437)
The Upanaya', 'Reaffirmation (19 one of the five Members of the Syllogism) has been defined as that which, on the strength of the Corrobora

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tive Instance, reasserts the subject as being so, or as being not so '-(Nyayasülra 1. 1. 38). This Re-affirmation is not the means of proving the conclusion, as it only serves to make clear the sense of the Probans adduced, being, as it is, like a second affirmation of the Probans' such is the anthoritative statement of Dinnāga in regard to this Re.affirmation.-But Bhūviuita and others have argued as follows, in order to show that (without this Reaffirmation) the function of the Probans itself would remain unfulfilled - The fact of the Probans subsisting in the thing where the Probandum is known to be present is not mada clear by the statement of the Probans, which comes just after the statement of the Proposition ; because the former only mentions the Reason-Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product': -and whether this character of being a product' subsists, or does not subsist, in Sound, this is learnt only from the Reaffirmation. Or the Reafirmation may be regarded as serving the purpose of providing Re-presentment; when the Probans is stated At first, it points out the presence of the Probans-e.g. being a product'-in & general, inqualified, form;-then the Corroborative Instance is cited, where it is shown that the said Probans is invariably concomitant with the Probandum ;-o that when, after these, the Reaffirmation is stated, it brings about the Representment of the Probans with the qualification that it is invariably concomitant with the Probandum,- So is Sound a product! Thus inasmuch as it indicates a particular feature, it is not a mere repetition".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1438-1439)
IF THERE IS NO STATEMENT OF THE Proposition, THERE CAN BE NO STATEMENT OF THE Reason (PROBANS); AND CONSEQUENTLY, THERE NEED BE NO STATEMENT OF THE Reaffirmation, FOR THE PURPOSE OF INTIMATING THE EXISTENCE (OF THE PROBANS IN THE MINOR TERM, SUBJECT).-MERE PRESENCE (OF THE PROBANS IN THE SUBJECT) HAVING BEEN STATED AT FIRST, AND THEN, IP ITS INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE (WITH THE PROBANDUM) IS SUBSEQUENTLY POINTED OUT, -BY THIS ALL THAT IS INTENDED BECOMES ACCOMPLISHED, SO THAT TH Representment WOULD BE ENTIRELY USELESS. -
(1438-1439)
COMMENTARY. * For the purpose of intimating the excistence'-of the Probans, in the Subject, Minor Term.
What is meant is as follows:- The necessity of the statement of the Proposition having been negatived in the manner shown above, if the

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INFERENCE
709
statement of the Reason is to come after that, then it cannot come in at all and as a consequence of this, there should be no statement of the Re-affirma. tion, as this has to be preceded by the statement of the Reason.-If the Reafirmation is made for the purpose of showing that the Probans resides in the Subject, then some other purpose will have to be asserted as following from the Statement of the Reason.
It might be urged that-" The purpose served by it is the intimating of the fact of its being the Reason."
That however cannot be accepted; because what would be the use of this intimation of that fact, when the proving of the Probandum is actually accomplished in another way-as explained previously ? Consequently, barring the intimation of the fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject, no other purpose can be pointed out, for the Statement of the Reason. Thus then this fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been already indicated by the Statement of the Reason,-if the Reaffirmation is again made for that same purpose, it is clearly proved that it is a needless repetition : how too could the Probans be inadmissible' without such Reaffirmation ?
As for the Representment, that also is useless; because the mere fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been previously asserted by the Statement of the Reason-and the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum also having been already asserted-what is wanted would be already accomplished; so that the affirmation of the same thing over again would clearly bear the imprint of a needless repetition. Where then would there be inadmissibility of our Reason in this case also l(1438 1439)
Nigamana', 'Final Conclusion' (the fifth member of the five-membered syllogisin) has been defined as "the Re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probang' (Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 39). What is meant is that when it is re-asserted that "Therefore Sound is non-eternal', -the word 'therefore implies the potency of the Probans as shown in the Corroborative Instance, and then on the basis thereof, there is reassertion of what had been stated in the Proposition :-this reassertion is called the 'Final Conclusion', Nigamana',—the exact connotation of the term 'nigamana' being that whereby the Proposition, the Premiss (statement of the Probans), the Corroborative Instance and the Re-affirmation are connected, string together, as serving the same purpose (Nyāya-bhāsya).
As a matter of fact however, when (as shown before) the statement of the Proposition itself is not there, how can there be any statement of the Final Conclusion, which is only a reiteration of the Proposition ? Hence the Final Conclusion cannot form part of the Reasoning to prove the conclusion.-On this subject, the Revered Dinināga has made the declaration that Inasmuch as the Final Conclusion is a mere repetition, it cannot be the means of proving anything'.-Against this, Uddyotakara and others, under the above Sütra, have argued thus :-" There is no repetition here, because the Proposition states the Probandum as to be proved, while the Final Conchu. sion states it as proved ; and without the Final Conclusion there can be no proving; because until that is stated, the suspicion regarding the truth of

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the other Factors of the Reasoning does not entirely cease as to whether or not Sound is really non-eternal (for instance); hence for the removal of this suspicion, the Final Conclusion has to be stated separately".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1440). As A MATTER OF PACT, THE PROVING IS ACCOMPLISHED BY THE FORCE OF THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS : CONSEQUENTLY, THERE CAN BE NO SUSPICION REGARDING THE CONTRARY CONCLUSION; HENCE THE STATEMENT OF THE FINAL CONCLUSION
TS USELESS.-(1440)
COMMENTARY
When it has been definitely ascertained that in Sound there is present the character of being a product', which has been shown to be invariably concomitant with non-eternality',-how can there be any suspicion of its eontrary, 'Eternality? When the fact of a certain substance being surrounded by flaming fire has been duly ascertained, no sane man can ever suspect the presence of coolness in that substance. Even if there were any such suspicion] it could not be set aside merely by the statement of the Final Conclusion, withont any reasons.-(1440)
Aviddhakarna has argued as follows :-"A single idea cannot be expressed by diverse isolated assertions; hence for bringing about the connection between these assertions it is necessary to state the Final Conclusion ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1441).
As A MATTER OF FACT, IT IS ONLY BY CONNECTED ASSERTIONS THAT AN IDEA IS EXPRESSED ; HENCE FOR THE PURPOSE OF BRINGING ABOUT THIS CONNECTION, IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO STATE THE FINAL CONCLUSION SEPARATELY.
-(1441)
COMMENTARY. When the fact of the Probana heing connected with the Probandum by the relation of sameness or by that of Cause and Effect has been established.then the statement of its presence in the Subject and its invariable concomitance (with the Probandum) as connected together, bring about, by implication, the single Idea, in the shape of the desired Conclusion. Even though the statements are isolated, yet they are connected, and as such together lead to

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711
the desired end. Consequently it is not necessary to state the Final Conclusion for the purpose of bringing about the said connection.-.(1441)
TEXT (1442) SOME PEOPLE HOLD THAT INFERENCE IS OF TWO KINDS AS FOLLOWS(A) That based upon perceived particulars AND (B) that based
upon generalised relationship.-(1442)
COMMENTARY Some people'-Kumārila and others.
They describe Inference as of two kinds-(1) that based upon perceived particulars, and (2) that based upon generalised relationship.-(1442)
Question :- Which is the Inference based upon the Perceived Particulars Answer :-[Given by Kumārila) :
TEXTS (1443-1445).
(A) "That based upon the relationship of perceived. Particulars is as
FOLLOWS IT SO HAPPENS THAT, IN THE CASE OF TWO PARTICULAR THINGS, SUCH AS THE Fire PRODUCED BY BURNING DRIED CowDUNG, AND THE Smoke PROCEEDING FROM THAT FIRE, THE OBSERVER HAS THE COGNITION OF THE THINGS, AND THEN SUBSEQUENTLY, ON GOING TO ANOTHER PLACE, THE OBSERVER HAPPENS AGAIN AND AGAIN TO RECOGNISE IN OTHER PLACES THE PRESENCE OF THE SAME FIRE THROUGH THE INDICATION OF THE SAME SMOKE SEEN BEFORE ; AND DUE VALIDITY ATTACHES TO SUCH COGNITION (BY REASON OF TTS BEING BASED UPON THE PREVIOUS PERCEPTIONAL COGNITION), AND IT BECOMES RECOGNISED AS A MEANS OF COGNITION DISTINOT FROM PERCEPTION: BECAUSE IT BRINGS ABOUT THE COGNITION OF A THING (FIRE) THE EXISTENCE OF WHICH HAD BEEN IN doubt. It is THIS THAT HAS BEEN DESCRIBED BY Vindhyarisin AS INFERENCE based upon the perceived relationship OF PARTIOULARS".-Shloka. vārtika-INFERENCE, 141-143).—(1443-1445)
COMMENTARY What is meant is as follows First of all, the man has noticed through Sense-perception in a certain place a particular Fire and a particular Smoke,at a later time, he goes to another place and again and again sees the same particular Smoke, and then infers the same particular Fire this is Inference based upon the perception (of the relationship) of Particulars, it is so called because it has for its objective the previously-perceived Particular. This

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cannot be regarded as invalid on the ground of apprehending what has been already apprehended; because there is an additional factor present here, in the shape of the removal of the doubt as to whether or not the Fire is still there. This is the sum total of what Kumarila means.
We now proceed to explain the words in detail
* That based upon the relationship of perceived. Particulars-Question What relationship9-The answer is as follows:-Shabarasvīmin has stated the definition of Inference as follows:- When the perception of one factor of a well-recognised relationship leads to the cogoition of the other factor of that relationship, which latter is not in contact with the man's sense-orgars--this second cognition is what is called Inference (Inferential Cognition). This Inferential Cognition is of two kinds : (1) that based upon directly perceived relationship, and (2) that based upon a generalised relationship. As an example of the former, we have the inferential cognition of Fire following from the cognition of Smoke (which is based upon the relation of invariable concomitance between a particular Smoke and & particular Fire perceived in the kitchen); and as an example of the second kind of Inference, we have the case where, finding that the Sun changes its position, we infer that it moves.-on the ground of our experience that in the case of Devadatta it is only by moving that he changes his position (which experience has led to the generalised relationship between moving and change of position in general)." (Shabara-Bhasya, on 1. 1. 5, Translation, page 15).
In connection with this, Kumūrila, with a view to explaining the nature of the Inference based upon the perceived relationship of Particulars has used the words--Pratyaksadrstasambandham, etc.' (Teat 1443. This is to be construed as The Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars - they explain as follows' ;-The words they explain having gone before in the preceding text (in the Shlokavārtika).
In connection with the two particular things-Fire and Smoke-the observer has formed the idea of the new factor in the shape of dry cowdung,the idea being that 'these two things Fire and Smoke are the effeot of the burning of dry cowrung; and then he has also formed the idea of the particular spot in the shape of the Hill, -the idea being that these two things, Fire and Smoke, exist on the Hill-The compound 'gomayēndhana' means
that of which dry cowdung is the fuel', and the compound 'taddēsha means 'that of which that is the place and these two compounds qualify the 'vishat the two particular things' (Fire and Smoke) :the adi' stands for other particular fuels in the shape of the woods of the various trees, Sarja, Sarala, Sallaki and the rest, and also other Fires ;-there Brises the cognition, in regard to these the Locative being construed by
splitting up' the words ;-such perceptional cognition becomes apprehended by the observer ;-that same observer, through the indicative in the shape of the same Smoke as seen in another place and at another time, cognises the same Pire; and this happens again and again ;-this cognition thus becomes one that is distinct from the previous Perceptional Cognition.-Or the construction may be 'he cognises Fire on the basis of the previous cognition'.--The compound Sandihyamāna, etc.' is to be interpreted as the cogni

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tion of that thing whose presence was in doubt-as to whether it is there or not?:- This Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars, as described above, has been spoken of hy Vindhyavusin as 'Vishesatodrsta', • Inference in relation to Particulars':-(1443-1445)
The other kind of Inference, the Samanyatodreça, that based upon generalised Relationship, is next described
TEXT (1446).
" THOUGH THE INFERENCE BASED UPON GENERALISED RELATIONSHIP COULD BE EXEMPLIFIED ON THE BASIS OF another Fire AND another Smoke, -YET THE INFERENCE CITED IS THAT OF THE SUN MOVING', AS THIS IS BASED absolutely UPON GENERALISED RELA
TIONSHIP” (Shloka-vi.-IN.
FERENCE, 145).—(1446)
COMMENTARY
The author of the Bhāşya (Shabara) has cited the Inference of the moving of the Sun from its change of position as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship. In regard to this, the following objeotion might be raised-In reference to another Fire and another Smoke (other than those actually perceived), there can be Inference on the basis of common character and this Inference of Fire and Smoke would be baserl upon generalised Relationship; while these Smoke and Fire were present in his mind already, why did he give this up and cite the care of the Sun moving as an example of Inference based upon goneralised Relationship ?'
Anticipating this, Kumārila offers the explanation- Though the Inference, etc. etc.'. That is to say, when the Inference based upon Generalised Relationship could be cited, on the basis of other Smoke and Fire as corroborative Instances, the author of the Bhāşya has cited the case of the Sun. in consideration of the fact that the moving of the Sun is imperceptible at all times, and hence for cognising it, the only means available is the Inference based upon generalised Relationship, and not that based upon Perceived Particulars; hence he wished to cite a case like that of the Sun which was purely and unalloyedly one of Inference based on Generalised Relationship: and he did not cite the case of Smoke and Fire, as in this case the Inference need not always be one based upon Generalised Relationsbip.-(1446)
The objection to the above-mentioned classification of Inference is us follows:

