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CHAPTER VII.
SECTION (D). The Doctrine of Soul' according to the Digambara Jainas.
COMMENTARY The Author now proceeds to refute the soul' postulated by the Dig. ambam (Jnina)
TEXT (311).
Thu Jainas, LIKE THE Mimamsakas, ASSHOT THAT THE PERSON (SOUL) IS CHARACTERISED BY SENTIENCE'; THAT, IN THE FORM OF 'SUBSTANCE, IT is inclusive, AND IN THE FORM OT
SUCCESSIVE T'Acroks', IT IS exclusive.-(311)
COMMENTARY
Jainas', i.e., the Digambaras.—They assert as follows:-" The Soul is characterised by Sentience only, and in the form of Sustance, it remains the same under all states, and as such is inclusive (comprehensive) in its nature; while in the form of successive factors, being distinct with each state, it is
exclusive in its nature. This two-fold character of the Soul is cognised by direct Perception, and hence does not stand in need of being proved by other proofs. Thus that Sentience which is found to continue to exist through all the states, even though these states are diverse, in the forms of Pleasure and the rest, -is substance'; while tho successive factors consist of the diverse states which appear one after the other; and all these are distinctly perceived".
Such is the view of the other party (the Digambara Jainas).- (311)
The reputation of this viow proceeds with the following
TEXT (312) UNDER THIS VIEW ALSO, IF THE unmodified SUBSTANCE IS CONNECTED WITH THE Successive Factors, THEN THERE IS NO DIFFERENCE (OHANGE) IN IT, AND, IN THAT CASE, IT COULD NOT BE
LIABLE TO MODIFICATION.—(312)
COMMENTARY
There are two opinions possible:-(a) The Substance that exists in the form of Sentience may be connected with the successive factors in its um.