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724
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVIII,
do actually find Fire-Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail.-the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Prabans, even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time. And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of woll-dis. cerned Probans.--it can never be made otherwise : e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the prosence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.
It has been argued in commentary on 1460, etc.) that-"Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc., -and the Fire burning the Abhrapatala, etc. etc".
But in all these cases, there is no proper Probans at all; as tho three features are not present. The mere fact of not being perceived cannot lead to the idea of the Probana boing excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent; is has been thus declared-Exclusion from that where the Probanduan is known to be absent cannot follow from mere nonperception. In fact, the reality of Invriable Concomitance follows only from the prosence of the relationship either of essential samencss or of being the effect, as hns seou thus declared-Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance--and this follows from Perception, not from No. perception'; and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships—of essential samene88, or of being the effect--is present.---(14751477)
The following might be urged—"How is it known that the wellAscertained Probans never fails ? There is no reason why this shonld be so."
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXT (1478).
(a) THERE CAN BE NO NATURE (OR OFARAOTER) WITHOUT A NATURE
(or CHARACTER); (5) NOR CAN THERE BE EFFECT WITHOUT A CAUSE. BECAUSE OTHERWISE) THERE WOULD BE THE INCONGRUITIES OF (a) DEVIATION FROM NATURR, AND (6) 'CAUSELESSNESS. AND WITHOUT THESE TWO (RELATIONSHIPS) THERE CAN BE NO
INFERENCE.-(1478)
COMMENTARY.
There are only two kinds of Probans--(1) Nature of the thing and (2) Being an Effect : 'non-apprehension' being inchided under Nature'. And these two kinds of Probans are not possible except where there is a Probandum, called 'Nature' and 'Cause', -by reason of which there could be 'fallibility' (falsity) in the Probana.
* Why is it not possible ?"
