Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 153

168
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VII.
momentarineas and other properties; because the Perception of these things is always indeterminale (vague, undefined) in character, and as such not conducive to any definitely certain cognition; and hence there can be no definitely certain cognition of their momenlariness and such other properties.In your case however, it would not be right; because the notion of 'T' is welldefined and definite (according to you) and hence of the nature of a definitely certain cognition,-so that the notion of the Soul also would be definitely certain ;-and where a thing has been the object of a definitely certain cognition, there can be no room for any assumed conception to the contrary ; by virtue of which any dispute could arise; specially as when there are two contrary notions, one must annul the other. In fact, it is in the very nature of definitely certain cognitions regarding their objects, that they bring about well-ascertained notions of their objects; so that, if they do not bring about these well-ascertained notions, it follows that they do not apprehend the objects at all. (216)
Having thus demolished the Opponent's doctrine, the Author proceeds to set forth his own view :
TEXTS (217-218).
TAUS IT FOLLOWS THAT DESIRE AND ALL THE REST CANNOT SUBSIST IN THE SOUL';-BECAUSE THEY APPEAR SUCCESSIVELY,-LIKE THE 'SEED-SPROUT-CREETER'.-OR, ALL PSYCHICAL (SUBJECTIVE) CONCEPTS MUST BE REGARDED AS HAVING THEIR FORMS OBSESSED BY ABSENCE OF SOUL',-BECAUSE OF SUCH REASONS AS BEING THINGS BEING EXISTENT" AND SO FORTH.-JUST LIKE THE JAR AND
OTHER EXTERNAL OBJECTS.-(217-218)
COMMENTARY.
The argument is to be formulated as follows Things that are produced successively can not subsist in the Soul,-0.g. Seed-Spront-Creeper Pleasure and the rest are produced successively : hence they are found to be besot by a concomitance to what is denied (by the Opponent); because
successive origination' is invariably concomitant with 'subsistence in what is not-Soul', which is contrary to subsistence in the Soul' (which is what is desired by the other party). Aronson annulling the desired conclusion is also available in the fact that the appearance of effects must be simultaneous when the cause is present in its perfect form.
Or,-there is also a more direct reason :-Things that are ondowed with the chnracter of being things, being products, having origin, and so forth, all these are devoid of the Soul',-as is found in the case of such things as the Jar and the like ;-and all such subjective (psychical) concepts as the Mind, Intellect, Pleasure, Pain and the rest appearing in the Living Body, are endowed with the said character of being things and the rest;