Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 154

(A) NYĀYA DOCTRINE OF THE SELE',
159
[hence they cannot have any connection with any such thing as the Soul).-(217-218)
Question--"In what way is this invariable concomitance (Premiss) established "
The answer is provided in the following Text :
TEXT (219).
IF THE THINGS IN QUESTION WERE CONNECTED WITH THE SOUL, THEN THE THINGS CAUSED BY THAT (SOUL) WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS ETERNAL; AND BEING ETERNAL, THEY WOULD YET BE POWERLESS FOR EFFECTIVE ACTION. CONSEQUENTLY IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE FOR THEM TO HAVE THE PROPERTIES OF EXISTENCE AND THE
REST.-(219)
COMMENTARY
If the things in question are connected with the Soul-if the Body and the rest wore controlled by the Soul,--then this Soul would be their 'Cause'; ay what is not a Cause cannot be a controller ; as otherwise there would be an absurdity. And the Body and other things cansed (produced) by that Sonl, having their Cause always present in its perfect form, would have to be regarded as eternal,- i.e. not successive.
The following might be urged: "If they are held to be eternal,even so they retain their character of being things and so forth.
The answer is given in the words and being eternal, etc. etc.' ;-i.e. being cternal, the Body and the rest would have to be regarded as powerless in bringing about any effective action. The word 'prasajyale' (singular) of the Grst line being transformed, in this construction, to the plural form [Prasajyata ' as applied to the second line being construed as 'Prasajyante').
-The sense is that in the case of an eternal thing, any effective action, either successive or simultaneous-is incompatible. And on the cessation of the power for effective action, they cease to be things' (entities); because
capacity for effective action is the characteristic of all Entities (Things), And when the character of being Entities has ceased, there is cessation of the other characteristics of Entities also,-such as having existence and the like; and thus the invariable concomitance becomes duly established.-(219)
Uddyotakara argues as follows:-"What is it that is meant by (the Living Body] being not connected with the Soul ?-a) If it incans that the Body does not serve any useful purpose for the Soul,—then, there can be no Corroborative Instanco (such as would be accepted by both parties); as (according to us) there is nothing that does not serve a useful purpose for a Soul.- (0) If again, what is meant is simply the denial of the Soul, the meaning of the proposition being that the Soul is not the Body', then our answer is