Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVI.
real and also the word denoting them; and hence their cnse does not falsify our Premiss."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1093). AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE IS NO UNIVERSAL (COMMONALTY) IN THE CASE OF THE THINGS IN QUESTION, WHICH COULD BE DENOTED; NOR IS THERE ANY UNIVERSAL WORD DENOTATIVE OF THAT UNIVERSAL; NOR DOES THE DENOTATIVE CHARACTER BELONG TO THE WORD, AS SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITIBS
ARB ALL IN PERPETUAL FLUX.-(1093)
COMMENTARY.
In course of our examination of the Universal ', we have rejected, in great detail, the whole conception of the Universal; hence the assertion that the Universal' is the denoted and denoter in the case in question makes the Reason "false" (Inconelnsive).
* Tasya of the Universal.
The term Universal' has to be taken as understood after denotative which connects it with the context.
It might be argued that-" Even though there is no real entity denoted in the case, yet the denotative certainly is there in the shape of the Specific Individuality of the word 'Mahashxéta, etc.".
The answer to this is- Nor does the denotative, etc. etc.;-that is, it has been shown that the 'Perpetual Flux' embraces all things; hence the Specific Individuality of words cannot be denotative, because as it is momentary, it could not form the subject of any Convention ; also because it could not be concomitant with the time of usage; as explained before.(1093)
The following T'est sums up the argument
TEXT (1094).
HENCE BOTH OF THESE SHOULD BE HELD TO OONSIST IN THE ILLUSORY REFLECTION' ETC.-THUS IN VIEW OF THESE, THE FALSITY'
REMAINS UNSHAKEN.-(1094)
COMMENTARY. Both'-.e. the denoted thing as well as the denotative Word.
Reflection, etc. The etcetera' is meant to show that even under the view that Ideas (Cognitions) are formless, it would be necessary to admit the existence, within the Idea itself, of another specifio Idea in the form of the conception of object' where there is no real object.