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TEXTS (1447-1448).
INASMUCH AS IT HAS BEEN PROVED THAT PERPETUAL FLUX' TS ALL
EMBRACING, THERE CAN BE NO INFERENCE OF WHAT HAS GONE BEFORE, --BY ITSELF. IF IT BE ARGUED THAT THE SAME. NESS IS ASSUMED ON THE BASIS OF THE SAMENESS OF THE CHAIN"-THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) NO SVOH SAMENESS CAN HAVE ANY REAL EXISTENCE; AND WHAT 19 MERELY ASSUMED CANNOT BE AN ENTITY,--
(1-447-1448)
COMMENTARY * AU-embracing -.e. einbracing all such things as Fire, Smoke and the rest.
It might be argued that "Even though the individual things are momentary, there would be sameness (unity) of the chain or series."
The answer to that is—No such sameness, etc. That is, this sameness would be something assumed, not real; so that in reality, there would be no continuity of existence for anything; under the circumstances, it cannot be right to say by the observer remaining at that place', or by that same means and so forth.-What too is merely assumed cannot be an entity or thing; hence there would be no sense in the words because it is a cognition of a thing whose existence was doubled.' (as used in Teac 1445, by Kumärila).(1447-1448)
The following might be urged When the Inference was described as based upon Perceived Particulars, it was on the basis of the assumed, not real, sameness."
The answer to that is as follows:
TEXT (1449)
A COGNITION devoid of objects IS NOT ADMITTED BY YOU; AND IF THE
INTERENCE HAD AN assumed OBJECT, IT WOULD
CLEARLY BE devoid of an object. -- (1449)
COMMENTARY
The following might be urged "Though the Individual is fleeting (momentary), yet the Universal is something not fleeting; and on this baris, the sameness or unity would be real, and the Inference would not be devoid of an object".
The answer to this is as follows:

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715
TEXTS (1450-1455).
IF WHAT IS MEANT IS TRAT—" EVEN ON THW DESTRUCTION OF THE
INDIVIDUAL, THE UNIVERSAL PERSISTS "-THEN, THAT CANNOT BE ; BECAUSE EVEN IF THE UNIVERSAL EXISTED, THAT ALSO WOULD CERTAINLY BE COVERED BY THE PERPETUAL FLUX-FURTHER, ON WHAT GROUNDS HAVE YOU ASSERTED THE RESTRICTION THAT ** THESE SAME TWO PARTICULARS WHOSE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN COGNISED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, ETC. ETC." (Text 1443) ?-THEN AGAIN, HAVING ONCE COGNISED A THING BY MEANS OF INFERENCE, IF THE SAME THING IS COGNISED AGAIN BY MEANS OF INFERENCE, — WHY IS NOT THIS LATTER REGARDED AS VALID ? WHAT IS THE PECULIARITY IN THE PREVIOUS ONE (WHEREBY IT IS REGARDED AS VALID, AND NOT THE LATER ONE) - IF IT BE URGED THAT-"THE LATER ONE IS NOT REGARDED AS valid BECAUSE LIKE REMEMBRANCE, IT APPREHENDS WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED ", THEN WHY IS NOT THE PREVIOUS INFERENCE ALSO REGARDED AS THE SAME - IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—" IN THE FORMER INFERENCE THERE IS THIS ADDITIONAL PECULIARITY THAT IT SETS ASIDE THE DOUBT THAT HAS SET IN DURING THE INTERVAL,"WHY IS NOT THE SAME IN THE LATTER ALSO? HENCE IT IS THIS LATTER ITSELF THAT SETS ASIDE THE DOUBT AS TO SOMETHING BEING present or not present: AND HENCE THE GENERALISED PERCEPTION IS REALLY WHAT IS INDEPENDENT.-- (1450-1455)
COMMENTARY.
- Alerli - The Universal.
Even if '-i.e. granting that such a thing as the Universal exists.
The other party regards the Individual and the Universal as identical; how then can the Universal continue to exist when the Individual is destroyed? If it did, then, having different fates, they would have to be regarded as distinct from one another.
If it exists'—This also is only by way of being granted; as in reality, the Universal having been once for all rejected, how could it exist ? If it existe'-i.e. even if it existed it would be in perpetual fux': as the 'perpetual Aux' has been proved to be all-embracing.
Further, when a thing has been once cognised by means of an Inference, and later on, the same thing (Fire) is cognised by another Inference drawn from the same Inferential Indicative Probans). (Smoke), why has not this latter Inference also been cited as one based upon Perceived Particulars, - when the qualification of having been 'cognised by Perception is considered desirable ?

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVIII.
It might be arged that—" It has not been so regarded as it apprehende what has been already apprehended ".
That cannot be right; as the same applies also to what is bused on Perceived Particulars.
* In the case of that based upon Perceived Particulars, there is this additional peculiarity that it has set at rest the doubt that has appeared during the interval."
That cannot be right; as this same peculiarity is also present in what is based upon the Inferred Particulars.
Thus from all this it follows that when all things are in a perpetual Alux', the only Inference possible is that based upon generalised Relationship, not any based upon Perceived Particulars.-(1450-1455)
TEXT (1456).
SOME SHORT-SIGHTED PEOPLE HAVE ASSERTED THAT "INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION ", THOUGH, BY THESE VERY WORDS, THEY OFFER UP THEIR OWN DESIRE TO SPEAK' (INTEN. TION, IDEA IN THE MIND, AS SOMETHING TO BE INFERRED
FROM THOSE Worps),-(1456)
COMMENTARY.
* Some people'-the followers of Brhaspati and others.
Through these same worde', - i.e. by the words Inference is not a means of Right Cognition
This shows that the assertion of these people involves self-contradiction. For instance, when a man makes a statement to another person, it is on the basis of the understanding that the idea present in one's mind is under stood from the words he uses, which are indicative of that idea'; so that when the people denying Inference make the statement,-by this statement itself-they admit the fact of Inference being a Means of Right Cognition - and yet this same he denies by the statement that Inference is not a Means of Right Cognition and this is self-contradiction.
This objection is going to be further explained later on.-(1456)
The Charuākas urge the following arguments (against Inference, as & Means of Right Cognition):

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TEXTS (1457–1469),
"Inference for one's our sake CANNOT BE RIGHT-BECAUSE IT IS BROUGHT
ABOUT BY THE THREE-FEATURED INDICATIVE, WHICH IS SUBVERSIVE OF WHAT IS DESIRABLE,-LIKE WRONG COGNITION.-NOR CAN THE PRESENCE OF THE THREE FEATURES IN THE INDICATIVE BE REGARDED AS THE MEANS OF INFERENCE ; AS THEY ARE PRESENT ALSO WHERE THERE IS NO INFERENCE, JUST LIKE THE TWO FEATURES':-FURTHER, THE CONTRADIOTTON OF INFERENCE IS POSSIBLE IN EVERY REASONING, SO ALSO THERE IS POSSIBILITY IN EVERY CASE OF THE INFERRING OF MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY CONCLUSIONS : AND THERE IS POSSIBILITY OF FINDING A REASON WHICH IS CONCOMITANT (NOT-SEPARARLE) WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONCLUSION (DEDUCED FROM AN INFERENCE)."-(1457-1459)
COMMENTARY.
Inference for one's own sake cannot be right because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative,-like the Wrong Cognition. Here is a Wrong Cognition based upon a three-featured Indicative]— The eye and other organs are for the purpose of other persons, becanse they are composite things ; like the Couch, the Seat and such things'; this is a wrong cognition, being subversive of a desirable idea, but brought about by a three-featured Indiontive; and like this the Inference in question also is brought about by a three-featured Indicative, and hence it must be wrong.
Nor can the presence of the Three Features in the Indicative be the means of Inference; because, like the Two Features, they are present also where there is no Inference.
Further, in every reasoning, contradiction of Inference would be possible; for example, it would always be possible to put forward the Inference that
The intended Probandum cannot reside in the Subjeet (Minor Term), because it is a part of the aggregate of all these several factors, like the form svf the Minor Term itself and this would put an end to all Inferences.
Then again, in all cases, when an Inference has been put forward, there is always a possibility of several undesirable contingencies being put forward ; for instance, when the Inference has been put forward that Sound is noneternal, because it is a product, like the Jar', -some one might set up the argument to the contrary, that just as the reason asserted proves the non. eternality of Sound, so does it also prove the fact of its not being the quality of Akasha', and so forth.
Lastly, in every case, it is possible to find a Reason that is concomitant with the contrary of the desired Conclusion; for instance, the inference having been put forward, that Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar', some one may put forward the following reasoning which is concomitant with and proves) the contrary of this conclusion-Sound is

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
eternal, because it is perceptible by the Ear, like the universal Sound'. Several such examples may be found in the Tattuaţika.-(1457-1459)
Bhartyhari argues (against Inference) as follows:
TEXTS (1460-1462).
** CONDITION, PLACE AND TIME BEING DIFFERENT IN REGARD TO
DIFFERENT POTENCIES, THE COGNITION OF THINGS BY MEANS OF INFERENCE IS NOT ATTAINABLE-EVEN IN THE CASE OF A THING WHOSE POTENOY IS WELL-KNOWN, THAT POTENOY BECOMES RESTRICTED IN REGARD TO PARTIOULAR EFFECTIVE ACTIONS, BY BECOMING RELATED TO PARTICULAR THINGS-EVEN WHEN A CERTAIN CONCLUSION HAS BEEN DEDUCED WITH GREAT CARE, FROM AN INFERENCE, IT MAY BE PROVED TO BE OTHERWISE BY OTHER MORI INTELLIGENT AND CLEVER PERSONS WELL-VERSED IN THE ART OF REASONING "-(Vākyapadiya, p. 16).—(1460-1462)
COMMENTARY
The potency of things varies with their Condition, Time and Place; hence no definite conclusion can be got at regarding them by means of Inference ; for instance, it is not possible to be convinced that 'Devadatta is unable to bear the burden, because he is Devadatta, like Devadatta in the state of childhood : here there is a possibility of the man's potency having changed, hence the reasoning becomes 'indecisive - Similarly, difference in the place makes a difference in the taste, strength and ripening of the Amalaki, the Kharjüra and other fruits ; hence it cannot be argued that all Amalaki fruits are astringent, like the Amalaki I am tasting now,' -Similarly difference of lime leads to variations in the coolness and other properties of the water of the well, and hence it cannot be right to argue that all water is cool', and so on.
Avasthädēshākälānăm':-the Genitive ending goes with bhēdāt': and the Genitive in Bhavnām 'goes with prasiddhi
Then again, the Fire's capacity to burn, which is manifested in the case of graiss, is set aside as against the mass of clouds; and there can be no such reasoning as- The mass of Clouds is burnt by Fire, because it is earthy (+). like the grass'.
Further, when one man has proved a certain fact, another man, more clever, proves quite the contrary of it; this cannot be desirable.-(14601462)
Another writer argues as follows:

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TEXTS (1463-1467).
* Inference for the benefit of another CANNOT BE A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNI
TION, BECAUSE IT IS ONLY A REITERATION SO FAR AS THE SPEAKER HIMSELF IS CONCERNED; AS THE MAN PUTTING FORWARD THE INFERENCE DOES NOT HIMSELF DERIVE HIS KNOWLEDGE OF THE THING FROM THAT INFERENCE.-FOR TRE OTHER PERSON, TO WHOM THE INFERENCE IS ADDRESSED, THE COGNITION SO DERIVED COMES TO BE for his own sake; BECAUSE WHAT DIFFERENCE IS THERE BETWEEN THE COGNITION DERIVED THROUGH THE EAR AND THAT OBTAINED THROUGH THE Eyes 1-SO FAR AS THE OTHER PERSON IS CONCERNED, THE STATEMENT OF THE INFERENCE) CANNOT BE REGARDED AS Inference for the sake of another; BECAUSE IT FALLS WITHIN THE CHAIN OF COGNITIONS PRODUCED BY THE EAR, AND BECAUSE IT IS A MEANS OF COGNITION,-LIKE THE SENSE-ORGAN NOR IS THERE ANY DIRECT INDICATION OF THE OBJECT INFERRED ; HENCE, LIKE THE IDEA OF THE RELATION OF INVARIABLE CONCOMITANCE, IT CANNOT BE A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION-IF IT BE EXPLAINED THAT—"IT IS CALLED for the sake of another, BECAUSE IT LEADS TO THE ACTIVITY OF THE OTHER PERSON", --THAT ALSO CANNOT BE RIGHT : BECAUSE IN THIS WAY), THE Inference for one's oum benefit ALSO MIGHT BE REGARDED AS 'FOR THE SAKE OF ANOTHER LAS TRAT ALSO MIGHT LEAD TO THE ACTIVITY OF OTHER PERSONS)." (1463-1467)
COMMENTARY
Inference for the sake of others cannot be a means of right coguition, because it is only a reiteration, so far as the speaker himself is concerned.
As regards the other person to whom the Inference is addressed, for him, the cognition so derived turns out to be for his own benefit ; what difference is there between the cognition of a thing derived through the Ear and that derived through the Eyes? Just as, when one's Visual Organ is operative, the resultant cognition is not spoken of as being for the benefit of others, so also it cannot be spoken of as such if the cognition is derived through the operation of the Auditory Organ.—The term 'darshana' stands for the Visual Organ, the term being derived as dyshyatë anëna', that whereby a thing is seen'.- Samvit'--stands for cognition.
Similarly, so far as the other person is concerned, to whom the Inference is addressed, the statement of the Inference cannot be said to be for the sake of others because it falls within the chain of cognitione produced by the Ear,-or because it is a means of cognition, like the Sense-orgun.-The compound Shrotrsantānādi' contains the statement of two reasons; and yatha indriyasya.cites the corroborative Instance,
There is another argument also —So far as the other person is concerned, the statement of the Inference in question cannot be said to be for the sake of another, because it does not directly indicate the object

