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TATTVASANGRAKA: CHAPTER VIII.
TEXTS (414-445).
FE AS A MATTEE OF FACT, THERE IS ALWAYS THE Recognition OF A THING IN THE FORM THIS IS THAT SAME', WHEN THE SENSE-ORGAN CONCERNED IS RIGHTLY FUNCTIONING; AND THIS RECOGNITION IS QUITE FIRM AND UNDENLABLE.-THIS THEREFORE IS AN IRREPRESSIELE FACT OF PERCEPTION, WHICH ANNULS ALL THE REASONS THAT HAVE BEEN ADDUCED FOR PROVING THE PERPETUAL FLUX OF
THINGS."-(444-445)
COMMENTARY.
"For instance, in regard to Mountains, the Body, the Diamond and such things, after the proper functioning of the sense-organ concerned, there appears the valid senso-perception called "Recognition',-in the form of * this is that same ,--which rejects the idea of things being momentary Even though it is true that such Recognition is found to appear also in regard to newly grown nails, hairs, grasses, and such things-yot the Recognition regarding the Diamond and such things cannot be invalid, -as it is never annulled. This is what is meant by the epithets firm and undeniable'. What is meant is that the mere fact that the Recognition in the case of Hairbrought about by the Eyes affected by darkness, is invalid cannot lead men with unclouded minds to regard as invalid the direct visual perception of the real Hair, brought about by undimmed Eyes.—The epithet firm' implies the fact of its not being of doubtful character, there being no such doubt Els to whether this is really the same or somothing else. The epithet 'undeniablo' implies the fact of its not being wrong," --(444-445)
The Author answers these arguments in the following
TEXTS (446-447). IX FACT, RECOGNITION CAN NEVER BE OF THE NATURE OF DIRECT SENSEPERCEPTION, BECAUSE THE FORM OF THE THING ITSELF IS INEXPRESSIBLE, AND THE Recognition IS EXPRESSED IN WORDS.-Recognition MUST BE WRONG, AND SENSE-PERCEPTION IS ENTIRELY DIFFERENT FROM IT. TRAT RECOGNITION IS WRONG 15 CLEAR FROM THE FACT THAT IT APPEARS IN THE FORM OF THE NOTION OF "nondifference' WHERE, IN REALITY, THERE
is difference.-(446-447)
COMMENTARY.
The very fact of the said Recognition being of the nature of Perception is not admitted. Because the real character of a Thing' is inexpressible in