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670
TATTVASANGRAHA : CHAPTER XVII.
of the Object, it appears to be characterising the object and hence active. Herein lies the action of the Cognition in presenting the object--not in mere invariable concomitance. For instance, the sprout does not cense to be invariably concomitant with the seed. This the Cognition itself cannot be the Means of Cognition. It is for this reason that the nature of the Means of Cognition is stated through the distinction that it is the Cognition with a form, not the formless Cognition-which is the Means of Cognition. This distinction too should be understood to be made through the Conception that follows in the wake of the Cognition.-(1346)
The following Text shows that the Buddhist view is not nullified by common experience :
TEXT (1347).
THUS THEN, THE COMMONLY KNOWN) DISTINCTION (BETWEEN THE COGNITION AS Meana AND COGNITION AS Fruit) IS PURELY IMAGINARY,-AS IN THE CASE OF THE Bow. THE DISTINCTION CANNOT BE HELD TO BE BASED UPON THE RELATION OF THE Producer
and Produced.—(1347)
COMMENTARY.
In connection with the Bow, there are such notions as-(a) The Bow pierces', (b) 'He pierces with the Bow', (c) 'the arrow proceeding from the Bow, pierces, where the same Bow is spoken of as (a) 'Agent, (6) Instrument, and (c) 'Ablative and this distinction is only imaginary (not real) ;' and yet it is not incongruous; so it is in the case in question also.-(1347)
TEXT (1348)
WHEN THE COMPACT FIBRE OF THE WOOD IS RENT ASUNDER BY THE CUT OF THE AXE, THE AXE IS (POPULARLY) CALLED THE CUT' ONLY WHEN IT ENTERS INTO THE FIBRE ; AND IT IS IN THIS WAY THAT THERE IS sameness (BETWEEN
THE AXE AND THE CUT).-(1348)
COMMENTARY.
When the cutting of the Trees with the Axe comes to be examined, it is found that the cut consists in the entering of the Axe into the wood. fibre; and this entrance is a property belonging to the Axe itself; so that in this sense there is sameness between the Axe and the Out; and there is no incongruity in this.-(1348)
The same idea is further elucidated :
