Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 362

ON QUALITY' AS A CATEGORY
307
TEXT (647). DIMENSION HAS BEEN CLASSED AS LARGE', 'LONG' AND THE LIKE ; -WHY CANNOT IT BE REGARDED AS DUE TO DIVERSITY OF FORMS
IN THE THING ITSELT 1-(647)
COMMENTARY The theory of the other Party is as follows:
Dimension is the basis of all notions of size ; it is of four kinds-(1) Large, (2) Small, (3) Long, (4) Short.-The Large Dimension again is of two kinds-eternal and non-eternal ;-the eternal, as also the Largest, Dimension subsists in A keäsha, Time, Space and Soul; the non.eternal' Dimension subsists in the Triad and other substances.Similarly the Smal!" Dimension also is of two kinds- eternal and non-eternal ;-the eternal and also the smallest, Dimension, subsists in the Atom and the Mind, in the shape of the 'atomic globule'; and the non-eternal Dimension subsists in the Diad only ; it is also used in connection with such things as the Pearl, the Amalaka-Fruit, the Bilva-fruit and the like, which are really large':but only figuratively, on accoumt of the absence of much largeness' in their
large dimension, e.g. the Large Dimension of the Pearl is not of the same degree as that of the Amalaka; and so on in regard to all things.Question: What is the difference between the Largeness and Length as subsisting in the Triad and the Smalln888 and Shortness subsisting in the Diad? - Answer As rogards Largeness and Length, there is mutual dis. tinction ; for instance, we come across such varied expressions as 'from among the Large things, bring tho Longer one fromu umong the Long things, bring the larger one'. As regards the distinction between smallness' and shortness', it is perceptible only to Mystics who alone see them."
In this scheme the Large 'and the rest are held to be something different from Colour and the rest,-on the ground that they are apprehended by Cognitions other than cognitions of these latter, like Pleasure, oto.-In thus Rcasoning, if the Reason adduced is meant to consist in the fact that ** Largeness, etc. are the objects of Sense-perception different from the Senseperception of Colour and such things ", then, such a Reason is one that is * unproven', not admitted; bocause as a matter of fact any such thing as the 'Large and other Dimension' is never found to appear in any Senseperception, apart from the Colour and other things as they exist.-If thon, it be held that the notion of small', 'large' and the like is a cognition that is entirely different from the cognition of Colour, etc., then the Reason becomes *fallible', 'Inconclusive '; 8. there is nothing to invalidate a contrary conclusion. As a matter of fact there is nothing that really forms the object of the notion in question, as what is held to be such is a mere verbal figment. All that happens is that when the same Colour is seen turning towards the same direction,--and it is desired to bring out the difference between that Colour and other Colours,—there appears the notion, based upon preconceived convention, that it is largel. And this does not