Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 640

EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF "SENSE-PERCEPTION". 645
that has been urged, therefore, is only the effect of blindness. Hence we desist from further argumentation.-(1284)
The upshot of his whole argument is stated by the Author in the following
TEXT (1285).
FROM ALL THIS IT FOLLOWS THAT WHATEVER COGNTTION APPEARS IN REGARD TO THE SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALITY OF THINGS APPERTAINS TO WHAT IS BEYOND THE RANGE OF WORDS AND IS
HENCE non-conceptual (1285)
COMMENTARY
With the following Tects, the Author proceeds to present the view of Kumarila ; and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss) - put forward (under Text 1257 above), to the effect that when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real ', -that it is partly inadmissible as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning :
TEXTS (1286-1288).
“ AT FIRST THERE IS ONLY A pre-cognition, WHICH IS non-conceptual,
LIKE THE COGNITION OF THE INFANT AND THE DUMB AND THE LIKE ;
-IT IS BORN PURELY OF THE THING (COGNISED); AT THAT MOMENT, NEITHER THE UNIVERSAL NOR THE PARTICULAR CHARACTER IS APPREHENDED; ALL THAT IS APPREHENDED IS ONLY A CERTAIN INDIVIDUAL WHICH IS THE SUBSTRATUM OF BOTH THOSE CHARACTERS. -(Shlokavārtika-Sense-perception, 112-113).-SUBSEQUENTLY, THE THING BECOMES APPREHENDED ALONG WITH THE PROPERTIES OF THE CLASS-CHARACTER ' AND THE REST; AND THE COGNITION ALSO BY WHICH IT IS THUS APPREHENDED IS REGARDED AS SENSE. PERCEPTION',- (Shlokavārtika—SENSE-PERCEPTION, 120)."-(12861288).
COMMENTARY
All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premies of the Buddhist)—that the basis of conceptuality, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there is not admissible. Because, as a matter of fact, except in the initial Pre-cognition, in all other Sense-perceptions, the apprehension of the thing as qualified by qualifications' is present.-If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the Pre-cognition, then the argument is superfluous.
Such is the view of the Opponent (Kumärila).