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346
TATTVASANGRAIA CHAPTER X.
OR (B)-TE SUBSTANCB IN QUESTION CANNOT SUBSIST IN SEVERAL COMPONENTS, BECAUSE IT IS ONE,-LIKE THE ATOM.—AND (C) IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUBSISTENCE WOULD BE THE PROOF ANNULLING THE OTHER PARTY'S PROPOSITION.
-(605-606)
COMMENTARY. The arguments are to be formulated as follows:
(A) That which is diverse cannot be permeated by a singlo substance, e.g. the Jar, the Hut and many other things which are many are not per. reated by any single substance the components in question, such as the yarns, the Hand and other Limbs of the body and so forth, are diverse : hence there is found in these a character which is contrary to the larger term of the Opponent's proposition (i.e. to the components being pormented by the single composite).
Or, (B) What is one must subsist in a single substance, like the single Atom ;-and the substance called composite is one ; hence there is found a charactor incompatible with tho larger predicate of the Opponent's proposition.-This is an argument in the forin of a reductio ad absurdum.
(C) In support of both the above arguments, the author adduces a proof annulling the contrary of the Buddhist's conclusion Impossibility of subsistence, etc. etc.':-.e. the fact that the subsistence of the composite in the components cannot be explained on the basis of any means of Right Cognition serves to annul the conclusion (of the other party).-(605-606)
Question —"Why should there be this impossibility ? ** Answers
TEXTS (607-608). (IT THE Composite SUBSISTED IN THE Components] IT COULD SUBSIST
IN ONE Component, EITHER EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN WHICH IT SUBSISTS IN ANOTHER Component, OR IN SOME OTHER FORM. NO THIRD WAY IS POSSIBLE. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE FOR IT TO SUBSIST IN ONE EXACTLY IN THE FORM IN
WHICH IT SUBSISTS IN ANOTHER; BECAUSE IT IS ALREADY EMBRACED WITHIN ITS FOLD BY THE LATTER. IF IT WERE NOT SO, THEN IT WOULD NOT BE SUBSISTING IN THAT EITHNR.
(607.608)
COMMENTARY. When the one Composite which is embraced-sulysists in one of its components in ono form,-is it in the same form that it subsists in another of its components! Or in some other form I-There are only these two alternatives possible; in fact in any case, there can be no other alternative than the thing being one or the other. The former alternative cannot be