Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
Universal and other qualifications are different as well as non-different (from the qualified), but not absolutely different, or absolutely non-different. He has asserted as follows:-"As their cognitions are distinct, Colour, etc. cannot be one and the same; what is held is that they are one as well as diverse, as conceived in the form of Being (when they are one) and in the form of Colour, etc. (when they are diverse)" -(Shlokavārtika, Senseperception, 158). He has again assorted that-"For us, the Universal and the rest are not other than the Individual "-(Shlokavārtika, Senseperception, 141).- Paratvam', difference ', here stands for other than'.
In keeping with itself-i.e. tinged with the form of the qualifying factors; as the qualification is so called only because it brings about the apprehension of the qualified thing which is tinged by the qualifying factor; otherwise, it would not be & qualification et al; as it has been declared that-'The Qualification is so called because it colours the qualified thing with its own cognition':-(1296)
The following might be urged :-"As a matter of fact, the subsequent cognitions envisage both (the Universal as well as the Particular), inasmuch as what they apprehend is the Particular as characterised by the Universal; so that they cannot be said to apprehend the Specific Individuality only ".
The Answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1297).
ONE AND THE SAME COGNITION CANNOT COMPREHEND BOTH THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY AND THE UNIVERSAL, BECAUSE, IF SUCH A COGNITION WERE 'CONCEPTUAL', THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE FORMER, ON THE OTHER HAND, IF IT WERE OTHERWISE, THERE COULD BE NO COMPREHENSION OF THE
LATTER. (1297)
COMMENTARY.
It is not right that one and the same Oognition should apprehend the Specific Individuality as well as the Universal.-Because, would that Cognition be Conceptual or Non.conceptual? If it were Conceptual. Determinate.there could be no apprehension of the former,-i.e. the Specific Individuality.-If otherwise, i.e. if it is Non conceptual, then there could be no apprehension of the latter '-.e of the Universal.-(1297)
It has been proved that if the subsequent Cognitions apprehend the Specific Individuality, they must be 'Non-conceptual --The Author now proceeds to show that-even granting that the said cognitions are Conceptual', as they would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended (by the previons Non-conceptual Cognition), no validity could attach to those Cognitions :