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252
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER VIII,
held by the Ajivakas. These are the four alternatives. The first of these alternatives is not tenable: as in this case, the condition, being non-different from the thing, wonld be, like it, always there, and what is always there cannot be produced, or if it be produced, the thing itself also might be produced in the same way; and that would deprive it of its permanence. -If the second alternative be accepted, in that case, the effect being produced by the condition in question, the Thing itself would cease to be the Cause.
The term asau' (in the fourth line of the Text) stands for the Permanent Thing.–(397-399)
The same argument is further clarified in the following
TEXT (400).
THE EFFECTS WOULD IN THAT CASE BE PRODUCED ONLY WHEN THE SAID CONDITION 19 THERE, AND THEY WOULD NOT BE PRODUCED WHEN THE CONDITION IS NOT THERE ;AND THUS IT WOULD BE THIS CONDITION THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE REGARDED AS THEIR
Cause.-(400)
COMMENTARY When it'-.e., the said condition—is there. Thus, i.e., from the positive and negative concomitance just pointed out.-(400)
The following Text states an answer from the standpoint of the Opponent (and then refutes it)
TEXT$ (401-402). IT MIGHT BE AROUND THAT—* ON ACCOUNT OF ITS (THE CONDITION'S) RELATION TO THE THING, THE CAUSAL CHARACTER DOES BELONG TO THAT THING) ALSO "-WHAT RELATION CAN BE HELD TO SUBSIST BETWEEN THESE TWO ?-IT CANNOT BE identity; AS THE TWO ARE RECOGNISED AS DISTINCT. NOR OAN THE RELATION BE HELD TO CONSIST IN THE FACT THAT IT IS PRODUOED FROM IT ; AS IN THAT CASE, THERE SHOULD BE SIMULTANEITY; AND THEN THE APPEARANCE OF THE EFFECTS
ALSO WOULD BE SIMULTANEOUS.-(401-402)
COMMENTARY Ils' -.e., of the condition. That'--the permanent thing.
With the words what relation, etc.' the Author replies to the answer of the Opponent. The meaning is that no relation is possible between the two. There are only two kinds of relation possible : Identity and Being Produced out of it the relation between the thing and the condition cannot