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TATTVASANGRAHA
CHAPTER XVIII.
inferred.-like the cognition of the relation of Invariable concomitance,
Tasmàti.e. because it does not directly indicate the object inferred. What is meant is that becanse it is not directly indicative of the inferred object, therefore the statement cannot be regarded as a means of Right Cognition,-it being like the Cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance,--,e. the Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum ; and the cognition of an Indicative which is so related to the Probandum (is not by itself the Means of Right Cognition).
If it be explained that it is said to be for the benefit of another because it leads to the activity of the other person ", -even so it cannot be right; because in that sense the Inference for one's own benefit may also be for the benefit of others; because "another is a relative term ; just like the term * other side':-(1463-1467)
The above arguments are answered in the following
TEXT (1468).
WHEN THE INFERENCE IS SPOKEN OF AS BROUGHT ABOUT BY THE THREEFEATURED INDICATIVH', WHAT IS MEANT TO BE INDICATED IS THAT IT IS COMPATIBLE (WITH THE REAL STATE OF THINGS); AND THIS SAME (compatibility) is WHAT CHARACTERISES THE Valid Cognition ; WHY
THEN IS IT DENIED 1-(1468)
COMMENTARY.
First of all, the author points out the contradictory character of the Probans in the first argument propounded in Text 1457-viz. : Because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative ".- What is meant is that it is compatible, etc. etc':-that is what is meant to be indicated is that it is compatible; the sense being that, because the cognition that proceeds from the Tlıree featured Indicative is indirectly appurtenant to the thing concerned, it is not incompatible, just like Sense-perception, as has been asserted in the following statement-Inasmuch as the Probans and the Probandum are indirectly appurtenant to the Thing, and are entirely free from any wrong notions regarding it, there can be nothing deceitful about it.
This same':-i.e. compatibility; as has been thus declared- The cognition that is not incompatible is right (or valid)'. In the case of Sense-perception also, even for one who admits its validity—there is nothing that can be pointed out as determining its validity, except this absence of incompatibility; and this same condition is present in the case of the cognition proceeding from the three-featured Indicative; why then is the validity of the cognition brought about by the Three-featured Indicative sought to be denied, on the ground of its being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative ?
What is indicated by this is the incongruity between the Probandum and the Probans (as put forward by the Opponent (in 1457). For instance, where there is the character of being brought about by the three-featured Indica

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tine, thero is absence of incompatibility and where there is absence of inconipatibility, there is validity; and validity and invalidity are mutually exclusive,
the incompatibility consisting in the fact that where the one is present the other cannot be present and where the one is absent, the other is present; so that by implication the Probans put forward by the Opponent is contradictory :-(1468)
The following Tecls proceed to show that the Corroborative Instance (cited by the Opponent in 1457, that of Wrong Cognition') is devoid of the Probandum :
TEXTS (1469-1471).
WHEN THE WRONG COGNITION, AS 'SUBVERSIVE OF WHAT IS DESIRABLE,
IS SPOKEN OF AS BEING SIMILAR', THE SIMILARITY' MEANT MUST BE ONLY THAT OF THE VIEW OF THE FIRST PARTY,-AND NOT real SIMILARITY ; BECAUSE AS REGARDS THE REAL STATE OF THINGS, THE COGNITION IN QUESTION HAS BEEN DEFINITELY FOUND TO BE not incompatible; IN FACT, IT IS IN VIEW OF THIS FACT THAT IT IS A VALID ARGUMENT AGAINST WHAT IS DESIRED BY THE DISTUTANT. — THUS THE REASON ADDUCED IS FOUND TO BE CONTRADICTORY :AND THE CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE ALSO IS FOUND TO BE DEVOID OF THE PROBANDUM, IN THE SAME WAY, IN THE SECOND ARGUMENT, THE PROBANS IS 'INADMISSIBLE':-(1469-1471)
COMMENTARY
As proving the contrary of what is desired by the disputant, the cognition in question must be valid; otherwise, if it were meant that all coguitions iure invalid and at all times, in regard to another Probandun,—then, such invalidity might affect Sense-perception also. In fact, it has boen spoken of 2** * wrong Cognition', only in reference to the view of the First Party.The term pūrvapaksa' here stands for the paksa', view of the pūrva, the First Party. One who holds the view that the Eye and the rest appertain only to an object which is essentially incapable of any additional features imposed upon it, it is only in reference to the view of such a party that the Cognition could be spoken of as 'wrong': because (under that view) the Eye, etc. have been proved to be the Cause of many fleeting cognitions.
Oontradictory'; because the character of being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative' is never present in any invalid Cognition - and when the cognition so brought about is valid, then the said character is present in that same Cognition which is subversive of what is desired (by the Disputant).
Says the Opponent : When an argument to the contrary is urged against the Materialist, then the Corroborative Instance cannot be one that is admitted (by both parties). The opponent does not admit the validity of tho Cognition of what is subversive of what is desired; and what is not admittod by either of the two parties cannot Horvu u 4 Corroborative Instance.
46

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TATTVASANGBAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties that alone can be cited against the argument of either party."
The answer to this is as follows:- Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words,—yet, tre absence of incompatibility has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied ; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the validity also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned ; consequently, the contradiction that we have urged is in regard to the real state of things, not in regard to the theory of the other party.
Or, the Opponent's Reason may be regarded as contradictory on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason. For instance, the
contradictory Reason would be in the form- What is not incompatible is valid, -e.g. Sense-perception, the cognition brought about by the three. featured Indicative is compatible; [hence it must be valid]' ;-this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself. The Reason here pnt forward cannot be Inadmissible, for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indica tive of validity). Nor can it be 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful), as that would make Sense-jxercoption also invalid.
Asadhyata :-ie. the Instance would be dovoid of the Probandum.
In the second argument' ;-i.e. in the argument "nor cun thu preso of three features, etc. etc.' (urged under Text 1458),
The Probans is inadmissible':--because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent.
'In the same way'-i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Threu-features, etc. etc. (1469-1471)
The following Text provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459):
TEXTS (1472-1474). EXPONENTS OF THE TRUE REASONING HAVE ALL DECLARED THAT THAT
REASON ALONE IS CAPABLE OF PROVING THE CONCLUSION WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROBANDUM) IS KNOWN WITH CERTAINTY,
-SUCH RELATIONSHIP BEING EITHER IN THI NATURE OF sameness of essence OR or being an effect ;--AND AGAINST SUCH A PROBANS, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH DETECT AS THAT OF BEING CONTRARY TO INFERENCE AND SO FORTH, BECAUSE NO SUCH INFERENCE COULD BE POSSIBLE EXCEPT THROUGH essential sameness or being the cause. MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES CANNOT BELONG TO THE SAME THING. CONSEQUENTLY THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF ANY PROBANS WHICH MIGHT BE CONCOMITANT WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONOLUSION.-(1472-1474)
COMMENTARY. Against such a Probans-i.e. in a Probans that is related through esaential sameness and through being an effect.

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Waccept through essential sameness, or being the cause':-.e. except through being the same, or being the Cause.-there can be no Probans (Inferential Indicative): if there were, it would be featureless and not a Probans at all.
It has been argued that-"What is meant to be the Probandum is not present in the Subject (Minor Term)".
The answer to that is that, if the Probandum is not present in the Minor Term, then the aggregate (of the Three features') as a whole is not present in the Prabans; hence on account of the absence of a part of the aggregate, such a Probans would be clearly 'inadmissible.
It has been argued that, in the case of all Inferences, there is possibility of particular Inferences to the contrary ".
This is not right. Because that alone is called Contradictory' which is found to prove the contrary of the desired Probandum, and no particular case is meant to be the Probandum (in the argument under dispute, which is in reference to the definition of Inference). As a matter of fact, in the case of An Inference based on the nature of things, there is no possibility of there being any (valid) Probans proving the contrary : becalise in the same thing, two mutually contradictory properties cannot coexist.-(1472-1474)
on account of the diversity
It has been argued (under 1470) that of Condition, Place and Time, etc. etc."
The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (1475-1477).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, INFERENCE PROCEEDS ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THINGS
WHOSE INDICATIVE CHARACTER 'HAS BEEN PROPERLY ASCERTAINED BY REPEATED EXPERIENCE ; ALL, ELSE IS REGARDED AS "NOT INFERENCE'. SO THAT EVEN THOUGH THE POTENCIES OF THINGS VARY ACCORDING TO THE VARIATIONS OF CONDITION, TIME AND PLACE, YET THE COGNITION OF THINGS BY MEANS OF INFERENCE IS nol unattainable.—AND WHEN A CERTAIN CONCLUSION HAS BEEN DEDUCED, WITH GREAT CARE FROM AN INFERENCE, IT CANNOT BE PROVED TO BE OTHERWISE, EVEN BY CLEVERER PERSONS.(1475-1477)
COMMENTARY.
It is only the well-ascertained Probans that is held to be truly indicative, - not one that is doubtful; e.g. when the presence of Smoke is only suspected, in regard to Vapour, it does not lead to a certain Cognition of the presence of Fire
Question :-"How does the certainty of the Probans come about?"
Answer-By repeated experience : -as is found in persons well-versed in the science of goms, in regard to gems. That is to say, persons who are conversant with the nature of the things concerned, do discern the real Smoke from Vapour : And when they proceed to act after discernment, they

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII,
do actually find Fire-Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail.-the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Prabans, even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time. And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of woll-dis. cerned Probans.--it can never be made otherwise : e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the prosence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.
It has been argued in commentary on 1460, etc.) that-"Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc., -and the Fire burning the Abhrapatala, etc. etc".
But in all these cases, there is no proper Probans at all; as tho three features are not present. The mere fact of not being perceived cannot lead to the idea of the Probana boing excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent; is has been thus declared-Exclusion from that where the Probanduan is known to be absent cannot follow from mere nonperception. In fact, the reality of Invriable Concomitance follows only from the prosence of the relationship either of essential samencss or of being the effect, as hns seou thus declared-Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance--and this follows from Perception, not from No. perception'; and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships—of essential samene88, or of being the effect--is present.---(14751477)
The following might be urged—"How is it known that the wellAscertained Probans never fails ? There is no reason why this shonld be so."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1478).
(a) THERE CAN BE NO NATURE (OR OFARAOTER) WITHOUT A NATURE
(or CHARACTER); (5) NOR CAN THERE BE EFFECT WITHOUT A CAUSE. BECAUSE OTHERWISE) THERE WOULD BE THE INCONGRUITIES OF (a) DEVIATION FROM NATURR, AND (6) 'CAUSELESSNESS. AND WITHOUT THESE TWO (RELATIONSHIPS) THERE CAN BE NO
INFERENCE.-(1478)
COMMENTARY.
There are only two kinds of Probans--(1) Nature of the thing and (2) Being an Effect : 'non-apprehension' being inchided under Nature'. And these two kinds of Probans are not possible except where there is a Probandum, called 'Nature' and 'Cause', -by reason of which there could be 'fallibility' (falsity) in the Probana.
* Why is it not possible ?"

