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INFERENCE
725
* Because otherwise, eto, etc.'.-Thore is copulative compounding between bhéda' and 'animáttata': the sense is that tlie Probans which forms the Nature of the thing would cease to be its nature, and the Probans which is an effect would come to be without cause; and yet no Probans is admitted which forms neither the nature' nor the effect of the Probandum), - except when there is no connection and when there is no Invariable Concomitance.
* Without these two-i.e. as 'nature and as effect'. The word has the Dual Ending.-(1478)
It has been argued (under Team 1463) that "the Inference for another's benefit cannot be valid, etc. etc.".
The answer to this is as follows:
TEXTS (1479-1481). THE STATEMENT OF THE THREE-FEATURED PROBANS HAS BEEN DESCRIBED
AS INFERENCE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANOTHER, ON THE GROUND OF ITS BEING INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE, WITH REFERENCE TO THE OTHER PERSON ADDRESSED. BUT THIS INFERENTIAL CHARACTER' CAN ONLY BE SECONDARY' (FIGURATIVE) AND CONVENTIONAL. HENCE THE FACT OF ITS BEING INDICATIVE OF WHAT IS POSSIBLE' CANNOT LEAD TO ANY INCONGRUITY.-IF INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OP RIGHT COGNITION, THEN YOUR ASSERTION IS USELESS, INDEED NO DISPUTANT EVER COMPREHENDS WHAT YOU WISH TO SPEAK OF.-(1479-1481)
COMMENTARY.
The statement (of the Inference) has been spoken of as 'for another's benefit', in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.
Even in reference to the listener, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans, and on that account, it leads to the Inference, or on account of Convention, it has been spoken of as 'Inference': this name 'Inference ' being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible. Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the Senseorgan, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as 'Inference for another's benefit'; as in those cases, there is no 'indication of what is possible. It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception. For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (nttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker's wish to speak (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with
