Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 722

INFERENCE
727
Il night be argued that-"No Inference is admitted by us at all but the other party have accepted it as a Means of Right Cognition and in view of this lattor, our assertion is not useless"
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1484).
IF THIS (INFERENCE) IS NOT A MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE, THEN WHAT DOES THE OTHER PARTY UNDERSTAND BY IT-OF WHAT SORT TOO WOULD THAT COGNITION BE WHICH HAS BEEN BROUGHT ABOUT BY WHAT IS NOT A MEANS OF COGNITION ?
-(1484)
COMMENTARY.
How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inforence as a Moans of Knowledge ! The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Moany of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition 1
Even if there be such a definite Cognition; even so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means ? The uccepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a more whim.
It might be argued that-"Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his onemy and by that same sword fells the enemy, -in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent ".
The answer to this is— Of whal sort, etc. etc.;-what is meant is as follows - If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as Means of Righe Knowledge, what is really not a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is not a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge ? Certainly, if a man has taken up, as sword, what is not-sword, another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous.-- (1484)
Aviddhakarna han argued thus in the Tattvafikā :-"It may be asked By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person ? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea :-But this is not right. Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement ; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person; hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties".
This is the view put forward in the following