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716
TATTVASANGRAHA: CHAPTER XVIII.
It might be arged that—" It has not been so regarded as it apprehende what has been already apprehended ".
That cannot be right; as the same applies also to what is bused on Perceived Particulars.
* In the case of that based upon Perceived Particulars, there is this additional peculiarity that it has set at rest the doubt that has appeared during the interval."
That cannot be right; as this same peculiarity is also present in what is based upon the Inferred Particulars.
Thus from all this it follows that when all things are in a perpetual Alux', the only Inference possible is that based upon generalised Relationship, not any based upon Perceived Particulars.-(1450-1455)
TEXT (1456).
SOME SHORT-SIGHTED PEOPLE HAVE ASSERTED THAT "INFERENCE IS NOT A MEANS OF RIGHT COGNITION ", THOUGH, BY THESE VERY WORDS, THEY OFFER UP THEIR OWN DESIRE TO SPEAK' (INTEN. TION, IDEA IN THE MIND, AS SOMETHING TO BE INFERRED
FROM THOSE Worps),-(1456)
COMMENTARY.
* Some people'-the followers of Brhaspati and others.
Through these same worde', - i.e. by the words Inference is not a means of Right Cognition
This shows that the assertion of these people involves self-contradiction. For instance, when a man makes a statement to another person, it is on the basis of the understanding that the idea present in one's mind is under stood from the words he uses, which are indicative of that idea'; so that when the people denying Inference make the statement,-by this statement itself-they admit the fact of Inference being a Means of Right Cognition - and yet this same he denies by the statement that Inference is not a Means of Right Cognition and this is self-contradiction.
This objection is going to be further explained later on.-(1456)
The Charuākas urge the following arguments (against Inference, as & Means of Right Cognition):