Page #720

INFERENCE
725
* Because otherwise, eto, etc.'.-Thore is copulative compounding between bhéda' and 'animáttata': the sense is that tlie Probans which forms the Nature of the thing would cease to be its nature, and the Probans which is an effect would come to be without cause; and yet no Probans is admitted which forms neither the nature' nor the effect of the Probandum), - except when there is no connection and when there is no Invariable Concomitance.
* Without these two-i.e. as 'nature and as effect'. The word has the Dual Ending.-(1478)
It has been argued (under Team 1463) that "the Inference for another's benefit cannot be valid, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1479-1481). THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED
AS INFERENCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER, ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE, WITH REFERENCE TO THE OTHER PERSON ADDRESSED. BUT THIS INFERENTIAL CHARACTER' CAN ONLY BE SECONDARY' (FIGURATIVE) AND CONVENTIONAL. HENCE THE FACT OF ITS BEING INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE' CANNOT LEAD TO ANY INCONGRUITY.-IF INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OP RIGHT COGNITION, THEN YOUR ASSERTION IS USELESS, INDEED NO DISPUTANT EVER COMPREHENDS WHAT YOU WISH TO SPEAK OF.-(1479-1481)
COMMENTARY.
The statement (of the Inference) has been spoken of as 'for another's benefit', in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.
Even in reference to the listener, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans, and on that account, it leads to the Inference, or on account of Convention, it has been spoken of as 'Inference': this name 'Inference ' being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible. Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the Senseorgan, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as 'Inference for another's benefit'; as in those cases, there is no 'indication of what is possible. It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception. For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (nttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker's wish to speak (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with

Page #721

726
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIIT
anything external (objective): all that the world does is to indicate the presence of Smoke; and it is through Convention that it brings about the conceptual Cognition (associated with words), and hence, in reference to the external thing, it comes to be described as being for the benefit of others'. And when what is meant to be understood is only the Speaker's wish to speak. then it turns out to be for the Speaker's own benefit! Because it is held to be indicative of the Speaker's wish to speak of what contains the Smoke, which is the effect of the statement in question; it is indicative, not expressive, of it; because no other cognition is comprehended from it.
*Your assertion is useless':-.e. the assertion that "Inference is not the means of right cognition " --Because as a matter of fact, from the said statement, no person to whom it is addressed, comprehends what you wish to speak of. This shows that your assertion involves self-contradiction:This has been explained previously.- (1479-1481)
Purandara has argued as follows: What is known as Inference, in the ordinary world, is admitted by the Charākas also: what they deny is that foron of Inference which people have set up, beyond that known in common experience"
This is anticipated and answered in the following
TEXTS (1482-1483).
IF IT BE URGED THAT "WHAT IS ORDINARILY KNOWN AS THE
INFERENTIAL. INDICATIVE IS ACCEPTED BY US, BUT NOT WHAT HAS BEEN SET UP BY OTHERS", -THEN (THE ANSWER IS THAT) EVEN THE ORDINARY MAN UNDERSTANDS WHAT IS THE 'CAUSE', ETO, OF THR Effect, etc.; AND IN REALITY, THIS IS ALL THAT THE MASTERS OF THE SOIENCE OP REASONING ALSO HAVE DECLARED. SO THAT WHEN THE ORDINARY (POPULAR) IDEA IS ACCEPTET), WHAT IS IT THAT BECOMES EXCLUDED :-(1482-1483)
COMMENTARY
The construction is the ordinary man understands, etc. eto.
Effect, etc.'-'Eto.' is meant to include the nature of the thing. - Similarly in 'Cause, etc.', the nature' is meant to be included. In both casos the Plural number has been used in view of individual things.
Thus then, the Inferential Indicative which is understood by ordinary men to be related through the relationship of Nature' and Effect', - is just what has been spoken of by us as the 'Probans'; and when you accept this, what is it that you discard, for which you are den ving the character of Inference (1482-1483)

Page #722

INFERENCE
727
Il night be argued that-"No Inference is admitted by us at all but the other party have accepted it as a Means of Right Cognition and in view of this lattor, our assertion is not useless"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1484).
IF THIS (INFERENCE) IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, THEN WHAT DOES THE OTHER PARTY UNDERSTAND BY IT-OF WHAT SORT TOO WOULD THAT COGNITION BE WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT IS NOT A MEANS OF COGNITION ?
-(1484)
COMMENTARY.
How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inforence as a Moans of Knowledge ! The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Moany of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition 1
Even if there be such a definite Cognition; even so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means ? The uccepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a more whim.
It might be argued that-"Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his onemy and by that same sword fells the enemy, -in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent ".
The answer to this is— Of whal sort, etc. etc.;-what is meant is as follows - If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as Means of Righe Knowledge, what is really not a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is not a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge ? Certainly, if a man has taken up, as sword, what is not-sword, another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous.-- (1484)
Aviddhakarna han argued thus in the Tattvafikā :-"It may be asked By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person ? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea :-But this is not right. Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement ; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person; hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties".
This is the view put forward in the following

Page #723

728
TATIVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII.
TEXT (1485).
“INFERENCE, CONSISTING OF A VERBAL STATEMENT, IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE FOR THE SPEAKER; HE ONLY CONVEYS THE IDEA TO THE OTHER PARTY BY MEANS OF THE STATEMENT."
(1485)
COMMENTARY
He lie the Speaker. Tēna -by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statemont, The above view is controverted in the following
TEXT (1486). A CERTAIN MEANS OF KNOWLINGS IS HELD TO BE not A Means of Knowledge ONLY WHEN IT does not BRING ABOUT THE COGNITION OF WHAT IS NOT ALREADY KNOWN AS FOR INSTANCE, THE INFERENCE THAT YOU HAVE PUT TORWARD, WHICH CONVEYS NO IDEA TO
THE SPEAKER.-- (1486)
COMMENTARY.
When a statement is said to be 'not a means of Knowledge', it is not bu. cause, it conveys the idea to the Speaker,but because it does not convey any information that is not already known. As regards conveying the idea to the Speaker, it is of course there. In the case of your Inforence (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.-Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.
From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Coguition,—just like Sensu-perception.-(1486)
End of Chapter (18) un Inference.
End of Volume 1.

Page #724

INDEX TO TATTVASANGRAHA
ENGLISH TRANSLATION, VOL. I
Abhün, 381. Abhijnipa, 481 615. Abhidhitsuah, 603. Athrapatan, 724. Absolute Destruction, 106.209.
.. Exclusion, 166. . Inconclusive, 165.
Negation, 535, 537. Accomplishment, 591. Acquiring, 129. Action. 139, 260, 285, 394, 400, 421,
588, 616. Action and Roaction. 299. Action-Momont, 302, 314.
-Universal, 450. Active Agent, 152. Adhyakaz (Prayyakş), 627. Aduvita Doctrine of Soul. 213. Affirmation, 234, 492, 518, 594. Agont, 148. Agent and objeot, 302. Agreeable, 666. Aggregate of Intellect, etc., 142. Aggregate, 161, 225. Agriculturist, .. Arkāres, 25. Alorür, 358. Alpädin, 318. All, 528. Alāta, 629. All-embracing, 714. Amusement, 135. Anyāpoha, 596 Annihilation, 240, 241, 242. Another's use, 202. Antagonism-notion of, 269. Ankarmatra, 412. Annuller and Ampulled, 157, 652. Anuortti, 206. Appearance and Disappearance, 194,
197, 581, 102. Apprehension, 310, 669.
47
Apoha, 439, 483, 491, 492, 493, 40
406, 497, 499, 501, 508, 509, 542. 179, 189, 593, 505, 196, 604, 600,
609. Apokak, 07. Apares, 480. Army, 427 Arrangoment, 76, 80, 81. Ardlanisn, 358 Ashitha, 615. Ashvini, 701, Ass. 241. Association, 102. Atoms, 69, 71, 228, 319, 321, 335.
345, 403, 446.
Perceptibility of, 339. Atomie Dimension, 362. Attachment, 58. Attributes. 25. 26, 28, 357. 37. 60, 61, 69. Aurlible 548. Andlitory, 548. Austerity, 481. Auxiliary Causes, 94, Anxiliary, 253, 266. Aviddhakarna-for Theism, 69.
. -142, 235, 321, 3611. 384, 385, 710, 727. Acharya Suri, 116. A kisña, 25, 31, 126, 166, 180, 186,
194, 228, 237, 242, 244, 247, 248, 257, 259, 279, 317, 319, 337, 352,
353, 356, 394, 446, 679. Ajovikas, 252. Amalaka, 367. Anandapravi, 22. Aropita, 18. Astikas, 13. Atman, 142. Ayatana, 17, 18. Almasuarüpan, 182.
Baby, 347.

Page #725

730
TATTVASANGRAHA :
Baleya, 241, Banabhatto, 103 Barbarian, 706. Barren woman, 129, 154, 236, 237, 259,
261, 609. Bauddha, 217, 236, 312, 385, 609. Being, 145, 147, 219, 260, 402, 407,
409, 485, 638. Bhadanta Fogasena, 204. Bharlanta, 226. Bhānuita, 492, 639. Bhavah. 583. Bhavana, 380. Bhavand is Habit, 58. Bhāvivikta, 155, 278, 323, 403.406,
426, 437, 655, 656, 657, 708. Bhuarga, 626. Bharadevija, 696. Bharrhari, 718. Blikkhre, 226, 688. Bitva fruit, 352. Birth, 3, 139, 465.
and Robirth. 16.
-End of, 316. Black Cow, 504 Blue Lotus, 509, 510, 670, 572, 573. Blossod Lord, 15, 16. Bludgeon, 230. Body, 152, 160. Bodhisattva, 23 Body of Convention, 411. Bondage, 131, 215.
, and Liberation, 318. Both-God and Primordial Matter,
101. Bay, 156 Breaking up of Series, 268. Brahman, 122, 123, 126, 127, 128, 129, Braun- sence of Worl.Soinki,
118. , -highest, 119.
+ volves, 125. Brahmana, 29. Breathing, 163, 164. Bahaspati, 716. Buddha, 98, 226. Buddhi, 25, 26, 151, 164, 175, 192,
199, 387. Buddhist, 75, 167, 676. Builder, 80. Burden, 225. Barner, 177.
Camphor, 69). Capacity for Effective Action, 229.
250, 259, 263. Caste, 481. Categories, 17, 330, 416. 364.
-Six, 318. Causation, L. Caus, 29, 146, 108. Causal Relation, 110. Causeless, 106. Cause - Intelligent, 69, 89. Causal Irleation. 23.
+ Potency, 13. Cause and Effect, 33. 37, 290, 295, 298,
312, 315. Ceuse-no recours to. 43.
-Toatorial, 71. Cossation. 242. Chun, 594. Chain, 170, 714. Chaitany, 164, 175, 176, 192. Charity. 9. 355. Charactorless, 152. Characteristic, 205. Charwāka, 228, 716, 725. Chmitra's Son. 240. Ohastr, 351. Chains of Attachment, ct, 293 Chain, 207, 490, 591. Chaitra, 695. Character, 724. Chitta, 151, 355. Chitrāngrada, 622, Clay, 125. Clincher, 93. Cloth, 325. Cogniser, 140, 143, 145, 187, 189.
187, 512, 601. Cognisable, 597, 600, 601. Cognition, 60, 129, 139, 144, 145,
149, 167, 172, 175, 181, 230, 308,
479, 547, 559, 629. 038, 087, 674. Cognition-Joint, 78.
+ -Eternal, 214, 215. Cognitive Moment, 107. Coherenco, 481, 487. Collective Dotermination, 480. Colour, 140, 147, 149, 176, 056, 662,
684, 695. Colour-phane, 221. Combination, 594 Combustible, 177.

Page #726

INDEX
731
Cow, 500, mo8. Creation, 72, 91, 1936. Creator, 73, 98. Creatorship, 97, Oronting, 104. Create, 228. Curd, 55. Cycle of Birth and Death, 316.
htning into existence, 300. Common Elount, 546. Catamonalty, 512, 113, 511, 142, 552. Cumphrion, 1:3-. 138. Compouliuin of True Doctrines, 1, 11,
13. 14. Compmont, 346. Composites, 209,329, 324, 341, 345, 346,
347, 381. Comprehensivo Notion, 429. Concealment, 232. Comoeption, 52. 300. Conceptual Entity, 161, 650.
Content551, 61,5, 616. 017, 811, 8:20. 694. 62.5, 638, 630,
633, 654, 650, 657, 668, 676. Conceptul filon, 54, 650.
Reflection, 572 Perception, 643.
Thought, 606 Canonitance, 81. Concurrent. 86. Cort lition, 718, 793. Configuration, 476. Conglomoration, 360. Conjunet, 380. Conjunction, 344, 369, 371, 394, 444,
460. Connection, 14, 587. Cook(x), 410, 420, 423, 500. Co-ordination, 319, 571, 579. Consciousness, 07, 09, 61, 85, 120.
139, 110, 144, 155, 199, 215, 311. 610, 811, 613.
turnal, 213, 214. Consecutively, 150. Constructive, 19. Consecutivo, 86. Conleet, 396. Container-Contesinod, 452, 456. Contrary Charactor, 93. Contradictory, 85. Controller, 101. Continuance, 581, 582. Convention, 153, 351, 405, 407, 410.
427, 470, 473, 550. 635. Conventional Conception. 411. Copper, 243. Corroborativo Instance, 88, 113, 150. Cormio Intelligence, 25, 26, 27, 32, 37,
196, 197, 199, 200.
Dancing Girl, 150, 631. Dāra, 584. Death, 139. Decay, 3. Definite Cognition, 157. Delusion, 161. Denoted, 531, 566. Denoter-Denoteil Rolation, 566, 367, Desire, 140, 146, 158, 193, 198. Desireci, 580. Dosire to Spoak, 480. Dependent, 112, 375. Denoted and Denotative. 517. Denotability, 607, Destiny, 134, 356, 700. Dostructive, 19. Destruction, 147, 166, 183, 229, 230,
231, 232, 233, 235, 237, 238, 239,
241, 242, 265, 268, 494, 581, 686. Destructive Cause, 230. Destructive and Productive o
Momento, 288. Destroyer and Destroyed, 268. Detorminato Judgmont, 552, 576.
* Concoption, 562, 670. Deudatta, 87. Devatā, 480. Dharma, 14, 15, 17, 23. Dharmakirti, 10. Dhātri, 408, 552. Dhava, 585. Drátu, 17, 18. Dhoumsa, 238. Diamond, 272. Difference, 105, 639, 653. Different, 233. Different-Non-difforont, 220, 265. Digambara, 204, 635. Dimension, 366, 369. Dirināga, 186, 471, 532, 537, 618, 619,
620, 623, 124, 625, 627, 661, 708. Disease, 3. Disjunction, 371, 373, 394.

