Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 90

DOCTRINE OF GOD'.
95
Uddyolakara has argued as follows:-" Though the cause of Things named 'God' is eternal and perfect and always present, yet the producing of things is not simultaneous, because God always acts intelligently and purposely; if God had produced things by His mere presence, without intelligence (or purpose), then the objection urged would have applied to our doctrine. As a matter of fact however, God acts intelligently; hence the objection is not applicable; specially as God operates towards Products solely by His own wish. Thus our Reason is not Inconclusive."
This is not right. The activity and inactivity of things are not depen. dent upon the wish of the Cause; only if it were so that the appearance of all Effects would not be possible, even in the constant presence of the untraminelled Cause in the shape of God, simply on account of His wish being absent. The fact of the matter is that the appearance and non appearance of things are dependent upon the presence and absence of due efficiency in the Cause. For instance, even though a man may have the wish, things do not appear, if he has not the efficiency or power to produce them; and when the Cause in the form of Seeds has the efficiency or faculty to produce the Sprout, the Sprout does appear, even though the Seed has no wish at all. I then the Cause called 'God' is always there fully endowed with the due untrammelled efficiency, -as He is at the time of the producing of a particular thing, then why should Things stand in need of His wish, which can serve no purpose at all? And the result of this should be that all things should appear simultaneously, at the same time as the appearance of any one thing. Thus alone could the untrammelled causal efficiency of God be shown, if things were produced simultaneously. Nor can God, who cannot be helped by other things, stand in need of anything, for which He would need His wish.
Further, in the absence of Intelligence, there can be no desire for anything else, -and the Intelligence of God you hold to be eternally uniform ; so that, even if God acted intelligently, why should not there be a simula taneous production of things? Because like God Himself, His Intelligence also is always there. If then, His Intelligence be regarded as evanescent, even so, it must co-exist with God, and its presence must be as constant as God Himself; so that the objection on that score remains in force.
Thus the addition of the qualification, in the form because of God's Intelligence', -turns out to be futile; and our Reason is not . Inconclusive, Nor is the Reason "Contradictory', because the Probans is present in all cases of the Probandum.
And yet the production of things is not found to be simultaneous; hence the conclusion must be contrary to that desired by the Theist.
The argument may be formulated as follows 'When a certain thing is not found to be produced at a certain time, it must be taken to be one whose Cause at that time is not untrammelled in its efficiency,-ag is found in the case of the Sprout not appearing while the Seed is still in the granary ;
These are not the exact words of the Nyüyavārtika; it is a paraphrase of what has been there said under Sütra 4. 1. 21, p. 466, 1, 8, and p. 467, 1. 10 st. seq., Bib. Ind. Ed.