Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATIVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVII.
become devoid of Being :-that is, if, at the time of apprehension, the said Universal · Being is not touched by Sense-perception,--and the Particular (or Individual) alone is apprehended, then this Particular by itself, if apprehended at all, would be devoid of existence, as devoid of the character known as Being and thus it could become characterless; and as such could not be apprehended by Sense-perception, because it would be devoid of Being,--having lost its Being or Existence, and become like the sky, flower."-(1269)
TEXT (1270).
"THE ASSERTION THAT THE COGNITION APPREHENDS A qualified THING, AND YET IT IS NOT Conceptual IMPLIES GREAT TEMERITY INDEED! CERTAINLY, NO QUALIFICATION IS POSSIBLE EXCEPT THROUGH CONNECTION WITH QUALIFICA
TIONS."-(1270)
COMMENTARY.
"From all this it follows that your assertion that the Cognition apprehends a qualified object, and yet there is in it no Conceptual Content implies great ternerity on your part, in making an assertion opposed to all canons of Right Cognition."
This sums up the criticism against the Buddhist doctrine.
* The Reason for this is provided, in the words. Certainly no qualification, etc. etc. that is to say, just as a man does not become a stick-holder, without the stick, -50 a thing cannot be qualified without connection with qualifications.--Hence that cognition which apprehends the qualifications is 'Conceptual' (with Conceptual Content).
"The argument may be formulated as follows:-The Apprehension of the qualified thing, which is under dispute, is Conceptual, because it appre. hends a qualified thing. --like the cognition 'This is a piece of Cloth." (1270)
The following Test proceeds to answer the above criticisms of Sumati :
TEXT (1271).
WIEN TIE COGNITION IS HELD TO APPREHEND THE QUALIFIED THING, IT IS BY REASON OF ITS APPREHENDING THE THING AS DIP. FERENTIATED FROM OTHER HOMOGENEOUS AND HETEROGENEOUS THINGS-AND NOT OF THE CONNECTION
OF QUALIFICATIONS.—(1271)
COMMENTARY.
If what is meant by Sumati's Reason-because it apprehends the qualified thing is the presence of a qualification which is something distinct