Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 271

276
TATTVASANGRAHA; CHAPTER VIII.
be not appreliendeel; what is held is that, though the inomentary character is apprehended. yet its apprehension is not definitely certain, on account of the ground for certainty not being there : because mere apprehension does not bring about certain Cognition ; the certainty is dependent upon the needs of the apprehender and the soundness of the repetition of the apprehension.This explnnation is not available for you; because for you, even the previous perception is determinate (certain) in chnracter; and when the form of the thing has been definitely cognised with certainty, through that previous Perception, then its present existence also, which is non-different from the previous form, must also have been definitely ascertained with certainty by that same Perception; if this latter were not definitely certain, the form of the thing also, -as non-different from this present existence, would have to be regarded as not definitely ascertained.
Some people have held that-" The validity of the Rocognition is based upon the definite ascertainment of the Thing that has been in doubt." -This also becomes rejected by our above reasoning. Nor, in the present case, is there any ascertainment of a Thing in doubt -because in the case of Hairs, even though different hairs come ont one after the other, there is Recognition ; so that the doubt would remain (even after Recognition, which has been found to be fallible in the case of Hairs).-(458)
It has been argued (under Text 455) that " what has been cognised by other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, if so apprehended by Sense-perception" -This is answered in the following
TEXT (459).
IF WHAT HAS BEEN COGNISED THROUGH INFERENCE AND THE OTHER MEANS OF COGNITION WERE ANNULLED BY SENSE PERCEPTION, THEN
INFERENCE AND THE REST COULD NOT BE REGARDED AS MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION, BECAUSE THEY ARE ANNULLED,-LIKE COGNITIONS THROUGH
DETECTIVE VISION.—(459)
COMMENTARY. If the subject matter of an Inference, such as because it is your child fit must be dark-complexioned]'.--could be annulled by Sense-perception,-then that Inference cannot be a Means of Right Cognition at all; because on account of its subject matter boing annulled, there can be no agreement with the real state of things, and hence it would be like the perception obtainod through defective vision-Hence the assertion that "What has been cognised through other Means of Cognition could be accepted as otherwise, on the strength of Sense-perception is irrelevant, being entirely impossible.-(459)