Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 650

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF " SENSE-PERCEPTION". 655
in regard to anything, it envisages it because it bears its semblance; and as anything other than that thing is not perceived, it distinguishes the former thing from all else; in connection with all things, there are these two poleswhat is perceived and what is other than the perceived; consequently it is indicated that there is no third alternative.
"If that is so, then, if the Subject, Sound, for instance-has been apprehended by Perception itself, the inferential concept of non-eternality that appears in connection with it cannot be valid".
That does not affect our position. Even though the Perception be brought about, yet that aspect of the thing alone is said to be apprehended (by the Perception) in regard to which the resultant definite cognition is produced and which alone lends itself to activity; while that aspect in regard to which it is not able to produce a definite cognition, because of the operation of an imposition based on misconception,-even though such an aspect might be apprehended as fit for leading itself to activity, it is regarded to be as good as not-apprehended ; and it is in regard to this that, for the purpose of setting aside the said imposition, Inference becomes operative and hence valid -no such validity can belong to the Conception that follows in the wake of the Sense-perception; as in the latter case, there is no setting aside of any imposition that has come in.
Question: "What is the reason that, though the apprehension appears in regard to the form of the thing which is different from that of all other things, yet the resultant Idea is not certain and definite ?"
Answer :—The reason lies in the fact that it is dependent upon other causes. Merely because a thing has been apprehended it does not follow that the Idea in regard to it is certain and definite; because it depends upon other causes, in the shape of repetition, the man's interest, the vividness (of the original perception) and so forth. Just as, when one has the same person as his Father and Teacher, when he sees him coming, the definite idea in his mind is My Father is coming', not my Teacher is coming :-(1306)
Bhāvivikta and others, who take exception to the idea that the nonconceptual Perception leads to activity through bringing about the Conceptual Content", bring forward certain arguments these are set forth in the following
TEXT (1307). « THE non-conceptual CANNOT BRING ABOUT THE CONCEPTUAL CONTENT, (a) BECAUSE THEIR OBJEOTS ARE DIFFERENT, AS IN THE CASE OF THE COGNITION OF COLOUR, ETC,, -AND ALSO BECAUSE IT IS non-conceptual—LIKE TRE EYE, ETC."
(1307)
COMMENTARY. The cognition produced by the Senses (which is non-conceptual) cannot bring about the conceptual cognition, which is mental, a) because their objects are different, as in the case of the cognitions of Colour, Touch, etc.; and also (b) because it is non-conceptual,-like the Eye and other organs.