Page #727

732
TATTVASANGRAHA :
Dissatisfaction, 61 Dissociation, 241. Dissolution, 103, 132, 134. Dissolving, 104. Dispositions, 189, 190. Disruption, 233, 238, 239, Distinctive charactor, 18+. Distributiveness, 205. Diversity, 605. Doctrine of Both God and Primordial
Matter, 101. Doctrina of 'Worl-Sound'. 118.
Pursa', 132.
Soul'. 130, » Thing by Tteoll, 108, 112. Doer, 139, 160, 185, 286, 207.
. and Experiencer, 12, 317. Donkey. 241. Doubt, 45. Droam, 130, 139, 278. 603, 658. Dream-ond, 278, Dull-witted men, 198.
Eternal, 186. Evancent and NOIL-VALLO Cent, 243. Bex, 527. Evan, 603. Evolution, 131. Evolve, 25. Excluclel, 198, 602, 603. Exclusion, 166, 1:3, 53, 530), 101.
559, 564, 571, 500, 593, 594, 95,
008, 623, 626. Exclusiveries, 205, 203. Existonco, 147, 157, 241, 332, 33, 103.
. -only oporuliun, 303. Existont Effect, 48. Existence atul Noit-existoire. 310. External, 562, 578,570, 009, 619. External World, 21. 675. Extornality, 5ől. Experiancor, 106, 185, 186. Exporiences, 194. Lye, 694.
Earth, etc., 143. Effoct, 107, 131, 700. Effect-Existen, 28.
-non-existont, 39, 40, 41, 4).
-manifestation of, 47, 1-subsists in Cause, 55. Effort, 739. Effnlgent Regions, 91. Efficient Cause, 258. Efficiency, 258. Effective action, 264, 265. Effort, 388. Elorontal substances, 72. Elasticity, 388, 390. Elophanil, 173, 174. Elephant-Universal. 486. Embellishmonts, 16, 508. Emerald, 212 Entiroty, 351, 577. Entity, 107, 140, 223, 244, 644. Enjoyer, 139, 103, 196. Enlighteneil Ono, 98. Entity, 602, 660, 704. Error, 661. Essence, 107. Earence of things, 52. Eternality, 223, 608. Eternal Sentence, 165.
. Cognition, 599.
Faculties, 488. Falling, 693, Fantacios, 21. Father, 697, 698. Feelings, 59, 199. Feminine, 580. Figuring, 602 Final Clauso, 25. Final Conclusion, 709, 710, T'iro, 177. Firo-brand, 032. Flame, 87. Fleeting Ideas, 8.5. Fluidity, 244, 388. Foolish poraona, 08. For Benefit of othors, 670. Form, 211, 002. Forest, 587. Formloss, 31, 147, 219, 220. Four-fonturer. 681. Fruit, 672. Fruitful activity-Capacity for, 250. Futile Rejoinder, 81, 83.
Gavishvayol, 504. Cauaya, 491. Gendor, 523, 579. Generic character, 64. Generalised Perception, 715.
-Rolationship, 713.

Page #728

INDEX
733
Gemorality. 139. Go, 8. God, 2, 86, 91, 92, 93, 04, 05, 96, 97.
102, 132, 135, 136, 248, 257,
564, 660. -Doctrine of, 58, 75. -Cognition of, 87.
- Primordial Matter, 102, 104, 105, 106. Going, 400, 401. Going up-Going down, 394. Grace of Blessel Loril, 11, Gravity, 388. Great Teacher, 687. Group, 384, 385. Group of Sontencer, 12. Group of Sixtoen, 25. Gud oht, 148.
Habity 58. Happiness, 182, 185. Haro-holdor, 692. Hare's Horus, 108, 141, 234, 236, 238,
262, 517, 643, 684. Haritki, 408, 633. Hatred, 388. Hant, 475. Hoavor, 84. Herumahat, 526.
work of Laksanakāra, 570. Highest Goodl, 13, 15, 110, 129. Himülnya, 161, 377, 436, 441, 472. Hiranyarbha, 22. Homogeneos, 32, 638, Homogeneity, 63. Honey, 549. Horse, 501. Horns, 84. Home's Horn, 473. House, 89.
Illuminator, 144. Illusion, 130, 180, 189, 488, 538, 658,
650. 661. Illusory Conception, 151, 152. Illusory, 566, 600. Imperceptibility, 176. Impressions, 187, 388, 389, 809, 663. Immediato Sequence, 304, 300. Impartite, 211. Iminovoables, 453. Impossibility of the Positive, 670. Import, 494, Import of Words, 166, 470, 480, 181,
487, 495, 497, 504. Impressions, 516.
Il-notion of, 167, 187, 188. Inactive, 8. Inconclusiveness, 88, 209. Inconclusive, 166. Indefinite Conception, 157, Indicative Cause, 116.
. Character, 723.
.. Roason, 115. Indotorminato Perception, 337. Individual, 477, 679, 715. Individuality, 139, 260, 513, 494. Infallible, 700. Inforence, 93, 149, 150, 278, 633, 679,
712, 727 -For ono's own benefit, 717. - othors, 704, 719, 735. -Based upon Perceived
Particulars, 714, Inferred Particulars, 715. Infinite Regres, 97. Inforontial Indicative, 166, 611, 555,
671, 690, 699, 701, 726. Inherenca, 139, 253, 450, 457, 464.
. of Existence, 259. Initial Stage, 266. Inheritance, 484, 488. Injunction, 592. I-principle, 25, 26, 27. Instance per dissimilarity, 88. Instrument, 668. Intelligent Cause, 86. Intelligent Being, 90. Intelligence, 170, 171. Intervolved Wheel of Causation, 1,
15, 16, 314, Intuition, 497, 543. Intermittent Action, 90.
I-Consciousness, 151, 155, 156, 157,
162, 168, 169, 188, 190. Idea, 167, 405, 411, 415, 482, 602. Idealism, 495. Telealist, 338, 656, 691. Idealistic form of things, 802. Identity, 207, 262, 454. Ignorance, 16, 130, 148, 604, 661. I know, 167.
•

Page #729

734
TATTVASANGRAIA :
Invariable Concomitano. 83, 84. 03.1
682, 0R3, 730. Ishwaraks, 25.
Jnyal, 85. Juimini, 00, 269, 445. Jaina, 204, 206 Jira, 14. Jalil, 583. Jnana, 151, 175, 387. Jeya, 525. Joint Cognition. 76, Jujubo Fruit, 146.
Lamo anul Blind. 195. Lamp. 383,687, 699. Large, 387. Latont, Potney, 53, Liberation, 130, 195, 911, 20:3. Light Effulgent, 130. Lightning, 283, 549 Lily, 70. Limits, 61. Lirig. 19. Lion, 156. Lokāyata, 21. Long, 367. Lord-Care of Wurk, H.
Lutus, 109, 702. Luminous Regiutas, m. Lunar Gom, 139,
Kadambari, 103. Kadamba flower, 279. Kalpanā, 615, 619, 623. Kala, 258 Kalmāşa, 595. Karida, 318. Kapite, 25. Karaka, 152. Karka, 633. Karma, 17, 163. Karmio Residue, 91. Kastha, 358. Katyāynna, 478. Kaya, 151. Keshondraka, 667. Khadira, 669. Knowable, 597, 601.
Kila' denoting improbabil , 103. King's officer, 520. Kodravci-reed, 29. Koszparmartha-Suplati, 294, Kyrika, 701, 702. Karena, 245, 246, 368. Katnika, 245, 246. Kumiril, 166, 171, 182, 180, 273, 275,
286. 307, 308, 313, 38, 493, 408. 517, 527, 539, 543, 544, 553, 557, 556, 561, 562, 563, 564, 66, 566, 569, 670, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 501, 592, 593, 594, 596, 506, 517, 601, 602. 603, 608, 636, 645, 646. 647, 148, 640, 668, 669. 671, 711, 712, 713, 714.
Madhyamiker, 691 Mahal, 25. Mahüdaya, 22. Mahashuetá, 167 Man's Horns, 554. Maintaining, 104. Manifest ani Manifestell, 460, Manifest, 26, 27, 32, 33, 34, 37, 57, 62
690. Maker, 101. Malla-ost, 26. Manifestation of Effect, 17, 602. Manifested Things 63.
... World, 72, 73. Mansions, 368. Masculine, 580. Mass of worls, 228 Mas, 345. Material Coue, 71, 117. Mans of Right Cognition, 611, ne,
6711, 679, 073, 675. Moang of Knowlerige, 797,728. Montal Illusion, 632, 600, 661.
Perception, 865, Mercy, 29. 23. Merit-Demerit, 71, 92, 134, 139, 392, Merit, 196. Mercifal One, 224. Middlemoot State, 45. Milk, 55, 200. Mimum.saka, 170, 174, 175, 183, 204,
364. -Conception of Soul, 164.
Lakparus, 619. Laksana-Author of, 558.
-Hetumukha his work, 570.

Page #730

INDEX
735
Mincl-Contact. 399. Mi, 354, 358, 392. Minel (i.. Cognition), 565, Minor Term, 706, 707. Mirror, 172, 177, 178, 179. Misconception, 45, 378, 604. Mobilo, 16. Modification, 31, 38, 186, BRO, Moment, 286, Momontorinors. 129, 182. 207. 285. Momentary, 228, 244, 269, 489, 600.
Existence, 238.
Character, 418. Momentum, 388, 389, 391. Moona-Two, 613. Moon, 660, 703. Moon-ness, 692. Mother's marriage, 111. Mouthless Persell, 92. Mouthlescu, 92, Movement, 17. Mule, 659. Mutual help, 266. Mysties, 12, 216, 404, 447, 66, 666,
668. Mystiu vision, 278.
Niruzkichyem, 581. Nirubhagati, 179. Nişëdha, 633. Non-apprehension, 110. Non-entity, 609. Non-etornality, 83, 196. Non-conceptual, 640, 65+. 666. Non-existence, 113, 413. Non-existent, 515. No-Soul, 15, 160. 167. 287. Non-perception, 114, 503. Non-Cow, 507, 608. Non-difference, 645, Non-entities, 565. Not-cognition, 667. Not-momentary, 180. Number, 126, 127, 205, 363, 305, 388
380, 430, 579, 586. Nyiybirds, 11. Nyaya, 140. - Sutra, 359, 387, 476, 708, 700.
Bhäsya, 709. Nyāyazārtika, 92, 95, 137, 141, 160,38).
384, 386, 390, 627. Nyyamukha, 618, 635. Nyāyavaishexika, 139.
Nairat., 14. N yayika. 83, 1455. 157. 106. 203.
370, 478. Narvanı, 603. Name, 52, 119, 204, 400, 41). 410,
616, 620, 624, 634. Name-Sound, 119. Na-na-pachali. 524. Narasimha, 211, 212, 688. Näsha, 582 Nature, 19, 58, 257, 602, 606, 724. Nästiteya, 224. Nasau na pachals, 594. Need, 304. Negation, 107, 233, 234, 433, 426,
434, 511, 513, 563, 564,
600, 604.
-Absolute, 635. Negative, 605. Nogativing, 606. Negation of Negation, 514. Nigamana, 709. Nirmalsikam, 160. Niralmakam, 160, 16L. Niruleta, 245.
Objectlers. 612. Object, 60, 125. Obstacle, 548.
Om', 118, Omniscient Being, 24, 260.
Person, 99, 144, 262, 600, Omniscience, 97. 98. Omipresence, 143, 155. One featured Probang, 681, 683, 684,
698. One ness. 98, 150, 207, 609. Operation, 304. Operator, 155. Ordainer, 134. Origination, 183. Otherwise Impossiblo, 687.
Pachati, 590. Padurcha, 416. Paddy, 29. Padarthapraveklu, 33). Palace, 369. Panini, 478, 599. Particles, 525. Particulars, 74, 403, 548.

