Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XIIL
to subsist in all particular individuals,- our explanation is as follows:- This notion of Cow' (the Universal) has for its object something that subsists in everyone of the individuals ;-because each individual is found to contain the whole form of the thing -like the notion in regard to each individual. The one-ness also of the Universal is fully established. Because even though the Universal subsists in its entire form in every individual, yet it is ons only, because it is apprehended by a cognition of one and the same forrn; just as the exclusion of the Brahmana by such negative terms as nonbrāhmana'.-It cannot be urged against this that this notion of identical form in regard to things that are different must be wrong, and hence it is not right to determine the nature of things on the strength of that notion'.Because there is no defect in the source of this notion; nor is there any subse. quent cognition that annuls this notion. Hence there being none of the causes of mistake, the assertion that it is wrong cannot be right ".
All these argunents have been this formulated (by Kumārila, in Shlokavärtika-Vanavāda 44-49) "The Idea of Cow in regard to the different individual core is based upon the one Universal Cow',-because it manifests the cow and because it is of one form,- just like the notion of the individual Cow.—The Idea of the Cow cannot be based upon the individual Black Cow,-or it must be based upon something other than this individual,--because it is present even when the individual is not present, just as the notion of being made of clay' in regard to the Jar.-The Idea of the Cow' has for its object everyone of the individuals in which it subsists, because it subsiste in everyone of them in its complete form,-just like the notion in regard to each individual.-Even though the Universal subsists in each individual, yet it is only one,-because it is cognized as one-just like the exclusion of the Brāhmana in the case of the negative term (like
non-brāhmana').—The notion of 'one-ness in regard to the Universal Cow cannot be regarded as wrong because there is no defect in its source, nor any subsequent cognition annulling it".
In the first of these arguments, the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum'; because a single Universal Cow' is not admitted; hence the fact of the notion of the one individual cow being based upon that cannot also be admitted. If what is proved is the general fact of its having a single basis, then it is superfluous; bocause it is admitted by us also that the notion is due to the exclusion of the non-coto, which is one only, which serves to distinguish the Cow from all heterogeneous things.
In the argument that the notion of Cow cannot be based upon any particular Black Cow,- if what is denied is the fact of its being produced directly from it, then it is superfluous; because the producing is interposed by the apprehension of the specific peculiarity and the conception of the Convention'. If what is denied is the fact of even indirect production, of the notion from the individual, then the Proposition is annulled by direct experience and the Corroborative Instance is devoid of the Probandum.
Even when what is meant to be proved is that the notion is based upon something other than the individual, if the fact of the notion being due to something else be sought to be proved even when the Black Cow is close by,then this also is contrary to direct experience. Because as a matter of fact,