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EXAMINATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE PERMANENOE OF THINGS. 265
such a moment' could be produced from the undifferentiated things, wherefore could the effect in question also not be produced ? Nor can it be right to say that they are produced out of what is different from the initial - series', as it is entirely on this ground that there is no differentiation among the components of the series' themselves. If these also were ultimately to bring about particular entities, then there would be an infinito rogress-Thus, there being no differentiation, how could any effect be produced from an undifferentiated series' of Causes? If there were to be production out of the undifferentiated Cause, then all things would be produced from all things.
"Thus then, even when there is an incongruity in effective action, coming either successively or simultaneously,-things do have effective activity, and in the same manner, even though they are permanent, they could have the necessary effective activity. Hence it is needless to have recourse to the theory that things aro momentary,
* Thus the Reason put forward (by the Buddhist) - because things exist (therefore they must be momentary)' is found to be Inconclusive.
"Nor can it be said that the production of the effect is due to the "Beries" in a particular condition, and not always':-becange in accordance with the reasoning explained above, there being no peculiar condition brought about by Auxiliaries, the series would remain always indifferentiated.-Nor can it be right to assent that the series itself is only a peculiar feature connected with its own constituent cause', as this would be contrary to a perceived fact. For instance, the effect is actually found to appear and disappear at the appearance and disappearanco (respectively) of the Auxi. liarios. If then, the peculiar condition were connected only with its own constituent cause, then the productivity would belong to the thing inde. pendently of auxiliaries.
“Further, in accordance with the reasonings adduced above, the series remaining always undifferentiated, such particular products as the Potsherd and the rest could not be prochuced out of the Jar.
" Then again, if the Destruction of a thing, consisting of the cessation of the serios of its homogeneous moments, were without Cause,--then, as independont of all else, it should come about at the very outset; and if it does not come about at the initial stage, it could not come at a later stage either; because it would, even then be as undifferentiated as before.--If then, for the destruction of things, no such Oause is admitted as another
series' distinct from the Cause of the things themselves,-thon why should Fire be the destroyer of Cold ? because what is ineffective cannot be i des. troyer, simply because it is incapable of doing anything and even 50 if it were regarded as an effective destroyer, it would be an absurdity; and everything would be the destroyer of everything. Thus it would be impossible to explain such phenomena as the use of the term 'non-apprehension and the destroying of life as being due to opposition (or destruction)." (428–434)
The above arguments are answered in the following