Book Title: Tattva Sangraha Vol 1
Author(s): Kamlashila, Ganganatha Jha
Publisher: Oriental Research Institute Vadodra

Previous | Next

Page 717
________________ 722 TATTVASANGBAHA : CHAPTER XVIII. In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties that alone can be cited against the argument of either party." The answer to this is as follows:- Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words,—yet, tre absence of incompatibility has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied ; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the validity also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned ; consequently, the contradiction that we have urged is in regard to the real state of things, not in regard to the theory of the other party. Or, the Opponent's Reason may be regarded as contradictory on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason. For instance, the contradictory Reason would be in the form- What is not incompatible is valid, -e.g. Sense-perception, the cognition brought about by the three. featured Indicative is compatible; [hence it must be valid]' ;-this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself. The Reason here pnt forward cannot be Inadmissible, for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indica tive of validity). Nor can it be 'Inconclusive' (Doubtful), as that would make Sense-jxercoption also invalid. Asadhyata :-ie. the Instance would be dovoid of the Probandum. In the second argument' ;-i.e. in the argument "nor cun thu preso of three features, etc. etc.' (urged under Text 1458), The Probans is inadmissible':--because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent. 'In the same way'-i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Threu-features, etc. etc. (1469-1471) The following Text provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459): TEXTS (1472-1474). EXPONENTS OF THE TRUE REASONING HAVE ALL DECLARED THAT THAT REASON ALONE IS CAPABLE OF PROVING THE CONCLUSION WHOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE PROBANDUM) IS KNOWN WITH CERTAINTY, -SUCH RELATIONSHIP BEING EITHER IN THI NATURE OF sameness of essence OR or being an effect ;--AND AGAINST SUCH A PROBANS, THERE CAN BE NO SUCH DETECT AS THAT OF BEING CONTRARY TO INFERENCE AND SO FORTH, BECAUSE NO SUCH INFERENCE COULD BE POSSIBLE EXCEPT THROUGH essential sameness or being the cause. MUTUALLY CONTRADICTORY PROPERTIES CANNOT BELONG TO THE SAME THING. CONSEQUENTLY THERE CAN BE NO POSSIBILITY OF ANY PROBANS WHICH MIGHT BE CONCOMITANT WITH THE CONTRARY OF THE DESIRED CONOLUSION.-(1472-1474) COMMENTARY. Against such a Probans-i.e. in a Probans that is related through esaential sameness and through being an effect.

Loading...

Page Navigation
1 ... 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753