Page #731

736
TATTVASANGRAHA:
Probana, 10. 115, 116, 079, 6B0, 681,
707 Produced, 669, 671. Product, 147, 193, 230, 252, 669, 671. Prorluctive Reason, 115. Proof, 114. Productive Cause, 116. Products of Primor linl Matter, 26. Production of things. 54. Prompter of activity, 10. Proper Name, 621, 622. Proposition, 705, 707, 700. Prosperity, 119, 120, 13. Psychical Concepts, 158, 206. Pwgrla, 217, 218, 220, 254, 25551 Purvindara, 726. Purpose, 3, 12, 14, Purist-doctrine of, 132.
. -Cause of the World. 132. Paruapaks, 721.
Quality, 17, 139, 280, 360, 415, 430.
530, 571, 617. Qualification-Qualified, 432, 610, 617.
Paryuddaa, 533. Patrasvamin, 680, 681, 182, 688, 689,
691, 693, 194, 696, 697. Perceived Particulars, 715, 716. Perception, 60, 112, 157, 195, 214.
278, 632. Perfect Cause, 94. Perishable, 199. Porpetual Flux, 178, 227. 228. 260.
270, 273, 274, 285, 287, 292, 390,
394, 568, 681, 714, 716. Personality, 25. Pervasive, 114, 844. Permanence of things, 237, 249, 318. Permanent thing, 250, 251, 252, 253,
256, 257, Phenomenon, 18. Place, 718. Pleasure, 57, 113, 169, 277, 388, 665.
666, 723. Plurality, 517 Positive, 529, 660, 605. . Entity. 689. Potenay, 55, 56, 66, 105, 106. 180.
694, 718. Potentiality, 28. Potter, 87. Posteriority, 353, 357.381. Prablanjana, 702. Prrumaya, 525. Prashastamati, 72, 73, 97, 98, 135, 447,
456, 458, 459. Pratitya, 23, 176. Pralityam pada1. 23. Prakrri, 3, 26. Pratynyn, 18. Predhānn, 25, Pratyek-Budidhus. 144. Predamed, 233. Promiss, 707 Primordial Matter-triple essonce, 103.
2, 22, 25, 26, 32, 33, 34, 37, 02, 65, 67. 71, 102, 104, 105, 131, 192, 194. 195, 198, 199, 227, 604, 691. Principal character, 424. Priority, 353, 357, 38). Preclusion, 234. Pre-cognition, 645, 651. Primary Elemental Substances, 73. Prior Negation, 432. Probandum, 85, 116.
Rajar-aspect, 103, Rajas-attribute, 33, 60. 103, Re-affirmation, 707, 708, 709. Rerlisty 487, 656. Reason, 91 Recalling, 148. Rocognition, 76, 167, 181, 270, 272,
273, 275, 278, 292, 388. Receptacle, 146. Reductio ad absurdum, 248. Reflected Object, 703. Reflected Image. 589, 602, 607. Rafloction, 178, 179, 197, 136, 538,
660, 562, 568, 568, 579,693. 009,
610, 612, 616, 703, 704. Rojecting, 129. Relation, 462. Relative, 462 Relative Negation, 590. Remembrance, 149, 278, 290, 409,
632, 665, 715. Representative Cognition, 278. Representment, 706, 709. Revelation, 22. Right Doctrine, 16. Rock-crystal, 179, 323, 328.

Page #732

INDEX
7:37
Rokini, 701, 702. Rudimentary Substances, 25, 26, 34.
Saffron, 328. Saints, 23. Sameness, 605. Samanyan, 402, 583. Sämänyatodysta, 711, 713. Sameness of Form, 666, 670, 675, 704,
722, 724. Şannagari, 585, Sarijña, 206 Sarkhya, 25, 30, 35, 36, 105. 184, 172,
193, 199, 200, 486, 689. -refutation of, 36.
-Kärika, 195, 200. Sanskara, 70. Samevaya, 450. Samutpada, 23. Sapalsa, 706. Satisfaction, 61. Sarua, 528. Sattua aspeet, 103.
-attribute, 33, 60, 103. Sauträntika. 657. Scripture, 6, 224. Seed and Sprout, 305. Self-recognition, 673. Self-sufficiency, 106, 134.
Soul, doctrine of, 139. » Cognisable, 155.
► of Mimamsuke, 164. Semblance, 662. Sensation, 18, 631.
Pleasure, 603, 104. Seuse-perception, 19, 74, 614, 626,
627, 045, 652, 657, 676, 694, 716. Sequonce-immediate, 55. Sense-organs, 25. Sentence, 12, 64, 164. 186, 192, 193,
194, 199, 205, 172, 201. Separateness, 370. Series, 168. Severalty, 577 Serpent, 165, 188. Shabara, 170, 688, 712.
. bhäsya, 712. Shollannya, 119. Shankarastāmin, 140, 342, 349, 350,
414, 420, 425, 426, 433, 667, 673. Shape, 663. Sharira, 151.
Shashalânchhana, 684. Shişād vibhāsā, 599. Shauri, 138. Shimeapa, 249. Skiva, 22. Shlokavārtika, 167, 170, 171, 174.
182, 184, 189, 342, 849, 350, 414, 430, 585, 145, 146, 147, 648, 649, 650,
669, 671, 672, 711, 712, 713. Shravaka, 144. Shruti, 489. Shrutamayi, 71. Shyāmāla, 162. Sileata, 585. Silver, 691. Similarity, 642. Simultaneity, 249, 267, 630, 665. Singularity, 608. Sitharana, 24. Six Categories. 339. Skandhas, 17, 20, 23. Sky-lotus, 28, 94, 105, 107, 132, 219,
240, 262, 517. Solar Disc, 327. Soul. 2. 139, 140, 143, 146, 151, 154,
155, 159, 160, 164, 168, 180, 182, 185, 188, 192, 193, 194, 195, 204,
208, 295, 679, 684. Soul, according to Vätsiputriyas, 217. Soul.les, 142, 156, 162, 210, 604, Sound, 176, 393, 686. Sound-Essence, 123.
-Word, 118. -Letter, 118. -Form, 120. -ideality of, 121. -Cognition of, 121. -Eternal, 124.
-Modification of, 124. Space, 205, 257, 354, 357, 389. Spaggalakxana, 19. Speaker's Wish, 698. Specifie Individuality, 17, 130, 404,
468, 470, 473, 474, 175, 484, 499, 505, 517, 533, 535, 553, 554, 573, 610,
634, 645, 648, 650. Spider, 132, 137. Spirit, 43, 64, 132, 192, 194, 197. 201 Spotted Cow, 504. States, 183, 185. Sthitik, 582. Sihilisthapaka, 388, 890.

Page #733

738
TATTVASANGRAHA :
Truth, 216. Tuchchhata, 58). Two-featured, 683. Two Moons, 661.
Subjective, 665. Subject matter, 4, 14. Succession, 249, 251, 257. Successive Factors, 204, 205, 208, 209,
211. Subsistence, 360, 361, 371. Subsistent, 348, 605. Substance, 14, 147, 204, 206, 200, 211,
260, 318, 343, 352, 353,
356, 403, 487, 478, 574.
-Universal, 459. Substratum, 74, 146.
of Universals, 78. Sun, 343. Sumati (Jain water), 635, 136, 637, 638,
641, 142, 644. Superior Person, 6. Supersensuous Things, 11. Supreme Lord, 103. Svarga, 480.
Taimirz, 662. Tairthika Philosophers, 218. Tamas-aspect, 103.
--Attribute, 33, 60, 103. Tanmatras, 25. Taste, 178. Tatxika, 718, 727. Tayin, 18. Teachership, 92. Teachings, 8, 7. Tomaples, 80. Theist, 86, 90, 94, 98, 99. Theism. 68 Theistic Sankhya, 25, 103. Thing by Itself, 108, 110, 553, 561,
637. Time, 21, 136, 205, 248, 247, 353, 357,
381. Tirobhavanam, 582. Thorn, 109. Thought-phases, 217, 221, 225. Three-featured, 601, 697, 704, 720,
726. Time, 718, 723. Tongs-Pair of, 302. Transformation into Reflection, 181. Transference, 160. Treatise, 12. Tree, 444. Tribhuxına, 585. True Doctrines, 13.
Udd yotakara, 71, 72, 93, 94, 136, 140,
141, 152, 155, 156, 159, 160, 161, 226, 236, 237, 242, 245, 279, 282, 313, 323, 340, 348, 352, 372. 374. 407, 423, 131, 432, 460, 471, 476, 527, 528, 581, 532, 537, 677, 578,
603, 606, 709. Ultimate Inclividualities, 102, 46, 449. Ultimate Goad, 98. Uncommon entity, 512, 521. Unbelief, 221. Uniqueness, 892. Unclean character, 48. Unnauilest, 26, 27, Unseen Force, 134, 392, 393. Unmodifiable, 31, 102, 203, Uniform Entity, 149, 542. Universals and Particulars, 467. Universal Dissolution, 72. Uncreated, 228. Universal, 74, 227, 281, 318, 402, 417,
418, 428,431,432,433, 134, 135, 439, 113, 477, 484, 485, 496, 512, 522. 540, 548, 554, 563, 568, 577, 582, 583,687, 596, 604, 607, 609, 617, 618, 633, 640, 641, 649, 060,
675, 704, 715. Great, 434.
Highest, 442. Unproven, 85. Unthinkable, 180. Upalabdhi, 387. Upūdhi, 17. Upanaya, 707. Upanisade, 161, 213. Usage, 470, 473, 691. Utpådah, 589.
Vaibhāsika, 242, 301, 490. Vana, 585. Vaishesika, 360, 451, 587, 614, 684, 866. Varsa, 585. Väkyapadiya, 119, 718. Validity, 663.

Page #734

INDEX.
739
Viacidity, 388. Visual Perception, 635. Volition, 61, 199. Void, 495, 644 Vyāvrtti,, 206. Vyadi, 478.
Valid Cognition, 720. Variegated character, 223, 500, 520. Vaubandhu, 224. Vāteiputriya's Doctrine of Soul, 217,
228. Vascina, 390. Verr, 119. Verbal Expression, 53, 414, 614.
Cognition, 278, 511, 597 Verb to be ; 485. Verbal Casuistry, 578. Vega, 388. Velocity, 388. Verbs, 523. Pijnanuddin, 495. Vindhyaväsin, 37, 713, 714. Vindhya Mountain, 114, 161, 377,
435. Vipaka, 706, 707. Vipina, 584. Visibility, 686, 698, 699. Vishesatodraga, 711, 714 Vişnu, 22, 138. Visual Cognition, 77, 109, 110, 491,
536, 558. Visual Perception, 599, 661, 695. Vision of the Body of Being, 189. Vishēscu, 446. Vishesanu, 626.
White Horse, 633. Wheel of Causation, I, 2, 14, 17, 19.
20, 21, 22, 23, Whirling Fire-brand, 632. Words, 606, 616, 685. Word-sound-origin of the World
118. Word-highest, 118.
-Essence of, 118.
-122, 518, 538, 569. ,, -Import of, 466. Word and Indicative, 503. World-Effect of Sound, 131. Wrong Cognition, 278, 717, 721.
Yarns, 326. Yellow Conchshell, 661. Yoga, 25, 61, 216. Yogāchard, 657. Yoga-sena, 264. Yogin, 129.

Page #735


Page #736

Gaekwad's Oriental Series
) CATALOGUE OF BOOKS
1937
ORIENTAL INSTITUTE, BARODA

Page #737

SELECT OPINIONS
Sylvain Levi : The Gaekwad's Series is standing
at the head of the many collections now published in India.
Asiatic Review, London: It is one of the best
series issued in the East as regards the get up of the individual volumes as well as the able
editorship of the series and separate works. Presidential Address, Patna Session of the Oriental
Conference: Work of the same class is being done in Mysore, Travancore, Kashmir, Benares, and elsewhere, but the organisation at Baroda
appears to lead. Indian Art and Letters, London: The scientific
publications known as the " Oriental Series" of the Maharaja Gaekwar are known to and highly valued by scholars in all parts of the world.
Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London:
Thanks to enlightened patronage and vigorous management the "Gaekwad's Oriental Series" is going from strength to strength,
Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt.: The valuable Indian
histories included in the “Gaekwad's Oriental Series" will stand as an enduring monument to the enlightened liberality of the Ruler of Baroda and the wisdom of his advisers.
The Times Literary Supplement, London: These
studies are a valuable addition to Western learning and reflect great credit on the editor and His Highness.

