Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 660

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION".
665
TEXTS (1332-1339).
AS A MATTER OF FACT, PLEASURE, ETC. ARE FELT IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THE PERCEPTION OF THE EXTERNAL OBJECT, WHY IS IT THAT THEY ARE ALWAYS FEUT AT THAT SAME TIME 1-IT IS REGARDED AS cog. NISED BY MENTAL PERCEPTION; BUT THIS PERCEPTION IS NOT THERE AT THE TIME; AS COGNITIONS HAVE BEEN DESCRIBED AS APPEARING in succession (NOT AT THE SAME TIME).-IF IT BE URGED THAT " IT IS ONLY SIMULTANEOUS birth OF COGNITIONS THAT IS NOT ADMITTED, NOT THEIR SIMULTANEOUS existence " THEN THE ANSWER IS THAT THERE CAN BE NO (CONTINUED) existence OF ANYTHING; AS ALL THINGS HAVE BEEN PROVED TO BE MOMENTARY - IF IT BE URGED THAT THERE IS AN ILLUSION OF SIMULTANEITY, DUE TO THE QUICK SUCCESSION OF THE COGNITIONS" THIS ALSO HAS BEEN REJ DOTED ALREADY. IF THE PLEASURE, ETC., WERE AMENABLE ONLY TO REMEMBRANCE, THEN THE FEELING COULD NOT BE VIVID (AS IT IS).- IF IT BE ASSUMED THAT THE SAID ILLUSION IS IN THE FORM OF 'AGREEABLE' AND 'DISAGREBABLE', THEN IT COMES TO THIS THAT THE EXISTENCE OF PLEASURE AND PAIN RESTS IN THEMSELVES (AND THEY ARE THUS SELF-COGNISED), WHEN THE MYSTIOS COGNISE, BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, THE PLEASURE, ETO. OF OTHER PERSONS, TUEN, ON ACCOUNT OF THE SIMILARITY OF EXPERIENCE, THEY WOULD THEMSELVES BE UNHAPPY (AT THE UNHAPPINESS OF OTHER PEOPLE). FOR YOU, THE FEELING OF PAIN CONSISTS, NOT IN THE EXISTENCE OF THE PAIN ITSELF, BUT IN THE COGNITION OF WHICH THAT PAIN IS THE OBJECT; AND THAT IS ANOTHER CHAIN'.
-THE SAME APPLIES TO THE INTERENCE OF ANOTHER PERSON'S PAIN ALSO, AS INFERENCE HAS BEEN DESCRIBED (BY OTHERS) AS objective (WITH OBJECT), AND NOT PURELY subjective (NOT TOUCHING OBJECTS). -(1332–1339)
COMMENTARY
It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the Vaishafika) is contrary to perceived facts.
When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest,-then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended 1-Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object; as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only. And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.
It might be held that," it is only the birth of Cognitions that has been held to be in succession, not their existence".