Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 463

468
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVI.
of basis, then the argument is futile ; because we also hold that they hayo their basis in the awakening of the Tendencies and Impressions embedded in the inner consciousness; though not in tho external object; because the first cognition being always verbal, is wrong, and it cannot have any real basis.
Located, etc.'-i.e. embedded in consciousness; i.e. in the form of Tendencies and Impressions.-(809)
This same line of thought is further supported by reference to the scriptures :
TEXT (870).
WHATEVER IS SAID TO BE THE OBJECT OF A VERBAL EXPRESSION IS NEVER REALLY COGNISED ; SUCH IS THE VERY ESSENCE
OF ENTITLES. -(870).
COMMENTARY. Whatever',-. e. Specific Individuality', Universal' and the like.
Such is the very essence of things';-this character, of being beyond the reach of words, forms the very essence of things. This has been thus declareci -By whatever name a thing is spoken of, that thing is not really cognised there ; such is the very essence of things'.
Question :"What is the proof for Verbal Cognition being wrong and baseless?"
Answer:-The proof has already been asserted by us to the effect that inasmuch as Verbal Cognitions impose non difference upon things that are different, they are all wrong. For instance, when one thing is cognised as what it is not, that cognition is wrong; e.g. the cognition of Water in the Mirage Verbal Cognition consists in the imposing of non-difference on what is different ;-hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as wrong). There is no real entity in the shape of the Universal' which could be the object of Verbal Cognition-by virtue of which the Reason might be regarded as 'Unproven. Because the Universal' has been already discarded in great detail.-Even granting that there is such a thing as the Universal' even so, if that Universal is held to be something different from the particular things, the cognition would still be one of non-difference where there is difference; and hence wrong. Because a set of things cannot be the same as others when they are held to contain these. If, on the other hand, the Universal be held to be non-different from the particular things, the entire Universe would really form the single object of the Universal'; and hence the cognition of it as Universal' must be wrong, because the notion of the * Universal' does not appertain to a single thing; as the cognition of the Universal' is always preceded by the perception of diversity.
When Verbal Cognition is thus proved to be wrong, it must also be objectless, baseless; because the object productive of the cognition having surrendered its form, there can be nothing left which could be the basis of the cognition.
Or, we may prove the objectlessness of Verbal Cognitions in another manner: That alone can form the import of words whereto they have been