Page #738

GAEKWAD'S ORIENTAL SERIES
Critical editions of unprinted and original works of Oriental Literature, edited by competent scholars, and published
at the Oriental Institute, Baroda I. BOOKS PUBLISHED.
Rs. A. 1. Kavyamimāṁsā: a work on poetics, by Rājasekhara
(880-920 A.D.): edited by C. D. Dalal and R. Anantakrishna Sastry, 1916. Reissned, 1924. Third edition revised and enlarged by Pandit K. S. Ramagwami Shastri of the Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1934
2-0
her of Paloh Chandra of Guzerata edited out of prio
This book has been set as a tect-boole by several Universities including
Benares, Bombay, and Patna. 2. Naranārāyaṇānanda : & poem on the Pauranic story of
Arjuna and Krsna's rambles on Mount Girnar, by Vastupala, Minister of King Viradhavala of Dholka, composed between Samvat 1277 and 1287, i.e., A.D. 1221 and 1231 : edited by C. D. Dalal and R. Anantakrishna Sastry, 1916 .
Out of print. 3. Tarkasangraha: a work on Philosophy (refutation of
Vaiseșika theory of atomic creation) by Anandajõâna or Anandagiri, the famous commentators on Sarkaracārya's Bhásyas, who flourished in the latter half of
the 13th century: edited by T. M. Tripathi, 1917. Out of print. 4. Pārthaparākrama: & drama describing Arjuna's re
covery of the cows of King Virāta, by Prahladanadeva, the founder of Palanpur and the younger brother of the Paramāra king of Chandrăvati (& state in Marwar), and & feudatory of the kings of Guzerat, who was a Yuvaršja in Samvat 1220 or A.D. 1164: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1917,
.. Out of print. 5. Rāstraudhavamsa : an historical poem (Mahakāvya)
describing the history of the Bägulas of Mayūragiri, from Rastraudha, king of Kanauj and the originator of the dynasty, to Nārāyana Shâh of Mayūragiri, by Rudra Kavi, composed in Saka 1518 or A.D. 1596 : edited by Pandit Embar Krishnamacharya with Intro. duotion by C. D. Dalal, 1917 ..
Out of print. 6. Lingānušāsana : on Grammar, by Vamana, who lived
between the last quarter of the 8th century and the first quarter of the 9th century: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1918 .
0-8 7. Vasantavilāsa: an historical poem (Mahākā vya) de
scribing the life of Vastupala and the history of

Page #739

Rs. A. Guzerat, by Balachandrasūri (from Modheraka or Modhera in Kadi Prant, Baroda State), contemporary of Vastupāla, composed after his death for his son in
Samvat 1296 (A.D. 1240): edited by C. D. Dalal, 1917 1-8 8. Rūpakasatkam: six dramas by Vatsarija, minister of
Paramardideva of Kalinjara, who lived between the 2nd half of the 12th and the 1st quarter of 13th cen
tury: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1918 .. Out of print. 9, Mohaparājaya: an allegorical drama describing the
overcoming of King Moha (Temptation), or the conversion of Kumārapala, the Chalukya King of Guzerat, to Jainism, by Yasahpala, an officer of King Ajayadeva, son of Kumărapăla, who reigned from A.D. 1229 to 1232 : edited by Muni Chaturvijayaji with Introduotion and Appendices by C. D. Dalal, 1918
2-0 10. Hammiramadamardana: a drama glorifying the two
brothers, Vastupala and Tejahpāla, and their King Viradhavala of Dholka, by Jayasimhasuri, pupil of Virasūri, and an Acārya of the temple of Munisuvrata at Broach, composed between Samvat 1276 and 1286 or A.D. 1220 and 1239: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1920 ..
2-0 11. Udayasundarikatbā : & romance (Campū, in prose and
poetry) by Soddhala, a contemporary of and patronised by the three brothers, Chohittarija, Nāgārjuna, and Mummunirája, successive rulers of Konkan, composed between A.D. 1026 and 1050: edited by C. D. Dalal and Pandit Embar Krishnamacharya, 1920
2-4 12. Mahavidyāvidambana: a work on Nyāya Philosophy,
by Bhatta Vádindra who lived about A.D. 1210 to
1274 : edited by M. R. Telang, 1920 13. Prācinagurjarakāvysangraha : a collection of old
Gazerati poems dating from 12th to 15th centuries A.D.: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1920 ..
.. 14. Kumārapālapratibodha: a biographical work in
Prakrta, by Somaprabhācharya, composed in Samvat
1241 or A.D. 1195 : edited by Muni Jinavijayaji, 1920 7-8 15. Ganakārikā : & work on Philosophy (Pasupata Sohool),
by Bhagarvajña who lived in the 2nd half of the 10th
century: edited by C. D. Dalal, 1921 .. 16. Sangitamakaranda: a work on Music, by Närada :
edited by M. R. Telang, 1920 .. 17. Kavindrācārya List: list of Sanskrit works in the
collection of Kavindricărya, a Benares Pandit (1656 A.D.): edited by R. Anantakrishna Shastry, with a foreword by Dr. Ganganatha Jha, 1921 ..
0-12 18. Vārāhagshyasūtra : Vedic ritual (domestic) of the
Yajurveda: edited by Dr. R. Shamasastry, 1920 . 0-10 19. Lekhapaddhati a collection of models of stata and nri
vate documents, dating from 8th to 15th centuries A.D.:

Page #740

Rs. A. edited by C. D. Dalal and G. K. Shrigondekar, 1925 ..
2-0 20. Bhavişayattakahā or Pañcamikah : & romance in
Apabhramsa language, by Dhanapala (circa 12th cen
tury): edited by C. D. Dalal and Dr. P. D. Gune, 1923 6-0 21. A Descriptive Catalogue of the Palm-leaf and Im
portant Paper MSS. in the Bhandars at Jessalmere, compiled by C. D. Dalal and edited by Pandit L. B. Gandhi, 1923
3-4 22. Paraśurāmakalpasūtra : a work on Tantra, with com
mentary by Ramešvara : edited by A. Mahadeva Sastry, B.A., 1923
Out of print. 23. Nityotsava: a supplement to the Parasurāmakalpasūtra
by Umānandapātba: edited by A. Mahadeva Sastry, B.A., 1923. Second revised edition by Swami Tirvik.
rama Tirtha, 1930 24. Tantrarahasya: a work on the Prabhākara School
of Purvamimams, by Rámānujäcārya : edited by Dr. R. Shamasastry, 1923
Out of print. 25, 32. Samarāngaña: a work on architecture, town.
planning, and engineering, by king Bhoja of Dhara (11th century): edited by Mahamahopadhyaye T.
Ganapati Shastri, Ph.D. Illustrated. 2 vols., 1924-1925 10-0 26, 41. Sadhanamālā: a Buddhist Tantric text of rituals,
dated 1165 A.D., consisting of 312 small works, composed by distinguished writers: edited by Benoytosh Bhattacharyya, M.A., Ph.D. Hlustrated. 2 vols., 19251928 ..
.. 27. A Descriptive Catalogue of MSS. in the Central
Library, Baroda : compiled by G.K. Shrigondekar, M.A., and K. S. Ramaswami Shastri, with a Preface by B. Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., in 12 vol., vol. I (Veda,
Vedalaksaņa, &nd Upanisads), 1925 28. Mānasollāsa or Abhilaşitārthacintāmaņi : an enay
olopædic work treating of one hundred different topics connected with the Royal household and the Royal court, by Somesvaradeva, a Chalukya king of the 12th century: edited by G. K. Shrigondekar, M.A., 3 vols., vol. I, 1925 ..
.. .
2-12 29. Nalavilāsa: a drama by Ramachandrasūri, pupil of
Hemachandraguri, describing the Paurānika story of Nala and Damayanti: edited by G. K. Shrigondekar, M.A., and L. B. Gandhi, 1926
2-4 30. 31. Tattvasangraba: a Buddhist philosophical work
of the 8th century, by śānteraksita, a Professor at Nalanda with Pañjikā (commentary) by his disciple Kamalasila, also a Professor at Nalanda : edited by Pandit Embar Krishnamācbārya with a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, M.A., Ph.D., 2 vols., 1926., 24-0

Page #741

Rs. A.
19-8
5-0
33. 34. Mirat - 1 - Ahmadi: by Ali Mabammad Khan, the
last Moghul Dewan of Gujarat: edited in the original Persian by Syed Nawab Ali, M.A., Professor of Persian,
Baroda College, 2 vols., illustrated, 1926-1928 . 35. Mänavagrhyasūtra : & work on Vedic ritual (domestic)
of the Yajurveda with the Bhásya of Astāvakra: edited with an introduction in Sanskrit by Pandit Ramakrishna Harahaji Šāstri, with a Preface by Prof. B. C. Lele, 1926 ..
.. 36, 68. Nātyaśāstra : of Bharata with the commentary of
Abhinavagupta of Kashmir: edited by M. Ramakrishna Kavi, M.A., 4 vols., vol. I, illustrated, 1926, vol. II, 1934
Vol. I (out of print). 37. Apabhrarsakavyatrayi: consisting of three works,
the Carcari, Upadeśarasa yana, and Kalasvarūpakulaka, by Jinadatta Sāri (12th century) with commentaries : edited with an elaborate introduction in Sanskrit by
L. B. Gandhi, 1927 38. Nyāyapraveśa, Part I (Sanskrit Text): on Buddhist
Logio of Dinnāga, with commentaries of Haribhadra Sūri and Pārsvadeva: edited by Principal A. B. Dhruva, M.A., LL.B., Pro-Vice-Chancellor, Hindu University,
Benares, 1930 .. 39. Nyāyapraveśa, Part II (Tibetan Text): edited with
introduction, notes, appendices, etc., by Pandit Vidhusekhara Bhattacharyya, Principal, Vidyabhavana, Vis
vabharati, 1927 . 40. Advayavajrasangraha : consisting of twenty short
works on Buddhist philosophy by Advayavajra, a Buddhist savant belonging to the 11th century A.D., edited by Mahămabopadhyāya Dr. Haraprasad Sastri,
M.A., C.I.E., Hon. D.Litt., 1927 60. Kalpadrukośa : standard work on Sanskrit Lexico
graphy, by Keśava : edited with an elaborate introduction by the late Pandit Ramavatara Sharma, Sahityacharya, M.A., of Patna and index by Pandit Shrikant Sharma, 2 vols., vol. I (text), vol. II (index),
1928-1932 43. Mirat-i-Ahmadi Supplement: by Ali Muhammad
Khan. Translated into English from the original Persian by Mr. C. N. Seddon, I.C.S. (retired), and Prof. Syed Nawab Ali, M.A. Illustrated. Corrected reissue,
1928 . 44. Two Vajrayāpa Works : comprising Prajñopěyavinis
cayasiddhi of Anangavajra and Jnanasiddhi of Indrabhūti-two important works belonging to the little known Tantra school of Buddhism (8th century
A.D.): edited by B. Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., 1929 .. 45. Bhāvaprakasana: of Sáradátanaya, & comprehensive
work on Dramaturgy and Rasa, belonging to A.D. 1175-1250 ; edited by His Holiness Yadugiri Yatiraja Swami, Melkot, and K. S. Ramaswami Sastri, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1929
1-8
2-0
14-0
6-8
3-0
7-0

Page #742

4-8
Rs. A. 46. Rāmacarita : of Abhinanda, Court poet of Háravarsa
probably the same as Devapäla of the Pāla Dynasty of Bengal (cir. 9th century A.D.): edited by K. S. Rama
swami Sastri, 1929 47. Nanjarājayasobhūsana ; by Nrsimhakavi alias Abhi
nava Kalidasa, a work on Sanskrit Poetics and relates to the glorification of Nañjarija, son of Virabhūpa of
Mysore: edited by Pandit E. Krishnamacharya, 1930 5-0 48. Nātyadarpana : on dramaturgy, by Rāmaoandra Sūri
with his own commentary: edited by Pandit L. B. Gandhi and G. K. Shrigondekar, M.A. 2 vols., vol. I,
1929 49. Pre-Dinnaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from
Chinese Sources : containing the English translation of Satásāstra of Aryadeva, Tibetan text and English translation of Vigraha-vyāvartani of Nagarjuna and the re-translation into Sanskrit from Chinese of U payahr. daya and Tarkasastra : edited by Prof. Giuseppe Tucci, 1930
9-0 50. Mirat-i-Ahmadi Supplement : Persian text giving
an account of Guzerat, by Ali Muhammad Khan: edited by Syed Nawab Ali, M.A., Principal, Bahaud. din College, Junagadh, 1930..
0-0 51, 77. Trişaştisalākāpuruşacaritra: of Hemacandra, trans
lated into English with copious notes by Dr. Helen M. Johnson of Osceola, Missouri, U.S.A. 4 vols., vol. I (Ādiśvaracaritra), illustrated, 1931 ; vol. II, 1937
26-0 52. Daņdaviveka: a comprehensive Penal Code of the
ancient Hindus by Vardhamăna of the 15th century A.D.: edited by Mahamahopadhyaya Kamala Krsna Smrtitirtha, 1931 ..
8-8 53. Tathāgataguhyaka or Guhyasamāja : the earliest and
the most authoritative work of the Tantra School of the Buddhists (3rd century A.D.): edited by B. Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., 1931
..
4-4 54. Jayākhyasamhita : an authoritative Pañcara tra work
of the 5th century A.D., highly respected by the South Indian Vaisnavas : edited by Pandit E. Krishnamacharyya of Vadtal, with one illustration in nine colours
and a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., 1931 . 12-0 55. Kāvyālankārasārasamgraha : of Udbhata with the
commentary, probably the same as Udbhataviveka of Rajánaka Tilaka (11th century A.D.): edited by K.S. Ramaswami Sastri, 1931 .
..
2-0 56. Päränanda Sūtra : an ancient Tántric work of the
Hindus in Sūtra form giving details of many practices and rites of a new School of Tantra : edited by Swami Trivikrama Tirtha with a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., 1931
3-0

