Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER EX.
TEXT (487). "Tuus THAT ALONE CAN BE REGARDED AS THE CAUSE OF AN EITECT WHOSE ACTION IS FOUND TO BE THERE BEFORE THE PRODUCTION OF THAT EFFECT; AND NOT MERE IMMEDIATE
SEQUENOE."-(187)
COMMENTARY. Not mere immediale sequence', 'can be the basis of the notion of Cause-effect-this has to be regarded as understood.-(487)
What has been already explained above is now briefly summed up :
TEXTS (488-489). "THE UPSHOT BRIEFLY IS THIS IF THE EFFECT WERD PRODUCED FROM A CAUSE THAT HAS perished, THEN SUCH AN EFFECT WOULD BE WITHOUT CAUSE, AS WELAT HAS PERISHED CAN HAVE NO CHARACTER (OR POTENTIALITY).-IF THE EFFEOT BO VELD TO BD PRODUCED FROM A CAUSE TILAT Has not perished, -THEN, AS THE CAUSE IN THAT CASE WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST DURING SEVERAL MOMENTS, WHEREFORD COULD THE MOMENTARY CHARACTER OF THINGS NOT BECOME DISCARDED (ON THAT ACCOUNT) ?"
-(488-489)
COMMENTARY. Only two views are possible in this connection (1) The Effect is produced out of the Cause which is itself destroyed, and (2) that it is produced out of the Cause which is not destroyed; things cannot be other than either destroyed or not destroyed. The first view cannot be right; because what has been destroyed is non-existent, and if production from that were admitted, the effect would have to be regarded as without Cause ; which would mean that it is eternally excistent.-Nor can the second view be right as, in that case, things would continue to exist during several moments, which would deprive them of the character of momentariness.
Wherefore could it not be discarded ? '-i.e. it would certainly become discarded. For instance, it would mean that-a) the Thing comes into existence, then (6) it acts, then (c) it produces the Effect, then (d) it porishes; so that it is there during all these several moments; which rejects the idea of its being momentary 488-489)
Having thus shown the impossibility of the relation of Cause and Effect', the Opponent proceeds to show the impossibility of any Means of Cognising such relation: