Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 40

DOCTRINE OF PRIMORDIAL MATTER.
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is as much an "imposition' (as Wrong Cognition).--As a matter of fact, every Means (of Cognition), when operating on its objective, does two things : it sets aside Misconception and Doubt relating to the object of Cognition, and produces a definitely Certain Cognition relating to it. This fact cannot be compatible with reason, under the Sankhya theory of the Existent Effect :-(23)
In the following text, the Author proceeds to explain why the said fact is not compatible with reason, under the Sarithya theory :
TEXT (24).
THE DOUBT AND THE MISCONCEPTION CANNOT BE SET ASIDE, AS THEY WOULD BE ALWAYS THERE. NOR IS THE PRODUCING OF DEFINITELY CERTAIN COGNITION POSSIBLE, FOR THE VERY SAME REASOX. HENCE ALL THAT HAS BEEN
SAID IS PUTILE.—(24)
COMMENTARY [It is not compatible) because, as regards Misconception and Doubt, both of these, under your theory, would be of the nature of either Senlienca (Oonsciousness, Spirit) or Coemic Intelligence and Mind ; in either case any setting aside of these would be impossible, because Spirit, Cosmic Intelligence and Mind, all these being eternal (constant).-Misconception and Doubt also would be constant. Nor would the production of Definitely Certain Cognition be possible through any Beans: for the same reason, i.e. because it is always there (ex lvypothesi).- From all this it follows that all that you lovo said in support of your doctrine is entirely futile.-What this hints at is that the Sankhya-doctrine involves self-contradiction; for instance, when the Sarklys speaks of the means of producing a definitely Certain Cognition, it implies the producing of the Definito Cognition which has not been thore; and this is contrary to the assertion that the Effeet is existent'; so there is clear self-contradiction.-(24)
TEXT (25).
IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, (IT BE HELD THAT) THE DEFINITE COGNITION THAT WOULD BE PRODUCED WOULD BE ONE THAT HAS NOT BEEN
THERE,—THEN, THIS ONE INSTANCE OF THE EFFECT BEING NON-EXISTENT) WOULD INVALIDATE ALL THOSE REASONS (THAT HAVE BEEN SET FORTH
BY THE Sankhya).- (25)
COMMENTARY If, in order to avoid the futility of the reasons, it be admitted that the Definite Cognition that is produced from the Meang is one that did not exist before, then, in that case, the entire set of reasoning - Because