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INFERENCE
709
statement of the Reason is to come after that, then it cannot come in at all and as a consequence of this, there should be no statement of the Re-affirma. tion, as this has to be preceded by the statement of the Reason.-If the Reafirmation is made for the purpose of showing that the Probans resides in the Subject, then some other purpose will have to be asserted as following from the Statement of the Reason.
It might be urged that-" The purpose served by it is the intimating of the fact of its being the Reason."
That however cannot be accepted; because what would be the use of this intimation of that fact, when the proving of the Probandum is actually accomplished in another way-as explained previously ? Consequently, barring the intimation of the fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject, no other purpose can be pointed out, for the Statement of the Reason. Thus then this fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been already indicated by the Statement of the Reason,-if the Reaffirmation is again made for that same purpose, it is clearly proved that it is a needless repetition : how too could the Probans be inadmissible' without such Reaffirmation ?
As for the Representment, that also is useless; because the mere fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been previously asserted by the Statement of the Reason-and the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum also having been already asserted-what is wanted would be already accomplished; so that the affirmation of the same thing over again would clearly bear the imprint of a needless repetition. Where then would there be inadmissibility of our Reason in this case also l(1438 1439)
Nigamana', 'Final Conclusion' (the fifth member of the five-membered syllogisin) has been defined as "the Re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement of the Probang' (Nyāyasūtra 1. 1. 39). What is meant is that when it is re-asserted that "Therefore Sound is non-eternal', -the word 'therefore implies the potency of the Probans as shown in the Corroborative Instance, and then on the basis thereof, there is reassertion of what had been stated in the Proposition :-this reassertion is called the 'Final Conclusion', Nigamana',—the exact connotation of the term 'nigamana' being that whereby the Proposition, the Premiss (statement of the Probans), the Corroborative Instance and the Re-affirmation are connected, string together, as serving the same purpose (Nyāya-bhāsya).
As a matter of fact however, when (as shown before) the statement of the Proposition itself is not there, how can there be any statement of the Final Conclusion, which is only a reiteration of the Proposition ? Hence the Final Conclusion cannot form part of the Reasoning to prove the conclusion.-On this subject, the Revered Dinināga has made the declaration that Inasmuch as the Final Conclusion is a mere repetition, it cannot be the means of proving anything'.-Against this, Uddyotakara and others, under the above Sütra, have argued thus :-" There is no repetition here, because the Proposition states the Probandum as to be proved, while the Final Conchu. sion states it as proved ; and without the Final Conclusion there can be no proving; because until that is stated, the suspicion regarding the truth of
