Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 60

DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
65
and yet they are not regarded by you as having a single Cause endowed with the same properties.-It might be urged that--" The property of being endowed with Sensience and the like that has been attributed to Spirits, is not in the direct literal sense, but in the indirect, secondary, figurative sense ; and the reason for this lies in the fact that, all Spirits are found to be excluded from insentience' and other such qualities, and hence they are placed under the genus 'Sentient', which stands for the negation or exclusion of Insentience, which is assumed to meet their case; though in reality there is no such genus": -If then, it is only indireet and figurative, then, in regard to the Manifest' also, -as in the case of Spirits-why is the presence of Pleasure, etc. not taken as 'assumed ' in the same way,-without their being preceded and produced by any single Cause endowed with the same qualities –Thus the Probans (Reason) is found to be Inconclusive,
The mention of Spirits is only by way of illustration. In the same manner, Pleasure, etc., being so many modifications of Primordial Matter, are endowed with such qualities as being attributes', 'insentient', 'non. enjoyer' and so forth, -and Primordial Matter and the Spirits are endowed with such qualities as 'Eternality and the like, and yet none of these are preceded and produced by any single such Cause. So the Probans is clearly Inconclusive.-(44)
Thus the Reason (put forward by the Sarikhya)" Because of homogeneity".-has been refuted. Now under the pretext of Re-affirming his conclusion, the Author proceeds briefly to point ont defects in the other reasons (put forward by the Sankhya) :
TEXT (45). THUS, EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF A CAUSE IN THE SHAPE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER', ALL DIVERSITY RELATING TO EFFECTS AND CAUSES AND OTHER THINGS BECOMES EXPLICABLE, ON THE
BASIS OF THE DIVERSITY OF POTENCIES.(15)
COMMENTARY.
It has been asserted (in Sänkhyakūrika, 15) that "Primordial Matter exists as the Cause, (a) because of the finite character of specific objects, (b) because Activity is due to Potency, and (C) because there is differentiation between Cause' and 'Effect".--As a matter of faet, all these threo Reasons are inconclusive, as no reason is provided to preclude a conclusion contrary to the one set forth.
For instance, even in the absence of a Cause in the shape of Primordial Matter, the three facts set forth-that of objects having a finite character, etc.-are not inexplicable. For instance, if what is sought to be proved is only the existence of a Cause,-then the argument is superfluons,-proving what is already proved'; we also do not admit of any Effect being produced without a Cause; so that if the name 'Primordial Matter' were given in general to all Causes, then there would be nothing to quarrel about. On the