Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 42

DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
47
or of 'Cause and Effect (Producer and Product). The former is not possible in the case in question ; because the two factors concerned not rendering any help to one another, the said relation of Container and Contained' is not possible ; even if there were any help rendered, if that Help were something distinct from the two factors, then the Connection itself conld not be there ; so that there would be an infinite regress. If, on the other hand, the Help were not so distinct, then the operation of the Cause would be futile; as the Definite Cognition (Effect) itself would have brought about the Pecaliarity, which, ex hypothesi, is not distinct from the said Help.--Then agnin, the 'Peculiarity being something incorporeal, it would not be possible for it to fall downwards, and as such, it would not need a 'container' (or receptacle, support), because a receptacle' can only serve the purpose of preventing this downward fall (due to gravity).-Nor is the relation of Cause and Effect possible (between the Effect and its Peculiarity'); because the Cause in the shape of the Definite Cognition being aluvys there, it would be possible for the peculiarity to be produced aluxys, which is absurd. Nor world it be right to hold that the production of the Peculiarity by the Definite Cognition would be dependent upon the actual operation of the Cause. Because there can be no dependence upon what renders no help ; and if there is help rendered, then the theory becomes open to the objection and infinite regress urged above.-Further, this Peculiarity that is held to be produced as something distinct,-is it existent or non-ecistent (prior to the operation of the Cause)! These two horns of the dilemma present them. selves here also. If the Peculiarity is something non-existent, then, as urged above, all the reasons (put forward by the Sarikh ya) become invalidated. If, on the other hand, it has been existent, then there is no use for the Cause. -If in regard to the Manifestation also, a further manifestation were postulated, there would be nothing to prevent the infinite regress as to what this further manifestation is and so forth.-Thus, even on the alternative of the two being distinct, there would be non-connection' -and as tliere would be no connection (relationship), any production of peculiarity! in the nitture of the Effect would not be possible.-(26)
TEXT (27)
THE MANIFESTATION OF THE EFFECT CANNOT CONSIST IN ITS Apprehension ; NOR IN the removal of what was obstructing its Apprehension; BECAUSE THE APPREHENSION IS A CONSTANT FACTOR, AND ALSO BECAUSE THERE IS NO POSSIBILITY OF A SECOND
(APPREHENSION), -(27)
COMMENTARY.
It cannot be right to regard the manifestation' (of the Effect) as consisting in the appearance of the cognition of the Effect; because the Cognition of the Effect is a constant factor. For instance, this cognition of the Effeet must, under the theory of the upholder of the theory of the Effect being