Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 1
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

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Page 710
________________ INFERENCE. 715 TEXTS (1450-1455). IF WHAT IS MEANT IS TRAT—" EVEN ON THW DESTRUCTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL, THE UNIVERSAL PERSISTS "-THEN, THAT CANNOT BE ; BECAUSE EVEN IF THE UNIVERSAL EXISTED, THAT ALSO WOULD CERTAINLY BE COVERED BY THE PERPETUAL FLUX-FURTHER, ON WHAT GROUNDS HAVE YOU ASSERTED THE RESTRICTION THAT ** THESE SAME TWO PARTICULARS WHOSE RELATIONSHIP HAS BEEN COGNISED BY SENSE-PERCEPTION, ETC. ETC." (Text 1443) ?-THEN AGAIN, HAVING ONCE COGNISED A THING BY MEANS OF INFERENCE, IF THE SAME THING IS COGNISED AGAIN BY MEANS OF INFERENCE, — WHY IS NOT THIS LATTER REGARDED AS VALID ? WHAT IS THE PECULIARITY IN THE PREVIOUS ONE (WHEREBY IT IS REGARDED AS VALID, AND NOT THE LATER ONE) - IF IT BE URGED THAT-"THE LATER ONE IS NOT REGARDED AS valid BECAUSE LIKE REMEMBRANCE, IT APPREHENDS WHAT HAS BEEN ALREADY APPREHENDED ", THEN WHY IS NOT THE PREVIOUS INFERENCE ALSO REGARDED AS THE SAME - IF IT BE ARGUED THAT—" IN THE FORMER INFERENCE THERE IS THIS ADDITIONAL PECULIARITY THAT IT SETS ASIDE THE DOUBT THAT HAS SET IN DURING THE INTERVAL,"WHY IS NOT THE SAME IN THE LATTER ALSO? HENCE IT IS THIS LATTER ITSELF THAT SETS ASIDE THE DOUBT AS TO SOMETHING BEING present or not present: AND HENCE THE GENERALISED PERCEPTION IS REALLY WHAT IS INDEPENDENT.-- (1450-1455) COMMENTARY. - Alerli - The Universal. Even if '-i.e. granting that such a thing as the Universal exists. The other party regards the Individual and the Universal as identical; how then can the Universal continue to exist when the Individual is destroyed? If it did, then, having different fates, they would have to be regarded as distinct from one another. If it exists'—This also is only by way of being granted; as in reality, the Universal having been once for all rejected, how could it exist ? If it existe'-i.e. even if it existed it would be in perpetual fux': as the 'perpetual Aux' has been proved to be all-embracing. Further, when a thing has been once cognised by means of an Inference, and later on, the same thing (Fire) is cognised by another Inference drawn from the same Inferential Indicative Probans). (Smoke), why has not this latter Inference also been cited as one based upon Perceived Particulars, - when the qualification of having been 'cognised by Perception is considered desirable ?

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