Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 646

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 651
TEXT (1298). ON ACCOUNT OF THERE BEING XO ABSOLUTE DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE UNIVERSAL AND THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY),-IP THE UNIVERSAL AND OTHER PROPERTIES HAVE BECOME ALREADY APPREHENDED BY THE INITIAL COGNITION, THEN THE SUBSEQUENT COGNITION WOULD BE APPREHENDING ONLY WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED,AND IT WOULD THUS BE LIKE
REMEMBRANCE.-(1298)
COMMENTARY. The Universal and the rest are not regarded as absolutely distinct from the Individual; as has been declared by Kumarila (in Shlokavārtika, Senseperception, 141) that The Universal and the rest are not anything other than the Individual". Under the ciroumstances, as the Universal and the rest will have been already apprehended by the initial (non-conceptual) Pre-cognition, the subsequent definite (conceptual) cognition of the same Universal and the rest would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended,-and thus being like Remembrance, it must have to be regarded as invalid.
This argument may be formulated as follows :-The Cognition apprehending what has been already apprehended cannot be valid, -e.g. Remembrance the conceptual Cognition following on the wake of Perception apprehends what has been already apprehended ;-hence there is perception of a character contrary to the wider notion (of validity).-(1298)
[Says the Opponent) _“If the Reason adduced here is that "the Universal, etc. are already apprehended as differentiated from all imposition (Doubts and Misconceptions),- then it is one that is not admitted'; if it means that they are apprehended somehow, then it is Inconclusive, in view of the character of Inference"
This is the argument that is set forth in the following
TEXTS (1299-1300). " (AT THE INITIAL STACE), THERE IS ONLY A VAGUE IDEA OF SEVERAL
UNIVERSALS, AND THERE IS NO DEFINITE IDEA OF ANYTHING; THE DEFINITE IDEA COMES ONLY LATER; AS THIS APPREHENDS THE THING AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM ALL IMPOSITIONS (DOUBTS AND MISCONCEPTIONS). JUST AS INFERENCE APPREHENDS THE OBJECT AS DIFFERENTIATED FROM IMPOSITIONS, SO ALSO DOES THE (LATER) DEFINITE COGNITION."-(1299-1300)
COMMENTARY. "At the first stage, the Thing is apprehended by Pre-cognition only in a vague, not in the well-defined form; the well-defined cognition comes only