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696
TATTVASANGRAHA OHAPTER XVIII.
even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said danial would be contrary to a wider proposition; while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.(1402)
The Text now takes up the argument put forward (by Patrascāmin) under Text 1375, to the effect that "the Soul and the Jer are somehow nonexistent, etc. etc
TEXT (1403).
IN PROVING THAT THE JAR AND OTHER THINGS ARE SOMEHOW NONEXISTENT", -THE PROBANS IS FOUND AS, IN A PREVIOUS CASE,
TO BE FUTILE AND ALSO INADMISSIBLE'(1403)
COMMENTARY. Here also, there would be proving what is already admitted as the fact of the Jar, etc. being somehow nonexistent is already admitted.
In case it is not admitted, then the Probans also, in the form because it is not apprehended , cannot be admitted ; so that the Probans becomes Inadmissible!
In this way, the defect in the Probans may be pointed out,-just as it was in connection with the argument seeking to prove that the things in question are existent.-- (1403)
It has been argued that "there being nothing where the Probandum ve known to be absent, there can be no Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity". -The answer to that is as follows:
TEXTS (1404-1405),
HERE ALSO, THERE IS A CLEAR CORROBORATIVE INSTANCE per dissimilarity;
THAT SAME FORM OF THE THINGS BECOMES the thing where the Probandum is lenown to be absent.-IN THE PROVING OF THE CHARACTER OF BEING SOMEHOW EXISTENT' TX REGARD TO NON-ENTITIES, THERE WOULD BE PROVING OF WHAT IS ALREADY ADMITTED '; ALSO INADMISSIBILITY, AND THE CONCOMITANOR OF THE CONTRARY CHARLOTER IN
THAT WAY.-(1404-1405)
COMMENTARY
That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended, if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would
