Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 146

(A) NYAYA DOOTRINE OF THE SELI
151
It might be urged by the Opponent-"It is just such a Probandum, of which the one-ness is assumed, that we mean; so that the Corroborative Instance cannot be said to be devoid of the Probandum '."
The answer to this is that if something like this is tohat you desire to prove, then it involves the fallacy of 'futility', 'proving what is already proved '; as (according to us) several Impressions appearing consecutively do form the objects of the apprehension of several things, which go to make up & single Cognition.—(201)
Under Text 182, it has been argued that "the term 'soul is expressive of something distinct from the aggregate of Intellect, Sense-organs and the rest." -This is answered in the following Text :
TEXTS (202-204).
IN THE CASE OF SYNONYMS, SUCH AS buddhi', chitta' AND THE REST - WE FIND THAT THOUGH EACH OF THEM IS A SINGLE TERM, YET IT DOES NOT EXPRESS A THING DIFFERENT (FROM THAT EXPRESSED BY OTHERS) HENCE YOUR REASON IS INCONCLUSIVE'. -"BUT A QUALIFICATION (IN THE FORM AS APART FROM RECOGNISED SYNONYMS) HAS BEEN ADDED."-OUR ANSWER TO THAT IS THAT THE QUALIFICATION IS NOT 'ADMITTED', AS THE FACT REMAINS THAT THE SOUL 'IS SYNONYMOUS WITH CONSCIOUSNESS'; AS IT IS CONSCIOUSNESS ITSELF, AS THE SUBSTRATUM OF I-CONSCIOUSNESS, THAT IS SPOKES OF AS THE SOUL' ALL THIS HAS BEEN SAID BY US ON THE BASIS OF ILLUSORY CONCEPTION'; IN REALITY, THERE IS NOTHING THAT IS DENOTED BY THE TERM IN QUESTION
(SOUL").-(202-204)
COMMENTARY.
The reason because it is a single term '-is 'inconclusive -Because in the case of such synonyms as (a) buddhi', chitta', jñana', -as (6) * indriya', 'akpa', -as (c) vēdana' and chitta',-as (d) kaya' and
sharira', --which are denotative of (a) Intellect, (b) Sense-organs, (c) Cognition, and (d) Body, according to our view, the character of denoting distinct things is not present, though each term is one; hence no preclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being possible, the Reason must be 'inconclusive!
Says the Opponent:-" It is because we suspected this that in our argument we added the qualification, apart from well-recognised synonyms', to our Reason; how then can it be Inconclusive ?"
The answer to this is as follows:-This qualification of the Reason is one that is not admitted '. -"How?"-Because the fact remains that the