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Rs. A. 57, 69. Ahsan-ut-Tawarikh : history of the Safawi Period of
Persian History, 16th and 16th centuries, by Hasani-Rumlu: edited by C. N. Seddon, 1.C.S. (retired), Reader in Persian and Marathi, University of Oxford. 2 vols. (Persian text and translation in English), 1932-34
19-8 58. Padmānanda Mahākāvya: giving the life history of
Reabhadeva, the first Tirthaokara of the Jainas, by Amarachandra Kavi of the 13th century: edited by H. R. Kapadia, M.A., 1932 .
14-0 59. Sabdaratnasamanyaya: an interesting lexicon of the
Nânărtha class in Sanskrit compiled by the Maratha King Sahaji of Tanjore: edited by Pandit Vitthala Sastri, Sanskrit Pathasāla, Baroda, with a Foreword by B. Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., 1932
11.0 1. Saktisangama Tantra: a voluminous compendium of
the Hindu Tantra comprising four books on Kali, Tārā, Sundari and Chhinnamastă : edited by B. Bhatta.
charyya, M.A., Ph.D., 4 vols., vol. I. Kalikhanda, 1932 2-3 62. Prajñāpāramnitās: commentaries on the Prajñāpāra
mitā, a Buddhist philosophical work: edited by Giuseppe Tucci, Member, Italian Academy, 2 vols., vol. I, 1932 .. ..
12-0 63. Tarikh-I-Mubarakhshahi: an authentic and contem
porary account of the kings of the Saiyyid Dynasty of Delhi: translated into English from original Persian by Kamal Krishna Basu, M.A., Professor, T.N.J. College, Bhagalpur, with a Foreword by Sir Jadunath Sarkar, Kt., 1932
7-8 64. Siddhantabindu : on Vedānta philosophy, by Madhusu
dana Sarasvati with commentary of Purusottama:
edited by P. C. Divanji, M.A., LL.M., 1933 . 11-0 65. Istasiddhi: on Vedānta philosophy, by Vimuktåtmä,
disciple of Avyayātmā, with the author's own commentary: edited by M. Hiriyanna, M.A., Retired Professor
of Sanskrit, Maharaja's College, Mysore, 1933 .. 14-0 66, 70, 73. Shabara-Bhāşya : on the Mimāmsā Sūtras of
Jaimini : Translated into English by Mahāmahopādhyāya Dr. Ganganath Jha, M.A., D.Litt., etc., ViceChancellor, University of Allahabad, in 3 vols., 19331936 ..
.. 67. Sanskrit Texts from Bali: comprising a large num.
ber of Hindu and Buddhist ritualistic, religious and other texts recovered from the islands of Java and Bali with comparisons: edited by Professor Sylvain Levi, 1933 . ..
3-8 71. Nārāyana Sataka: a devotional poem of high literary
merit by Vidyākara with the commentary of Pitämbara : edited by Pandit Shrikant Sharma, 1936.
..
48-0
2-0

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Rs. A. 72. Rājadharma-Kaustubha: an elaborate Smrti work on
Rājadharma, Rājanīti and the reqnirements of kinge, by Anantadeva: edited by the late Mahamahopadhyaya Kamala Krishna Smrtitirtha, 1935 ..
10-0 74. Portuguese Vocables in Asiatic Languages : trans.
lated into English from Portuguese by Prof. A. X.
Soares, M.A., LL.B., Baroda College, Baroda, 1936 1275. Nāyakaratna: a commentary on the Nyāyaratnamālā
of Pärthasarathi Misra by Rāmānuja of the Prābhākara School: edited by K. S. Ramaswami Bastri of the
Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1937 76. A Descriptive Catalogue of MSS. in the Jain Bhan
dars at Pattan : edited from the notes of the late Mr.
C. D. Dalal, M.A., by L. B. Gandhi, 2 vols., vol. I, 1937 8-0 78. Ganitatilaka : of Sripati with the commentary of
Simhatilaka, a non-Jain work on Arithmetic with
Jain commentary: edited by H. R. Kapadia, M.A.,
1937 79. The Foreign Vocabulary of the Quran: showing the
extent of borrowed words in the sacred text: compiled by Professor Arthur Jefferey of the School of Oriental Studies, Cairo.
Shortly 80, Tattvasangraha : of Śāåtarakṣita with the commen
tary of Kamalasila: translated into English by Maha
mahopadhyaya Dr. Ganganath Jhs, 3 vols., vol. I, 1937 17-0 81. Harosa-vilāsa: of Hansa Mitthu : forms an elaborate
defence of the various mystic practices and worship: edited by Swami Trivikrama Tirtha and Mahamahopadhyaya Hathibhai Shastri, 1937
..
4-0
II. BOOKS IN THE PRESS. 1. Nātyaśāstra : edited by M. Ramakrishna Kavi, 4 vols,
vol. III. 2. Mānasollāsa or Abhilaşitārthacintâ mani, edited by G.K.
Shrigondekar, M.A., 3 vols., vol. II. 3. Alamkāramahodadhi: a famous work on Sanskrit
Poetics composed by Narendraprabha Sūri at the request of Minister Vastupala in 1226 A.D.: edited by
Lalchandra B. Gandhi of the Oriental Institute, Baroda. 4. Sūktimuktāvali: a well-known Sanskrit work on
Anthology, of Jalbana, a contemporary of King Krana of the Northern Yadava Dynasty (A.D. 1247): edited by Pandit E. Krishnamacharya, Sanskrit Päthasālā,
Vadtal. 5. Dvādaśāranayacakra : an ancient polemical treatise
giving a résumé of the different philosophical systems with a refutation of the same from the Jain stand

Page #745

Rs. A. point by Mallavädi Suri with a commentary by
Simhasuri Gani: edited by Muni Caturvijayaji. 6. Krtyakalpataru: of Laksmidhara, minister of King
Govindachandra of Kanauj: edited by Principal K. V.
Rangaswami Aiyangar, Hindu University, Benares. 7. Brhaspati Smrti, being a reconstructed text of the
now lost work of Brhaspati: edited by Principal K. V.
Rangaswami Aiyangar, Hindu University, Benares. 8. A Descriptive Catalogue of MSS. in the Oriental
Institute, Baroda: compiled by the Library staff, 12
vols., vol. II (Srauta, Dharma, and Gphya Sūtras). 9. Madhavānala-Kāmakandalā: a romance in old Western
Rajasthani by Ganapati, a Kayastha from Amod :
edited by M. R. Majumdar, M.A., LL.B. 10 Tattvopaplava : a masterly criticism of the opinions of
the prevailing Philosophical Schools by Jayarasbi : edited by Pandit Sukhalalji of the Benares Hindu
University. 11. Anekantajaya pataka : of Haribhadra Suri (c. 1120 A.D.)
with his own commentary and Tippanaka by Murichandra the Guru of Vadideva Suri: edited by H. R.
Kapadia, M.A. 12. Parama-Sam hita : an authoritative work on the
Pancharatra system : edited by Dewan Bahadur S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar, of Madras,
III. BOOKS UNDER PREPARATION.
1. Prajiāpāramitis: Commentaries on the Prajiāpā ra •
mitä, a Buddhist philosophical work: edited by Prof.
Giuseppe Tucci, 2 vols., vol. II. 2. Saktisangama Tantra: comprising four books on Kali,
Tārā, Sundari, and Chhinnamasti: edited by B.
Bhattacharyya, Ph.D., 4 vols., vols. II-IV. 3. Nāyadarpana: introduction in Sanskrit giving an
account of the antiquity and usefulness of the Indian drama, the different theories on Rasa, and an examination of the problems raised by the text, by
L. B. Gandhi, 2 vols., vol. II. Gurjararāsāvali: a collection of several old Gujarati
Rāsas: edited by Messrs. B. K. Thakore, M. D. Desai,
and M. C. Modi. 5. Tarkabhāsa: a work on Buddhist Logio, by Mokşakara
Gupta of the Jagaddala monastery: edited with a Sanskrit commentary by Pandit Embar Krishnama
charya of Vadtal. 6. A Descriptive Catalogue of MSS, in the Oriental
Institute, Baroda : compiled by the Library staff, 12 vols., vol. III (Smrti MSS.).

Page #746

11.
Rs. A. 7. An Alphabetical List of MSS. in the Oriental Insti
tute, Baroda : compiled from the existing card cata
logue by the Library Staff. 8. Nitikalpataru : the famous Niti work of Ksemendra:
edited by Sardar K. M. Panikkar, M.A., of Patiala. 9. Chhakkammuvaeso : an Apabhramsa work of the Jains
containing didactic religious teachings: edited by
L. B. Gandhi, Jain Pandit. 10. Samrät Siddhānta: the well-known work on Astro.
nomy of Jagannatha Pandit: critically edited with numerous diagrams by Pandit Kedar Nath, Rajjyotisi,
Jaipur Vimalaprabhá: the famous commentary on the Kālacakra Tantra and the most important work of the Kalacakra School of the Buddhists: edited with comparisons of the Tibetan and Chinese versions by Giuseppe
Tucci of the Italian Academy. Nişpannayogāmbara Tantra: describing a large
number of mandalas or magic circles and numerous
deities: edited by B. Bhattacharyya. 13. Basatin-i-Salatin : a contemporary account of the
Sultans of Bijapur: translated into English by M. A.
Kazi of the Baroda College and B. Bhattacharyya. 14. Madana Mahārnava: a Smrti work principally dealing
with the doctrine of Karmavipaka composed during the reign of Māndhătă son of Madanapala : edited by
Embar Krishnamacharya. 15. Trişastiśalākāpuruşacaritra : of Hemacandra : trans,
lated into English by Dr. Helen Johnson, 4 vols.,
vols. III-IV. 16. Vivāda Chintamani; of Vachaspati Misra : an authorita
tive Smrti work on the Hindu Law of Inheritance: translated into English by Mahamahopadhyaya Dr.
Ganganatha Jha. 17. Brhaspatitattva: a Saiva treatise belonging to an carly
stratum of the Agamic literature written in old Javanese with Sanskrit Slokas interspread in the text : edited by
Dr. A. Zeiseniss of Leiden. 8. Anu Bhāsya: a standard work of the Suddhadvarha
School: translated into English by Prof. G. H. Bhatt,
M.A. of the Baroda College. 19. Aparajitaprcchă: a voluminous work on architecture
and fine-arts: edited by Mr. P. A. Mankad, L.C.E. 20. Hetubindu: the famous work of Dharmakirtti on Buddhist
logic: edited from MS. discovered at Pattan by Pandit Sukhalalji of the Benares Hindu University.

Page #747

10
Rs. A 21. A Descriptive Catalogue of MSS. in the Jain Bhan.
dars at Pattan : edited from the notes of the late Mr. O. D. Dalal, M.A., by L. B. Gandlii, 2 vols., vol. II.
For further particulars please communicate with
Tu DIREOTOR, Oriental Institute, Baroda.

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11
THE GAEKWAD'S STUDIES IN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.
Rs. A 1. The Comparative Study of Religions : [Contents:
I, the sources and nature of religious truth. II, supernatural beings, good and bad. III, the soul, its nature, origin, and destiny. IV, sin and suffering, salvation and redemption, V, religious practioes. VI, the emotional attitude and religious ideals) by Alban G. Widgery, M.A., 1922
15-0 2. Goods and Bads: being the substance of a series of
talks and discussions with HH, the Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda. Contents : introduotion. I, physical values. II, intellectual values. III, sesthetic values. IV, moral value. V, religious value. VI, the good life, its unity and attainment]: by Alban G. Widgery, M.A., 1920. (Library edition Rs. 5) Immortality and other Essays: (Contents: I, philosophy and lite. II, immortality. III, morality and religion. IV, Jesus and modern culture. Ý, the psychology of Christian motive. VI, free Catholicism and non-Christian Religions. VII, Nietzsche and Tolstoi on Morality and Religion VIII, Sir Oliver Lodge on science and religion, IX, the value of confessions of faith. X, the idea of resurrection. XI, religion and beauty. XII, religion and history. XIII, principles of reform in religion): by Alban G. Widgery, M.A., 1919. (Cloth Rs. 3) ..
2-0 Confutation of Atheism : a translation of the Hadis-2Halila or the tradition of the Myrobalan Fruit: translated by Vali Mohammad Chhanganbhai Momin, 1918 .. 0-14
Conduct of Royal Servants : being a collection of verses
from the Viramitrodaya with their translations in English, Gujarati, and Marathi: by B. Bhattacharyys, M.A., Ph.D.
0-6

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of a
a
in
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D.G.A. 80. CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY
NEW DELHI
Borrowers record. Call No.- Bsal/san/Jha-7974
Author-santa rakṣita.
Title
Tattvasangraha.
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GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY 7974 CALL No._Bsal-s'an Jha D.G.A. 79.