Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

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TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER vin.
shape of fluidity; again this character of fluidity, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of solidity. So that there is no change of one and the same thing.
Thus the Cause of Destruction is in every way infructuous; and our Reason is not unproven'.
Nor is our Reason' Contradietory', as what is put forward does actually happen according to our view.
Nor is the reason 'inconclusive', as it has been already established before.
The following might be urged—" The Alisha does not need a cause for becoming corporeal (with a shape), and yet it is not permanently liable to corporeality; in the same manner, though the Things may be products, yet there may be some thing which is not permanently liable to destruction."
This is not right. There is no Product which is not regarded as noneternal (avanescent); as all caused things are held to be evanescent; and these same Products are made the subject of the inferential argument; how then can the Reason be inconclusive? Those things which, though Products, are yet expected to be eternal, on account of their indestructibility, --these are really included under the category of 'uncreated things, and As such should be regarded as discarded by the discarding of that category itself. So that there is no defect in our Reason. Nor is it admitted that Akasha and such other things are independent in the matter of their corporeality: because as a matter of fact, when a Property does not belong to a thing. that thing is certainly dependent upon something else' in regard to that property; things are never regarded as dependent on something else' for the purpose of those properties that are already present in them ; in fact, they are so dependent, only in regard to Properties that are not there already. So the Corroborative Instance cited by the other party is one that cannot be admitted. (384)
The Author proceeds to say something regarding the category of uncreated things':
TEXTS (385-386). THE Akasha AND OTHER THINGS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELD TO BE 'UN. CREATED ARE REALLY NON-EXISTENT, IN THE FORM OF ENTITIES; AS THEY ARE DEVOID OP ALL POTENTIALITY; HENOB THERE CAN BE NO ROOM FOR ATTRIBUTING TO THEM ANY SUCH ALTERNATIVE CHARACTERS AS THAT OF 'MOMENTARINESS' OR NONMOMEXTARINESS '; WHEREBY THEY COULD BE REGARDED EVEN AS AN 'ENTITY'-BE IT EITHER
MOMENTARY OR OTHERWISE (385-386)
COMMENTARY. If things like Akasha were such as have their existence established, then alone could there arise any discussion as to their being momentary, etc.;