Tattva Sangraha Vol 1

SR No.: 007608
Original Sutra Author: N/A
Author: Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra
Publication Year: 1937
Total Pages: 753
Language: English
Classification: Book_English
File Size: 42 MB

Page 424

EXAMINATION OF SĀMĀNYA', THE UNIVERSAL'.
429
Further, when you are asked the question-How is it that one and the same Universal produces diverse notions 1-You will have to say that "such is the restricted capacity of things that even though itself one, it is capable of producing notions of diverse forms"-If such be the case, then why should not the assumption be that the determining factors consist in the diverse things themselves whose capacities are well known and fully ascertained ? In doing this, nothing would be done which is not in strict accordance with experience.-(775-776)
The following might be urged-- Of the Universal also, the capacity is well known and fully ascertained ".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (777).
As A MATTER OF FACT, THERE CAN BE NO AFFIRMATIVE CONCOMITANCE (OF THE NOTIONS) WITH THE UNIVERSALS; AS THEIR NOTION IS NOT ALWAYS PRESENT ; AS FOR NEGATIVE CONCOMITANCE, THAT IS NOT POSSIBLE IN THE CASE OF
WHAT ARE ETERNAL.-(777)
COMMENTARY.
As a matter of fact the notions of Being and such other Universale do not appear at all times; and hence it can never be right to assert the affirmative coneomitance of these with the Universals. If the notions were really concomitant with the presence of the Universals, then, as the Universals would be there at all times, why could not the notions appear at all times Specially as the Universal does not need anything else; because other things cannot create any peculiar capacities in it. Hence there can be no affirmative concomitance with these Universals.
Nor is negative concomitance possible. Because at the time that the notions of Being, etc. do not appear,-it cannot be said that the canse of this non-appearance lies in the non-existence of the Universal; because eternal things must be always present, and hence their non-existence (absence) is impossible. Consequently there can be no negative concomitance with the Universals.—(777)
Thus then, there being objections against the view that Comprehensive notions should have their cause in something different (from the individual things),--the following assertion of the other party also becomes discarded :* When in regard to Quality, there arises the notion that it is nol-substance, it is not-4ction and so forth, the basis for this lies in the particular Universal Quality'; while Inherence in the same object is the basis for the compre